Appendix — General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mackrill

Supreme Court brief1964

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“APPENDIX A

175 Neb. 631, 122 N.W. 2d 742

.GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION,

a corporation, Appellee, .

Vv. i

Donald E. MACKRILL, Appellant.

No, 35438. |

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

‘July 16, 1963.

Heard before WHITE, C. J., and CARTER, MESS- —

MORE, YEAGER, SPENCER, BOSLAUGH and.

_ BROWER, JJ. _ : :

SPENCER, Justice.

This is a replevin action in which General Motors Ac-

ceptance Corporation, hereinafter refer zed to as plaintiff,

alleges it has a special interest in a1 Chevrolet sedan

pickup Biscayne by reason of being the assignee of a

conditional sale contract entered into between Kizzier

_ Chevrolet Company, a corporation, hereinafter referred

to as Kizzier, and Donald EK: Mackrill, hereinafter re-

ferred to as defendant. Defendant appeals from the over-

ruling of a motion for a new trial after a judgment for

the plaintiff for possession and costs.

On December 9, 1961, defendant: purchased the car in

question from Kizzier and signed what is designated as a

conditional sale contract, obligating himself to pay a bal-

ance of $1,573.76. The financial part of the transaction

is described in the conditional sale contract as follows:

App. 2

‘ ‘‘Undersigned seller hereby sells, ‘and undersigned buyer

or buyers, jointly and severally hereby purchase (s), sub- /

ject to the terms and conditions set forth below and upon

the reverse side ‘hereof, the following property, delivery *

and acceptance of which in good order are hereby acknowl-

edged by ‘buyer; viz. : }

Mew Year No. Make Body Type . Model Manutfac- Motor

or Model Cyl. Trade Name If Truck, ~ Number turer’s No.

- Used Give Tonnage or Series Serial No.

used. _196Q, 8 “Chevrolet sedan pickup Biscayne 01280S 134161 none

For a TOTAL TIME SALE PRICE computed as follows :

1. *CASH SALE PRICE (Including the itemized costs . Sah

; designated below ) © $1895.00(1)

r “TOTAL DOWN PAYMENT under instalment sale—

-- Consisting of $645.00 plus $ none '

(Net Trade-in) (Cash) * —- $ 645.00(2)

DESCRIPTION OF TRADE-IN Make , Chevrolet

, Model Bel Air

Year 1956

3. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ITEMS 1 AND 2- ; ~ $1250.00(3)

4a. COST OF REQUIRED CAR INSURANCE. eee €

(Include this item, if buyer has authorized seller to apply ns

; for the insurance ) $ 80.00(4a)

4b. COST OF CREDITOR INSURANCE ON LIFE OF BUYER

(Exclude this item if buyer does not. authorize

_ Such insurance) Ps $ 9.60(4b)..

Oe cissninsnchnsntaenes $ none (4c)

. 5. ° BASIC TIME PRICE (PRINCIP. AL BALANCE) :

(Add items 3, 4a, 4b and 4c) ~ $1339.60(5)

6. TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAL $ 234.16(6)

7, TIME PRICE BALANCE (Add items 5 and’6) _ $1573.76(7)

8. TOTAL TIME SALE PRICE (Add, jitems 2 and 7) $2218.76(8)

The Time Price Balance is payable at the seller's office designated below or

at such office of any assignee. as may be hereafter designated in 24 instal-

ments of $......... ieiehaiaeieaneoes as Jisted each, commencing Jan. 10, 1962, and on the

same day of each successive month thereafter, or as indicated in space below.

The final instalment shall equal the amount of time price balance remaining due..

1 @ 200.00 on Jan. 10, 1962 and-23-@ 59.72.”

q

App. 3

Defendant was allowed $845 for his old car, received

$200 of the amount in cash, and was given credit for $645.0

There is a dispute between the parties as to whether this -

$200 was a loan or was advanced by Kizzier on the old

ear for the purpose of paying off an encumbrance of some °

type on the car..For the purpose of a decision herein,

that point is immaterial and will not be discussed.

Subsequent to December 9, 1961, the salesman for Kizzier

advised defendant that he had used a wrong rate for

computing the insurance premiums in the eontract and that

the contract would have to be changed to include an addi-

tional $9. On January 13, 1962, defendant signed a new

contract which is.the contract involved in this action. The

contracts are on the same form and are exactly the same_

except for the changes in the amounts inserted in the

contracts. The itemization of the description of the trans-

action in the January 13, 1962, contract is as follows:

App. 4

“For a TOTAL TIME SALE PRICE computed as follows : abs

1. *CASH SALE ‘PRICE (Including the itemized costs im

designated below ) $1895,00(1)

2. TOTAL DOWN PAYMENT under instalment sale—

Consisting of $645.00 plus $ none

(Net Trade-In) (Cash) . _$ 645.00(2)

DESCRIPT ION OF TRADE-IN Make Chevrolet ;

Model Bel Air -

| Year 1956

- 3.° \DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ITEMS 1 AND2 .. — $1250.00(3)

-4a. COST OF REQUIRED CAR INSURANCE (Include this

item, if buyer has authorized seller to apply for.the insurance) $ 89.00(4a)

4b. COST OF CREDITOR INSURANCE ON LIFE OF BUYER

(Exclude this item if buyer does not authorize

such insurance ) $ 10.47(4b)

OU, .* siiicmseisatinsebicisiebinaiutanicedbabehiatlonstesiahisdstiiniatipsincinialinasenstineint Sestbeaiaehatoene $ none (4c)

5. BASIC TIME PRICE (PRINCIPAL BALANCE) »

* = (Add items 3, 4a, 4b and 4c) - $1349.47(5)

6. TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAL - $ 231.22(6)

7. . TIME PRICE BALANCE (Add items 5 and 6) : $1580.69(7)

8. TOTAL’ TIME SALE PRICE (Add items 2 and 7) $2225.69(8)

The Time Price Balance is payable at the seller’s office designated below or- :

at such office of any assignee as may be hereafter designated in 24 instalments

of $.... _as listed each, commencing Jan. #0 1962, and on the same day

of each successive month theréafter, or as indicated in Space below. The final

dle oiege shall equal the amount of time price balance remaining due. 1 @

200,00 on Jan. 10, 1962; and 23 @ 60.03.”

Defendant sets out eight assignments of error. . The

_ pertinent ones may be summed up in the contention that

the transaction evidences an installment loan at usurious

rates. It is the plaintiff’s contention that the transaction

is a time price sale and not a loan transaction. [Plaintiff

contends further that, in any event, there is no time price

differential which is in violation gf the Installment Sales

Act or the Installment Loan Act construed with the laws

regulating the amount of interest which may be- charged

by a private person.

App. 5 —

In Elder y. Doerr, Neb., 122 N.W. 2d 528, we held the

Nebraska Installment Sales Act to be unconstitutional. It

will, therefore, not be necessary to discuss any of the

provisions of that act with relation to this tfinsaction.

We are.concerned with only two points. Is the transaction

a bona fide time sale? If not, is the contract usurious and

void under the provisions of the Nebraska Installment

Loan Act?

Is ‘the transaction a valid time sale’ or what -our

cases have denominated as « '%an in violation'of the terms

of the Installment Loan .“°t. In considering whether or

not such a transaction is a time sale made in good faith

or a loan, the court will look through the form and ex-

amine its substance. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Dis-

count Corp., 168 Neb. 298, 96 N.W. 2d 55. We have said

many times an, essential of a valid time sale price is a

price agreed upon between the parties where the buyer

is actually informed of and has at the time the sale is

made an opportunity to choose between a cash and a time

sale price. See Wood v. Commonwealth Trailer Sales, Inc..

172 Neb. 494, 110 N.W, 2d 87.

This transaction on its face shows a cash: sale price

of #1 895, an allowance for the trade-in, and two ad-

ditional charges for insurance. The total of $1,349.47 is

shown to be the basic time price: The only apparent con-

clusion is thaf the amount of $1,349.47 is to be financed.

' There is then an item designated as time price differential

of $231.22. Regardless. of the term used, this item is a

charge for the loan of money or for forbearance of a

debt. Disguise it by any name or title we will; it is and

remains interest. We are concerned not with the form

but the intent of the transaction.

Dwayne Kizzier testified that the deal with the defendant |

was not accepted on the contract, but on the purchase

¥

App. 6

order. To quote him, ‘‘ * * * but the original’ deal ‘is

made on the purchase order and approved by the Sales

Manager or myself.’’

t

The. purchase order recites the following:

‘**Base price of unit © ; $1895.00

Tot. Credit — 645.00

Sub-Total 1250.00 ~

Insurance Mo 24 Ded 50 ~ 80.00.

Life Ins. . . 9.60

Time Sales Charge Mo. 234.16

Total: of above items 1573.76”"

(Italics supplied.)

This merely emphasizes that an interest charge was

_ made on the unpaid balance. There is no evidence in this

egse that the defendant was give en a choice between ereash

and a time sale price. ‘\

Kizzier. was not licensed to make installment loans.

Under our law, the permissive provisions of the Install-

ment Loan Act will! not apply to a nonlicensee, but a non-

licensee will be bound by the- inhibitory provisions of the

act. Curtis v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 166 Neb. 815,

91 X.W..2d 19.

The highest legal rate which could’ be charged by

a nonlicensee is 9 percent simple interest. The amount to

be. financed was $1,349.47. It was to be financed for a pe: ~

riod of 24 months. Under the contract in this case, it was

payable in installments, with the first payment of $200 ©

due in 1 month? and with an installment payment-\of _

$60.03 due each nionth thereafter for 23..months, so that

at the end of 24 months $1,580.69 would have been paid.

This is $1,349.47 plus the.time price charge of $231.22.

Is $231.22 in excess of 9 percent simple interest

_on this contract? If a 9 percent charge had been made.on

‘ the full amount of $1,349.47 for fhe fult period of 2 2 years, |

App.7

4

”

’ ~_——

it would have only amounted to $242.90. The interest on

the $200 payment for 23 months wovld be $34.50. The

interest on the $60.03 installment due in’ February for

22 months would be $9.70, and cach $60.03 installment

- would increase thé interest rebate approximately 45 cents

each inonth. It is readily apparent, therefore, that the

charge was an usurious one, and the penalties of the In-

*stallment Loan Act are applicable. We determine that

the interest charge’ of 9 percent simple interest on this

contract, with a payment of $200 after 1 month and the

balance in 23 equal installments, would be* approximately

$107. This is ee less than the $231.22 actually

charged. .

-

It is‘ argued that the defendant had at times worked

as a car ‘salesman and, fully) understood the transac-

tion. It could also be argued that the defendant was

not in a position to’ accept a cash sale offer if -one had

been made, and that the very nature of the transaction |

indicated the sale would need to be a time price sale. The

fact that a purchaser has full know ledge of and accepts

_ the terms of the proffered sale is not a defense to a charge

of usury. Nor is his inability to. pay cash a matter for

consideration on whether a purchaser was offered a choice

between aCash and a time sale. The lender herein is the

. Violator of the law, and against him alone are ‘its penalties

enacted. Elder v. Doerr, supra. |

Inasmuch as the transactidn is in violation of the pro-

visions of the Installnient Loan. Act, the contract and any

indebtedness due thereunder is void and uncollectible.

Section 45-155, R.R.S.. 1943. The contract being void, the |

plaintiff was not entitled to succeed in th® replevin.action,

> and judgment should have been entered for.the defendant.. -

For the reasons set out above, we reverse the judgment.

entered herein and remand the cause to the trial court with.

* amobile.

Pan 7 App. 8 | .

directions to set aside. the judgment for the > plaintiff and

to enter a judgment for the defendant for possession, dam- '

ages, and costs. If for any reason the vehicle cannot be

returned to the possession of the defendant, then to deter- |

mine the value thereof as of the date of replevin and to

- enter judgment for said amount, damages, and costs.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

‘BOSLAUGH, Justice (dissenting). . f)

I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority

in this case.

The purchase order ‘referred to in the majority opinion

contained all of the essential information concerning the

transaction including the number and amount of install-—

ment payments to be made. The defendant testified that

he read the purchase order and that he understood it.

The defendant also testified that at the time he signed the

purchase order he received an invoice which stated the-

‘total cash pricé”’ and “‘total time price’’ for the auto-

This is“a law action in which the findings of the court’

have the effect of a verdict of a jury. It is a question

of fact as to whether the transaction was a time sale -

made. in good fajth or a loan made in violation of the

Installment Loan Act. The burden of proof was on the

defendant to establish that the transaction was a loan.

In my opinion the evidence is sufficient to sustain the

judgment of the trial court and the judgment should have

been affirmed. as :

I am authorized to state that Judge BROWER concurs

‘in.this dissent. :

we

Xa

* <3

APPENDIX B

EXCERPTS FROM MOTION FOR REHEARING IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA WHICH

; PRESENT THE FEDERAI, a

[p. 7]

34. The 19: 9 Nebraska Installment Sales: Act required

sellers to state a ‘time price differential’’ in a conditional

sales contract. This Court’s decision—tm«this case and

Elder vy. Doerr have held; (1), that the Installment Sales .

Act is unconstitutional; and (8) that~4oing what the

statute required subjected the scller to other Nebraska

- statutes which not only forfeit the property sold to the

buyer without further payment but require the seller to

repay any portions of the purchase prive already collected.

This Court’s decision in this conté xt, as applied to trans-

actions entered into in reliance on the 1959 Act before

its invalidation, has entrapped all persons, including _-

appellee, who gomiplied with the 1959 statute in a manner

so arbitrary, capricious, unfair and unjust as to.consti- .

tute the taking of appellee’s property without due process

‘of law in violation of the Fourteenth Afnendment to the . .

Constitution cf the United States.

35. The decision’ invalidating retroactively, because of

the seller’s compliance with the Installment Sales Act, a

contract which would have constituted a valid time sale

agreement under the previous decisions of this Court, and

thereby subjecting the seller to forfeiture both of his right

to the property sold and to any proceeds from the sale is

arbitrary and capricious and a taking of property without

due process of law in violation of the Due,Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the

_ United States. =

App. 10

36. The decision of the Court holding that. by the use

of the term ‘*time price differential’ in accordance with

the provisions of the Nebraska statute entitled ‘*Nebraska +

Installment Sales. Aet,’’? the difference between the cash

price and time sale, price of the goods was transformed

into interest, is so unexpected, unusual and so at variance

with well settfed law. as to be urireasonable, arbitrary, and

?

. capricious, and so contrary. to prior decisions of the

Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court

of Nebraska, and the jurisprudence of, the states of the

United States of America, as to vielate- fundamental eon-

cepts of justice, and constitutes the taking -of appellee's

. property without due process of law, contrary to the Four-

teenth Amendment to the C onstitution of the United States

of America. | | se

37. After enaciment “of rs Installufent Sales Act in

1939 persons of ordinary intelligence could not reasonably

hay e anticipated that by complying with the full disclosure

requirements of that statute, the penalty provisions of the

Installment Loan Act would’ be applied to the facts of this

case, and said Act, -as here applied, to: forfeit appellee’

property rights, is vague, indefinite and uncertain in vio-

jation.of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.

-tocthe ¢ ‘onstituiion of the United States.

38. ‘The Lnstaliment Loan “Aci, in. the light of its am

euage and the prior decisions ofthis Court, and the Lista

ment Sales Aet prior to its invalidation by this ¢ i oN

“not be understood by. persons of ordinary intelligence to

- apply an ordinary time sale sueh as is before the Coart’ .”

in this ease, and said Act, as here applied to forfeit appel

lee's property rights, is vague, iidetinite, and uncertain int

violation of the Due Process Clause 6! the Pourteenth

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,

aA

“App. 11

39. The rule of law which this Court applied retro-

actively so as to forfeit appellee’s property rights was, in

the light of the statutes of Nebraska and this Court’s prior

decisions, so vague, indefinite, uwiicertain and unanticipa-

table that persons of ordinary intelligence could not have

been expected to know of its existence, so that to apply

such rule retroactively to forfeit appellee’s property was

arbitrary and capricious and violative of the Due Proeess

‘Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitutiou

of the United States.

40. The Installment Loan Act, as here interpreted after .

the fact and applied”to situations when such application.

could not have-been anticipated by appellee or others ‘simi-

larly situated, is an impairment of the obligation of con-

tracts forbidden by Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution

of the United States.

41. The holding that ‘‘There is no evidence in this case

- that the afendant was given.a choice between a ‘cash and

a time sale price,’’ which is contrary to the contract giving

the purchaser precisely such a choice before its execution

and is supported by no evidence in the case, violates ap-

pellee’s right to.a fair decision guaranteed by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-

stitution cf the United States. .

“tp. 38). |

Every transaction wherein the statutory requirements

were complied with may be invalidated ‘and the purchasers

-under all installment sales contracts exeeuted since 1959

‘ will be allowed to keep the goods covered by the contracts,

and not pay anything more for the merchandise, and fur-

thermore, recover everything theretofore paid on the con-

tracts. The result will be the forfeiture of hundreds of

miliions of dollars’ worth of property interests which: :

App. 12

sellers must let purchasers: retain free of charge. Such a

result could only be justifiable as applied to a person who

_ enters into’a transaction which he knows is unlawful. This

drastic and enormous forfeiture which should shock the

conscience of this Court, arises because all law abiding

-dealers and financial ipstitutions operating in’ Nebraska, _

- in good faith sought to comply: with the 1959 statute. We —

‘submit that it is utterly wrong to charge them with the

knowledge that the statute would be held unconstitutional

paricularly when'many similar laws have been enacted and

applied, without question, in other states. Thus, the effect

of the 1959 law by this decision was to entrap all dealers

and cooperating financial institutions into a course of con-

duct: which not only forfeited their right to receive or keep

amounts paid for goods sold, but also, to lose the article

. .itself, The decision of this Court which has such an effect _

is so arbitrary, capricious, unfair and unjust as to conflict

with those fundamental principles which have been estab-_

lished in onr system of jurisprudence for the protection

and enforcement of private rights, and to constitute the

taking of appellee’s property without due process of law

in violation of the 14th.amendment to. the Constitution of

the United States: and to constitute an impairment of the

obligation of appellee’s contract ‘rights in violation of —

Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.

After passage of the Installment Sales Act-and prior to. |

this Court’s decision in these cases, no one in Nebraska

reading the Installment Loan Act could have foretold that.

_ it would apply to the facts of this case—where a sale was

made in the form prescribed by the Installment Sales Act.

tven counsel for appellant did not contend that the latter

statute was unconstitutional. Its constitutionality clearly

was nof obvious. And yet, appellee and countless others.

are subject to forfeiture of their. property without anv

App. 13.

payment for it because of their inability to determine

correctly. that this Court would hold that the Installment

Sales Act was invalid and that compliane ith its re-

quirements as to the form of an installment sale contract’

would violate the small loan. and usury statutes. To con-

strue the Installment Loan Act as applicable in-these cir-

cumstances, retroactively, is to make it as so applied too

vague, indefinite, ‘and uncertain for persons of ordinary

intelligence to have been able to predict, and, therefore,

in violation of the‘Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co.,

267 U.S. 233; Jordan v- DeGearae, 341 UT. S. 223, 231:

Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F. 2d 652, 655 (C.A..9, 1962),

which hold. that the indefiniteness doctrine applies to civil

eases when there is a forfeiture.

_ Federal questions under the Hith Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States, arise by réason of the |

Court’s making findings shown by the record to be with- |

out evidence to support them, and contrary to the.only evi-

‘dence on the point, and that such findings were decisive

of the case, amounting to arbitrary or capricious exercise

.of power in ciear conflict with those fundamental prin-

ciples which have been established in our system of ju-

risprudence for the protection and enforcement of pri-

-“vate rights.

If this Court is unwilling to reconsider and change its

decision as -applied to the facts of this case, we urge that

it state clearly that the decision will only apply prospec-

tively insofar as other cases are concerned. Many courts

have adopted this device when-decisions overruling past

doctrine: or holding statutes unconstitutional -would have

serious retroactive effect on contract and property, rights

e. g., Hare vy. General Contract Purchase Corp., 200 Ark.

:

App. 14

601, 249 S.W. 2d 973 (1952); O’Brien v. Atlas Finance

Co., 223 Ark. 176, 264 S. W. 2d 839 (1954); Molitor v.

Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Mil. 2d 11,

163 N. E.'2d 89 (1959); World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.

Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130 S. W. (2d) 848 (1939); Mutual

- Infe Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815, 177 S. W.

— (2d) 588 (1943) ; McLean Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh Terminal

—. Coal Corp., 328 Pa. 250, 195 Atl. 4 (1937). The Arkansas

case of Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp. is close-

-ly in point, since it gave prospective operation only to a

decision changing the law governing credit sales in which

the title docutnents are discounted to a finance company.

To apply the decision of this Court retrospectively to

all time sales in Nebraska since the enactment of the In-

stallment Sales Act in 1959 would have the effect of sub-

jecting the sellers of enormous amounts of property, who

could not have been expected to anticipate this Court’s

1963 decisions, to the complete forfeiture of their prop-

erty rights. The result may be bankruptcy for many in-

stitutions; and serious losses for a great many others.

This is precisely the kind of situatton which has caused -

many courts to give prospective effect only to decisions

‘ invalidating statutes (or overruling past. precedent).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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