Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Atlantic City v. Caporossi
Supreme Court brief1964
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Office Supreme Court, U.S.
, Ter... ¢ ; F I i D
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a _ fF JUN 9" 1984
JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK
In THE
Supreme Court of the ‘United States
sishauan Term, ~
267.
: Noo
ATLANTIC CITY, a municipal corporation
of the State of New Jersey,
Petitioner,
v.
ANDREW CAPOROSSI,
+
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
SamvuEn P. Or.anpo,
130 N. Broadway,
Camden, New Jersey 08102,
Counsel for Petitioner.
Georce W. SHapoan,
22 W. Jefferson Street,
Rockville, Maryland 20850,
OnmThe Petition.
International, 711 So. Sth St., Phila., Pa. 19143
CITATIONS £0 OPINIONS BELOW ...........--cceeecceeees
JURISDICTION .....,..... POP TTT eT TTT TET TTT
COTS TRMIED civ ccivcccescccseecesrcisvnsnecuss
DOMTUUES TORII bbs dc escsectacsss aeeekeblsebese ees
L The Conn Should Grant Certiorari Because the Deci-
* sion Below Significantly Affects One of the Great
Natural Resources of the State of New Jersey and
le SR kk branes esi kkkdeedub kena eee Ra ces ce
(a) Importance of Resource and Unstable ey
Cy Bets Oe SPRUE 6 ud esc dieu eeedewdunances
II. The Court. Should Grant Certiorari Reewne of the
Questionable Application by the Court of Appeals
of the Rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ........
There Is a Division Among Circuits Concerning
Whether a Federal Court May Disregard State
Court Decisions Which, Though Not Overruled
by Later State Court Decisions, Are Felt to Be
Outmoded by Change in Time and Circum-
CED av cvccwcccknddusedsnentsudravcesue
, CoNcLuSION eR Ee STE Tee EEE CE ee EY EE Pe rrr re
Appenpix A:
Opinion of United States-Court of Appeals for the Third
Cireutt Dated March 10, 1964 ......i.ccccccccece :
Judgment of United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit Dated March 10, 1964 ...... Uiguvaswscns 3+
APPENDIX B: ara Pay
Opinion a United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey Dated August 7, 1963 .. eee ceeceeceees
Judgment of United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey Dated June 6, 1963 ........ Wecuanese
APPENDIX C:
State Legislative Efforts to Improve the Seacoas; Resort
— eee cetuseeedaneee anodes ppcaes jx cna wns
©
9
10
13
| TABLE OF CASES CITED.
; ; ; . Page .
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) .16 -
Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78 Atl. 196 (E.& A.
OPT TTT TT TT eT Tye peas wen 8, 11, 15, 16, 18, 20,21
Blaylock v. Muskogee, 117 F. 125 (Gt Cir. 2908) .nccsiccccs 13
City of Denver v. Porter, 126 F. 288 (8th Cir. Se Gonenise 13
Cloyes v. Delaware Twp. 23 N. J. 324, 129 A. 2d 1 (1957) .. 5 ; ey
Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945) 13 ~
Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492 (1890) ......:-..e. esses 13
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ............4. 43, 15
Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S.459 12
Harris v. Atlantic City, 73 N. J. L. 251, 62 A. 995 (Sup. Ct. .
MD :idadcvancane Fe a oe Re ge NOE po dy A 4
Home Royalty Ass’n v. Stone, 199 F. 2d 650 (10th Cir. 1952) 14
Jess Edward, Inc. v. Goergen, 256 F. 2d 542 (10th Cir. 1958) 14
Kuchler v. New Jersey and N. Y. R. Co., 104 N. J. L. 333, 140
GW, WE rockin cs ccnccvccencccescs 15, 16, 20, 21
‘Martin v. City of Asbury Park, 1f1 N. J. L. 364, 168 Atl. 612
“ (E. & A. 1933) ; 114 N. J: L. 298, 176 Atl. 172 (E. & A.
BD SauK bh ck4 nd ed5646be5 ER 45s UCabn ahi cbensbiee 15, 20, 21
Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F. 2d 906 (ist
Me SR ys scar chats Wan cian bakemueeukaseakabe 14
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S..228 (1943) Veenaenepens 15
Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 290 F. 2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 365 U. S. 293 (1961) .............. bikes bene 14
Polk County v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 262 F. 2d dient deca
ES iS er Lael iad ect aesaunewadiie gas 13
State v. Atlantic City, 23 N. j. 337, 129 A. 2d 293 (1957) .... 9
Schwartz v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141, 160,A. 2d 1 (Sup. Ct.
Six Companies v. Joint Highway District, 311 U.S. 180 (1940) 14
%
a TABLE OF OASES CITED (Continued). ~
» ‘ , . Page
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S, eo, kakeen eee Terre 12
Terranella v. Union Bldg. & Cham: Co., 3 N. ‘. 443, 70 A. 2d
FO REOMEE WAL ibe icedesnessacevdanwarwasnagaeeees 15,16
. Weeks v. City of Newark, 62 N. J. Super. 166, 162 A. 2d 314
(App. Div. 1960), aff. o.b. 34 N. J. 250, 168 A. 2d 11
i ROBE iE OAR en a NREL DY, cal ass My) 11, 15, 18, 21
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND —
STATUTES CITED.
Page
Boardwalk Acts: ;
L. 1889, c. 129, §1, p. 206, R. S. 40:179-78, et. seq.
"OG A era sipcisks haces neuaLoetoaa tes 4
Bi RG a i hie O ies went ccaceees 4
Historical Note, R. S. 40:48-8, 15 N.J. S.A. ........@@... 8
L. 1945, c. 156, p. 544, §2, R.-S. 40:48-8a, N. J. S.A. ...... 7
.Park Act, L. 1894, c. 93, § I, p. 146, R. S. 40:179-98, et. sed.
SO Teer Ore, =| 4
P. L. 1903, p. 387, R. S. 12:3-33, N. J. S.A. .....ececccee ; a
DOS EGE, ov acecsencsiccinent 24.2.2, 3,8, 15, 16, 17
Rules of Decision Act of 1948, c. 46, 62 Stat. 944, 28 u. &. <&. ,
ER rere Pre eraser arciaree ier eR DONC at res - 2
MB: SC, Geet MGA) oo cede sscncasss ae
33 U. S.C. A., §426(e) ......... Fee parte tue hver dees 9
United States Constitution, Eleventh Amendment ............ , 12
ORDINANCE AND REPORT CITED.
Page
Park Ordinance of the City of Atlantic City, October 9, 1899 5
1950 Report of the New Jersey Beach Erosion Commission .... 10
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IN THE
\
|
Supreme Court ’ the United Sears,
iain Term, 1963.
No.
ATLANTIC CITY, a Municrpat Corporation OF THE
State or New JERSEY, |
: Petitioner,
v.
- ANDREW CAPOROSSI, .
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
Petitioner, Atlantic City, prays that a writ of certiorari
issue to review the judgment of the United States. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, entered in the above-
entitled case on March 10, 1964. |
. CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW.
The opinion of the District Court (R. 40a-80a) is re-
ported at 220. F. Supp. 508 (1963), and is printed in Ap-
pendix B hereto, infra, p. 25. The vpinion of the Court of
Appeals, printed in Appendix A hereto,. myee, p. 23, is
reported at 328 F. 2d 620 (1964).
| JURISDICTION. ms |
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
Mareh 10, 1964. Appendix A, p. 24, infra. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C., Section 1254(1).
é
GTI PE LIS STF NS EP IST
2 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
1. May a Federal court ina diversity cuse indulge in.
‘‘re-analysis: and’ re-evaluation”’ of ‘‘anciently venerated
legal postulates’? of applicable State court decisions in
order to find that ownership and maintenance by a munic-
_ ipality of a public bathing beach bordering on the Atlantic
Ocean is a ‘“‘proprietary”’ activity outside the application
of the State municipal tort immunity statute, R. S. 40:9-2,
N. J. S. A., when the court admits that ‘‘there are nu ‘New
J ersey cases which endow municipally owned public beaches
‘or public parks with proprietary characteristics’’ and the
State court of last resort has held that operation of beach
parks is a governmental function?
! 2: May a United States court, in a diversity case, dis-
regard State court holdings which, though not overruled by
later State court decisions, are felt by the Federal court
to be outmoded by change in time and circumstance? _
STATUTES INVOLVED.
No municipality or county shall be liable for in-
jury to the person from the use of any public grounds, ~
buildings or structures, any law to the contrary not-
withstanding: R. S. 40:9-2, N. J. S. A.
The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts
of the United States in cases where they apply. Rules
of Decision Act of 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 944, 28 U.S. C.
§ 1652.
‘
Petition for a sit of Certiorart — —-
‘STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The cies. Andrew Cigetenk tasttend suit in
the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey against the petitioner, City of Atlantic City, and
others on July 19, 1961. The respondent, on August 24, 1960,
' while lawfully bathing i in the Atlantic Ocean within the con-
‘fines of the public beac park operated by the City of At-
lantic City, had struck his head’ on some submerged pipes
and sustained serious personal. injuries. The primary
- defense of petitioner, set out in its Ninth Defense in its
Answer (R. 162-182),"was statutory immunity haart to
R. S. 40:9-2, N. J. S. A. '
Petitioner City of Atlantic City moved for a aaeited
oan at the close of plaintiff’s case (R. 118a-6), the trial
court reserving decision thereon (R. 118a-30), and at the
close of all the evidence (R. bir upon the ground,
inter qlia, that:
Rigietat Plaintiff’s injuries were ‘received by -
him from the use of public grounds operated by the
City of Atlantic City in a governmental capacity or as
a governmental function, and the plaintiff is therefore
- precluded from any recovery against the defendant
City by virtue of and because of New Jersey statute
annotated 40:9-2, with which Your Honor is un-
doubtedly familiar.’’ (R. 1674-32)
The -trial court, iiine that operation of the beach
" park by the city was a proprietary function and that the
statutory immunity did not apply, denied the Motion (R.
168a-11). |
In addition, the petitioner requested the court to in-
struct the jury to return a verdict of no cause for action in
favor of the City upon.the same ground (R. 189a-5). The
court refused to so instruct (R. 187a-7), and the at nae
took exception thereto (R. 188-20). |
4 Petition for a Writ of Certtorari
A Motion for J. N. O. V. or, in the alternative, for New
Trial, predicated i in part upon the same ground | (R. 35a),
also was denied in a written opinion which is set forth in
full, infra, p. 25. The jury returned a verdict against the
City of Atlantic City in the amount of $600,000 (191la-12).
Neither the jury’s finding of negligence by the City, nor
its evaluation of the plaintiff’s damages, is questioned kere.
A timely appeal was taken and the District Court’s
ruling was affirmed by the United States Coirt of Appeals
on March 10, 1964, infra, p. 24.
The relationship between the State of New J ersey and
-its municipal subdivision, insofar as beach parks are con-
cerned, had its genesis in L. 1889, c. 129, § 1, p. 206, R. S.
40 :179-78, et. seq. N. J. S. A., known as the Boardwalk Acts.
Fourth class cities, as the seacoast cities were soon to be
known, were thereby authorized to construct public walks
along the beach or ocean front. By amendment, L. 1890,
c. 107, § 1, p. 159, the Legislature provided that these walks
might be elevated. Thus was the foundation laid for the
famous Boardwalks. The primary object of this act ‘‘was
evidently to secure pleasant promenades for, pedestrians
** *.°' Harris v. Atlantic City, 73 N. J. L. 251, 62 A. 995
(Sup. Ct. 1906).
By L. 1894, c. 93, $1, p. 146, R. S. 40:179-98, et. seq.
N. 7 S. A., the ‘‘Park Act,’’ cities located on or near the
ocean, and embracing within their — any beach or ocean
‘front, were authorized: ‘ ‘
ra ae open aid lay out on and along said beach
or ocean front, a public park or place for public resort
and recreation, and to devote the lands within the limits
of such park or place of resort, when established as.
herein directed, to such use exclusively.’’
The ‘Act went on to provide that whenever the governing
- body determined to lay out such a park, it had,
‘‘to devote the same exclusively for public use ‘as a
‘ public park or place for public resort and recreation, -
‘\
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 5
and to keep the same forever open and unobstructed
for such public use.’’ R.§S. 40:179-100, N. J. S. A.
R. S. 40:179-102 made it lawful for the governing body
to accept a dedication of lands lying within the park, and
R. S. 40:179-103 gave authority to the governing body to
regulate the use of the-park and to prevent obstructions
thereof, placed restrictions upon the use of the park lands,
and expressed the legislative intention that the view of the
ocean from the boardwalk ‘‘shall be free and open and
enn: ‘and that no use shall be made of the said
lands and property inconsistent with the purpose of this
ee °
Pursuant to the authority Porn the City of Atlantic
City enacted a ‘‘Park Ordinance’’ on October 9, 1899 (R.
309a, Ex. D-5). In that Ordinance the City determined ‘‘to
- open-and. lay out a public park. or place for public resort or
recreation on and along the beach or ocean front of the city.
In Section 3, it was ordained that all lands lying within the
park
“fare hereby devoted to public use as a public park
or place for public resort and recreation exclusively,
and for such use shall be kept open and unobstructed
forever, * * *’’ (R. 312a)
Most owners of — within the beach park deditated those
lands to the City around 1900 (R. 285a), thus making
condemnation proceedings unnecessary. The City cove-
naated, wter alia, that the dedicated lands,
‘‘shall forever be and remain open so that the
view oceanward from the said elevated public walks
erected * * * shall be free, open and unobstructed and
that no use shall be made of the said land by the
grantee, its successors or assigns, inconsistent with
its use as a public park or place for public resort and
recreation.’’ (R. 290a) - :
6 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
Thereafter, by P. L. 1903, p. 387, R. S. 12:3-33, N. J.
S. A., the Legislature provided that when a municipality
laid out a public park along the ocean, the municipality
- eould then apply to the State Riparian Commissioners for
a grant to the municipality of land under ‘water within the
limits of such park. In a Riparian Grant dated February
13, 1907, the State Riparian Commissioners,.in considera-
tion of the sum of $21,062.50, granted to the City all of the
lands lying under water within the limits of the park (R.
302a, Ex. D-4). "The grant provided:
‘“‘The land * * * is granted and conveyed for park
uses and purposes and none other, and shall be kept
and maintained as an open public park or place for
public resort and recreation, and that no building or-
other structures shall be erected gn such park or on
the lands under water hereby granted atid conveyed
inconsistent with its use as a public park or place for
public resort and recreation; * * * and also provided
that if at any time hereafter, such publie park or the
land under water hereby granted, shall cease to be used
as such park or place for public resort and recreation,
then and in that event. this grant, and all the right,
‘ title and interest in said lands under water thereby
granted, shall cease, and determire and the lands
* * * shall forthwith thereupon revert to the State.”’
* (R. 305a)
The Atlantie City Beach Park has at all times there-
after been open, without charge, so the public at large and
to all people without regard ge race, place of residence or
any other consideragion (R. 85a-3; 116a-8; 145a-25), and
has been used by the public for a wide variety of recrea-
tional activities (R. 147a-40; 156a-12).
Atlantie City, upon laying out the beach park and
receiving the Riparian grant, become a resort. The recrea-
tional and popularly conceived health-giving features of
the City began to attract great numbers of people during
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari f 7
the summer months (R, 147-5). Facilities and services
had to be provided, thus posing financial difficulty for the
City. The primary source of revenue was the real prop:
erty tax, which eventially became ‘‘almost prohibitive’
(R. 159a- 29).. The City was confronted with extraordinary
influxes of people during the busy months, requiring
enormous increases in municipal services such as police,
fire protection, lifeguards, clean-up men and medical per-
sonnel on the beach (R. 149a-7; 156a-7). In addition, the
Boardwalk and beach were damaged from time to time by
storms, and were constantly under attack by the processes
of erosion. The many measures taken by the State Legis-
lature and the Federal Government to shore up the unstable
economy of the great natural resource are set out in Ap- -
pendix C, infra, p. 62. Express legislative recognitions of
the problem were frequent: ia
‘An emergency is hereby declared to exist in munici-
palities bordering upon the Atlantic Ocean which are
seaside or’summer resorts and which because of their
- size have a great fluctuation in the number of visitors,
_because of the recent hurricane, the continued erosion °
of beaches and the danger of hurricane in the near
future, all of which make it impossible for such munic-
ipalities to function normally as seaside or summer
resorts during the next three fiscal years unless some
additional revenue can be raised for use in providings
and continuing the facilities which attract visitors to
such municipalities as seaside or summer resorts.’*
L. 1945, ce. 156, p. 544, § 2, R. S. 40:48-8a, N. J. S.A.
‘‘Whereas, the Legislature, in furtherance of public
. policy, has for period of years greatly enlarged
municipal activities, principally in matters of public
health and-safety, with no consequent grant of revenue
power to meet these modern and constantly expanding
conditions ;
—_ , 5 = PE ee ne ei esas faa atin omnes eigenen
PANN NEE ENE PSALM ATEN CPE EMC AR Bm SLI oN eit oS Oma AE SOR IO RY ata sn aN 78 es ytico
‘
8 Petition for a rit of Certiorart
Whereas, the sources of revenue in the various munic-
ipalities, particularly in Cities of this State bordering
upon the Atlantic Ocean and being seaside or summer
resorts, are inadequate and insufficient to meet existing
municipal obligations; and
_ Whereas, many of these impositions are mandatory
in character, and it is necessary and essential that
such cities be given power to increase existing reve-
nues; therefore’’. Historical Note, R. S. 40:48-8. 15
N.J.S. A.” ‘ °
A counter-balancing factor contributing to economic
stability was the early case of: Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80
N. J. L. 416, 78 Atl. 196 (E. & A. 1910), holding the city
immune from liability for personal injuries upon the public
beaches. Since Bisbing’s holding, supplemented by subse-
quent legislative enactment of R. S. 40:9-2, an act designed
‘‘to clarify the existing law as to the non-liability of —
* counties, municipalities and school districts . . .’’, see
Schwartz v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141, 149, 160 A. 2d 1 (Sup.
Ct. 1960), there has followed a sixty-six year history of
immunity with no other reported cases arising from an
injury upon any New Jerscy beach, despite the fact that
injuries thereon are. so numerous: as to require full-time
medical stations, physicians, and other trained personnel
at the Atlantic City beach alone (R. 62a-31)-
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari: 9
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT. —
__I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Decision
Below Significantly Affects One of the Great Natural
Resources of the State of New Jersey and the Nation.
(a) Importance of Resource and Unstable Economy.
The determination of this case affects the legislative
_ policy of the State of New Jersey and the economic stability
of the Atlantic seacoast resort area. Ocean bathing and its
related beach activities constitute leisure time attractions
to a major portion of ‘the Nation’s population. Thirteen
‘million persons are estimated to patronize Atlantic City
\\ each year (R. 346a). In 1947, Colonel F. F. Freech, Dis-
trict Engineer, concluded that ‘‘the resort business is the
only substantial Téason for the existence of. the city’’ (R.
348a, 17-18).
Despite resort revenues, both the Federal and State
governments have found it necessary to contribute large
sums to perpetuate that existence.’ Economic instability
» has been the history,of the Atlantic resort area. Aside:
from the immense sums spent to prevent oceanic erosion
of this Vital natural resource, the State has repeatedly
enacted legislative devices to save the resort economy from
(1) The State has participated in 10 or 11 beach protection
projects in Atlantic City alone at a cost of approximately one million
dollars. The Federal Government has contributed an equal amount
to such projects in Atlantic City (R. 129a-134a; 142a-13). The State
interest, and the interest of the public at large in the beach and its
protection were recognized by the State Supreme Court in State v.
Atlantic City, 23 N. J. 337, 129 A. 2d 293 (1957). See also, 33
U.S.C. A., §426(e) for an expression of Congressional recognition
of a national interest in the shores of the United States and the
“healthful recreation. of the people” thereon. And see, Federal Beach
Erosion Control Study (R. 121a-25; Ex. D-10, 339a-355a) demon-
strating the vital public interest at stake. For the State recognition
of the same interest, see the reports of the New Jersey State Beach
Erosion Commission (R. Supp. la, 5a).
BEE SIMI eI Or IN AEE Se Te PO IM SS THA Fa oat ex LSE TY gE te sis
“ +
10 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari -
bankruptcy.?, These statutes, as shown in Appendix C,
recognize the vital public interest in maintaining the area’s
stability. In addition, perhaps the most eloquent state-
-ment of currency is found in the 1950 Report of the New
Jersey Beach Erosion Commission:
‘‘Coast protection warrants prominent standing in
the general State budget. Since State revenues are
considered general funds not earmarked as to source
or use, and are appropriated annually for State func-
tions deemed essential, coast protection must receive
recognition befitting a modern-day problem of grave
interest - the people and the government of New
Jersey. .
“The seme Industry, the name _ given
shorefront business and recreational activity, is popu-
larly said to be founded on the State’s priceless natural
assets of sand, sea, and sunshine. Its motivating
credo of a better, fuller, healthier life for the people of
New Jersey is symbolic of the social and business life
of today. It is not only recognized as the greatest
service industry in New Jersey, but also as the major
industry in gross income as well as for its . wide
ramifications into diversified industrial life and busi-
ness throughout the State... .
‘“‘The continued prosperity of the Recreation’
Industry admittedly depends upon the existence and
usability of the beaches and shorefront. The preserva-
tion oi these physical assets in first class condition i is
essential to the welfare of the people of New Jersey.
(R. Supp. Appendix 7a, 8a).
. (b) Impact of Decision.
As has been ‘seen, the Atiantic resort economy "an
unstable one requiring periodic in jeetions of massive ~.ate
(2) See Acts of 1922, 1931, 1936, 1945 and 1947 discussed in
Appendix C hereto, infra, p- 02.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 11
and Federal aid. The decision of the court below would
remove the status of immunity from tort liability which
has attended the beach park area for the past 66 years,
The significance of this in economic terms is staggering,
particularly in view of the fact that ocean bathing is a
hazardous activity. Innumerable accidents occur annually
at the Atlantic City beach alone. The tremendous impact °
upon liability instrance coverage and premium increases
should not be overlooked. Cf. Weeks &. City of Newark,
62 N. J. Super. 166, 182, 162 A. 2d 314 (App. Div. 1960).
In addition, the City spends over $200,000 annually for
beach maintenance and operation to protect against this
hazard and to keep the area elean and attractive (R. 70a).
As stated in the opinion below: _
‘*(d) [The City] provided a complete unit of |
Beach Patrol Police; so-called ‘‘protected eaches”’
by the stationing of lifeguard stands and a trained
lifeguard patrol\with ranking officers, having care of
the beach, the foreshore, and the:ocean, with the use
of life-saving: equipment, such as boats, rafts, surf
boards, respirators, life preservers and the like. _
(e) It provided a trained unit of beach personnel
for the physical maintenance, care and cleaning of the
beach surface, with appropriate supervisory personnel.
for inspections, such as the Captains of the Beach
Patrol and the Commissioner of Public Safety.
(f) It provided medical stations, with physicians
and trained personnel, for injuries sustained by
‘bachers and other users of the beach area, which
(3) Since 1894, when cities were enabled by the State Legis-
lature to lay out public parks, there has been only one reported case
arising from injury upon a New Jersey beach, Bisbing v. Asbury Park,
80 N. J. L. 416,78 Atl. 196 (E. & A. 1910). Since Bisbing’s holding:
of immunity for such injuries, there have been no further New Jersey
cases despite annual drownings, shark attacks, and a variety ‘of in-
juries upon clam shells, glass, pipes, timber and other debris—injuries
so numerous as to require at Atlantic City Beach full-time medical
stations, physicians, and other trained personne: (R. 62a-31).
s VES SEER EAS ERESS, TUBS aia
12 . Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
medical stations and personnel maintained a record
of mishaps, injuries and medical assistance rendered,
all of whick were reported to appropriate municipal
officers.’’ Infra, p. 51.
With the advent of the ‘‘adequate’’ award in personal
‘injury cases, one can easily see that sweeping aside im-
munity from the ocean beach area would result in de-
struction of the delicate economic balance which has been
maintained through the combination of city revenues, im-
munity from tort liability, and outside aid. Such a drastic
departure from the sixty-six year history of immunity re-
quires the most careful scrutiny—especially when the
departure results from a Federal court, decision rather
than that.of a State court.
Where a question of immunity is involved, it is a matter
. of peculiar concern to the sovereignty of the State. Indeed,
the federal policy of non-intervention is expressed by: the
Eleventh Ameudment to the United States Constitution.
Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasur of Indiana, 323 U.S.
459; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436. That the federal
judiciary would honor State policy in. such matters has
long been recognized:
It must be conceded that this adjudication as to the
liability of a city for injuries caused by a defect in the
sidewalks, the repair of which it has both the power:
and duty to provide for, is not in harmony with the
general rule in this country . . . nor in accord with
the views expressed by this court . . . that ‘the au-
thorities establishing the contrary doctrine, that a city
is responsible for its mere negligence, are so numerous
and so well considered that the law must be deemed to
be settled in accordance with them,’.. . . But even if
_ it were a fact that the universal voice of the other .—
authorities was against the doctrine announced by the
Supreme Court of Michigan, the fact remains that the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari . 13
decision of that court, undisturbed by legislative ac-
tion, is the law of that State. Whatever our views
. may be as to the peasoning or conclusions of that court.
is immaterial. It does not change the fact’ that its
decision is the law of the State of Michigan, binding
upon all its courts, and all its citizens, and all others
who may come within the limits ofthe State. Detroit
v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 498-99 (1890). See also,
‘ Blaylock v. Muskogee, 117 F. 125 (8th Cir. 1902) ; City
of Denver v. Porter, 126 F. 288 (8th Cir. 1903). ,
JI. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because of the
Questionable Application by the Court of Appeals of
the Rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.
There Is a Division Among Circuits. Concerning
Whether a Federal Court May Disregard State
Court Decisions Which, Though Not Overruled by
Later State Court Decisions, Are Felt to Be Out-
moded by Change in Time and Circumstances.
There is a division among the Circuits as to whether a
federal court may anticipate a change. in settled state law
which has not yet been authoritatively announced by the
state’courts. Judge Frank has said that the test is,
What would be the decision of reasonable intelligent
lawyers, sitting as judges of the highest New York
court, and fully conversant with New York ‘‘juris-
prudence?’? Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149
F. 2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1949).
In a contrary view, Judge Jones of the Fifth Circuit has
said that to follow such a process ‘‘would be attempting to
psychoanalyze state court judges rather than to rationalize
state court decisions.’”’ Polk County v. Lincoln Nat. Life
Ins. Co., 262: F. 2d 486, 489 (Sth Cir. 1959). The Court
+N OD, NR BOOTLE SIR re ler SE - eee a eee ee ee ee ee ee :
POSTS DERE BOLO AL ESSE RATA PATE ERY OLIN ES IIE
14 Petition for a Writ of Certtorart
went on to hold that a decision of the state court on the
precise point in controversy in the federal-court which
clearly establishes the rule to be followed, is binding and
conclusive upon the federal court. In such a situation,
said the court, 262 F. 2d at 490:
‘*We are not permitted to overrule a decision of the
* Supreme Court of Georgia on any theory that the
Georgia Supreme Court, as presently constituted,
would not, be bound by what it had said when dif-
ferently constituted some years ago. Nor can we apply,
in diversity cases, a rule of stare decisis which permits
us to weigh the degree of authority belonging to a
precedent by its agreement with the spirit of the times.
’ The Georgia courts can overrule their prior decisions.
The Federal Céurts cannot do so.- Moore v. Illinois
Central Railroad Co., 312 U.S. 630... .”’
Also compare: Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works,
_ 241 F. 2d 906, 908 (1st Cir. 1957) with Nolan v. Transocean
Air Lines, 290 F. 2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 293
(1961). And see Tome Royalty Ass’n v. Stone, 199 F. 2d —
650 (10th Cir. 1952); Jess Edward, Inc. v. Goergen, 256
F. 2d 542 (10th Cir. 1958).
The older decisions of this Court. shiny agree with
the Fifth Circuit view. The repeated test is that a local
decision must be followed unless ‘‘there is convincing eVi-
dence that the law of the State is otherwise.’* Sir Com-
panies v. Joint Highway District, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940)
and,
. « the highest court t of ‘the state is the final arbiter
of what is state law. When it has spoken, its pro-
° nouncement is to be uecepted by federal vourts as de-
fining state law unless it has later given clear and
persuasive indication that its pronouncement will be :
modified, limited or restricted .
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 15
Even though it is arguable that the Supreme Court of
Ohio will at some later time modify the rule of the
West case, whether that will ever happen remains 2
+ matter of conjecture. West v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Co., 311 U. S. 211, 236-38 (1940). See
also, Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field. 331 UT. S. 169 (1940).
Again, the rulings of a State court of last resort must be
-taken as controlling ‘‘unless it can be said with some ax-
surance that the [State] Supreme Court will not follow
them in the future . . .’’ Meredith v. Winter Haren.
320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). Some of the cases cited here have
received criticism and the lower courts are in confusion as
to the present rule of law-ascertainment under ric. | The
instant case illustrates the confusion.
Here, the lower court refused to follow the eXPFess
rulings and rationale of cases decided by New Jersey’s
court of last resort which have never been questioned by
the New Jersey courts. In Bisbing v. Ashury Park, 80
N. J. L. 416, 78 A. 196 (E. & A. 1910), the highest court of
New Jersey decided a case which ix factually indistinguish-_
able from the present case. The Bishing case bas been re-
affirmed in casés decided in 19284 and in 1935.2) The ra-
tionale of these cases has never been questioned and ha<
been approved by the New Jersey Supreme Court as late
as 1950,° 19577 and 1960.8 The rule of these eases wa-
made statutory by the State Legislature in 1933.
(4). Kuchler v. New Jersey and N.Y. R. Co.. 104N. J. L. 333.
140 A. 329 (E. & A. 1928).
(5) Martin v. ed Park II, 114.N. J. L. 298, 176 A. 172
(E. & A. 1935).
(6) Terranella v7. Union BuiJdiny & Construction Co., 3.N. }.
443, 70 A. 2d 753 (1950).
(7) Cloyes v. Delaware Twp.. 23 N. J. 324, 129 A. 24 1 (1957 5.
(8) Weeks v. City of Newark, G2 N. J. Super. loo, 162 A. 2d
314 (App. Div. 1960), aff. o.b. 34.N. J. 230,168 A. 2d 11 (1901).
(9) R. S. 40:9-2 N. J. 5S. A.
16 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
The lower court felt that a recent opinion by this Court .
furnished an escape from the line of New Jersey author-
ities just cited: “In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America, 350 U. S. 198 (1956), a senate of the strict rule
was suggested.”’ Infra, p. 43.
.The court felt that ‘the indication of a relaxation in
_ Bernhardt allowed it ‘‘to determine whether subsequent to
Bisbing and Kuchler, there is judicial persuasion to con-
vince this court how the highest New Jersey State Court
would decide this question.’’ Infra, at p. 44. This view
_ was particularly important in view of the court’s recogni- -
tion that stare decisis would compel following the older .
‘ -Bisbing case and that the New Jersey Supreme Court has
expressly refused to come to: ically with - entire problem.
Said the district judge:
* In Cloyes v. Delaware Twp., the Supreme Court .
_ said:
_ *We do not believe this * the case in which to
consider whether to come to grips with the entire
problem... .’
This then is the posture of the New Jersey law on this
‘issue. There are no New Jersey cases which endow
municipally owned public beaches or public parks with
‘proprietary characteristics. The next logical query -
_involves the legal compulsion of this Court to apply
the substantive holding of Auchler which in turn relies
on Bisbing which, in turn, relies on Strader.’’ Infra,
p. 42.
The court then looked toward more recent judicial develop-
ments, many of which occurred in other states, while ignor-
ing completely the recent New Jersey case of Terranella
r. Union Bldg. & Const.Co., 3 N. J. 443, 70 A. 2d 753 (1950),
which reaffirmed in dictum that the operation of a public -
park was subject to the immunity granted by R.'S. 40:9-2,
m8 }
‘ *
~
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 17
N.J.S. A. See aiso, Schwartz v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141, 160
A. 2d 1 (1960). ‘The real basis for the lower court’s-refusal
to follow the controlling New Jersey law was subsequently
made clear:
‘*When viewed against the panorama of legal his-
tory, it seems inevitable that even with quickened en-
lightenment, responsive changes came more slowly and
often with tedious caution. This seems especially true
in regard to anciently venerated legal postulates which
justify their continued existence on the’ pragmatic
needs of remote times and outmoded conditions rooted
in ritualistic adherence to the docirine of stare decisis.
Stare decisis, while a valuable and well established doc-
‘ trine, should serve as a flexible channel marker for
guidance’ and not as anv immovable sand bar which may
cause disaster; it should not be permitted to foreclose
re-analysis and re-evaluation of legal postulates, which
may well have lost their vitalizing principle. If out- ,
moded and artifi¢ial distinctions are to persist in con-
' fining a court of law to a choice of specific alternatives,
one of which provides remedy for an injured individual,
and the other does not, then the choice of remedy séems
clear as the demands of justice must be obliged in each
particular case. ‘
As was eloquently stated by Mr. Justice. Holmes,
commenting on ‘The Path of the Law,” in Collected
Legal Papers, Oliver Wendell Holmes, p. 187:
‘It is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which ft was laid down have vanished long
since and the rule simply persists from blind lim-
itation of the past.’’’ Infra, at pp. 48-49.
_ In choosing to find law which was not revolting to his
conscience the court had to disregard the controlling New
ss
*
» "
18 Petition for a Writ of Certtorari
Jersey law. The Btsbing case, supra, established a criterion
regarding the New Jersey governmental proprietary clas-
sification that has never been challenged. That criterion
is whether the function in question is one voluntarily as-
sumed by the City as a consequence to permissive legisla-
State . . .’’' <A‘ further embellishment of the
Ntion from the State, or whether the function is ‘‘ within the
imperative public duties imposed on a municipality as agent
/ of - th
criterion is whether the activity benefits the public as a
whole or only the local citizenry.
The Bisbing case is not only factually indistinguishable,
but the same arguments unsuccessfully urged by the plain-
tiff in that case are the arguments adopted by the lower
court4n its opinion in the instant case. In Bisbing, the de-
fendants’ alleged negligence was set forth i in the plaintiff’s
declaration :
‘“That the defendant, a municipal corporation, was sub-
ject to. . . the duty . . . of keeping sound, safe,
and serviceable for public use all of the parks and pub-
7 places except the streets and avenues in said City
Asbury Park, and particularly the public place
one as the beach-front lying east of Ocean Avenue
** - Yet, the defendant did not keep said public place
known as the beach front * * * sound, safe, and service-
abl. for public use and travel.’’ 80 N. J. L. at 448, 78
Atl. at 197. |
The plaintiff had tripped in a hole under an exposed water
pipe located on the grounds adjacent to the ocean board-
“walk and part of the public park. In rejecting the plain-
tiffs arguments the Court adopted a rationale which has
never been questioned by the courts of New Jersey:
‘Ti. keeping up the public grounds, the agents of the
City were fulfilling a corporate duty imposed by law
=" s.
(10) Weeksw 7. City of Newark, supra, 62.N. J. Super. 166, 181,
"162 A. 2d 314. 323 (App. Div. 1960).
a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 19 -
. . . @ governmental act,:and not-the exercise of ‘a
power conferred for its own benefit.’’ 80 N. J. L. at
424, 78 Atl. at 199. |
Perhaps more important, the court expressly rejected
the arguments adopted by the lower court in the instant
ease. The argument was that since the City derived sub-
stantial direct economic benefit from the use of the public
property, the whole of the. property should be regarded as
being used in a proprietary capacity (an argunient, inci-
dentally, which is inapplicable as to the Petitioner [R. 157a-
38; 97a-24; 157a-13; 157a-24) :
‘‘But it also appears in the case that . . . there were
constructed piers, pavillions, bath houses, a restaurant,
soda water stands, novelty stands, and other buildings
owned by the City and from which the city, by way of
rents, commissions, charges, and bathing privileges, |
derived a revenue. It as well also was in receipt of a
‘revenue from ground rents for portions of said
grounds, for rolling chair privileges, weighing ma-
‘chines, telescopes, and charges for the privilege of
going to a place of 'anding of a sailing yacht.
- By reason of the income . . . the City becomes lia-
ble, it is said . . . hence the insistence is that
the defendant was ‘managing and dealing with this
whole property as a private owner would, and that it
was held by the City for its own advantage and profit
.* 80 N. J..L. at 422, 78 Atl. at 199.
However, the Court rejected this argument pointing ont
that the legislation pertinent to the ocean front required
the use of this property as a public resort for all the citi-
zens, that it was a duty imposed by Taw, and that any
portion of the property which was public property and
not being used directly in a proprietary function would be
immune from tort liability. The fact that the lower court
20 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
' adopted the same arguments rejected in Bisbing may be
readily seen from a cursory reading of the Court’s opinion.
Infra, p. 25.
The Bisbing criterion was reaffirmed in Kuchler, supra,
“in 1928 (which the lower court also regards as no longer.
valid law in New Jersey), and was specifically affirmed in
identical rationales in the two decisions of Martin v. City
of Asbury Park, 111 N. J. L. 364, 168 Atl. 612 (BE. & A.
1933); 114 N. J. L. 298, 176 Atl. 172 (BE. & A. 1935). In
the 1933 Martin decision, the court found that where the
. City was lessor of a bath house which was negligently
maintained resulting in the: plaintiff’s fall on slippery
steps, the function of that particular portion of the prop-
erty was proprietary and the City might be sued. This
rationale of course Was precisely that adopted in Bishing.
In 1935, the second Martin decision again cited Bisbing
with approval and pointed out that the appropriate legis-
lative acts demonstrated the special status of seaside re-
sorts to the general public use, imposing an imperative
duty upon the cities to use the property for such a purpose.
In Martin, the question of immunity turned upon whether
the portion of the property where the accident occurred
was being used in a proprietary capacity. Sincw the City
of Asbury Park there occupied the status of an or@inary
landlord, the activity was regarded as proprietary, one in
which a private individual could engage as well as the
City. But in Bisbing, the accident occurred on public
grounds which were not being used in a proprietary ae-
tivity. - In this respect the instant case (involving an acci-
-dent apon the ocean beach itself) is precisely analogous
to the Bisbing accident occurring upon a portion of the
grounds adjacent to the boardwalk.- Bisbing and Martin
would both allow recovery in the instant case if the injury,
for example, had occurred in a hotel located on property
leased from the City. But the injury did not occur in such
circumstances and thus under Bisbing and Martin there
would be no liability.
Petition for a Writ of Certaorart | 21 -
The)two cases relied upon by the lower court as an
indication of departure from the earlier rationale. (Cloyes
v. Twshp. of Delaware, supra, and Weeks v. City of
Newark, supra), actually reaffirmed the instant rationale
and in no way questioned its applicability in the present
situation. In Cloyes, Chief Justice Weintraub said: ‘‘The-
courts declined to extend the concept of governmental im-
munity to new areas of activity while tending to adhere to
it in the areas in which it had been established.’’ 23 N. J. at
329, 129 A. 2d at 3. The court, in finding liability in Cloyes,
noted that the municipal operation of a sewage disposal
plant was proprietary because this was not an ancient
function of government, was still operated by private
utilities in some places, and the legislation allowing mu-
nicipal operation of sewage disposal plants was permissive
and not mandatory. Application of these criteria is in no
sense a departure from the criteria followed in the Bisbing
and Martin cases. :
Finally, in the latest articulation of the New Jersey
court, Weeks v. City of Newark, supra, so heavily relied
upon by the District Court, the rationale expressed was
precisely in line with that established in Bisbing and
Martin. In finding the operation of a municipal swimr.ing
pool proprietary, the court said:
‘“‘The operation of a swimming pool is an activity
which a municipality provides for its citizens more
as a matter of local convenience than in the exercise
of some duty discharged on behalf of the State with
consequent benefits accruing to the State as a whole.
It is a service which could just as well be provided by
a private corporation, and very often is.”* 62 N. J.
Super. at 180, 162 A. 2d at 322.
The Weeks decision did not-even mention the Bishing
case and its result is entirely in accord with the criteria
established’ in Bisbing, Kuchler and Martin, supra. _Fur-
ther, its analysis exposes the obvious distinction between
22 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
a municipal swimming pool intended for local use and
the Atlantic City beach which attracts the public of the
nation and which-has been the subject of so much State
and Federal aid.
CONCLUSION.
- For the foregoing reasons, this petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted. |
es
Respectfully submitted,
SaMvEx P. Or.Lanpo,
Counsel for Petitioner.
Grorce W. SHapoan,
‘ On the Petition.
APPENDIX A.-
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE Turep Circurr.
No. 14,661. 7 ra
ANDREW CAPOROSSI
v.
ATLANTIC omy, A MunicrpaL CorPoRATION OF THE STATE
oF New JERSEY;
LESTER WARREN, INC., a Corporation or THE STATE OF
New Jersey, an» MOLLIE GERBER anp SHEPARD
GERBER,
~ ATLANTIC CITY, a Municipa, Corporation oF THE STATE
oF New JERSEY,
| Appellant.
AppkAL From THE Unrtep States Distkict Court rorR THE
District or NEw JERSEY.
Argued February 20, 1964:
Before Katopner and Hastir, Circuit Judges, and Krmx-
patrick, District Judge.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
(Filed March 10, 1964.)
Per CuRIAM: .
On review of the record we find no error.” The judg-
ment of the District Court entered pursuant to the jury’s
verdict will be‘affirmed for the reasons so well stated by
Judge Cohen in his excellent opinion reported at.220 F.
Supp. 508 (D. C. N. J. 1963).
(23)
24 Appendiz A
JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
: OF APPEALS.
This cause came on to be sei on the record from the
United States District Court for the cies of New Jer-
sey and was argued by counsel.
On consideration whereof, it is now “ene ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the judgment filed June 6,
1963 in favor of the plaintiff, Andrew Caporossi, and against
the defendant, Atlantic City, a municipal corporation of the
State of New Jersey, be, and the same is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
| Attest: Ipa O. Creskorr, .
March 10, 1964. | : ‘Clerk.
Appendiz B | 25
APPENDIX B.
_ a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
District or New JERSEY.
Civil 581-61.
ANDREW CAPOROSSI, ae
| Plaintiff,
Vv.
_ATLANTIC CITY, a Municipat Corporation oF THE STATE .
or New Jersey, anp LESTER WARREN, INC., a Cor-
PORATION OF THE StaTE or New JERSEY,
Défendants.
OPINION.
(Filed 8/7/63.)
Conen, District Judge:
This is a motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict,
‘and in the alternative for a new trial,? by the defendant,
Atlantic City, a municipal corporation of the State of New .
Jersey, subsequent to a trial by jury and‘a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff, Andrew Caporossi. Appropriate motions
during trial were made by this defendant’ for a directed
vertlict, or judgment of involuntary dismissal, on all claims
for damages asserted by all parties against it, which were
denied. In addition to the legal, factual and argumentative
bases advanced by defendant at time of trial, which it re-
news and commingles with its present motion, it urges
(1) Fed. R. Civ. P. 50,28 U.S. C. A. 2078, properly to set aside
the verdict after trial.
(2) Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, 28 U. S. G. Ay |
26 | . Appendix B a
specifically. that the verdict of the jury was contrary to law, ©
and against the weight of the evidence; that the amount of °
damages awarded was excessive; and that the actions of
the court in failing to charge certain requested instructions
and in ruling on motions of the codefendants constitute
fatal judicial error warranting:a new trial. ~
While many of the reasons assigned by the Court orally,
{n its disposition of certain motions at time of trial, are
equally applicable now, the magnitude as well as the com-
plexity of the legal issues presented and upon which it is
compelled to rule as matters of law, requires renewed cou-
sideration and enunciation of its conclusions.
This litigation, grounded in tort for personal injury
and based upon diversity of ¢itizenship and jurisdictional
amount,’ was instituted by plaintiff, Andyw Caporossi, a
citizen of New York, against defendants, ihe city of Atlan-
tie City, a municipal corporation of the State of New
Jersey, Lester ‘Warren, Inc., a New Jersey corporation,
which operated the Commodore Hotel in Atlantie City, and
Mollie * and Shepard Gerber, citizens of New Jersey, who
owned and operated a parking lot in Atlantic City. The
plaintiff alleged negligence and nuisance against the de-
fendants who asserted cross-claims among themselves.
~ At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proofs, and again
at the conclusion of the entire case, all defendants moved
for judgments of involuntary dismissal and directed ver-
‘dicts, charging failure of the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case against each of them, in that no issue of fact ex-
isted for the jury’s resolution, and that consequently as a
matter of law their motions should have been granted.
. On such motions made at the end of the plaintiff’s
case, it is axiomatic that the trial judge must accept as _
(3) ZU. S.C. 1332.
(4) Defendant Mollie Gerber died, pendente lite, which fact was
noted on the record, and the trial proceeded against defendant,
Shepard Gerber, as the surviving tenant by the entirety.
y
Appendiz B oe 27
proof all evidence supporting the position of the plaintiff,
and must give him the benefit of all inferences that may
logically and legitimately be drawn therefrom.® And again
where any of the evidence would cause fair-minded men to __
differ, the issue is one for the jury’s determination. Like-
wise, in passing upon a motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the’ verdict, or more properly to set aside the verdict,
it should net be granted if the-evidence produced at trial ©
was sufficient to present a jury question, or if the verdict
is supported by substantial evidence. Whereas, /on- the
motion for a new trial, though similar problems are in-
volved, Such a motion is addressed to the sound judicial
discretion. of the trial court, and it may only be granted
where, despite substantial evidence, the verdict is clearly
against the weight of the evidence, or is based upon evi-
‘dence which is false, or would result in a miscarriage of
justiee,’ )
So viewed, and having in mind these salutary prin-
ciples, the testimony is considered.
On August 24, 1960, the date of the injury herein, and
for many years prior thereto, the defendant, Atlantic City,
owned, operated, maintained, and controlled a publie bath-
ing beach within the confines of the city, bordering on the
Atlantic Ocean, to which membersgof the public were in-
vited. The portion of the beach in question lies-at the foot
_(5) Hayden v. Curley, 34 N. J. 420, 422, 169 A. 2d 809 (1961) ;
California Fruit Exch. y. Henry, 89 F. Supp. 580, (W. D. Pa. 1950);
- Satur vy. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 18 F. R. D. 271,-(W. D. La.
1955). ? :
(6) Schrader v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., 280 F. 2d 355. (5 Cir.
1960) ; Shreve v. Hof Shoppes, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 436 (D.C. 1960),
aff'd. 292 F. 2d 761, 110 U. S. App. D. C. 268: Moffett v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 85 F. Supp. 174, (D. C. N. Y. 1949), aff'd. 184 F. 2d
859, (2 Cir.), cert. den.. 71 S. Ct. 533, 340 U. S. O48. 95 L. Ed.;
Weinzen y. Penna. R. Co., 143 F. Supp. 360, (D. C. Pa. 1956) : Rich-
field Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F. 2d 709, (9 Cir, 1959) ; cert.
den., 361° U. S. 961, 80 S. Ct. 570, 4 L. Ed. 543.
(7) Cloyes v. Dalaware Twp., 23 N. J. 324,129 A. 2d 1 (1957),
1943), citing extensive authorities and cases. ,
28 A ppendiz B
of St. Charles Place between the Garden Pier and the Steel
Pier, known as the Delaware Avenue section. This is a
highly populated area, serviced by multitudinous hotels,
many of which were supplied with pipe lines conveying
salt water from the ocean to these hotels providing salt
water baths for their guests. In the event of abandonment,
fire, or other reasons for disuse, the -pipes, referred to
throughout the testimony as dead ‘‘pipes’’, were exposed
and protruded, above the sand, but’ below the surface of
the ocean, constituting a known dangerous condition and
an admitted hazard to bathers. ,
The Commodore Hotel owned and operated by the
defendant, Lester Warren, Inc., is situated on the northerly
side of Pacific Avenue, facing St. Charles Place, the board-
walk, and the beach. .Gerbers’ parking lot, formerly the
new Davis Hotel destroyed by fire in 1952 and acquired by
them in 1954 after mesne conveyances, is located on the
easterly side of St. Charles Place, between Pacific Avenue
and the boardwalk. aid
{n Marck, 1944, pursuant to a resolution of the defend-
ant City, a permit was issued to the then owner of the
New Davis Hotel, Rose Fleischer, for the installation of
salt water intake pipes, leading from the ocean to the said
hotel. One terminal of these pipe lines, in disuse since ,
1952, was located on the beach at St. Charles Place, and
for a considerable period of time prior to the occurrence :
of August 24, 1960, was exposed, the extent of the exposure a lye
varying with the height of the tide; at times completely sf 3
exposed, at others partially exposed, and at still others
completely submerged in the ocean ‘entirely invisible to
public bathers. The hazardous condition created by the
presence of these pipe lines on the beach was known to the
beach personnel and to at least: two of the City Commis-
sioners, as well as to many other employees of the City.
The many pipe lines on the beach, and specifically the
one in question, resulted in injuries of various kind and
degree to lawful bathers almost daily. Sué@h oceurrences
Appendix B ‘99 ©
were reported to and acknowledged by the employees and
officials of Atlantic City. Despite these circumstances,
these pipes remained without safeguards or other pre-
cautionary: measures and without any warning sigys what-
soever. Recommendations for their removal,-prior to the
accident, were repeatedly made and as often refused. How-
ever, after the incident giving rise to the lant, en
-of action, the pipes, belatedly, were removed. Evidéiice of
their removal was proper since control, of. same was in
issue. =i
Although no charge was made by the :City to persons
using the beach, luxury taxes were imposed upon hotels
and merchants which were passed on to guests and con-
sumers, of $1,797,457.4 for the year 1959,.and $1,781,531.07
for 1960, resulting in economic benefit to the City. In
furtherance of its endeavors to solicit and attract people to
the resort, the City for many years advertised extensively
in newspapers, national magazines, on television and radio
‘as far west as Kansas City, up to Canada and down into
the South appealing to one-third of the national population
to use its beach. The City maintained its own. public rela-
tions department and employed the services of the Dorland |
Advertising Agency to whom it paid, in 1959, the sum of
$206,587.96 and, in 1960, the sum of $197,243.26.
Shortly prior to August 24, 1960, the plaintiff and his
prospective bride, seeking to spend their honeymoon in
Atlantic City, communicated with the Commodore Hotel,
owned and operated by defendant, Lester Warren, Ine..
requesting information concerning its facilities. In re-
sponse the plaintiff received a brochure, the design of which
was authored by the President of the defendant hotel-cor-
poration. The brochure listed ‘‘free surf bathing from
hotel to beach”’ as one of its features. It also contained a
map of the hotel ky relation to te beach, as well as a picture
of persons bathing ty the surf. The plaintiff sent a money
oré>r to the hotel in August, 1960, making reservation for
himself and his fiancee, commencing August 23, 1960. After
30 A ppendix B
marriage they arrived on August 23, 1960, at 6:00 P. M.
and registered at- the Commodore Hotel. That evening
they attended Steel Pier, an amusement pier situated on ~
the boardwalk abutting the beach. On August 24, 1960, -
about 4:00 P. M., they prepared to go to the beach; neither
‘had ever been there before, nor were they-aware of its site.
Upon checking his. valuables with the Room Clerk, the -
plaintiff made inquiry as to the location of the hotel beach
and was directed to walk down St. Charles Place, which the
plaintiff and his wife proceeded to de. Upon arrival at the
beach, they selected a location and placed a blanket on the.
sands, near a lifeguard stand. Shortly thereafter, the
plaintiff and his wife entered the ocean and after a few
minutes of splashing at each other playfully, the plaintiff
trod into the surf and dove into an incoming wave. His -
head struck a submerged object. A pool of blood appeared
on the water's surface at the site ef the plaintiff’s entrance
into the surf and at the location of the pipe in question;
after calls for help, lifeguards and others ran into the surf,
removed the plaintiff therefrom, and summoned medical
assistance. The plaintiff sustained severe and permanent
. injuries to hix spine and spinal cord, resulting in quadri-
plegia.
* At the conclusion of the evidence; the motion for dis-
missal of defendant, Gerber, was granted on the ground
that there was insufficient testimony upon which liability
in- negligence r nuisance could be predicated on either fact
_or law." ‘Thaandst that was proved was a‘ reéord easement
for the laying of the pipes, which easement was not within
00 years of defendant's chain of title of record. Actual
(8) Lambe. Reardon, 69 N. J. Saper. 87, 64, 173 A. 2d 320,
525, (App. Div. 1961): “A plaintiff does not make out a prima. facie
‘cise against an abutting owner merely by putting in proof of the exist-
ence of a nuisance, and he cannot thereby throw upon the owner -the
burden of establishing that neither he nor his predecessor in title is
responsible for its creation or continuance.” (citations omitted) On
the contrary, plaintiff has the burden of proving that the owner or his
predecessor in title was responsible therefor.
Appendiz B 31
knowledge was categorically denied by the defendant, and
remained uncontradicted. The motion of defendant, Lester |
Warren, Inc., the owner-operator of the Commodore Hotel,
was taken under advisement by the Court, and the question
of its negligence together with that of defendant, Atlantic
City, was submitted to the jury. The jury ultimately re-
turned a verdict for plaintiff in damages in the amount of
$600,000.00 against defendant, Atlantic City; and a verdict
of no‘cause for action in favor of defendant, Lester Warren,
Ine. Thereafter, the motions of defendant, Lester Warren,
Inc., directed to plaintiff’s claim anc to the cross-claim of
defendant, Atlantic City were granted by the Court.
In contravening the plaintiff’s claim for damages fér
injuries sustained as a proximate result. of defendant At-
lantic City’s negligence in operating a public beach, or on
the basis of the maintenance of a nuisance, defendant inter-
posed by pleading and argument of its motion .that as a
municipal corporation it is immune from tort liability under
common law principles and by statute conferring such im-
munity, Revised Statutes of New Je rsey Title 40 9-2, N. J.
S. .A., which reads.as follows :-
‘*No municipality or county shall be liable for injury
to the person from the use of any publie grounds.
buildings or structures, any law to the contrary not-
withstanding.’’ (L. 1933, ¢. 460, approved Jan. 10,
1934.) .
Defendant concedes :that if injury to a person results
from the use of ‘tany public grounds, buildings or struc”
tures’’ which is devoted to a proprietary activity, as dis-
tinguished from governmental, there is mo statutory im-
munity against municipal tort liability and common law
principles apply; but contends that if the function is govern-
mentai, then under statutory immunity there ix no liability
whether the alleged tort ix based upon simple negligence,
active wrongdoing, Or nuis.... e.
32 . Appendiz B
The primary thrust of defendant’s argumert is that
the area involved in this casepje that of a ‘*publie park’’,
hence within the language of jhe immunity statute in ques-
tion, in‘that it ix within ‘‘publie grounds’* therein énum-
erated. In support of this contention defendant places
great reliance upon the character of the land in question,
beach.front property, as being determined by the nature.
of its acquisition, conditioned upon its purpose and use as
a ‘+public park, or place for public resort and recreation.’
_ By its Charter Provisions (P. L. 1854 p. 278) the territorial
limits of Atlantic City extend into the Atlantic Ocean to
the exterior line of-the State’s riparian jurisdiction. Pur-
suant to permissive but not mandatory legislative authority,
(P. L. 1894 ¢. 98, R. S. 40:179-98, et seq. N. J. S. A.) the
defendant, on October 13, 1899, passed a municipal ordi-
nance **to lay out and open a public park or place for public
resort and recreation along the beach or ocean front of
Atlantic City, establishing the interior or iniand line of
such park or place of publie resort and recreation, and the
limits and boundaries thereof, and providing for the is-
suing and sale of bonds to defray the costs, damages and
expenses incurred in the opening and laying out of such
park ‘and acquiring the lands, property and rights neces-
sary therefor, and for the assessment of property benefited
thereby.’’ The ordinance further provided for the con-
degunation of lands desired by the municipality for -such
“public purpose which were not so dedicated by the private
owners thereef. To avoid condemnation proceedings «by
the municipality the then private owner of the beachfront
area here in question, now known as St. Charles Place, a
James B. Riley, joined with other beachfront owners, and
by deed dated February 6, 1900 conveyed to defendant
municipality ‘tall their’and each of their right, title and
interest, in and to the above deseribed tract. of land (em-
bracing the area in question) and every part and .parcel
thereo!, including such parts and pareeis thereof as‘are or
eh a.
may be cevered by water.’ -There was reserved to the
. Appendix B ae 33
grantors, their heirs and assigns, the right to lay beneath ,,
the surface of their respective lands so conveyed, a pipe or
pipes from their remaining and adjoining lands to and
into the ocean for the purpose of obtaining and conveying
sea water to their lands. _
Thereafter, and pursuant to the Act of April 8, 1903
which was.a supplement to the Act of April 11,-1864, de-
fendant on February 13, 1907 secured a riparian grant
trom the State of New Jersey Riparian Commissioners, for
lands urder water lying between the highwater line of the
westerly shore of Absecon Inlet and the exterior lines
established by the Riparian Commissioners, and for lands
under water lying between the highwater line of the At-
lantic Ocean and the exterior line as established by the
Commission, which ineluded the area in question. This
riparian. grant was made expressly subject to a prior grant
by the State-of New Jersey, through its Riparian Commis-
sioners, to the United States of America on August 17,
1878. Further, the grant to the municipality provided that
should public purpose cease, the lands were to revert to the
State.
Such then ae the title of defendant, Atlantic City,
when in 1944 it issued a permit for the laying of salt water
intake pipes to Gerbers’ predecessor in title, pursuant to’
a ‘*Resolution’’ of its Board of Commissioners, which reso-
Jution provided, inter alia, for the laying of pipes and in-
takes at sufficient depth under the sands of the ‘public
park** so that neither pipe nor intakes shall protrude above
the beach; that the permitee was to assume sole responsi-
bility for damage to street construction or to the public”
using the beach caused by the same becoming uncovered
on the beach; and that such permitee was to post bond to
assure all repairs, and to lower the pipe line when sach
were necessary ‘to protect the public property and people
using the’ beach.*’ No grant of easement of record was
ever properly lodged to give notice of such resolution or
34 Appendix B
construction permit which would appear upon a search of
the title to the lands in question.
Defendant, Atlantic City, strenuously argues that the
Court departed from the obligatory duty imposed upon it
by the Federal Rules of Decision Act (28 U.S. C. 1652), as
interpreted by Erie &c. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 8. Ct.
817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938), and by subse-
quent United States Supreme Court decisions, in holding
that the city in its operation of ‘‘the beach park’’ was en-
gaged in a proprietary function, and in refusing to base its
determination of the substantive law of New Jersey on the
decisions of the New Jersey.Court of last resort, as then
constituted, in Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78
A. 196 (E. & A. 1910), and Kuchler v. N. J. d N.Y. R. R.
Co., 104 N. J. L. 333, 140 A. 329 (E. & A. 1928), which cases
it contends hold that the operation of a ‘‘public park’’ is
a governmental function. |
The legal compulsion to apply state substantive law
under the Federai Rules of Decision Act,’ and as developed
by the United States Supreme Court sinee Erie, is weli
established in diversity actions in the Federal District
Courts.’” In such actions, as here, the Federal District
Court is but another forum of the state courts and is com-
pelled to make. such determination as would a state court
on the precise issue presented to it.” Its function is not to,
<peculate as what the law will be in the future, or apply a
» (9) 2U. S.C. 1652: “The laws of the several states, except
Where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise: require or provide. shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.” June 25, 1948. ¢. 646, 62 Stat. 944. Based on
Title 28 U.S.C. 1940 ed.. see. 725 (R.S. sec. 721); Judiciary Act of
1789, sec. 34. .
(10) Nolan v. Transocean .\ir Lines, 365 U. S. 293, 81 S. Ct.
556, 5 L. Ed. 2d 572 (191): King v. Order of Travelers, 333 U. S.
153, 68 S. Ct. 488, 92 ©. Ed. GOS (1948), and see fotes (12) and
(13) post. : ;
(11) Hausman v. Buckly. 209 *. 2d 696 (2 Cir., 1962), cert.
den. 369 U.S. 885, 82 5. Ct. 1137, 8 L. Ed. 2d 286.
_ Appendix B | 35
rule of law. which it considers better or wiser.7* And con-
versely, the Federal District Court in a diversity case must
accept a binding ruling of the state court of last resort, or
lacking such, its intermediate appellate courts, even though
in its opinion it is an erroneous one. As was stated in
West v. Amer. T..d T. Co., 311 U.S. 228 (1940) at pp.
236, 237 :
_ (True, as was intimated in the Erie Railroad case,
the highest court of the state is the final arbiter of
what is state law. When it has spoken, its pronounce-
ment is to be accepted by federal courts as defining
state law unless it has later given clear and persuasive
‘indication that its pronouncement will be modified, lim-
ited.or restricted. ... . But the obvious purpose of
Sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act is to avoid the mainte-
nance within a state of two divergent or conflicting sys-
tems of law, one to be applied in the state courts, the
other to be availed of in the federal courts, only in case
of diversity of citizenship. That object would be
thwarted if the federal court= were free to choose their
own rules of decision whenever the highest court of
the state has not spoken.
‘*A state ix not without law save as its highest
court has declared it. There are many rules of deci-
sion commonly aceepted and acted upon by the bar
and inferior courts which are nevertheless laws of the
state although the highest court of the state has never
passed upon them. In those circumstances a federal
court ix not free to reject the state rule merely because
it hax not received the sanction of the highest state
(12) West v? Amer. T. & T. Co., 311-U. S. 223. 61S. Ct. 179,
85 L. Ed. 139 (1940). | |
(13; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Morris, 273 VF. 2d 452 (8
Cir.. 1960): Hausman ve Buckly. ante.: West v. Amer. T. x. ee
Ante.; Six Companies of California v. Highway Dist.. 311 U.S. 180,
61 S.Ct. 186. 83 L. Ed. 114 (1940); Fidelity Trust v_ Field, 311
U.S. 169, 61 S. Ct. 170, 85 L. Ed. 109 (1940). y
-
36 ' Appendix B
court, even though it thinks the .rule is unsound in
‘principle or that another is preferable. State law.is to
be applied in the federal courts as well as the state
courts and it is the duty of the former in every case to
‘ascertain from all the available data what the state law
is and apply it rather than to prescribe a different rule,
however superior it may appear from the viewpoint
of ‘general law’ and however much the state rule may
have departed from prior decisions of the federal
courts.”’
In any consideration of the effect of the immunity ~
statute upon the state of the law, which must bind and
guide a court called upon to make a determination of the
existence of municipal liability:or immunity in tort law,
‘resort must be made, of necessity, to the original historical
development of the substantive law of New Jersey in order
to ascertain the present law to be applied in the particular
case. . . : -
At the outset it should be understood that although the
statute imports to grant blanket immunity to nrunicipalities
in its operation of public buildings, lands, etc., the New
Jersey courts have interpreted this immunity to apply only
when a\governmental function is being performed on the
premises in question.
Thus,}we are confronted with the query of whether
the ownership and maintenance or operation by the munic-
ipality of the public bathing-beach in Atlantie City, border-
“ing on the Atlantic = -an, was activity within the classifiea-
tion of governmental capacity and function, for the phrpose
_of determining immunity or non-immunity in tort law."
(14) The origin of the doctrine of governmental immunity is
steeped in the early history of England on the rudimentary theory that
“the King can do no wrong.” The balancing of the concept of such
sovereign immunity against the right of the injured individual gave
rise in judicial decisions to artificial distinctions, such as governmental
and: proprietary functions, in order that a wrong should not be with- -
out judicialeremedy. Such cases seem irreconcilable on the basis of
Appendix B - 37
The historical inception of the municipal immunity
‘ problem is. stated in McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N. J. 172,
190-191, 162 A. 2d 820, 830 (1960) :
“The general thesis of municipal immunity traces
back to the 1788 English.case of Russell v. The, Men
of Deron; 2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K. B.
1788). At that time ‘thé idea of the municipal corpo- .
rate entity was in a nebulous state and the action was
in effect against the population of a whole county.’ The
- decision was predicated on ‘lack of precedent to sustain
the action, fear of a multitude of such actions and the
absence-of funds in the treasury to be used in payment
of judgments arising out of torf claims. (Citation of
authorities omitted.) In such a situation Judge As-
hurst, speaking for the Kings Bench in Russell, said,
‘that it is better than an individual should sustain an
injury than that the public should suffer an incon-
venience.’ 100 Eng. Rep., at p. 362. How the courts
of the United States came to apply the sovereign
immunity doctrine, according to Professor Borchard,
‘is one of the mysteries of lega] evolution.’ ’’ See 15 .
Rut. L. Rev. 98 (1960) note; discussed, 86 N. J. L. J. 1
(1963).
the various reasons and tests assigned to determine the ‘one classifica-
tion or the other. Municipal Corp. 38 Am. Jr. 573, 574. pp. 266, 267 ;
63 C. J. S. sec. 747-750 pp. 34-38; Nissen v. Redelack 246 Minn. 83.
74.N. W. 2d 300, 55 A. L. R. 2d 1428 (1955) annotated p. 1434: under
the topic “Municipal operation of bathing beach or swimming pool as
governmental or proprietary function for purposes of tort liability” :
Prosser, the Law of Torts (2d ed. 1955). sec. 109; 2 Harper and
James, the Law of Torts (1956) sec. 296; 3 McQuillin. Municipal
Corporations (3d ed. 1950) sec. 53.29; Dodridge, Distinction Be-
tween Governmental and Proprictary Functions of Municipal Cor-
porations, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1925). In the present day. par-
ticular and new activities of municipal corporations give rise to further
distinctions, ¢.q. “Parks, Playgrounds, Public Squares and Commons.”
63 C. J. S: sec. 907: “Public Baths, Beaches and Swimming Pools,”
63 C. J. S. 908. p. 322: further authorities collected, OO A. L. R. 2d
1199 nn. 1-6.
3s. : Appendix B
Prior to the immunity statute of 1934, ‘governmental
tort immunity’? in New Jersey enunciated in Board of
Chosen Freeholders of Sussex County v. Strader, 18 N. J. 1.
108 (Sup. Ct. 1840) had been ratified by decisions of its
‘courts of last resort to a point where the legal classification
of the municipal activity involved was either governmental.
or proprietary with alternate liability or freedom in the
field of tort law.”
Of course, the difficulty i in determining the one classifi-
cation or the other plagued the courts. See: Weintraub
and Conford, Tort Liability of Municipalities in New
Jersey, 3 Mercer, Beasley L. Rev. 142 (1934).
The precise effect of the statute upon municipal lia-
bility was considered by the lower courts in New Jersey,
shortly after its enactment, in.Leeds-v. Atlantic City, 15
“ J. Mise. 868, 181 A. 892 (Cir. Ct. 1935), and in Falcone
.v. Newark Board of Education, 17 N. J. Mise. 75, + A. 2d
687 (C. P. 1939).**
In Leeds, the court pointed out that it could be pre-’
sumed that the Legislature was mindful of the distinction
between governmental and proprietary functions in the
New Jersey decisional law when it enacted the statute in
question, and that had a drastic change in the law been.
intended, ‘such would have been manifest in the language
of the statute. It found no such drastic change, and con-
cluded that Atlantic City’s ownership and operation of
Convention Hall, where plaintiff was injured while a pay-
ing. patron at a football game, was similar in nature to a
(15) Schwartz.v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141, 160 A. 2d 1, (1900).
. learned opinion by Justice Hall, for the New Jersey Supreme Suet
citing extensive authority: cf: Thompson v. Millville Bd. of E d..
11 N.-J. 207, 94 A. 2d 206 (1953); Cloyes v. Delaware Twp., 23
N. J. 324,.129 A. 2d 1 (1957).
(16) The 1933 enactment. effective in 1934, R. S. 40:9-2.
N. J. S. A.. applied to school districts as well as municipalities and
counties, and with the 1937 revision of the New Jersey Statutes, tie
statute was parceled into “Education” (R. S. 18:5-30. N. J. S. A.)
and the statute here in question, “Municipalities and Counties”; RK. S.
40 :9-2, N. J. S. A.
Appendix B 39
private enterprise, hence proprietary in nature rather than
governmental and, consequently, not within the statute
which would absolve it from liability for negligence.
In Falcone, the court was confronted with a ease where
a child was injured at school by a falling slate slab. It
referred to the two exceptions to the general common law
rule of non-liabijity of governmental bodies for negligence
—active wrongdoing and proprietary function. The court
declared that the statute in question was intended to modify
the common law rule, but that the courts have carefully
construed and applied the statute so as not to overrule un-
necessarily the common law principles, pointing out that
the statute concerns ‘‘ public: grounds, buildings or strue-
tures,’ and hence, public streets and publie ways, and
proprietary activities, as distinguished from governmental,
are not within the protection of the statute.
Judge Goldman, in Weeks vr. City of Newark, 62 N. J.
Super. 166, 171-2, 162 A. 2d 314, 317 (App. Div. 1960),
provided scholarly review and brilliant analysis of the law
in New Jersey pertaining to the municipal immunity
problem, stating:
‘Various courts have considered the statute subse-
“quent to the Leeds and’ Falcone decisions. However,
the precise effect of the statute upon the common law
classification of municipal and county activities as
governmental or proprietary has never been expressly
declared by our court of last resort.*’
- Judge Goldmann goes on to point ont that cases pre-
~ sented to the Supreme Court of New Jer <ey are not such
as to call forth any definitive declaration short of implying
that.common law distinetion of governmental or proprie-
tary functions persists as part of New Jersey law.
In Weeks the Court found that the municipality had
engaged in a proprietary function, and hence. if negligent.
was not protected by the immunity statute. The funetion
al
-
40 | Appendiz B
was the operation of a swimming pool, the Hayes Park
_ Pool West, by the municipality, the City of Newark, where
plaintiff was injured. It was held to be an activity not nec-
essarily nor. historically incident to government, byt rather
susceptible of, and usually exercised by, private enterprise.
With respect to the operation of a swimming pool by
a municipality, the Court in Weeks observed that there are
two general views reflected by the case law on the subject:
(1) The majority or Massachusetts doctrine, on the ques-
tion of immunity where a swimming pool is maintained and
where nominal charge only may be made, proceeding gen-
erally on the ground that maintenance of a swimming pool
is in the interest of the public health and welfare, hence,
governmental; and (2) that of a strong minority, known as
the New York line of decisions, holding proprietary-non-
immunity, on the ground that the modern trend is against
municipal non-liability, and although the public health
might incidentally be benefited, it should be realized that a
municipality that operates a swimming pool is acting as a
legal indi-idual voluntarily assuming a duty, not imposed
tipon it as a necessary and essential incident of govern-
ment for the benefit of a locality rather than the general
public.'7 -
On appeal, Ww eeks was affirmed. unanimously by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, per curiam. This convine-
ingly demonstrates the Court’s gauging of the develop-
ment of the law on the problem before it, as well as the dis-.
cernment of the judicial temper of the court of last resort
in the State of New Jersey.
Those courts which classify these facilities as govern-
mental do so usually on the ground that they have intimate ~
(17) See generally, 55 A. L. R. 2d 1434, anno. “Municipal op-
eration of bathing beach or swimming pool as governmental or
proprietary function, for “ear of tort liability: 51 A. L. R. 370,
suppl. 57 A. L. R. 40@, 8 A. L. R. 2d pp. 1310, 1315 and 1317;
_ also, “Liability of municipal corporations for injuries due to condi-
tions in parks,” 29 A. L. R , supplemental in 42 A. L. R. 263, 99
ATR oie 142 ALR 160, A. L. R. 2d 1204, sec. 4(b).
Appendix B 41
relation with the public health or, more broadly, with the
public good. Such is the rationale of the two cases stressed
by the defendant, Bisbing v. Asbury Park, supra, and Kuch-
lerv. N.J.&@N.: ¥.R. R. Co., supra. The opinion in Bis-
bing is seemingly based, to some extent, on the criterion
that ‘‘neither the grass plot (where the accident occurred),
nor the way upon which it bordered, produced revenue to
the City’’; and further, that the land in question was a
‘‘park site’’ held for public purpose in governmental ca-
pacity, and therefore immune under Strader. The theory
of corporate .berefit as the sole proprietary test has since
Bisbing been rejected in New Jersey.” In Kuchler it was
determined that a municipality which leased from a railroad
company a plot of ground maintained by it as a park im-
mediately above the station was not liable for injury occur-
ring as a result of ice on steps leading from the park to the
station. The Court stdted that ‘‘the maintenance of public
parks is a recognized method of serving the public interest,
and nothing in the instant case is presented to differentiate
it as an exception from the application of this well-settled
rule,’’ relying for authority on Bisbing. . .
In ‘‘Tort Liability of Municipalities in New Jersey’’,
supra, the ‘abundant crop’’ of decisions referred: to by
Chief Justice Hornblower in Freeholders of Sussex v.
Strader, supra, ensued in passing years, as lunicipal ac-
tivity expanded with changing times and became more com-
(18) See Weeks v. Newark, supra; Housing Authority vy. Trust
Co.. 25 N. J. 330, 136 A. 2d 401 (1957). Cf: Hoffman v. Bristol,
113 Conn. 386, 155 A. 499 (1931). 75 A. L. R. 1191. where although
recognizing the operation of a non-profit public bathing beach as a
governmental function to which immunity attached, following the
Massachusetts view, the municipality was held liable on the basis of
nuisance for maintaining a diving board above shallow water.’ Note
that-while Massachusetts represents the majority view holding munici-
pal beaches a governmental function, it also provides an interesting
paradox : Cape Cod, a peninsula beached on three sides by the Atlantic
Ocean, and comprised of approximately 68 small villages, consists
principally of private beaches, and it would appear that the problem
f{ municipal liability would seldom, if ever, arise.
s
42 : Appendix B
plex. The article reviews the decisions of the New Jersey
Courts up to May of 1934. Present day problems were
there anticipated by the authors of the landmark treatise,
and to some extent resolved a quarter of a century later.
In Cloyes v. Delaware Twp. the Supreme Court, then
speaking through Justice Weintraub (now Chief Justice
and one of the authors of the rears ln in 23 N. J. 324, 332,
129 A. 2d 1, 5, (1957), said: °
‘‘We do not believe this is the case in which to con-
sider whether to come to grips with the entire problem.
We are satisfied that movement toward Strader is in
‘the wrong direction. Hence, we confine the inquiry to
the question of whether the operation here conducted
is proprietary within the holding of more recent au-
thorities, without regard to whether the result will jell
with expressions which antedate them.”’
This then is the posture of the New Jersey law on this
issue. There are no New Jersey cases which endow mu-
nicipally owned public beaches or public parks with pro-
prietary characteristics. The next legical query involves
the legal compulsion of this Court to apply the substantive
holding of Kuchler which relies on Bisbing which, in turn,
- relies on Strader.
Although there must be faithful adherence to state sub-
stantive law in non-federal matters it should be a wise and
discerning loyalty. Blind adherence to certain state deci-
sions, i.e., Strader, Bisbing and Kuchler, without evaluating .
those decisions in the light of other. more recent and more
relevant judi¢ial developments would result in PREstice
_ and a perversion of the staie law which a federal court sets
out to apply.’”” The then understandable fear, assigned as
a basis in Strader, for insulation against municipal liability
—a pernicious dissipation ef public funds- —has become a
(19) See Fahs v. Martin, 224 F. 387 (5 Cir. 1935) ; See lA °
’ Moore Fed. Pract. (1961) 0.309.
Appendix B 43 |
myth under the conditions of a modern enlightened society.
Like gaslight of another time it must give way to the
brightened illumination of today, which chases the shadows
and leaves exposed the inadequacy of such a Mid-Victorian
concept.
The governmental-proprietary dichotomy is probably
oné of the most unsatisfactory known to the law. In 1955
a majority of five Justices of the United States Supreme
Court spoke of ‘‘. . . the non-governmental-governmental
quagmire that has long plagued the law of. municipal cor-
porations. A comparative_study of the cases in the forty-
eight states will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More
than that, the decisions in each of the states are dishar-
monious 2nd disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try
to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound.’ Indian .
Towing Co. v. U. S., 350 U. S. 61, 76 S. Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed.
48 (1955). .
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, 350
U. S. 198 (1956), a relaxing of the strict rule was sug-
gested. Faced in a diversity case with a question ap-
parently settled by a 1910 decision of a “state Supreme
Court, it felt bound by that decision. The Court, however,
noted: _ ° a ,
“*. . > it was agreed on oral argument that there is to
late authority from the Vermont court, that no frac-
ture in the rules announced in those cases has-appeared
in subsequent rulings or dicta, and that no legislative
movement is under way in Vermont to change the
result of those cases.
sé
. . There appears to be no confusion in the Ver-
mont decision, uo developing line of authority that
casts a shadow over the established ones, no dicta,
doubts or ambiguities in the opinion of Vermont judges
on the question, no legislative development that prom-
ises to undermine the judicial rule.’’
44 Appendiz B
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter sug-
gested that a federal court might decide that the Vermont
court, if faced with the question at this time, might reach
a conclusion contrary to the 1910 decision. He argued,
quite forcefully, that the court should attempt to decide
what the Vermont court would do with the question now.
The task, therefore, is to determine whether subse-
quent to Bisbing and Kuchler, there is judicial persuasion
to convince this ‘Court how the highest New Jersey State
Court would decide this question.” The Supreme Court
: (20) An examination of 50 years of judicial history of Bisbing
v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78 A. 196, (E. & A. 1910) anno.
33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523, discloses that it has been cited by the~
appellate courts ‘of New Jersey only as companion authority with
and since Strader (1840), supra, for the general principle that a
municipality. is not liable in negligence in the performance of its
goyernmental duties, with certain exceptions such as proprietary
functions and active wrongdoing; e.g. Karpinski v. Boro of South
River, 85 N. J. L. 208, 88 ‘A. 1073 (E. & A. 1913) where child injured
by electric wire on street, the municipality supplying electric service
to private consumers ; Stephens v. Commissioners of Palisades Inter-
state Park, 93 N. J. L. 500, 108 A. 645 (E. & A. 1919), a case in-
volving a broader concept—the ‘defendant interstate (N. J. and N. Y.)
Commission was directly created by statute and held to be within the
rule in Strader, supra, of a public agency charged with a public duty
and therefore absolved from negligence; Johnson v. Bd. of Ed. of
N. Wildwood, 102 N. J. L. 606, 133 A. 301 (E. & A. 1926), injury
in s¢hool building, followed Strader, supra; Kuchler v. New Jersey
& N.Y. R. Co., infra; Liming v. Holman, 10 N. J. Misc. 582, 160
A. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1932), involved injury to a jail attendant by escapee,
and relied on the general rule of public duty ; Martin v. Asbury Park,
(2 cases) infra; Com’r. Int. Rev. v. Sherman, 69 F. 2d 759 (1 Cir.
1934), involved question of exemption from tax of employee engaged
in governmental function. ( now obsolete), but it states the Massa-
chusetts view on parks, citing Bisbing with approval, -but makes
distinction in kind between parks created as part of a general statu-
tory park system, and “pleasure resorts”; Doerr v. Newark, 128
N. J. L. 491-27 A. 2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1942), alleging injury from a
fall in City Hall where plaintiff went to pay water bill, pointing out
site of fall not clear..and she might have cause of action if in water
department ; Miller v. Layton, 132 N. J. L. 426, 41 A. 2d 24 (Sup.
Ct. 1945): a bridge damage case much like Strader, upon which court
‘ relied; Hill v. Boro Collingswood, 9 N. J. 369, 88 A..2d 506 (1952)
pertained to a Park Commission, not unlike Palisades, ante, but there
the park was part of a County Park System created by statute, R. S.
Appendix B 45
in New. Jersey has spoken out repeatedly against the
amplification of the doctrine of immunity from tort !a-
bility, despite a general legislative unwillingness to act ip
light of present day circumstances, and despite the relue-
tance of the majority of courts of other states to break
with outmoded doctrines of the past. In McCabe v. N. J.
Turnpike Auth., 35 N. J. 26, 170 A. 2d 810, (1961), the
Court found sufficient. manifestation of legislative intent to
subject the Turnpike Authority to suit, without resorting
to the troublesome distinction of governmental .or proprie-
tary activity for negligently inflicted wrongs, pointing out
that ‘‘Critical writers have made it clear that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity has little relevancy to modern day
concepts 6f justice’’2" As was stated by the Court in both
McCabe and Cloyes, the doctrine of municipal immunity
developed for a society totally unlike the present day one,
and should not be further burdened with “hairline distine-
tions which are elusive and unsatisfactory and often most
40 :37-17, 18 as autonomous agency, and its general governmental
function could not be thwarted by local zoning ordinance. And
within the 35 years since Kuchler v. New Jersey & N. ¥. R. Co..
104. N. J. L. 333. 140 A. 329 (E. & A. 1928), the New Jersey courts
have cited it in opinions only twice. See: Kelley v. Curtiss, 29 N. J.
Super. 291, 297, 102 A. 2d 471, 473 (App. Div. 1954). reversed
on other grounds, 16 N. J. 265; 108 A. 2d 431 (1954). Stringfield v.
City of H censack. 68 N. J. Super. 38. 43. 171 A.-2d 301. 304
(App. Liv. 1961) a municipal parking case, which merely alludes to -
it. Neither of these intermediate appellate cases relied upon Auchler
as controlling autherity. Furthermore, in Auchler: the site of injury
was on steps leading to a park site leased from the railroad company.
A review ‘of the New Jersey decisions of the past 35 years
clearly demonstrates a more realist.c attitude in the tort field to-
wards the proprietary classification in refusing to extend an ancient.
inflexible, and often harsh, and modernly unnecessary doctrine ot
immunity to new situations. “The New Jersey trend is in line with
that being foilowed elsewhere.” Schwartz v. Stockton, 32 N. J. 141.
147, 100 A. 2d 1, 4 (1900). .
(21) See Taylor v. N. J. Highway Authority, 2? N. J. 454.
126 A. 2d 313 (1956). There Justice Jacobs observes that federa!
decisions persuasively point vut that the doctrine‘ of governmental
J :
immunity from suit in currently in disfavor. .
46 aa Appendiz B
artificial.’” And, as emphasized in Cloyes, any attempted
expianaticn-for judicial inconsistency can be found only in
the history of the subject and the evolutionary develop-
ment of that area of law as particular cases called for dis-
position in light of changing times, extended municipal
activities, and progressive concepts of remedial justice in
the field of tort liability. Tae underlying reason for the
granting of immunity to municipal corporations was the
_ practical concern of the courts to avoid the supposed in-
evitable flood of negligence actions, or, as stated in the
Strader case, the ‘abundant crop.’’
Comparisons, while not controlling of course, provide
greater dimension to the concepts being considered. A fac- -
tually analogous situation arose in Ide t. St. Cloud, 150
Fla. 806, 8 So. 2d 924, noted in 8 A. L. R. 2d 1317 (1942),
where .a city pursuant to charter power, maintained a
public bathing beach to which the general public was in-
vited. For some time, it had knowingly allowed a deep |
hole there to remain hidden. and unguarded. Plaintiff's
deceased husband and son were drowned. It was held that
the complaint stated.a cause of action. More than 40 years
ayo, Florida, a state equally famous, if not more so, for
its publie beaches as New «Jersey, recognized municipal
liability in tort to innocent victims of misfortune. In
‘Kaufmann v. Tallahasse, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922), it
repudiated ehtirely the governmental-proprietary ‘distinc- |
tion with its judicially evolved ‘‘quagmire’’ of legal fictions
and logistical niceties. ‘The Florida court espoused the view
that. antiquated concepts were inapplicable to modern cities
. operating as municipal corporations under d commission or
city manager form of government for the reason that in
modern times the activities of such cities ‘*. . . partake
more of the. nature of business than government.’’ The
court concluded further, that all such functions of munici-
pal corporations would be considered proprietary, in the
exercise of which, there would be liability for the negligence
” (22) Wide: 3 Mercer,Beasley L. Rev.’ 142, op. cite..
—_
.
Appendix B - 47
of its officers and agents. Thirty-five years after Kauf-
mann, in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130,
60 A. LR. 2d 1193 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1957), the court swept
aside the basic immunity rule and established the prin-
ciple of vicarious liability for both active and passive neg-
ligence under the doctriné of respondeat superior. Some of
the language is: pashomeriy edifving. 60 A. L. R. 2d 1193, at
pages 1196-1197:
‘‘The problem in Florida has become more confusing
heeause of an effort to prune and pare the rule of im-
munity rather than to uproot it bodily and lay it aside
as we should any other archaic and outmoded concept.
. that the time has arrived to face this matter
squarely in the interest of justice and place the resnon-
sibility for wrongs where it should be. In doing this
we are thoroughly cognizant that some may contend
that we are failing to remain blindly loyal to the doc-
trine of stare decisis. However, we must recognize that
the law is not static. The great body of our laws is the
product of progressive thinking which attunes -tradi-
tional concepts to the needs and demands of changing
times. ‘The modern city is in substantial measure 4
large business institution. While it énjoys many of the
basic powers of government, it nonetheless is. an incor-
porated organization which exercises those powers pri-
marily for the benefit of the people within the municipal
limits who enjoy the services rendered pursuant to the
powers. To continue to endow this type of organiza-
tion with sovereign divinity appears to us to predicate
the law of the Twentieth Century upon an Eighteenth
Century anachronism. Judicial consistency loses its
virtue when it is degraded by the vice of injustice. *’
In like manner, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
abandoned old legal frontiers in the case of Barker +r.
City of Santa Fe, 4% N. M. 85, 136 P. 2d 480, 482 (Sup. Ct.
_ 1948):
48 Appendix B
‘‘It is almost incredible that in this modern age ‘of
comparative sociological enlightenment, and in a repub-
lie, the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in
the maxim, ‘the King can do no wrong’, should exempt
the various branches of the government frem liability
“for their torts, and that the entire burden of damage
resulting from the wrongful acts of government should
be imposed upon the single individual who suffers the
injury, rather than distributed among the entire com-
munity constituting the government, where it could be
borne without hardship upon any individual, and where
.it justly belongs.’’
Both Kaufman and Barker were adopted with ap-
proval by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in McAndrew,
supra, observing that Illinois had done likewise for the
same reasons in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dis-
trict, No. 302, 18 Ll. 2d 11, 163 N. FE. 2d 89 (1959).
When viewed against the panorama of legal history,
it seems inevitable that even with quickened enlightenment,
responsive changes came more slowly and often with
tedious caution. This seenis especially true in regard to
anciently venerated legal postulates which justify their
continued existence on the pragmatic needs of remote
times and cutmoded conditions’ rooted in ritualistic ad-
herence to the doctrine of stare decisis.. Stare decisis, white
a valuable and well established doctrine, should serve as a
fiexible channel marker for guidance and net as qn im-
movable sand bar which may cause disaster; it should not
he permitted to foreclose re-analys's and re-evaluation of
legal postulates, which may well have lost their vitalizing
principle. If outmoded and artificial distinctions are to
persist in confining a court of law to a choice of spécific
alternatives, one of which provides remedy for an injured .
individual, and the other does not. then the choice of
‘remedy seems clear as the demands of justice must be
obliged in each particular case.
Appendix B ee ale
_ As was eloquently stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, com-
menting on ‘*The Path of the Law’’, in Collected Legal
Papers, Oliver Wendell Holmes, p. 187:
‘‘It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than it was laid down in the time of. Henry IV.
It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it
was laid down have vanished long since and the rule .
simply persists from blind limitation of the past."’
It seems axiomatic that when the reason for a-rule or
principle falls,.so too the rule or principle. Justice Wein-
traub advanced this very rationale in Cloyes, 2p°N. J. Sot,
328 ;,.129 A.2d 1, 3, stating:
‘**At a time when municipal activities were few and the
capacity of munieipalities to respond-in damages was
uncertain, the doctrine of the Strader ease undoubtedly
seemed to be the common sense answe r to the problem.
But when municipalities and other governmental agen-
cies expanded into new areas, cither replacing private
entrepreneurs or meeting new needs which theretofore
had not required publie activity, additional factors had
to be weighed. The expansion of the area of operations
enlarged the area of hurt. The number of private
injuries which would go without remedy necessarily in-
creased. The experience of private operators who per-
formed subject to the wrdinary principles of tort lia-
bility had demonstrated that such operations céould
absorb the impact of liability for negligence withont
curtailing er imperiling the service. and hence the fear
of a crushing impact upon public funds which played
a rolein the Strader ease was allayved . 2. The ad
vent of liability insurance increased eonfidence in the
ability of loeal government to earry on without special
immunity. And, lastly, concepts of fair play and jus
tice changed. The notion that a remedy by indictment
could satisfy the public interest became archaic. It
‘
50 Appendix B
could not be adjusted to new thinking, the view that
society is better served by absorbing the misfortunes
negligently inflicted upon individuals rather than by
leaving them to their own inadequate devices for the
supposed benefit of the entire community.’”.
Such lucid language of the Chief Justice seems par-
ticularly appropos to the matter now calling for resolution.
The inquiry here is not one which seeks to impose undue
hardship on a municipal corporation or confront it with
absolute liability in the field of negligence,. but rather to
determine whether its conduct and activity are such as to
call upon it, as with any other tortfeasor, to answer. in
liability on ordinary principles of negligence, where it
voluntarily assumes to act in a proprietary capacity not
necessarily incident and essential to its fundamental essence
as a governmental body politic.
The foregoing decisions of the New Jersey courts,
while not precisely dispositive of the issue here, provide
the controlling rationale for determination and offer ample.
criteria in light of the current development of its law
governing municipal liability in negligence.
With respect to the specific activities of defendai.‘..
Atlantic City, in regard to the public bathing beach in
question, the following operations appear from the evi-
dence and stand uncontradicted or explained away by
the defendant:
(a) The extensive efforts of defendant to induce, at-
tract and invite persons generally, of which plaintiff was
one, to come to ifs City and use its facilities, foremost of
which was the beach and ocean bathing.” It-employed wide-
spread national advertising for this purpose, at a cost of
several hundred thousauds /of dollars annually. —
(b} It imposes # system of ‘‘luxury taxex’’ for the
raising of revenue tor the, municipal corporation, which
taxes are passed on to all consumers and guests for the
¢
| Appendiz B a 51
use of its facilities, realizing approximately 134 million
dollars annually, without which the City, according to the
testimony of its Director of Revenue and Finance, would
be ‘‘bankrapt’’. Some portion of such ‘revenue was used
to maintain and 6perate the beach in question; a sum over
$200,000 annually. ;
(ce) It fostered and provided by way of concessions
on its boardwalk abutting its beach, snack bars, restau-
rants, rolling chairs, rest stations, rest pavilions, bath
houses, and other public incidents of commerce ; and on its
beach, beach chairs, cabanas, umbrellas, pony rides, horse-
back riding, rest stations, from all of which it collected
mercantile revenue.
(d) It provided a complete unit: of Beach Patrol
Police; so-called “ protected beaches”’ by the stationing of
lifeguard stands and-a trained lifeguard patrol with rank-
ing officers, having care of the beach, the foreshore. and the
ocean, with the use of life-saving equipment, such as boats,
ratts, surf boards, respirators, life preservers and the like.
(ce) It provided a trained unit of beach personnel for
the physical maintenance, care and cleaning of the beach
surface, with appropriate supervisory personnel for in-
spections, such ax the Captains of the Beach Patrol and the
Commissioner of Public Safety.
(f) It provided medical stations, with physicians and
trained personnel, for injuries sustained by bathers -and
other users of the beach area, which medical stations and
personnel maintained a record of mishaps, injuries and
medical assistanee rendered, all of which were reported to
appropriate municipal officers.
In Weeks, a pablie swimming pool was involved: in
the instant case, a public bathing beach. In Weeks. the mu-
nicipality exercised complete dominion and contrel of the
pubiic park swimming pool; likewise here; in both cases
52 Appendix B
the respective municipalities derived revenue; in both
cases the municipalities provided facility to the public, and
there was no discrimination against individual citizens or
members of the public generally.
In the instant case the defendant municipality did not
preempt any right of the sovereign State of New Jersey
to operate the beach; it did not share the benefits or
burdens with the State; it did not operate the public beach
in question under and subject to the control or super-
vision of the State or as its agent or alter ego; it did not
seek or employ any participation by the State as a neces-
sary or desirable adjunct to its operation. On tbe con-
trary, the defendant v.unicipality for the length and course
of a great many years, assumed complete and exclusive
dominion and control of che beach shore in question, and
engaged in its operation and management to an extent
manifestly commensurate with sole proprietorship. |
Atlantic City fostered and sponsored a great influx of
tourists to use its facilities; it was literally in the business
of promoting. tourists and their use of its attractions of
entertainment and recreation; it is internationally char-
acterized by itself, and others, as the ‘* Playground of the
World”’; it has also become known as the ‘‘Convention
City’’, as the city of ‘‘Miss America’’, of the beauty
pageants, and recently the successful bidder for the Demo-
cratie National Convention at’ an estimated $650,000.00.
Atlantic City’s bare naive assertion that it was merely
paternally and altruistically engaged in government in
providing public park facilities for the w Il-being of its
citizens, surrounding communities, the people of the State
of New Jersey, of the nation and the world at large, in the
face of its incurring of great expense, a full-time pro-
motional endeavor,-the reaping of substantial revenues -
and benefits, all without legitimately selfish proprietary
interests and rewards, is-at best unrealistic.
: Thus, it is difficult to conclude, that, as a matter of
law, defendant municipal corporation was performing time-_
Appendia B BB
honored, customary and characteristic employments of a
political governmental body charged with the collective
good and welfare of its citizens, as with an isolated park-
site where inhabitants seek health, rest and fresh air in
an environment of trees, fountains, ponds, streams, knolls,
footpaths, and the like, as anciently of the ‘‘Walden’’ of
Henry Thoreau, and modernly generally associated with
‘*narks’’; or as with the quietude of a public library for
research, study or contemplation. Rather, it engaged on
a grand scale in the commerce of services and facilities
unknown in earlier times when common law immunity in
negligence cases arose. Indeed, it would be most difficult
to conceive a private entrepreneur, and enterprise, which
could so amply commercialize and exploit a natural re-.
source, or resort, to such extent as to render certain mu-
nicipal services as police and -fire protection, streets and
. highways, welfare agencies, and the like, as merely a
corollary to big business.. That the defendant, Atlantic
City, was engaged in a proprietary activity, as distin-
guished from a governmental function, in light of all the
foregoing considerations, seems not only well founded in
fact and logic, but is compelling for acceptance as a matter
of law, with respect to its obligation to answer in negligence
as a private proprietor similarly so engaged.
The Bisbing case, and Kuchler which’ relies upon it
for authority; are not controlling in the instant case. In
b.-bing, the court was steeped in the legal philosophy of
Strader, which it cited as its major premise; it merely
alluded to ‘‘private capacity’? now well known in the de-
cisions of New Jersey as ‘‘proprietary capacity’’. The
court concluded that the use of the land there in question
was governmental. Bisbing does not stand for the proposi-
tion, as contended by defendant, that public lands, or a
public park, or some portion thereof, cannot under any cir-
cumstances be devoted to a proprietary use. Kuchler pro-
- vides no greater persuasion for such contention. These.
cases have been significantly left behind in the development
oF _ - Appendix B
of the law of New Jersey regarding municipal tort liability,
as pointed out in Cloyes, and are clearly distinguishable
both in faet and law. The crystalization of the substantive
law of New Jersey: in the vast 50 years cannot be dis-
regarded and resort made to earlier expressions alone, not
precisely dispositive of a current issue of law. Such is the
very folly interdicted by Justice (now Chief Justice)
Weintraub in Cloyes. Rather it is this crystalization of the
substantive law of New Jersey, as reflected in its judicial
decisions of binding persuasion and compelling legal force,
that has guided this Court to the applicable criteria and to
its ultimate decision. As once said by Mr. Justice Holmes:
“The lay embodies the story of a nation’s develop-
ment through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt
with ax if it contained only the axioms and corollaries
of a bowk of mathematics. In érder to know what it
is we must know what it has been and what it tends
to become.’” ~
That a municipal corporation may act in many spheres
and, in legal contemplation, be classified for particular
., purposes, is a matter of common experience.” A deter-
mination here, for the purposes of tort liability, that the
maintenance and operation of the bezch and bathing facili-
ties incident thereto, by the defendant municipality, was
in the nature of a proprietary activity, does fot defeat,
work a forfeiture or reversion, or occasion any violence to
any restrictive covenant, grant, or deed of dedication
limiting or civeuriscribing municipal purposes as ‘*‘ public
park or place.for public resort and recreation.’’ Public
purpose persists, although a particular use devoted to the
*(23) Vide: Cloyes v. Dela. Twp., op. cite; McCabe v. High-
way .luth. op. cite; err v. Turnpike, op. cite; e.g., the borrowing of
funds, the issuance of bonds. operation of sewerage disposal plants,
or water supply. highway authorities, turnpike comnassions, con-
demnation proceedings, participation in federal loans anu grunts of
funds for redevelopment or urba> renewal, road improvements, soil
erosiv *, etc. pa “iy
Appendix B ° 55
public at large may be proprietary, as distinguished from
governmental. In Martin v. City of Asbury Park, 111
N. J. L. 364, 168 A. 612 (E. & A. 1933), opinion by Chan-
cellor Campbell, the City was hela as a proprietor in its
leasing of a bath house and bathing establishment, and
answerable in negligence; and in the subsequent case.of -
ewMartin v. Asbury Park, 114 N. J. L. 298, 176 A. 172 (E. &
A. 1935), a supplementary proceeding where satisfaction
of the judgment obtained in the foregoing case was sought,
by execution against the leased bath house, and was denied. -
The court held that even though in the prior case there ©
was a proprietary use, the land in question was devoted
to a ‘‘public purpose’ and therefore not subject to
execution.” “
- Additionally, it is significant that enabling legislation
in 1894, permitting cities bordering on the Atlantic Ocean
to ‘‘open and lay out a public park or place for public re-
sort or recreation on and along the beach or ocean front of
such city’’ ete., and under which defendant acted, pertains
to lands for dedication for public purposes, albeit, for mul-
tiple -or disjunctive uses by such municipal corporations.
_ Furthermore, mere characterization by a municipal corpo-
ration-of a permissive public purpose does not determine
and classify its particular use in negligence law.
As was so aptly stated in Weeks, 62 N. J. Super. 166,
_ 183; 162 A. 2d 314, 323-324:
‘‘Tt is not unreasonable so to construe the statute here
‘in question as to hold a municipality for negligence in
the maintenance of . . . [land] devoted to the per-
(24) It should be noted, that the Court although citing Bisbing
as authority for immunity, did not defeat the concept of divisible
municipal capacity, governmental-proprietary, under the ‘statute re-
quiring public purpose of the lands in question. Therefore, neither
it, nor Bisbiny, stands for the proposition that “park lands” are ipso
esse governmeptal function. To like effect: Baird v. Ed. of Recrea-
tion Commissioners, Village of South Orange, 108 N. J. Eq. 91, 154
A. 204 (Chanc. Ch. 1931). reversed on other grounds, 110 N. j. Eq.
(03, 160 A. 537 (E. & A. 1932).
56 - Appendia B
formance of a function voluntarily assumed under its
general powers or by permissive legislation, or where
it performs a service which could be provided as well
(and often is) by a private corporation, or where the
function is allocated to the municipality for its profit or
special advantage, rather than for the purpose of carry-
ing out the public functions of tle state without special
advantage to the city.’’ [Brackets supplied.]
It is also urged that the Court erred in denying certain
requests to charge made by defendant, Atlantic City, which
had for their purpose the declaration of its immunity.
Consistent with the Court’s rulings on prior motions, these
requests were denied.
The-additional requests to charge were covered gen-
erally in the charge of the Court, and were for that reason
denied; * or they had no foundation in the evidenge, such
as actuarial formuiae or arithmetical computations,” and
were carried generally in broad terms of ‘‘present-value’’ ;
or did, in the Court’s opinion, constitute prejudicial error
as with the requested instruction regarding the absence of
income tax assessment‘on any damage award made by ver-
dict ;?7 or la: ked the citation of any reliable supporting au- -
thority, and the clarity of Jaw and preciseness of language
to which the Court was entitled.” -Those ‘requests of. the
codefendant, Warren, which defendant, Atlantic City, orally
adopted by way of reference as its own, were for the rea-
sons expressed to the codefendant, as well as the reasous
set forth above, likewise denied.
(25) Gerhart v. Disston & Sons, 290 F. 2d 778 (3 Cir. 1961) ;
Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138, 10 S. Ct. 290, 33 L. Ed. 531 (1889).
(26) See note 25, ante. ;
(27) Altenius v. Penna. R. Co., 32 Fed. R. D. 7, 210 F. Supp.
~ 834 (D.C. Dela. 1963); McWeeney v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co., 282 F. 2d 34 (2 Cir. 1960).
(28) 28 U. S.C. A. Rule’ 51; S. Dist. Ct. Dist. of New
Jersey, Local Rule 18; Cherry v. Ta ed 259 F. 2d 774 (© Cir.
1958) ; Alexander v. Kramer Bros. 273 F. 2d 372 (2 Cir. 1960).
,
Appendix B 57
The remaining thrust of the defendant’s motion ‘is that
the jury’s verdict for damages in the amount of $600,000.00
was ‘‘excessive,”’ and a result of fie ‘influence of passion,
prejudice, mistake and sympathy.’ This Court is cogni-
zant of its judicial responsibility where the amount of dam-
ages awarded by jury verdict/is questioned; and it recog-
nizes that, while the primary( responsibility is that of the
jury, it is not exclusively so, and the ultimate responsibility
rests with the trial judge2* In this regard, certain cardinal
features lighted the way for the jury in determining its
award. On August 24, 1960, before the injury in this case,
plaintiff was a young man, age 24 years, in good health, a
bridegroom, gainfully employed as a high school mathe-
matics teacher in Long Island, New York, and was further-
ing his education towards a Master’s degree in the Science
of Mathematics leading, in the natural course of events in
this technological Age, to greater proficiency, increased
earning potential and capacity, with a reasonably probable
richer and fuller, life. Indeed, he was virtual’; on the
threshold of life’s grand experiences. These are the un-
contradicted facts in evidence. Against such is contrasted
the plaintiff after injury. He sustained severe, complete
and permanent traumetic injuries of the spine and spinal
cord, with resultant quadriplegia. He was hospitalized im-
mediately in the Atlantic City hospital, where he remained.
for about 4 months, and thereafter was transported to che
Rusk Institute of Rehabilitation, in New York, where for
some 14 months he underwent extensive and arduous re-
habilitative therapy. Then, as now, he is completely para-
lyzed from the neck down the trunk of the body including
the upper and lower extremities; he has ucceeded in de-
veloping some shoulder an¢@ wrist movement only. He is
permanently confined to his bed or a wheel chair, and re-
quires the assistance of a male nursing “ttendant to admin-
(29) Guerini Stone Co. v. P. J. Carlin Constr. Co., 240 U. S.
264. 36 S. Ct. 300. 6 L. Ed. 636 (1915); Dellaripa v. New York,
N. H. & H. R. Co., 257 F. 2d 733 (2 Cir. 1958).
28 ' Appendix B
ister to his personal and private needs. Periodic check-ups,
medical treatments and antibiotics have been’ prescribed as
_essential, for the balance of his life expectancy, approxi-
mately 43 years, which, aceording to the uncontradicted
testimony of ‘plaintiff’s medical expert, was established
mediéally to be the same as for any other young man of his
age, providing he has the continuing benefit of the’ pre-
scribed medical care. His injuries terminated his gainful
‘employment. He was earning as a high school teacher
$4,500.00 annually in-the New York School System, and has —
a wage-loss to date of approximately $10,000.00. His medi-
cal bills to date approximate $23,964.71, and estimated fur-
ther medical expenses are at least $1,500.00 annually. Fur-
ther education, if not impossible, is at best highly improb- |
able. These then, are the uncontradicted facts in evidence.
And it may well be noted, that in the presentations and
arguments of all counsel in this case, they displayed com-
mendable’ restraint, awareness of legal proprieties and
utmost good taste. There was not the slightest nuance of
passion or sympathy engendered by counsel.
‘There ‘is nothing which would _warrant, or should
prompt, this Court to pretend to a wiser assessment of
damages for the injuries to this particular individual, and
substitute its judgment for that of the twelve jurors sworn,
no less, .to exercise their best judgment in the same cause.
While precise formulae-in the area of personal injury neg-
ligence law remain elusive and undevised, our jurispru-
dence demands that provision be made for fair, just and
reasonable compensation: Clearly this is what the jury has
endeavored to do; and it is this, nothing more or less, that
this Court believes it has.done. Furthermore, in the ex-
ercise of this Court’s judicial discretion, it is its conviction
that there was: substantial basis in the evidence for the
amount of damages awarded by the jury and that, under
_ all the instant circumstances, the verdict represented fair,
just and reasonable compensation.
/
«
‘ Appendix B . 59
In summary, it was the finding of this Court, at the
conclusion of the testimony, that the defendant, Atlantic
City, was engaged in a proprietary activity within the
meaning of the substantive law of New Jersey, and, as
such, chargeable in negligence if found guilty of wrong-
doing, and the case was so submitted:to the jury with
appropriate instructions on negligence and nuisance. as a
specific refinement thereof. However, if governmental,
then this case may very well"be the one that the New
Jersey Supreme Court was waiting for. This could very
well be, as stated by Chief Justice Weintraub in Cloyes,
23 N. J. 324, 332, 129 A. 2d 1, 5 (1957) ‘‘the case in which
to consider whether to come to grips with the entire
problem.’’ In any event, assuming but not conceding, that
the operation of the public beach be construed govern-
mental in capacity and function, it is the view of this Court’
‘that the defense of immunity is still unavailable to the
defendant because of its active wrongdoing.” . There were
here committed acts of commission ‘and acts of omission-—
tantamount to commission—so overwhelmingly negligent
that had a motion been made by fhe plaintiff for the direc-
tion of a verdict, this Court would have been hard-pressed
to retreat from an obligation to grant it, and to submit to
the jury for its determination, the sole issue of damages.
_In view thereof, it is:now, after verdict. the conclusion of
this Court, that there was Brese nted legally sufficient and
factually ample evidence, of Atlantic City’s negligence.
Here was a situation where an extremely perilous condi-
tion, without any warning whatsoever, was permitted {5
continue for an intolerable period of time, despite the.
reoecurrences of accidents almost daily. despite the ad-
mitted knowledge of and recoguition of danger by namer-
ous nhunicipal employees and officials one of whom was the
Director of Publie Safety, the other charged with the care
and maintenance of the beach, and ¢ despite conntless recom.
(30) ° See Yanen v. Conti, 73 N. " Super. 23, 179 A. 2d 129
(App. Div. 1962).
60 Appendiz B
. o .
mendations—if not pleas—for the removal of these
saadianae dais To sit idly by and countenance such
known danger to the unsuspecting public, to fail to take
reasonable measures to avoid disaster instead of tempor-
izing with the situation,*’ is abundant proof of grossly
negligent conduct. The verdict of the jury against the
defendant, Atlantic City, was proper. Insofar as the -
propriety of the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant,
- Warren, the provision of a’private hotel beach to its guests,
knowledge of the hazardous pipes, and direction of the
- plaintiff by the hotel to a known place of peril, presented
purely factual issues that were resolved by the jury in
Warren’s favor. Thee was substantial basis for such
finding.
For all these reasons, the motions of the defendant,
Atlantic City\are denied, and the verdict of the® jury as _
recorded shall remain undisturbed.
The — order may be submitted.
Mrrcnet. H. Conex, _ .
a Judge, U.S. District Court.
(31) See Zanca v. Conti, ante. ’ a
(32) Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v’ Yeatts, op. cite; Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U. §. 243, 61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 147
(1940). :
Appenkz B | 61
JUDGMENT OF THE U. 8. DISTRICT COURT.
The above entitled action having been tried before the
' Honorable Mitchell H. Cohen, U. S. D. J., and a Jury, on
May 27th, 28th, 29th, 31st; June 3rd, 4th and 5th, 1963, and
the Jury having returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff,
Andrew Caporossi aguinst the Defendant, Atiantic City, a
municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey, in the
sum of $600,000.00; and a verdict of No Cause for Action
in favorjof the Defendant, Lester Warren, Inc., a corpora-
tion of the State of New Jersey, against the Plaintiff,
Andrew Caporossi; and a verdict of No Cause for Action
in favor of the Defendant Lester Warren, Inc., a corpora-
tion of the State of New Jersey, on the aaa of the
Defendant, Atlantic City,
It is, on this 6th day of June, 1963,”
OrveEreED that judgment in the sum of $600,000.00 be
entered in favor of the Plaintiff, Andrew Caporossi against
ee Defendant, Atlantic City, a municipal corporation of
1e State of New Jersey, with costs, and it is further
Orperep that judgment of No Cawse for Action be
entered in favor Wie Defendant, Lester Warren, Ine., a
corporation of the State of New Jersey, against the Plain-
tiff, Andrew Caporossi, without costs; and No Cause for
Action in favor of the Defendant, Lester Warren, Inc., a
corporation of the State of New Jersey, on the Cross-claim
of the Defendant, Atlantic City, without costs. .
. | MitcHecy H. Coney,
U.S. Dd...
b
62 Appendiz C ~*
APPENDIX C.
State Legislative Efforts to © Improve the Seacoast Resort
Economy.
In the preamble to the Act of 1922, L. 1922, ¢. 35 $1,
p. 65, R. S. 40:179-109, N. J. S. A., which permitted the
resort cities to erect and operate ‘convention halls’’ to
improve their revenues; the recital recognized that certain
cities had undertaken to lay out beach parks but had been
unable to do so because of financial difficultzes, inter alia.
See Historical Note to R. S. 40:179-109, N. J. S. Au.
In 1931, the Legislature enacted statutes providing for
a Municipal Finance Commission, a ‘‘quasi-receivership’’
of municipalities which were in default in the payment of.
principat or interest on municipal notes or bonds. L. 1931,
c. 340, § 102, p. 831, as amended, R. S. 52:27-2, et seq.,
N. J. S. A. In 1935, the resort City of Asbury Park came
under control of the Municipal Finance Commission. City
of Asbury Park v. Smock, 121 N. J. L. 487, 3 A. 2d 607
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
In 1936, the Legislature provided:
‘*In every municipality under control of the mu-
nicipal finance commission, and which shall own the
beach and upland contiguous thereto, a beach commis-
sion shall be appointed. This commission shall consist
of four suitable persons, residents of such municipality.
Said persons shall be known as beach commissioners
and shall be appointed by the governor, by and wit:
the advice and consent of the senate, * * *.°’ LL. 1936,
ce. 160 § 1, p. 872, R.S. 40:55 A-1, et seq. N. J. S. A.
ae
The Beach Commission so established had absolute
power over the beach, all revenues related to it were kept
1 a separate account solely to benefit the beach, the Beach
Pa ara operated independently of the municipal gov-
ernment and answered solely to the governor and state
legislature. See R. S. 40:55 A-d:
Appendix C ; 63
‘*The beach commission * * * shall * * * be substi-
tuted for and vested with all the powers and duties now »
vested in or exercised by the, governing body of such
municipality, relating to and in respect of the manage-
ment and control of the beach, and the cor.struction,
maintenance, and use of the beach, and a’: properties
and structures,. piers, bulkheads and jet’ies owned. by
‘the municipality contiguous to such bach, and shall
lay out, embellish, improve, manage, and control the
boardwalks, convention halls, bath houses, places of
amusement, stores, buildings, and pruperties, and the
portions of the beach owned and heretofore controlled
*#@¢ 899
.
by such municipality
And see, Asbury Park v. Smack, 121 N. J L. 48%, 3 A. 2d
607 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Kleinfus v. Sirgany, 1. N. J. Mise. 175,
_ 178, 6 A. 2d 724, 726 (Cir Ct. 1939). : -
Regarding the separate accounting and its purpose, see
R. S. 40:55 A*t8; R. S. 40:55 A-9; and R. S. 40:55 A-10,
N.J.S. A.; the latter section provides:
‘“*It is the interition of this chapter ‘o make avail-
&
ablé to such beach commission, for the conduct of the
beach and its enlargement, extension, mprovement,
and for the addition of new and further facilities, all
moneys which shall be received for the overations of
such beach and the properties and structures thereon,
whether eurrently- or theretofore earnel, and ail
‘\
poses, and to place the.same under the j irisdiction
and control of said beach cominissioners, t> the end
that the same shall be self-sustaining and seli-liquidat-
ing and thereby relieve the taxpayers.”
In 1945, the Legislature (in an Act later held ureconsti-
tional as a special law) recognized the acute financia’ prob-
lems and instability of the resort economy:
moneys raised by taxation or otherwise for beach pur- .
vere,
64 Appendix C
**An emergency is hereby declared to exist in mu-
nicipalities bordering upon the Atlantic Ocean: which
are’ seaside or summer resorts and which because of —
their size have a’ great fluctuation in the number of
visitors, because of the recent hurricane, the continued
erosion of beaches and the danger of hurricane in the
near future; all of which make it impossible for such
municipalities to function normally as seaside or sum-
mer resorts dwring the next three fiscal years unless
some additional revenue can be raised for use in pro-
viding and continuing the facilities which attract visi-
tors to ‘such municipalities as ‘seaside or summer
' resorts.’’ Ly: 1945, ce. 156, p. 544, 42, R. S. 40:48-8.2,
N. J.S. A. Zi
In ‘1947, the Legislature renewed its efforts to stabilize
the resort economy by_ providing for a new sales tax ap-
plicable to such cities, L) 1947, c. 71, p. 431, § 1, et seq., R. S.
40 :48-8.15, N. J. S. A. Its purpose was so stated:
‘“Whereas, the Legislature, in furtherance of pub-
lie policy, has for a period of years greatly enlarged
municipal activities, principally tn matters of public
health and safety, with no consequent grant of revenue
power to mect these modern and constantly expanding
conditions; and
Whereas, the sources of revenue in the various mu-
nieipalities, particularly in Cities of this State border-
_ ing upon the Atlantic Ocean and being seaside or sum-
mer resorts, are inadequate and insufficient to meet
' ¢xisting municipal obligations ; and
Whereas, many of these impositions are mandatory in
character, and it is necessary and essential that such
cities be given power to increase existing revenues; «
therefore’’. Historical Note, R. S. 40:48-8.15, N. J.
S$. A.
- * Appendiz C 65
..
In 1948, in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the
Statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly stated the
situation, .
‘‘The proofs show that the presence of sur imer
visitors imposes an unusual burden upon mun cipal
government since it must increase its facilitie, for
police and fire protection. The beach front mst, at
all hazards be saved and it must be cleaned ar de po-
liced. Suitable provision must be made for bathiy g and
. the safety of bathers.
The statistics adduced, and made a part of the
~ record, in this case indicate that the municipal ex senses
in cities binding upon the Atlantic Ocean are very dif-
ferent from comparable inland cities where the e :traor-
dinary expenses mentioned do not exist and Where a
normal business is carried on for a much longer period
of the year.”’ 137 N. J. Bxat 350, 60 A. 2d at 246-47.
Karis v. Board of Com’rs of Atlantic City, 187 37. J. L.
349, 350, 62 A. 2d 246, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.