Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Crudup v. Georgia

Supreme Court brief1963

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4 } as IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 19633

. New

JOHN N. CRUDUP

~ Vs.

THE STATE. OF GEORGIA

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

_€

JOUN N. CRUDUP.

~ . Pro. Se

999-11. Jackson Building

Gainesville, Georgia

Dissenting Opinion Court of Appeals of Georgia

4 % : s

P -. INDEX:

; ‘ ; PAGE

Opinions Below a |

‘ Jurisdiction .. * Oo! ae Pisce rey ip 2

Questions Presented for Review ro 2

Su “ot rs it peer dine ; “- wx

Statute and Rules Involve — fs 3

Statement of the Case .. tL

¢ Reasons for Granting the W rit 6

| * The Supreme Court: -of Georgia has Scigedl an

- . important Question of Law in Confliet with

the Decisions of this Court. and has so far De-

parted from the Accepted Course of Judicial

Procedure as to Call for the Exercise of this

Court's’ Power of Review oh 6

Il. There is a Manifest Public Interest in the Ques--

tn tions here .Presented and, the Supreme Court *

“of Georgia's Decision Refuses to Follow Ap-

Te Decisions- of this Co 7); oe

Ili. There is a Manifest Public Interest in the

Questions. Presented and Important and Un-

.- decided Questions are here Presented iss

Cenclusion «+ ae A

Certificate ‘of Sérvice | * 15

a . > ° 5 ; , Se ae

: [ee eae are : :

Opinion Supreme Court of Georgia an |

aa ji

Dissenting Opinion Supreme Court of Georgia 3° 2

Opinion Court of Appeals of Georgia of

ii”

CITATIONS:

: - Cases. ; aa

Fisher v. Pace, 336 U. S. 155; 93 L ed’ 569... Sn. ©

Re Green, 8 L ed 2d oc, OEE OCT Pe are Ee oe (1)

” Re McConnell, 82 Sep. Ct. 1288 (i962) :s 3, 6,7

Wood v. . Georgia, 8 L ed 569 Te eo One ae Ge .10

Statutes ond Rules. ; .

ities Code § 24-3323. .. %.. ....., * 8, 12

Title 28 U. S. C..A. § 1257 Face pine iecwks ia eee eee,

, Title 28 U.S. ee ook Noe. i's Ss os ante 2

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IN THE

‘Supreme Court of the United States.

OCT OBER TERM, 1963

‘ No

JOHN .N.-CRUDUP ie

ee ; . ‘ : ve y,

s THE STATE OF GEORGIA fi

il. : . . /

; ba 4

PET ITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME: COURT oF — °

XY be

bate : ar i

TO THE ! HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE |

JUSTICES OF THE’ mace’ § CouRT OF THE UNITED

STATES: ; y *

\ : . By

“Your petitioner, John NY Grudup, respectfully prays that a

writ of certiorari may issue to:the Supreme’ Court of the

State of Georgia to* review a judgment of that Court affirm-

inga judgment of theCourt of Appeals of the State of Geor-

gia affirming a contempt judgment of the City Court of Hall

“County, Georgia gainst this’ petitioner on the 23rd day of

February, 1962 by Judge Joseph H. Blackshear of the City -

Court of Haly County, Georgia. y es

. rf

Ve _ OPINIONS BELOW.

The famjority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court

of Géorgia, rendered on the 4th day of April, 1963 and the

Court of Appeals, rendered on the 27th day of September,

1962 are printed in the appendix heretd, infra, pp. 1-21.

oe" JURESDIC TION.

he iis of the Supreme Court of Georgia was en-

Pat on the 4th day of April,.1963 and-is printed in the

‘appendix ‘hereto: Petitioner then files a petition. for rehear-

ing which was denied on the 4th day of April, 1963. The.

Supreme Court of, the United States has jurisdiction to act

in such matter by. virthe of Title*28, § 1257,'U. S.C. A: and

Title 28, § 2101, U.S.C. A., because ‘Constitutional questions

are involved in the ‘case. . Si . a”

* *

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

. The facts ‘as herein shown, petitioner contends, were.

Pat of his constitutional rights as provided in the 14th .

Amendment of, the Constitution of the United States. ay de- *

“‘nying due process of law: and equal protection of the law.

.The summary nature of contempt proceedings, the risk of _

imprisonment without _Jury, trial pr ful! hearing, make this .

the most drastic weapon entrusted..to the trial judge. To-

sanction the procedure When it is patent that there has -

been no interference e of any kind with the trial is-a dental

of ici process. Fas : ae: :

. Petitioner contends that the: sanctioning of the contempt i

ae by the trial judge and.Aht power to successively a-

‘mend, enlarge, change and glaborate the judgment itself,

without a rule nisi or shows causé. order, without notice of -

“afy kind and no epportunity to be @éard, respond or object

. and it being ‘patent that in a interference with the

‘trial, is a denjal_of due process of law and of pe titioner's

rights. TN ie

3. These facts, pe itioner contents, we re denial of - his

a anbedthorat Vis ¥hts as provided by the 4th Amen ngent to

the G 7Ons titution of the Unite <dStates as he was oe due

proce css Of law and equal protection of the laws as embod-

ted in the 11th Amendment to the Constitution of the United

- Stites. Petitioner, as herein show h, Was given no-notice or _

opportunity toa be * ‘ard prior to the trial court undertaking ‘ «

to amend tayvice asd eslaryge the facts upon Which-the judg-"

ment for contempt was based and’ the original order. This

vio! atic neof- petitidner’s rights to. due process of law oceur

red on: tw (2) separate ‘occasions after the order. was first

written by the trial court. ;

4. Petitioner contends that the trial court failed-t to adjudge

" petitioner in ‘contempt ‘of court and that to subsequently

draw an order adjudging petitioner in contempt, without

_ notice and opportunity to be heard, is a denial of due pro-

cess of. law. .: :

5. Petitioner contends that the . Statement “a petitioner,

“ upon which the judgment for colitempt was based was elicit-'

ed from petitioner by the trial- judge and was in response

‘to the court's s inquiry; and that the judgment of contempt

setting forth that the mere response yas conteniPtuous and.

predicating the order upon the respohse. when it is patent

that the response was proper, is.a denia]<of freedom ‘OFf-...,. 2

speech and due precess as provided in the First and Four-

teenth Amendments to the United States.: a :

6. The judgment: of the Supreme Court of Georgia affirm-_ -

ing the judgement of the Court of Appeals of Georgia which

affirmed the judgment of the City Court of Hall County,

Georgia’ is in direet conflict with ‘appliekble decision of this

Court, in particularly In Re McConnell,.82 Sup*, Ct. 1288

(1962) and -by: said action. the above State Courts have so’

far departed from the accepted and. usual-course of judicial —

proceedings and so far sanctioned such a departure by a

lower court as to call for. an exercise of this €ourt’s pow er

af supervision.

STATUTE AND RULES INVOLVED. |

It is submitted by petitioner that the following ‘Code Sec.

tion was not recited as*thé basis for’ the contempt adjudi-

cation in the order of the trial court, however; it was men-

tioned in the brief by defendant- in-érror in, the ‘Court of Ap

peals, State of Georgia and in the decision of the Court of

Appeals, State of Georgia’ ‘and is therefore. cited.

1. “Georgia Code § 24- 3323, providing :

“No attorney shall ever attempt to argue or explain a’

case, after having been fully heard, and the opinion of the

court has been pronounced, on pain io being considered

in contempt.” :

" @

8 As PO Ce : \ - ee 7 |

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 7)

On the 23rd day of February, 1962, in'the ‘City Court of

Hall County, Georgia, before the Honorable Joseph H. Black-

shear, Judge of said Court, there came on for trial the case

of the State of Georgia versus Marion Smith, same being a -

criminal accusation wherein. the said Marion Smith was.acc./

cused of the .offense of driving an automobile while under ,

‘the influence of intéxicants. The defendant Marion Smith ‘

Was represented in said trial by John -N, Crudup, who was

appointerl by the trial. Court. to represent and defend the

_ 4ccused in. said trial, and is hereinafter referred to ‘as pe-

. titioner. The trial of said case was before a jury of twelve

men ifi said Court. — ; Nerves rence

During the progress of the ‘trial, and immediately . after

the State had rested its case, petitioner requested that a wit-

“ness for the State be recalled for further cross-examination _

by defense counsel. When this request was made, the Court -

inquired: into the purpose pf further cross-examination.- Pe-

titioner stated that he wanted to ask the witness if he had

not testified there was a woman in the car. The Solicitor then

stated that the witness had -not so testified. The Court ruled.

“that if said ‘witness was regalled. the witness would be a wit:

ness for the defendant on trial. Petitioner then stated to the

Court that he did not wish to call said witifss as his client’s ©. ||

. Witness inasmuch‘as he had no witnesses to offer and ‘did pa

- hot wish to forfeit his right to the concluding argument by ie

making this witness 4 Witness for the cefendant: the Court

-. then inguired:if there was any other’testimony the defense.

_NMesired to offer. Petitioner replied there was none and that’

he had no witnesses to offer other than the defendant’s

statement and that he would-like to reese!) the witness,’afore-*

“said, for the purpose of re-cross examination. Whereupon,

_the Court inquired. of petitioner if he knew of any reason

why the ‘petitioner should not be adjudged in contempt of

‘court; to this query, petitioner replied ‘that he -was not in- , .

. contempt of the Court; ‘wheréupon, -the Court then and there

levied a fine and sentence upon the petitioner of $10.00 or

three (3) days in, jail. The Court never adjudged petitioner

in contempt of Court diting the trial of said case. : ;

: Thereafter, on the 26th ‘day of February, 1962, the Judge |

\ of the City Court of Hall County, Georgia. witeved a {judg

.’ ‘ment, nunc pro tune February. 23rd, 1962, adjudicating pe"

. titioner in contempt .of the City ‘Court of. Hall County, Geor-

gia, and said judgmient was_filed in the office of the Clerk

‘of the City Court, Hall County, Géorgia on the 27th day of

Februgy: 1962.°No order to show cause or rule‘nisi of any

description Was served upon’ petitioner . prior to said “judg-

ment. ; ats

- Thereafter, withirt the: time prescribed by law, “ pétitloner

filed -his supersedeas and tendered to said Judge his bill of

_ exceptions, reciting therein the facts as they: transpired and

specifying as material to a clear understanding of the errors

: a ee of the judgement of contempt. Thereafter, the

a Judge ic Court refused. to ufqualifiedly certify said, * . .

‘bill of pole eh and petitioner, on the 17th day of March.

1962, tendered another bill of exceptions to the trial judge.

-The second bill of exceptions was returned to: petitioner w ith .

a qualified certificate of said trial judge.

On the 24th day of March,’ 1962, the ‘trial judge atended

his judgment of contempt, amplifying the judgment of con-

‘tempt and thie factual basis of said judgment, and filed said -

amendment to said judgement on’ March (24th. 1962.

No rulé nisi or notice prior to said amendment Was given

petitioner, and said _umendment to said judgment of con

a, Was entered w ithout. the knowledge’ of petitiover.

/ . ‘ wer

i G Py . °

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

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Keg ot a ra eres th

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. FHE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGI HAS DECIDED AN

IMPORTANT QUESTION OF LAW CONFLICT WITH -

THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND HAS SO FAR.

DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED GOURSE OF JUDI-

- CIAL PROCEDURE AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE

- OF THIS COURT'S POWER O REVIEW.

I ‘he Supreme, Court of Georgia sta

: in its decision:

“Upona careful perusal of: the record i€ is clearly shown

that, after being directed by the trial -judge to proceed

With his défense and call some. other witness, counsel in- .

stead continued to insist, upd his request contrary to re-

peated adverse ruiings by the court. Under suéh Gircum-

stances*and mindful of«the discretion granted to a trial

judge in ‘matters of contempt, we are constrained to the

view that the trial judge’s adjudication of contempt was

not an enormous, ‘flagrant. or gross abusé of his dis¢rétion.”

It must be. noted, cand this Was strongly urged in petitioner's

motion for rehearing) in the Supreme Court of the.State of ,

‘Georgia, that there was absohutely no-admoni8hing- of peti-

tioner at any time. The only thing that #&§ shown was that

‘the trial Court ‘obdefta petitioner to-proceed with his defense

and call-some other witness. This was done by the trial

Court with fw! knowledge of, and after a complete and

respectful explanation by petitioner that there were no wit-

" nesses yo be called fer the defendant and that all the de-

fend: wit had to offer was the glefendant’ s statement. ft i»

therefore: mahifest that petitioner had fully explained to

the Court his ‘postion with: respect to the. presentation of

the defense and the. trial Court had full” knowledge of this.

This Court. held in the case In Re McConnell, 82 Sup. Cf.

1288 (1962) : i

“The arguments of a lawyer in presenting his chent’s

case strenuously and persistently cannot amount to a con-

—_

tempt of coif so ‘long “as the lawyer does net in some:

way create an obstruction whic! blocks. the, judge. in the

perforniance .of -his judicial duty. The petitioner created

no such obstacle here. ; ; eS

Petiioner ‘respectfully submits that thes McConnell case

‘plainiy peraiels the case at bar and petitioner ung Gestion

ably did nothing -to create an obstacle in the performance of

judicial duty 'y the Court, but rather, wastan honest, good

faith effort to present his chent’s case. Further citing the

McConnell case :

”

*While we appreciate the necessity fOr a judge te cthave

.. the power to protect himself from actual obstruction in

‘the courtroom, or even from conduct so. hear to the court

‘as actually obstruc ice, it is also essential to a Bair

“tdministration of juStice that. lawyerss be able to make’

hondst good- fain efforts to present their client’s cases

An independent’ Judici lary and i: vigorous,” ph pice bar

are both indispensable ‘parts of our System of justice. ‘Lo

preserve the kind of trials that our systen! oo ae io

vress has limited “the summary contempt power vested in

cowts to the least possible power adequate to, preagnt

actualobstruction of justice, and we think that thi it pote.

‘did not extend to this case." - wr 3 .

Phe Case at jbar possesses characteristics Which denote far

{ ’

fess Vigolous ti: inguage than that employed in the MeConne!

case, The case. at bar reflects purely and@simply an - honest,

good-faith effort by*petitioner to carry out the’ purpose oF

Judicial inquiry. Such conduct could never be construed in,

any other i in order to preserve and maintain the kind

gf trials that our system envisayres, 9

It, must be strongly noted Mere that contempt power is. di

rectly premised in the Court's rig! to conduct its busines’

In “an untgummeled way” when jeopardized by “conduct

that tends directiy tu. prevent the discharge of their funct-

ion”. It is therefire manifest, ‘that the trial Court's order

m cessarily reveal some factual recitation t would

permit this Court to decide whether, the trial cout commitied.

a LTOSS abuse of discretion. * .

The Supreme Court of Géorgta concludes in its opinion by

stating, ““Uponma careful perusal of the vioeind it.is clearly

shown that, after being directed by _the trial] judge ‘to pro-

ceed with his defense and call some other witnesses, coun-

sel instead continued to insist upon his request contrary” to

_yepeated adverse rulings by the court’. -It is submitted by

petitioner that this is a cgmplete misconstruction of the facts

of the case. The Supreme Court, of Georgia here finds that |

*..- counsel instead continued to insist - - -”. The accept-

ed definition of the word “instead”, is as an alternative or

substitute, or in place of the thing mentioned. This would

mean in reading’ the Supreme Court of Georgia’s opinion

that trial counsel is place of proceeding with the defense and —

calling another witness again requested’ permission for cross. .

eXamination, or restating it, as a substitute to proceeding or

as an alternative to proceeding with he case, trial counsel

elected to request cross-examination of the witness. This,

of course, is not the correct fractual account of the case. The

record clearly shows that trial counsel stated that he did

not have any Witgggsses to proceed with and that the only

thing that would “We offered for the defense was the un-

sworn statement: of the defendant. This explanation. was

made to the Court as-the record shows and the trial- Court

Was absolutely cognizant of the fact that there were no ¥it--

nesses to call for thie defense. The record clearly shows this.

Therefore, to state that “ . --- counsel instead -continued to

insist -- " is a complete misconstruction of the facts. Pe

titioner did notadlo this “instead” but was doing the only ‘

thing that was left for him to do. This was not an .alter- |

native thing nor was it a substitue. Petitioner. had no other

course to follow. There was no refusal to abide by the order

of the court because there was no other witness to call and

Was SO stated by petitioner. There is clearly no refusal by

petitioner to abide by any ruling. order or direction of the

trial court and to conclude such is a compléte misconstructior

of the taets of the case at bar. -) :

The factual account in the trial court’s order was absolute-

ly nothing more thar three repeated requests andl emphasize

the. word request. It is manifest and ‘is clearly recognized

that the mht to perfect the record is absolute and that this

‘right dees not extend so far as to permit arguing, remon-

strating or insisting upon a rig cht tu do. something or to pur

‘sueca ‘line of questioning. However here, there was neve:

any “arguing” by the petitioner or “remonstrating”’, nor Was

‘there ever an “insisting that thére was a right to do some

thing” or “to pursue a line of questioning’. The record onl¥

reveals three repeated requests. A request tan néver be con-

sidered to be arguing or renronstratiny or insisting upon a

right to do something, for a request. Is nothing org than

vasking epermission from the Court. The trial judge never

directed or ordered petitioner not to make such a request,

therefore, no A ‘fusal to abide by an order or. direttion is

shown. The fact, that the. request was made three times does

rot change the ‘character of the inektent without a factual

showing thyt petitioner was committing some act incident

thereto or was pursuing: a mode of conduct that would Justify

i ruling of contempt, These tnings do not appear in the

Courts order and in fact did not occur. Lo hold that three

repeated requests‘in the absence of any other showing, as

the: record shows in the case, could be contempt’ 6f Court

will cast a Shadow of stagnation upon what we have his

torically viewed! as trial advocacy. |

ton ee

THERE. <e ‘MANIFEST PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE

QUESTIONS HERE PRESENTED AND, THE SUPREME

COURT OF GEORGIA’S DECISION REFUSES TO FOL-

‘LOW APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

‘ASS Was stated by this Court in the case of Fisher v2 Pace.

336 U.S. 153; 93 L ed: 569: tas :

“There must be adequate ‘facts tv support a-stimmars

order for contempt insthe ._presence of the Coupt

It ise absolutely essential that. this Court understi nd he

subject matter upon which the tri: al @ourt’s dise reuion ope i

_ ated. Courts cannot construe that w bet doe $s not exist. There

are no presumptions in favor of the order and the conclus- |

ion of the.frial judge cannot cure the failure to re cite de

tail sufficient facts in the order to constitute ae of

court.. The order fails to show disobedience of/any ruling

The order fails to dischose any disrespecttul, conduct or de

meanor by. petitioner. The order fails to disclose any: dis

ruption of the proceeding or disrespect for the orderly pre.

cedure and dignity of the Court. The order fails to show

any insolent language used Ly petitioner. The order fails to

show how and in what ‘manner the court Was held up to

public ridicule. The order fails to disclose any facts that

would substantiate disrespectful tone in speech, demeanor

or any other conduct. The absence cf these facts in the order

is because ih truth and in fact it did not exist or occur. The

‘order entered forms the only basis for review and this Court -

cannot construe that which does not exist. . :

This Court held in the case of Re Green, 8 L- ed 24.198:

“Excegxt forea narrowly limited category of contempts,

‘<lue pypcess of law requires that. one charged with con-

tempt if court. be advised of the’ chargés against him,

have aNreasonable opportunity to meet them by way of

-defense or expldnationc‘have the right to be represented.

by counsel, and have chance to ‘testify and call other. wit-

. nesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or expan.

ation”. Pa ee a |

. .

The question in the case at bar is whether due process: of:

law requires that notice be given and opportunity be heard

prior to the triaf court undertaking to amend twice and en-

iarge the facts upon which the judgment for contempt was

based in the origina! order-even though it was purportedly

ordered during the trial of a case. Certainly, due process re-

_quires notice and opportunity to be heard where, subseduéft ——

to the original judgment, conceding it was alledged direct

contempt. the trial court amends, enlarges and adds to the

original order on two successive occasions. . — -

»* ,

Ke Iii.

THERE IS A MANIFEST PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND IMPORTANT AND UN.

DECIDED QUESTIONS ARE HERE PRESENTED. .

This Court helt] in the case of Wood «+. Georgia, § b& ed

2d; 568: - 4 pe *

“Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired *

through the exercise of the power to punish for contempt «-

of court unless there is no doubt that the utterance in

y .

question’ constitute an imuminent, not meggly a likely threat

to the. administration of justice.” . nls S99 sts ee

Although the Wood. case deals with an cut of court ulter

ance the principle is no less applicable and ‘petitioner res-

pectiulty submits that the freedom of speech invisioned and

guaranteed in the. first and fourteenth amendments of the

Consitution of -the United States unequivocally was violated

by holding petitioner in contempt.of court for having stated.

in reply to the court's fhquiry if there was any reason Why

petitioner should not be ‘held in contempt and the reply by

_petitioner that he wasnot in contempt of court. There being

‘no evidence thut such a reply was disrespectful in tone or

in manner nor in any Way disrupted the ‘orderly procedures

; a,

of the Court and the administration of justice. For the trial

court to conclude that such a reply, in and of itsell, Was

Contemptuous, and no factual showing of any disrespect 01

disruption of the .Court procedures, is patently erroneous. :

Petitioner respectfully submits that the trial cpurt violated

petitioner ¢onstititional right of freedom of speeclr as em

bodied in the first ané fourteenth amendments to thé Consti- on

tution of the United States in holding petitioner's reply to be

contemptuous.

Furthers can it be said that three requests, if so construed,

and nothing more, result ina conciusion that the trial Court

was prevented’ from conducting iis business in an “‘untram-

meled way’” Can it be said-thatthree Tequests, 1T'so Con

. strued, and nothing’ more, result in a conclusion that: such,

conduct “tends directly to prevent the discharge of .the

Court’s function? “2 2 Rn ei Maat :

To conclude such, would bé saying that any issue’ between

trial. counsel ahd the Court, if xepeated-thrée times, could

constitute contempt of Court. a? ; :

his. of Course, petitioner believes, is not_What the Court

«of Appeals nor the Supreme Court-of Georgia intended.

The Court of Appeals of Georgia in its headnote ‘opinion

said, “When an attorney fails to yield after three rulings: of

the trial judgesadverse to him on the question of recalling

‘» a witness for further cross-examimation; and insists for ‘the

third time on recalling “such witness, this court. cannot say

that the trial judge’s adjudication of contempt was a gross

enormous. or flagrant adbust of discretion; Would not the

question thtmclearly be stated. Did the ‘petitioner, as trial

“attorney fail to yield? Now the question at hand is whether

‘Petitioner ‘failed to yield’’. This, we subnwt, does not, appear

. .anywhere in the trial court’s ofder. Failing to yield as ap-

plied in the case at bar could not possible mean disobeying

‘an order or command, for no such fact appears, Failing to

yield could not mean that petitioner obstructed. the adminis:

tration of justice, for no such fact appears. Failure to yield

could not possibly mean that there was conduct which tends

.directly to prevent to court’s discharge of its function, for ne

such fact appears. We are therefore left with the fact that

failure to vield as shown in the case at bar refers to noth-

ing more than making an. additional request of Phe Court.

it emphatically does. not refer to any act that factually dem-

onstrates contempt. a

What is a proper appiication’of Georgia Code Section 2-4-

3523. It must be noted that the Court of Appeals' decision

makes specific reference to the Code Section ‘although -the

trial Court’s order does. not set forth any reference ‘to. Code

Section 24-3325: It cannot be questioned that a proper ‘ap

plication of this Code Section wopid demand that some fact-

__ual -hetding must be shown. demonstrating conduct that

would conceivably be émbraced within the seuope of the

statute. ;

it is further submutted by petitioner that Code Section 24-

3323 necessarily coitemplates that the “arguing” or “at:

tempting to explain w case” must factually show that this

resulted in’ either direct disobedience to am?.order or com-

mand or resulted in tending to disrypt the ‘administration of

justice or tended. to prevent the court, from discharging its:

function. It if obvious that Code ‘Section 24-5025 contem-

pintes nothiig more’ than mamtaining and preserving the

“majesty of the law. It is. not intended to vive rise an un

warranted exercise of judicial power that would completely

relegate ‘the tril advocate to a mere whisper in the hali of

justice silenced by personal whim clothed in the finery of

'. judicial expediency. ‘It?is submitted by petitioner that any

other interpretation: given ‘to Code Section 24-3323, would,

under that section be*.in direct contravention with, those

rights guaranteed petitioner iinder the Federal’ Constitution

’

and 14th Amendment thereto. and the Constitution of the

State of Georgia, Act 1, Section | 2-15 paragraph. 15.

In conclusion petitioner respectfully submits that the pro-

prierty of conduct and demeanor of the trial advecate can

not go unchecked or unchallen ged—equally as important,

ard with respect to the case at bar, the exercise of judici Ai ;

discretion respecting that propriety cannot go unchallenged. bee ase

Herein lies the balance, and the proper. concept of judicial

determination. As Justice Felix Frankfurther once said in

commenting on the seriousness of iaw, “i duo take law {very *

serious, deeply serious, because fragile as,reason is and limit- 7

ed us law is as thé expression of the institutionalized medium -

of reason, that’s all we heve standing between us‘and the ty, eo

ranny of mere will and the crueity of unbridled, “ndisciplin- Be ad

ed feeling”. This could not be more appropriately stated

With respect to the case at-bar. The%tria TAS = roa

tection and ‘assurance that he can fulfill his-vole in the quest ele

for truth in juslicial process is that his ¢ nduct anil demean

or in that quest bé governed: by establisited measures. This is

all that stands between the trial adyocate and the tyrann)

‘--of mere will and the erueliy of yribridled feeling. :

Petitioner’ submits that he was never adjudicated in cot

tempt of court. The trial. your! nevéis ordered petitioner

to do or not to do anything, but simply inquired ot petitioner

w thy he ‘should not be held in c¢ontempt after Oy good-faith — c

" explanation had been made ‘of- what the proposed offense

was to be. To this question, petitioner respectfully, simply

and honestly replied that he was not in contempt, of Farr.

To this reply there was never an, adjudication of combempt

by the. trial court.

This, in fact, Wus the seque nce of events and to conclude

that ‘such a reply by a trial counsei is contemptuous gonduct

will relegate the trial lawyer ty a mere e6 ho in the scheme ia

of justice. As was pointed out by Chief Justice Duckworth of

the Supreme. Court of Georgia in his dissenting opinion, ‘“for-

a trial lawyer to fail to assert a position so fundamenta! vag 8

would certainly be-a dérefiction of the dutw imposed upon a

.trial lawyer.” a : : :

The concept of the role of the trial advocate and the con

cept of the administration of justice are compatible and are

> adie ‘

Bis ne

. ;

. blended together and en massed in. the whole system of

jurisprudence and until the conduct of the trial attorney ap-

pears to be incompatible and in conflict with the concept of

the administration of justice it cap never be said that such

conduct is contemptuous, but, to the. contrary, is in further-

ance of the pursuit of truth. . {@ lh a

CONCLUSION.

,. The ruting of the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Court

of Appeals of Georgia in the case at bar is manifestly erron-

eous and against public policy, and Yaises a serious question

in the admihistration of justice in our Court system. The ©

questions -presénted are ‘of paramount public importance be.

cAuge, as shown by the instant record, unless a lawyer is

permitted to vigorously assert the duty imposed upon -him

as a trial advocate, a defendant can hever fully assert his

rights in the courts. Not’ only is the trial advpcate’s role.

rendered meaningless and void, if@s certainly consequential

that the defendant will not receive a fair trial. Under the

ruling: in this case, it is impossiblé for a lawyer, as a trial

_ advocate, to perform the duty. imposed ‘upon him without

‘running the risk of a jail sentence. To condone such will

stagnate trial advocacy. “ a3, o4

_ It is therefore respectfully urged that, got only” Gecause .

of thé rights of this petitioner, but forthe reason of the

manifest. public interest in the questions presented, this pe-

tition for-a write of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted, _

‘ P " & oe ;

PIQHN.N CRUDUP. 7

x : ; Pre Se” :

. : a

” - . ~

lo . °

ee CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .

+1. JOHN N. CRUDUP, counsel of record and named as

petitionet in the foregoing petition for wnt of certiorari,,.do

hereljy certify thit 1 have this day ‘served a copy of the |

. withiA and foregoing Write of Certiorari upon C. Ernest

-~Smith. Solicitor of the City Court of Haii.Ceunty, Georjia

and Wpon Eugene. Cook, Attorney General, State of Georgia .

and upoi Hughel Harrison, Assistant Attorney General.

State of-Georgia by mailing a copy of same to them in a

“properly addressed “and adequately stamped envelope to

cause, the same to be delivered to them in .due course of

United States mail.

This_o2 « day of July, 1963. °

; os : . . | a, :

2 John N. Crudup = |

* ne! 2

° 4

if =, & chubur v. THE STATE

APPENDIX. ay

- Case No. 21923 : - 3 Decided: “APR 4 1963 :

"SU, PREME COURT OF GEORGIA No. 606

g -

oy ape ILLIAN, Justice. This case arose out of the citation for

contempt of an attorney, John N. Crudup, by the Judge

of the City Court of Hall County. On grant of certiorari,

'. we review the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming

the trial judge, Crudup v. State,-106 Ga. App. 8383 (129

-SE2d 483). ¢ ; aa

The relevant facts as set out-in the citation fur contempt

“as stated by the trial judge are as follows: ses.

After counsel had. on numerous occasions, sasael repeti

tious questions on cross-examination of. the State’s witnesses

" despite the admonition of the trial judge, the State rested.

Whéreupon counsel requested tnat a witness be recalled for

’ the-- -purpose of cross-examination as to a particalar point.

The judge ruled that the witness could’ not be recalled for

cross-examination, but that he could, be called’ as a witness

for the. defendant. Counse] stated he ‘did not wish to'call the

witness for the defendant, “but w anted to recall him .about

his testimony while on the stand.” The judge again ruled

that the witness. could not be recalled for the purpose stated

and “direct: | Attorney Crudup to provéeed with his defense

: and call so.... other witness.” Counsel stated he had no other, '

“witness “except the defendant w ould make a statement,” but

that he wanted te-put the w itness in question back on the

stand. The judge again stated to counsel that he ‘could .call

the witness for the defendant, but could nat recall] him for

further-cross-examination to ask him what_he. testified to:

earlier in the trv]. Counsel then again stated he did not

want to call the witness as a witness for the defendant but

persisted in his request to recall’ him for cross-examination

‘ as to his testimony given éarlier in the trial. At this point,

the judge asked ‘counsel if he hadfany reason to give why he —

should not be punished | for contempt of the’ court in failing

and. refusing to abide. by the rulings of the court that. the

poe *

Pee ae ae APPENDIX oe

witness could not be recalled for the purpose he was in-

sisting’ on. Counsel replied that “he was not in contempt : of.

court.” __—- Held: | .

“The power to punish contempts is inherent in every

court of record.” a:

——..

Bradley v State, 111 Ga. 168 (36 SE 630). See also Plunk-

ett: v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72 (70 SE 781); Atlanta News-

papers v. State 216 Ga. 399, 402. (116 SE2d 580). There is

no question that every court has the power to preserve and

. enforce order in its immediate presence, and as near thereto

‘as is necessary to prevent interrupton, disturbance, or hind-

erance to its proceedings: that this includes the power. to

- compel obedience to fts judgments, orders and process, and

to-control, in the furtherance of justice, the conduct of its

‘officers and all other persons connected: with a judicial: pro-

ceeding before it, in every matter appertaining. thereto. Code —

§ 24-104. See also Code Sec. 24-105. Further, no attorney ~

shall ever actempt to argue or explain a case, after having

been fully heard, and the opinion of thé court has been pro- —

nounced, on pain 8f being considered in contempt. Code

‘Ann. § 24-3323 (formerly-Code Sec. 24-3306).

Upon a careful perusal of the record it is clearly shown ~

that. after being directed by the trial-judge to proveed with

‘his defense and call some other witne$s, counsel -instead con.

tinued to insist upon. his request contrary to repeated adverse

rulings by the court. Under such circumstances and mindful -

of the discretion granted to a trial judgé in matters of: con- .,

tempt, we are constrained to the view that the trial judge’s

adjudication of contempt was not. ar enormous, flagrant or

«ross abuse of his discretion. Cabot -v. Yarborough, 27 Ga..

- 476; Remley v. DeWall, 41 Ga. 466 (5); Hayden v. Phinizy.

67 Ga. 758 (2); Salem v“Staté, 101 Ga. App. 905 (1) (115

SE2d 447). See also Carson v Ennis, 146-Ga.726, 728 (1) (92

. SE 221); Garland vy. State, 101 Ga. App. 395, 401 (6), .and

the disseni at page 427 (114 SE2d 176). . a

* Judgment affirmed. _AH] the Justices concur, except Duck-

worth, C. J., Head, P. J., and Candler, J., who dissent.

FP | ‘ | : | . y

f, p a

APPENDIX - .: ":.*° |; -8

_ 21923, Crudup v The State . |

DUCKWORTH, Chief “Justice, dissenting. 6 - :

J ‘ P * s

While the purported amendment of the contempt “judg-

ment contains extensive recitals of the conduct of the con-

tempor in repetitious cross-examination of the State’s .wit-

nesses,.and arguments of the judge that such conduct was ~

very obnoxious to him| yet.the specific matter upon which —

the contempt judgment is based is a request, repeated four:

times. couched in perfectly respectful and proper: language,

to be allowed to recall a State’s witness and have him say

‘whether or not he had testified that eggs was a woman in

the car, and to each-of, such requests

recall the witness but he would have to’ adopt him asa de-

- fense witness. 1 wonder, with all other matters,recounted by

the judge, just what le asked the attorney to speak about

when he asked if he wished to show why he should not be

punished, for contempt? Was he intending that the attorney

account/for his conduct: throughout the trial? While sum-—

mary punishment for contempt in the presence of the court

is permissible, this doce™no

tempt with6ut specifying the grounds’ thereof. The judge's

order recites that the mattér sought to be asked ‘the wit-

_ ness was irrele. ant, yet his same order recites that he. au-

-horized counsél to-recall the witness. for the sole purpose

: of asking him ahout. it, ‘provided ‘ony he pay the stated

»rice thereof of adoptipg a deputy sheriff, 2-State’s witness, |

as the witness of the accused., These recitals. preclude any__

efaims that the reason for deriyipg the tequest was that the

testimony would ‘have been. jrrdlevant. Then in the face of

the indisputable, fact this was a criminal Case where the de- .

fendant pleads nothing but “not guilty,” and the recited fact

+‘hat the defendant had offered no evidence, the judge 4s-

serts that neither the State nor the accused contends that -

there ‘was. a woman in the car. Where did the judge -dis-

-cover the contentions of the aceused when to this point he |

-had made none except “not guilty”? These recitals ‘of. the ©. >

‘judge show unmistakably h unfairness to the attorney..The ~~~

admitted’ facp that the solicitor stated in the hearing of the

judge and -jury that- the: witness had not so testified, and °

counsel for the accused replied, that he had so testified,

. \ °

o°

he judge said he could °

t.authorize a judgment for con-.

“4 es APPENDIX ae

vividly demonstrated to the ‘les that sian Was disagree-

ment as to the witness’ testimony. If the court was conducted .

‘as all courts should be, its sole object was to dis¢over the

truth from the purest sourcessCode § 38-101. The only pure

source here was the witness himself. Since the ‘judge had

allowed the solicitor-to violate the law by stating what the -

witness had not said, apparently without thinking of-hold- .- ,

‘ing him in contempt, counsel-for the aecused would not have

- been counsel for the accused 2s required by the ‘Constitu-

tions, State and Federal, had he ng insisted, until ordered

to desist, upon protecting his ¢lient — the. injury ° in-

flict ed by the ee

It is appareat that the contempt judgment’ was based

upon alleged prevention of. the orderly dispatch a cvurt

‘*. business. A second thought, as. sho sn by the attempted: a-

mendment; was to charge jim -with violating Rule 23, fobnd

in Code Ann. § 24-5323. The first charge is obviously ground-

less since reaqjuests for permission to call au witness are ptoper eo:

nd necessary parts of a trial. And the be dnd is invalid be-

cause, first, by his repeated* replies.to the request. the judge:

had authorized the repeated requests, hence, they were ‘made

with the court's permissi and in the second place, what

the attorney did Was not “attempt to argue or explain a

“case,” which are only acts specified by the rule #® consti-

‘tuting grougds for contempt. What he did was neither argu-

ment nor “Xplanation. It was an humble request. The judge

recites that he failed to purge himself of contempt, vet the

record shows conciusively that he had not been adjudged in’

contempt, and no act of his had “been. speciffed as contempt-

ous. ¢ ‘ounsel did nothing, Ahat the cowt had ordered him not”

to do. The solitary portion of the request that was - - denied:

Was that the witness be on cross-examination. The judge's

refusol was never violated. in tHis part of the request the

attorney was clearly within the rights granted by law. In

-- Long v. Staté, 12 Ga. 293, at Pages 330, 331,-this court speak. .

pe through one of its abiest Justices, Justice Nesbit. Said: :

ey 2 it is certainly the business” of court, when pratticable, —

to’ correct the misre presentations of the testimony by coun- :

sel, Particularly: when that counsel] is in conclusion. And it

“Is practicable, when the witness whose evidence Ppt - =

* : Po o

APPENDIX “ ;

r "

to be eiteainenenited, is in Court. He gught to be called. to,

say what he did testify.” Here counsel for the accused charg-

ed that the solicitor had misrepresented the evidence of a

witness who was in court. The vest of counsel for. the

accused was that he be called'to say what_he did testify. In-

stead of being granted as Judge Nesbit saidShould be. done,

it was, because of its repetition, made the sole ground for

punishing counsel for contempt. How far can justice change?

I Jappen to know Judge Blackshear, and know him to

be a capable and honorable judge, but ev en.so, he is human,

and subject, as we ali are, to err. My very severe criticisnt of

this contempt judgment is not intended to in any way, even

by impli¢ation, reflect unfavorably upon the personal, pro-

‘fessional or official character of the judge, but only to say

“that in this cd&e he was ‘in my opinion ‘trigger happy’ to

throw his judicial weight agujnst a highly respectful lawyer

and thereby unjustly humiliate him and place a black mark

upon his honorable. prefessional record. For this court te

affirm that judgment is an open invitation to tyranical

judges to shackle the legal profession and thereby deny

litigants- the benefit of counsel. Wy , :

During the more than 24 fears | have served here, the

Supreme Court has never punished a single lawyer for con-

tempt, and thé same lawyers that’ practice before ° the

Supreme Court: practice before the trial courte» Power to

punish for contempt is essential and should be extsc ‘ised in

all cases where necessary, but it is not a power that should

be, carelessly exercised, or to intimidate lawyers in the dis-

charge of their important duties. i hope the bare majority.

of 4.to 3 that rendered this pharicente® will eventually whapge,

-and a decision can be rendéred by this court making it clear.

that every judge does not have ‘the authority to arbitrarily

- punish a lawyer every time he chooses without substantial

facts showing a necessity therefor -in order that the court's

business might be cond cted. orderly and. without uNWaT

ranted interference.

21923. Crudup v. Sfate of ibenin APR 12 1963

I an authoribed to state that Mr. Justice Chandles con-

curs in. this dissent.

4 | APPENDIX

| | Sep 27 1962

39545 CRUDUP v. STATE OF GEORGIA “1-31

When an “attorney fails to yield after three rulings of the .

trial judge ddverse to him on the ‘question of recalling a

$ ‘witness for further cross-examination, and insists for the

third time on recalling such -witness, this court cannot say

that the trial judge’s adjudication or contempt Was a gEOSs,

enormous, or flagrant abuse of. discretion. + ;

This is An appeal from an order of the trial judge adju- .

dicating the plaintiff in error in contempt-of court. It states

in part: “John N. Crudup, the defendant’s attorney, then —

called to a Court Bailiff to bring in Deputy Sheriff Fuller.

The court inquired -of .Attorney Crudap if he overlooked

« something when Witness Fuller was on the witness stand

and Attorney Crudup stated that he wanted to recall Wit-

ness Fuller and ask him if he didn’t testify that a woman

was in the car with the defendant at thé time of the oé-

ence. The Court ruled that Witness Fuller could not be

‘giled for, such further cross-examination and that the

: Jury would Know: what he testified but the witness could be

called as 2 witness for the defendant. Attorney Crudup

«Stated he did not want to call Witness Fuller as a witness

for the defendant but wanted to recall him about his testi-

mony while on the stand. The Court’ again ruled that Wit-

ness Fuller could not bé recalled for the purpose: stated and

. _ directed Attorney Crudup to proceed with his defense and

‘call some other witness. Attorney Crudup-stated he had. no

no other avitngs except the defendant would make a state-

ment but that he wanted to put Witness Fuller back on the

stand. The Court again stated to Attorney Crudup that he

could call Witness Fuller to the stand to testify as a witness

.for the défendant but could not recall him for°further cross-

examination to ask him what he testified to earlier in the

trial. Attorney Crudup then again stated he did not want to-

call Witness Fuller as a witness for the defendant but per-

sisted in his request to recall him for tross-examination as to

his testimony given earlier in the‘trial and if he didn’t testify

that a woman was in the car at the time of oecurrence.”’

(Emphasis suppiied) °** “At this point-the Court asked At-

‘ oe

APPENDIX 7

torney John N. Crudup if he had any reason to give why he

should not be punished for contempt of the Court in faiJing

and refusing to abide by the rulings of the cee the

witness could not’ be recalled for theJpurposys he Was in-

' sisting on. Attorney John N. Crudupfthereupon replie¥ to

‘the Court that he was not in contempt of the Court. Attor- _

ney John N. Crudup having thus failed and réfused to abide

by the rulings of the Court that Witness -Fuller could Hot be

recalled for further cross-examination regarding: matters to

“Which he had or had not testified earlier in the case, and

having refused to, abide by the Court’s ruling that the jury

would remember the evidence, and Attorney John, N. Crudup

having persfsted repeatedly in refusing to abide by the rub

Ings of the Court and insisting on recalling the Witness for

the purposes aforesaid, and the. Attornev’s conduct being re-

t . :

peated and the. Attorney John N. Crudup having failed and

1. Canon 1, The Canons of Professional Ethics of the Amer-

ican Bar Association, states:. “It is the duty of the lawyer

to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude. not

- for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial

office, but forthe maintenance of its supreme importance.

... Adopted by the Géorgia Bar Association, May 29,

1917. Report, Georgia Bar. Association. 1947, pp. 51,151, ©

328. ; ; ,

Canon 15, The Canons of Professional Ethics of the Amer-

ican Bar Association, states: “The lawyer owes ‘entire

devotion to the interest of the ciient,, warm zeal in the

maintenance. and defense of his rights and the exertion of

his utmost learning and ability,’- to the end that nothing

be. taken or be withheld: from him. save by the rules of

law, legaily applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public.

unpopularity should.restrain him from the full discharge

of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is ntitled to

the benefit of amy and every remedy and defellee that is

authorized by the law. of the land. and he-may expect his

lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. Bui it is

steadfastly to be-borne in mind that the great trust of

__the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the

bounds of the law. The office of attorney does rat permit,

much less does it demand of him for his client, violation

of law’ or any manner of fraud or chic ec. He must obey

‘his own conscience and not that of his! client.” Adspted

by the -Georgin Bar Association, May 25, 1917 Report.

. Georgia Bar Association, 1947, pp. 51, 151, 33: .

" ta APPENDIX

refused to purge the contempt after opportunity ‘to do so,

and said Attorney having stated to the Court that he’ was

not Tn contenypt after’ having been so adjudged, the Court

now in the exercise of a seund judicial discretion does con.

sider, order, and adjudge that John N. Crudup an Attorney *

at Law, has wilfully and intentionally. conducted himself in

contempt of the Ceurt and in che ‘fiancé of the Court, and

that it is necessary in order to carry on the administration

of justice, preserve order and decorum in the Court and to

enforce due respect to the Court's orders and rulings...”

(Eniphasis gupplied).

HALL. Judge. 1 in Garland =v. State, 99 Ga. App. 83B2

4 SE ).-this court held that a judgment ef contempt

must contain “factual holdings setting out the misconduct on

the bart of the attorney suc h us will disclose to a review ing’

court the subject matter upon which the: discretion of the

trial court vperated.”” The judgment in this case meets that

test.

The reconciliation be ween aA attorney’ s ‘duty to main

tain respect due th e courts | and Wis duty to- protect and

mdvance the interests of his chent-2 may prove to be at

times difficult.

" Nevertheless, it is basic that even #& to ‘laymen ignorance

of the law is no excuse. Code § 102-105. Surely this applies

With even greater force to’ an attorney Who ts a member of

one of tire three “learned professions.”’ Accord, Georgia

E72

Board “of Optometry ». Friedman, 183 G: 1 £869, 675 ( SE )..

Few ¢ ses are found vdjudicating the que stion of eontemp*

by ain atterney in disobeyin * the rulings of the Court. W-

belleve Unis indicated that generally lawvers“and JUd Bes. 2

Cora great respect to the authority. duties, and rights

each other aac ies Vital roie ofeach in ine judicial process

he Act establishing the City Court of Hall County (Ga.

» ES9O0-98, po 989, as amended by’"Ga_L. 1916, p. 225, 2283,

provides that the court shall be a court of record, have the

same rules. of procedure and practice as the Supenor Courts

of the State unless otherwise provided in the Act. and that

the yudge shall ame the same power to enforce his orders.

fo Preserve orde to Punish for comfempt and to enforce:

+ APPENDIX | 9

ali his judgments._as is vested by law in the judges of the

Superior Courts of the State.

Code § 24-104 provides: “Every court has power - 1, To

preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence.-and -

us near thereto as is necessary to prevent interruption, dis-

turbance, or hindrance to its proceedings. .... 3. To com

pel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and- to

. the orders of a judge out of court,-in -an action or proceed-

- ing therein.” ... 4. To control, in furtherance of justice, the

conduct of its officers and ali other persons connected wit!

a. judi¢ial proceeding before it, in every matter appertaining rate

thereto.” The power to punish contempts is inherent in-every

_ court of record (Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State of Geor-

"gia, 216 Ga. 399 (1)-( SE) ) and, under Code § 24-104,

“every court,-whether a ceurt of record or not, has pdwer to

punish for contempt committed in its immediate presence.”

Plunkett. v. Hamilton, 136 Ga: 72 (1) ~ SE ); Brooks v.

Sturdivant, 177 Gal 514,516 ( SE): Watson v. Dampier,

148 Ga. 588 (1) ( SE); Rapalje, Contempt, p..1.3 > Rule...

(25 of the Rules’ of the Superior.Courts (Code § 24-3323)

specifically provides: “No attorney shall ever attempt to

argue or explain a case, after having beep fully heard, and

the opinion of the court has been pronounced, on pain of _

being considefed in contempt.” 4 Accord, 17 C.3.S. 35, § 25

(b)..“The majesty of the law must be maintained: its man-

dates must be implicitly obeyed.” Mays v. Willingham, 37

Ga. App. 478, 480°(. SE_ ).

Contempt of court-has been Variousiv defitied: incits broad

sense it means disregard for or disabedience of the order or

3. “We siart with the premise ihat the right of courts to.

conduct their business in an untrammeled way lies at the

foundation of our system of yovertment and that courts |

necessarily must possess the means of punishing for, con-

_ tempt when ‘conduct tends directly te prevent the dis-

charge of their functions.” Wood’ \. Georgia, __ U.S:

— aes) )=—h i reef a

1. Rule 25 (Code (24-3323) Was present in the Code of 1910

L. 4916, p. 225, 228) to the Act establishing the Cie

- Court of HalLCounty and is applicable in the present case”

Chance vAState. 97 Ga. 346 ( SE») ot

lo : APPENDIX

| be

commatd of the court, but “it also jasiadaa interruption” of.

the proceedings . : °° 12.Am. Jur, 389, Contempt, § 2. Con*®

tempt or court, as a ah rare offense, is as old as are

courts themselves. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 281. This

is especially true in the case of crimimal contempt, where

the court exercises # discipliniry and summary jurisdiction

“over attorneys and other offieers ee justice. Fox, History

of Conte apt of Court h, Lote bas. 5 - Carre must be ee

“Tow ever to “distinguish. betWeen cases of cantenmpt in facie ; ba a

-curiae and those tnvolving an Sut-of-court statement. The.

latter involyes the constitutionaily guarenteed liberty of free :

- expression and the power, of courts .te punisli for such con-

tempts is iimited to cases ih which there is a “clear and

present danger to the administration of justace.” MeGil! ‘7

State./Z09 Ga. 506, 505 ¢€. SE: ): Wood v, Georgia tos.

. ( Sup. Ct. ): Bridges v. Cahturnia, 314 U.

252 (62 Sup. Ct. 190); Pennekamp v. Floridig2328 U.8. 33

(66 Sup. Ct. L029)5 Cray vs. Harner, S30 U.S. 567 (eT Sup,

CP. 1249). The former involves the inherent power of sourt-

“to mauttain érder in their court roongs and to assure litl-

gants a fare tral. .”” wire v: Georg}: i tae 3

( | Re i eee . It “is absolutely essential to the

protection of the courts in the dise harge of their functions.”

White s George, 195 Gia. 4S, ATO | SE ) “As/ an

incident to their being, Courts must have the authority ‘neces-

sary in a strict seise’ 6 to enable them to go on with thei

work. In doing their work. courts. like others. mat

eneountor obstructions They mest. therefore, be vested wit!

incidental “powers of self-protection — Sone action

necessary Cy timblethe “age gt to proceed with tts affairs . -

This manifestation of a court's activity is ‘not a mystica

emanation ey | rat referable solely te’ the fact that

court fas business at h at id and must get om with if.” Frans

furter and Landis. “The Power tp’ Regulate Contempt.”

‘Harvard Law Revises rove, 102 In’ summary. the inte a

. ‘ ° oe a

ference with the imi iediate process of litigation may bs

treated by the presiding judge ys & facie’ curiae contemp',

Ex paste ‘Terry, i236 1.5. 389 °( 2. San. Ct) ,

5 “The twentieth Article of John’s Magna Carta dves not’

extend to officers’of justice. whose amercements are as

sessed by the Court and not by the jury y

.( SE. ):-Cabot v. Yarborough, 27 Ga. 476 ( SE

-»a

be’

Questions of contempt are for the court treated with con-

tempt, and the trial court’s adjucation of contempt will not

be interfered with unless there is-a gross, enormous, or fla-

gran abuse of discretion. “Salem v. Georgia, 101 Ga. App.

905 (1) ( SE); Garland -v State, 101 Ga. App. 395, 401

); Remiley v. DeWail, 41 Ga. f66 (-. SE ); Hayden

. Phinizy, 67 Ga. 75681 «SE. ); Warner \. Martin, 124

7a. 387 (SES Mays.v. Willingham, supra.-

Pen,

The jadgment here shows that the contemnor attempted -

_to'recall'a witness for the purpose of further cross-examina-

tion and that upon ascertaining the purpdése of such recail

the trial judge ruled adversely to the contemnor’ on this

point, but stated that the witness could be called asa witness

for the contemnor’s client. The contemnor insisted upon re-

calling the witness for the purpose of further cross-exam-

ination. The trial judge again ruled adversely to the con-

temnor on’ the same. question and directed him to proceed

with hjs defense. The contemnor, again insisted upon re- -

calling the witness. The trial judge again ruled for the

third time adversely to the contemnor on the same question.

' The contemnor again insisted for the third time (after three

previous rulings on the same question) upon recalling the

witness. By virtue of the eee rules of law, and with

specific reference to Code §24-3: 323, andounder the record in

this case, We cannot say that the trial judge's adjucation of

contempt Was 4 gross, enormous or flagrant abfise- of ‘dis

cretion. Garland v. State, 101 Ga, App. 395 ( , SE hes

pa 7 ey ee :

The fact that the trial judge did not adjucate ihe coA-

temnor.in ‘contempt until afer he had given him an oppor-.

unity to make a statement-as to avhy he should rot be held

aun contempt is of no consequence. it ndoubtedly this del.

Was a “Wise exercise of discretion . ° ‘to allow the con

o > ° a - @ “e

6. Hoimes, J., in Craig v. Hecht, 263 UU. S. 255, 280, 2&1

ne i & SeNNaeeme . .

. Even the-dissenting opinion (p. 421) in the Garland case

bipeaahed that “A lawyer is required by the rules of court

to vield, without further argumerit, to any order or ruling

iad the judge in whose presence he is. Failure to do so .

% contempt.”

‘

APPENDIX cere eee | acd

12 ? APPENDIX 2

temnor an opportunity to niitigate his offense by showing

that-no contempt was intended, or any other mitigating? cir-

cumstances, except in cases where there would be no-excuse

for the action of the contemnor.” White v. George, 195 Ga.

165, 470-4174 ( SE ); Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat 38

(5 L. ed. 391). In “all ordinary matters an advocate must.

eyen more than ordinary persons, since he has a special

‘privilege to practice law. conform himself to the usages of

‘the C ourt. and the rulings of the Judge.’ Oswald's s Contempt

of Court, p. 54-55. Being an officer of the court, a member

of a learned profession and fully cognizant of Code Section

24-3523, the contemnor needed no specific warning to cease

persisting in: his argument in view of the three previous rul-

ings of the court. that the witness could not be recalled. for

furter cross-éxamination. He needed no further protection

for his client than an adequate record. Even if the tral

judge was in error on his first ruling, it Was the duty of

counsel to abide by the first. and subsequent rulings; and if

any right of his client was violated, the remedy was by writ

of-error. “Any other procedure wuld result in mockery

of our trial courts and would destroy every concept of or

derty process in the administration of justice.” Fisher x.

Pace 326 U.S. 155, 162 ( Sup. Ct. -_- ).

‘We have not overlooked the case of In Be MeConnell.

_ U.S: aces S : ). It is not con-

troling here for the reason that it merely involved the “ex.

ercise of! the Supreme Court of the U nited States’ “super

visory power” over inferior federal courts. Furthermo

S. a. The federa? courts have no statue similar to Code

§24-3325. = ,

bo. There being ne similar statute, the contempt Was based

on the alleged improper language of the attorney” as

being an actual obstruction of justice. ;

itis clear from In Re McConnell that the inferior fed-

. eral courts. as distinguished frem Georgia’ courts of

record, are “hmited in -contempt cases, to ‘the least

. possible power adequate to the énd proposed? °

d. There was a real issue in In Re McConnell as to wheth

er it Was necessary under the Federai Rules of Civi!

Procedure for the attorney to pursue the questioning

which the judge had forbidden in order to perfect his

record for appeal

s&s -

_ APPENDIX “13

it is i yeaa from the present avestion on several

grounds. 8/

It matter not what we individually might have done under

the circumstances if we were siting as the trial judge, The

trial judge has a wide discretion in regulating and controlling

the business of the = and the conduct of the trial. At-

lanta Newsrapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74 ( ee 3:

nigra Hubbard, 82 Ga. App. 813 ( SE __ ):,Yacksan

. Moultrie Production Credit Association, 76 Ga. App. 768

( SE ). We have-no discretion and must follow what

Chief Justice.Sir Edward Coke called the “seraight mete-

wahd of the law."

We must also remember that ours is an adversary system

and that the two opposing attorneys are partisan advocates.

Confidence: and power is réposed in the trial judge to ad-

minister thé business of the court in a. non-partisan manner

Such occurrences as we have in this case must ke: viewed:

as a unit-in order to appraise properly the’ alleged miscon

dust. The relationship of the contemnor as an officer of

the court must not be lost sight of’ and reliancé must be

placed upon the fairness and objectivity of the presiding

\ judge. Pisher v. Pace, supra, p. 161; accord, Garland v.

State, 101 Ga. App. 395, 416-4117 ( SE ._ It is axi-

_, omatic that, if we do not uphold the trial judges in this,

_ State ar the proper exercise cf their discretionary power to

contrul recalcitrant attorneys, they will control.our tria!

Jue yes. , ;

Judgment affirnged.

Carlisle, P. J..;Bell, Frankum, Jordan, Eberhardt and Rus-

sell, J. J.. concur. ee ey i 4

Felton C. J., and Nichols, P. J., dissent.

39545 CRUDUP v. STATE OF GEORGIA... H-31

FELTON. Chief Judge, dissenting.

| have no quarrel with the very fine and ‘studicus- opinion —

prepared by Judge Hall except that | wish that we couid

_ store it away and use it ina case where it is applicable

“sit

to the f facts. as | Alo not think is the case here,

The original cofitempt ‘ordet: id that’ iS. the only one |

mentioned in the opinion, does no. allege one ‘single thing.

Which Mr. Crudup did which was in the slightest degree

contumacious. or which tended® in the remotest degree to.

obstruct the administration of justice: A mere réading of

the order will prove this to be true. Mr. Crudup stated to

the court three times what he wanted to do. — The court, in-

stead of telling -Mr. Crudup not to make, he statement again,

kept on repeating what he had been saying and. when_Mr--

Crudup repeated hirpself the fourth time, one time less than 3

the Judge, the Judge asked Mr. Crudup if he had any reason -

to give why he should not be pushed for contempt aid

Mr. €rudup- “said he. was’ not in contempt. The -court-can-/,.. B

strued his last statement a's adjudging Mr. Crudup in cone,

tempt and ruled that Mr.. Crudup refused to purge the con

terfirpt after.opportunity to «do so. ! FRere Was’ TT jud@ment

of contempt .until the written order dud_tie record .doe- not

ourt embodied in-Code § 24-3323 hhs no application to th:

“facts of this case and so far as appears trom the récord,:

show any refusal by Mr. ‘Crudup to purge ‘himself after op:

portunity. The attorney did not violate _: any discretion of

the court. He did.not disobev anyv.order because he did not--

call fhe witnesses again to the stand for the purpose’ of

cree ex aeamatee after the Judge ruled that he could not.

! think that before, the Judge could hold Mr. Crudap in con-

tempt he would have had to rule that he could not again

make the requestto call the witness for cross-examination.

The ourt left the door: oper for two additional rejuests

and | do not see‘how Mr. Crudup could have known the

lishit~ without -the Judye’s first :telling him. The rule of

the gudge did not base his ordei?on it in whole or part: The -

McGill case means,-:in my opinion, that the Fédéral rule is

about the same as Georgia’s and a recent opinion of the

U.S. Supreme Court fits this ease like a glove. The case is:

_In the Matter of Criminal Contempt of ‘Thomas C. McCon-

nell, Petitioner, No. 498, decided June 18, 1962. The opinion

is as follows: “MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion

of the Court.

The petitioner Thomas C. McConnell, a lawyer. Was sum-

PY oe + APPENDIX ( tae Bs

marift | toitisd guilty of contempt of court for statements made

while representing the Parmelee Transportation Company. in

an antitrust suit for treble damages and an injunction. The

complaint charged that a number of defendants had. unlaw- ‘

‘ fully conspired to destroy Parmelee’s business by restraining

° _ and monopolizing: trade in violation of the Sherman Act. ,Pe--

cane _titioner and his co-counsel, Lee A. Freeman, had done ex-.

. tensive pretrial preparation on the issue.of conspiracy which

t “was the heart of their case:, At the very. outset of the trial,

-. “i ‘ibwever, the district judge on his own motion refused to per-

eel ~ fit cognsel to try to prove their conspiracy charge, hoiding

% that they must first prove ina wholly separate trial that.

-.‘ defendants’ actions had resulted in an economic. injury to

e- public — an erroneous ‘Holding since we heye held that

. the right of recovery of a plaintiff,in a treble damage anti-

trust case does-not depend at al! on proving an economic

injury to the public. oe ee

“Cut off by the judge’ s*erroneous ruling from trial of the

basic issue of. conspiracy, and: wishing to provide: a record

which would allow this ruling to be reviewed by the Court

of Appeals, coungel for Parmelee asked counsel for defer

darts to stipulate. t plaintiff would have introduced cer-

23 ‘tain ‘evidence of- conspiracy had it been allewed to do. So.

1 sl Defense counsel refused to stipulate, however, insisting that

it Parmelee’ s counsel prepare their recoral.by following the pro~<> —

cedure set out in Rule 43 (c) of the Federal R a of ‘Civil

‘Procedure, which requires that. hegore’ an offer -o f proof. is

made questions upon which'the offer is based must first. be

asked in the presence of the juny. Unwiliing : risk dismis-

sal of their appeal ‘for failure to tollew Rule 43 (c). “Par j

“melee’s counsel- preceedéd to produce and question witnesses

in the presence of the jury in order to lay the proper founda-

‘tian for their offers of proof of conspiracy. But duringAhe

process of this questioning the judge ordered it Stoppedcand

‘ directed that any further offers of proof be m: ade ®:ithont

firstAving asked questions of witnesses in the presence of

‘” the jury: This ruling placed Parmelee’s counsel in quite a

dilemma because defense counsel was still insisting that al!

offers of proof be made in strict compliance with Rule 43 (c)

and there was no way of knowing with certainty whether

the Court of Appeals would treat the trial court's order to

f ¢

ee Sage _ APPENDIX 5

dispense with questions before thg jury. as an excuse for |

fdilure’ to comply with the Rule. Petitioner therefore ‘not

only sought to make clear to thé court that’ he thought de-—

‘fense counsel's ‘objection was ‘right’ but also repeatedly in-

sisted that he be allowed to make his offers of proof in com-

¢ pliance witli the Rule. Edllowing the trial the judge<trarged

petitioner and his co-counsel in a number of specifications

with being guilty of contemptuous ‘conduct during the course

of the trial. After separate hearings both lawyers were sume

_marily found guilty by the trial jydge on all specifications.

Both appealed to the Court, of Appeals, which reversed all

of Freeman’s convictions, reversed two of petitioner McCon-

nell’s convictions, but, with Judge Duffy dissenting; sustained

the conviction of petitioner on Specification 6 — “the specifi-

cation based on -petitioner’s insistence that he be allowed to

make offers of proof in compliance with Rule 43 (c). Even

as to this. conviction, however, the’ Court of Appeals held .

that the jail sentence imposed by the. trial judge should be

reduced to a fine of $100. As in Offutt v. United States, the

‘importance of assuring alert self-restraint.in the exercise

by district judges of the summary power for. cpmmaesiee! con-

terept' prompted us to bring, the case here."

“The’ statute under which petitioner was summarily con-

victed of contempt in,18 U. S. C. § 401, which ptovides that:

, ‘A court of. the United *States shall have: power to punish

- by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of

its authority, and none other, as — (1).Misbehavior of any

‘person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the

administration of justice-. . .. - This section is based on an

Act passed in.18531 in order te correct serious abuses of the

‘summary contempt power that had grown up and was..in-

tended as a ‘drastic delimitation ... . of the broad .unde-.

fined. power of the inferior federal courts ynd@x the Act -

of 1789, ’revealing ‘a Congressional intent to safeguard Con-

stitutional procedures by limiting courts, as Congress is lim- °

ited in contempt cases, to “the least possible power adequate

to the end proposed.” “The exercise by federal.courts of any

broader contempt power than this,’ we have said, ‘would

permit too great inroads on the procedural’ safeguards of the

Bill of Rights, since contempts are summary ‘in their nature.

and leave determination of guilt to a judge rather than a

-, > ° APPENDIX. ss ® o'7

jury.’ And was held long: ago, in Ex’ parte Hudgings, that

while this statute ‘undoubtedly shows a purpose to give

‘courts summary powers to protect the:administration of jus-

tice against immediate interrupton’ of court business, it also —

means that before the drastic procedures of the summary

contempt power may be invoked to replace the protections

of ordinary constitutional procedures there must be an actual Se

obstructign of justice: ‘An obstruction to the performance

' of judicial duty resulting from an act done’ in the presence

of the court is, then, the chafacteristic upon -which the pow er,

to punish for contempt must rest.” This being true, it follows!

that the presence of that element must clearly be shown ‘in

every case: Where the power to punish for ‘contempt is ex-

erted .. .' Thus the question in this case comes down’ to

whether it can ‘clearly be shown’ on this record that the

petitioner’s statemehts while attempting to make his offers

‘ of proof actually obstructed the district judge in ‘the -per-

formance of judicial duty.’

“The Court of Appeals answered this question. by sustai:-

fng Specification 6 only on the basis of petitioner’s last sen-’ .

tence in the colloquy set out in the specification. That spear?”

fication reads: *On ‘April 27, 1960, in the presence and hear-

ing of the jury, after the Court had instructed the attorneys

Ter plaintiff to refrain from repeatedly asking questions ci.

subjects which*the Court had ruled was not 4tdmissible, in -

the presence of the jury as distinguished from. an offer of |

proof outside the presence of the jury, the following oc-*

curred: “By Mr. McConnell: Now you are trying to tell us’

we can't ask these questions. We have a right to ask these

ug tions, and until we are stopped from asking these queés-

ios We are going to ask them, because it is in our prerog-'

alos in doing it. By the Court: I am now stopping you

from “asking the questions about conversations “with Mr.

.Cross, because’ I have ruled specifically, definitely and com-

pletely that it is not an issue in this case. By Mr. McCon-

nell: We have a right to ask them. By the Court: You

can offer proof 6n it. By’ Mr. McConnell: We have a right

to ask afestions which we offer on this issue, and Your

Honor can sustain their objection to them. We don't have

a right to read the answers, but we have a right to ask.

\ °o

, fe

- x

;

. :

? °

f£

ate

og “

Py +4 » 2

Fad

Ix i “APPENDIX.

the Auestions, and we propose to ie so unless some =

Staps us. (Emphasis added.) ; .

. counsel asked for a shit gpcess, that followi x this recess

peTHioner did not ¢ continue wo ask questions which the Judge

had forbidden and that in fact he did not ask any ‘more

sucly questions again throughout the remainder of the trial.

We agree with Judge Duffy w ho.dissented below tKat there

was nothing in petitioner's conduct sufficiently disruptive

of the triat court's business to De an obstruction of justice.

“The record shows that after, this colloquy petitioner's co-

It is true that petitioner stated that counsel had a right to ask |

4juestions that the judge dith not want asked ‘and that ‘Wwe

propose to do so unless some bailiff stops us.’- The fact re

tains, however, that the bailiff never had to interrupt the.

‘trial by arresting petitioner, for the simpte. reason hat after

this statenfent petitioner never did ash any more questions

along the line which -the Judge had forbidden. And we

cannot agree that a mere statement bya lawyer of. his in-

tention te press his legal contention until the court has a baii-

iff stop him can amount to an obstruction of justice that can

be punished under the. limited powers of sunynagy contempt

of gBurt so long as the lawyer dogs not in meen “bas create

ah obstruction which blocks the judge in the perfornYance of

“his Judicial -duty. The ‘petitioner created no, such obstacle

here cs

“While We appreciate the necessity fora judge to have the

“power to protect himself from actual obstruction in the court-

room, or evel from conduct so ae to the court us ac tual!:

to obstruct justice, :it is alsg essential to a fair administrat on

of justice that lawyers be able to make honést vood-f fajth ef-

gtorts ty present. th eir clients Cases An independent jJudici-- °

. a

ars ‘and a Sigorous, in depend: Dt bur are both seri ete sabie

patts of cur system: of Justice. To peeserve the kind of trials

that vur system envisages, Congress has limited the-summary

vontempt power vested in courts to the least possible power

adesfuate to prevent actual obstruction of Justice, and we

think” that that power did net. extend to this Case. Reversed’

‘

WwW her Mr. cro presented his bill of exceptions Bey.

certification’ the Judge insisted on his including ¢ herein A acts

° a , m vi F ‘

: ‘APPENDIX, — S IT

not stated in the: first. order of . contenipt and thereafter

amended his first order, nunc pro ttinc, without hearing or

notice. as follows: “For the record. in this case to be com-

plete and sufficient for review and to specify with particu.

larity the etonduct of John N. Crudup, Attorney at Law, con-

stitut'«: the contempt of court, the Judgment of contempt

pronounced during’ the. trial on February 23, 1962, at-the

February. 1962. Termt of court and éntered nunc tune

on February 26. 1962, for February 25, 1962, is n@®, dur-

ing the same February 1962 Term of this court. amended

.to complete and specify the record as follows:

1. Tht matters and things set forth in the: Judgment of

Contempt of Court in the case of The State of Georgia

versus John N. Crudyp entered nunc pro tunc, pow February

26, 1962 fer then Péb ‘gary 23, 1962 transpired during the

public trialof The State of Georgia versas Marion Smith the

defendant being re presented by Jotai-N. Crudup. Attatimey

“at Law. and that same occurred_ On fe eee 23, 1962, dur:

_ ing the present February. 62 Tehinset this Court, and in

said “public: trial and before a jury of, twélre Mes, spectia-

tors ‘in the court room, officers ane: attornes€,* antl before

the Trial Judge. 2 . Witness Putter did: nottestify during the

trial that ‘w woman was iy the verte With. ‘defendant at the

time of the oc SUEPENCE “as - contended ‘-by-Atorney John N.

Crudup- Neither, hire 4 dtate ver the defend:tnt Marion Smith

contended a Womap w asin the car with. the defendant, and

teftumony on the subject was néither ndaterisal nor yelevant

Lo any: issue iit the ease ind would. neither have aided nor

harmed: anvone. The repeated insistence of Attorney Jobin

N. Crudup- to .recal) Witness Fuller and ask him what, he

testified while on the stand and if be didn’t testify <itlie! ,

yon the triat that a WeMan Waits in the car with the defendant

ait the tune of the occurrence Was in eee disobedience,

resentmevt and resistence to the COprtaseods and ruling of the

Court previously announced and mode that the withess cotuid

ot be recalled for cross-examiination anid that the jury would

-know what be testified? and was a contempt of court by’

arguing and. quarreling with the trial judye after’ tRe- Apiior

apd ruling of the court had been pronounced, and after At

Tari tpere (ivy uly ’; hia ot eee Dj fr] y byes rd. tic! 1} Oy; Whbeh’ wey

. ae | : APPENDIX ¢

known to Attorney Crudup and ef which he was made fully

aware by the Court., Such conduct of ‘Attorney John N.

Crudup Was contemptuous and knowingly, wilfufly and in-

tentionally done to interfere with and impede the trial and |

in disrespect te the Court and the Court's rulings. 3..Said

misbehavior and contempt of court by Attorney John N.

. Crudup made necessary that he be then and there adjudged.

in contempt of court and punished in order that the trial

Judge could control the judicial proceedings and protect

those proceedings from disruption, interference and obstruc-

tion during the trial, and in order to maintain respect for

the Court. 4. Said contempt of court by John N. Crudup was

committed in the immediate presence of the court and in

the immediate presence of a jury of twelve men, court of-

ficers, and spectators* during a public trial and was such

conduct as tended to hold the court up to public ridicule.

All rulings of the court were made in the presence of and

_ known to Attorney John N.-Crudup, the judgment of con-

te mpt* was’ dade his presence in the court room during

the proceedings, the opportunity to purge himself of con-

tempt was fully afforded him, and he declined to purge.

the contempt after opportunity. The Court thereupon sen-

tenced Atterney John N. Crudup to pay a fine of ten dotars

or serve threejdays in jail. This punishment was necessary

and reasonable. Shortly thereafter and on the same day,

February 25, 1962,.Attorney John N. Crudup camte to the

trial Judge. stated he wanted.to pay the ten dollar fine and

asked if. he could be granted time to go.to his office to get

the money. His request was granted but the following day

it became known that he did not pay the fine. Attorney

Crudup Was requested to appear in court and he advtsed

the Court he wished to make a supetsedeas bond and’ asked

if he would. be permitted to do so. The Court assured him’

the request would be granted, and the Court advised, Kim

the judgment would be written up and that a- oo

be meade for his appeal. 5 . The judgment of-contempt and

punishment was necessary in the administration of Justice

and to maintain decorum and respect for the Court and was

used only in she exercise of a sound Judicial discretion and

onlyawith the utmost sense of Monge nd circumspec-

tion. The tnal Judge afferded Attorr, John N. Crudup’

} « ;

: 0 a : aes

APPENDIX ~~. 1, “=a

ar opportunity to purge himself of contempt or to offer-—

an explanation or extenuation of his misbehavior and con-

temptuous conduct. Although-the contempt was Knowingly,

wilfully and intentionaliy committed in the immediate pres-

ence, sight and hearing of the Court, the trial Judge neverthe-

less in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion and with the

utmost sense of résponsibility and circtumspection . inquired

if he had any reason to give why he should not be punished

_for contempt. Attorney Crudup refused to speak in explana-

tion, mitigation or extenuation of his contemptuous conduct

but stubbornly and defiantly spoke in resentment and de-

fiance of the Court by arguing that he was not in contempt

of the Court.’ 6. The proceedings were not reported by a

Court Stenographer but the facts, rulings, orders, decisions

and proceedings recorded, reported and shown in the Judg

ment of contempt signed nunc pro tunc February. 26, 1962,

for February 23, 1962, and the facts, rulings, order, decisions,

and proceedings recorded, reported and shown herein, are

all within the personal knowledge of the trial Judge and

‘are true. 7. The February 1962 ‘Term of the City Court of

Hall County, Georgia is still open and the record in this case

is being completed during the same term the contempt pro-

ceedings occurred. This Amendment of the Judgment signed

nune pro tunc is dated and signed on March 24, 1962.

s/ Joseph H, Blackshear, Judge City Court, Hall County,

Georgia.” . ‘

The second order is null and void as the majority evidently

’ considered it. The original contempt judgment is erroneous

for the reasons stated. I dissent from the ig a of af-

firmance.

Nicols, PJ. < concurs in ‘the dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.