Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Konigsberg v. United States

Supreme Court brief1964

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Vein Quiars =

Office Supramg Caurt, U.S

FILED

OCT 5 1964

oe No. 9.5.8, se

JOHN 'F. DAVIS, CLERK

IN THE

* Supreme Coart Of The United States

October Term, 1964 .

. AAXICO AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner -

~-

"MS.

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL.

ET AL,

ng a -

VV

%

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE’

' UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

y ~ FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT na?

> Joun D. WHEELER

: A. W. WorrTHY

2100 National Bank of Commerce.

Building -

* San Antonio, Texas 78205

Of Counsel: . :

BoyLe, WHEELER, GRESHAM. DAVIS

& GREGORY

REA LET TL OT TT A MRR IO AS ERNE ISIE EEN ot ARSE RRNA

CLEMENS PRINTING CO SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS” é

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Index .. Nit Senate 6 oo Se, OE RI |

Table i ‘Authorities. eva sires oc re |

‘Opinion Below —_....:..2..-2+--- ---+----~- soe ae ee

TU oe i he ton a: ed

- Questions ieee coe |

Statement:

The ne ITH ss ie ioast sr ee __8

_ The Facts - 2 es ae

‘Action of oy Laiitie ‘Below. 1 SOs eee!

~ Reasons for Granting Writ: :

The Representation Issue -_.... erase

Whether Failure of ALPA and C-46 Pilots

-to Request Conferences on Disputes as

‘to Termination is’a Bar to this na...

Conclusion a SARE oe

_ Appendix A caaeeenateigpainae ee We ahaa:

AppendixB wen LARA

‘TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Pages

Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks,

ete. v. United A‘> Lines, Inc.,.Case No. or

Supreme Courttocket.- 9. - 10, 11

- General Committee V. Missouri, Kansas, Texas

Railroad oo ala 320 U.S. 323, 88 en

L.Ed 76 (1943) - etna -earlentene- MG, 19, 2B, 21

‘INDEX 8

_« NLRB. v. Auto Ventshade, Inc.,

ri

John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, | . US.

-11LLEd2d 9990 nee Sy

Slocum v. Delaware L. & W. R. laced

339 U.S. 239, 94 L.Ed. 795 (1950)

Switehmen’s Union v.. National Mediaticz . Board,

320 U.S. 297, 88:b.Ed. 61 (1943) |

Virginia Railway Company v. System Federation

Pe

No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937). _.17, 18

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope,

119 F.2d 39 (4th Cir., 1941)--

Breeland v. Southern Pacific Co.” Se og na

231 F.2d 576 (9th Cir., 1955)

Butte, Anaconda & P. Ry..Co. v. Seta

of L. F. & E., 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir., 1959, cert.

‘ den. 6L.Ed.2d 388). —

Division 14 v. Leighty, 298 F.2d. 17 (4th Cir..

1962 cert. den. 369 U. S. 885, 8 L.Ed.2d 287) 38, Zi.

International ‘Ass’n of Machinists v. Northwest

Airlines, 304 F. 2d 206; 212 (8th Cir., 1962) _

“N.LR.B. v. Armato,

* 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir., 1952)

276 F.2d 303 (gh. Cir., aad

N.L.R-B. v. Grace Co., :

184 F.2d 126 (8th Cir., eile

N.L.R.B. v. Lunder Shoe Corp.,

211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir., 1954)

‘N.L.R.B. v. McFarland,

306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir., 19627

=.-.2]

\ ‘

25

14

it

f)>-.@

Y

| itt ane

Order of me Comdiateeh & Br euneens Vv. i

Switchmen’s Union 269 F.2d-726 (5th or -

1959, cert. den. 361 U.S. 899, 4 L.Ed. 2d 155) aa

Peoples v: ‘Southern Pacific Co.,

232 F.2d-707 (9th Cir, —. Ye

Ruby v. American Airlines, 323 F.2d 248 Poe A

(2nd Cir., 1963, cert. den. J US. : kt 4

11 L.Ed.2d-611) iw oer Sascha

‘ Rutland Ry. Corp. v. Brothe hood, 307. F. ods 21 ae tae y

(2nd Cir., 1962, cert. den. § L.Ed.2d 978). 25

' Sigfried v. Pan American World Airways,

' 280 F.2d 18 (5th Cir., 1956,.cert.den, . .

- 351 U. S: 925,. 100 L.Ed. 1455) as ae

Fs

i iz iene: |

ee Page -No. _

* Railway Labor Act: °. a “es

‘ 44 Stat. L. 577, 48 Stat.. 1185, 49 Stat.

1189, 28 USC 1254 (1), 45. — Sec.. 151, .

a Sweater ws an

Jp 28 USC, Sec. 1831, 1332 and 1337. ae

“ 28-USC, Sec. 2201, et seq. Me Mate |

29° USC, Sec. 185g 3

45 USC, Sec.2Ninth 16, 20, 21, 28

.,45 USC, Sec. 5 First... 2 uewacceagee ¢

45 USC, Sec. 6. > 3, 23, 24, 25

45 USC, Sec. 152 Sixth. oe 27

45 USC, Sec. 183 . ed Z em

5 000 Gee. M1 20

45 USC, Sec. 2038 > eae, 20, 21, 28, 24

45 USC, Sec. 204 | ay ‘21

45 USC, Sec. 301 (a) - nen I.

as)

“

IN THE . bg

‘Supreme Court Of The United States

October Term, 1964

e = Nos. . ‘e oe F

oe INC., Petitioner

ww

‘ws. ¢

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL,

; ET AL, ,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

- .FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. ~.

>

’ AAXICO AIRLINES, INC., prays that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Court

cause on a 15, 1964.

OPIN ION BELOW

The opinion of ihe Court of Appeals (Appendix

A, infra) is reported at 331 F.2d 433. The trial court

rendered no Opinion.

; - of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ‘entered in the above =

aisGooe

JURISDICT 1ON

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was en-

tered Apri! 15, 1964, (R p. 829). Motions for rehear- ae

ing were overruled: July 10; 1964. Jurisdiction - .

COurt is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1).

ae PRESENTED.

1. - . Does the United. ‘States District

Re: 3 _ Court have jurisdiction of an.action. ©

‘ by pilot employees and their labor representatives, un-

der the air carrier provision of the Railway Labor Act,

~ to require the employer to submit questions cf applica-

tion and construction.cf a collective bargaining agree- .

ment to a system board of*adjustment under circum-

stances which raise substantial questions as to the

continued representative status of the union and as

_.to-the continuing obligation of the employer under —

the collective agreement? The circumstances raising

these questions are: the employer, which had as its -

sole business the performance of scheduled flights of

' twin engine C-46 aircraft. under contract with ‘the

United States Air Force, lost its Air Force contract,

furloughed its pilots and leased its aircraft to the ©

‘ suevessful bidder; the C-46 pilots, with consent of the —,

union, contracted with the successful bidder for as- _

sumption of the collective agreement and.were em- |

ployed by the successful bidder under that agreement

in performance of the Air Force contact. |

/

2. ' Do the facts that the employer gave —

‘ formal notice of termination of the

agreement, that the union-failed to request conferences. -

_ as is requir ed by the Section 6 of the Railway Labor

Act, and that time for intervention of the National

Meditation Board has expired bar complainants from

equitable relief requiring the employer tp submit ques-

tions of contract construction to: a system. board of °

adjustnient?: ar ert

STATUTE. . é

The statute involved . and referred tc herein is '

the Railway Labor Act (44 Stat. L. 577, 48 Stat, 1185,

"49 Stat. 1189, 45 U: S:C. See.-151, et seq.) the pertinent

-portions of which are set out herein as Appendix »

ai + STATEMENT. :

The Pleadings _ AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIA-

_ TION, INTERNATIONAL, a labor

~" anion, and certain of its pilot’ members brought this:

- ‘suit against AAXICO AIRLINES, INC.. seeking judi-

cial enforcement of.a collective bargaining agreement _

entered into pursuant to the Railway Labor Act so as

to require AAXICO to ‘recall the pilots, train them to

- fly large four engine aircraft and to pay them wages Sts

claimed lost. The complaint also sought a declaration

of -the rights of-the parties under the contract and the.

Railw ay Labor Act. (R.'6-35) Jurisdiction was claimed

. in the trial court under 28 U.S.C., See. 1331, 1332 and

1337; 28 U.S.C., See. 2201-et seq; and 29 U.S.C., See. :

185... ( References are to the cape récord )

..

“AAXICO moved for dismissal of the action” on

thé ground that the’ Railway Labor Act vests ‘jurisdic-

" tion of the dispute exclusively in administrative bodies

created pursuant to the’ Act. (R. 41-2, 56-7, 116-18).

In addition, AAXICO asserted defenses to the suit on

the merits. (R, 850-879, 579-586).

The ‘acts: Prior to June 30, 1960, and for ap-

| ‘proximately eight (8) yea rs,

AAXICO was continuously engaged in the perform-

- ance of contracts with the United States for air trans-

portation on regular scheduled flights in direct sup-

port - of the defense establishment in a program re-

férred to as the LOGAIR Program. Flights operated in

LOGAIR were of a short haul nature, and C-46 twin

‘engine aircraft were used, (R.:A89) (R: 601-2) Al-

though it had submitted a bid, AAXICO did not-secure

the contract with the United States in the LOGAIR -

Program for the period beginning July 1, 1960. (R.

589-90) On June 17, 1960, AAXICO by letter advised

‘its employees as follows: 4 :

“T sincerely regret to adviss you that the Company

has been unsuccessful in securing the award of |

Logair routes to be flown during: fiscal year i961,

beginning July 1, 1960. .

“This. letter, therefore is official notification to

you that, effective midnight, June 30, 1969, you

will be furloughed. The furloughs of those pilots .

- who may be required to complete a flight after

midnight June 30 will take effect as of the com-

| As

“

@ .

pee ae

pletion of such flight. You are required to. file -

your address with us and to notify us proniptly of .

_ any change of address.” (R. 28).

- AAXICO ceased all operations, sold portions of

its property necessary for flying operations, and ‘fur-’

loughed or discharged all personnel having flight

operations duties. Only’ the corporation’s president, .

general manager and treasurer remained to manage

the assets of the corporation. (R. 590)

Capitol Airways, Inc., was the successful bidder on

those portions of the LOGAIR Program theretofore

operated by AAXICO. (R. 590) Capito! Airways, Inc.,

. leased appreximately twenty-four (24) C-46 aircraft

. from AAXICO for the purpose of continuing these air-

'- eraft in the LOGAIR operation. (R. 590-1)

“On June 30, 1960, Capitol Airways, Inc., agreed

to assume the AAXICO collective bargaining agree-

ment and employ the AAXICO pilots under its terms.

(R. 637) This agreement was negotiated by Lucien

McLeod, then chairman of the Master Executive Com- _

mittee for the AAXICO pilots and the highest union.

officifl in the AAXICO local. (R. 618-9) The agree-

‘ment was expressly joined by individual pilots who

are’ parties to the suit. TR. 658) The agreement was

participated in by high officers of the union to such

an extent that United States District Court, Middle

District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, held’ the

‘union estopped to assert provisions of its bylaws re-

| | “ge

fusing authority to McLeod tg contract for the union.

(R. 655 et. seq.) Capitol did employ as many of the

pilots as desired this employment. (R. 597, 690-704)

On October 17, 1960, AAXICO wrote to the union.

. as follows:

“Aaxico Airlines has suspended service in ali

forias of air transportation. We operated our last

‘flights in early July of 1960 and have not had any

pilots in our employ since that date.

“On December 7, 1959, an Agreement and various

Letters of Agreement and a Supplemental Agree-

ment were signed between Aaxico Airlines, Inc.

and The Air Line Pilots in the service of Aaxico

_ Airlines, Inc. as represented by The Air Line

Pilots. Association International.

“This letter is to‘advise. that the subject matter of

the agreements listed in the Paragraph above no

longer exists and therefore Aaxico Airlines con-

siders these agréements terminated and of. no

further - force and effect.” (R. 31)

The union replied on November 8, .1960, in “part

as follows: ,

“We are not ina position to agree entirely with

your statement. So long as AAXICO remains in-

operative, this document lies dormant. In the event

that operations of the Company are resumed, how- ~

ever, within the period in which AAXICO pilot

employees have job tenure under this Agreement,

this Association would require their ar einen

by the eect a p2)

-_ =

- The union took no other action with respect to

this notice of.termination. Neither the union nor the

pilots made any effort to negotiate further with.

- AAXICO concerning any matter. The union gave no

‘notice of a desire for a meeting under the_provisions

of 45 U.S.C., Sec. 152 Sixth. No attempt was made

> to invoke the services 6f the National Mediation

Board under 45 U.S.C., Sec. 183. No grievance was

filed with the employer under the grievance procedure |

provided in the contract. Nv appeal was taken to the -

System Board of ec areemene (R. 14, Complaint par.

19, 20, 21). ,

In May, 1961, the Air Force revised the LOGAIR |

Program to provide long distance trunk line flights

across the United States using large four engine DC- a

6A aircraft. (R.595) ‘AAXICO bid on contracts under |

the LOGAIR Program and on June 2, 1961, was con-

ditionally awarded the DC-6A contract. (R. 598).

AAXICO was also successful bidder on the “Missile”

contract, requiring ‘the operation of one DC-6A and

one four engine DC-4. (R. 258)

These contracts did not require revival of the old

C-46 operation. They put AAXICO in a new business.

- (R. 602)

The qualifications of the personnel required for

this new operation were substantially different from

those of the personnel who performed the C-46 opera-

ales

tions. None of the pilots previously employed to oper-

ate C-46 aircraft, assuming they were contractually

free to do so, were qualified for four efigine aircraft.

(R. 599-60)

AAXICO undertook the prentn a of the missile

sand DC-6A contracts more than eight’(8) months after

“the exchange of letters of October and November. .

-During-that period, until the filing of suit in Florida

on June 28, 1961, there was no communication of any

kind between the parties. AAXICO expended sub-

_ stantial sums and: committed itself contractually to -

pilot supply companies, referred to in the record as

IASCO and ASCO; for the supplying of qualified four

engine aircraft, and also committed itself to the Air |

Force for an expensive air tr ansportation effort in a —

new field. (R. 604)

-On June -28,-1961, the union brought suit in the

Florida State courts against AAXICO. (R. 44-46) In

that action, as in this one, the union sought construc-

tion of the contract, declaration of rights and enforce-

ment of the contract. (R. 46) This suit was subse- |

quently dismissed, but not until this action was brought _

and AAXICO moved to stay this’ action pending a

decision of the Florida State court. (R. 41-2, 52)

is : $

On July 20, 1961, twenty (20) days after AAXICO

began DC-6A operations, S. E. Terry, by letter ad- .

dressed to Howard J. Korth, for the first time asserted

> _9-

what purported to be a grievance under the terms of _

the collective bargaining agreement. The letter states:

“Pursuant to the Agreement between Aaxico Air- .

lines, Incorporated and the air line pilots in its

service, as represented bythe Air Line Pilots

Association, International, the pilots of Aaxico

Airlines, Inc., hereby file. this as a Group Griev-

ance and request an investigation and hearing

thereon. The grievance is based upon the Com-

pany’s violation of the Agreement specifically in-

cluding Sections 13 and 24 thereof, by refusing to

recall furloughed pilots.” (R.33) |

Section 13 of the contract provides for senior rity.

Section 24 provides for the demotions and reductions

of personnel. (R. 27)

Howard J. Korth replied to the bie 20th letter on

July 27, 1961, as follows: ;

“As Airline Pilots Association Trternational was

advised on October 17, 1960, Aaxico Airlines con- -

siders that the agreement previously existing be-

tween’ Aaxico Airlines and the airline pilots in

the service of Aaxico has been terminated. This

company, therefore, could not possibly be in viola-

tion of such terminated agreement and your re-

_ quest for a hearing based upon an alleged gr oup

‘grievance is entirely out of line, and of course,

cannot be considered by this company.” (R. 34)

On August 4, 1961, S. E. Terry replied as follows:

“T am in receipt of your letter of July 27, 1961,

denying my request for a hearing relative to a.

group. grievance dated July 20, 1961. Since this

a”

*

isin

| decision | is unsatisfactory to the affected pilots,

I hereby request an appeal hearing.

“Tt is requested that the Cine send a

- copy of al] hearing notices and decisions rendered

in this case to the undersigned and to the Legal De-_

partment, Air Line Pilots Association, Interna-

tional, 55th Street and Cicero Avenue, Chicago 38,

‘Mlinois.’ - "CR. 35) :

AAXICO. made no reply to this letter. :

Action of the On Motion for Summary Judgment,

Courts Below: the trial court found that it had juris-

diction, declared the collective agreement to be in oft

ect, found that AAXICO’S actions in: failing to recall

_ and train the C-46 pilots had breahed the agreement,

_ and ordered AAXICO to honor the agreement. (R. 646

et seq., 678 et seq.) The Court of Appeals reversed and °

remanded with an opinion which permits the trial court ’-

to order AAXICO to submit the questions of effective-

ness, application and construction of the collective

agreement to a system board of adjustment. (Ap-

pendix A) ca

~ REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

L

The Represen- This case involves questions similar to

tation Issue: those presented in Brotherhood of

- Railway and -Steamship Clerks, ete., v. United Air

Lines, Inc., which is set down for argument No. 31 for

the October Term, 1964. The questions presented are

a

not identical t6, those in Case No. 801, but are comple-

mentary. Forjthis reason, it is the opinion of Petitioner

that consideration of the two cases togéther will assist

the Court.

In United Airlines. the representation question

* arises’because of a merger which the C.A:B. approved

after refusing the request‘of the union thatthe merged

corporation be required to recognize existing « ollective

hargaining agreements. In the instant case the repre-

sentation question arises because the bargaining unit

went as a whole with the work to another employer

who assumed the collective bargaining agreement.

It is evident that in both cases two questions may

be found: (1) whether the representative status of the

union to the employer continued after the change giv-

ing rise to the dispute, and (2) whether the employees’

contract rights (or some of them) survived the change.

It is useful for purposes of analysis to recognize the

differences between United Airlines and, the instant

case as the differences bear on these questions. .

In United Airlines the question raised by the union

is whether its representative status survived the merger

and attaches to the successor corporation so as’ to

permit the union, on behalf ‘of its-members, to assert .

a-pre-merger collective agreement. The union denies

any claim to representation of the members in future

contract negotiations. It seeks therefore to split “rep-

resentation” rights along the lines of “miajor’’ and

—12—

“minor” disputes and to continue the union’s repre-

sentation for purposes of “minor” disputes although _

its rights for “major” disputes did not survive the

- merger.

In. tié. instant case the question is ®vlether the

union’s representative status to the old employer sur-

vived the shifting of the bargaining ‘unit to a new em-

ployer with whom the union dealt as representative.

The union claims the right to enforce the contract

against the old employer and also the right to nego-

tiate with*the old employer respecting future rélation-

ships with old and new employees.

In both cases the initial question is whether the

_ Railway Labor Act places jurisdiction to b coceae these

questions in the Courta.

ALPA and its aia seek’ to “simultaneously

assert representation and contract rights on behalf of —

_. the same group of employees against two employers.

- It is ALPA’s theory that its furloughed pilot members

continued to have recall rights against. AAXICO de-

spite their assertion of, and exercise of, contract. and

representation rights against Capitol Airways,

AAXICO’s cuccessor in operation of C-46 LOGAIR

schedules. ALPA was, if this contention be sound, si-

multaneously the representative of the-C-46 pilots to

AAXICO and to Capitol. ALPA claims that it is, at all.

_ events, still the. labor representative of any pilot em-

es ee may have. |

a ae

To : a : limited, but. ‘vital, extent the Cont of Ap- |

peals’ decision approves these. claims. The Court of:

= Appeals remanded this case with an opinion which

will permit the trial court, if it finds that AAXICO

frustrated ALPA’s efforts to process its claims under,

.. the grievance procedure, to require AAXICO- to now

permit and join in such processing. Thus, the Court of —

Appeals holds that ALPA .and the Pilots have repre-

sentation and contract rights against AAXICO which

survived. the shift of the entire bargaining: unit to a

new employer and continuation with the new em-

ployer of the same employment under. the same col-

lective agreement. 3

Petitioner believes the decision of the Court of

_ Appeals on this portion of the cause .is inconsistent

with the developing federal law relating to collective

_ agreements and employer-employee relationships.

It is now evident, based on this Court’s holding

in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, __- ‘USS.

PRGA ae , 11. L.Ed. 2d 899, that the national labor

-policy merits and requires that i In some circumstances

contract rights survive a change in -employers. The

several Courts of Appeals have long held that union

representation rights survive such a change. It is also

evident that the continuance of such rights is not de-.

pendent on common law contract concepts but is based

instead on the belief that stability of relationship of

employees to the work performed will pr ene indus-

trial peace.

—14—

’ The: concept of a “eommon ‘law of a particular

- industry or of a particular plant” discussed in yvohn

Wiley & Sons obviously depends on the continued.

existence of. the plant or industry. The Court suggests

that contfact rights would be held not to survive against

‘a successor where there was “lack of any ‘substantial

continuity ofidentity of the business enterprises ..:.”

Similarly, the Courts of Appeals have held’ that rep-

resentation status under the National Labor Relations.

Act survives without. regard to the form of transfer

‘from old to new employer unless the transfer “ . has

changed the employing industry so as to ve the

certified bargaining unit inappropriate... .” ’ NR.B.

v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962). N. L.R.B.

v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952); N.L.R.B. v..

Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1954);

N.L.R.B. v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th

Cir. 1960) ; N. L.R.B. v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126 (8th

* Cir. 1950).

In the instant ‘case the record establishes the: om

tinued existence of the ‘business of performance of

the C-46 schedules under the LOGAIR contract. Cap-

_ jtol took over the schedules intact from AAXICO and

operated them with former AAXICO pilots and air-

eraft. The “common law of the plant” as well. as the

_ express contract continued with the substitution of a

new employer.

- On the othér hand, ‘the business of AAXICO

—is— |

anal radically. Although it retained its pe and

top management, no other facet of the business re-

mained.: All property used in flying operations was ;

either sold, leased or otherwise disposed of. AAXICO’s .

new operations required new facilities and aircraft .

_ and also required differently qualified flight person-

nel.

o

John Wiley. & Sons and the representation cases

cited above are concerned only with the obligations of

the new employer. They do not deal with the continued:

| obligations of the old employer, if any exist. Never-

theless, reason and logic require that the imposition of

duties on the new employer, on the ground that he

has inherited the common law of the shop, should

| require the release from those same obligations of the

old employer who no longer has the shop. This corol-

lary should certainly apply i in the instant case where °

the old employer’s business lacks substantial continuity

of identity with the business in which’ the employer

was ssngacia engaged.

John Wiley & ‘Sons, supra, arose. : under Sec. 301

(a) of the National Labor Relations Act. expressly

vesting in the federal courts jurisdiction of actions to

- enforce Jabor contracts. Each of the representation

cases cited arose as actions to enforce N.L.R:B. awards

and were reviewed under statutory provisions: placing

jurisdiction in the Courts‘of Appeals. No comparable

provisions occur in the Railway Labor Act, and ‘comp-

=~

arable cases have not reached the federal courts under »

the Railway Labor Act. Petitioner urges these cases

solely in support of its contention that a substautial

representation question exists in this cause.

Because the representation since exists we sub-

mit that it should be resolved before questions of the

construction of the collective agreement are submitted

to a system board of adjustment. If, as Petitioner be-

lieves is the case, the shift of the AAXICO bargaining

unit to Capitol, and Capitol’s assumption of the collec- -

' tive agreement, relieved AAXICO of further obliga-

tions either to ALPA as representative or to the C-46

pilots under the agreement, then the questions of con-

tract construction are moot. Orderly administration of

the Railway Labor Act would, therefore, require that

the represéntation issue be resolved before fruitless:

‘litigation is conducted looking toward resolution of

disputes as to those matters of contract application and

cénstruction which the Court of Appeals correctly held

are within the. exclusive jurisdiction of the system

board of adjustment. |

Who shall decide this question, the Seied or the ©

Court? The decisions of this Court plainly support .

Petitioner’s contention that the Board and not ™

Court has jurisdiction.

“Section 2 Ninth of the Railway Labor Act pro-

vides: : ;

—,

“If any digpute-s..all arise(aniong a carrier’s em-

ployees as to who are the representatives. of such

employees designated and authorized in accord-

ance with the requirements of. this-Act, it shall be

the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request of

. -either party to-the dispute, to investigate such

_ dispute and to certify to both. parties, in writing,

within thirty days after the receipt of the invoca- |

tion of its services, the name-or names of the in- |

dividuals or organizations that have been desig-

nated and authorized to represeht the employees

Z involved’ in the dispute, and certify the same to

the carrier. Upon receipt of such certification the

carrier shall treat with the representative so certi-

fied as the representative of the craft or class.for

the purposes of this Act. “i .

_ This Court in Virginia Ry. i v. System Federa-

. tion No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937) held

that portion of the statute which requires that “the

carrier shall treat with the representative so certified” —

is mandatory and. enforceable by injunction by the

_ federal courts. It is on this language of the Act and,

‘the holding in Virginia. Ry. Co..that ALPA and its.

members seek to found their case. Respondents claim -° zt

that because ALPA was certified by the Board as.

bargaining agent to AAXICO, and because AAXICOQ.

has not.sought out arid bargained with -ALPA. re-

- specting employment of pilots to operate- the DC-6A

aircraft, that AAXICO has refused to bargain within’

the meaning of Virginia Railway. Co., and therefore .

may be and should be — to se bar gain.

—

This door to the courts opened by Virginia Rail-

way Cg. was at, least partly shut again by General

Committee B.L.E. v. M.K.T., 820°U.S. 328, 88

L.Ed. 76, in which this Court held that the courts

lack jurisdiction. to resolve jurisdictional. conflicts

between two unions, each seeking for their members

the right to perform particular services. With respect

’ to Virginia Ry. Co. v: System Federation No. 40, supra,

the Court stated at p. 339:

. In that ‘connection reference is made to the

statement of this Court .., . that the Act imposes

upon the carrier ‘the affirmative duty to treat only

With the true representative, and hence the nega-

tive duty to treat with no other.’ That expresses

the basic philosophy of Section 2 Ninth. But the

decision does not imply, as is argued here, that

every representation problem arising under the

Act presents a justiciable controversy. It does not

suggest that the two respective domains for two -

or more overlapping crafts should be litigated in.

the federal courts.” (emphasis added)

In General Comniedties. supra, and its companion

cases two unions competed for the same work. There

was no representation dispute in the sense of their

being competing unions seeking to represent the same

emplovees. Rather the question was which group of.

employees, each . having a certified representative,

would be entitled to perform disputed work. The’ case

at bar ‘presents similar issues. ALPA and the o-&

pilots seek “to displace from employment another

v

‘19

group of pilots in operation of the DC-6A aireraft

now operated by AAXICO.: Ss

The. DC-6A pilots do not have a , representative

certified by the National Mediation-~Board. They are

not parties to this suit and have: not sought certifica-

tion of any representative. Arguments that such facts .

make General Committee distinguishable have been

rejected in other cases. Division No. 14 v. Leighty, 298 -

F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1962, cert. den. 369 U.S. 885); Ruby

¥. American Airlines, 323 F.2d 248 (2nd Cir. 1963,

cert.den.- US. , 11 L.Ed.2d 611). The ex- .

istence of two groups of employees, each having a

claim to the Work, and not their representative status,

_ Should be the basis for finding the existence of the

dispute. :

While there was no dispute between employees

as to who-was the representative in Gener al Committee,

‘there is such a dispute in the case at bar. To the extent

that ALPA claims the right to represent the DC-6A

pliots now operating AAXICO's aircraft, there is 4

dispute within the express language of the Section 2

Ninth. The DC-6A ‘pilots were ‘employed by AAXICO

under contract with pilot supply companies, and their

wages, hours and working conditions are controlled by

this contract. The case at bar is similar in some respects:

to Ruby v. American Airlines, 323° F.2d’ 248 (2nd Cir.

1963, cert: den., 11 L.Ed.2d 611). Nevertheless, the

principal aim of Respondents i is not representation of

the DC- 6A pilots, but their replacement.

—_— =

In General Committee, the Court was able to

. conclude that the claim was not justiciable without its

having to construe Sec. 2 Ninth and other provisions

of the Act'to determine whether the National Mediation

- Board does have jurisdiction of-such suits under that

| provision of the Act. It is apparently the view of the

National Mediation Board that Sec. 2 Ninth does not —

provide for settlement of jurisdictional disputes under |

the procedures of that Section. General Committee,

supra, page 336, note 11. This question is of substantial

importance to the. administration of the Act, but its

answer is not dispositive of this case since it is clear

that under other provisions of the Act, the Mediation

Board ‘does have jurisdiction of the controversy for

some purposes. :

Sec. 2 Ninth gives the Board adjudicatory functions

in case of representative disputes within its coverage.

The Board’s decision in these cases is final and not

reviewable. Switechmen’s Union v. National Mediation

Board, 320 U.S. 297, 88 L.Ed. 61 (1943). Any dispute

relating to representation not covered by Sec. 2 Ninth

~ and not involving those matters within the jurisdiction

- of the system board of adjustment is also within the

board's jurisdiction, but as a mediator and not a judge.

Sections 201, 203; Sec. 5 First. Only those disputes

“growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation |

‘or application of agreements concerning rates of pay,

rules or working conditions” are within the jurisdiction

—21—

of the system board of adiustment. Sec. 204. It is well .

settled that the quoted language relates to the enforce-

ment of existing rights growing out of a collective

agreement and does not reach representation disputes. |

Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239,

94° L.Ed. 795 (1956); General Committee v. MKT

RR Co., 320 U.S. 3238, 88 L. Ed. 76 (1943) ; Division 14

v. Leighty 298 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1962, cert. den. 369

U.S. 885, L.Ed.2d 287); compare Order of Railway

Conductors and Brakemen v. Switchmen’s Union, 269 |

F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Butte; Anaconda & P. Ry.

Co. v. Brotherhood, 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1959, cert.

den, 6 L.Ed. 2d 388) ; Sigfried v. Pan American World

Airways, 230 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1956). The board,

therefore, has jurisdiction of this matter either in its

adjudicatory capacity under Sec: 2 Ninth or as a medi-.

ator under Sec. 203. In either case, the Board and not”

the courts has jurisdiction and the complaint should be

dismissed as non justiciable. General . Committee,

supra, at p. 332. |

Whether Failure of ALPA na C-46 Pilots to Request

Conferences on Disputes as to Termination is a Bar to

this Action:

: When AAXICO gave formal notice to ALPA that ”

the contract was terminated the union replied only

that it was “not in a position to agree entirely .. .”

and that “liln the event that operations of the Com-

pany are resumed . . .- within the period in which

AAXICO pilot niles have job tenure under this

Agreement, this Association would require their re-

employment by the Company.”.-No request for con-—

ferences or for mediation, or for any other action was

made and na such action was taken.

After AAXICO.was committed to the new DC-6A

program, which could not be flown by the former C-46

pilots, ALPA brought suit for judicial construction

and enforcement of the collective agreement.

Petitiorier submits that the equitable relief sought.

by respondents should be held barred because of their

failure to seek timely relief under the processes of the

Railway Labor Act.

The Court of Appeals discussed the issues ee

as follows: |

_ “This letter-from Aaxico and the reply by ALPA .

had élearly created th. first dispute between the

parties. If this dispute was referable to.a construc-

tion of the terms of the then existing contract, the

procedure required by the Railway Labor Act _

was that the aggrieved. party should have then

filed a grievance and processed it through the

System Board of Adjustment. If, on thé other hand,

this amounted to the thirty days’ written notice

contempiated by Section 6 of Title 1 of the Rail-

way Labor Act of ‘an intended change in agree-

ments affecting rates of pay, rules or. working

conditions,’ the parties were under obligation to

aa

. arrange for the conference provided for in Section

6 of Title 1 and proceed through: the Mediation

Board until the negotiations for the new contract,

or the change in the old contract, were > exhausted.

“Neither of these procedures was followed.. .. ”)

The Court did not, however, decide whether the ~

notice created a “major” or “minor” dispute. Instead

the Court looked tothe relief scught by the complaint

and, without regard to the representation defense

raised by Petitioner, concluded that the relief sought

required disposition of matters within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the System Board. Petitioner submits .

that the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that

the complaint does raise questions within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the system board, but that the issues

raised by both the complaint and answer show a rep-

resentation dispute exclusively within the jurisdiction _

of the National Mediation Board under either Sec. 2 °

Ninth or Sec. 203, and that respondents failed to timely

invoke the remedies pr ovided for such disputes.

For reasons discussed in connection with I. above,

‘Petitioner believes the representation dispute is not.

referable to a system board of adjustment. Petitioner

- did, in fact, give forme! notice of termination of the

agreement. Such notice would appear clearly to be

within the provisions of Section 6 and to portend “an

intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay,

rules or working conditions . “i

o-6

Section 6 provides:

“Carriers: and representatives of the. euuployees

shall give at least thirty days’ written notice of an _

. intended change in agreements affecting rates of

pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and

_ place for the beginning of conference between the

representatives of the parties interested in such |

intended-changes shall be agreed upon within ten

days after the receipt of said notice, and said time

shall be-within the thirty days provided in the

notice. In every case W here such notice of intended

change has been given, or conferences are being

held with reference thereto, or the services of the

Mediation Board have been requested by either

party, or said Board has proffered its services;

rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall

not be altered by the carrier until the controversy

has been finally acted upon as required by section

5 of this Act, by the Mediation Board, unless a

period of ten days has elapsed after termination

,of conferences without request for or proffer of

the services of the Mediation Board.”

. Quite obviously this Section was intended to re-

quire the parties to maintain the status quo pending

processing of Section 203 disputes as is required by

- the Act. The parties must first confer, and strive for

agreement. Failing.to reach agreement either party

may seek the participation of the Mediation Board.

“If all else fails, a presidential commission may be

created and seek to adjust the dispute. Until the

course of these events is run the employer is ‘forbidden

wae mares Se

25

7 to change wages, hours or working conditions, and

the union may not strike. ,

The Act does not, however, forbid changes or a

strike after notice unless a dispite is raised and con-

~~ —~—-ferences.. begun. In the absence of some showing of

interest by the union, Section 6 permits an employer

to give effect to'the proposed changes. In this instance

the change proposed was the severance of relationship

between the contracting parties. Because the undis-

puted evidence shows that the Respondents did not

comply with Section 6 of the Act, they should be den- |

ied equitable relief seeking at this late date to raise and .

adjust their dispute. See Rutland Ry. Corp. v. Brother-

hood, 307 F.2d 21 (2nd Cir. 1962, cert. den. 9 L.Ed.2d

978); ILA.M. v. Northwest Airlines, 304 F.2d 206 (8th

Cir. 1962); People v. Southern Pac. Co., 232 F.2d 707

(9th Cir. 1956); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v Pope, .

119 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1941; Breeland v. Southern Pac.,

231 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1955). |

\

CONCLUSION =—s

Petitioner respectfully submits that this applica-

tion should be granted.

JouHn D. WHEELER

5 ™

ae uth trea “=,

A. W. Wortuy

Attorneys for Petitioner

AAXICO saIRLINES, INC.

Of Counsel: —

’ BoYLe, WHEELER, GRESHAM, Davis — .

& GREGORY

2100 Natioral Bank of Commerce Building

. San Antonio, Texas 78205

__ APPENDIX A

en :

IN THE

United States Court Of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No, 20931

. AAXICO AIRLINES, INC.,

| a

versus _

AIR LINES PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,

seen:

Appeal from the United States District Court ‘for the

Western District of Texas.

(April 15, 1964.)

- Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and RIVES and WIS-

DOM, Circuit Judges. -

TUTTLE, Chief Judge: This appeal raises the

question whether the trial court had jurisdiction to

construe what it found to be a subsisting agreement and

to grant an injunction requiring the appellant to carry

out the terms of such see as construed by the.

‘trial court.

2a

The contest between the parties arose in the fol-

lowing manner:

Aaxico had for Aeveral years conducted’ an air’

transportation business with the use of C-46 aircraft on .

the basis of contracts with}the United States Govern-

ment. Beginning on June 16, 1956, Aaxico and ALPA

had been parties to a collective bargaining agreement

covering the employees flying its aircraft. The most

recent of the ccilective bargaining agreements between.

the parties became effective on January 1, 1960. It pro-

- vided that it was to continue in full force and effect

until June 30, 1961, “and thereafter until each succeed-

ing June 30, unless written notice of intended change

is served in accordance with Section 6, Title 1 of the

Railway Labor Act by either party thereto at least 60

’ days prior to June 30, 1961, or June 30 of any suc-

ceeding year.”' Prior to the expiration date of this

last agreement, and without any specific written notice

“of an intended change in agreements affecting rates

- of pay, rules or working conditions,” on the occasion of

_‘Aaxico’s losing its Logair (Government) contract as of -

June 30, 1960, and the leasing by it of approximately. -

25 C-46-aircraft to Capitol Airways, which company ac-

. quired the Logair contract from the Government,

Aaxico furloughed all of its approximately 221. pilot

emplcyees by giving them two w eeks’ notice as required

1 Section 6, Title,1 of the Railway Labor Act is a provision relating

to the change “in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules or .~

working conditions,” and _ rovides for the processing of bargaining ,

through the Mediation rd before proposed errr in =

existing agreements can be put into effect.

3a

under the agreement. The notice contained the state-

ment, “We cannot, at this time, see any possibility of

a resumption of our Logair flying, but if any change

should take place you will be promptly notified.”

Thereafter, although Aaxico had no other air

_ transportation business to’ carry on until it was able to

‘obtain further or new contracts, it did not dissolve but

maintained a skeleton organization principally engaged

in seeking new contracts including an effort to bid on

_the following year’ 8 Logair éontract. “ -

On Oktober 17, 1960, during the stated life of the |

contract, Agxico wrote to ALP AS as follows:

“Aaxico ‘Airlines: has -stispended service in all

forms of air transportation. We: operated our last

flights in early July of 1960 and have not had

any pilots in our employ since that date.

“On December 7, 1959 an Agreement and various .

Letters of Agreement and a Supplemental Agree-

ment were signed between Aaxicu Airlines, Inc.

_ and The Air Line Pilots in the service of Aaxico

Airlines, Inc. as represented by The Air Line Pilots

Association International.

“This letter is to advise that, the subject matter of

the agreements listed in the Paragraph above no

‘longer exists and therefore Aaxico Airlines con-

‘ . giders these agreements terrminated and of no

further legal force and effect.”

Appellee replied on November 8, in part, as fol-

lows: ~

4a

“We are not in a - position to’ agree entirely with

_ *your statement. So long as AAXICO remains

inoperative; this document lies dermant. In the

event that operations of the Company are resumed,

however, within. the period in which AAXICO

yeh employees have job tenure under this Agree-

ment, this Association would require their re-

employment by the Company.”

This letter from Aaxico and the reply by ALPA

had clearly. created the first dispute between the ~

parties. If this dispute was referable to a construction |

of the terms of the then existing contract, the procedur e.

required by the Railway Labor Act was that t ag--

grieved party should have then filed a grievande and

processed it through the System Board of Ad justment.

If, on the other hand, this amounted to the thirty days’.

written notice contemplated by Section 6 of Title 1 of

the Railway. Labor Act of “an intended change in

eements affecting. rates. of pay, rules or. working

conditions,” the parties were under obligation to ar- |

range for the conference provided for in Section 6 of

Title 1 and proceed through the Mediation Board until

the negotiations for the new contract, or t.e change i in.

the old contract, were exhausted. |

‘Neither of the procedures was followed. Instead,

after Aaxico obtained new Government contracts, ef- |

fective July 1, 1961, in the performance of which it. |

used DC-6A aircraft, a type of aircraft different from

. that which had theretofore heen used in the prior

5a

operation and as to which pilot qualifications are dif-

ferent and more stringent, the Airline proceeded to

obtain pilots through two pilots supply companies

which, for the purpose of this appeal, we can assume.

amounted to nothing more or less than‘a service agent

for the.employment of pilots by the Airline itself.

However, prior to the actual commencement of opera-

tion, on June 28, 1961, appellee, without having made

any further demand or request for arbitration oryne- —

diation under either provision of the Railway $4

Act, brought suit in the Florida State Courts against

the appellant seeking a construction »f the contract,

a declaration of the rights, and enforcement of the

contract.? | |

The next step chronologically was that on July

20, 1961, after appellant had begun DC-6A opera-

tions, appellee addressed a letter containing the fol-

lowing to the President of Aaxico:

“Pursuant to the Agreement between Aaxico Air-.

lines, Incorporated and the air line pilots in its

service, as represented. by the Air Line Pilots As-.

sociation, Internationa", the pilots of Aaxico Air- |

lines, Inc., hereby file this as a Group Grievance

and request an investigation and hearing thereon.

The grievance is based upon the Company’s viola-

tion of the Agreement, specifically including Sec-

2 This suit was subsequently dismissed, but not until after this

present action was brought in the federal court and appellant +

—— to stay this action pending a decision of the Flori State

ourt. ;

6a

tions 13 and 24 peeee by eee to recall fur-

loughed pilots.”

Section 13 of the contract provides for seniority..

Section 24 provides for the demotions and reduction

of personnel.

The President of the appellant replied on July

27th as follows:

“As Airline Pilots Association International was

advised on October 17, 1960, Aaxico Airlines con-

siders that the agreement previously existing be-

“tween Aaxico Sirlines and’ the aifline pilots in

the service of Aaxico has been terminated. This

company, therefore, could not possibly be in vio-

lation of such terminated agreement and your

request for a heuring based upon an alleged

group grievance is entirely out of line and, of

course,.cannot be considered by this company.”

To this letter appellee replied on August 4th:

“I am in receipt of your letter of July 27, 1961 |

denying my request for a hearing relative to a

group grievance dated July 20, 1961. Since this

decision is unsatisfactory to the affected pilots,

I hereby request an appeal hearing.

“It is reovested that the Company send a copy of

all hearing notices and decisions rendered in this case |

to the undersigned and to the Legal Department, Air

Line Pilots Association, International, 55th Street and

Cicero Av enue, Chicago 38, Illinois.” 7

No action thereafter having been taken by either

¢

Ta

party relating to the matter of grievance, ALPA filed

this suit on August 24, 1961.

The pleadings and proof adduced before the trial

court presented the following issues:

(1) Did the loss by Aaxico of its sole air car-

riage contract, followed by the leasing of its planes

to another airline and the furloughing of all of

its pilots, and the complete suspension of its

operations pending the obtaining of a new con-

tract, either constitute a termination of the col-

lective bargaining agreement then in effect or

did it warrant Aaxico in treating it as terminated

by its unilateral action?

_ (2) What tribunal is appropriate under the Na-

tional Railway Labor Act to decide issue No: 1?

(3) If the agreement between Aaxigo and ALPA

remained: in effect through the date of expira-

tion, June 30, 1961, notwithstanding the circum- .

stances mentioned in issue No. 1, were any of

the rights of ALPA and its members under such _

agreement violated upon the occasion of Aaxico's

reengaging in air carriage under the contracts it

obtained to be effective July 1, 1961?

(4) If such rights were violated, what tribunal

_ should make these determinations?

(5) Did the district court have jurisdiction over

this controversy and, if so, to what extent?

The trial court held that the first issue was to be

answered in the negative. It decided on the basis of

ba

the facts, which were undisputed so far as actually

bear on this issue, that the loss of the Logair contract

_ With the Government by Aaxico and its complete sus-

pension of operations pending the negotiation of a

future contract, which occurred approximately one

- year later, neither amounted to a termination nor did

it t justify Aaxico in terminating it unilaterally.

Thus, the trial court also answered the second i is-

sue. It decided that it was the prone tribunal to pass

on this legal question.

' The trial court also answered issue: No. 3 by.stat-

ing that it had jurisdiction to determine that under

the contract there were certain rights both of ALPA

and of its members that were’ violated when Aaxico

hired new pilots, and paid them different rates of pay

than provided for under the agreement and when it

_ hired the new pilots without reference to the seniority

and other provisions of the existing agreement.

he court, thus, also decided issue No. 4, partially,

.. to the effect that it was the proper tribunal to deter- -

mine what rights under the contract had been vio-

'- lated, but it also decided that there were certain other

contract disputes that should be referred, following

grievance procedures as outlined in the agreement,

to the System Board of Adjustment.

Finally, the court answered issue No. 5, both by

the action it took in resolving issues Nos. 1 and 3, but

9a

also by concluding that it had the power to require

Aaxico to assure the setting up of a System Board of

- Adjustment in order that grievance procedures could

be pursued as provided. for under the tinictniaed Labor.

Act.

We conclude that the jurisdiction of the court was

considerably moré limited than that which it exercised.

To the extent that the trial court could find on the

record before it that the appellant had failed to make

available the grievance machinery in order to permit

a reference to’ a System Board ‘of Adjustment, and

to the extent that the court could find that ALPA had

not either acquiesced in or abandoned any rights which

it may have had under the contract, if not terminated,

it would be within the competence, of the trial court

to have required Aaxico to assure the availability of

- grievance procedures and a System Board of Adjust-

‘ment. In point of fact, Aaxico did not appeal from that

part of the trial-court’s order which required it to

“join with plaintiff Air Line Pilots Association in

_ establishing a System Board of Adjustment to fune-

tion under said contract; and give effect to‘such Sys-

tem Board, as set out in the System Board Agreement

_ of said contract.”. .

This is another one of those cases which, when —

brought to court, poses the preliminary question

whether the relief sought is relief which can appro-

priately be granted by the court or which, under thé

10a

carefully considered scheme of. the Railway Labor

Act, must be resolved by the System Board of Adjust-

ment. The answer to this question is found in deter-

mining whether the dispute is what has generally been

recognized in cases arising between carriers and their

employees as a “minor” dispute or a “major” dispute.

This terminology, used by the Supreme Court ‘in Elgin, -

- Joliet & Eastern Rwy. Co. v. Buriey, 325 U.S. 711, was

discussed by us in a recently decided case, St. Louis, -

San Francisco & Texas Rwy. Co..v. Railroad Yard-

masters of America, AFL-CIO, dth Cir....F.2d....,

No. 20570, decided March 4, 1964. Pointing out, as

we did, in that opinion that the court has adhered to

the distinction between minor disputes and major .

disputes we there said, “It is plain here that the dis-

pute raised. by the complaint could be resolved only

by construing the existing. contract. It follows that

the trial court erred in entertaining jurisdiction of the

suit. The appellee should have been remanded to the

grievance procedure set .forth in the contract.”

We thus recognized what has: always been the

distinction between the two types of disputes. If “the

dispute relates either to the meaning or proper appli- -

cation of a particular provision [of an existing agree-

ment! with reference to a specific situation or to an

omitted case,” Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Rwy. Co. v. -

Burley, 325 U.S. 711, it is a minor disputé no matter

how seriously it may affect the parties to the contract.

With these. general principles in mind we look

dia .

first to the first issue stated above: Clearly, the com-

plaint by which this litigation was started was based --

on the theory that the agreement between Aaxico and |

ALPA was a continuing.one and was still in effect.

The complaint showed that the appellant had pro-

ceeded on the theory that the contract had been ter-

minated. How, then, was this question to be’ decided?

Obviously, it could be decided only by interpreting’

the agreement itself and thus it was a minor dispute,

one which under the completely uniform holdings of

the. courts must .be submitted to the grievance pro-

cedures with final decision to be made by the System

Board-of Adjustment. We conclude, therefore, that

‘it was beyond the competence of the tria] court to

resolve this dispute,

So, too, with respect to the other interpretations

made by the trial court of the obligations of the parties

under the terms of the agreement. tor instance,

whether, assuming the contract was still in effect,

Aaxico was required ‘to recall for the operation of the

new equipment requiring greater or different skilis, the

pilots whe had previously been furloughed, was neces-

sarily to be determined from the contract of employ-

ment. The failure of Aaxico to recall tne pilots and,

in their place, to decept pilots furnished by another

agency, if objected to by ALPA or any of the plain-

tiffs, was the proper ‘subject of grievance procedures

in the traditional sense: Thus, it was beyond the com-

petence of the trial court to resolve these issues as well,

12a

of. course, as the issue of whether the pay require-

ments under the ‘contract were to be carried out.

We think it clear that if the proof shows that

Aaxico made impossible the carrying out by the ‘ap-

pellees of. the grievance procedures to the System

Board of Adjustment, the trial court had jurisdiction

to order Aaxico to carry out its obligations under the -

contract to make arbitration and decision of these

‘matters effective. Virginia Rwy. Co. v. System Federa-

tion No. 40, 300 U.S. 515.

The undisputed facts present in this case prob- ©

ably warrant a comment that, regardless of how the

trial ccurt finally détermines the factual issues, a -

normal processing of the disputes immediately after

they arose would have proved the effieacy of the plan

contemplated in the Railway Labor Act, whereas the

failure to resolve these disputes promptly has re-

sulted‘in litigation that will inevitably lead to serious

unanticipated .loss to one party or the other. This is

true because if the question of the termination of the

contract had been resolved in the fall of 1960 at a

time when no pilots were employed or sought to be

employed by Aaxico, this whole dispute might well

have been resolved before the commencement of the

operations by the use of new equipment July 1, 1961.

We do not intimate a judgment on the issue’ whether

the circumstances existing after the exchange of cor-

respondence at that time amounted to either an ac- —

13a

quiescence by appellees or a waiver of a right to pur-

sue the dispute further, but we do hold that the extent

of the rights of the appellees thereafter was to present

their contention to the district court that they were un-

able to pursue their grievance procedures because of

stated failures on the part of the appellant to make

such processes available. Thereupon the trial court

could promptly have resolved this issue either. by

directing submission of the questions to the grievance _

procedures or by holding that the appellees no longer

had such rights.

The judgment is REVERSED and the case is

REMANDED for further peogeedtings not inconsistent |

with this, cial

ida eae ,

APPENDIX B oe

Statutory Provisions

The relevant provisions of the Railway Labor Act

(44 Stat. L. 577, 48 Stat. 1185, 49 Stat. 1189, 45. U. SC.

Sec. 151 et seq.) are as follows: |

TITLE I .

Sec. 2. General Purposes. The purposes of the

Act are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce

or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2)

to forbid any limitation upon freedom. of association

among employees or. any denial, as a condition of |

employment or otherwise, of the right of employees

to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the

complete independence of carriers and of.employees. —

in the matter of self-organization; (4) to provide for

the prompt and orderly settlement-of all disputes con-

cerning rates of pay, rules,- or working conditions;

(5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement

of all disputes growing out of. grievances or out of ”

the interpretation or application of agreements cover-

~ ing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.

General Duties. First. (Duty to settle disputes.) —

It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents,

and employees to exert every-reasonable effort to

make and maintain agreements concerning rates of

pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all

@

15a

- disputes, whether. arising out of the appli¢ation of"

- such agr eeménts or otherwise, in order to avoid any

interruption to. commerce or to the operation of any

carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier

‘and the employees thereof. .

Second. (Conferences between repcesentatives. )

All disputes .between a car rier or carriers: and its or

their employees shall be considered, and, if possible,

decided, with all expedition, in conference between

vi esentativ és designated and authorized so to’ con-

fer “respectiv ely, by the carrier or carriers and by the .

employees thereof interested | in the dispute. —

Third. ( Daslevation of fe idea Repr e-

_ sentatives, for the purposes of this Act, shall be desig-

nated by the respective parties w ithout interference,

influence, or coercion by either party over the designa-

tion of representatives by the other; and neither\ Party

shall in any way interfere with, influence, or coerce

the other in ‘its choice of represeniatives. Representa-

tives. of employees for the purposes of this Act. need

not be, persons in the employ of. the carrier, and \no

carrier shall, by interference, influence, or coercion

seek in any manne? to prevent the designation by its

- employees as their representatives of those who or

ay hich are not employees of the carrier.

Fourth. (Employees’ ri

- collectively; freedom frojn interference by carrier.)

_ Employees shall have the Night to organize aad bargain

t to organize and bar ain

l6a

‘collectively through representatives of their own chcos-

ing. The majority of any craft or class of employees

shall have the right to determine who shall be the

- representative of the craft or class, for the purpose of

this Act. No carrier, its officers or agents, shall deny

or in any way: question the right of its employees to

join, organize, or assist in organizing the labor or-

_ganization of their choice, and it shall be unlawful’

for any carrier to interfere in: any way with the or-

ganization of its employees,’or to use the funds of the -

carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to

any labor organization, labor representative, or other

agency of collective bargaining, or in performing any

work therefore, or to influence or coerce employees

in an effort to induce them t6-join or remain or not.

‘to join. or remain members of any labor organization |

or to deduct from the wages of employees any dues,

. fees, assessments, or other contributions payable to.

labor organizations, or te collect or to assist in the

collection of any such dues, fees, assessments, or other

contributions: Provided, That nothing in this Act

shall be construed to prohibit a carrier from permit-

ting an employee, individually, o: local representa-

tives of employees from conferring with management

during: working hours without loss-of time, ‘or to

prohibit a carrier frem furnishing frée transportation

to its employees while engaged in the business of a.

labor organization.

17a «..

- Sixth. (Conference of representatives; time;‘place;

agreements between parties.) in case of a dispute be-

~-tween a carrier. or carriers and its or their employees,

arising out of grievances or out of the interpretat’ on

_ or application of agreements concerning rates of pay,

rules or working conditions, it shall be the duty of the

designated representative or representatives of such

cartier or earriers and of such employees, within ten

days after the receipt of notice. of a desire on the part

of either party to confer in respect to Su! dispute, to

specify a time and place at w: Lich such conferen

shall beheld: Provided, (1) That the place so speci

fied: shall be situated upon the line of the carrier in-

volved or as otherwise mutually agreed upon; and (2)

that the time se specified shall allow the designated

-conferees reasonable. opportunity to reach such place

in effect between the parties.

‘of conference, but shall not exceed twenty days from

the receipt af such notice: And provided further, That

nothing i in this Act shall be construed to supersede the

provisions of any agreement. (as to conferences) then

-: ial (Change in vides of pay, etc., coumrery

to agreements forbidden.) Ne carrier, its officers, or

agents shall change -the rates of pay, rules, or work-

ing ‘conditions of its employees, as a class.as. embodied

in agreements except in the manner prescribed. in -

‘such agreements or in Section 6 of the Act.

7 Ninth. (Disputes as to who.are employees’ repre-

18a

sentatives; ‘investigation by Mediation Board; elec-

tions.) If. any dispute shall arise among a carrier's

employees as to who. are the representatives of such

employees designated and authorized in accordance

‘with the requirements of this Act, it shal! be the duty

of.the Mediation Board, upon request of either party

to the disputes, tu investigate such dispute and to certify

to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after the

receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or

names of the individuals or organizations that Rave .

. been designated and authorized to represent the em-

ployees involved in the dispute, and certify the same

to the carrier. Upon receipt of such certification the

" carrier shall treat with the representative so certified —

as the representative of :the ¢raft or class for the pur-

~. .pose of this: Act. In such an investigation, the Media-

tion Board shall be authorized -to take’a secret ballot

of the employees involved, or to utilize any other ap-

propriate method of ascertaining the names of their

duly designated and authorized representatives - in

such manner as shall insure the cheice of representa-

tives by the employees without interference, influence,

or coercion exercised -by the carrier. Inthe conduct of

any’ election for the purposes herein ‘indicated the .

Board shall ‘designate who may par ticipate in the elec-

tion ‘and establish the rules to govern te election, or

may Bppoint a committee of three neujfal persons who

after hearing ‘shall. withi wis designate the

employees who may participate in the election. The °

Board shall have access to and have power to make

.

19a ‘

copies of the books and records of the carriers to.

obtain and utilize such information as may be deemed.

necessary by it to carry out the purposes and provi-

sions of this paragraph.

* * *

Sec. 5. Functions of Mediation Board, First. (Dis-

putes as to which services of Mediation Buard may be

invoked. ) The parties, or either party, to a dispute be-

‘tween an employee or group of employees and carrier

may invoke the services of the Mediation Board.in any

of the following cases:

(a) A dispute concerning changes in rates of pay, ;

rules, or working conditions . not adjusted by the

parties in conference.

(b) Any other dispute not referable to the National

Railroad Adjustment Board and not adjusted ‘in con-

ference between the parties or where conferences are

icfused. °

. The Mediation Board may proffer its services in

case any labor emergency is found by it to exist at

any ime. :

In either event the said Board shall promptly put |

itself in communication with ‘the parties“*to such con-

troversy, and shall use its best efforts, by mediation,

‘to bring them to agreement. If such efforts to bring

about an amicable settlement through h mediation shall

be unsuccessful, the said-Board shal] at once endeavor

Po

20a

as its final required action (except as provided in

paragraph third of this Section and in Section 10 of ~

this Act) to induce the parties to submit their contro-

versy to arbitration, in accordance with the provisions

of this Act. |

If arbitration at t the retuest of the Board shall be

refused by one or both parties, the Board shall at once

notify both parties in writing “at its mediatory efforts

have failed and for thirty days thereafter, unless in

the intervening period the parties agree to arbitration,

or an emergency board shall be created under Section

10 of this Act, no change shall be made in the rates of

pay, rules, or working conditions or established prac-

~ tices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose.

Second. (Interpretation of mediation agreement. )

In any case in: which a controversy arises over the

meaning or the application of any agreement reached

through mediation ucder the provisions of this Act,

either. party to the said agreenient, or both may apply

to the Mediation Board for an interprctation of the

meaning or application of such agreement. The said

Board shall upon receipt of such request notify the

parties to the controversy, and after a hearing of both

sides give its interpretation within thirty days. .

Sec. 6. (Notice of Intended Change in Agreements °

‘Affecting Rates of Pay, Rules, or Working Conditions. )

Carriers and representatives of the employees shall

2la

give at least thirty days’ written notice of an intended

change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or |

working conditions, and the time and place for the be- -

_ ginning of conference between the representatives of

the parties interested in such intended changes shall

be agreed upon within ten days after the receipts of

said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty

days provided in the notice. In every case where such

notice of intended change has been given, or con-

ferences are being held with reference thereto, or.

' the services of the Mediation Board have been re-

quested by either party, or said Board has proffered its:

services, rate: of pay, rules, or working conditions shall .

not be altered by the éarrier until the controversy has

been finaly acted upon as required by Section 5 of this —

Act, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten

days has elapsed after termination of conferences

without request for or proffer of the services of the ~

TITLE I] 4

Section 201. Useoliestion of Title I to Air Carriers

and Employees.) All of the provisions of Title I of this

Act, except the provisions of Section 3 thereof, are

extended to and shall cover every commen carrier by

air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and —

‘ every carrier by air transporting mail for or under

contract with the United States Government, and every

22a |

air pilot er cther person who performs any work. as an

employee or subordinate official of such carrier or car-

. riers, subject to its or their continuing authority to.

supervise and. direct the manner of rendition of his

service.

Sec. 202. (Inclusion in Definitions of “Carrier”

and “Employee.”) The duties, requirements, penalties,

benefits, and privileges prescribed and established by

’ ‘the provisions of Title I of this Act, except Section 3

thereof; shall apply to said carriers by air and their

employees in the same manner and to the same extent

as though such carriers and their employees were

- Specifically; included within the definition of “carrier”

and “employee,” respectively, in Section I thereof.

Sec. 203. (Extension of Jurisdiction of Mediation

Board.) The parties or either. party to a dispute be-

tween an employee or a group of employees and a -

carrier or carriers.by air may invoke the services of the.

National Mediation Board and the jurisdiction of said.

Mediation Board is extended to any of the following

cases: << 3 |

(a} A dispute concerning charges in rates of pay,

ruies, or W orking conditions not adjusted by the parties

in conférence. 3 mars

(b): Any other dispute not referable ‘to an adjust-

ment board, as hereinafter provided, and not adjusted

in conference between the parties, or where confer-

ences are refused.

23a

‘The National Mediation Board may proffer its

services in case any labor cmergeney is found by it to

exist at any time.

The services of the Mediation Board. may be in-

voked in a case under this title in the same manner and

to the same extent as are the disputes covered by Sec-,

tion 5 of Title I of this Act.

Sec. 204, Gian: lien to adjustment

. ‘board,, establishment of boards. of adjustment. ) The

disputes between an employee or group of employees

and a carrier or carriers by air growing out of griev-.

ances, or out of the interpretation or application of

agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working

conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on -

the date of approval of this Act before the Nationai

_ Labor Relations Board, shall be handled ,in the usual

manner up to and including’ the chief of operating

officer of the carrier designated to handle such dis-

putes; but failing to reach an adjustment in this man-

ner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the |

parties or by either party to an appropriate adjustment

board, as hereinafter provided, with a full statement

of: the facts and: supporting data bearing upon the

disputes.

It shall be the duty of every carrier and of its

employees, acting through their representatives, se-

lected in accordance with the provisions of this title,

to establish a board of adjustment of jurisdiction not

: 24a

exceeding the jurisdiction which may be lawfully

exercised by system, group, or regional boards of ad-

justment, under the authority of Section 3, Title I, of

this Act. = | !

‘Such boards of adjustments may be established

by agreement between employees and carriers either

on any individual carrier, or system, or group of car-

riers by air and any class or classes of its or their em-

ployees; or.pending the establishment of a permanent

National Board of Adjustment as hereinafter pro

vided. Nothing in this Act shall prevent said carriers by

air, or any class or classes of their employees, both

acting through their representatives selected in accord-

ance with provisions of this title, from mutually agree-

ing tothe establishment of a Nationa! Board of Adjust-

ment of temporary duration and of similarly Hmited

jurisdiction, ; ;

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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