Brief in Oppositionto Petition for Writ — Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Moses
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aos Ottye-Supreme Court, Us
CARY | Flick D
U.S ° FEB 20 1964
IN THE é
>
_ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ef ene Bont
-—+-™M40..
October "Verma. 1968 «--—
“99 :
CENTRAL LOUISIANA ELECTRIC COMPANY.
INC., ET AL..
ra 7 . Petitioner.
versus
MRS. SARAH LOU P. MOSES. ETC.. ET AL..
Respondents.
- |
j 4
a
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI
. H. ALVA BRUMFIELD,
SvLVIA ROBERTS © |
205 American Bank Building.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
HERSERT O'NIELL,
Thibodaux, Louisiana,
Attorneys for Respondents
eal
TS
Franklin Press, Inc. «fijpe Baton Rouge, La
II.
" VERSED THE JURY'S FINDING THAT CLECO’S *
NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS -
fest Weight of Evidence
B. _ Instructions Reiating to the Issue of Newton's
Contributory Negligence Were Erroneous, Mis-
leading and Should Not Have Been Given
4
C. The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Give Re-
spondents’ Charges on Sudden Emergency
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RF-
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT SINCE SUCH FIND-
Page
Counter Statement of Question Presented Aa
Counter Statement of the Case 1
. The Facts _ . 4
Argument Ree tee ree enor 23
- I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SETTING ASIDE THE FINDING’ THAT LEWIS —
NEWTON WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT,
AND THAT HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, WAS COR- ©
RECT, AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED 23
A. The Jury’s Finding Was Contrary to the Mani- .
23
ii
ING WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, |
AND RESULTED FROM ERRONEOUS, MISLEAD-
ING INSTRUCTIONS: oo: eosesscsnscee ee noe 29
A. The Finding Was Unsupported by the Evidence. . 2
B. Instructions Relating to Proximate Cause ‘Were
Erroneous and Misleading .............0.0:.--.- 2.
C. Additional Instructions Given to the Jury Were
Erroneous and Misleading ................ ener ee 34
JI THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY SET
ASIDE THE JURY VERDICT DENYING RECOV-
ERY FOR THE DEATH OF ROBERT MOSES.......... 36
Conclusion ................ ence Eo Paanedn ne Ae ee
tenes Se cepuntiassiesesniniianis a Oe FPO . -&
i
iit
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
- Begnaud v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 136 So,2d 123 ie: inal is
- 1962) cssuuscesnsusegsaneecsnneseensansassantorsanessnnneciasanesecgunennannegbesses 24
; »
Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen, 214 F.2d 373 (9th
Cir. 3954) -- ee icacieaitiaapliieDcoaesitibaon tad aatssanited EL ACRE We - OT”
Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Service; 231 N.C. 181, 56° °S.E.2d
560 (1949) . gonssauesnsonssinsnungeronseensonsenssronsseneshansessosessarsnetents ae
Burdell : v. Denig, 92 US. (2 Otto) 716 (1876) oe te ' 38
Carter v. Anant é& st. ‘shire Bay Ry. Co., 338 US
430 (1949) i SANE eae EIS acl en Pine Sah ier fae
/
ee v. United Staten, 194 P. 2d 974 (5th Cir. 1952) : 25, 28
Chiba, Rock Island and Pacific R.R. Co. v. sioustoh, So. .
U.S. (5 Otto) 697 (WTB)........:.-:.. adoapasdetbensos ant inavedkoneery 34°
D & D Planting Co. v. Employers Casualty Co., 240 La.
684, 124 So.2d 908 (1960) i 130
Daigle v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., ONT F.2d 227 (5th.
Cir.,-1957) ....... Pe ae
Dane v. Canal. Ins. Co., 240 La. 1038, 126 So.2d 335
pRB ee nineteen alweeseere ean ae reeren een eae
SG. Ys
t7 ,
‘DeLima v. Trinidad Corporation, 302 F.ld S85 (2d Cir:
RG ce Sa pM ae
Dirie Drie It Yourself Sys. v. dow rican Boveran Co.,
| 242 La. 471, 137 So0.2d 298 (1962) 30,°33, 36°
r
_
iv :
‘ Fine ‘ * .
’
England v. Lowsiana Board of Medical Examiners, 84
Montellicr v. United States, 202 F.Supp. (E.D. N. Y. 1962)
o
+
a
S. Ct. 461 (1964). Lipset arnietaetin Eads WS DPS nae P TE 34
eens v. ‘ieee Liability Assurance Corporation, a1
So.2d 852 (La. App, 1962) oy... erties 24; 25
" Harvey v. Great American Indemnity Co., 110 So. 2d aaa
(La. App. 1958) apes il eer ee eae oa 30
Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 237 (1944) ica ae
Jack v. Travelers, 112 $0.24 308 (La. App. 1959)... .36
Keyser v. “. 133 US. 8, aR RR eee .~ Beh aacene en 26 °
Kiriluk, v. ‘Kohn, 16 Il. App. 2d 385, 148 N.E. 2d 607
te REE aPC em eS paint ioe 35
sicaihictnias Life Insurance Company v. Foley, 105 U.S." ,
(15 Otto) 350 (1882) ; 26
Leonard | v. ‘fans & Barnes, Ltd., 2 La. 229, 44 So.2d
| 341 (1957) | 30
Le sill v. Railway. Expre ss Agency, 297 F.2d 849 (3rd .
Cir. 1962) . tian 35, 36
McCarthy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 F.24'877 (7th Cir.
1946) ss 26
Merchants Motor Freight. v rca ning, 8th Cir., 227 F. (2d)
247 (1955) : | S
37
Y/
wren,
ba ae
)
4a
. bad * .
Cs 7 , Vv
"Moses v. Central Louisiana Electric Company, 32A F.2d
69 (Sth Gir, 1963) peeecheeselolil EIR hearer eee . 24, 28, 33, 37
Orient Mutual Insurance Company v. Wright, es U. Ss. 1
Wall.) 456 (1864) ccna natin, ai ee. er 26
a Pryor t v. Williams, oh U.S. 43 (1920)... ete . 29°
Rennekamp v. Blair, 375 Pa. 620,101 A ‘a./24 669 (1954) \ 25
Simon v. Teras & P. Ry. Co., 124 So.2d 646 (La. App.
IY a iheccivcg tec Bie enn hsb rn ctagenniusiriazsoritsemeses piiretiecchiies dae a
. ; ~ . — y ‘
‘ Snodyrass-v. Centanni, 229 La. 915, 87.So.2d 127 (1956) 28
Sunkist Growers v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Pr. be 370,
US: 19 (1962) oreo amas ae wf.
' : Za
Teras & P. R. R. Co. v. Bourman, 212 2 US" 536 (1909)
Thacker ved. C. Satis Co., 254 F.2d 1672 (5th Cir: 1958) 4
Tharp v. Mundy, 195 F-2d 987 (Sth Cir. 1952).
.
-%
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co,, 269 U.S.
ER I oo av eee cca terececoreees tans
\
-)
an
IN THE
~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term.. 1963
f ; ee No.
CENTRAL LOUISIANA ELECT RIC COMPANY.
_ INC., ET AL..
| Petitioner.
| Ws versus
MRS. SARAH. LOU P. MOSES. ETC.. ET AL..
Respondents.
BRIEF {N OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI *
_ Counter Statement, of Question Presented
- Should ‘the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. reversing a jury verdict based on err@h-
eous, prejudicial instructions, and remanding the case for new
- trial, be reviewed by this Court?
_Counter Staterent of the Case
Mrs. Sarah Moses, individually, and as tutrrx of her minor
daughter, Karen Kay, and Mrs. Genevieve Newton, individ-
]
2
- ually anid as tutrix of her minor children, John Edward New-
‘ton and Judith Ann Newton, instituted” suits for the death of
their husbands, Mr. Robert Larry Moses and Mr: Robert
“Newton, resulting when a plane piloted by Mr. Newton, ‘4
which Mr. Moses was a passenger, collided with electric trans-
mission lines suspended between two towers owned by Central
Louisiana Electric Company and crashed into the Intracoastal
W aterway. near the town of Ramos, Louisiana, on November .
8,- 195%, at ee 5:40 P.M.
Named defendants were Central Soulelath Electric Com-
pany and its insurer, Michigan Mutual- Liability Company,
whose negligence was alleged to have been the failure to light
the transmission wires and towers in accordance with the Civil
Aeronautics Administration’s standards and thus failing to
warn aircraft of this obstruction and hazard to air navigation
which was directly in the take-off and landing paths of sea-
planes using two seaplane bases located nine-tenths of a “mile
and six-tenths of a mike, respectively, from the transmission
lines.
_ By means of an n amended complaint, R. S. Woodruff, his
insurer, State Automobile’ and Casualty Underwriters; R. -D.
Cooper, his insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and
the United States of America were added as parties defendant.
Charges of negligence directed against Woodruff consisted
of his failure to advise the Civil Aeronautics’ Administration
_ of the nearest landing area, which he knew to be Slaton Sea-
plane Base, as requized in Form ACA-117, filed by Woodruff
with the Civil Aeronautics Administration, pursuant to in-
structions given him by Central Louisiana Electric Company,
who had éngaged him to design the transmission lines and
-towers; in failing to provide markings, signs and lighting fa-
‘e
3
cilities on the towers and lines and negligent design and super-
_-vision_of the construction of such towers and lines.
* Defendant R. D. Cooper, the contractor who erected the
transmission towers and wires, was let out prior to submis-
sion of the case to the jury. A motion to dismiss filed on—
behalf of the United States of America alleging that the sup-
plemental complaint naming it as defendant showed on its face
that the action was brought after the expiratign of the two-
year limitation period prescribed by Title 28, United States
Code, Section 2401(b), was granted.
Following a trial to a jury, the verdict returned by the
_ jury stated in response to the special issues that it found i
Central. Louisiana Electric Company guilty of negligence, that
such negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident;
' that Woodruff was not negligent; that Mr. Newton was negli-
. gent and his negligence was the proximate cause of the acci-
dent.
Plaintiffs’ motion requesting. that the verdict in favor of ©
defendants be set aside and a new trial be ‘granted limited to
the question of quantum only, or in the alternative that a
new trial be granted on all issues, was denied by the trial
Court. 5
On appeal, ‘the United States Court of Appeals for the
= Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of defendant,
R. S. Woodruff, and reversed the judgment in favor of -defen- |
dants Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc., and ‘ts in-
surer, Michigan Mutual Liability Company, and remanded the
case for new trial.
v
_ 4
the Facts
On November 8, 1957, Louis. D. Newton: flew ‘a twin-
engine Grummond G-44 Widgeon amphibious plane, based at
- Slaton Seaplane Base, and owned ‘by his employer, Kerr- ~
McGee Oil Corporation, to an oil rig in the West Delta area,
near the mouth of the Mississippi River, carrying as his
‘passenger Robert L. Moses, also employed by Kerr-McGee.
(Tr. pp. 181-2, 648.)* .
Desmond S. Hare, chief ‘pilot for Slaton Seaplane Service,
(Tr, p. 176), had also flown out of Slaton Seaplane Base that ~
afternoon, and during his return flight to the base received
a message from Newton, who stated. that he was passing .
Houma and was about ten minutes behind Hare, -traveling in
the same-easterly direction (Tr. p. 183). Continuing on, Hare
‘noted that.the wind was out of the west-northwest, and since
it was dusk. ‘approximately five minutes past five o'clock, it
was best for him to make his landing by dropping. “down to
tree level height and go in undef the Central Louisiana~Elec-
tric Company’s wires, using a strasght-in approach. (Tr. p.
184.) A considerable amount of boat traffic on the Intra-
coastai Waterway on which Slaton Seaplane Base was located -
made it necessary for Hare to land a little bit short. (Tr. p.
184.) At approximately 5:30 P.M., Newton, coming from the
‘same ‘direction, crashed into the wires suspended across the
Intracoastal Waterway.
Eyewitnesses te the Accident.
George Reynolds, district supervisor of May Bros., who
flew out of Slaton Seaplane Base for the past four years, was
Tr. ig used throughout the brief to denote references to the trial
transcript. A ; Ss
9)
driving west on Highway 90, which parallels the Intracoastal
Waterway in the vicinity of the site of the crash. -(Tr. pp.
242-3, 248-9.) When he reached a point three-quarters of a
mile west of the Central Louisiana Electric Company's tow-.
-ers, Reynolds saw a plane with its clearance light and ro-
tating’ beacon on out of the left side of his windshield. (Tr.
pp. 245, 249, 258.) At-that. moment the plane was between
Reynolds and the towers, over the water, parallel to the water-
way, at an altitude estimated at 600 feet by Reynolds. (Tr.
pp. 245, 250-1.) Shifting his gaze from the plane, Reynolds
' next remembered seeing “flash sparks” and then the plane in
the water (Tr. p. 246); one of the wires. suspended from the
towers was down’ and in the water (Tr. pp. 254-5.)
Mr. and Mrs. Bernie J. Hebert. drivi ing east on ile
90, were just passing ‘Slaton Seaplane Base when they saw .
a light in the sky through the right side of the ‘windshie!d.
(Tr. p. 267.) Mr. Hebert realized the lights were on a plane
_ which appeared to be about as high as the towers, coming in
.a westerly direction to make a landing on the water.- (Tr. pp.
261-2.) “Mr. Hebert was unable’ to discern the wires. (Tr. pp.
262-3.) Keeping the ‘plane in his view, Mr. Hebert saw it stop
in mid-air, as though it had hit the wires, and a-flash occur-
“ped. (Tr. p. 265.) Trees then blocked Hebert’s view until he —
reached the Bayou Boeuf Bridge, at: which time he saw the
plane in the water. between two boats. (Tr.’pp. 2635-4.) A
wire from the tower was lying across the electric wirés run-
- ning beside the highway. (Tr. p. 265.) Mr. and Mrs. Hebert
turned back and used the phone at a nearby house to summon
the Morgan City police. (Tr. p. 266.3 Although the Heberts
Stayed at the scene some time thereafter,. they were unabie
to seé rescue operations because darkness had set in. (Tr. pe
266.)
° mas 6
Lioyd V. Funchess, Jr., a pilot in the employ of Guarisco
- Construction Company, had returned from a flight that after-
noon, and was talking to a mechani at the Guarisco Seaplane
Base, tocated just east of the Slaton Seaplane Base on the
Intracoastal Waterway, shortly before the accident. (Tr. PP.
ote?) Funchess saw a plane approaching from the east,
just above the towers, making a left-hand turn to line up
with the canal. (Tr. pp. 285-6, 291.) The position of the plane
was approximated by Funchess as being at least two or three
' thousand yards east of the towers at that time. (Tr. pp.
291-2.) The plane then went out of Funchess’ line of vision,
; and he next heard a crash or exmosion. (Tr. pp. 286-7.)
Looking down the canal, he saw a ‘Spias!. of water as the air-
craft hit the water. (Tr. p. 286.) The mechanic and Funchess
immediately put a small boat overboard, but when they got
to the scene only the tail portion of the plane was still above:
the surface of the water. They secured the tail to the off-
shore boat located near the plane, to keep. the plane from
sinking further. (Tr. pp. 287-8.) The offshore boat wreggee
the plane *o shallow water. am: p. 288.)
Levi Wilson “1st saw the plane east of him, headed west _
with its wing light on, as he was- seated on “the fender of.
his car in the driveway of the Maguire house 317 feet off
Highway 90 at Bayou Ramos. (Tr. pp. 315-6.). As the air-
— was passing Wilson, it was over the Intracoastal Water-
ay. (Tr. p.-318). Moments ‘after Wilson took his eyes off
the plane, he heard a crash, saw it stop in mid-air (Tr. p-
- 323), and saw it falling into the water. The witness could
_ not see the wires or towers from his vantage point (Tr. pp.
319-20): he then drove to the scene and saw soémeone tying.
a rope to the plane (Tr. p. 320).
7 °
Captain A. A. Smith of Coylé Lines, Inc., on the day of
the accident, was in the wheelhouse of a tugboat proceeding _
east on the Intracoastal Waterway towing five barges having |
an overall length of 1100 feet. (Tr. pp. 437-8, 440.) The wit-
ness stated it was just about twilight and the running lighis .
of the tugboat were on, consjsting of a white range light on
top of the mast which could be seen aii around, horizontal
and straight above; the other lights could be seen only from
the front. (Tr. pp. 445-6.) As Captain Smith passed the
Slaton Seaplane Base, he met an offshore boat going in the
opposite direction with its running ‘lights on. (Tr. pp. 439,
445,) A space of about 25 feet separated the tug and its
barges from, the west-bound offshore boat. (Tr. pp. 451-453.)
: | prs |
— ‘When Smith's tugboat was just beyond the wires, the wit-
ness first saw the aircraft, coming over the tree tops, approx-
imately 25 or 50 feet above them, ata 45-degree angle, one-
half to three-quarters of a mile east of the tugboat. (Tr. pp.
443. 431.) After cat¢hing sight of-the plane, Captain Smith
directed his attention to the waterway; he next saw the plane
_ when one of the men in the wheelhouse shouted that a plane
was falling’and looked like it would hit the last barge. (Tr
p. 443.) At that moment, the stern of the Jast barge was
beyond the towers: (Tr. pp. 443-4.) Captain Smith looked
back and Saw the plane falling into the water about in the
middle of the. Intracoastal Waterway. (Tr. p. 445.) He im-
mediately slowed the tugboat, turned back to return to the
plane in the event someone in the plane had jumped or Was
thrown clear-into the water. (Tr. p. 446.) The witness ob-
served a winch truck attaching a wire to the plane; theres; :
after, Captain Smith assisted in.removing the plane from the
chanhel. (Tr. p. 447).
,
-
2, Establishment and Operation of Slaton Seaplane
Dan Slaton testified o_ his seapiane base was estab-
lished in 1953; in addition “to renting: space and” providing
services for seaplanes belonging to other companies, Slaton
chartered his own planes, operated, by him or his employees,
‘Roger Ward and Desmond Hare. (Tr. pp. 482, 485.) Approxi-_
mately fifteen takeoffs and, landings were made a day petween
_1953 and November 1957, not including his own aircraft, and
the base has not been closed a single day since its opening.
(Tr. p. 483). On October t6, 1956, Slaton was- issued an air
_ carrier certificate authorizing him to operate as an air taxi _
operator and certifying that Slaton Seaplane Base has met the
"’ regulations, and standards applicable thereto. (Tr. pp. 485-6.)
When the construction ®f the towers and high lines began, .
Slaton wrote to Central Louisiana Electric Company (herein-
after refrvred to as CLECO}) on March 12, 1956, requesting the
installation of extra markiug= on the wires in order to make
them easier to see‘since they were a hazard to air traffic
using his seaplane base. (Tr. p. 488: copy of letter marked -
Plaintiffs’ 38.) Because the towers were also directly in the
path of planes taking off and landing, constituting a hazard
to air navigation: Slaton assumed CLECO would equip them
with lights, especially in view of the fact that all other towers
‘in the vicinity were lighted. ' (Tr. pp. 488, 492-3.) The wit-
ness knew of no towers within 4,000 feet Of a landing base.
as CLECO’s towets are, which are not lighted. (Tr. p. 506.)
Desmond Hare, employed as an office manager by Siaton
in 1954, and later flew Slaton’s plane (Tr. p. 176), stated that
during the construction of these towers he asked a CLECO
9°
_ employee pointed out to him as being in charge of the, job .
if lights would be put up every 150 feet on the towers. (Tr.
pp. 177-8.) This employee informed- Hare that he was aware
there would have to be lights and everything was being taken
care of. (Tr. p. 178.)
a Hr ; ,
3. Design and Construction of the Towers by CLECO. ‘
. s - —
On May 12. 1953, R. S. Woodruff of Fort Worth was
contacted by Mr. Bonnette, an official of CLECO, with re-
spect to preparing plans and specifications for‘certain towers —
over the Atchafalaya River, Bayou Boeuf and Bayou Shaffer. -
Ory. pp. 353. 355.) Woodruff explained that his brother had
been doing work fer CLECO in 1953, and after he became
associated with his brother, Woodruff had been performing
work for them “on a more or less continuous basis © * *”
(Tr. p. 349.) ;
‘Woodruff sent crews to the area of Bayou Boeuf, be-
ginning in March of 1954, to make surveys under the direc-
_ tion of CLECO, who designated the locations for the towers
involved in this accident, known as Bayou Boeuf No. | near
Ramos. (Tr. pp. 555-7.).-The survey, encompassing 5\), feet
on each sid .of the center line, was under the direction of
Woodruff’s employee, C. T. McNeil, who sent. field notes to
Woodruff's office during the progress of the work (Tr. py.
_ 357-8.) The final routing was made in May of 1955. (Tr. p.
355.) The‘towers were-214 feet from the top of the steel to —
the mean highwater mark of the Intrmeoastal Waterway (Tr.
p. 367); Woodruff’s plans and specifications did not provide
for marking and lighting of these towers and lines in any way.
(Tr. p. 375.)
10 ‘a
Bonnette of CLECO requested Woodruff to contact the —
Civil Aeronautics Administration office in Fort Worth" to’
- ascertain what forms should be filed with that agency in con-
nection with the’ construction of the towers and wires. - (Tr.
p. 381.) Bill Howe, one of Woodruff’ s employees, secured the
necessary forms, filled them out; Woodruff signed them and
sent a letter of transmittal to the Civil Aeronautics Admin- *-
istration. (Tr. p. 382.) The form, dated October 24, 1955, en-
titled “Notice of Construction or Alteration’ ACA-117, was
introduced in evidence as Woodruff 2A: (Tr. pp. 385, 387, —
389.)
Paragraph 5 of this form asked for the name of the near- .
est landing area to the proposed structures, which was answer-
ed by Woodruff and. his employees by the words “None
_ known.” Pa 6 requested the distance and direction of
the nearest landing area from the structures and was answer-
ed by a “little dash” on the — and nothing more.
(Tr. p. 386. )
Form ACA-117 was received by Earl Stone of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (hereinafter referred to as CAA,
or by Federal Aeronautics. Administration, FAA, successor
_* to the CAA) on October 31, 1955. (Tr. p. 392.) Woodruff
_ testified he received no answer to his letter of transmittal and
assumed the forms were sent back to CLECO. (Tr. p. 392.)
Thereafter, no CLECO official ever told Woodruff to place any
. special marking, painting or lighting on the towers. (Tr. p.
399.)
Woodruff testified he did not knéw: personally of the
existence of Slaton Seapianée Base, nor had been informed of
_ it through his erhpioyees or those of CLECO, until the tak- —
‘
11
_ ing of his deposition in 1960. (Tr. pp. 398-9. ) Form ACA-117;
in requesting the: name of the nearest landing area, defined
landing area as a place. where. land or®%seaplanes are landing
and which is noted in the Airman’s Guide. (Tr. p. 397.) Wood-
ruff testified he bélieved his responsibility as an engineer
’ placed on him the duty to follow the instructions on Form
ACA-117 and to have his employees check air charts as well
as the Airman’s Guide for any landing -area listed therein.
(Tr. p. 397. ) Because Slaton Seaplane Base did not appear in
such charts and guide, Woodruff, through his employees, did
not advise .1e CAA that the towers’ and wire would be 4000
feet from this seaplane base. (Tr. p. 398.)
In Kis deposition of June, 1960, Woodruff stated he did
some flying ¢Tr. p. 405), and in answer to the ‘question of
what steps he would have taken had he actually known these
- 214- foot towers were 4,000 “feet fron, Slaton — Base,
he gave andy answer as follows: :
“I would have consulted with my client, in a prob-
ability. After discussin’ with him, I would have saija,
‘It kind of looks like to me like you ought to put\some
kind of flagging or streamers or something on these top
wires. It is a daytime operation, arid that ought to. suffice -
unless the CAA ‘hes some different recommendaticn.
Suppose we go and ask them’; and I would have gone and
' asked-them and come back to my client and said what’ it
was, and if he said ‘I don’t want ‘it,’ I would have said
‘Well, I have advised you.’” (Tr. .p. 403).
- ©William M. Howe, a junior office engineer with Wootiruff,
testified he was asked by Woodru/f to contact his former em-
“ployer, the CAA-FAA, to find out about the necessary docu-
ments for completion or a notice for work going
12 a>
on at three crossings, Ramos, Berwick and Pharr, Louisiana.
(Tr. pp. 627-8.) Howe spoke with. Earl Stone of the CAA-.
FAA, and subsequently received several copies of the “Notice
_of Construction or Alteration” Form ACA-117. (Tr. pp. 628- ‘
9.) After reading the instructions on the back of this fori,
Howe consulted current aeronautical charts, the Coast Guard -
Chart (Tr. p. 631), and found the closest landing area listed
- on these charts to be Williams Memorial Airport at Patter-
son, Louisiana, approximately. seven or eight miles away. (Tr. |
pp. 632-4) It was Howe's belief that he also ‘consulted the
Airman’ s Guide; although he did not recail- doing so and did
‘not find Slaton Seaplane Base. (Tr. pp. 632-4.) After these
forms were filed with the CAA-FAA, Woodruff asked Howe
to contact Mr. Stone to determine the current status of the
documents. (Tr. pp. 635-7.) Stone advised that the forms
had been forwarded to CLECO. (Tr. p. 637.),
On cross-examination, Howe testified his work with Wood-
ruff in connection with these towers consisted of the reduc-
tion of field notes on to various maps and cross-sections of
the crossings. He did not’ know if these field notes contained
any information relating to landing areas or a ae
In the preparation of the CAA- FAA forms, Howe assumed .
‘Woodruff had looked at the current aeronautical charts with
him. (Tr. p. 640.)
It should be ‘ented that the CAA-FAA requires any per-
_ son constfucting a structure over 150 feet high and within
15,000 feet of a landing area or 20 miles of a’ civil airway
must file a “Notice of Construction or Alteration” Form
ACA-117, (Tr. p. 542.) Moreover, George Lambrose, plain-
tiffs’ expert, testified that the official aeronautical chart of
‘Louisiana, dated April 1, 1953, as -well as other current’ aero- -
wr
13
_ nautical -charts, showed that Brown: and Root’s Airfield was
located within 15,000 feet of the CLECO towers involved in
' this accident and aso within 20 miles of ac vil airway. (Tr.
pp. 595-7, 600.) ;
- When Howe was questioned regarding his pera to list
Brown and Root Airfield on the Form ACA-117 as the near-
est landing area, which Howe admitted was included on the
aeronautical charts and presumably in the Airman’'s Guide,
Howe was unable to explain. (Tr. Bp. 641-3.) His answer
was as follows: «!
“Q. You weren't ineseneuned then in giving the name of
_-the nearest landing area?
ahs For the purposé of the form, no, sir.”
Howe could not say whether he looked for the Brown and
_Root Airfield in the Airmant’s Guide “because of the time
Japse.”’ (Tr. ‘Pe 643.)
. N, A. iiaialan, an electrical engineer with CLECO, tes,
tified he was in: charge of construction of the towers at
Bayou Boeuf (Tr. p. 458-9 as project engineer (Tr: p. 461),
approving plans and spegifications for the toyers submitted
by Mr. "Woodr uff (Tr. p. 461.) While Mr. Berry was the direct
supervisor of the job, Mr. Bonnette visited the site quite often
(Tr. p. 460.) Before, during and after construction of the
towers, Mr. Bonnette knew * ‘Slaton’s place”’ was there (Tr. p.
464}, and he-“did know possibly that structures of that ?pe
might or should have been lighted” (Tr Pp. 463). Of is e-
position taken September 27, 1961, he was asked if he
aware such towers could be hazardous for aviation, 1 Which
he answered yes. (Tr. p. 464.) Mr. Bonnette testified he
would repeat _ that answer on _the stand. (Tr. p. 464.4 Also, , -
‘
Pa
os)
. 14
on his aaa the following — was: Boris to aie.
Bennette: :
“Q. I will ask it again, ‘Was it your understanding that
where such a tower, such as 10 and 11, these two
towers in question, were within a certain number of
feet . . . let’s say 4,000 feet off of a landing base,
landing field, that there were certain’ requirements
as to the markings of such towers? Do you know
that?’ And your answer was, ‘Yes, if that tower had
been at a - -’- And then there were two dashes, ‘with-
in the proximity of a landing field, I would say that
we would have possibly lighted them, I don’t know.’
- Did you answer that?
“A. As I recall I answered it just that way, yes.” (Tr.
p. 465.) iy : : .
7 ‘Mr. Bonnette did not recall having any conversations
with Mr. Woodruff or his employees with regard to the fact
that Slaton Seaplane Base was 4,000 feet fromthe towers
and didinot give such information to the CAA (Tr. p. 466);
‘although he did know that the CAA was to be advised that
the construction was to, take place (Tr. p. 466). It was Mr.
Bonnette’s testimony - that he did not see a copy of the form
filed by Mr. Woodruff with the CAAxuntil after the accident
. (Tr. pp. 467-8), and presumed. that the form was received
- from the CAA hy Mr. B. 18. McGrain, in charge of, the right-
of -way department in Alexandria (Tr. pp. 468-9). “Mr. Bon-
_nette did not recall whether he wag nctified by Mr. Woodruff
or Mr. Randali, his superior, that there were no require-
'_ ments, made by the CAA;. however, on } is deposition he stated
* that: ; ;
ae
15
“Q. I will read you the question, and theri - - this is on
: Page 78, ‘Well, on this particular job for the Bayou
Boeuf crossing, were you informed of any approval, -
disapproval, or action on the part of the CAA?’ You
said, ‘Yes, I was notified by Mr. Woodruff in a tele-
phone conversation that there were no requirements
as far as they were concerned. Question: Mr. Wood-
‘ruff told you that personally? - Verbally? Answer:
I don’t recall whether it was F. E: or R. S. Question:
One of them told you? Answer: Yes. Question: And
you saw and had copies of the applica‘ion itself?’
And you answered, ‘Yes, sir.’"’ (Tr. pp. 470-1.)
*
By a explanation Bonnette again asserted he did
° ’ -
not have a copy of the form as of the date it-was forwarded.
to the CAA Officials, but only after the accident. . \
“This is Page 83: ‘I see. You don’t know who in :
CLECO would ‘kpow? Offhand, no, sir, l would not.
Have you ever notified anybody in the Alexandria
. office? I have no reason to, so I did not. ‘A copy
was good enough - - You got a copy at that time?
Well, that is the original that Mr. Stone sent. Yes.
Now, the copies I refer to’ are —photostatic copies
Is that just as legal as - - What I'm trying to get at
is when did you get the copy? Answer: “The copy of -
the form was sent to me, or I got it tate r, consider-
ably later, from Mr. Woodruff.’ ” (Tr. p. 4036)
Mr. Berry, field engineer with CLECO. testified he Wis
ineharge of the construction of towers at Bayou Boeui, (Tr.
p. 477.) The fact that Slaton Seaplane Base was located 4,000
feet from the towers and that planes were ianding and taking
off there before, during, and after the construction was ad-
mittedly known to Mr. Berry. (Tr. 9. 479.)
‘Mr. R. D. Cooper, an fre. trae contracto. who entered -
into a contract with CLECO to erect towers and transmission
lines (Tr. p. 422), furnished only labor, ‘supervision and tools.
(Tr. p. 423.) Mr. Berry, supervisor for CLECO, was on the job
every day. (Tr. p. 423.) No fequest to paint or light these
towers. and lines was ever made?by anyone for CLECO. (Tr.
p, 424,) Cooper was asked by Bonnette to install six orange
balls on the wires as they were being strung. (Tr. p. A425.)
. &* ; = .
4. Requirements of the CAA-FAA Concerning Marking
and Lighting of CLECO’s Towers and Wires. _
kar! Stone, testifying as the Court's witness, stated that
he was employed by the FAA, and in 1955 was an air spiace
‘utilization officer concerned with anything which might be
regarded as an obstruction to air navigation. (Tr. pp. 523-5.
The witness stated that towers 214 feet high. tocated 4,000
feet from a seaplane base, such as thosé involved in the case
at bar, would be desigrated by the FAA as obst ructions to air
- Navigation. (Tr. pp. 535-7.) Such obstructions should be
painted intert.ational orange ahd white in alternating stripes.
(Tr. p. 537.) Stone ‘testified that the CAA-FAA has published
a r.anual entitled “Obstruction Mas ling and Lighting Stand-—
ards for Marking and Lighting Obstructions for Air Naviga-
tion,” of which the latest publication is dated November 1,
1956 (Tr. pp. 527-8.) On page 10 of this manual appears spe-
_ Cification A(2), which was read to the jury. dealing with the
lighting of such an obstruction to air navigation as was pre:
sented by CLECO's towers
“Q. When the particular obstruction is more than 150
feet but not more than 309 feet. in overall height
above ground or water, if so situated therg should
be installed at the top of the obstruction a flashing
17
300 .millimeter electric code beacon, equipped with
two lamps, and aviation red-colored filters. The two’
lamps of the beacon should be burned simultane-
ously, and each lamp should be at least 500 watts.
“Where a rod or other obstruction - - or other construc-.
tion of not more than 20 feet in height and: incapable of
supporting this beacon is mounted on top of the obstruc-
tign, and it is determined that this additiénal construction
does not permit. unobstructed visibility of the code bea-
con from aircreft at any normal angle of approach, here
should be insta'led two such beacons, positioned so as to
ifisure unobstructed visibility cf at least one of the bea-
cons at any normal angle of approach. At the approxi-
mate mid point of the overall height of the obstruction
there should be installed at least two lights, each light
consisting of a lamp of at least 100 watts enclosed in
aviation red obstruction light globes. Bach light should
be placedson diagonally or diametrically Opposite positions
of the- obstruction and mourited so as to insure unob-
structed Visibility of at least one light from aircraft at
an. normal angle of approach. In case of triangular or
rectangular-shape tower, the light of the mid-ievel should
be mounted so as to imsure unobstructed visibility of at
least one light from aircraft at any normai angle of ap-
proach, or a light should be installed on each corner of
the. tower at this Jevel” (Tr pp. 31-2.)
°
Therefore, a tower bufween 150 and 6%) feet hich, within
34m) fect of a landing area, eo within 20 miles of a civil air-
way. would have to be lighted as prescribed in the foregoing
specification... (Tr. p. 532.) ‘ ;
“The CAA-FAA manual provided for marking of overhead
wires as follows:
Ay -
18
“Overhead wires: Marking devices placed on overhead
wires should be spherical in shape with a diameter of not .
less than 20 inches, or may be of other shapés provided
the projections of such type of marker on any vertical
surface normally to each direction from which an: air-
craft is likely to approach the obstruction will not be less
than that presented by the spherical- -type marker de-
scribed above. At least one such marker should be dis-
. played for each 150 feet or fraction thereof of the overail
length of the’ overhead line. These, markers should be
placed at equai intervals not more than 150 feet apart
with the top of each marker not below the level of the
highest wire &t the point marked, and’should be ‘covered
as specified-under the marking of obstructions by colors.
The distance between markers and overhead wires lo-
cated more than 15,000 feet from the reference point of
any landing area may be increased toa distance of not
- more than 600 feet - -”
+ And if. you were to assume that the distance between
two towers is 1250 feet, then how many balls or
markings should be placed? -
“A. I believe thé Manual stated, they recommended every
_ 150 feet or fraction thereof, so it would be a matter
of dividing that distance by 150 feet.
“@. And if there were only six of these markers placed,
* six of these balls placed there, would it be two balls
short, wouldn't it?
oe belheve, that is correct, sir.” (Tr. pp. 540-541.)
Any person constructing a structure over 150 feet high |
within 15,000 feet of a Janding area or within 20 miles of a
civil airway was: réquired by the manual, page 24, to file a
notice of construction ‘or alteration, Form ACA-117. (Tr. p.
19
542.) Such notice of construction, or alteration, signed by
’R. S. Woodruff, was received by Eari Stone. (Tr. pp. 543-4.)
Following receipt of such’a notice, Stone stated Ke would first
check the location of the construction and also to see if there.
Was any landing area listed on the Form ACA.1i7 which was
submitted. (Tr. p. 546.) Stone would then pict the location of
the structure on an aeronautical chart, and e:.amine the chart
‘to see if any. landing ‘areas or Civil airways existed in the
vicinity. (Tr. pp. 546-7.)
' In order to determine whether or not civil. airways or
.
landing areas were present, Mr. Stone. used sectional aero- ~
nautical charts which show airports, aids to navigation, and
‘civil airways (Tr. pp. 547-548), as well as Form 29A, showing
‘all détailed information on each airport such as leneth of run-
ways and elevations (Tr. p. 548). He also referred to the Air-
man’s Guide to ascertain if there were any airports listed in
the Guide that were not yet published on aeronautical charts.
(Tr. p. 548). Stone stated that he relied in part upon the in-
formation furnished by CLECO on Form 117 and did not go
to the site of the construction. (Tr. p. 549.)
2
-
Mr. -Stone explained that a landing area is defined as
follows:
“Landing areas shall mean any locality either on land or
water including airports and intermediate landing fields
which. is listed as an airport in the current issue of the
Airmen’s Guide and is used for the landing and take-off
of an aircraft whether or not facilities are provided for
sheltering, servicing or repairing aircraft or for receiv-
ing or discharging passengers or cargo.” (Tr. pp. 551-2.) |
‘i
The boundary of a londing ‘area as defined by the man-
ual was given as follows:
va -
_-)
20
“A..The boundary of a landing area shall mean, ‘(1)
Any one of the limits of. that portion cf the landing
area maintained for the use of land aircraft in taking
off for landing: or (2) Any one of the limits of that
portion of the landing area used for water aircraft in
taking off or landing, which limits are desjgned as
being 5,000 feet in all directions measured over on
water from the principal ramp of the landing area or
if marked in acéordance with standard practice, the
Hmics of the landing area so marked.’ ” (Tr p A
a
The. witness explained that the owner r of ‘the airport sub-
mits « form to the FAA ‘requesting his airport be incl fed in
current aeronautical charts and specifications (Tr. p. 552.)
Should -he fail to do os - ‘oe airport dees not appear” on the
aeronautic ‘ab charts of Airmen’s Guide. (Tr. p. 553.)
The District Judge asked Stone what procedure he would
. follow in the event an individual! or corporation file| Form
ACA-1i7, listing as the nearest landing area a base not listed
in the aeronautica! chart and Airman’s Guide. and the witnes:-
responded as follows: — , Be
“T would normally write the operator of the airport as
listed on this form and advise nim there is a proposed
construction and give him the specifics on the case and
sec if he had any recommendations cohcerning this pro-
posed construction and of course my action would be hased
to some extent on what his reply contained.” * (Tr. pp.
DDT.) seas
If it were economicaliy feasible. Stone added that he might
_ send someone to the location. (Tr. pp. 558-3.)
_.The witness was asked what steps he would take if he
received a Form ACaA-117 which listed the nearest boundary
uo
- ‘eee
of a landing area as 4,000 feet from the — structure,
and replied as follows: bee ‘
“A. Well, first of ali, if it-had the airport listed as yéu
specified, then I would need additional information,
so, therefore, as I stated previously; 1 would go back
to the airport operator and ask him what direction
are your approached (sic) at this base, -hecause it is
possible that the construction could be in theapproach
area, which would require more rigid marking and
lighting than if it were not in the approach areas.”
- ({EXmphasis supplied, Tr. pp. 559-64). )
Even if a Notice of Alteration. and Construction, Form
ACA-117, was not required to be filed. but was actually filed
with the CAA- FAA, Stone-testified that he would recommend
the structure be markéd and hghted as would be appropriate .
to) the operation of the adjacent airport if he tuund the seruc~—
ture to be an obstruction. (Tr. p. 560.) Furthermore. he
would issue a hotice of this obstruction to the Airman’s Guide
‘ so that it could be included therein. (Tr. p. 560.) .
Mr, George Lambros, who has specialized in buying, .op-
erating and selling Widgeon aircraft. the same type that Mr.
Newton flew, and has flown 7500 hour: in Widgeons (Tr. p.
513), testified that the Corps of Engineers, US. Army Map
of the Morgan City area, dated -1955, showed the Brown and
Root Airtield to be within 15.000) feet of the CLECO towers.
(Tr. pp. 595-7—-marked plaintiff 39.1 The officia! deronautica!
. chart of Louisiana dated April 1, 1953, marked plaintiff “11.
also showed the existence of the Brown and Root Airport
(Trp. 598.4 The N. O. Sectional Aeronautical Chart angi fhe
cai World Aeronautical Chart for Galveston Bay Area—marked
plaintiffs. 42 and 4. respectively (Tr. p 600), dated Feb.11
22
1957, showed ‘that Victor 20-South Civil Airways is approxi- .
‘mately eight miles to the edge of the airway and the 13 -niles |
to the center ‘of ihe airway from the Slaton Se&plane Base.
o>
Thus, despite the fact that Slaton Seaplane Base was not
_ listed in the aeronautical charts or the Airman’s Guide at the —
time Woodruff filed Form ACA-117 on behalf of CLECO,
Brown and Root Airport and Victor 20-South Civil Airway
were *~cluded on these documents, and Brown and Root Air-
port should have been listed as the nearest landing area. The.
proximity of the Brown and Root Airport as well as the Civil
Airway required that lights be installed on CLECO’s towers
_in accordance with specification A(2) quoted above and found
on pages 531-2 of the transcript.
3. Evidence Relating to the Hazards to Air Navigation
Inherent in‘the Location and Height of CLECO’s Un- .
: marked, Unlighted Towers and Wires. 7
The uncontradicted evidence educed from George Lam-
bros and pilots whose planes were’ based at Slaton or Guarisco
Seaplane Bases, showed that the towers and wires were in the
gliding area of the Widgeon Newton was flying prior to the
. fatal accident. (Tr. pp. 190, 585-6.) The safest means of Jand-
ing was to fly under these wires ivr several reasons. (Tr. pp.
188-9, 283, 341, 586.) Mr. Hare stated it was impossible for
a Widgeon to. g@ over the wires and then begin its descent
without straining the craft's ‘structure. (Tr. p. 236.) “Hare
also tesiMied that a landing east of the wires was not feasible *
because taxiing the airplane the necessary distance .o the
base would cause the engines to overheat. (Tr. p. 226.) In
addition, flyii.g over the wires presented tlie possibility of the
plane stalling and falling into the wires. (Tr.-pp. 188, 587.)
= .
bd
i
23
_ Hare testified that on the day of the’ accident it would
\ ‘have been out of the question to come in from the west be-
. \_Aause of heavy boat traffic (Tr. p. 219), leaving a pilot such
as Newton no choice but to come in from the east under the
wires." Hare and Funchess both testified they knew of no.
regulation forbidding ay aviator from flying under such a
structure. (Tr. pp. 227, 289.) .
/ ~~* The'dull silver color of the towers made them extremely
hard to see. as they blended in with the foliage. (Tr. p. 192.)
The wires, unmarked except for six red balls, were very difli-
cult to see (Tr. pp. 192, 284-5, 329), and in Roger Ward’s
words were ‘a’ “known hazard” (Tr. p. 345).. Photographs
taken from the front of the plane on t#® final approach, every
100 feet, marked plaintiff 11-35, Tr. p. 199, were taken by
Desmond Hare on the same type Of day, and at the same time
as Newton made‘his landing. (Tr. pp. 193, 196.) Plaintiff 30,
an enlarged photograph showing the approach from the east, -
clearly indicates how difficult the towers and wires were to
discern. {Tr.. p. 199.)
6 ARGUMENT
I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, SET-
TING ASIDE THE FINDING THAT LEWIS NEWTON
WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AND THAT
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE |
OF THE ACCIDENT, WAS CORRECT AND SHOULD
NOV BE DISTURBED. “2
A. The Jury's Finding Was Contrary to the Manifest:
Weight of Evidence.
~ oe 5
mm
~
24
_ “Under the law of Louisiana “. . . in the absence of clear
creditable evidence to the contrary, a presumption of due care
_on the part of the deceased rises to the dignity of evidence.”
Finn v. Eniployers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, 141 So.
2d 852, 875 (La. App. 1962); Begnaud v. Texas & New Or-
leans Railroad Co., 136 So.2d 123 (La. App. 1962), cert. de-
nied, (1962 ); Simon v. Texas & ‘New Orleans Railroad Co.,
124 So.2d 646 tLa. Apr. 1960), cert. deniéd (1962), :
*
An examination .of the record discloses’ ‘that petitioners
were unable to present any evidence indicating contributory
negligence of :Louis Newton; moreover, testimony -given ‘by,
plaintiffs” witnesses showed that prior to the crash Newton ‘:,
Was employing the safest methods of making.a landing.
- Pilots who had made such a landing stated that the safest
procedure was to begin fhe approach 1,000 to 2,000 fect east
of the wires (Ward—Tr. p. 342; Lambros—Tr. p. 586), and
to fly under the wires (Hare—Tr. pp. 188-9; Funchess—Tr:
p. 283; Ward—Tr. p. 341; Lambros—Tr. p. 586). Eyewitness —
Funchess testified that. he saw Newton's plane. approaching
from the east, 2,000 or 3,000 yards east of the towers, at al
altitude just above the towers. (Tr. pp. 291-2.) Captain Smith
estimated. the plane was one-half to three-quarters of a mile
east ot the towers,°25 to 50 feet above the treetops. (Tr. pp.
433-451.; As the Court of Appeals noted in its cpinion, “That
was a customary route of apprdach to the Slaton Base.”
Moses v. Central Louisiana Electric Coppeny, 324 F.2d 69,
71 (5th Cir..19637. .
“
; Newton's plane did not pull up intg the wires, but rather,
witnesses saw the aircraft stop in 7M ‘and then fall into
the water. - (Hebert—Tr. p. 263; Wilson-— Tr. p. 323.) Testi-
mony that the wires. were almost impossible to see (Hare—-
>)
Tr. p. 192; Ward- -Tr. p. 345), coupled with the photographs
giving graphic evidence of this fact (Tr. pp. 193-200, plaintiffs’
11-35), lend support to the probability that Newton was mak-
ing a customary ‘Janding and crashed When Ke collided with
the invisible wires. ;
It was encumbent upon petitioners to prove Newton Ww < o
coritributorily negligent, and this burden. cannot be dischar ged
by a showing of mere speculation or conjectur e. Chapman v.
United States, 194 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1952): Finn v. Employers
Liability, Assurance Corporation, supra. The happening of an
accident does not give rise to a presumption of such negli-_
gence; the occurrence of an accident is insufficient to take the -
case to the jury. Renhekamp v. Blair, 375 Pa. 620, 101 A. 2d
669 (1954)...
Because petitioners ,resented no evidence that negligent
acts were committed by Newton which resulted in the crash,
| the jury’s finding that his negligen¢e proximately caused the
accident was clearly erroneous, ‘and was properly reversed
by the Court of -Appeals.
o
B. Instructions Relating to the Issue of Newton's Con-
tributory’ Negligence \vere Erroneous, Misleading,
_ and Should Not Have Been Given.
Respondent submits that there was no evidentiary basis
for the following instructions:
“To constitute actionable negligence for which recovery
can be had again t Central Louisiaria Electric Company
and their Insurer, Michigdn Mutual Liability Company,
vou must first find negligence-on the part of CLECO and,
in Addition, you must also find that such negligence proxi-
a
94
2456 (1864). .° ‘
p Poe
_aee ia op os
mately cause the ‘death: of Louis Newton .in a natural
and unbroken sequence of event¢, Without any independent
_ intervening act by Louis Newton. Therefore, where there
occurs betWeen an original act of negligence and the final .
* accident to a person, an entirely independent and unre-
lated act/“of ‘negligence by another which ‘intervenes and
accident, then the second amd intervening negligent act is
regarded in law as the proximate cause of the accident.”
(Tr! pp. 729-130.) . fake
is of itself sufficient to a alone as the cause of the
. : !
As pointed out abovey"no negligent inter -ning act is
reveaied by the evidence, anid hence no such principle of\ law
: shonid have beer mentioned to the jury. Under these cirdumi-
stanées, this Court has held such instructjons constituted re-
versible errdér. Keyser v. ‘Hitz, 133 U.S. 138 (1890); Knicker-
_ bocker Life Insurance Company v. Foleys 205 U.S. (15 Otto)
350, (1882); Orient Mut. Ins. Co. v.
ight 6B-U.S, (1 Wall.)
n Tharp v. Mundy; 195 F.2d 987, P89 (Sth Cir. 1952),
the district judge granted a request fo
_ with contributofy negligence on the
‘structions dealing
* : at ;
The appellate court held the judgmert-must be reversed since
contributory negligence was not raised by the evidence. .
The Seventh = Court of Appeals voiced a like con--
y v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 356 —
clusion in. McCar
F.2d 87@ (7th Cir. 1946), at page’882.
ah BE
. “Secondly, the instruction is improper because it told
the jury that the plaintiff could not recover if his decedent
was guilty of acts of negligence that woke “his
death. As.an abstract proposition of law thet is correct,
«but there was no evidence of any independent
oe
of the flaintiff-guest.
ts of neg-:
¢
“7 . ; _o}
' ligence by the decedent that was the-sole cause of the
Oo ‘accident and his death. The: Court had instructed on a
. proposition about which there was no evidence.” (Em-
phasis —— . oe - 3
: P 6
* The action ~ the trial court herein was in direct conflict
with the authorities ‘ied “abo ind was ‘properly reverst
. by the Court of Appeais. | . ar |
ra) ~. ' : | . . ‘ ‘
/ * --.€, ‘The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Give Respond-
S . * ents’ Charges on Sudden Emergency.
Respondents submit that the record discloses amples evi-
dence justifying an instruction to-the jury relative to sudden
emergency. Uncontradicted testimony established that cana!
- traffic was very heavy on the day. of the accident (Tr. p. 219)
Te i and, shortly before the accident, Captain Smith's tugboat with
| five barges in tow was passing an offshore boat-in the vicinity
of the towers and wires. Such evidence could give rise to an
inference that as Newton attempted to land. he was faced with
a sudden emergency not of his own making, that of the canal - }
° _. being occupied.by these vessels, and he decided not to lana.
The unmarked wires, 36 feet wige from .toy to bottom wire
(Tr. p. 426), were ‘then invisible and: the collision occurred
| as he fried to gain altitude, preparatory to circling the canal
, ®. again. (See plaintiffs’ “eqs charges 18, 19,.Tr. pp. 124- 5.)
‘The Court of Preaers conclusion on this issue was ex-
oe as a: a a
sa “We suggest, inp, that, on another trial, the -district
court take particular note of “the evidence to see whether
- an appropriate cap * on the: question of sudden emer-
’ gency Should be camel
*
ie ieee
28 ¢
' Moses ventral Louisiana Electric Company, supra, at
p. 73.
The doctrine of sudden emergency.was defined by the
€Bouisiana Supreme Court in. Snodgrass v. Centanni, 229 La. -.
915, 87 So. (2d) 127 (1956), at page 131:
“One whe suddenly finds himself in a position of im-
»-. minent peril, without sufficient time to consider and weigh
«all the circumstances or best means that may be adopted ©
to avoid an impending danger is not guilty of negligence
if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon-reflec-
tion may appear to have been a better method, uniess the.
emergency in-which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.”
Similar pronouncements. of this rule are ‘found in Chap-
man v. United States, supra; Dane v. Canal. Insurance Com-
pany, 249 La. 1038, 126 So.24.355 (1961.
"Merchants Motor Freight v. Downiiig. 997 F.2d 247 (8th.
Cir. 1955), provides an example of reversible error based
on failure to instruct on sudden émergency or Jegal excuse:
“The defendant ‘contends that since the jury found for
- the defendant they did not believe Mangert [plaintiff's
driver]. This reasoning is not sound. The jury was not
instructed on lega.excuse and care required in an emer-
gency. They may have found for the defendant under the.
instructions merely because the evidence showed without
controversy that plaintiff’s vehicle. was on the wrong side .
‘of the .road after the jackknifing and just prior to the
collision." ‘
“This court has held that a party ‘is entitled to a special -
* instruction on his theory of the case if there is evidence
ge
va
=
1 %
. >
: ‘
“aS :
ty
>
- to support it, and if a proper request has been made. dial
The court committed prejudicial error in failing to sub-
t ‘the legal excuse issue to the jury.”
oa
~ UL Berchants Motor Freight v. . Divine, Supra st Pi pp. 5B, 7
In many instances this Courf ha has held that failure. to in-.
struct the jury adequately on a concept of law vital to a liti-
gant’s case is tantamount to r€versible error. Pryor v. Wil-
liams, 2544'S. 43 (1920); Tesas & P.R. Co. v. Bourman; 212
U.S. 536 (1909); City of San Juan v. St. John’s Gas Co., 195
U.S. 510; ‘see ‘also, Daigée v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
247 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1957).
- Because the evidence warranted a charge on the question
of sudden emergency, it is urged that the suggestion by’ the
Court of Appeals that it be considered by the district court at
the time of the new ina was well- founded.
c-~
a Pye
1. “THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY REVERSED aa
THE JURY’S FINDING THAT CLECO’s‘NEGLIGENCE
w&S NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCI-
‘DENT SINCE SUCH FINDING WAS UNSUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE, AND RESULTED -FROM ERRON-
EOUS, MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS,
A.. The Finding Was Unsupported - the Evidence.
X ‘
The legal presumption of due caré on the: part of Newton,
' discussed above, has not been rebutted by defendants, and
plaintiff submits that the -accidént was pr oximately caused
when the pilot, exercising due care, crashed, into the wires
because they were. impossible to see due to CLECO’s failure
to-mark and light the towers and wires in accordance with the
minimum. standards established by the CAA-FAA.
A proximate causal " reltjonship exists in ‘Louisiana when
the negligent act— -here CLECO’s failure to mark and light
its epaiitien-e fs a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm; another expression of ‘the test used is to determine that
the injury’ would not» have occurred but. for ‘the negligence
of the defendant. D & D Planting Co. v. Employers Casualty
Co:, 240 La. 684, 124 So.2d 908 (1960); Leonard v. Holmes
& Barnes, Ltd., 232 La. 229, 94 So.2d 241 (1957); Harvey v.
Great American a Co., 110°So, 2d 595 (La. App. 1959).
I defendant’s negligent acts are -in the nature of omis- _
sions to take. necessary action, ‘the mere. possibility that the
accident would have occurred despite- the required precautions
does not break the chain of causatioon.” Dixie Drive It Your-
self Sys..v. American Beverage Co., 242_La. 471, 137 So. (2d) .
_ 304. ( 1962), and: authorities therein cited.
CLECO's negligerice in Alling out Form ACA- 117 _
the CAA-FAA from learning the true facts of the proximity _
* ;
of these towers to Slaton Seaplane Base and Brown and Root \
Airfield, ‘thus preventing the CAA-FAA from investigating
and fequiring painting and-illumination of CLECO’s towers
and wires. This withholding of information from *the CAA-
‘FAA came about through CLECO’s employee,. Bonnette, dele-.
. gating the responsibility of filing’ the form to Woodruff, who
t.ad never been to the site and had no knowledge of ‘the pres-
ence of seaplane ‘bases and air traffic on the Intracoastal
Waterway. Bonnette was acquainted with this fact from
personal ebservation, as was Berry, another CLECO employée, _
but none of CLECO’s employees relayed this. information to -
- Woodruff, who was given the ‘task mainly because his office
and that of the. CAA-FAA were docated in the same city of
Fort Worth.
31
Ear] Stone of the FAA stated that had he been informed .
the towers and wires wére in close proximity to a seaplane
base. not listed.on the Airman’s Guide or current aeronautical
charts, he would have written the gperator of* such unlisted
airport, advising him of the proposed construction, to ascer-
tain if the operator had any recommendations. Clearly, Mr.
Stone's correspondence with Slaton would have resulted in.
Slaton's request for extra marking of the installation. Slaton
had already attempted to ‘accomplish this very thing by writ-
ing to CLECO directly ‘on March 12, 1956::(Tr. p. 488:) How-
ever, CLECO’s negligence in not revealing its location with
regard to Slaton’s base, pretermitted the taking. of such steps
by the FAA, and was a proximate cause of the accident since
otherwise the FAA would have required the towers and wires
/e be lighted. and marked.
| “In addition, the negligence of Bill Howe e, to whom: Wood-
ruff had delegated the job of filling out Form ACA- 117 ‘is |
. chargeable to CLECO, his principal. Howe either did not dis-
cover the Brown and Root’s Airfield, listed in the aeronautical
charts and Airman’s ‘Guide, or gre. ind negligently failed to
list it as the “nearest landing area.’ ’ Because Brown and Root
—is-tocated-15,000 feet: from CLECO’s towers and wires, the
FAA would classify CLECO’s installation an obstruction to |
air navigation and would recommend that it be painted’ and
lighted in accordance with FAA standards. Once. again, fail-
ure to divulge this information respecting Brown and Root’s
Airfield prevented the FAA from -stepping in and making
+ recommendations and ultimately precluded CLECO’s lighting
and painting the towers and wires so that this accident could
have been avoided, making such eter a proximate cause _
of the accident. : _ oe
_ __. that CLECO would be absolved of liability if its negligence ~~
O
B. muntemitionn ‘Relating to Proximate Cae Were Er- 2
— and Misleading. 5
It is upinoies ‘that thejusy was a misled by the
erroneous charges given. bythe trial judge, and consequently,
was under the misapprehension that CLECO’s negligence could
not be the proximate cause. Uncontestable proof of-the jurors’
bewilderment is furnighed by their subsequent return to the
courtroom for further instructions on the proximate cause
‘ (Tr.-748-9). Their confusion is understandable when it is re-
called that they were instructed regarding a nonexistent inter-
vening negligent act (Tr. p. 730), and they alse received this *
instruction: | :
“Even if you should find that CLECO was negligent, if
you also find that its.negligence had become passive or
static and that the negligence of another brought about
the conditions which caused the accident, the you (sic)
verdict should’ be e for CLECO, or that it was not negli-
_ gense or not the: proximate cause.” _f Emphasis supplied.) - ;
. (Tr. P. 731.) ,
Referring to the instructions quoted above, the Court of .
_Appeais held that reversible error had been-committed-when ~~~
Ahe jury was so charged:
“Together with the response ‘given to the questions so
‘propounded by the jury, they serve, to distort and draw
out of focus the duty which the law placed upon CLECO. |
The emphasis upon negligence as an act and upon the re-
quirement that it-‘directly’ and ‘proximately’ caused or *
‘contributed to the. accident, coupled with the instruction
had become passive or static; and if the negligence of,
another brought about the condition which caused the
accident, was calculatéd to acquit CLECO of its proven
. a:
¢
and jury accepted negligerce in maintaining the wires at a
point where it knew plaes customarily passed over and
under them without taking precautions adequate to the
Surrounding circumstances. The charge as a wholesseems —
to leave the definite impression that the passive and static
presence of the wires was not to be considered as negli-
| gence if Newton chose to ‘approach, the ‘landing under °
y= and in cloge proximity to’ them, as was the tustom.”
“(Emphasis in the original)
Moses v. Central Louisiana Electric Company, supra, at |
.© .p» 72. .
\ In this connection, the Court of Appeals cited and relied
upon Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. ¢. Americun Ber erage Co., |
supra, which petitioners have argued was error because Dixie
was decided after the trial of the instant case; hence. the
appellate court wrongfully * yk reversed: the trial ‘court on
~ the basis of a change in- the law occurring in the interim.”
(Petition, p. 6). , A reading of this decision discloses that the
‘ Louisiana Supreme Court relied on prior jurisprudence, and
did not announce any change in the law. (See Dixie Drwe
It Yourself Sys. v. American Beverage Co., 137 So.2d at p.
306, footnote 17.) - ’ The courf-did-take” the opportunity to
comment upon ambiguous language in certain decisions, and
£3, © to conclude that “Insofar: as such a conflict exists, we have
. elected not. to follow these decisions.” Dirie Drwe It Yourself
Sys. . American Beverage Sys., 137 So.2d at p. "307. Since
voleatas have. failed to indicate what modification, of Lou-
isiana law was effected in the Dixie case, and the plain lan-
-. guage of that opinion refutes such a contention tion, respondents
peace winnie a
> = ___ urge thatthe argument is :without merit.
Further, as "petitioners: admit, yellenee upon a decision
; ‘rendered — to the judgment. in the case at-bat, has
\
been approved by this Court in Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S.
232 (1944). (Petition, p. 6) Some attempt is made to escape .
this precedent by citation of “England , v. Louisiana Board. of -
Medwal Examiners, 84°S . Ct. 461 (1964), whieh petitioners’
aver . has cast strong doubt on this practice.” * (Petition,
p. 6.) Petitioners give“no enlightenment as to the manner in
which these doubts proceed from the England ‘decision, 3 and it
is submitted that’ in a fact, such is not the case.
Asa consequence of the erroneous statement of law con-—
tained in the instructions, it was inevitable that the jury was
misled and returned a verdict contrary to the evidence ad-
_ duced. This view expressed by the Court of Appeals was emi-
nently correct, and in. harmony with holdings. of this: Court,
United States v. River Rouge: Improvements Co., 269 U.S. 411,
421 (1926); Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R.R. Co. v.
Houston, 95 U.S. 45 Otto) 697 (1878); see also, Thacker v.
J.C. Penny Co.; 254 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1958); Daigle v. Lou-
mana Power & Liglit Co., 24% F.2d 227 (5th Cir: 1957). .
C. Additional Instructions Given to the dury ‘Were Er-
One hour and forty minutes after retiring for delibera-
: tions, the jury returned to request these additional’ instrue-
tions: “Re-read charge quoting negligence by-more. ican one —
_ party; Define ‘a proximate cause of thé accident.’ (Tr. p.
748.) In answer to the second query, the Court gave this
charge : : ,
re “I charge you further that in the eyes of the law negli- a
gence is actionable only when it is the proximate cause
of the injury received. That is to say, where the negli-
gence proceeds in an unbroken chain without independent
. 7 ele
?
rr ; : - eS 35 K i <
intervening cause up to the“point of causing the accident -
or: halen the accident.
“Now, that is eins as good a defavition of. proximate
cause as you can get. Itisa legally, foolproof: definition
of proximate cause. Unfortunately, it is not the type of
‘definition thet is too helpful to a Jury whe is trying to
- determine with reference to proximate cause if there is a
duty.on ihe part of a person to do a certain act, and that.
party fails to perform: that duty will result in an accident, ,
- then that failure can be said to be. the proximate cause, se,
of the accident. Now, that is another way of stating
--. imate cause.” ( — supplied.) (Tr. pp. acide
With respect to the district court’s statement thet the
__— negligence must proceed in “an unbroken chain, péspondents
Y
submitgthat such a statement of Jaw conflicts yith the prin-
’ ciple enunciated in Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So.2d 729
_ (1954), to the effect that if, a person creating a danger could
or should reasonably have foreseen ‘that the accident might
occur, he is liable notwithstanding thgIntervening cause. See
also Fisher v. Norwich Union Fire ‘Insurance Society, Ltd.,
\119 So.2d 562 (La. App. 1960) ; Chavers v. Blossman: 45 So.2d
398° (La. App. 1950); Kiriluk/*. Kohn, 16 Ill. App. 2d 385,
148 N.E.2d 607 (1958); Ngfe, 9 Kansas L. Rev. 539 (1959);
Note, “Tul. AL. Rev. 419 (1€81). rae
s/ ) Mk =
. Particularly relevant to this issue is Leposki v. Railway
Erpress Agency, 297 F.2d 849 (3rd‘Cir. 1962), in which. an
erronéous instruction relative to an intervening act led to
"reversal of t ie judgment. In that case, defendant -claimed
. that the in rvening act of two boys setting fire to gasoline.
dripping/from defendant’s gasoline tank intake pipe barred
plaintiffs’ recovery: for fire damage resulting when the flames
spread to plaintiffs’ house. The court disagreed, noung that
a
cal
jury » eniil find that c= . . interveriing act was merely a
reaction: toa dangerous " dite that defendant itself cre-
-~ated.”. ki v. — Express Agency, supra, at p: 851.
"* Over: ‘and above this error in vagand to ‘the applicable
" Jaw, the district court also was mistaken in charging the jury iz
that: failure.to perform a duty “. . was another way of stating
proximate cause.” Unquestionably failure to perform a duty’
constitutes negligence, but does not denote proximate cause.
-Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage _
supra. °
When the jury is given no assistance in its endeavor to
return a verdict in conformity with the controlling jurispru-
dence, but instead is misled and confused by ‘the trial judge’s
charges, reversible error is present, Carter v. Atlanta & St.
Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 430 (1949); DeLima v. Trini-
dad Corporation, 302 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1962); Atkinson v.
Roth, 297 F.2d 570: (3rd .Cir. 1941). Accordingly, the judg-
nfent of the Court of Appeals herein should not be disturbed.
e
Ill. THE COURT OF APREALS CORRECTLY SET ASIDE
THE JURY VERDICT DENYING .RECOVERY FOR
_ THE DE4TH OF ROBERT,MOSES.
: "As pointed out in the foregoing, respondénts contend that
Newton's contributory negligence should not have been men-
tionéd to the jury due to the lack of evidence to substantiate
‘this instr uction. However, because this issue was submitted
to the jury, the trial judge should have given instructions re-
quested by respondents (No. 20, Tr. p. 125), stating ¢ghat any
, contributory negligence of Newton’ could not be imputed to
Moses, vack v- Travelers Insurance Co., 112 So.2d 308 (La.
App. 1959). ‘The Court of Angpat finding on this point.was ae
"the following: .
“We suggest that, on another trial, the district court take
_ particular. note of whether any contributory negligence —
on the part of decedent Moses was shown. We think that
proof on this point is meager indeed, and that it is very
doubtful from the record before us whéther Moses was -
’ chargeable with the contributory negligerice of Newton,
- if such could be proven... -
Moses v. Central Louisiana Electric Compiany, supra, at
} Pp. 73. ; wy - é °
. Respondents urge that the Court of penne holding \ was
: justified by: *the evidence, and that failure to convey Mrs.
. Moses’ theory of recovery was-error, Atkinson v. Roth, supra;
Baxter v. Ainsworth, 288 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1961); especially
in view of the presumption that Moses exercises due care up.
to the moment of his death, Simon v. Texas & P. Ry Co.,
supra, and the hesitance of the courts to apply assumption of
risk in airplane cases, Boise v. Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen,
- 214 F.2d 373. (9th Cir. 1954): Montellier v. United States, 202
F.Supp. 397 (E.D. ‘N.Y. 1962); Bruce v. O’Neal Flying Service,
231 N.C. 181, 56 enn 560 (1949).
CONCLUSION |
Petitioners have argued that the reversal of the jury’s.
verdict violates the ‘Seventh Amendment, and thereby de-
‘ prives them of their trial By jury. AS‘respondents have pointed
“out, the instructions were not only .erroneous statements of
the- laws pertaining to the issues, ‘but were also so misleading
as to prevent the jury from: arriving at a fair evaluation of the
- evidence presented. Certainly the Constitutional guarantee of
a jury trial can not be ‘interpreted to mean that a jury ver- ~
°
o
No
alee a 38
dict, based on such instructions, must be binding on thé appel-
late court. Such a proposition would deny to the Courts of
Appeals: their function of reviewing decisions and reversing
- judgments for errors of law, and would allow honest mistakes
by misinformed jurors to work injustices on litigants. Sunkist
Growers v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Pr. Co., 370 US. 19
(1962); Burdell v. Denig, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 716 (1876).-
sd
The decision of the Court of Appeals herein, being fully
supported by the jurisprudence of this Court, is corréct, and
should not be reviewed. It is’ ‘respectfully submitted that the
- ‘petition for certiorari should not, be’ denied. & |
aoa vshuianend, ;
O° : ies ‘H. ALVA BRUMFIELD |
' SYLVIA ROBERTS
HERBERT O’NIELL
Attorneys for Respondents.
4 ye
| ie » :
ae Pines
39
CERTIFICATE °
r hereby certify’ that copies of the foregoing Brief in
. Opposition to Petition for Certiorari -have been ‘served on /
Alvin R. Christovich, Sr., 1815 American: Bank. Building, New
/ Offleans, Louisiana‘ ‘John B. Baus, 2% 225 Baronne Street, New.
- Orleans, Louisiana; David W. Robinson, 137 St. Ferdinand
Street, Bator Rouge, . Louisiana; W. Ford Reese, Richard cn
Baldwin, and Thomas J. Wyllie, of the firm of ‘Adams and
Reese, 847 National Bank of Commerce Building, New Or-
leans, Louisiana; Jacob Landry, and Jack Cousin, of the firm
of: Landry, Watkins, Cousin: & Bonin, 211 East Main Street, ©
New Iberia, Louisiana by placing same in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid.
Baton Rouge, L Louisiana, sags day of
1964. , :
ee
% *
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.