Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Atlantic City v. Caporossi

Supreme Court brief1964

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Office Supreme Court, U.S.

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a _ fF JUN 9" 1984

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

In THE

Supreme Court of the ‘United States

sishauan Term, ~

267.

: Noo

ATLANTIC CITY, a municipal corporation

of the State of New Jersey,

Petitioner,

v.

ANDREW CAPOROSSI,

+

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

SamvuEn P. Or.anpo,

130 N. Broadway,

Camden, New Jersey 08102,

Counsel for Petitioner.

Georce W. SHapoan,

22 W. Jefferson Street,

Rockville, Maryland 20850,

OnmThe Petition.

International, 711 So. Sth St., Phila., Pa. 19143

CITATIONS £0 OPINIONS BELOW ...........--cceeecceeees

JURISDICTION .....,..... POP TTT eT TTT TET TTT

COTS TRMIED civ ccivcccescccseecesrcisvnsnecuss

DOMTUUES TORII bbs dc escsectacsss aeeekeblsebese ees

L The Conn Should Grant Certiorari Because the Deci-

* sion Below Significantly Affects One of the Great

Natural Resources of the State of New Jersey and

le SR kk branes esi kkkdeedub kena eee Ra ces ce

(a) Importance of Resource and Unstable ey

Cy Bets Oe SPRUE 6 ud esc dieu eeedewdunances

II. The Court. Should Grant Certiorari Reewne of the

Questionable Application by the Court of Appeals

of the Rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ........

There Is a Division Among Circuits Concerning

Whether a Federal Court May Disregard State

Court Decisions Which, Though Not Overruled

by Later State Court Decisions, Are Felt to Be

Outmoded by Change in Time and Circum-

CED av cvccwcccknddusedsnentsudravcesue

, CoNcLuSION eR Ee STE Tee EEE CE ee EY EE Pe rrr re

Appenpix A:

Opinion of United States-Court of Appeals for the Third

Cireutt Dated March 10, 1964 ......i.ccccccccece :

Judgment of United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit Dated March 10, 1964 ...... Uiguvaswscns 3+

APPENDIX B: ara Pay

Opinion a United States District Court for the District of

New Jersey Dated August 7, 1963 .. eee ceeceeceees

Judgment of United States District Court for the District of

New Jersey Dated June 6, 1963 ........ Wecuanese

APPENDIX C:

State Legislative Efforts to Improve the Seacoas; Resort

— eee cetuseeedaneee anodes ppcaes jx cna wns

©

9

10

13

| TABLE OF CASES CITED.

; ; ; . Page .

Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) .16 -

Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78 Atl. 196 (E.& A.

OPT TTT TT TT eT Tye peas wen 8, 11, 15, 16, 18, 20,21

Blaylock v. Muskogee, 117 F. 125 (Gt Cir. 2908) .nccsiccccs 13

City of Denver v. Porter, 126 F. 288 (8th Cir. Se Gonenise 13

Cloyes v. Delaware Twp. 23 N. J. 324, 129 A. 2d 1 (1957) .. 5 ; ey

Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945) 13 ~

Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492 (1890) ......:-..e. esses 13

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ............4. 43, 15

Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S.459 12

Harris v. Atlantic City, 73 N. J. L. 251, 62 A. 995 (Sup. Ct. .

MD :idadcvancane Fe a oe Re ge NOE po dy A 4

Home Royalty Ass’n v. Stone, 199 F. 2d 650 (10th Cir. 1952) 14

Jess Edward, Inc. v. Goergen, 256 F. 2d 542 (10th Cir. 1958) 14

Kuchler v. New Jersey and N. Y. R. Co., 104 N. J. L. 333, 140

GW, WE rockin cs ccnccvccencccescs 15, 16, 20, 21

‘Martin v. City of Asbury Park, 1f1 N. J. L. 364, 168 Atl. 612

“ (E. & A. 1933) ; 114 N. J: L. 298, 176 Atl. 172 (E. & A.

BD SauK bh ck4 nd ed5646be5 ER 45s UCabn ahi cbensbiee 15, 20, 21

Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F. 2d 906 (ist

Me SR ys scar chats Wan cian bakemueeukaseakabe 14

Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S..228 (1943) Veenaenepens 15

Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 290 F. 2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 365 U. S. 293 (1961) .............. bikes bene 14

Polk County v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 262 F. 2d dient deca

ES iS er Lael iad ect aesaunewadiie gas 13

State v. Atlantic City, 23 N. j. 337, 129 A. 2d 293 (1957) .... 9

Schwartz v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141, 160,A. 2d 1 (Sup. Ct.

Six Companies v. Joint Highway District, 311 U.S. 180 (1940) 14

%

a TABLE OF OASES CITED (Continued). ~

» ‘ , . Page

Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S, eo, kakeen eee Terre 12

Terranella v. Union Bldg. & Cham: Co., 3 N. ‘. 443, 70 A. 2d

FO REOMEE WAL ibe icedesnessacevdanwarwasnagaeeees 15,16

. Weeks v. City of Newark, 62 N. J. Super. 166, 162 A. 2d 314

(App. Div. 1960), aff. o.b. 34 N. J. 250, 168 A. 2d 11

i ROBE iE OAR en a NREL DY, cal ass My) 11, 15, 18, 21

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND —

STATUTES CITED.

Page

Boardwalk Acts: ;

L. 1889, c. 129, §1, p. 206, R. S. 40:179-78, et. seq.

"OG A era sipcisks haces neuaLoetoaa tes 4

Bi RG a i hie O ies went ccaceees 4

Historical Note, R. S. 40:48-8, 15 N.J. S.A. ........@@... 8

L. 1945, c. 156, p. 544, §2, R.-S. 40:48-8a, N. J. S.A. ...... 7

.Park Act, L. 1894, c. 93, § I, p. 146, R. S. 40:179-98, et. sed.

SO Teer Ore, =| 4

P. L. 1903, p. 387, R. S. 12:3-33, N. J. S.A. .....ececccee ; a

DOS EGE, ov acecsencsiccinent 24.2.2, 3,8, 15, 16, 17

Rules of Decision Act of 1948, c. 46, 62 Stat. 944, 28 u. &. <&. ,

ER rere Pre eraser arciaree ier eR DONC at res - 2

MB: SC, Geet MGA) oo cede sscncasss ae

33 U. S.C. A., §426(e) ......... Fee parte tue hver dees 9

United States Constitution, Eleventh Amendment ............ , 12

ORDINANCE AND REPORT CITED.

Page

Park Ordinance of the City of Atlantic City, October 9, 1899 5

1950 Report of the New Jersey Beach Erosion Commission .... 10

«

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; * e

IN THE

\

|

Supreme Court ’ the United Sears,

iain Term, 1963.

No.

ATLANTIC CITY, a Municrpat Corporation OF THE

State or New JERSEY, |

: Petitioner,

v.

- ANDREW CAPOROSSI, .

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

Petitioner, Atlantic City, prays that a writ of certiorari

issue to review the judgment of the United States. Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit, entered in the above-

entitled case on March 10, 1964. |

. CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the District Court (R. 40a-80a) is re-

ported at 220. F. Supp. 508 (1963), and is printed in Ap-

pendix B hereto, infra, p. 25. The vpinion of the Court of

Appeals, printed in Appendix A hereto,. myee, p. 23, is

reported at 328 F. 2d 620 (1964).

| JURISDICTION. ms |

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

Mareh 10, 1964. Appendix A, p. 24, infra. The jurisdiction

of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C., Section 1254(1).

é

GTI PE LIS STF NS EP IST

2 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. May a Federal court ina diversity cuse indulge in.

‘‘re-analysis: and’ re-evaluation”’ of ‘‘anciently venerated

legal postulates’? of applicable State court decisions in

order to find that ownership and maintenance by a munic-

_ ipality of a public bathing beach bordering on the Atlantic

Ocean is a ‘“‘proprietary”’ activity outside the application

of the State municipal tort immunity statute, R. S. 40:9-2,

N. J. S. A., when the court admits that ‘‘there are nu ‘New

J ersey cases which endow municipally owned public beaches

‘or public parks with proprietary characteristics’’ and the

State court of last resort has held that operation of beach

parks is a governmental function?

! 2: May a United States court, in a diversity case, dis-

regard State court holdings which, though not overruled by

later State court decisions, are felt by the Federal court

to be outmoded by change in time and circumstance? _

STATUTES INVOLVED.

No municipality or county shall be liable for in-

jury to the person from the use of any public grounds, ~

buildings or structures, any law to the contrary not-

withstanding: R. S. 40:9-2, N. J. S. A.

The laws of the several states, except where the

Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts

of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be re-

garded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts

of the United States in cases where they apply. Rules

of Decision Act of 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 944, 28 U.S. C.

§ 1652.

‘

Petition for a sit of Certiorart — —-

‘STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The cies. Andrew Cigetenk tasttend suit in

the United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey against the petitioner, City of Atlantic City, and

others on July 19, 1961. The respondent, on August 24, 1960,

' while lawfully bathing i in the Atlantic Ocean within the con-

‘fines of the public beac park operated by the City of At-

lantic City, had struck his head’ on some submerged pipes

and sustained serious personal. injuries. The primary

- defense of petitioner, set out in its Ninth Defense in its

Answer (R. 162-182),"was statutory immunity haart to

R. S. 40:9-2, N. J. S. A. '

Petitioner City of Atlantic City moved for a aaeited

oan at the close of plaintiff’s case (R. 118a-6), the trial

court reserving decision thereon (R. 118a-30), and at the

close of all the evidence (R. bir upon the ground,

inter qlia, that:

Rigietat Plaintiff’s injuries were ‘received by -

him from the use of public grounds operated by the

City of Atlantic City in a governmental capacity or as

a governmental function, and the plaintiff is therefore

- precluded from any recovery against the defendant

City by virtue of and because of New Jersey statute

annotated 40:9-2, with which Your Honor is un-

doubtedly familiar.’’ (R. 1674-32)

The -trial court, iiine that operation of the beach

" park by the city was a proprietary function and that the

statutory immunity did not apply, denied the Motion (R.

168a-11). |

In addition, the petitioner requested the court to in-

struct the jury to return a verdict of no cause for action in

favor of the City upon.the same ground (R. 189a-5). The

court refused to so instruct (R. 187a-7), and the at nae

took exception thereto (R. 188-20). |

4 Petition for a Writ of Certtorari

A Motion for J. N. O. V. or, in the alternative, for New

Trial, predicated i in part upon the same ground | (R. 35a),

also was denied in a written opinion which is set forth in

full, infra, p. 25. The jury returned a verdict against the

City of Atlantic City in the amount of $600,000 (191la-12).

Neither the jury’s finding of negligence by the City, nor

its evaluation of the plaintiff’s damages, is questioned kere.

A timely appeal was taken and the District Court’s

ruling was affirmed by the United States Coirt of Appeals

on March 10, 1964, infra, p. 24.

The relationship between the State of New J ersey and

-its municipal subdivision, insofar as beach parks are con-

cerned, had its genesis in L. 1889, c. 129, § 1, p. 206, R. S.

40 :179-78, et. seq. N. J. S. A., known as the Boardwalk Acts.

Fourth class cities, as the seacoast cities were soon to be

known, were thereby authorized to construct public walks

along the beach or ocean front. By amendment, L. 1890,

c. 107, § 1, p. 159, the Legislature provided that these walks

might be elevated. Thus was the foundation laid for the

famous Boardwalks. The primary object of this act ‘‘was

evidently to secure pleasant promenades for, pedestrians

** *.°' Harris v. Atlantic City, 73 N. J. L. 251, 62 A. 995

(Sup. Ct. 1906).

By L. 1894, c. 93, $1, p. 146, R. S. 40:179-98, et. seq.

N. 7 S. A., the ‘‘Park Act,’’ cities located on or near the

ocean, and embracing within their — any beach or ocean

‘front, were authorized: ‘ ‘

ra ae open aid lay out on and along said beach

or ocean front, a public park or place for public resort

and recreation, and to devote the lands within the limits

of such park or place of resort, when established as.

herein directed, to such use exclusively.’’

The ‘Act went on to provide that whenever the governing

- body determined to lay out such a park, it had,

‘‘to devote the same exclusively for public use ‘as a

‘ public park or place for public resort and recreation, -

‘\

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 5

and to keep the same forever open and unobstructed

for such public use.’’ R.§S. 40:179-100, N. J. S. A.

R. S. 40:179-102 made it lawful for the governing body

to accept a dedication of lands lying within the park, and

R. S. 40:179-103 gave authority to the governing body to

regulate the use of the-park and to prevent obstructions

thereof, placed restrictions upon the use of the park lands,

and expressed the legislative intention that the view of the

ocean from the boardwalk ‘‘shall be free and open and

enn: ‘and that no use shall be made of the said

lands and property inconsistent with the purpose of this

ee °

Pursuant to the authority Porn the City of Atlantic

City enacted a ‘‘Park Ordinance’’ on October 9, 1899 (R.

309a, Ex. D-5). In that Ordinance the City determined ‘‘to

- open-and. lay out a public park. or place for public resort or

recreation on and along the beach or ocean front of the city.

In Section 3, it was ordained that all lands lying within the

park

“fare hereby devoted to public use as a public park

or place for public resort and recreation exclusively,

and for such use shall be kept open and unobstructed

forever, * * *’’ (R. 312a)

Most owners of — within the beach park deditated those

lands to the City around 1900 (R. 285a), thus making

condemnation proceedings unnecessary. The City cove-

naated, wter alia, that the dedicated lands,

‘‘shall forever be and remain open so that the

view oceanward from the said elevated public walks

erected * * * shall be free, open and unobstructed and

that no use shall be made of the said land by the

grantee, its successors or assigns, inconsistent with

its use as a public park or place for public resort and

recreation.’’ (R. 290a) - :

6 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Thereafter, by P. L. 1903, p. 387, R. S. 12:3-33, N. J.

S. A., the Legislature provided that when a municipality

laid out a public park along the ocean, the municipality

- eould then apply to the State Riparian Commissioners for

a grant to the municipality of land under ‘water within the

limits of such park. In a Riparian Grant dated February

13, 1907, the State Riparian Commissioners,.in considera-

tion of the sum of $21,062.50, granted to the City all of the

lands lying under water within the limits of the park (R.

302a, Ex. D-4). "The grant provided:

‘“‘The land * * * is granted and conveyed for park

uses and purposes and none other, and shall be kept

and maintained as an open public park or place for

public resort and recreation, and that no building or-

other structures shall be erected gn such park or on

the lands under water hereby granted atid conveyed

inconsistent with its use as a public park or place for

public resort and recreation; * * * and also provided

that if at any time hereafter, such publie park or the

land under water hereby granted, shall cease to be used

as such park or place for public resort and recreation,

then and in that event. this grant, and all the right,

‘ title and interest in said lands under water thereby

granted, shall cease, and determire and the lands

* * * shall forthwith thereupon revert to the State.”’

* (R. 305a)

The Atlantie City Beach Park has at all times there-

after been open, without charge, so the public at large and

to all people without regard ge race, place of residence or

any other consideragion (R. 85a-3; 116a-8; 145a-25), and

has been used by the public for a wide variety of recrea-

tional activities (R. 147a-40; 156a-12).

Atlantie City, upon laying out the beach park and

receiving the Riparian grant, become a resort. The recrea-

tional and popularly conceived health-giving features of

the City began to attract great numbers of people during

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari f 7

the summer months (R, 147-5). Facilities and services

had to be provided, thus posing financial difficulty for the

City. The primary source of revenue was the real prop:

erty tax, which eventially became ‘‘almost prohibitive’

(R. 159a- 29).. The City was confronted with extraordinary

influxes of people during the busy months, requiring

enormous increases in municipal services such as police,

fire protection, lifeguards, clean-up men and medical per-

sonnel on the beach (R. 149a-7; 156a-7). In addition, the

Boardwalk and beach were damaged from time to time by

storms, and were constantly under attack by the processes

of erosion. The many measures taken by the State Legis-

lature and the Federal Government to shore up the unstable

economy of the great natural resource are set out in Ap- -

pendix C, infra, p. 62. Express legislative recognitions of

the problem were frequent: ia

‘An emergency is hereby declared to exist in munici-

palities bordering upon the Atlantic Ocean which are

seaside or’summer resorts and which because of their

- size have a great fluctuation in the number of visitors,

_because of the recent hurricane, the continued erosion °

of beaches and the danger of hurricane in the near

future, all of which make it impossible for such munic-

ipalities to function normally as seaside or summer

resorts during the next three fiscal years unless some

additional revenue can be raised for use in providings

and continuing the facilities which attract visitors to

such municipalities as seaside or summer resorts.’*

L. 1945, ce. 156, p. 544, § 2, R. S. 40:48-8a, N. J. S.A.

‘‘Whereas, the Legislature, in furtherance of public

. policy, has for period of years greatly enlarged

municipal activities, principally in matters of public

health and-safety, with no consequent grant of revenue

power to meet these modern and constantly expanding

conditions ;

—_ , 5 = PE ee ne ei esas faa atin omnes eigenen

PANN NEE ENE PSALM ATEN CPE EMC AR Bm SLI oN eit oS Oma AE SOR IO RY ata sn aN 78 es ytico

‘

8 Petition for a rit of Certiorart

Whereas, the sources of revenue in the various munic-

ipalities, particularly in Cities of this State bordering

upon the Atlantic Ocean and being seaside or summer

resorts, are inadequate and insufficient to meet existing

municipal obligations; and

_ Whereas, many of these impositions are mandatory

in character, and it is necessary and essential that

such cities be given power to increase existing reve-

nues; therefore’’. Historical Note, R. S. 40:48-8. 15

N.J.S. A.” ‘ °

A counter-balancing factor contributing to economic

stability was the early case of: Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80

N. J. L. 416, 78 Atl. 196 (E. & A. 1910), holding the city

immune from liability for personal injuries upon the public

beaches. Since Bisbing’s holding, supplemented by subse-

quent legislative enactment of R. S. 40:9-2, an act designed

‘‘to clarify the existing law as to the non-liability of —

* counties, municipalities and school districts . . .’’, see

Schwartz v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141, 149, 160 A. 2d 1 (Sup.

Ct. 1960), there has followed a sixty-six year history of

immunity with no other reported cases arising from an

injury upon any New Jerscy beach, despite the fact that

injuries thereon are. so numerous: as to require full-time

medical stations, physicians, and other trained personnel

at the Atlantic City beach alone (R. 62a-31)-

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari: 9

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT. —

__I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Decision

Below Significantly Affects One of the Great Natural

Resources of the State of New Jersey and the Nation.

(a) Importance of Resource and Unstable Economy.

The determination of this case affects the legislative

_ policy of the State of New Jersey and the economic stability

of the Atlantic seacoast resort area. Ocean bathing and its

related beach activities constitute leisure time attractions

to a major portion of ‘the Nation’s population. Thirteen

‘million persons are estimated to patronize Atlantic City

\\ each year (R. 346a). In 1947, Colonel F. F. Freech, Dis-

trict Engineer, concluded that ‘‘the resort business is the

only substantial Téason for the existence of. the city’’ (R.

348a, 17-18).

Despite resort revenues, both the Federal and State

governments have found it necessary to contribute large

sums to perpetuate that existence.’ Economic instability

» has been the history,of the Atlantic resort area. Aside:

from the immense sums spent to prevent oceanic erosion

of this Vital natural resource, the State has repeatedly

enacted legislative devices to save the resort economy from

(1) The State has participated in 10 or 11 beach protection

projects in Atlantic City alone at a cost of approximately one million

dollars. The Federal Government has contributed an equal amount

to such projects in Atlantic City (R. 129a-134a; 142a-13). The State

interest, and the interest of the public at large in the beach and its

protection were recognized by the State Supreme Court in State v.

Atlantic City, 23 N. J. 337, 129 A. 2d 293 (1957). See also, 33

U.S.C. A., §426(e) for an expression of Congressional recognition

of a national interest in the shores of the United States and the

“healthful recreation. of the people” thereon. And see, Federal Beach

Erosion Control Study (R. 121a-25; Ex. D-10, 339a-355a) demon-

strating the vital public interest at stake. For the State recognition

of the same interest, see the reports of the New Jersey State Beach

Erosion Commission (R. Supp. la, 5a).

BEE SIMI eI Or IN AEE Se Te PO IM SS THA Fa oat ex LSE TY gE te sis

“ +

10 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari -

bankruptcy.?, These statutes, as shown in Appendix C,

recognize the vital public interest in maintaining the area’s

stability. In addition, perhaps the most eloquent state-

-ment of currency is found in the 1950 Report of the New

Jersey Beach Erosion Commission:

‘‘Coast protection warrants prominent standing in

the general State budget. Since State revenues are

considered general funds not earmarked as to source

or use, and are appropriated annually for State func-

tions deemed essential, coast protection must receive

recognition befitting a modern-day problem of grave

interest - the people and the government of New

Jersey. .

“The seme Industry, the name _ given

shorefront business and recreational activity, is popu-

larly said to be founded on the State’s priceless natural

assets of sand, sea, and sunshine. Its motivating

credo of a better, fuller, healthier life for the people of

New Jersey is symbolic of the social and business life

of today. It is not only recognized as the greatest

service industry in New Jersey, but also as the major

industry in gross income as well as for its . wide

ramifications into diversified industrial life and busi-

ness throughout the State... .

‘“‘The continued prosperity of the Recreation’

Industry admittedly depends upon the existence and

usability of the beaches and shorefront. The preserva-

tion oi these physical assets in first class condition i is

essential to the welfare of the people of New Jersey.

(R. Supp. Appendix 7a, 8a).

. (b) Impact of Decision.

As has been ‘seen, the Atiantic resort economy "an

unstable one requiring periodic in jeetions of massive ~.ate

(2) See Acts of 1922, 1931, 1936, 1945 and 1947 discussed in

Appendix C hereto, infra, p- 02.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 11

and Federal aid. The decision of the court below would

remove the status of immunity from tort liability which

has attended the beach park area for the past 66 years,

The significance of this in economic terms is staggering,

particularly in view of the fact that ocean bathing is a

hazardous activity. Innumerable accidents occur annually

at the Atlantic City beach alone. The tremendous impact °

upon liability instrance coverage and premium increases

should not be overlooked. Cf. Weeks &. City of Newark,

62 N. J. Super. 166, 182, 162 A. 2d 314 (App. Div. 1960).

In addition, the City spends over $200,000 annually for

beach maintenance and operation to protect against this

hazard and to keep the area elean and attractive (R. 70a).

As stated in the opinion below: _

‘*(d) [The City] provided a complete unit of |

Beach Patrol Police; so-called ‘‘protected eaches”’

by the stationing of lifeguard stands and a trained

lifeguard patrol\with ranking officers, having care of

the beach, the foreshore, and the:ocean, with the use

of life-saving: equipment, such as boats, rafts, surf

boards, respirators, life preservers and the like. _

(e) It provided a trained unit of beach personnel

for the physical maintenance, care and cleaning of the

beach surface, with appropriate supervisory personnel.

for inspections, such as the Captains of the Beach

Patrol and the Commissioner of Public Safety.

(f) It provided medical stations, with physicians

and trained personnel, for injuries sustained by

‘bachers and other users of the beach area, which

(3) Since 1894, when cities were enabled by the State Legis-

lature to lay out public parks, there has been only one reported case

arising from injury upon a New Jersey beach, Bisbing v. Asbury Park,

80 N. J. L. 416,78 Atl. 196 (E. & A. 1910). Since Bisbing’s holding:

of immunity for such injuries, there have been no further New Jersey

cases despite annual drownings, shark attacks, and a variety ‘of in-

juries upon clam shells, glass, pipes, timber and other debris—injuries

so numerous as to require at Atlantic City Beach full-time medical

stations, physicians, and other trained personne: (R. 62a-31).

s VES SEER EAS ERESS, TUBS aia

12 . Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

medical stations and personnel maintained a record

of mishaps, injuries and medical assistance rendered,

all of whick were reported to appropriate municipal

officers.’’ Infra, p. 51.

With the advent of the ‘‘adequate’’ award in personal

‘injury cases, one can easily see that sweeping aside im-

munity from the ocean beach area would result in de-

struction of the delicate economic balance which has been

maintained through the combination of city revenues, im-

munity from tort liability, and outside aid. Such a drastic

departure from the sixty-six year history of immunity re-

quires the most careful scrutiny—especially when the

departure results from a Federal court, decision rather

than that.of a State court.

Where a question of immunity is involved, it is a matter

. of peculiar concern to the sovereignty of the State. Indeed,

the federal policy of non-intervention is expressed by: the

Eleventh Ameudment to the United States Constitution.

Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasur of Indiana, 323 U.S.

459; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436. That the federal

judiciary would honor State policy in. such matters has

long been recognized:

It must be conceded that this adjudication as to the

liability of a city for injuries caused by a defect in the

sidewalks, the repair of which it has both the power:

and duty to provide for, is not in harmony with the

general rule in this country . . . nor in accord with

the views expressed by this court . . . that ‘the au-

thorities establishing the contrary doctrine, that a city

is responsible for its mere negligence, are so numerous

and so well considered that the law must be deemed to

be settled in accordance with them,’.. . . But even if

_ it were a fact that the universal voice of the other .—

authorities was against the doctrine announced by the

Supreme Court of Michigan, the fact remains that the

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari . 13

decision of that court, undisturbed by legislative ac-

tion, is the law of that State. Whatever our views

. may be as to the peasoning or conclusions of that court.

is immaterial. It does not change the fact’ that its

decision is the law of the State of Michigan, binding

upon all its courts, and all its citizens, and all others

who may come within the limits ofthe State. Detroit

v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 498-99 (1890). See also,

‘ Blaylock v. Muskogee, 117 F. 125 (8th Cir. 1902) ; City

of Denver v. Porter, 126 F. 288 (8th Cir. 1903). ,

JI. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because of the

Questionable Application by the Court of Appeals of

the Rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.

There Is a Division Among Circuits. Concerning

Whether a Federal Court May Disregard State

Court Decisions Which, Though Not Overruled by

Later State Court Decisions, Are Felt to Be Out-

moded by Change in Time and Circumstances.

There is a division among the Circuits as to whether a

federal court may anticipate a change. in settled state law

which has not yet been authoritatively announced by the

state’courts. Judge Frank has said that the test is,

What would be the decision of reasonable intelligent

lawyers, sitting as judges of the highest New York

court, and fully conversant with New York ‘‘juris-

prudence?’? Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149

F. 2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1949).

In a contrary view, Judge Jones of the Fifth Circuit has

said that to follow such a process ‘‘would be attempting to

psychoanalyze state court judges rather than to rationalize

state court decisions.’”’ Polk County v. Lincoln Nat. Life

Ins. Co., 262: F. 2d 486, 489 (Sth Cir. 1959). The Court

+N OD, NR BOOTLE SIR re ler SE - eee a eee ee ee ee ee ee :

POSTS DERE BOLO AL ESSE RATA PATE ERY OLIN ES IIE

14 Petition for a Writ of Certtorart

went on to hold that a decision of the state court on the

precise point in controversy in the federal-court which

clearly establishes the rule to be followed, is binding and

conclusive upon the federal court. In such a situation,

said the court, 262 F. 2d at 490:

‘*We are not permitted to overrule a decision of the

* Supreme Court of Georgia on any theory that the

Georgia Supreme Court, as presently constituted,

would not, be bound by what it had said when dif-

ferently constituted some years ago. Nor can we apply,

in diversity cases, a rule of stare decisis which permits

us to weigh the degree of authority belonging to a

precedent by its agreement with the spirit of the times.

’ The Georgia courts can overrule their prior decisions.

The Federal Céurts cannot do so.- Moore v. Illinois

Central Railroad Co., 312 U.S. 630... .”’

Also compare: Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works,

_ 241 F. 2d 906, 908 (1st Cir. 1957) with Nolan v. Transocean

Air Lines, 290 F. 2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 293

(1961). And see Tome Royalty Ass’n v. Stone, 199 F. 2d —

650 (10th Cir. 1952); Jess Edward, Inc. v. Goergen, 256

F. 2d 542 (10th Cir. 1958).

The older decisions of this Court. shiny agree with

the Fifth Circuit view. The repeated test is that a local

decision must be followed unless ‘‘there is convincing eVi-

dence that the law of the State is otherwise.’* Sir Com-

panies v. Joint Highway District, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940)

and,

. « the highest court t of ‘the state is the final arbiter

of what is state law. When it has spoken, its pro-

° nouncement is to be uecepted by federal vourts as de-

fining state law unless it has later given clear and

persuasive indication that its pronouncement will be :

modified, limited or restricted .

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 15

Even though it is arguable that the Supreme Court of

Ohio will at some later time modify the rule of the

West case, whether that will ever happen remains 2

+ matter of conjecture. West v. American Telephone

and Telegraph Co., 311 U. S. 211, 236-38 (1940). See

also, Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field. 331 UT. S. 169 (1940).

Again, the rulings of a State court of last resort must be

-taken as controlling ‘‘unless it can be said with some ax-

surance that the [State] Supreme Court will not follow

them in the future . . .’’ Meredith v. Winter Haren.

320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). Some of the cases cited here have

received criticism and the lower courts are in confusion as

to the present rule of law-ascertainment under ric. | The

instant case illustrates the confusion.

Here, the lower court refused to follow the eXPFess

rulings and rationale of cases decided by New Jersey’s

court of last resort which have never been questioned by

the New Jersey courts. In Bisbing v. Ashury Park, 80

N. J. L. 416, 78 A. 196 (E. & A. 1910), the highest court of

New Jersey decided a case which ix factually indistinguish-_

able from the present case. The Bishing case bas been re-

affirmed in casés decided in 19284 and in 1935.2) The ra-

tionale of these cases has never been questioned and ha<

been approved by the New Jersey Supreme Court as late

as 1950,° 19577 and 1960.8 The rule of these eases wa-

made statutory by the State Legislature in 1933.

(4). Kuchler v. New Jersey and N.Y. R. Co.. 104N. J. L. 333.

140 A. 329 (E. & A. 1928).

(5) Martin v. ed Park II, 114.N. J. L. 298, 176 A. 172

(E. & A. 1935).

(6) Terranella v7. Union BuiJdiny & Construction Co., 3.N. }.

443, 70 A. 2d 753 (1950).

(7) Cloyes v. Delaware Twp.. 23 N. J. 324, 129 A. 24 1 (1957 5.

(8) Weeks v. City of Newark, G2 N. J. Super. loo, 162 A. 2d

314 (App. Div. 1960), aff. o.b. 34.N. J. 230,168 A. 2d 11 (1901).

(9) R. S. 40:9-2 N. J. 5S. A.

16 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

The lower court felt that a recent opinion by this Court .

furnished an escape from the line of New Jersey author-

ities just cited: “In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of

America, 350 U. S. 198 (1956), a senate of the strict rule

was suggested.”’ Infra, p. 43.

.The court felt that ‘the indication of a relaxation in

_ Bernhardt allowed it ‘‘to determine whether subsequent to

Bisbing and Kuchler, there is judicial persuasion to con-

vince this court how the highest New Jersey State Court

would decide this question.’’ Infra, at p. 44. This view

_ was particularly important in view of the court’s recogni- -

tion that stare decisis would compel following the older .

‘ -Bisbing case and that the New Jersey Supreme Court has

expressly refused to come to: ically with - entire problem.

Said the district judge:

* In Cloyes v. Delaware Twp., the Supreme Court .

_ said:

_ *We do not believe this * the case in which to

consider whether to come to grips with the entire

problem... .’

This then is the posture of the New Jersey law on this

‘issue. There are no New Jersey cases which endow

municipally owned public beaches or public parks with

‘proprietary characteristics. The next logical query -

_involves the legal compulsion of this Court to apply

the substantive holding of Auchler which in turn relies

on Bisbing which, in turn, relies on Strader.’’ Infra,

p. 42.

The court then looked toward more recent judicial develop-

ments, many of which occurred in other states, while ignor-

ing completely the recent New Jersey case of Terranella

r. Union Bldg. & Const.Co., 3 N. J. 443, 70 A. 2d 753 (1950),

which reaffirmed in dictum that the operation of a public -

park was subject to the immunity granted by R.'S. 40:9-2,

m8 }

‘ *

~

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 17

N.J.S. A. See aiso, Schwartz v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141, 160

A. 2d 1 (1960). ‘The real basis for the lower court’s-refusal

to follow the controlling New Jersey law was subsequently

made clear:

‘*When viewed against the panorama of legal his-

tory, it seems inevitable that even with quickened en-

lightenment, responsive changes came more slowly and

often with tedious caution. This seems especially true

in regard to anciently venerated legal postulates which

justify their continued existence on the’ pragmatic

needs of remote times and outmoded conditions rooted

in ritualistic adherence to the docirine of stare decisis.

Stare decisis, while a valuable and well established doc-

‘ trine, should serve as a flexible channel marker for

guidance’ and not as anv immovable sand bar which may

cause disaster; it should not be permitted to foreclose

re-analysis and re-evaluation of legal postulates, which

may well have lost their vitalizing principle. If out- ,

moded and artifi¢ial distinctions are to persist in con-

' fining a court of law to a choice of specific alternatives,

one of which provides remedy for an injured individual,

and the other does not, then the choice of remedy séems

clear as the demands of justice must be obliged in each

particular case. ‘

As was eloquently stated by Mr. Justice. Holmes,

commenting on ‘The Path of the Law,” in Collected

Legal Papers, Oliver Wendell Holmes, p. 187:

‘It is revolting to have no better reason for a

rule of law than it was laid down in the time of

Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds

upon which ft was laid down have vanished long

since and the rule simply persists from blind lim-

itation of the past.’’’ Infra, at pp. 48-49.

_ In choosing to find law which was not revolting to his

conscience the court had to disregard the controlling New

ss

*

» "

18 Petition for a Writ of Certtorari

Jersey law. The Btsbing case, supra, established a criterion

regarding the New Jersey governmental proprietary clas-

sification that has never been challenged. That criterion

is whether the function in question is one voluntarily as-

sumed by the City as a consequence to permissive legisla-

State . . .’’' <A‘ further embellishment of the

Ntion from the State, or whether the function is ‘‘ within the

imperative public duties imposed on a municipality as agent

/ of - th

criterion is whether the activity benefits the public as a

whole or only the local citizenry.

The Bisbing case is not only factually indistinguishable,

but the same arguments unsuccessfully urged by the plain-

tiff in that case are the arguments adopted by the lower

court4n its opinion in the instant case. In Bisbing, the de-

fendants’ alleged negligence was set forth i in the plaintiff’s

declaration :

‘“That the defendant, a municipal corporation, was sub-

ject to. . . the duty . . . of keeping sound, safe,

and serviceable for public use all of the parks and pub-

7 places except the streets and avenues in said City

Asbury Park, and particularly the public place

one as the beach-front lying east of Ocean Avenue

** - Yet, the defendant did not keep said public place

known as the beach front * * * sound, safe, and service-

abl. for public use and travel.’’ 80 N. J. L. at 448, 78

Atl. at 197. |

The plaintiff had tripped in a hole under an exposed water

pipe located on the grounds adjacent to the ocean board-

“walk and part of the public park. In rejecting the plain-

tiffs arguments the Court adopted a rationale which has

never been questioned by the courts of New Jersey:

‘Ti. keeping up the public grounds, the agents of the

City were fulfilling a corporate duty imposed by law

=" s.

(10) Weeksw 7. City of Newark, supra, 62.N. J. Super. 166, 181,

"162 A. 2d 314. 323 (App. Div. 1960).

a

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 19 -

. . . @ governmental act,:and not-the exercise of ‘a

power conferred for its own benefit.’’ 80 N. J. L. at

424, 78 Atl. at 199. |

Perhaps more important, the court expressly rejected

the arguments adopted by the lower court in the instant

ease. The argument was that since the City derived sub-

stantial direct economic benefit from the use of the public

property, the whole of the. property should be regarded as

being used in a proprietary capacity (an argunient, inci-

dentally, which is inapplicable as to the Petitioner [R. 157a-

38; 97a-24; 157a-13; 157a-24) :

‘‘But it also appears in the case that . . . there were

constructed piers, pavillions, bath houses, a restaurant,

soda water stands, novelty stands, and other buildings

owned by the City and from which the city, by way of

rents, commissions, charges, and bathing privileges, |

derived a revenue. It as well also was in receipt of a

‘revenue from ground rents for portions of said

grounds, for rolling chair privileges, weighing ma-

‘chines, telescopes, and charges for the privilege of

going to a place of 'anding of a sailing yacht.

- By reason of the income . . . the City becomes lia-

ble, it is said . . . hence the insistence is that

the defendant was ‘managing and dealing with this

whole property as a private owner would, and that it

was held by the City for its own advantage and profit

.* 80 N. J..L. at 422, 78 Atl. at 199.

However, the Court rejected this argument pointing ont

that the legislation pertinent to the ocean front required

the use of this property as a public resort for all the citi-

zens, that it was a duty imposed by Taw, and that any

portion of the property which was public property and

not being used directly in a proprietary function would be

immune from tort liability. The fact that the lower court

20 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

' adopted the same arguments rejected in Bisbing may be

readily seen from a cursory reading of the Court’s opinion.

Infra, p. 25.

The Bisbing criterion was reaffirmed in Kuchler, supra,

“in 1928 (which the lower court also regards as no longer.

valid law in New Jersey), and was specifically affirmed in

identical rationales in the two decisions of Martin v. City

of Asbury Park, 111 N. J. L. 364, 168 Atl. 612 (BE. & A.

1933); 114 N. J. L. 298, 176 Atl. 172 (BE. & A. 1935). In

the 1933 Martin decision, the court found that where the

. City was lessor of a bath house which was negligently

maintained resulting in the: plaintiff’s fall on slippery

steps, the function of that particular portion of the prop-

erty was proprietary and the City might be sued. This

rationale of course Was precisely that adopted in Bishing.

In 1935, the second Martin decision again cited Bisbing

with approval and pointed out that the appropriate legis-

lative acts demonstrated the special status of seaside re-

sorts to the general public use, imposing an imperative

duty upon the cities to use the property for such a purpose.

In Martin, the question of immunity turned upon whether

the portion of the property where the accident occurred

was being used in a proprietary capacity. Sincw the City

of Asbury Park there occupied the status of an or@inary

landlord, the activity was regarded as proprietary, one in

which a private individual could engage as well as the

City. But in Bisbing, the accident occurred on public

grounds which were not being used in a proprietary ae-

tivity. - In this respect the instant case (involving an acci-

-dent apon the ocean beach itself) is precisely analogous

to the Bisbing accident occurring upon a portion of the

grounds adjacent to the boardwalk.- Bisbing and Martin

would both allow recovery in the instant case if the injury,

for example, had occurred in a hotel located on property

leased from the City. But the injury did not occur in such

circumstances and thus under Bisbing and Martin there

would be no liability.

Petition for a Writ of Certaorart | 21 -

The)two cases relied upon by the lower court as an

indication of departure from the earlier rationale. (Cloyes

v. Twshp. of Delaware, supra, and Weeks v. City of

Newark, supra), actually reaffirmed the instant rationale

and in no way questioned its applicability in the present

situation. In Cloyes, Chief Justice Weintraub said: ‘‘The-

courts declined to extend the concept of governmental im-

munity to new areas of activity while tending to adhere to

it in the areas in which it had been established.’’ 23 N. J. at

329, 129 A. 2d at 3. The court, in finding liability in Cloyes,

noted that the municipal operation of a sewage disposal

plant was proprietary because this was not an ancient

function of government, was still operated by private

utilities in some places, and the legislation allowing mu-

nicipal operation of sewage disposal plants was permissive

and not mandatory. Application of these criteria is in no

sense a departure from the criteria followed in the Bisbing

and Martin cases. :

Finally, in the latest articulation of the New Jersey

court, Weeks v. City of Newark, supra, so heavily relied

upon by the District Court, the rationale expressed was

precisely in line with that established in Bisbing and

Martin. In finding the operation of a municipal swimr.ing

pool proprietary, the court said:

‘“‘The operation of a swimming pool is an activity

which a municipality provides for its citizens more

as a matter of local convenience than in the exercise

of some duty discharged on behalf of the State with

consequent benefits accruing to the State as a whole.

It is a service which could just as well be provided by

a private corporation, and very often is.”* 62 N. J.

Super. at 180, 162 A. 2d at 322.

The Weeks decision did not-even mention the Bishing

case and its result is entirely in accord with the criteria

established’ in Bisbing, Kuchler and Martin, supra. _Fur-

ther, its analysis exposes the obvious distinction between

22 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

a municipal swimming pool intended for local use and

the Atlantic City beach which attracts the public of the

nation and which-has been the subject of so much State

and Federal aid.

CONCLUSION.

- For the foregoing reasons, this petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted. |

es

Respectfully submitted,

SaMvEx P. Or.Lanpo,

Counsel for Petitioner.

Grorce W. SHapoan,

‘ On the Petition.

APPENDIX A.-

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE Turep Circurr.

No. 14,661. 7 ra

ANDREW CAPOROSSI

v.

ATLANTIC omy, A MunicrpaL CorPoRATION OF THE STATE

oF New JERSEY;

LESTER WARREN, INC., a Corporation or THE STATE OF

New Jersey, an» MOLLIE GERBER anp SHEPARD

GERBER,

~ ATLANTIC CITY, a Municipa, Corporation oF THE STATE

oF New JERSEY,

| Appellant.

AppkAL From THE Unrtep States Distkict Court rorR THE

District or NEw JERSEY.

Argued February 20, 1964:

Before Katopner and Hastir, Circuit Judges, and Krmx-

patrick, District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

(Filed March 10, 1964.)

Per CuRIAM: .

On review of the record we find no error.” The judg-

ment of the District Court entered pursuant to the jury’s

verdict will be‘affirmed for the reasons so well stated by

Judge Cohen in his excellent opinion reported at.220 F.

Supp. 508 (D. C. N. J. 1963).

(23)

24 Appendiz A

JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT

: OF APPEALS.

This cause came on to be sei on the record from the

United States District Court for the cies of New Jer-

sey and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, it is now “ene ordered and

adjudged by this Court that the judgment filed June 6,

1963 in favor of the plaintiff, Andrew Caporossi, and against

the defendant, Atlantic City, a municipal corporation of the

State of New Jersey, be, and the same is hereby affirmed,

with costs.

| Attest: Ipa O. Creskorr, .

March 10, 1964. | : ‘Clerk.

Appendiz B | 25

APPENDIX B.

_ a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

District or New JERSEY.

Civil 581-61.

ANDREW CAPOROSSI, ae

| Plaintiff,

Vv.

_ATLANTIC CITY, a Municipat Corporation oF THE STATE .

or New Jersey, anp LESTER WARREN, INC., a Cor-

PORATION OF THE StaTE or New JERSEY,

Défendants.

OPINION.

(Filed 8/7/63.)

Conen, District Judge:

This is a motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict,

‘and in the alternative for a new trial,? by the defendant,

Atlantic City, a municipal corporation of the State of New .

Jersey, subsequent to a trial by jury and‘a verdict in favor

of the plaintiff, Andrew Caporossi. Appropriate motions

during trial were made by this defendant’ for a directed

vertlict, or judgment of involuntary dismissal, on all claims

for damages asserted by all parties against it, which were

denied. In addition to the legal, factual and argumentative

bases advanced by defendant at time of trial, which it re-

news and commingles with its present motion, it urges

(1) Fed. R. Civ. P. 50,28 U.S. C. A. 2078, properly to set aside

the verdict after trial.

(2) Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, 28 U. S. G. Ay |

26 | . Appendix B a

specifically. that the verdict of the jury was contrary to law, ©

and against the weight of the evidence; that the amount of °

damages awarded was excessive; and that the actions of

the court in failing to charge certain requested instructions

and in ruling on motions of the codefendants constitute

fatal judicial error warranting:a new trial. ~

While many of the reasons assigned by the Court orally,

{n its disposition of certain motions at time of trial, are

equally applicable now, the magnitude as well as the com-

plexity of the legal issues presented and upon which it is

compelled to rule as matters of law, requires renewed cou-

sideration and enunciation of its conclusions.

This litigation, grounded in tort for personal injury

and based upon diversity of ¢itizenship and jurisdictional

amount,’ was instituted by plaintiff, Andyw Caporossi, a

citizen of New York, against defendants, ihe city of Atlan-

tie City, a municipal corporation of the State of New

Jersey, Lester ‘Warren, Inc., a New Jersey corporation,

which operated the Commodore Hotel in Atlantie City, and

Mollie * and Shepard Gerber, citizens of New Jersey, who

owned and operated a parking lot in Atlantic City. The

plaintiff alleged negligence and nuisance against the de-

fendants who asserted cross-claims among themselves.

~ At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proofs, and again

at the conclusion of the entire case, all defendants moved

for judgments of involuntary dismissal and directed ver-

‘dicts, charging failure of the plaintiff to establish a prima

facie case against each of them, in that no issue of fact ex-

isted for the jury’s resolution, and that consequently as a

matter of law their motions should have been granted.

. On such motions made at the end of the plaintiff’s

case, it is axiomatic that the trial judge must accept as _

(3) ZU. S.C. 1332.

(4) Defendant Mollie Gerber died, pendente lite, which fact was

noted on the record, and the trial proceeded against defendant,

Shepard Gerber, as the surviving tenant by the entirety.

y

Appendiz B oe 27

proof all evidence supporting the position of the plaintiff,

and must give him the benefit of all inferences that may

logically and legitimately be drawn therefrom.® And again

where any of the evidence would cause fair-minded men to __

differ, the issue is one for the jury’s determination. Like-

wise, in passing upon a motion for judgment notwithstand-

ing the’ verdict, or more properly to set aside the verdict,

it should net be granted if the-evidence produced at trial ©

was sufficient to present a jury question, or if the verdict

is supported by substantial evidence. Whereas, /on- the

motion for a new trial, though similar problems are in-

volved, Such a motion is addressed to the sound judicial

discretion. of the trial court, and it may only be granted

where, despite substantial evidence, the verdict is clearly

against the weight of the evidence, or is based upon evi-

‘dence which is false, or would result in a miscarriage of

justiee,’ )

So viewed, and having in mind these salutary prin-

ciples, the testimony is considered.

On August 24, 1960, the date of the injury herein, and

for many years prior thereto, the defendant, Atlantic City,

owned, operated, maintained, and controlled a publie bath-

ing beach within the confines of the city, bordering on the

Atlantic Ocean, to which membersgof the public were in-

vited. The portion of the beach in question lies-at the foot

_(5) Hayden v. Curley, 34 N. J. 420, 422, 169 A. 2d 809 (1961) ;

California Fruit Exch. y. Henry, 89 F. Supp. 580, (W. D. Pa. 1950);

- Satur vy. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 18 F. R. D. 271,-(W. D. La.

1955). ? :

(6) Schrader v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., 280 F. 2d 355. (5 Cir.

1960) ; Shreve v. Hof Shoppes, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 436 (D.C. 1960),

aff'd. 292 F. 2d 761, 110 U. S. App. D. C. 268: Moffett v. Arabian

Am. Oil Co., 85 F. Supp. 174, (D. C. N. Y. 1949), aff'd. 184 F. 2d

859, (2 Cir.), cert. den.. 71 S. Ct. 533, 340 U. S. O48. 95 L. Ed.;

Weinzen y. Penna. R. Co., 143 F. Supp. 360, (D. C. Pa. 1956) : Rich-

field Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F. 2d 709, (9 Cir, 1959) ; cert.

den., 361° U. S. 961, 80 S. Ct. 570, 4 L. Ed. 543.

(7) Cloyes v. Dalaware Twp., 23 N. J. 324,129 A. 2d 1 (1957),

1943), citing extensive authorities and cases. ,

28 A ppendiz B

of St. Charles Place between the Garden Pier and the Steel

Pier, known as the Delaware Avenue section. This is a

highly populated area, serviced by multitudinous hotels,

many of which were supplied with pipe lines conveying

salt water from the ocean to these hotels providing salt

water baths for their guests. In the event of abandonment,

fire, or other reasons for disuse, the -pipes, referred to

throughout the testimony as dead ‘‘pipes’’, were exposed

and protruded, above the sand, but’ below the surface of

the ocean, constituting a known dangerous condition and

an admitted hazard to bathers. ,

The Commodore Hotel owned and operated by the

defendant, Lester Warren, Inc., is situated on the northerly

side of Pacific Avenue, facing St. Charles Place, the board-

walk, and the beach. .Gerbers’ parking lot, formerly the

new Davis Hotel destroyed by fire in 1952 and acquired by

them in 1954 after mesne conveyances, is located on the

easterly side of St. Charles Place, between Pacific Avenue

and the boardwalk. aid

{n Marck, 1944, pursuant to a resolution of the defend-

ant City, a permit was issued to the then owner of the

New Davis Hotel, Rose Fleischer, for the installation of

salt water intake pipes, leading from the ocean to the said

hotel. One terminal of these pipe lines, in disuse since ,

1952, was located on the beach at St. Charles Place, and

for a considerable period of time prior to the occurrence :

of August 24, 1960, was exposed, the extent of the exposure a lye

varying with the height of the tide; at times completely sf 3

exposed, at others partially exposed, and at still others

completely submerged in the ocean ‘entirely invisible to

public bathers. The hazardous condition created by the

presence of these pipe lines on the beach was known to the

beach personnel and to at least: two of the City Commis-

sioners, as well as to many other employees of the City.

The many pipe lines on the beach, and specifically the

one in question, resulted in injuries of various kind and

degree to lawful bathers almost daily. Sué@h oceurrences

Appendix B ‘99 ©

were reported to and acknowledged by the employees and

officials of Atlantic City. Despite these circumstances,

these pipes remained without safeguards or other pre-

cautionary: measures and without any warning sigys what-

soever. Recommendations for their removal,-prior to the

accident, were repeatedly made and as often refused. How-

ever, after the incident giving rise to the lant, en

-of action, the pipes, belatedly, were removed. Evidéiice of

their removal was proper since control, of. same was in

issue. =i

Although no charge was made by the :City to persons

using the beach, luxury taxes were imposed upon hotels

and merchants which were passed on to guests and con-

sumers, of $1,797,457.4 for the year 1959,.and $1,781,531.07

for 1960, resulting in economic benefit to the City. In

furtherance of its endeavors to solicit and attract people to

the resort, the City for many years advertised extensively

in newspapers, national magazines, on television and radio

‘as far west as Kansas City, up to Canada and down into

the South appealing to one-third of the national population

to use its beach. The City maintained its own. public rela-

tions department and employed the services of the Dorland |

Advertising Agency to whom it paid, in 1959, the sum of

$206,587.96 and, in 1960, the sum of $197,243.26.

Shortly prior to August 24, 1960, the plaintiff and his

prospective bride, seeking to spend their honeymoon in

Atlantic City, communicated with the Commodore Hotel,

owned and operated by defendant, Lester Warren, Ine..

requesting information concerning its facilities. In re-

sponse the plaintiff received a brochure, the design of which

was authored by the President of the defendant hotel-cor-

poration. The brochure listed ‘‘free surf bathing from

hotel to beach”’ as one of its features. It also contained a

map of the hotel ky relation to te beach, as well as a picture

of persons bathing ty the surf. The plaintiff sent a money

oré>r to the hotel in August, 1960, making reservation for

himself and his fiancee, commencing August 23, 1960. After

30 A ppendix B

marriage they arrived on August 23, 1960, at 6:00 P. M.

and registered at- the Commodore Hotel. That evening

they attended Steel Pier, an amusement pier situated on ~

the boardwalk abutting the beach. On August 24, 1960, -

about 4:00 P. M., they prepared to go to the beach; neither

‘had ever been there before, nor were they-aware of its site.

Upon checking his. valuables with the Room Clerk, the -

plaintiff made inquiry as to the location of the hotel beach

and was directed to walk down St. Charles Place, which the

plaintiff and his wife proceeded to de. Upon arrival at the

beach, they selected a location and placed a blanket on the.

sands, near a lifeguard stand. Shortly thereafter, the

plaintiff and his wife entered the ocean and after a few

minutes of splashing at each other playfully, the plaintiff

trod into the surf and dove into an incoming wave. His -

head struck a submerged object. A pool of blood appeared

on the water's surface at the site ef the plaintiff’s entrance

into the surf and at the location of the pipe in question;

after calls for help, lifeguards and others ran into the surf,

removed the plaintiff therefrom, and summoned medical

assistance. The plaintiff sustained severe and permanent

. injuries to hix spine and spinal cord, resulting in quadri-

plegia.

* At the conclusion of the evidence; the motion for dis-

missal of defendant, Gerber, was granted on the ground

that there was insufficient testimony upon which liability

in- negligence r nuisance could be predicated on either fact

_or law." ‘Thaandst that was proved was a‘ reéord easement

for the laying of the pipes, which easement was not within

00 years of defendant's chain of title of record. Actual

(8) Lambe. Reardon, 69 N. J. Saper. 87, 64, 173 A. 2d 320,

525, (App. Div. 1961): “A plaintiff does not make out a prima. facie

‘cise against an abutting owner merely by putting in proof of the exist-

ence of a nuisance, and he cannot thereby throw upon the owner -the

burden of establishing that neither he nor his predecessor in title is

responsible for its creation or continuance.” (citations omitted) On

the contrary, plaintiff has the burden of proving that the owner or his

predecessor in title was responsible therefor.

Appendiz B 31

knowledge was categorically denied by the defendant, and

remained uncontradicted. The motion of defendant, Lester |

Warren, Inc., the owner-operator of the Commodore Hotel,

was taken under advisement by the Court, and the question

of its negligence together with that of defendant, Atlantic

City, was submitted to the jury. The jury ultimately re-

turned a verdict for plaintiff in damages in the amount of

$600,000.00 against defendant, Atlantic City; and a verdict

of no‘cause for action in favor of defendant, Lester Warren,

Ine. Thereafter, the motions of defendant, Lester Warren,

Inc., directed to plaintiff’s claim anc to the cross-claim of

defendant, Atlantic City were granted by the Court.

In contravening the plaintiff’s claim for damages fér

injuries sustained as a proximate result. of defendant At-

lantic City’s negligence in operating a public beach, or on

the basis of the maintenance of a nuisance, defendant inter-

posed by pleading and argument of its motion .that as a

municipal corporation it is immune from tort liability under

common law principles and by statute conferring such im-

munity, Revised Statutes of New Je rsey Title 40 9-2, N. J.

S. .A., which reads.as follows :-

‘*No municipality or county shall be liable for injury

to the person from the use of any publie grounds.

buildings or structures, any law to the contrary not-

withstanding.’’ (L. 1933, ¢. 460, approved Jan. 10,

1934.) .

Defendant concedes :that if injury to a person results

from the use of ‘tany public grounds, buildings or struc”

tures’’ which is devoted to a proprietary activity, as dis-

tinguished from governmental, there is mo statutory im-

munity against municipal tort liability and common law

principles apply; but contends that if the function is govern-

mentai, then under statutory immunity there ix no liability

whether the alleged tort ix based upon simple negligence,

active wrongdoing, Or nuis.... e.

32 . Appendiz B

The primary thrust of defendant’s argumert is that

the area involved in this casepje that of a ‘*publie park’’,

hence within the language of jhe immunity statute in ques-

tion, in‘that it ix within ‘‘publie grounds’* therein énum-

erated. In support of this contention defendant places

great reliance upon the character of the land in question,

beach.front property, as being determined by the nature.

of its acquisition, conditioned upon its purpose and use as

a ‘+public park, or place for public resort and recreation.’

_ By its Charter Provisions (P. L. 1854 p. 278) the territorial

limits of Atlantic City extend into the Atlantic Ocean to

the exterior line of-the State’s riparian jurisdiction. Pur-

suant to permissive but not mandatory legislative authority,

(P. L. 1894 ¢. 98, R. S. 40:179-98, et seq. N. J. S. A.) the

defendant, on October 13, 1899, passed a municipal ordi-

nance **to lay out and open a public park or place for public

resort and recreation along the beach or ocean front of

Atlantic City, establishing the interior or iniand line of

such park or place of publie resort and recreation, and the

limits and boundaries thereof, and providing for the is-

suing and sale of bonds to defray the costs, damages and

expenses incurred in the opening and laying out of such

park ‘and acquiring the lands, property and rights neces-

sary therefor, and for the assessment of property benefited

thereby.’’ The ordinance further provided for the con-

degunation of lands desired by the municipality for -such

“public purpose which were not so dedicated by the private

owners thereef. To avoid condemnation proceedings «by

the municipality the then private owner of the beachfront

area here in question, now known as St. Charles Place, a

James B. Riley, joined with other beachfront owners, and

by deed dated February 6, 1900 conveyed to defendant

municipality ‘tall their’and each of their right, title and

interest, in and to the above deseribed tract. of land (em-

bracing the area in question) and every part and .parcel

thereo!, including such parts and pareeis thereof as‘are or

eh a.

may be cevered by water.’ -There was reserved to the

. Appendix B ae 33

grantors, their heirs and assigns, the right to lay beneath ,,

the surface of their respective lands so conveyed, a pipe or

pipes from their remaining and adjoining lands to and

into the ocean for the purpose of obtaining and conveying

sea water to their lands. _

Thereafter, and pursuant to the Act of April 8, 1903

which was.a supplement to the Act of April 11,-1864, de-

fendant on February 13, 1907 secured a riparian grant

trom the State of New Jersey Riparian Commissioners, for

lands urder water lying between the highwater line of the

westerly shore of Absecon Inlet and the exterior lines

established by the Riparian Commissioners, and for lands

under water lying between the highwater line of the At-

lantic Ocean and the exterior line as established by the

Commission, which ineluded the area in question. This

riparian. grant was made expressly subject to a prior grant

by the State-of New Jersey, through its Riparian Commis-

sioners, to the United States of America on August 17,

1878. Further, the grant to the municipality provided that

should public purpose cease, the lands were to revert to the

State.

Such then ae the title of defendant, Atlantic City,

when in 1944 it issued a permit for the laying of salt water

intake pipes to Gerbers’ predecessor in title, pursuant to’

a ‘*Resolution’’ of its Board of Commissioners, which reso-

Jution provided, inter alia, for the laying of pipes and in-

takes at sufficient depth under the sands of the ‘public

park** so that neither pipe nor intakes shall protrude above

the beach; that the permitee was to assume sole responsi-

bility for damage to street construction or to the public”

using the beach caused by the same becoming uncovered

on the beach; and that such permitee was to post bond to

assure all repairs, and to lower the pipe line when sach

were necessary ‘to protect the public property and people

using the’ beach.*’ No grant of easement of record was

ever properly lodged to give notice of such resolution or

34 Appendix B

construction permit which would appear upon a search of

the title to the lands in question.

Defendant, Atlantic City, strenuously argues that the

Court departed from the obligatory duty imposed upon it

by the Federal Rules of Decision Act (28 U.S. C. 1652), as

interpreted by Erie &c. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 8. Ct.

817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938), and by subse-

quent United States Supreme Court decisions, in holding

that the city in its operation of ‘‘the beach park’’ was en-

gaged in a proprietary function, and in refusing to base its

determination of the substantive law of New Jersey on the

decisions of the New Jersey.Court of last resort, as then

constituted, in Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78

A. 196 (E. & A. 1910), and Kuchler v. N. J. d N.Y. R. R.

Co., 104 N. J. L. 333, 140 A. 329 (E. & A. 1928), which cases

it contends hold that the operation of a ‘‘public park’’ is

a governmental function. |

The legal compulsion to apply state substantive law

under the Federai Rules of Decision Act,’ and as developed

by the United States Supreme Court sinee Erie, is weli

established in diversity actions in the Federal District

Courts.’” In such actions, as here, the Federal District

Court is but another forum of the state courts and is com-

pelled to make. such determination as would a state court

on the precise issue presented to it.” Its function is not to,

<peculate as what the law will be in the future, or apply a

» (9) 2U. S.C. 1652: “The laws of the several states, except

Where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of

Congress otherwise: require or provide. shall be regarded as rules of

decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases

where they apply.” June 25, 1948. ¢. 646, 62 Stat. 944. Based on

Title 28 U.S.C. 1940 ed.. see. 725 (R.S. sec. 721); Judiciary Act of

1789, sec. 34. .

(10) Nolan v. Transocean .\ir Lines, 365 U. S. 293, 81 S. Ct.

556, 5 L. Ed. 2d 572 (191): King v. Order of Travelers, 333 U. S.

153, 68 S. Ct. 488, 92 ©. Ed. GOS (1948), and see fotes (12) and

(13) post. : ;

(11) Hausman v. Buckly. 209 *. 2d 696 (2 Cir., 1962), cert.

den. 369 U.S. 885, 82 5. Ct. 1137, 8 L. Ed. 2d 286.

_ Appendix B | 35

rule of law. which it considers better or wiser.7* And con-

versely, the Federal District Court in a diversity case must

accept a binding ruling of the state court of last resort, or

lacking such, its intermediate appellate courts, even though

in its opinion it is an erroneous one. As was stated in

West v. Amer. T..d T. Co., 311 U.S. 228 (1940) at pp.

236, 237 :

_ (True, as was intimated in the Erie Railroad case,

the highest court of the state is the final arbiter of

what is state law. When it has spoken, its pronounce-

ment is to be accepted by federal courts as defining

state law unless it has later given clear and persuasive

‘indication that its pronouncement will be modified, lim-

ited.or restricted. ... . But the obvious purpose of

Sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act is to avoid the mainte-

nance within a state of two divergent or conflicting sys-

tems of law, one to be applied in the state courts, the

other to be availed of in the federal courts, only in case

of diversity of citizenship. That object would be

thwarted if the federal court= were free to choose their

own rules of decision whenever the highest court of

the state has not spoken.

‘*A state ix not without law save as its highest

court has declared it. There are many rules of deci-

sion commonly aceepted and acted upon by the bar

and inferior courts which are nevertheless laws of the

state although the highest court of the state has never

passed upon them. In those circumstances a federal

court ix not free to reject the state rule merely because

it hax not received the sanction of the highest state

(12) West v? Amer. T. & T. Co., 311-U. S. 223. 61S. Ct. 179,

85 L. Ed. 139 (1940). | |

(13; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Morris, 273 VF. 2d 452 (8

Cir.. 1960): Hausman ve Buckly. ante.: West v. Amer. T. x. ee

Ante.; Six Companies of California v. Highway Dist.. 311 U.S. 180,

61 S.Ct. 186. 83 L. Ed. 114 (1940); Fidelity Trust v_ Field, 311

U.S. 169, 61 S. Ct. 170, 85 L. Ed. 109 (1940). y

-

36 ' Appendix B

court, even though it thinks the .rule is unsound in

‘principle or that another is preferable. State law.is to

be applied in the federal courts as well as the state

courts and it is the duty of the former in every case to

‘ascertain from all the available data what the state law

is and apply it rather than to prescribe a different rule,

however superior it may appear from the viewpoint

of ‘general law’ and however much the state rule may

have departed from prior decisions of the federal

courts.”’

In any consideration of the effect of the immunity ~

statute upon the state of the law, which must bind and

guide a court called upon to make a determination of the

existence of municipal liability:or immunity in tort law,

‘resort must be made, of necessity, to the original historical

development of the substantive law of New Jersey in order

to ascertain the present law to be applied in the particular

case. . . : -

At the outset it should be understood that although the

statute imports to grant blanket immunity to nrunicipalities

in its operation of public buildings, lands, etc., the New

Jersey courts have interpreted this immunity to apply only

when a\governmental function is being performed on the

premises in question.

Thus,}we are confronted with the query of whether

the ownership and maintenance or operation by the munic-

ipality of the public bathing-beach in Atlantie City, border-

“ing on the Atlantic = -an, was activity within the classifiea-

tion of governmental capacity and function, for the phrpose

_of determining immunity or non-immunity in tort law."

(14) The origin of the doctrine of governmental immunity is

steeped in the early history of England on the rudimentary theory that

“the King can do no wrong.” The balancing of the concept of such

sovereign immunity against the right of the injured individual gave

rise in judicial decisions to artificial distinctions, such as governmental

and: proprietary functions, in order that a wrong should not be with- -

out judicialeremedy. Such cases seem irreconcilable on the basis of

Appendix B - 37

The historical inception of the municipal immunity

‘ problem is. stated in McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N. J. 172,

190-191, 162 A. 2d 820, 830 (1960) :

“The general thesis of municipal immunity traces

back to the 1788 English.case of Russell v. The, Men

of Deron; 2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K. B.

1788). At that time ‘thé idea of the municipal corpo- .

rate entity was in a nebulous state and the action was

in effect against the population of a whole county.’ The

- decision was predicated on ‘lack of precedent to sustain

the action, fear of a multitude of such actions and the

absence-of funds in the treasury to be used in payment

of judgments arising out of torf claims. (Citation of

authorities omitted.) In such a situation Judge As-

hurst, speaking for the Kings Bench in Russell, said,

‘that it is better than an individual should sustain an

injury than that the public should suffer an incon-

venience.’ 100 Eng. Rep., at p. 362. How the courts

of the United States came to apply the sovereign

immunity doctrine, according to Professor Borchard,

‘is one of the mysteries of lega] evolution.’ ’’ See 15 .

Rut. L. Rev. 98 (1960) note; discussed, 86 N. J. L. J. 1

(1963).

the various reasons and tests assigned to determine the ‘one classifica-

tion or the other. Municipal Corp. 38 Am. Jr. 573, 574. pp. 266, 267 ;

63 C. J. S. sec. 747-750 pp. 34-38; Nissen v. Redelack 246 Minn. 83.

74.N. W. 2d 300, 55 A. L. R. 2d 1428 (1955) annotated p. 1434: under

the topic “Municipal operation of bathing beach or swimming pool as

governmental or proprietary function for purposes of tort liability” :

Prosser, the Law of Torts (2d ed. 1955). sec. 109; 2 Harper and

James, the Law of Torts (1956) sec. 296; 3 McQuillin. Municipal

Corporations (3d ed. 1950) sec. 53.29; Dodridge, Distinction Be-

tween Governmental and Proprictary Functions of Municipal Cor-

porations, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1925). In the present day. par-

ticular and new activities of municipal corporations give rise to further

distinctions, ¢.q. “Parks, Playgrounds, Public Squares and Commons.”

63 C. J. S: sec. 907: “Public Baths, Beaches and Swimming Pools,”

63 C. J. S. 908. p. 322: further authorities collected, OO A. L. R. 2d

1199 nn. 1-6.

3s. : Appendix B

Prior to the immunity statute of 1934, ‘governmental

tort immunity’? in New Jersey enunciated in Board of

Chosen Freeholders of Sussex County v. Strader, 18 N. J. 1.

108 (Sup. Ct. 1840) had been ratified by decisions of its

‘courts of last resort to a point where the legal classification

of the municipal activity involved was either governmental.

or proprietary with alternate liability or freedom in the

field of tort law.”

Of course, the difficulty i in determining the one classifi-

cation or the other plagued the courts. See: Weintraub

and Conford, Tort Liability of Municipalities in New

Jersey, 3 Mercer, Beasley L. Rev. 142 (1934).

The precise effect of the statute upon municipal lia-

bility was considered by the lower courts in New Jersey,

shortly after its enactment, in.Leeds-v. Atlantic City, 15

“ J. Mise. 868, 181 A. 892 (Cir. Ct. 1935), and in Falcone

.v. Newark Board of Education, 17 N. J. Mise. 75, + A. 2d

687 (C. P. 1939).**

In Leeds, the court pointed out that it could be pre-’

sumed that the Legislature was mindful of the distinction

between governmental and proprietary functions in the

New Jersey decisional law when it enacted the statute in

question, and that had a drastic change in the law been.

intended, ‘such would have been manifest in the language

of the statute. It found no such drastic change, and con-

cluded that Atlantic City’s ownership and operation of

Convention Hall, where plaintiff was injured while a pay-

ing. patron at a football game, was similar in nature to a

(15) Schwartz.v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141, 160 A. 2d 1, (1900).

. learned opinion by Justice Hall, for the New Jersey Supreme Suet

citing extensive authority: cf: Thompson v. Millville Bd. of E d..

11 N.-J. 207, 94 A. 2d 206 (1953); Cloyes v. Delaware Twp., 23

N. J. 324,.129 A. 2d 1 (1957).

(16) The 1933 enactment. effective in 1934, R. S. 40:9-2.

N. J. S. A.. applied to school districts as well as municipalities and

counties, and with the 1937 revision of the New Jersey Statutes, tie

statute was parceled into “Education” (R. S. 18:5-30. N. J. S. A.)

and the statute here in question, “Municipalities and Counties”; RK. S.

40 :9-2, N. J. S. A.

Appendix B 39

private enterprise, hence proprietary in nature rather than

governmental and, consequently, not within the statute

which would absolve it from liability for negligence.

In Falcone, the court was confronted with a ease where

a child was injured at school by a falling slate slab. It

referred to the two exceptions to the general common law

rule of non-liabijity of governmental bodies for negligence

—active wrongdoing and proprietary function. The court

declared that the statute in question was intended to modify

the common law rule, but that the courts have carefully

construed and applied the statute so as not to overrule un-

necessarily the common law principles, pointing out that

the statute concerns ‘‘ public: grounds, buildings or strue-

tures,’ and hence, public streets and publie ways, and

proprietary activities, as distinguished from governmental,

are not within the protection of the statute.

Judge Goldman, in Weeks vr. City of Newark, 62 N. J.

Super. 166, 171-2, 162 A. 2d 314, 317 (App. Div. 1960),

provided scholarly review and brilliant analysis of the law

in New Jersey pertaining to the municipal immunity

problem, stating:

‘Various courts have considered the statute subse-

“quent to the Leeds and’ Falcone decisions. However,

the precise effect of the statute upon the common law

classification of municipal and county activities as

governmental or proprietary has never been expressly

declared by our court of last resort.*’

- Judge Goldmann goes on to point ont that cases pre-

~ sented to the Supreme Court of New Jer <ey are not such

as to call forth any definitive declaration short of implying

that.common law distinetion of governmental or proprie-

tary functions persists as part of New Jersey law.

In Weeks the Court found that the municipality had

engaged in a proprietary function, and hence. if negligent.

was not protected by the immunity statute. The funetion

al

-

40 | Appendiz B

was the operation of a swimming pool, the Hayes Park

_ Pool West, by the municipality, the City of Newark, where

plaintiff was injured. It was held to be an activity not nec-

essarily nor. historically incident to government, byt rather

susceptible of, and usually exercised by, private enterprise.

With respect to the operation of a swimming pool by

a municipality, the Court in Weeks observed that there are

two general views reflected by the case law on the subject:

(1) The majority or Massachusetts doctrine, on the ques-

tion of immunity where a swimming pool is maintained and

where nominal charge only may be made, proceeding gen-

erally on the ground that maintenance of a swimming pool

is in the interest of the public health and welfare, hence,

governmental; and (2) that of a strong minority, known as

the New York line of decisions, holding proprietary-non-

immunity, on the ground that the modern trend is against

municipal non-liability, and although the public health

might incidentally be benefited, it should be realized that a

municipality that operates a swimming pool is acting as a

legal indi-idual voluntarily assuming a duty, not imposed

tipon it as a necessary and essential incident of govern-

ment for the benefit of a locality rather than the general

public.'7 -

On appeal, Ww eeks was affirmed. unanimously by the

Supreme Court of New Jersey, per curiam. This convine-

ingly demonstrates the Court’s gauging of the develop-

ment of the law on the problem before it, as well as the dis-.

cernment of the judicial temper of the court of last resort

in the State of New Jersey.

Those courts which classify these facilities as govern-

mental do so usually on the ground that they have intimate ~

(17) See generally, 55 A. L. R. 2d 1434, anno. “Municipal op-

eration of bathing beach or swimming pool as governmental or

proprietary function, for “ear of tort liability: 51 A. L. R. 370,

suppl. 57 A. L. R. 40@, 8 A. L. R. 2d pp. 1310, 1315 and 1317;

_ also, “Liability of municipal corporations for injuries due to condi-

tions in parks,” 29 A. L. R , supplemental in 42 A. L. R. 263, 99

ATR oie 142 ALR 160, A. L. R. 2d 1204, sec. 4(b).

Appendix B 41

relation with the public health or, more broadly, with the

public good. Such is the rationale of the two cases stressed

by the defendant, Bisbing v. Asbury Park, supra, and Kuch-

lerv. N.J.&@N.: ¥.R. R. Co., supra. The opinion in Bis-

bing is seemingly based, to some extent, on the criterion

that ‘‘neither the grass plot (where the accident occurred),

nor the way upon which it bordered, produced revenue to

the City’’; and further, that the land in question was a

‘‘park site’’ held for public purpose in governmental ca-

pacity, and therefore immune under Strader. The theory

of corporate .berefit as the sole proprietary test has since

Bisbing been rejected in New Jersey.” In Kuchler it was

determined that a municipality which leased from a railroad

company a plot of ground maintained by it as a park im-

mediately above the station was not liable for injury occur-

ring as a result of ice on steps leading from the park to the

station. The Court stdted that ‘‘the maintenance of public

parks is a recognized method of serving the public interest,

and nothing in the instant case is presented to differentiate

it as an exception from the application of this well-settled

rule,’’ relying for authority on Bisbing. . .

In ‘‘Tort Liability of Municipalities in New Jersey’’,

supra, the ‘abundant crop’’ of decisions referred: to by

Chief Justice Hornblower in Freeholders of Sussex v.

Strader, supra, ensued in passing years, as lunicipal ac-

tivity expanded with changing times and became more com-

(18) See Weeks v. Newark, supra; Housing Authority vy. Trust

Co.. 25 N. J. 330, 136 A. 2d 401 (1957). Cf: Hoffman v. Bristol,

113 Conn. 386, 155 A. 499 (1931). 75 A. L. R. 1191. where although

recognizing the operation of a non-profit public bathing beach as a

governmental function to which immunity attached, following the

Massachusetts view, the municipality was held liable on the basis of

nuisance for maintaining a diving board above shallow water.’ Note

that-while Massachusetts represents the majority view holding munici-

pal beaches a governmental function, it also provides an interesting

paradox : Cape Cod, a peninsula beached on three sides by the Atlantic

Ocean, and comprised of approximately 68 small villages, consists

principally of private beaches, and it would appear that the problem

f{ municipal liability would seldom, if ever, arise.

s

42 : Appendix B

plex. The article reviews the decisions of the New Jersey

Courts up to May of 1934. Present day problems were

there anticipated by the authors of the landmark treatise,

and to some extent resolved a quarter of a century later.

In Cloyes v. Delaware Twp. the Supreme Court, then

speaking through Justice Weintraub (now Chief Justice

and one of the authors of the rears ln in 23 N. J. 324, 332,

129 A. 2d 1, 5, (1957), said: °

‘‘We do not believe this is the case in which to con-

sider whether to come to grips with the entire problem.

We are satisfied that movement toward Strader is in

‘the wrong direction. Hence, we confine the inquiry to

the question of whether the operation here conducted

is proprietary within the holding of more recent au-

thorities, without regard to whether the result will jell

with expressions which antedate them.”’

This then is the posture of the New Jersey law on this

issue. There are no New Jersey cases which endow mu-

nicipally owned public beaches or public parks with pro-

prietary characteristics. The next legical query involves

the legal compulsion of this Court to apply the substantive

holding of Kuchler which relies on Bisbing which, in turn,

- relies on Strader.

Although there must be faithful adherence to state sub-

stantive law in non-federal matters it should be a wise and

discerning loyalty. Blind adherence to certain state deci-

sions, i.e., Strader, Bisbing and Kuchler, without evaluating .

those decisions in the light of other. more recent and more

relevant judi¢ial developments would result in PREstice

_ and a perversion of the staie law which a federal court sets

out to apply.’”” The then understandable fear, assigned as

a basis in Strader, for insulation against municipal liability

—a pernicious dissipation ef public funds- —has become a

(19) See Fahs v. Martin, 224 F. 387 (5 Cir. 1935) ; See lA °

’ Moore Fed. Pract. (1961) 0.309.

Appendix B 43 |

myth under the conditions of a modern enlightened society.

Like gaslight of another time it must give way to the

brightened illumination of today, which chases the shadows

and leaves exposed the inadequacy of such a Mid-Victorian

concept.

The governmental-proprietary dichotomy is probably

oné of the most unsatisfactory known to the law. In 1955

a majority of five Justices of the United States Supreme

Court spoke of ‘‘. . . the non-governmental-governmental

quagmire that has long plagued the law of. municipal cor-

porations. A comparative_study of the cases in the forty-

eight states will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More

than that, the decisions in each of the states are dishar-

monious 2nd disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try

to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound.’ Indian .

Towing Co. v. U. S., 350 U. S. 61, 76 S. Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed.

48 (1955). .

In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, 350

U. S. 198 (1956), a relaxing of the strict rule was sug-

gested. Faced in a diversity case with a question ap-

parently settled by a 1910 decision of a “state Supreme

Court, it felt bound by that decision. The Court, however,

noted: _ ° a ,

“*. . > it was agreed on oral argument that there is to

late authority from the Vermont court, that no frac-

ture in the rules announced in those cases has-appeared

in subsequent rulings or dicta, and that no legislative

movement is under way in Vermont to change the

result of those cases.

sé

. . There appears to be no confusion in the Ver-

mont decision, uo developing line of authority that

casts a shadow over the established ones, no dicta,

doubts or ambiguities in the opinion of Vermont judges

on the question, no legislative development that prom-

ises to undermine the judicial rule.’’

44 Appendiz B

In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter sug-

gested that a federal court might decide that the Vermont

court, if faced with the question at this time, might reach

a conclusion contrary to the 1910 decision. He argued,

quite forcefully, that the court should attempt to decide

what the Vermont court would do with the question now.

The task, therefore, is to determine whether subse-

quent to Bisbing and Kuchler, there is judicial persuasion

to convince this ‘Court how the highest New Jersey State

Court would decide this question.” The Supreme Court

: (20) An examination of 50 years of judicial history of Bisbing

v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78 A. 196, (E. & A. 1910) anno.

33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523, discloses that it has been cited by the~

appellate courts ‘of New Jersey only as companion authority with

and since Strader (1840), supra, for the general principle that a

municipality. is not liable in negligence in the performance of its

goyernmental duties, with certain exceptions such as proprietary

functions and active wrongdoing; e.g. Karpinski v. Boro of South

River, 85 N. J. L. 208, 88 ‘A. 1073 (E. & A. 1913) where child injured

by electric wire on street, the municipality supplying electric service

to private consumers ; Stephens v. Commissioners of Palisades Inter-

state Park, 93 N. J. L. 500, 108 A. 645 (E. & A. 1919), a case in-

volving a broader concept—the ‘defendant interstate (N. J. and N. Y.)

Commission was directly created by statute and held to be within the

rule in Strader, supra, of a public agency charged with a public duty

and therefore absolved from negligence; Johnson v. Bd. of Ed. of

N. Wildwood, 102 N. J. L. 606, 133 A. 301 (E. & A. 1926), injury

in s¢hool building, followed Strader, supra; Kuchler v. New Jersey

& N.Y. R. Co., infra; Liming v. Holman, 10 N. J. Misc. 582, 160

A. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1932), involved injury to a jail attendant by escapee,

and relied on the general rule of public duty ; Martin v. Asbury Park,

(2 cases) infra; Com’r. Int. Rev. v. Sherman, 69 F. 2d 759 (1 Cir.

1934), involved question of exemption from tax of employee engaged

in governmental function. ( now obsolete), but it states the Massa-

chusetts view on parks, citing Bisbing with approval, -but makes

distinction in kind between parks created as part of a general statu-

tory park system, and “pleasure resorts”; Doerr v. Newark, 128

N. J. L. 491-27 A. 2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1942), alleging injury from a

fall in City Hall where plaintiff went to pay water bill, pointing out

site of fall not clear..and she might have cause of action if in water

department ; Miller v. Layton, 132 N. J. L. 426, 41 A. 2d 24 (Sup.

Ct. 1945): a bridge damage case much like Strader, upon which court

‘ relied; Hill v. Boro Collingswood, 9 N. J. 369, 88 A..2d 506 (1952)

pertained to a Park Commission, not unlike Palisades, ante, but there

the park was part of a County Park System created by statute, R. S.

Appendix B 45

in New. Jersey has spoken out repeatedly against the

amplification of the doctrine of immunity from tort !a-

bility, despite a general legislative unwillingness to act ip

light of present day circumstances, and despite the relue-

tance of the majority of courts of other states to break

with outmoded doctrines of the past. In McCabe v. N. J.

Turnpike Auth., 35 N. J. 26, 170 A. 2d 810, (1961), the

Court found sufficient. manifestation of legislative intent to

subject the Turnpike Authority to suit, without resorting

to the troublesome distinction of governmental .or proprie-

tary activity for negligently inflicted wrongs, pointing out

that ‘‘Critical writers have made it clear that the doctrine

of sovereign immunity has little relevancy to modern day

concepts 6f justice’’2" As was stated by the Court in both

McCabe and Cloyes, the doctrine of municipal immunity

developed for a society totally unlike the present day one,

and should not be further burdened with “hairline distine-

tions which are elusive and unsatisfactory and often most

40 :37-17, 18 as autonomous agency, and its general governmental

function could not be thwarted by local zoning ordinance. And

within the 35 years since Kuchler v. New Jersey & N. ¥. R. Co..

104. N. J. L. 333. 140 A. 329 (E. & A. 1928), the New Jersey courts

have cited it in opinions only twice. See: Kelley v. Curtiss, 29 N. J.

Super. 291, 297, 102 A. 2d 471, 473 (App. Div. 1954). reversed

on other grounds, 16 N. J. 265; 108 A. 2d 431 (1954). Stringfield v.

City of H censack. 68 N. J. Super. 38. 43. 171 A.-2d 301. 304

(App. Liv. 1961) a municipal parking case, which merely alludes to -

it. Neither of these intermediate appellate cases relied upon Auchler

as controlling autherity. Furthermore, in Auchler: the site of injury

was on steps leading to a park site leased from the railroad company.

A review ‘of the New Jersey decisions of the past 35 years

clearly demonstrates a more realist.c attitude in the tort field to-

wards the proprietary classification in refusing to extend an ancient.

inflexible, and often harsh, and modernly unnecessary doctrine ot

immunity to new situations. “The New Jersey trend is in line with

that being foilowed elsewhere.” Schwartz v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141.

147, 100 A. 2d 1, 4 (1900). .

(21) See Taylor v. N. J. Highway Authority, 2? N. J. 454.

126 A. 2d 313 (1956). There Justice Jacobs observes that federa!

decisions persuasively point vut that the doctrine‘ of governmental

J :

immunity from suit in currently in disfavor. .

46 aa Appendiz B

artificial.’” And, as emphasized in Cloyes, any attempted

expianaticn-for judicial inconsistency can be found only in

the history of the subject and the evolutionary develop-

ment of that area of law as particular cases called for dis-

position in light of changing times, extended municipal

activities, and progressive concepts of remedial justice in

the field of tort liability. Tae underlying reason for the

granting of immunity to municipal corporations was the

_ practical concern of the courts to avoid the supposed in-

evitable flood of negligence actions, or, as stated in the

Strader case, the ‘abundant crop.’’

Comparisons, while not controlling of course, provide

greater dimension to the concepts being considered. A fac- -

tually analogous situation arose in Ide t. St. Cloud, 150

Fla. 806, 8 So. 2d 924, noted in 8 A. L. R. 2d 1317 (1942),

where .a city pursuant to charter power, maintained a

public bathing beach to which the general public was in-

vited. For some time, it had knowingly allowed a deep |

hole there to remain hidden. and unguarded. Plaintiff's

deceased husband and son were drowned. It was held that

the complaint stated.a cause of action. More than 40 years

ayo, Florida, a state equally famous, if not more so, for

its publie beaches as New «Jersey, recognized municipal

liability in tort to innocent victims of misfortune. In

‘Kaufmann v. Tallahasse, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922), it

repudiated ehtirely the governmental-proprietary ‘distinc- |

tion with its judicially evolved ‘‘quagmire’’ of legal fictions

and logistical niceties. ‘The Florida court espoused the view

that. antiquated concepts were inapplicable to modern cities

. operating as municipal corporations under d commission or

city manager form of government for the reason that in

modern times the activities of such cities ‘*. . . partake

more of the. nature of business than government.’’ The

court concluded further, that all such functions of munici-

pal corporations would be considered proprietary, in the

exercise of which, there would be liability for the negligence

” (22) Wide: 3 Mercer,Beasley L. Rev.’ 142, op. cite..

—_

.

Appendix B - 47

of its officers and agents. Thirty-five years after Kauf-

mann, in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130,

60 A. LR. 2d 1193 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1957), the court swept

aside the basic immunity rule and established the prin-

ciple of vicarious liability for both active and passive neg-

ligence under the doctriné of respondeat superior. Some of

the language is: pashomeriy edifving. 60 A. L. R. 2d 1193, at

pages 1196-1197:

‘‘The problem in Florida has become more confusing

heeause of an effort to prune and pare the rule of im-

munity rather than to uproot it bodily and lay it aside

as we should any other archaic and outmoded concept.

. that the time has arrived to face this matter

squarely in the interest of justice and place the resnon-

sibility for wrongs where it should be. In doing this

we are thoroughly cognizant that some may contend

that we are failing to remain blindly loyal to the doc-

trine of stare decisis. However, we must recognize that

the law is not static. The great body of our laws is the

product of progressive thinking which attunes -tradi-

tional concepts to the needs and demands of changing

times. ‘The modern city is in substantial measure 4

large business institution. While it énjoys many of the

basic powers of government, it nonetheless is. an incor-

porated organization which exercises those powers pri-

marily for the benefit of the people within the municipal

limits who enjoy the services rendered pursuant to the

powers. To continue to endow this type of organiza-

tion with sovereign divinity appears to us to predicate

the law of the Twentieth Century upon an Eighteenth

Century anachronism. Judicial consistency loses its

virtue when it is degraded by the vice of injustice. *’

In like manner, the Supreme Court of New Mexico

abandoned old legal frontiers in the case of Barker +r.

City of Santa Fe, 4% N. M. 85, 136 P. 2d 480, 482 (Sup. Ct.

_ 1948):

48 Appendix B

‘‘It is almost incredible that in this modern age ‘of

comparative sociological enlightenment, and in a repub-

lie, the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in

the maxim, ‘the King can do no wrong’, should exempt

the various branches of the government frem liability

“for their torts, and that the entire burden of damage

resulting from the wrongful acts of government should

be imposed upon the single individual who suffers the

injury, rather than distributed among the entire com-

munity constituting the government, where it could be

borne without hardship upon any individual, and where

.it justly belongs.’’

Both Kaufman and Barker were adopted with ap-

proval by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in McAndrew,

supra, observing that Illinois had done likewise for the

same reasons in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dis-

trict, No. 302, 18 Ll. 2d 11, 163 N. FE. 2d 89 (1959).

When viewed against the panorama of legal history,

it seems inevitable that even with quickened enlightenment,

responsive changes came more slowly and often with

tedious caution. This seenis especially true in regard to

anciently venerated legal postulates which justify their

continued existence on the pragmatic needs of remote

times and cutmoded conditions’ rooted in ritualistic ad-

herence to the doctrine of stare decisis.. Stare decisis, white

a valuable and well established doctrine, should serve as a

fiexible channel marker for guidance and net as qn im-

movable sand bar which may cause disaster; it should not

he permitted to foreclose re-analys's and re-evaluation of

legal postulates, which may well have lost their vitalizing

principle. If outmoded and artificial distinctions are to

persist in confining a court of law to a choice of spécific

alternatives, one of which provides remedy for an injured .

individual, and the other does not. then the choice of

‘remedy seems clear as the demands of justice must be

obliged in each particular case.

Appendix B ee ale

_ As was eloquently stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, com-

menting on ‘*The Path of the Law’’, in Collected Legal

Papers, Oliver Wendell Holmes, p. 187:

‘‘It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of

law than it was laid down in the time of. Henry IV.

It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it

was laid down have vanished long since and the rule .

simply persists from blind limitation of the past."’

It seems axiomatic that when the reason for a-rule or

principle falls,.so too the rule or principle. Justice Wein-

traub advanced this very rationale in Cloyes, 2p°N. J. Sot,

328 ;,.129 A.2d 1, 3, stating:

‘**At a time when municipal activities were few and the

capacity of munieipalities to respond-in damages was

uncertain, the doctrine of the Strader ease undoubtedly

seemed to be the common sense answe r to the problem.

But when municipalities and other governmental agen-

cies expanded into new areas, cither replacing private

entrepreneurs or meeting new needs which theretofore

had not required publie activity, additional factors had

to be weighed. The expansion of the area of operations

enlarged the area of hurt. The number of private

injuries which would go without remedy necessarily in-

creased. The experience of private operators who per-

formed subject to the wrdinary principles of tort lia-

bility had demonstrated that such operations céould

absorb the impact of liability for negligence withont

curtailing er imperiling the service. and hence the fear

of a crushing impact upon public funds which played

a rolein the Strader ease was allayved . 2. The ad

vent of liability insurance increased eonfidence in the

ability of loeal government to earry on without special

immunity. And, lastly, concepts of fair play and jus

tice changed. The notion that a remedy by indictment

could satisfy the public interest became archaic. It

‘

50 Appendix B

could not be adjusted to new thinking, the view that

society is better served by absorbing the misfortunes

negligently inflicted upon individuals rather than by

leaving them to their own inadequate devices for the

supposed benefit of the entire community.’”.

Such lucid language of the Chief Justice seems par-

ticularly appropos to the matter now calling for resolution.

The inquiry here is not one which seeks to impose undue

hardship on a municipal corporation or confront it with

absolute liability in the field of negligence,. but rather to

determine whether its conduct and activity are such as to

call upon it, as with any other tortfeasor, to answer. in

liability on ordinary principles of negligence, where it

voluntarily assumes to act in a proprietary capacity not

necessarily incident and essential to its fundamental essence

as a governmental body politic.

The foregoing decisions of the New Jersey courts,

while not precisely dispositive of the issue here, provide

the controlling rationale for determination and offer ample.

criteria in light of the current development of its law

governing municipal liability in negligence.

With respect to the specific activities of defendai.‘..

Atlantic City, in regard to the public bathing beach in

question, the following operations appear from the evi-

dence and stand uncontradicted or explained away by

the defendant:

(a) The extensive efforts of defendant to induce, at-

tract and invite persons generally, of which plaintiff was

one, to come to ifs City and use its facilities, foremost of

which was the beach and ocean bathing.” It-employed wide-

spread national advertising for this purpose, at a cost of

several hundred thousauds /of dollars annually. —

(b} It imposes # system of ‘‘luxury taxex’’ for the

raising of revenue tor the, municipal corporation, which

taxes are passed on to all consumers and guests for the

¢

| Appendiz B a 51

use of its facilities, realizing approximately 134 million

dollars annually, without which the City, according to the

testimony of its Director of Revenue and Finance, would

be ‘‘bankrapt’’. Some portion of such ‘revenue was used

to maintain and 6perate the beach in question; a sum over

$200,000 annually. ;

(ce) It fostered and provided by way of concessions

on its boardwalk abutting its beach, snack bars, restau-

rants, rolling chairs, rest stations, rest pavilions, bath

houses, and other public incidents of commerce ; and on its

beach, beach chairs, cabanas, umbrellas, pony rides, horse-

back riding, rest stations, from all of which it collected

mercantile revenue.

(d) It provided a complete unit: of Beach Patrol

Police; so-called “ protected beaches”’ by the stationing of

lifeguard stands and-a trained lifeguard patrol with rank-

ing officers, having care of the beach, the foreshore. and the

ocean, with the use of life-saving equipment, such as boats,

ratts, surf boards, respirators, life preservers and the like.

(ce) It provided a trained unit of beach personnel for

the physical maintenance, care and cleaning of the beach

surface, with appropriate supervisory personnel for in-

spections, such ax the Captains of the Beach Patrol and the

Commissioner of Public Safety.

(f) It provided medical stations, with physicians and

trained personnel, for injuries sustained by bathers -and

other users of the beach area, which medical stations and

personnel maintained a record of mishaps, injuries and

medical assistanee rendered, all of which were reported to

appropriate municipal officers.

In Weeks, a pablie swimming pool was involved: in

the instant case, a public bathing beach. In Weeks. the mu-

nicipality exercised complete dominion and contrel of the

pubiic park swimming pool; likewise here; in both cases

52 Appendix B

the respective municipalities derived revenue; in both

cases the municipalities provided facility to the public, and

there was no discrimination against individual citizens or

members of the public generally.

In the instant case the defendant municipality did not

preempt any right of the sovereign State of New Jersey

to operate the beach; it did not share the benefits or

burdens with the State; it did not operate the public beach

in question under and subject to the control or super-

vision of the State or as its agent or alter ego; it did not

seek or employ any participation by the State as a neces-

sary or desirable adjunct to its operation. On tbe con-

trary, the defendant v.unicipality for the length and course

of a great many years, assumed complete and exclusive

dominion and control of che beach shore in question, and

engaged in its operation and management to an extent

manifestly commensurate with sole proprietorship. |

Atlantic City fostered and sponsored a great influx of

tourists to use its facilities; it was literally in the business

of promoting. tourists and their use of its attractions of

entertainment and recreation; it is internationally char-

acterized by itself, and others, as the ‘* Playground of the

World”’; it has also become known as the ‘‘Convention

City’’, as the city of ‘‘Miss America’’, of the beauty

pageants, and recently the successful bidder for the Demo-

cratie National Convention at’ an estimated $650,000.00.

Atlantic City’s bare naive assertion that it was merely

paternally and altruistically engaged in government in

providing public park facilities for the w Il-being of its

citizens, surrounding communities, the people of the State

of New Jersey, of the nation and the world at large, in the

face of its incurring of great expense, a full-time pro-

motional endeavor,-the reaping of substantial revenues -

and benefits, all without legitimately selfish proprietary

interests and rewards, is-at best unrealistic.

: Thus, it is difficult to conclude, that, as a matter of

law, defendant municipal corporation was performing time-_

Appendia B BB

honored, customary and characteristic employments of a

political governmental body charged with the collective

good and welfare of its citizens, as with an isolated park-

site where inhabitants seek health, rest and fresh air in

an environment of trees, fountains, ponds, streams, knolls,

footpaths, and the like, as anciently of the ‘‘Walden’’ of

Henry Thoreau, and modernly generally associated with

‘*narks’’; or as with the quietude of a public library for

research, study or contemplation. Rather, it engaged on

a grand scale in the commerce of services and facilities

unknown in earlier times when common law immunity in

negligence cases arose. Indeed, it would be most difficult

to conceive a private entrepreneur, and enterprise, which

could so amply commercialize and exploit a natural re-.

source, or resort, to such extent as to render certain mu-

nicipal services as police and -fire protection, streets and

. highways, welfare agencies, and the like, as merely a

corollary to big business.. That the defendant, Atlantic

City, was engaged in a proprietary activity, as distin-

guished from a governmental function, in light of all the

foregoing considerations, seems not only well founded in

fact and logic, but is compelling for acceptance as a matter

of law, with respect to its obligation to answer in negligence

as a private proprietor similarly so engaged.

The Bisbing case, and Kuchler which’ relies upon it

for authority; are not controlling in the instant case. In

b.-bing, the court was steeped in the legal philosophy of

Strader, which it cited as its major premise; it merely

alluded to ‘‘private capacity’? now well known in the de-

cisions of New Jersey as ‘‘proprietary capacity’’. The

court concluded that the use of the land there in question

was governmental. Bisbing does not stand for the proposi-

tion, as contended by defendant, that public lands, or a

public park, or some portion thereof, cannot under any cir-

cumstances be devoted to a proprietary use. Kuchler pro-

- vides no greater persuasion for such contention. These.

cases have been significantly left behind in the development

oF _ - Appendix B

of the law of New Jersey regarding municipal tort liability,

as pointed out in Cloyes, and are clearly distinguishable

both in faet and law. The crystalization of the substantive

law of New Jersey: in the vast 50 years cannot be dis-

regarded and resort made to earlier expressions alone, not

precisely dispositive of a current issue of law. Such is the

very folly interdicted by Justice (now Chief Justice)

Weintraub in Cloyes. Rather it is this crystalization of the

substantive law of New Jersey, as reflected in its judicial

decisions of binding persuasion and compelling legal force,

that has guided this Court to the applicable criteria and to

its ultimate decision. As once said by Mr. Justice Holmes:

“The lay embodies the story of a nation’s develop-

ment through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt

with ax if it contained only the axioms and corollaries

of a bowk of mathematics. In érder to know what it

is we must know what it has been and what it tends

to become.’” ~

That a municipal corporation may act in many spheres

and, in legal contemplation, be classified for particular

., purposes, is a matter of common experience.” A deter-

mination here, for the purposes of tort liability, that the

maintenance and operation of the bezch and bathing facili-

ties incident thereto, by the defendant municipality, was

in the nature of a proprietary activity, does fot defeat,

work a forfeiture or reversion, or occasion any violence to

any restrictive covenant, grant, or deed of dedication

limiting or civeuriscribing municipal purposes as ‘*‘ public

park or place.for public resort and recreation.’’ Public

purpose persists, although a particular use devoted to the

*(23) Vide: Cloyes v. Dela. Twp., op. cite; McCabe v. High-

way .luth. op. cite; err v. Turnpike, op. cite; e.g., the borrowing of

funds, the issuance of bonds. operation of sewerage disposal plants,

or water supply. highway authorities, turnpike comnassions, con-

demnation proceedings, participation in federal loans anu grunts of

funds for redevelopment or urba> renewal, road improvements, soil

erosiv *, etc. pa “iy

Appendix B ° 55

public at large may be proprietary, as distinguished from

governmental. In Martin v. City of Asbury Park, 111

N. J. L. 364, 168 A. 612 (E. & A. 1933), opinion by Chan-

cellor Campbell, the City was hela as a proprietor in its

leasing of a bath house and bathing establishment, and

answerable in negligence; and in the subsequent case.of -

ewMartin v. Asbury Park, 114 N. J. L. 298, 176 A. 172 (E. &

A. 1935), a supplementary proceeding where satisfaction

of the judgment obtained in the foregoing case was sought,

by execution against the leased bath house, and was denied. -

The court held that even though in the prior case there ©

was a proprietary use, the land in question was devoted

to a ‘‘public purpose’ and therefore not subject to

execution.” “

- Additionally, it is significant that enabling legislation

in 1894, permitting cities bordering on the Atlantic Ocean

to ‘‘open and lay out a public park or place for public re-

sort or recreation on and along the beach or ocean front of

such city’’ ete., and under which defendant acted, pertains

to lands for dedication for public purposes, albeit, for mul-

tiple -or disjunctive uses by such municipal corporations.

_ Furthermore, mere characterization by a municipal corpo-

ration-of a permissive public purpose does not determine

and classify its particular use in negligence law.

As was so aptly stated in Weeks, 62 N. J. Super. 166,

_ 183; 162 A. 2d 314, 323-324:

‘‘Tt is not unreasonable so to construe the statute here

‘in question as to hold a municipality for negligence in

the maintenance of . . . [land] devoted to the per-

(24) It should be noted, that the Court although citing Bisbing

as authority for immunity, did not defeat the concept of divisible

municipal capacity, governmental-proprietary, under the ‘statute re-

quiring public purpose of the lands in question. Therefore, neither

it, nor Bisbiny, stands for the proposition that “park lands” are ipso

esse governmeptal function. To like effect: Baird v. Ed. of Recrea-

tion Commissioners, Village of South Orange, 108 N. J. Eq. 91, 154

A. 204 (Chanc. Ch. 1931). reversed on other grounds, 110 N. j. Eq.

(03, 160 A. 537 (E. & A. 1932).

56 - Appendia B

formance of a function voluntarily assumed under its

general powers or by permissive legislation, or where

it performs a service which could be provided as well

(and often is) by a private corporation, or where the

function is allocated to the municipality for its profit or

special advantage, rather than for the purpose of carry-

ing out the public functions of tle state without special

advantage to the city.’’ [Brackets supplied.]

It is also urged that the Court erred in denying certain

requests to charge made by defendant, Atlantic City, which

had for their purpose the declaration of its immunity.

Consistent with the Court’s rulings on prior motions, these

requests were denied.

The-additional requests to charge were covered gen-

erally in the charge of the Court, and were for that reason

denied; * or they had no foundation in the evidenge, such

as actuarial formuiae or arithmetical computations,” and

were carried generally in broad terms of ‘‘present-value’’ ;

or did, in the Court’s opinion, constitute prejudicial error

as with the requested instruction regarding the absence of

income tax assessment‘on any damage award made by ver-

dict ;?7 or la: ked the citation of any reliable supporting au- -

thority, and the clarity of Jaw and preciseness of language

to which the Court was entitled.” -Those ‘requests of. the

codefendant, Warren, which defendant, Atlantic City, orally

adopted by way of reference as its own, were for the rea-

sons expressed to the codefendant, as well as the reasous

set forth above, likewise denied.

(25) Gerhart v. Disston & Sons, 290 F. 2d 778 (3 Cir. 1961) ;

Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138, 10 S. Ct. 290, 33 L. Ed. 531 (1889).

(26) See note 25, ante. ;

(27) Altenius v. Penna. R. Co., 32 Fed. R. D. 7, 210 F. Supp.

~ 834 (D.C. Dela. 1963); McWeeney v. New York, N. H. & H. R.

Co., 282 F. 2d 34 (2 Cir. 1960).

(28) 28 U. S.C. A. Rule’ 51; S. Dist. Ct. Dist. of New

Jersey, Local Rule 18; Cherry v. Ta ed 259 F. 2d 774 (© Cir.

1958) ; Alexander v. Kramer Bros. 273 F. 2d 372 (2 Cir. 1960).

,

Appendix B 57

The remaining thrust of the defendant’s motion ‘is that

the jury’s verdict for damages in the amount of $600,000.00

was ‘‘excessive,”’ and a result of fie ‘influence of passion,

prejudice, mistake and sympathy.’ This Court is cogni-

zant of its judicial responsibility where the amount of dam-

ages awarded by jury verdict/is questioned; and it recog-

nizes that, while the primary( responsibility is that of the

jury, it is not exclusively so, and the ultimate responsibility

rests with the trial judge2* In this regard, certain cardinal

features lighted the way for the jury in determining its

award. On August 24, 1960, before the injury in this case,

plaintiff was a young man, age 24 years, in good health, a

bridegroom, gainfully employed as a high school mathe-

matics teacher in Long Island, New York, and was further-

ing his education towards a Master’s degree in the Science

of Mathematics leading, in the natural course of events in

this technological Age, to greater proficiency, increased

earning potential and capacity, with a reasonably probable

richer and fuller, life. Indeed, he was virtual’; on the

threshold of life’s grand experiences. These are the un-

contradicted facts in evidence. Against such is contrasted

the plaintiff after injury. He sustained severe, complete

and permanent traumetic injuries of the spine and spinal

cord, with resultant quadriplegia. He was hospitalized im-

mediately in the Atlantic City hospital, where he remained.

for about 4 months, and thereafter was transported to che

Rusk Institute of Rehabilitation, in New York, where for

some 14 months he underwent extensive and arduous re-

habilitative therapy. Then, as now, he is completely para-

lyzed from the neck down the trunk of the body including

the upper and lower extremities; he has ucceeded in de-

veloping some shoulder an¢@ wrist movement only. He is

permanently confined to his bed or a wheel chair, and re-

quires the assistance of a male nursing “ttendant to admin-

(29) Guerini Stone Co. v. P. J. Carlin Constr. Co., 240 U. S.

264. 36 S. Ct. 300. 6 L. Ed. 636 (1915); Dellaripa v. New York,

N. H. & H. R. Co., 257 F. 2d 733 (2 Cir. 1958).

28 ' Appendix B

ister to his personal and private needs. Periodic check-ups,

medical treatments and antibiotics have been’ prescribed as

_essential, for the balance of his life expectancy, approxi-

mately 43 years, which, aceording to the uncontradicted

testimony of ‘plaintiff’s medical expert, was established

mediéally to be the same as for any other young man of his

age, providing he has the continuing benefit of the’ pre-

scribed medical care. His injuries terminated his gainful

‘employment. He was earning as a high school teacher

$4,500.00 annually in-the New York School System, and has —

a wage-loss to date of approximately $10,000.00. His medi-

cal bills to date approximate $23,964.71, and estimated fur-

ther medical expenses are at least $1,500.00 annually. Fur-

ther education, if not impossible, is at best highly improb- |

able. These then, are the uncontradicted facts in evidence.

And it may well be noted, that in the presentations and

arguments of all counsel in this case, they displayed com-

mendable’ restraint, awareness of legal proprieties and

utmost good taste. There was not the slightest nuance of

passion or sympathy engendered by counsel.

‘There ‘is nothing which would _warrant, or should

prompt, this Court to pretend to a wiser assessment of

damages for the injuries to this particular individual, and

substitute its judgment for that of the twelve jurors sworn,

no less, .to exercise their best judgment in the same cause.

While precise formulae-in the area of personal injury neg-

ligence law remain elusive and undevised, our jurispru-

dence demands that provision be made for fair, just and

reasonable compensation: Clearly this is what the jury has

endeavored to do; and it is this, nothing more or less, that

this Court believes it has.done. Furthermore, in the ex-

ercise of this Court’s judicial discretion, it is its conviction

that there was: substantial basis in the evidence for the

amount of damages awarded by the jury and that, under

_ all the instant circumstances, the verdict represented fair,

just and reasonable compensation.

/

«

‘ Appendix B . 59

In summary, it was the finding of this Court, at the

conclusion of the testimony, that the defendant, Atlantic

City, was engaged in a proprietary activity within the

meaning of the substantive law of New Jersey, and, as

such, chargeable in negligence if found guilty of wrong-

doing, and the case was so submitted:to the jury with

appropriate instructions on negligence and nuisance. as a

specific refinement thereof. However, if governmental,

then this case may very well"be the one that the New

Jersey Supreme Court was waiting for. This could very

well be, as stated by Chief Justice Weintraub in Cloyes,

23 N. J. 324, 332, 129 A. 2d 1, 5 (1957) ‘‘the case in which

to consider whether to come to grips with the entire

problem.’’ In any event, assuming but not conceding, that

the operation of the public beach be construed govern-

mental in capacity and function, it is the view of this Court’

‘that the defense of immunity is still unavailable to the

defendant because of its active wrongdoing.” . There were

here committed acts of commission ‘and acts of omission-—

tantamount to commission—so overwhelmingly negligent

that had a motion been made by fhe plaintiff for the direc-

tion of a verdict, this Court would have been hard-pressed

to retreat from an obligation to grant it, and to submit to

the jury for its determination, the sole issue of damages.

_In view thereof, it is:now, after verdict. the conclusion of

this Court, that there was Brese nted legally sufficient and

factually ample evidence, of Atlantic City’s negligence.

Here was a situation where an extremely perilous condi-

tion, without any warning whatsoever, was permitted {5

continue for an intolerable period of time, despite the.

reoecurrences of accidents almost daily. despite the ad-

mitted knowledge of and recoguition of danger by namer-

ous nhunicipal employees and officials one of whom was the

Director of Publie Safety, the other charged with the care

and maintenance of the beach, and ¢ despite conntless recom.

(30) ° See Yanen v. Conti, 73 N. " Super. 23, 179 A. 2d 129

(App. Div. 1962).

60 Appendiz B

. o .

mendations—if not pleas—for the removal of these

saadianae dais To sit idly by and countenance such

known danger to the unsuspecting public, to fail to take

reasonable measures to avoid disaster instead of tempor-

izing with the situation,*’ is abundant proof of grossly

negligent conduct. The verdict of the jury against the

defendant, Atlantic City, was proper. Insofar as the -

propriety of the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant,

- Warren, the provision of a’private hotel beach to its guests,

knowledge of the hazardous pipes, and direction of the

- plaintiff by the hotel to a known place of peril, presented

purely factual issues that were resolved by the jury in

Warren’s favor. Thee was substantial basis for such

finding.

For all these reasons, the motions of the defendant,

Atlantic City\are denied, and the verdict of the® jury as _

recorded shall remain undisturbed.

The — order may be submitted.

Mrrcnet. H. Conex, _ .

a Judge, U.S. District Court.

(31) See Zanca v. Conti, ante. ’ a

(32) Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v’ Yeatts, op. cite; Montgomery

Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U. §. 243, 61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 147

(1940). :

Appenkz B | 61

JUDGMENT OF THE U. 8. DISTRICT COURT.

The above entitled action having been tried before the

' Honorable Mitchell H. Cohen, U. S. D. J., and a Jury, on

May 27th, 28th, 29th, 31st; June 3rd, 4th and 5th, 1963, and

the Jury having returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff,

Andrew Caporossi aguinst the Defendant, Atiantic City, a

municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey, in the

sum of $600,000.00; and a verdict of No Cause for Action

in favorjof the Defendant, Lester Warren, Inc., a corpora-

tion of the State of New Jersey, against the Plaintiff,

Andrew Caporossi; and a verdict of No Cause for Action

in favor of the Defendant Lester Warren, Inc., a corpora-

tion of the State of New Jersey, on the aaa of the

Defendant, Atlantic City,

It is, on this 6th day of June, 1963,”

OrveEreED that judgment in the sum of $600,000.00 be

entered in favor of the Plaintiff, Andrew Caporossi against

ee Defendant, Atlantic City, a municipal corporation of

1e State of New Jersey, with costs, and it is further

Orperep that judgment of No Cawse for Action be

entered in favor Wie Defendant, Lester Warren, Ine., a

corporation of the State of New Jersey, against the Plain-

tiff, Andrew Caporossi, without costs; and No Cause for

Action in favor of the Defendant, Lester Warren, Inc., a

corporation of the State of New Jersey, on the Cross-claim

of the Defendant, Atlantic City, without costs. .

. | MitcHecy H. Coney,

U.S. Dd...

b

62 Appendiz C ~*

APPENDIX C.

State Legislative Efforts to © Improve the Seacoast Resort

Economy.

In the preamble to the Act of 1922, L. 1922, ¢. 35 $1,

p. 65, R. S. 40:179-109, N. J. S. A., which permitted the

resort cities to erect and operate ‘convention halls’’ to

improve their revenues; the recital recognized that certain

cities had undertaken to lay out beach parks but had been

unable to do so because of financial difficultzes, inter alia.

See Historical Note to R. S. 40:179-109, N. J. S. Au.

In 1931, the Legislature enacted statutes providing for

a Municipal Finance Commission, a ‘‘quasi-receivership’’

of municipalities which were in default in the payment of.

principat or interest on municipal notes or bonds. L. 1931,

c. 340, § 102, p. 831, as amended, R. S. 52:27-2, et seq.,

N. J. S. A. In 1935, the resort City of Asbury Park came

under control of the Municipal Finance Commission. City

of Asbury Park v. Smock, 121 N. J. L. 487, 3 A. 2d 607

(Sup. Ct. 1939).

In 1936, the Legislature provided:

‘*In every municipality under control of the mu-

nicipal finance commission, and which shall own the

beach and upland contiguous thereto, a beach commis-

sion shall be appointed. This commission shall consist

of four suitable persons, residents of such municipality.

Said persons shall be known as beach commissioners

and shall be appointed by the governor, by and wit:

the advice and consent of the senate, * * *.°’ LL. 1936,

ce. 160 § 1, p. 872, R.S. 40:55 A-1, et seq. N. J. S. A.

ae

The Beach Commission so established had absolute

power over the beach, all revenues related to it were kept

1 a separate account solely to benefit the beach, the Beach

Pa ara operated independently of the municipal gov-

ernment and answered solely to the governor and state

legislature. See R. S. 40:55 A-d:

Appendix C ; 63

‘*The beach commission * * * shall * * * be substi-

tuted for and vested with all the powers and duties now »

vested in or exercised by the, governing body of such

municipality, relating to and in respect of the manage-

ment and control of the beach, and the cor.struction,

maintenance, and use of the beach, and a’: properties

and structures,. piers, bulkheads and jet’ies owned. by

‘the municipality contiguous to such bach, and shall

lay out, embellish, improve, manage, and control the

boardwalks, convention halls, bath houses, places of

amusement, stores, buildings, and pruperties, and the

portions of the beach owned and heretofore controlled

*#@¢ 899

.

by such municipality

And see, Asbury Park v. Smack, 121 N. J L. 48%, 3 A. 2d

607 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Kleinfus v. Sirgany, 1. N. J. Mise. 175,

_ 178, 6 A. 2d 724, 726 (Cir Ct. 1939). : -

Regarding the separate accounting and its purpose, see

R. S. 40:55 A*t8; R. S. 40:55 A-9; and R. S. 40:55 A-10,

N.J.S. A.; the latter section provides:

‘“*It is the interition of this chapter ‘o make avail-

&

ablé to such beach commission, for the conduct of the

beach and its enlargement, extension, mprovement,

and for the addition of new and further facilities, all

moneys which shall be received for the overations of

such beach and the properties and structures thereon,

whether eurrently- or theretofore earnel, and ail

‘\

poses, and to place the.same under the j irisdiction

and control of said beach cominissioners, t> the end

that the same shall be self-sustaining and seli-liquidat-

ing and thereby relieve the taxpayers.”

In 1945, the Legislature (in an Act later held ureconsti-

tional as a special law) recognized the acute financia’ prob-

lems and instability of the resort economy:

moneys raised by taxation or otherwise for beach pur- .

vere,

64 Appendix C

**An emergency is hereby declared to exist in mu-

nicipalities bordering upon the Atlantic Ocean: which

are’ seaside or summer resorts and which because of —

their size have a’ great fluctuation in the number of

visitors, because of the recent hurricane, the continued

erosion of beaches and the danger of hurricane in the

near future; all of which make it impossible for such

municipalities to function normally as seaside or sum-

mer resorts dwring the next three fiscal years unless

some additional revenue can be raised for use in pro-

viding and continuing the facilities which attract visi-

tors to ‘such municipalities as ‘seaside or summer

' resorts.’’ Ly: 1945, ce. 156, p. 544, 42, R. S. 40:48-8.2,

N. J.S. A. Zi

In ‘1947, the Legislature renewed its efforts to stabilize

the resort economy by_ providing for a new sales tax ap-

plicable to such cities, L) 1947, c. 71, p. 431, § 1, et seq., R. S.

40 :48-8.15, N. J. S. A. Its purpose was so stated:

‘“Whereas, the Legislature, in furtherance of pub-

lie policy, has for a period of years greatly enlarged

municipal activities, principally tn matters of public

health and safety, with no consequent grant of revenue

power to mect these modern and constantly expanding

conditions; and

Whereas, the sources of revenue in the various mu-

nieipalities, particularly in Cities of this State border-

_ ing upon the Atlantic Ocean and being seaside or sum-

mer resorts, are inadequate and insufficient to meet

' ¢xisting municipal obligations ; and

Whereas, many of these impositions are mandatory in

character, and it is necessary and essential that such

cities be given power to increase existing revenues; «

therefore’’. Historical Note, R. S. 40:48-8.15, N. J.

S$. A.

- * Appendiz C 65

..

In 1948, in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the

Statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly stated the

situation, .

‘‘The proofs show that the presence of sur imer

visitors imposes an unusual burden upon mun cipal

government since it must increase its facilitie, for

police and fire protection. The beach front mst, at

all hazards be saved and it must be cleaned ar de po-

liced. Suitable provision must be made for bathiy g and

. the safety of bathers.

The statistics adduced, and made a part of the

~ record, in this case indicate that the municipal ex senses

in cities binding upon the Atlantic Ocean are very dif-

ferent from comparable inland cities where the e :traor-

dinary expenses mentioned do not exist and Where a

normal business is carried on for a much longer period

of the year.”’ 137 N. J. Bxat 350, 60 A. 2d at 246-47.

Karis v. Board of Com’rs of Atlantic City, 187 37. J. L.

349, 350, 62 A. 2d 246, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1948).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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