Appendices — Weinstein v. New York

Supreme Court brief1963

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APPENDIX A.. .

BS ANE.

Unitep States Court or Apreats

/ For the Eighth Circuit.

No. 16,899

Beatrice Foods Co., Ap aaa from the

Appellant, United States Dis-

trict Court for the

District of Ne-

braska.

vs.

United States of America,

~ Appeilee.

{ January 2, 1963. |

Before Vax Oosternour and Buackmun, Cireuit Judges,’

and Henvey, District Judge.

Buackmun, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment entered upon a

jury verdict that the defendant Beatrice Foods Co. was

guilty of a conspiracy made illegal by $1, as amended, of

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. $1.) A fine of $15,000 was

“imposed. coe

The indictment was returned in August 1958. It named

Beatrice, Roberts Dairy Company and Alamito Dairy

Company as defendants. All three defendants were en-

gaged in the dairy business in the Omaha-Council Bluffs

area. The indictment contained one count which charged

that from January 1954 to April 1957 the defendants, in

s

a

°

¢ 3 2 9S v

e s : @

violation of the Act, ‘“have engaged in a combination and

conspiracy to eliminate and suppress competition in the

sale of milk and cream"’ to the United States Veterans —

Administration Hospital in Omaha and to the United

_ States Offutt Air Force Base near that city. Some of the

specific features of the charge are quoted in the margin.’

Roberts and Alamito submitted’ pleas of nolo contendere:

These were eventually accepted by‘the court. Those two

defendants were. then adjudged guilty and a fine of $5,000

was imposed dpon each of them.

Beatrice, the remaining defendant, moved, pursuant fo

Rule 6(b)(2), F.R.Cr.P., to dismiss the indictment for.the

reason that the grand jury which returned it ‘‘was drawn

from a jury list whieh was ‘not properly or lawfully

selected’’. After a hearing ‘this motion w aus denied. Bea-

trice then entered a plea of not guilty. On the. basis

of an “affidavit of one of its attorneys Beatrice ates moved

1 9 ‘The aforesaid combination and conspiracy Vv han’ ‘consiated of

a

a continuing agreement, understanding, and concert of action ,

among the defendants the substantial terms of which were :

(a) To fix and establish non-competitive prives and dis:

orn for milk and eream>sold and distributed to the Offutt

AF 6

(b) To fix and establish non-competitive prices and dis-

counts for milk and cream sold and distributed by the defend-

ants to the Veterans Hospital ;

(c) To allocate to the defendant Roberts, the bid,contract

business of supplying milk and cream to the Veterans

Hospital ;

(d) To alternately allocate fo the defendants Alaito and

Beatrice the bid contract business of supplying milk and cream

to the Offutt AFB.

* % ° . .

‘*The combination and conspiracy alleged in this indictment has

had, among other things, the following effects:

(a) Prices paid by the Veterans Hospital and Offutt AFB

for milk and cream have been artificially fixed at high) and

seaduaeadiades levels; * * *

(f) Competition among defendants in the sale of milk and

cream to the Offutt AFB and the Veterans Hospital has \been

substantially lessened and eliminated.”’

#

: 29

to quash the indictment “because the indicting grand

jury's sessions and déliberations were tainted and defend-

ant was prejudiced by repeated acts of misconduct by the

United States attoriveys before said jury”’.

_ The case proceeded to trial. At the close of the govern-

ment’s evidence, Beatrice moved for a judgment of ac-

quittal and rested. The adverse verdict was returned and -

judgment was critered. Beatrice then renewed its motions

for dismissal of the indietment and for judgment of ac-

quittalang asked in the alternative for a new trial. These, -

motions were all denied, :

_. The defege urges here (1) impraper se ‘ection of the

grand jury: (2) misconduct off government counsel befere

the grand jury; CT) insufficiency of the evidence ; (4). error

in the reception of evidence, and (5) error in the dnstrue-

tions, We examine these points in turn and recite the

pertinent faets as each is considered.

OW The challenge to the qrand jury array. The govern-

ing statutes;are 28 U.S.CLA, s$ 1861 and 1864. The former?

prescribes as qualifigations for both grand and petit jurors

(ay United States citizenship; (b) attained age of 21

‘years; (@) one year’s residence within the judicial dis->

triet; (d) absence of a criminal record of the kind de-

seribed in if statute; (e) ability te read, write, speak and

eunderstand Rnglish; aml (f) mental and physical capacity

2 § 1861. Qualifications of Federal jurors u

Any citizen of the United States who has attained the age of

twenty one*years and who bas resided for a period of one year

within the judicial district, is competent to serve as a grand or

petit juror unless—

(1) He has been convieted in a State or Federal court of record

of a crime punjshable by imprisonment for more than one year and

his civil right ave not been restored by pardon on amnesty.

(2) He is unable to-read, write. speak, and tinderstand the

English language.

(\) Tle is ineapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmities

to render efficient jury service. .

30 v , 4

to render efficient jury service. This section was given

its present form on September 9, 1957, by the Civil Rights

Act of 1957, Pub. L..85-315, Part V, § 152, 71 Stat. 634, 638.

Theretofore, the. statute had required only residence in

the district, rather .than at least -one year’s residence

there, and had also provided that one who was -incom-

petent to serve as a juror by the law of the state where

the federal court sat was also incompetent to serve as a

federal juror.” Seats e

Section 1864° prov hies that ‘the names of grand jurors

shall{ be drawn from a box containing the names of not

less than 300 then qualified persons and that the bok shall

be refilled from time to time by the clerk of the t and

a jury commissioner having prescribed qualificatibrt.

Beatrice's position is that § 1864 is mandatory and re-

quires the clerk and the commissioner to place the names

of 300 or more qualified persons in thé box; that this |

duty of selection may not be delegated; that the proce-

dure the clerk followed in selecting names for this grand

jury did not meet the statutory requirements ; and ‘that

Beatrice need not. demonstrate individual prejudice to it

by the selection procedures employed.

At the hearing on the motioti to dismiss the indictment

the following facts were dev eloped and 3 are not i in dispute:

3. § 1864, Manner of drawing jury commissioners and their

com neation

e names of grand ond petit jurors shall be publiely drawn

from a box containing the names of not less than three hundred

qualified persons at the time of each drawing.

The jury box shall from time to time be refilled by the clerk of

court, of his deputy, and 4 jury commissioner, appointed by the

court.

e : @ ° ° -e ‘°

The jury commissioner and the clerk, or his deputy, shall alter-.

nately{place one name in the jury box without reference to party

affiliations, until the box shall contain at least’ 300) names or such

larger number as the court determines. :

e . . “@ e

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31

Mary A. Mullin was the clerk. She served in that

capacity sinee 1939. The jury commissioner was G. V.

Middleton. He was appointed in 1955. He died in July

1958. The. court’s order, for the grand jury was issued on “

October (23, 1957, only one month and two weeksxafter

$1861 was amended. The jury was drawn en 2 era

. 6, was empaneled the following February, was excused for

‘a time, and was reconvened in August 1958 when the in-

dictment of the three defendants was returned.

Miss Mullin, sinceaher Appointment as clerk, main-

tained a list of . jurors, She kept this ‘‘r

vised constantly’’. Names and addresses wére said oh on

cards. Names of. women were on blue cards and those of *

men were on white cards. Middleton maintained his own _

card record. His was separate and apart from the clerk's

and was not under his direction or supervision.. His cards

were orange. Miss Mullin had ne knowledge as to how

Middleton obtained his names. When this grand jury was

empaneled Miss Mullin placed not less than 150 of her

cards in the box and Middleton placed not less than. 150

of his cards there. The clerk and ‘Middleton did this by

placing cards one ata time alternately in the box. Miss

Mullin testified that’ she apportioned blue cards and white

cards consistently but that she had no idea as to the pro-

portion of the one group to the other.

The clerk employed t) ¢ sponsor'system practice of send-

ing to certain persons4n, the district requests for. recom-

“mendations of prospective federal jurors. The form she

used for this purpose quoted § 1871 in full. Tt provided

choices for names of*men or of women or. of both men and

women; upon any particular use of this form she crossed

out two of these three alternatives. She in fact requested

names of persons of both sexes from time to time. On at

least one occasion she used the form to ask for names of

colored men.

\

| 32 ee

ae pe r) por

When Miss Mullin received recommendations from her

sources she clfecked the names submitted against her ex-

isting list. She then sent a mimeographed questionnaire

to each person whose name was not already on her. list.

She did not add a name to the list upon its mere presenta-

(tion by a-sponsor. ° ‘

,The questionnaires were of two types. Each bore the

name of the clerk and advised ‘the recipient that he was

a prospective federal juror. Each asked his age, oceupa-

tion and address, and whethet? he was a voter. One type,

the older, asked whether " was a federal employee. The

other asked the name of his employer and whether he

owned.zeal estate ip his owi diame. Miss Mullin conducted

no personal interview with any prospectis ‘© juror.

There was no evidwnee presented as toghow the names

on Middleton's list were sefected.

It ix important to note that Beatrice does not attack the

indictment on the grounds (a) that any paptieular person

~%n this grand jury was in any way not ualified, or (1)

that the required, numbe® of names were not in the jury

box, or (¢) that the ,jury was not representative of the.

‘community in that an eligible group had.been excluded in

its selection, See, as to this last factor, Thiel v. Southern

Pacifié Co. 1946, 328 U. S. 217, 220; Ballard vy. United

States 1946, 3829 U.S. 187, 195; Hoyt v. Florida 1961, 368

U. S. 57. 59: Smith v. Teras 1940, 311 U.S. 128: Neither

has Beatrice suggested or offered to prove individual

prejudice to it as a defenaant. ry

‘The attack, instead ts directed to claimed deficiencies in

“ie thechanics of the selective, process. Ft is argued that

the letters to the sponsors and the questionnaires ‘‘do

not begin to provide sufficient infér mation to determine

whether or not that person i qualified to act as a federal

juror under® ¢ 1861, particularly with respect.to the Eng-

: .

33

' lish language Tequirement, criminal record, infirmities, and

the one year residence newly preseribed by the 1957

amendment. It is then said that the record clearly estab.

dishes that Miss* Mullin did not know whether the ‘names

she placed in the bex were those of qualified persons, that

“this is a breach of ‘statutory duty, and that it is fatal to

the indictment. a4 os.

It was suggested long axe that the placing of names of

qualified — the ag box is mandatory, United

States v. Chaires, C) C. XN. D. Fla., 1889, 40° F. 820, 821.

Since then, some courts aa specifically so héld. United

States v. Silverman, D. Conn., 1955, 129 F. Supp, 496, 511;

United States v. Brandt, XN... Ohio, 1955, 139 F. Supp. 362,

365. It has been said, too, that’ éhe duty ‘pf selection can-

not be delegated by jury officials. Glasser ve United States

_ 1942, 315 U. S. 60, 85. However, a has prescribed

no particular method of jury esclection. ‘The choice of the

means * * * rests largely in the sound discretion of the

trial courts and their, officers’* under ‘the guidance of the

pertinent statutes. Thiel v. Southern ‘Pacific Co, supra,

pp. 220-21 of 828 U.S.; Glasser vy. United States, supra,

p. 86 of 315 U.S. oT i ‘re is a prestimption that the jury

officials have discharged their duties properly. Poltafico

-y. United States, 6 Cir, 1956, 237 F. 2d 97, 110. cert. den.

352 U.S. 1025; United States v. Fujimoto, D. Hawaii 1952,

105 F. Supp. 727, 729. When the defense elaims the-exist-

ence of a fatal flaw in the selection process it Has the bur-

den of overcoming that presumption.’ Pradier v. United

States 1948, 335 U.S. 497, 508; United States v. Sil tei

supra,,p. 511 of 129 F. Supp.: Walker v. United States

Cir. 1937, 93 F. 2d 383, 392, cert den. 202 U, Sb44; . y

- vy. Henslee, 8 Cir., 1961, IST F.2d 986, 942, cert. den, 368

_U.S. 871,

Accepting all this, we are not persuaded by Beatrice’s

challenge to the array: :

¥

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(a) When the jury officials themselves are the ones who

ultimately determine a juror’s qualification, the sponsor

system is not in itseif an invalidating factor. Walker v.

United States, supra, p.'391 of 93 F. 2d, where this court

said that this ‘‘was not a delegation, but a discharge of

duty”’; United States v. oe nnis, 2 Cir., 1950, 183 F. 2d 201,

216-24, affirmed 341 U. S. 494; Padgett v. Buxton-Smith .

peremntee Co., 10 Cir., 1960, 283 F. 2d 597, 598, cert. den.

365 U.S. 828; United States v. Silverman, supra, p. 510 of

129 F. Supp.; United States v. Silverman, D. Conn., 1999,

132 F. Supp. 820, 823-27; United States v.. Romano, D,

Conn., 1961, 191 F. Supp. 772; United States v. Brandt,

ND. Ohie, 1945, 139 F. Supp. 349, 360; United States v.

Hoffa, S. D. Fla. 1952, 205 F. Supp. 710, 719-20. Here a

sponsor’s recommeidation was not-the solé feature of the

selection process. It- was coupled as to each prospect

with a questionnaire directad to most of the qualifications

specified by the statute. Although certain of. the requests

to sponsors were limited as to sex, the requests, taken as

a group, were fot so limited and the one requesting names

of Negro males was sent to a deputy federal court clerk

who was himself a Negro and who reasonably might, he

expected to possess usefully wide acquaintanceship with

othegs of his race. Also, the law docs not contemplate

that the jury officials be personally acquainted with each

prospective juror. Walker v. United States, sapra,’p. 391

of 93 F. 2d.

(b) The fact that the clerk and, the jury commissioner

maintained separate lists does not seem to us to disqualify

the panel. We find nothing in § 1864 w hich requires that

both jury officials pass upon the ‘cualiteations of each pro-

spective juror‘even though it obviously is desirable that

they do so. The policy of the statute is that the jury box

be refilled by both acting alternately. It does not appear

to go so far.as to require agreement upon each name.

- ae eae )

4

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Compare United States vy, Clancy, 7 © ir., 1960, 276 F; 2d

617; 625, reversed on other grounds, 360 U.S, 3, Local.

36 ete. vy. United States, 9 Cir, 1949, 170 PF. Pd 320, 341,

cert. den, 389°U ‘S. 947.

(c) The questionnaires employed were not i as desirably

complete as they might have been. They did not inqtire,

for example, as to a prospect's fluency 1 1 English, as to

his ‘criminal reeord and as to his me eo ‘and physical

' capacities. Yet they did advise him of the purpose of the

questionnaire itself:and they did inquire as ‘to his being a

voter. The filling out of the form and its return would |

result in some indication of the prospect's language abil-

ity and of his infirmities. Voting status under Nebraska _

law would presumably show United States citizenship, at

least six mowfhs’ residence in the ee R.R.S, Neb.

1943 $°32-102, and something as to erlminai record, RRS :

Neb, §§ 29-112 and 29-102. The information requested as

to age, occupation and employer is not completely unre-

‘vealing as to capacity. Furthermore, the leHer to each

sponsor quoted § 1861. The sponsor therefore knew ex-

actly what was required for those he wis to recommend

as prospective jurors. We are not free to presume that he

ignored these requirements.

(d) It is evident, a8 Beatrice urges, thitt the question-

naires were not so complete or so helptully informative as

the one given as an xample in the September 1960 Re-

port of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Opera-

tion of the Jury System, 26 F.R.D. 409, 507-08. Bunt such

deficiencies as they possessed were largely overcome by

the answers which ,were necessarily foytheoming, by the

natural tendency to make one’s physical infirmities known,

and by the court’s own authority to, excuse unqualified

prospective jurors. United States v. Brandt, supra, p. 365°

of 139 F. Supp. The 1960 Report itself states that its sug:

al 3

r

36

-» gested questionnaire *‘need not be rigidly adhered to”’. 26

F.R.D. 436.2 ™

(e) Nor do we think the fact that the box may have con-

tained names which were on the jury officials’ respective

lists pridr to the 1957 amenetuent imposing the one-year

residence requirement is fatal. See Glasser ¥. United

States, supra, p. 65 of 315 U.S. Compare United States

v. Dennis, supra, pp. 217-18 of 188 F. 2d; United States v.

Flynn, 2 Cir., 1954, 216 F. 2d 354, 385, cert. den. 348 U.S.

909. This jury was drawn less than two months after that

amendment. And the evidence does not disclose: that the

residency requirement was not met as to® ‘these. grand

jurors. See United States v. Austrew, D.. Md., 1961, 190

F. Supp. 632, 634.

(f) We do not regard United States v. Silverman, supra,

“429 F, Supp. 496, and United States v. Brandt, supra, 139

F. -Supp. 362, "as opposing authority. In Sidrerman the

request to sponsors gave no information whatever as to

the statutory qualificationss and the questionnaires em-

ployed were sent outt only after the drawing. Thus there

was no determination by the jury officials theinselves of

the qualifications of the prospects. Compare the disposi-

tion of the second challenge in United States v. Silverman,

supra, pp. 823-27 of 132 F. Supp. In Brandt the challenge ~ .

to the array was not successful.

(g) The facts here fall far short of the more material

situation where an entire cohesive group is exeluded in

the jury selection process. There the jury system itself

is threatened and asa consequence prejudice to the par-

ticular defendant need not be demonstrated. Thiel vy.

Southern Pacific Co., supra, pp. 220-21 and 225 of #28

U.S.; Ballard v. United States, supra, p. 195 of 329 U.S.

(h) Although perfection in jury selection is of course

desired, it is too much to expect that the sy stem in every

37.

federal judicial district will be conducted and will operate

with the -precision of a fine timepiece. Perfect. perform-

ance is not required. United States v. Brandt, supra, p.

360 of 189 F.Supp. This js why we have the matty safe-

guards consisting of the use of the box itself, the drawing

of names from it, the large number of names required,

and the like. At the very niost, there were mere irregu-_

larities in the selection. of the grand jury which indicted

Beatrice and its codefendants. In the absénce of indivi-

dual prejudice to the defendant, these do not justify dis-

miss@l of the indictment. | Agnew v. United States, 1897,

165 U.S. a6, 44: Young v. United States, D.C. Cir. 1994,

212 FL 2d 286, 258-39 and footne te 5, cert. den, 347 U.S.

1015. See Frazier v. United States, supra, p. 503-04 of

339 US. Compare United States v. Greenberg, S.D. N.Y.

1961, 200 F, Supp 382, 387. We equate this feature of this

case owith the situations involved in ‘United States v.

Clancy, 7 Cir. 1960, 276 F. 2d 617, 625, 631-32, reversed on

other grounds, 365 U.S. 312; United States v. Dennis,

‘supra, 2 Cir.p 1950, 183 F. 2d 201; Local 36, ete., v. United

States, supra, & Cir, 1949, 177 F. 2d 320, 341; Abdul v.

United States, 0 Cir, 1960, 278 Fs 2d 234, 235, eert. den:

364 U.S. 832; Romney vy. United States, D.C. Cir. 1948,

167 F. 2d 521, 527. cert. den. 334 U.S. 847; Padgett v.

Burton-Smith Mercantile Co,, supra, 10 Cir. 1960, 283 F.

Md JOT, 599, See Brookman v. United States, & Cir., 1925,

8 F.2d 803, 806-07; Gaughan vy. United States, 8 Cir., 1927,

19 F. 2d 897,.898-99. Compare Walker v. United States,

supra, p. 891 of 93 F. 2d.

We note, incidentally, that the Nebraska jury selection

system employed by this clerk and this jury commissioner

was carefully reviewed once before and was upheld by

Chief District Judge Delehant in an unreported memo-

randum filed September 24, 1956, in) United States v.

Brown, reversed on other grounds, 8 Cir., 1957, 245 F. 2d

™~

d

¢ ,

38 “RO \Aakerasas ADM

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549. We, tgo, conclude that the system was not disquali-

fying and that the challenge to the array must fail.

2. Misconduct of government counsel before the grand

jury. On the day the.trial was to begin, more than thirty-

two months after the the return of the indictment, Beatrice

™ moved thit the grand jury minutes le produced for in

spection by the defense and the court and that the indict-

ment be dismissed because of misconduct of non-local gov

ernment attorneys before the grand jury. This motion

was supported by an affidavit of ene of the attorneys for

Beatrice to the effect that, immediately following their

appearance hefore the grand jury in T9908, three witnesses,

all agents or employees of Reberts, recorded on tape what

had transpired before the viland jury and that the tape

reflects instances of belligerency toward these witnesses,

accusations of lying, threats of prosecution for perjury,,

and assertions of the very matter under consideration by

the grand jury. In denying this motion and its renewal

‘after judgment the court stated that government counsel

had produced -the grand jury transeript ‘and the Court

having carefully read and studied the entire Grand Jury

transeript in camera, finds that the allegations contained

in the affidavit * * * are not supported by the record and

therefore are without foundation and should be over:

ruled”’. ;

’

Beatrice argues here that the affidavit staads aneontra

dicted in the record: that the conduct of government conn

sel was an abuse of the limited function of the prosecutor

before the grand jury; that Beatrice was thereby deprived .

of its right to a fair and unprejudiced investigation: and

that the paucity of evidence at the trial convineingly dem-

onstrates that the indictment was returned because of

» prosecutorial compulsion rather than because of the force

of the evidence. This court indicated at the oral arguinent, |

that it would eall up the grand jury transcript for its

own in camera examination, Défense counsel since then

have suggested that the same constitutional infirmities

cattach to appellate inspection as to district court review,

Grand jury proceedings, of course, have long enjoyed a

character almost sacrosanct. ‘Grand jury testimony is

ordinarily confidential’. United States vo Socony-Vacuun

Oi Co. W840, S10 Tog. 150, 283. But the Supreme Court

in that case alse said. pe 24, that ‘tafter the grand jury's

funetions are ended, diselosure is wholly proper where

thefends of justice require it’. This is specifieally recog

rized hy Haake te), BR CrP. ~~

— Phis stindispensible secreey of vrand jury proceedings"

us Mr Justice Frankfurter has typified it in United States

V. Johnson, WAS. ST UUS. a08, O18,

“onust net be broken except where there is a com-

pelling necessity. There are instances when that need

Will outweieh the countervailing poliey. But) they

toust he shown with partiGularity '. (sated States v.

Procter d Gamble Co, 1998, 256 US. 677, O82.

“And in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, v. United States, 1959,

SHG TES. 295, S96, 399400, the Supreme Court has teld us

that, moder Rule Ge). inspeetion of the grand jure min-

utes has been committed to the sound discretion of the

trial judwet’: that the defense does not have a‘ richt"” to

grand jury minutes; and thatinstead it has the burden te-

show ‘ta particnlarized need ™ whick a the pol-

eve Of seereev So

No case preeisely in point here has been cited to us.

Most have applied the Pittsburgh Plate Glass standard to

Situations of alleged or suspected diserepaney between a

Witness’ testimony at the trial and that before the grand

jury. See, for example, Berry v. United States, 8 Cir.,

TOGL, 205 BF. 2d 192, 194-95, cert, den, 368 0, S. 955° Travis

v. United States, 10 Cir, 1959, 269 F.2d O28, 945-46, re-

,

CD

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. 40

versed on other grounds 364 U.S. 631. General allegations

usually have been frowned upon. United States v. Coduto,:

7 Cir, 1960, 284 F. 2d 464, 468, cert. den. 365 U.S. 881;

Ogden v. United States, 9 Cir., 1962, 308 F. 2d 724, 741-42.

In camera inspection by the trial court has been suggested,

see Brilliant v. United States, 8 Cir., 1962, 297 F. 2d 3835,

391, cert. den. 369 U.S. 871, ahd in some cases has been

employed within limits and not disapproved. - The Second

Cireuit seems to have gone so far as to require in camera

inspection of at least a portion of the grand jury minutes

whenever a suggestion has been made as to discregmney.

United States v. Hernandez, 1960, 282 F. 2d 71; 1961, 290

F. 2d 86, 88-89; United States v. Giampa, 1961, 290 F. 2d 838,

85. Other courts, including our own, have recognized the

drawbacks of routinely. compelling trial judges to indulge |:

such inspection and have upheld, as a non-abused dis-

cretionary matter, “a trial court’s refusal to inspect the

grand jury transcript. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.

United States, + Cir, 1958, 260 F. 2d 397, 404, affirmed,

supra, 360 U.S. 395; Berry v. United States, supra; Bril-

liant v. United States, supra; Hance v. United States, 8

Cir., 1962, 299 F. 2d 389, 398; Banks v. United States, 8

Gir., 1953, 204 F. 2d 666, 669-70, cert. granted and case re-

manded on other grounds, 348 U.S. 905; Traris v. United

States, supra.

In the present case are a number of facts; each perhaps

of no great significance when constdered alone, which seem

in the aggregate at least to afford a tone to this demand ?

from the defense: (a} The motion was presented to the

court more than two and one-half years after the indict-

ment was returned despite the fact that the affidavit al-

leged that the recorded statements were made immediately

following the witnesses* appearance before the grand jury.

We are not saying, that the motion was untimely for it

was made befere trial as required by Rule 12(b)(2).

. 41

(b) The supporting affidavit was that of counsel and was

sworn to on the day of the trial. No supporting affidavit

from any of the three witnesses was presented. (c) The

Witnesses in question were only three of many which ap-

peared Nefore the grand jury. (d) The witnesses were

agents or employees of Roberts, one-of—the defendants

under consideration. (e) The affidavit itself indicates that

recorded statements were taken from other witnesses but

it ‘contains no similar reference to ansegh thew (f) One

of the three witnesses testified at the triWt

Under these circumstances we cannot say that the de-

fense has established a particularized need for the grand

jury transcript. There is authority to the effect that a

prosecutor, while before the grand jury, may not partici-

pate in its deliberations or express opinions on questions

of fact or attempt to, influence the finding. See, for ex-

ample, United States vy. Wells, D. Idaho, 1908, 163 F. 313,

425-26. But the courts generally have been most cautious

in ‘iyvalidating indictments for alleged grand jury miscon-

duct of the prosecutor. See McKinney v. United States,

& Cir, 1912, 199 F. 25, 28-29; United States vy, Rintelen,

S.D. N.Y... 1916, 235 F. 787, 794-95. ) :

Nor is it effective or significant to say that the attor-

ney’s affidavit stands alone and uncontradicted in’ the

record, The burden is on the defense. The situation is:

not unlike that in Glasser v. United States, supra, where

the Supreme Court said, p. 87 of 315 U.S., ‘the formal

_affidavif alone, even though uncontroverted, is not enough.”’

&

We recognize that this is a situation where the tradi-

tional reasons for grand jury secrecy (see, fer example,

United States v Rose, 3 Cir., 1954, 915 F. 2d 617, 628-29, 8

Wiemore, Evidence (MeNaughton Revision 1961), § 2360),

may have little application. But there is a strong pre-

sumption of regularity accorded to the findings of a grand

6

{9

a

42

jury. United States v. Nunan, 2 Cir., 1956, 236 F. 2d 576,

594, cert. den. 353 U. S. 912. The ‘tends of justice’? are

the guide. We do.not see in the allegations of this affidavit

anything which suggests that the ends of justice require

that the whole or any .part of this transcript. be made

available to the defendant. It follows that the trial court

would not have abused its discretion had it refused to

examine ‘the grand jury minutes. It follows further that

there can then be no error in the district court’s inspection

of the transcript in camera and’in its subsequent denial.

of the defense motion, and that this does not constitute,

as Beatrice suggests, a secret reception of evidence or a

‘denial of due process or a deprival ‘of the confrontation .

guaranty of the Sixth Amendment. It will afford the de-

fense little comfort, perhaps, when we say, for what it is

worth, that we, too, have carefully read the 1,100 pages of

the grand jury transcript. We find nothing in those pro-

ceedings which, in view of the antitrust character of this,

ease, is prejudicially offensive to the ends of justice... On

the basis of that inspection, also, we conclude that. the

trial court’s denial of Beatrice’s motion was not ancabuse

of diseretion. The fact we have done so in this case is not

to & taken as a precedent for thus burdening any court

‘or as a holding. on our part that a review of this kind is

necessary or even indicated in all cases,

Compare, generally, on this point, . Fitts v. Superior

Court, 1935, 4 Cal. 2d 514, 51 P. 2d 66, 70-71; United States

v. Greenberg, S.D. N.Y., 1962, 204 F. Supp. 400; United

States v. Kahaner, S.D. N.Y., 1962, 204 F. Supp. 921.

3. The sufficiency of the evidence. Because of the im-

portance of this issue and the’emphasis given it by the de-

fense, we review the evidence in detail. At the trial the

government introduced a number of exhibits including:

compiled charts. This documentary material disclosed the

following:

o

48

~

(a) The three years preceding April 1954. The Veterans

Hospital opened in early 1951. For ten bid periods all

three defendants submitted offers. Alamito received the

Hospital contract four times, twice at no discount from the

wholesale list price, once at 3%, and one at 10) ;

Beatrice obtained the contract four times, .onee at 1%

discount, once at 4)47, and twice at 5% ; and Roberts re-

ceived the contract twice, onée at 1% discount and once

at 267. On one occasion Beatrice offered a bid of 73%

discount but was outbid by Alamito. For the eight bid

periods at the Air Force Base, “Alamito received the con-

tract twice with no discounts, Roberts received it twice at

zero and 3.966, respectively, and Beatrice received it four

times, twice at 24%, onee at 34%, and once at 5%

(b) April 1954 to early'1957. During this period all con-

- tracts for both the Hospital and the Base were awarded

at a flat 2% discount, with one exception at the Hospital

when. an alternate of 14 discount for six monthsg rather

than 20) for twelve months, was accepted. Each of the

«lefendants won contracts at this level. Roberts was al-

ways the successful bidder at the Hospital during eight,

consegntive bid periods, with Alamita and Beatrice either

not bidding or bidding at zero or 1@ discount. At the

Base Alamito and Beatrice were alternately successful at

9°; + Roberts consistently submitted a bid at no discount;

Beatrice and Alemito, when losing the Base contract, did

so on bids ranging from zero to 14%.

(e) The period after early 1957. At the Hospifal Alamito

obtained the business at 25% discount for the period begin-

ning July 1, 1957; on July 1, 1958, Beatrice gained it at

5% + on Octaber 1, 1958, Roberts acquired it at 10%.” At.

tlie Base, for the’six month period beginning June 1, 1957,

Roberts obtained the contract for milk if gallons at about

So discount: for the six month period begitfhing Decem-

vd

44

ber 1, 1957, Beatrice gained the gallon contract at about

4% ; and for the next succeeding period both Beatrice and

Alamito submitted gallon bids at about 5% discount.

The government's gase also included the following: (a)

Evidence as to the Wids submitted by the three defendants

and others to the University of Nebraska Hospital and to

the Creighton Memorial St. Joseph's Hospital, loth in

Omaha, during the period of the alleged conspiracy. This

showed variations in bidding by the three defendants and

offers of discounts from zero up to 15%. (b) Testimony

of Lewis Klesath, former manager of Beatrf€e’s Council

Blaffs plant, to the effect that in 1956, during the indict-

ment period, he received calls from officials of Roberts and

Alamito a week'or so in advance of contemplated changes

in wholesale list prices in the area and \that he discussed

those, price changes ain] their effective dates with them.

Area prices, of. course, were the base points from which

bid discounts were measured.

It is axiomatic by iow that on an appeal from a convic-

tion it. is not forts to weigh the evidence ‘‘but only to

consider whether the evidence in its most favorable aspect

‘to the Government is legally capable of allowing a juty to

become persuaded of guilt.’’ Phelps ‘v. United States, 8

‘Cir. 1947, 160 F. 2d 858, 868, cert. den. sub. nom. Peters v.

United States, 334 U.S. 860; Glasser ¢. Unitek States,

“supra, 315 U.S. 60, 80; Blanner vo U nited States, sc ir.,

1961, 293 F. 2d 723, 725, cert. den. 368 U.S. 931; Isaacs v.

United States, 8 Cir., 1968, 301 F. 2d 706, 727, cert.-den.

371 U.S. 818. -Participation in a criminal conspiracy may

be shown by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct

evidence. Delli Paoli v. U nited States, 1957, 352 U.S. 232,

- 9360. footnote 4; Blume nthal v. United States, 1947, 332

U.S. 539, 557; . Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 1943, 319

US. 703. Of course, declarations of a conspirator are ad-

e

missible over the objections of an alleged co-conspirator

who was not present when they were made, only if there

is proof aliunde that he is connect ted with the conspiracy,

Glasser v. United States, supra, p. 74 of 315 US.; Tingle

v. United States, 8 Cir, 1930, 38 F. 2d 573, 575.

The government emphasizes and argues (a) that during

the three years preceding the indictment period each of

the three defendants had some share of the fluid milk

business at both the Base and the Hospital; (b) that vig

orous competition had been present during that period with

@ resulting bids varying from zero yp to 1o% discount and

with the last accepted bids at both the Base and the Hos-

pital at 5% and both possessed by Beatrice; (¢) that about

March 1954 a dramatic und complete-change in_the bid

pattern took place, and genuine competition came to an

end; (d) that at the Hospital Beatrice did not renew its

immediately preceding successful 50 bid and, with one

exception, never offered any discount there; (e) that

Alamito offered no discount to the Hospital although, be

fore, it had submitted discount offers up to 10g; (8)

that Roberts received the Hospital business exclusively for

the three and one-quarter year period at a uniform 2

discount; (g) that this was in contrast with Roberts* inter

mittent success in the preceding three years; (h) that

Alamito, being a ‘‘small business,’ could have obtained

any contract with only an equal bid but did not) submit

such a bid; (i) that at the Base Roberts did not reoffer its

- previously successful 3.960 bid and offered no discount

at all; (j) that Beatrice did not repeat its last successful

3% bid there; (k) that Alamite and Beatrice got the Base

business at a uniform 2% diseount;. (1) that it came te

them in almost perfect rotation; (m) that the 2% discount

at the Base was the first ever offered there by Alamito;

(ni) that after the indictment period there was a sudden ,

reversion to the original competitive practices as illus.

-

trated by Roberts’ submitting bids at the Base ranging

from zero.to 8%, by Beatrice*s getting ‘the gallon contract

there for one period ‘at 4%, by 5% bids being offered. by

both Alamito and Beatrice for the succeeding peridd, and

by successful bids by Alamito, Beatrice and Roberts, re-

spectively at 24%, 9 5%, and 10%, all in contrast .to the

uniform 2% prevailin /theretofore ; and (0) that this

documentary proof is buttressed by the Klesath testimony

and by.the naan) carci at the two Omaha community:

hospitals.

The government further argues that for the last bid

‘period before the indictment period the Base volume was

about twice that of the Hospital; that, with Beatrice and

_ Alamito sharing the Base equally and with Roberts having

‘the Hospital exclfgively, the total business was thus

divided equally three ways; that the bid pattern at the

Base and the Hospital at a uniform winning figure of 2%

was obviously unnatural as show by the ntrasting pat-

tern at the University and Creighton hosRitale 3 in which

the defendants participated; that the record contained no

evidence of a ‘‘moral call of community charities for favor-

able prices,’’ as. Beatrice would typify it, with respect to

the two latter hospitals which would account for the bid -

pattern differences; that there was widely disparate bid-

‘ding at the Base and at the Hospital, both before and

after the indictment period; and that it follows that there

was concerted action to fix prices at the two government

institutions during the period in question and to ajlocate

the business there among the three dairies.

Beatrice argues (a) that there is direct evidence against

the existence ef any conspiracy; (b) that there was no

Alamito witness adverse to Beatrice but only one who

said he did not know what the other dairies were going

~' to do; (c) that there was no Roberts witness adverse to

Wid

Beatrice for the Roberts witness testified that her com-

‘pany determined its bids without consultation with

Beatrice; (d) that the Alamito and Roberts witnesses de-

~nied-the existence of the conspiracy ‘and, inasmuch as they

were called by the prosecution, the government is bound

by their testimony; (¢) that the Hospital purchasing de-

partment witness Admitted that, so far as he knew,

’ Beatrice had to do* only with its own bids; (f) that the

“only direct evidence against Beatrice was inadmissible

hearsay; (g) that Roberts’ refusal to offer a discount at

the Base from March 1954 on arose out of ff8 dispute with

the Air Force over the latter’s: taking unwarranted dis-

counts for late cash payments; (h) that Roberts did con-

tinue to bid discounts ac the Hospital; (i) that Roberts

never had bid more than 2%, the 3.96% for one period at

the Base being 2% plus a 2% cash prompt payment dis-

count thereon; (j) that it was the uniformity of price

which the defendants had to pay for raw milk, as required

by a federal milk marketing order, which lajd the founda-

tion for identical wholesale prices in the area; (k) that

- the 2% discount figure was not new in 1954 but had ap- ,

peared in 1952 and°1953 and captured: the business; (1)

that bids were publi¢ly opened and each bidder therefore

knew what the others had offered at preceding bid periods;

(m) that Alamito, in contrast to Roberts and Beatrice,

needed only to meet» the bids of the others in order to get

the business; (n) that the total dollar volume of the Base

and the Hospital from January 1954 to April 1997 was

not divided equally among the three defendants but went

37.7% to Beatrice, 19.8% to Roberts, 40.1% to Alamito

and 2.4% to another dairy; 4 (0) that evidggice of the

4. The wov ernment re plies that these figures find no support in

the record and that any percentage for the hon-defendant dairy is

attributable to cottage cheese, a commodity not specified in the

indictment and not included in the compilation of the gove rnment 's

opposing figures.

48

bidding transactions with the University and Creighton

hospitals has fie~Significance because it was nof demon-

strated that they presented comparable situations as to

cost elements and the like, because there was advertising

-value in being the official datry at a well-patronized general

hospital, and because there was a duty to provide favor-

able prices to community charities ;.(p) that there-was no

proof that the bids at the Base and the Hospital were not

independently prepared or were not the product of inde-

pendent judgments of different businessmen; (q) that the

. bids reflected good business judgments independently ar-

rived at; (r) that the Klesath testimony was immaterial

and, in any event, established nothing more than ex-

changes of information about the Omaha market generally ;

(s) that the government concedes the absence of a con-

spiracy before 1954 and yet there are-instances of iden-

tical bids by all three defendants during that earlier time ;

(t) that the post- conspiracy period reflects similar in-

stances and yet the government concedes no conspiracy

then existed; ‘(u) that the trial degenerated into a mass

of extraneous evidence; (v) that the facts are as consistent .

with innocence as with guilt; and (w) that the government

totally failed to prove the crime charged.

c

In passing: ‘upoh ‘this issue of the sufficiency of the evi-

denee, we have in mind thatthe conspiracy charged here

actually is very confined, It concerns only fluid milk. It

concerns only the’ Veterans Hospital and the Dffutt Air

Force Base. And it concerns only the period fram 1954 to

April 1957. Other outlets in the area and other products

are not embraced in the charge.

We recognize, too, that fluid milk is.a highly standard-

ized commodity which provides little room, if any exists at

all, for quality differences or for special or advantageous

purchases of the raw product from suppliers and which,

SH

Be

o 49

because of uniform labor contracts, encounters processing

costs of rigid consistency. This court noted these very

factors in Pevely Dairy Co, v. United States, 8 8 Cir., 1949,

178 F. 2d 368, 367-69, cert. den. 339 U.S. 942, and observed

there that »

‘We are clear that mere uniformity of prices in the

sale of a standardized commodity such as milk is not

in itself evidenee of a violation of the Sherman Anti-..

Trust Act’’.

These stubborn facts of the milk business, by their very

existence, present difficulties in the prosecution of an anti-

trust case against commercial dairies. But of course they

_ not coustitute an insuperable obstacle to the successful ,

* prosec ution of such a ease, :

After carefully reviewing all the evidence and the entire

transcript here we have coneluded that, although some

might regard the ease as not a strong one, Beatrice was

nevertheless not entitled to a judgment of acquittal. Bea-

trice chose to stand on its motion for that judgment and

offered nothing in opposition or in explanation of the evi-

dence presented by the government. We cannot say that

that evidence, wholly apart from the Vavra and Anderson

testimony Which js mentioned below, was not sufficient to

sustain the jury’s verdict or that it was so affirmatively

adverse as to necessitate an acquittal. The bid patterns

at the Base and Hospital for the pre-conspiracy and post-

conspiracy periods contrast vividly with that prevailing

during the indietment period. The disparity in the bids

at each institution before and after; the 2% uniformity of °

the successful bids at both institutions during the period;

the indicated approximately equal division of the aggre-

gate business among the three defendants; the almost even

rotation, timewis, of the Base business between Beatrice

and Alamito; the absence of tie bids by Alamito; the

contrast with the simultaneously existing bid patterns at

fo

oe

Creighton and the University, and the Klesath testimony

manifestly present, upon the standards enunciated by the

authorities cited abové, an adequate basis for valid infer-

ences of the collusion statutorily forbidden. Of course,

there are arguments w hich can be made to the contrary.

But we are persuaded that those arguments are properly

for the jury and do not compel the acquittal which Beatrice

demands here as a matter of law. That those arguments

did not convince the jury is not any thing with which we

“may presently deal, even though, had the ease been tried

to us in the first instance, it might hay e been possible for

us to decide the issue otherwise.

The defense strenuously urges that there is an utter

absence of any direct and independent evidence of col-

laboration between the alleged conspirators. It is true

that Alamito’s wholesale manager testified that he did not

know what anyone else’s bid figures were going to be, that

Roberts’ treasurer testified that her company did not ob-

tain the approval of Beatrice, before they’ put into effect

their price bulletins designed for intra- plant use, and that

representatives of the Base and Hospital eath testified

that so far as he knew Beatrice had nothing( te do with

the preparation of any bid except its own. But this over-

looks, we feel, the bid pattern at the Base and the Hospital

and also the Klesath testimony. Although the Klesath

conversations had to do with matters affecting the area

generally and were not directed specifically to business at

the Base and the Hospital, the pricing at the latter was

dependent on the former. All this, it seems to us, is basic

evidence from which the inferences which the jury neces-

sarily drew could properly follow.

Beatrice, however, cites as controling authority United

States v. Borden Co., N. D. Tll., 1953, 111 F. Supp. 562, re-

versed as to the ( ‘layton Act issue but affirmed as to the ‘

© o1

Sherman Act issue, 347 U.S. 514; and Pevely Dairy Co. v.

United States, supra, 8 Cir., 1949, 178 F. 2d 363.

Borden was a,civil suit brought by the ‘United States.

Ten defendant dairies were charged with conspiracy to

restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in the sale

of fluid milk to wholesale customers in the Chieage area,

in violation of the Sherman Act, and with price diserim-

ination, in violation of the Clayton Act. Injunetive and

other relief was sought. Five defendants negotiated a

consent deeree. At the conelusion of the government’s

case the five remgining defendants each moved to dismiss.

The court initially observed that conspiracies of the kind

described in the complaint ‘‘are diffienlt to prove, and most

often can be proved only through. the use of evidence

which is cireumstantial and seemingly remote’’; t’ at the

testimony of solicitors of the defendants and of wholesale

customers served by the defendants revealed.‘‘ glaring in-

consistencies’? and cumulatively failed ‘‘to reveal any con-

sistent pattern of business conduct among the defendants’’:

and that the testimony did reveal a ‘‘continuous shuffling

of customers’? which was ‘‘not consonant with the exist-

ence of a monopolized market’’. The court reviewed other

oral- and documentary evidence and indicated that it was

‘‘more impressed with what the documents fail to show

_ rather than that which the documents show’’. The gov-

ernment introduced exhibits which were tabulatiéhs of bids

made bys the dairies for institutional customers. These

showed that particular defendants repeatedly submitted

low bids to particular institutions and that certain defend-

ants were alternately successful in bidding for the busi-

ness of certain institutions. The court refused to draw

from these charts the inferences of collusion for which the

government argued but concluded instead that the exhibits

showed no more than ‘‘a disposition on the part of certain

defendants to bid for the milk requirements of particular

52

public institutions’’. It went on to observe that there was

no direct evidence of an agreement or understanding among

the defendants or of intercorporate communication; that

reasonable businessmen will act similarly when facing a

like problem; that every major dairy in the-area had been

presented with the same problem, namely, the advent of

a new competitor, and that similar action directed toward

this problem did not enable the court to infer a concert

of action, Jt held that the government must present inde-

pendent evidence to jirove that the defendants were partici-

‘pants in a plan. The dismissal of that part of the com-

plaint which charged Sherman Act violations was therefore

granted. As we have noted above, this phase of the trial

court’s decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, pp.

516-17 of 347 U.S. The remainder of the case continues

in litigation. See United States v. Borden Co., 1962, 370

U.S. 460. |

In Pevely the two tlefendant dairies were convicted by

a jury of a conspiracy to fix wholesale and retail prices

on milk in the St. Louis area in violation of the Sherman

Act. Six individual defendants who were officers or em-

ployees of the corporate defendants were acquitted. One

of the issues raised by the defense was that the evidence

was insufficient to sustain the conviction. This court, in

ruling on the issue, observed that the evidence was wholly

circumstantial and undisputed. It noted that raw milk

prices were fixed by government regulation; that uilk

quality was prescribed by local ordinance; that labor costs

were substantially the same for each defendant; that the

processed product the defendants handled was a standard-

ized product; that the circumstantial evidence ‘consisted of

the uniformity of prices charged and the proximity in

time of price changes; that proved conversations between

employees of the defendants concerning price, announce-

ments occurred only some seven vears before the filing of

ihe

53 i

the indictment; that prices were thoroughly analyzed by

management upon the basis of economic factors; that the

evidence showed that those factors were the only, consider-

atifgns influencing the price changes; that the pricing sys-

tem was in accord with one established by an international

association; that economic principles must be recognized

by the courts; that mere uniformity of prices in the sale

of a standardized commodity such as milk is not in itself

evidence of a violation of the Sherman Act; that the price

changes were not simultanconus and were not uniformly

initiated by the same defendant; that the same economic

factors applied to each defendant; that the evidence was

undisputed that officials of the defendant dairies made no —

agreement with respect to the fixing of prices; that the

acquittal of the individual officials weakened the presump-

tiow of correctness usually attributable to the verdict of a

jury; that the circumstances were not inconsistent with

innocence; and that the motions ‘of the defendants for ac-

quittal should have been sustained. Judge Thomas dis-

sented on this issue.

Borden and Pevely do lend some’ support and arguimen- |

tative material to the position of Beatrice here, We feel,

however, that neither compels a conclusion that the evi-

dence in the present case was insufficient: to support a

jury verdict. In so holding we do net in any way impinge

upon the authority of either Perely or Borden. Both cases

were concerned with conspiracies alleged to exist with re-

svect to broad metropolitan areas, Here only two institu-

tions are involved. “Borden presented instances of what

the court chose to describe as ‘‘glaring inconsistencies in

the testimony’’; there was an absence of evidence of a

pattern of business conduct; and there was continnous

shuffling of customers. In Pevely the government's evi-

dence was Wholly circumstantial; there was evidence of

absence of agreement; no inter-corporate conversation with-

o4

r

in seven years was shown; and there, was proof that prices

were determined by each dairy acting independently upon

its own analysis ef economic factors. In both Borden and

Pevely testimony was presented by the defense which

served to destroy°the inferences the government urged.

In the case before us Beatrice has made no record, there

is at least some direct evidence supporting the circumstan-

tial, and there were bid patterns of definite outline. The

prosecution’s case rises aboye those presented ‘in Borden

and Pevely.

,

In cases of this kind direct testimony of unlawful agree-

ment is usually not available and the prosecution is com-

pelled to rely on inferences drawn from the course’ of con-

duct of the alleged conspirators. Here, as we have noted,

there is some supporting testimony of direct character.

In any event, we regard as pertinent the following lan-

guage of the Supreme Court in Interstate Circuit, Inc, v.

United States 1939, 306 U. S. 208, 225-26:

_. ‘Taken together. the circumstances of the case which

we have mentioned, when uncontradicted and with no

more explanation than the record affords, justify the

inference that the distributors acted in concert and in

common agreement * * *. When the proof supported,

as we think it did, the inference of such concert, the

burden rested on appellants of going forward with

the evidence to explain away or contradict it.’’

That Court has also said, with respect to criminal cases,

‘‘Once the Government has established its case, the de-

fendant remains quiet at his peril’’. Holland vy, United

States, 1954, 348 U. S. 121, 138-39.

4. Errors in the reception of evidence. This is di-

rected to the trial court’s admission into evidence of the

bids of Roberts and Alamito and of the testimony of gov-

ernment witnesses Vavra and Anderson,

55 Ata

The bid evidence is attackéd on the ground that a con-

spiracy cannot be proved by declarations of alleged co-

conspirators made outside the presence of the defendant.

We feel, however, that Beatrice’s own ‘bids are facts which

are pertinent to the issue here. It is true that the bids of

Alamito and Roberts were necessary to show their. par-

ticipation in the alleged conspiracy; when viewed alone,

however, those bids could not implicate Beatrice. It is the

bidding pattern of all three which evidences the con-

spiracy and the bids of all three constituted conduct rather

than declarations.

Vavra was a driver formerly employed by Alamito. He

testified that in May 1955 he started working parttime

for that dairy; that he ran its route to the Base; that in No-

vember of that year he talked with MeCarty, the Alamito

plant manager; that he asked McCarty what he was to Bs

when the route was over and if he would still be et

ployed; that MeCarty said, ‘** * * no, but that I would

probably be back in six months; that Alamito would have

the route out there again’’; that MeCarty told him he

‘*would probably be working every six months * * * it was

the policy of the two companies, Meadow Gold [Beatrice |

and Alaniio, that one would have it for six months and

then the other one’; that he was reemployed when

* Alamito received the contract «gain in June 1956; and that

MeCarty hail died by theetime of the trial.

Beatrice’s objection to the Vavra testimony is that it

was inadmissible in the absence of independent proof of

the claimed conspiracy. Because we feel that independent

proof of the conspiracy was present, we necessarily con-

clude that the district court did not err in admitting this

testimony. 5

Major Anderson was procurement officer at the Base

from 1955 to 1958. He testified that he had a conversa-

tion in his office with his clerk, Phyllis Orth, on May 8,

wv

1956, when bids were to be opened; that Mrs. Orth said,

‘‘T wonder whose turn it is today’’; that in response to

_ his inquiry she furfher said, ‘* Well, those bids are rotated

among the firms’’; and that she said that she based that

comment on ‘‘past observations of bid openings in this

office’’. The district court, on its own motion, struck that

festimony and directed ‘the jury to disregard it because

it was self-servi ing and not binding on Beatrice.

The Major then testified that he was present at the

opening of bids on that day; that he observed the bids

were identical on most fluid milk items; that ‘he announced

that they were. identical; that it was stated by those pres-

ent that the discounts would vary at different times; that

he then’ said,

‘*Do you mean to tell me that your costs of the various

firms are identical on all or a majority of these items

down to a fraction of a cent even though some of you

may have efficient personnel and equipment and some

of you: may have less efficient personnel and equ. p-

ment?”’;

and that they replied in the affirmative. In response to

an immediate inquiry by the court, Anderson conceded

that he had no way of disputing this because he had never

been in the milk business. .

Beatrice objected to the Anderson testimony on the

ground that it was hearsay and not binding on Beatrice.

It argues that the witness would not have ‘een permitted

to testify directly tha. ‘he uniform bids were the. result

of an illegal price-fixing conspiracy and that he should

not be allowed to do the same thing indirectly.

Clearly the Orth-Anderson conversation can be of no

significance on this appeal. With the proot aliunde in this

record we must accept the premise that the jury obeyed

the court’s instructions to disregard this testimony. We

view the situation as oneewhere the instruction has cured

57

the error and not as one of the kind where its withdrawal

cannot’ remove a harmful effect it caused. Compare Dolan

v. United States, 8 Cir. 1955, 218 F. 2d 454, 460, cert.

den, 849 U.S. 923; Wiley v. United States, 8 Cir, 1958, 257

F. 2d 900, 905-6; HNotteakos v. United States, 1946, 328

U. S. 750, 764-65; Deli Paoli v. United States, supra, p-.

242 of 352 U.S.

Although we have doubt as to the admissibility of the

other: Anderson testimony, we are not convinced that, if

its admission was error, there was resulting prejudice.

_ Anderson‘s comment was one which a jury would regard

as a natural reaction for a procurement officer and we

agree that whatever seeming significance it might initially

have had was dulled and dissipated by the — court’s

own rebuke and limiting question. On this recor \we hold

its admission to have been harmless error within the

standard of Rule 52(a), F. R. Cr. P. \

5. Errors in the instructions. Beatrice’s points here

are (a) that the trial court by its instructions in effect

amended the indictment by several times describing the

charge against the defendants as one to fix uniform prices

in the general Omaha area and (b) that the court’s thrice-

repeated emphasis to the jury that it should consider the

evidence as a whole was prejudicially misleading and con-

fusing. Appropriate exceptions were made,

7

We have read the instructions in their entirety and with

great care. It is seldom that counsel in a complicated

criminal case can be satisfied with every phrase of the

court’s charge to the jury. It is seldom, too, that an ap-

pellate court or, for thet matter, a trial court reviewing

his own instructions already delivered cannot find ways in

which those instructions could have been improved.

It would serve little purpose for us to set forth in this

already lengthy opinion the details of the charge which

58 c*) .

4 9

_ the defense aftacks here, It will spffice to -say that the

trial court did\make references to the ‘*¢ Jmaha aréa’’-and-~~

did speak of conspiring to maintain uniform and non-

competitive prices on dairy products in that area. : We

feel, however, that thé charge is neither fataily defective

nor unfair. It seems elpar to us (and, as to this, we have

considered the government's closing arguments and the

fact of the jury’s request, fiot acted upon by the court be- . * |

cause the verdict was returned ily the*interim, for a copy

of the text of the Sherman Act) that the jury did not

assume or understand that Beatrice was charged with

anything. other than a conspiracy directed solely to the

Base and the Hospital or, to express it reversely, that it

undertood Beatrice was not charged with a conspiracy to

fix uniform ‘prices generally in the Omaha market. We

are persuaded as to this by the court’s and counsels’ re-"

' peated emphasis upon the Base and the Hospital:as the

objects of the conspiracy. Also, the indictment .was read

‘to the jury and was specific in its confining aspects. The

evidence itself was overwhelmingly :dirécted tothe two

institutions. Area reference was not improper in itself

for the bids, in terms of discounts from wholesale dist.

prices, were of significatice only in relation to the prices

prevailing in the Omaha niarket. It is often the case that

a court might -properly have, given instructions requested

by the Mefense buttwe cannot say that the instructions here

did not adequately present the issues in a fourm under-—

standable to the jury. The situation is far different from

those involved ®i Stirone v. United States, 1960, 361 U.S.

912, and Bollenbach-v. United States. 1946, 6 U.S. 607,

and other cases suggested by the defense.

Beatrice’s argumeht as to undue emphasis upon the evi-

dence as a whgle also fails to persuade us. It is true that

the jury wis told three separate times during the course

of the instructions to consider the evidence as a whole. .

59 : lacs

But it was also told, and at least-three separate times, that

the cohspiracy had to be established by evidence inde-

pendent of the declarations of co- conspirators. Here, too,

we are not willing to assume on this record that the jury.

‘did not heed the cautionary portion. of this charge or was

e prejudicially confused. ‘*Our theory of -trial relies upon

the ability of a jury to follow. instructions” .,. Opper Y.

United States, 1954, 348 U.S. 84, 95. |

Affirmed. | ,

A true copy.

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*. : Attest: z ecg :

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

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_ APPENDIX B.

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| CHARGE TO JURY.

‘

”

By The Court: Ladieg and gentlemen of the Jury: :

Now that the evidence’ftas been’ presented to you and

the arguments of counsel have been made, it becomes my

duty to inforni you of the legal principles and considera-

tions by which you are to be guided in arr iving at your

verdict.

_ Under “your oaths of office you are bound by the law

as the Court shall declare it to you. As these ipstructions

embody the law gov erning this ease, it is ease that

vou give close ‘and careful attention to. them.

At the outset, I may properly urge you to make a.forth-

“rT ight:effort to accomplish.an agreement in your delibera-

.tions. Inconclusive trials are highly undesirable. A com-

mon ‘tinderstanding among competent and intelligent per-’

sons ought to be possible. on oer

Hoxever, this observation must not be construed by 3 any

juror as a suggestion of the abandonment, for the sake of

agreement alone, of an ‘opinion held understandingly and

earnestly p? him gr her. The ‘Court must never coerce

agreements by jurors. But it is appropriate to suggest that

if, during 1 your deliberations you should find yourselves in

apparent disagreement, each of you ought carefully to

examine the ground of his or her opinion before assum-

ing a final position of dissent. f. * ” °

An indictment, ladies and gentfemen, is a formal charge’

in writing against a defendant, or defendants. An indict-

ment is the result of an investigation by the Grand Jury

61 rs

and the officers of the law. This investigation is in no sense

to be taken as a trial, but it simply constitutes the regular

method of bringing the ie before the Court and Jury

for a trial.

The indictment itself is not evidence of¢ the guilt of a

—defendapt nor does it detract in any degreé fram the pre-

sumption of its innocence with which the law surrounds it

until its guilt is proved beyond a-reasonable doubt, and

in this instanee, when I say ‘‘it’’ I refer to the defendant

Beatrice Foods Company. This charge contained ‘in the

indictment the Government must establish by proof be-

yond a reasonable doubt in order to show the defendant

guilty “of the crime with which it stands charged.

Corporations are. entitled to the same fair and impartial

consideration at your hands, as are natural persons and

a corporation has the same intere*® and right that a

natural person has in defenditig its name » andsreputation

against’ imputations of crime.

You enter upon this investigation, ladies and gentlemen,

with. a presumption that Beatrice Foods Company is not

guilty of any crime, and this presumption stands’ as a

witness for it until-it is rebutted ‘and overturned by the

Government by competent and er redible proof. It is, there-

fore, incumbent: upon the Government, before you can

convict the defendant, to establish to your satisfaction be-

yond a reasonable doubt that the crime charged in the

indictment, and every constituent element thereof, has

heen ‘committed, that the same was committed, within the

Judicial District of the State of. Nebraska, and that Beat-

rice Foods Company committed *the crime in such a man-

ner.as would make it guilty under the law heretofore de-

fined and explained to you.

By reasonable doubt is not meant any possible or eap-

tious doubt that may arise in‘your minds, but it is that

A

ij

62

doubt engéndered after the application of the reasoning

of logical processes to. the evidence in the case, and an

inability after such te let the mind rest easily upon, the

certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not de-

manded by the law to convict on any criminal charge, but

‘moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required

as to every proposition of , Proof ee to constitute the

offense charged. ° ;

You are instructed that the ‘fact that the defendant. has

not produced evidence ‘in its behalf should not be con-

sidered or construed. in any way against it, and you are not

_ at liberty to indulge in any presumption of guilt or any

-unfavorable presumption or inference because it has not

produced evidence in its own behalf.

Under our law a defendant is entitled to take the stand

or not as he, she, or it chooses, and under our Constitution

‘ho one is compelled to be a witness .agathst themselves.

No presumption whatsoever is to be ‘indulged against a

defendant _because it does not take the stand, and it does

not ‘change the fact that the burden of proof is upon the

government, to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reason-

able doubt.

On ‘August 28, 1958, a Grand Jury for this District re-

turned an indictment in one, count against the defendant .

Beatrice Foods Company. As I have instructed you before:

while Roberts Dairy Company and Alamito Dairy Com-

pany are included in this indictment, they are not on trial

at this time. Py |

The indictment, so far as material for your purposes,

‘reads as ‘follows: , a

‘“‘The Grand Jury charges: Beginning in or about

January of 1954, the exact date being to the grand

jurors unknown, and continuing thereafter up to about

April, 1957, the defendant and others to the grand

a?

jarors unknown have ‘‘engaged in a combination and

conspiracy to éliminate and suppress Competition in

the sale of milk and cream to the Offutt Air Force Base

and the Veterans Hospital in unreasonable restraint

of the aforesaid trade and commerce in violation of

Section 1 of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, 26

Stat. 209, as amended (15 U.S. C. 1) entitled ‘An Act

to protect trade and commerce against unlawful

restraints and heintntine,’ commonly known as the

* Sherman Act. The aforesaid combination and con-

spiracy has consisted of a-»continuing agreement,

understanding and cert of action among the de-

fendants, the substanfial terms of which were:

(a) To fix and establish non-competitive prices and

. discounts for milk and cream sold and distributed

to'the Offutt Air Force Base ;

(b) To fix and establish non-competitive prices and

discounts for milk and cream sold and @stributed

by the defendants to the Veterans Hospital ;

(c) To allocate to the defendant Roberts, the bid

contract business of supplying milk and cream to

‘the Veterans Hospital ; oe :

(d) To alternately allocate to the defendants Alamito

and Beatrice the bid contract business of supply-

ing milk and cream to the Offutt Air Force Base.”’

Members of the jury, the purpose of the antitrust laws,

it should probably be briefly explained in the outset, is to

preserve the free flow of commerce among the several

states and to keep its channels open,free and unobstructed

to all. Their further ae is to secure to everyone an —

equal right*and opportunity to engage in the trade and

commerce of the country. They providé, among other

things, against conspiracies in restraint of free competition

in business and commerce which tend to restrict production,

64

fix, raise, stabilize or control-prices, or to maintain uniform

and non-competitive prices or otherwise control the market

to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods or

services, all of which is considered: as being injurious to

the public welfare.

1 shall now explain to you the law as applicable to the

charges in this indictment.

The pertinent’ section of the Sherman Act upon which

the indictment in this case is based reads as follows:

‘tEvéry contract, combination in the form of trust or

otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-

‘merce among the several states, is declared to be illegal.

K¥ery person who shall make any contract or engage

_ on any combination or conspiracy condemned by«this

Jaw shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, on

conviction thereof, shall be punished.”

Conspiracy, for your information, is a combination of

two or more persons by concerted action to aceomplish a

criminal, or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in <

itself criminal by unlawful means. Formal agreement

between the parties concerned is not essential to the forma-

tion of a conspiracy, but it is sufficient.if it is a concert

of action of all the parties working together understand-

ingly with a single design for the accofnplishment of. a

common purpose, or purposes. If the evidence of the

separate details of the transaction or transactions as it

or they are carried out indicates with requisite certainty

the existence of a preeneartes plan or purpose, that ts.

sufficient.

°

The conspiracy. is complete. whether the offense whieh

the parties haye agreed, or conspired, to commit, such as

price fixing or price maintenance, is committed or not. A

person may be guilty of a conspiracy if he takes any part

,in same knowingly, as set out, and the burden rests upon

65°

°

the Government to prov e guilty know ledge of the accused

: beyond a reasonable doubt.

A person joining a combination or coming into @ con-

spiracy after it is formed and in some way assisting in its

execution is a party thereto anti is liable therefor to the

same extent as if he had been an original party anda mem-

ber from the inception of the same.

It is not necessary, the Court should advise you, that

one conspirator know of each separate and minute act on

the part of another conspirator or have knowledge of all

of the operations of a conspiracy. *e

The gist of a conspiracy, ladies and gentlemen, is that

two or more persoys shall form a plan for concerted action.

You mist, under the- rules, as the Court has ‘stated, find at

least two of the alleged conspirators herein did this before

you would be justified in convicting the defendant.

— The concerted action or cooperation referred to may

arise from definite, express and well-understood, agreement

or combination, or it may ‘arise as well from a tacit silent’

; understanding. The understanding, comgmation or agree-

ment between the parties in a given cas@ to effect the

unlawful purpose charged must be proved beyond a reason-

able doubt, because without corrupt understanding there

>

is no conspiracy.

The defendant on trial in this case, you understand,

is a corporation. A corporation acts through its agents,

including its employees and officers. Therefore, in, deter-

mining whether the corporate defendant in this case has

violated:-the antitrust laws, it is necessary for you to

determine that the corporation has performed the acts

_ charged in the indictment: by virtue of and through the

acts of its agents, meaning its officers and employees.

In order for a corporation to be responsible for the

acts orestatements of an agent, it is not necessary that the

3

66

corporation, specifically authorize the agent to commit the

act or make the statement. A corporation is legally bound

by the acts and statements of its agenté done or made

within the scope of their express or apparent authority.

Express authority is that specifically given to an agent

by his superior; apparent authority is the authority which

outsiders would normally assume that the agent would -

have, judging from his position with the company and the

circumstances surrounding his past conduct. When the

act of the agent is within the scope of his, apparent author-

ity, the corporation is held legally responsible for it, al-

though it may be contrary to his actual instructions and

although it may be unlawful.

Ladies’ and gentlemen of the jury, the’ Court has in-

structed you that any act done by a party to a conspiracy

in furtherance of a common design and pending the illegal

enterprise, is, ini law, the act of all, and proof thereof. is

evidence against all who parthipate. Likewise, the Court

has instructed you that declarations by one alleged con-

spirator in the same circumstances are competent in evi-

dence against all. In this connection, however, the C ourt

instructs you, and you should keep this in mind in your

consideration of this case, that acts and declarations of an

-o alleged conspirator performed. or ‘made in the absence of

other conspirators, while competent against all who are

connected with the consptracy which has been formed and

which is in existence, such acts and*declarations may be

considered by you only if a conspiracy has-been found by

«3

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you to have been formed and the alleged conspirators are ©

_ ddentified with same. In other words, before you are war-

: oe : a

ranted in considering such acts or statements madé by one

alleged corispiratoy which might implicate other alleged

, conspirators, it is necessary for the Government to show

-the existence of a conspiracy, and this must be done by

independent evidence; that is, other evidence of a substan-

. vaitieg . 67

tial nature, you understand, leaving out the acts and decla-

rations of any alleged conspirator, or conspirators, referred

to. . ,

The question with you is whether or not Beatnce Foods

Company has entered into an agreement to fix and establish

prices ‘and digcounts on milk or to divide or allocate the

bid business of -supplving milk to Offutt Air Force Base

cand the Veterans Hospital. The Government contends that

“such an agreement is proven in part by testimony of tele-

phone conversations prior to price changes which were .

initiated on August 1, 1956, and January 1, 1957. The facts ©

are for yon to decide. Of course, as the Court has stated, an

agreement to fix or establish prices need not be formal nor

need it be spelled out in any certain language. It is for you

‘to consider the entire conversations and the setting in

which they took place, and to determine from that whether

or not Beatrice Foods Company reached a common under-

* standing with Roberts or Alamite, or both, to fix and estab-

lish its price. In this connection it is not necessary for the

Government to prove that every price change initiated or

every bid received by Beatrice Foods Company was pre-

ceded by telephone conversations 3 by Beatrice Foods Com-

pany with Roberts or Alamito and resulted from a price-

" fixing agreement among them. A single agreement to fix,

maintain or establish prices and discounts. constitutes a

violation of the law. F

As a first order of business, tifen, in your consideration. *

of this case, you, will first inquire as-to whether or not.

the Government has’ proven @ conspiracy existed by sepa-

rate and‘ independent evidence before you are wart anted

in considering any actions or declarations made pursuant,

to same as herein stated by the Court...

4

In determining the character of a combination, it is to

be judged not only by examining’ its separate parts, but by

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looking at it as a whole. It is not essential that each and

every act. be unlawful for acts done to give effect to the

unlawful agreement may be, in themselves, wholly innocent

acts, Yet if they are part of the sum of acts entered into

to make effective a price fixing agreement, then the evi-

. y» dence as a whole establishes a violation of the antitrust

oo! J

‘ laws. ..

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t

The Court instructs you that it would be a violation of

’ the Sherman Act for a group of individuals or corporations

to act together to fix, stabilize or control the prices to be

charged for dairy products which they handle, or to main-

tain uniform prices thereon, that is » you understand, espe-

‘cially where they control a substantial part of the inter-

state trade and commerce in that commodity. .Where the

members of a group, or- combination, has the power to fix

prices or otherwise regulate or control same and knowingly

act together for that purpose, the combination is illegal

and it is immaterial how reasonable or unreasonable the

prices agreed on ara, or to what extent they are or may be

effected by the combination: If such illegal combination

exists, it does not matter that there might have been other

factors which contribute to the raising of prices. .

To elaborate, the aim and result.of every, price fixing

agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of

competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably —

exercised or not, involves power to control the market and

- , to fix arbitrary and unréasonable prices. The reasonable

price fixed today may, through economic and business

‘ changes become the unreasonablefrice of tomorrow. Once

established; it may be maintained unchanged because of

the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a

price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create .

such potential power are in themselves unreasonable or —

> unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute in-

quiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreason-

vw

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@) a

able as fixed and without placing on the Government in

enforcing the antitrust laws the burden of ascertaining

from day to day whether it has become ‘unreasonable

through the mere variation of economic conditions.

Under the Sherman Act, ladies and gentlemen, ‘a com-

bination formed for the purpose and. with the effect of

raising, fixing, stabilizing or controlling or maintaining the

price of a commodity in interstate commerce, such as dairy

products, is illegal per se, or in and of itself, and a viola-

tion of the antitrust laws of the United States.

The Court should probably remind the jury at this point

that there is no controverted issue in the trial of this case

concerning the interstate character of the operation of

the defendants on trial with respect to their produets.

It is stipulated by the parties, as a matter of fact, that

the defendant on tria! was at all times materially eaaged

in interstate commerce, witherespect to the dairy products

here in queStion. - } | pe |

For your information, fixed prices on merchandise or

commodities means agreed prices and an agreement to fix

prices or to maintain uniform prices, as I say, is illegal in

itself, and this is true regardless of the machinery, meech-

e

anism or means employed :to arrive at this results and.

régardless of any cost factors which might enter into the *

manufacture and marketing of such commodities, for such

cost factors are irrelevant and immaterial where prices

are fixed, controlled or, maintained by agreement of the

parties. / ‘

So ladies and gentlemen, whatever justification or mo-—

tive, whether economic, benevolent, or otherwise, that price-

fixing agreements may be said to have, the law does not

permit inquiry into their reasonablenéss. Therefore, if you

determine that the defendants agreed or conspired to fix,

stabilize, or control prices, or agreed to maintain uniform

>

me 70 )

. and non-competitive prices of dairy products in interstate

- commerce within the Omaha area, you must find them guilty

notwithstanding the motives or purposes of the defendant

in so agreeing or acting. ee ;

The Court has stated to you the purposes of the Sherman

Antitgust Act and the restrictions under it, but hfs not

intended to leave the impression that it is unlawful for

dairy operators to sell dairy products at the same or

uniform prices, nor is it unlawful for ne dairy to meet

the price of another dairy, whether the price is lower or

higher. The mere fact that one or more of the dairies in-

volved here may have promptly met the price of another,

or thatethere was aj simultaneous price change, if such is

the evidence in your opinion, is not Sufficient to warrant

you in returning a verdict of guilty. Before you can con-

Vict the defendant on trial in'this case you must find from

the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any equality

or uniformity of prices at a given time resulted, as the

Court has stated, from a combination or conspiracy to fix,

control or maintain prices of dairy products in the Omaha

area. ,

* Beatrice Foods Company is charged with having com-

bined and conspired to fix and: establish non-competitive

prices and discounts for milk sold to Offutt Air Force

Base or the Veterans Hospital duriyg the period alleged

"in the indictment. Beatrice Foods Company is not eharged

with having combined or conspired to fix and establish

identical prices.

You may consider the facts, if you find them to be true,

that the prices and discounts charged to Offutt Air,Force~

Base or the Veterans Hospital during the period charged in

the indictment were not identical, only. insofar as yén be-

lieve such facts bear upon the question .of whether or not

the defendant entered into a combination or conspiracy to

71 ‘

fix and establish such prices and discounts.’ If, after a

consideration of all the evidenge, you find that the defend-

—antriid engage in a combination or conspiracy to fix aad

establish said prices uty discounts, as charged in +.

indictment, the fact that the prices and discounts were

not identical would not constitute a defense.”

It is not the law, members of the jury, that one cannot

sell his products at any price which is agreeable to him.

He may fix his own price at any level he desires so long

as he does not enter into an agreement or conspiracy with

other’ to fix, cgntrol or maintain the price of his products

which move ig interstate commerce.

The Court i tseyou, of course, that if you believe

the evidence in this casé shows a situation or situations

‘with respect to prices brought about by conditions, or fae-

tors, other than by agreement or agreements between the

defendant and others whicli established non- -competitive

- prices and discounts of dairy products from time, to, time

at Offutt Air Force Base, and the Veterans Hospital it

would be your duty to find in favor of the defendant, since

_ the main charge, as you have been advised, for which the

defendant:is on trial isthat of agreeing or conspiring to fix,

control or maintain the prices of dairy products. ~

Under tke Sherman Act, which is the legal basis for

this indictment, as you understand, it is“not unlawful for

competitors to, discuss labor problems, or the economic

conditions, of the gompanies, or the effect labor contracts

may have upon pricés, or the prices the ‘mselves, so long

as there is no combination, conspiracy or agreement be-

tween the competitors by which they sigree upon, fix or

stabilize their prices. °

‘The mere fact that the Government was the customer

© or prospective customer in the transactions. under examina-

tion is immaterial. The. Government has no o special: rights

27

‘ oT, ie < e 72 ‘

as a customer under thé‘antitrust laws and business firms °

have, the same liberty to decide whether they wish to sell

their products to the Government agenties, on what terms

and prices, as they have with fesnect to selling to private

firms or institutions.

The existence and nature of a! conspiracy or agreement

to restrain ‘trade it violation of the Sherman Antitrust

Act is to be determined upon a consideration of*the evi-

denge as a whole. It is not essential that each and ev ery

sact be unlawful, and you may find that many of the .acts

and statements ‘shown by the evidence are wholly immocent

when viewed individually. ‘

If you should find from all of the evidence beyord a

reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, you must never-

‘theless determine, as to the defendant Beatrice Foods indi-

vidually and separately whether or not it joined such.con-

spiracy. In other words, the membership of the defeudant

Beatrice Foods Company must be determined‘ from’ the © 3

evidence concerning its own actions. ..

If, and when it appears from the evidence presented here

that conspiracy existed, then the acts and statements of

any of the corpogations involved herein found to be a

member of the conspiracy may be considered by the jury

as evidence i in the case as to all of the cor porations, inelud-

ing this defendant, found to have been members. ot the

_ conspiracy, even though the.acts and statements may have |

_ occurred in the absence and without the knowledge of the

other members; provided such acts and statements weré

knewingly done and made during the continuance of such

conspiracy and in furtherance of an object or purpose of

the conspiracy.

Otherwise, any, admission or incriminator y statement

made by one person may not be considered as evidence

against any person who was not present and heard the

statement made.

vw

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=

Ordinarily, ev idence of acts and declarations of.an agent

of a corporation are admissible only as against that cor- .—

poration: Howeve, if you find that some or all of the -

corporations here, including the ‘defendant, acting through

their agents entered into an agreement or: understanding

concerning dairy prices, then evidence of acts or declara-

tions of an agent of one corporation who had agreed will

be binding upon all others who were parties to the same

agreement. This i is true, whether or not the other corpora-

tions, Who you may have found to have agreed, had any

knowledge of the commission of the act or the making of

*

the declar ations. - °° °

For this reason, .it is not necessary to show that all cor-

porations who you may have found to have agreed partici-

pated in every act, so long as one of the group did so act

in furtherance of the unlawful agreement.

You are instructed that in order to justify_a jary in

finding a verdict of guilty based entirely upon circumstan-

-tial evidefice, th@Tacts must not only be consistent with the

guilt of the defendant, but they must be inconsfstent with

any other reasonable hypoth¢sis that can be predicated

upon the evidence, Stated another way, not only must each

fact- relied upon to show guilt be proved beyond a reason-

able doubt, but such fact must be consistent with alk other

facts jntroduced in a chain of circumstances, and such facts

must further be inconsistent with any other rational con-

clusion than that of guilt of the defendant.

As I have said, the guilt of the defendant may be” livin

by circumstantial evidence alone and whether the. guilt of

the defendant has been so established is for you to deter-

mine. Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon to es-

tablish the-conspiracy of any other essential facts, it is not

only necessary that all the circumstances concur to. show

the existence of such conspiracy and facts sought to be

~

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74

proved, but such. circumstantial evidence must be incon-

sistent with.any other rational conclusion.

The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their

testimony are questions exclusively for you to determine.

In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of |

the several witnesses you should take into consideration

their interest in the result of the suit, if any such is proved ; -

their conduct and demeandr while testifying; their. appar- -

ent fairness or bias if any such.appears,.and opportunities

for seeing and knowing the things about which they testify ;

the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the story told by

them, and all the ev ridonée and facts and circumstances

proved tending to corroborate or contradict Such witnesses,

if any such appear.

If you find that any witness in this case has wilfully

testified falsely as to any material fact in the case, then you

are at liberty wholly to disregard all of the #estimony of

that witness, if you gonsider it to be wholly unwo: thy of

credence. However, you are not obliged so to disregard all

of the testimony of such witness and should not do so if in

your opinion any part ‘or parts of such testimony are

worthy of helief.

In this case, the only witnesses you have heard have been

‘ witnesses tendered by the Government. In bringing these

witnesses before you, the Government vouches for them

‘ and cannot, unlegs. the: witnesses have contradicted each

other, disavow any substantial part of their evidence re-.

gardless of whether it was given while the witness was on

direct examination by Government counsel or was given

while the witness was on cros#examination by defense

counsel. . - 8

The Court instructs the jury that the number of wit-

nesses alone testifying for one side or the other should not

determine the question of the guilt or innocence of a de-

<

e

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75

°

. fendant. Before you can determine the innocence or guilt

of a defendant it is your duty to consider all the evidence

introduced upon the trial. |

There is nothing peculiarly different in the way a jury

is'to consider the: proof in a criminal case from that by

which men and women give their attention to any question,

depending upon evidence presented to them. You are ex- .

pected to use your good sense, vonsider the evidence for the

purpose only for which it Jias been admitted ang in the

light of your knowledge of the natural tendencies and pro-

pensities of human beings resolve the facts according to

deliberate and cautious judgment, and while ‘remembering

that the defendant is entitled to any reasonable doubt that

may remain in your minds, remember as ‘well that if no

such doubt of guilt remains, the Government is entitled to

a verdict. 3 -

It is the right and duty of an attorney, whether repre-

senting the Government or a defendant, to protect the in-

terests of his client by objecting to the introduction of, or

moving to strike out, evidence he deems improper, as well

as to offer jevidence he helieves competent for admission.

You must not be prejudiced against any party to this case

because the attorney. for such party may_bave made suchs

objections or motions og offers, regardless of the Court’s

ruling thereon.

You. must disregard entirely any personal sympathy

which you may have or feel for the defendant. Likewise,

however, you must entirely disregard, and be utterly un-

influenced by, any inclination to which you may de tempted

towards a personal prejudice against the defendant fie’

out of any consideration and particularly out of the nature

and character of the charge made against the defendant.

You must try and determine the case solely upon the evi-

dence’ before you and the instructions contamed in the

charge now given you by the Court.

°

a

76

The punishment provided by law for the siiinns charged

in the indictment is a matter exclusively within the prov-

ince of the Court, and it is not to be considered by the jury

it arriving at an impartial verdict as to the guilt or inno-

cence of the defendant.

. You should carefully and impartially investigate, weigh

and consider all the evidence received in this trial. You are

to found your verdict upon the evidence received and upon

that alone. You are not to presume the —— of -any

fact unless it has been testified to on the trial.” You are not

to supplement what has been testified to with any other |

fact’ that you may think exists but which has not been

proved. In short, you are to determine this case upon>the

evidence before you and not upon what may or may not

exist outside that evidence. You are not to permit your-

selves to be influenced by evidence offered and excluded or

stricken out, if any theré be, nor by any statements of coun-

‘sel during the progress of the trial, or any arguments that

are not justified by the evidence, if any such statements or

arguments have been made.

Ta the trial of this case and in this charze, I have in no

wise attempted to express my opinion as to se guilt or

innocence of the defendant, and you must not construe any

statement, action or ruling by me as the presiding judge in.

the trial of tius cause, nor any of the instructions now given

you, nor this charge as a whole, as an.indication of any

opinion of mine upon the guilt or innocence of the defend-

ant. In this court it is within the province of the judge, in

his charge, to comment, or express his opinion, upon the

evidence or even. upon the guilt or innocence of a defendant

who is on trial. T have endeavored not to do that in this

instance>] have perceived no excepfional or confusing sit-

uation in the evidence, which might reasonably be expected

to elude you without my elucidation. Regardléss of what

\

77

»

- | may have chosen to say, regardless of any comment upon

the facts which you may consider I have actually made, I

must admonish you that you are the sole judges of the

facts; and your verdict must respond to your own recollec-

tion of them and your own conclusion touching them from

the evidence, and not to any intimation of my recollection

_or opinion of the evidence, which you may y consider that you

have discerne® in this charge.

: °

Some of the exhibits which have been received in evi-

dence will be made availabf to you for examination during

your study of the cases They must be returned into court

when you have imaie your deliberations.

Qa

When you retire to the jury room, members of the jury,

yor will first elect one of your members as foreman. It

will th 1 be the foreman’s duty to preside over your delib-

vera s on your verdict; to act as your chairman ; and to

represent you as spokesman i the further conduct of this

case.

— One form of verdict has been prepared and will be‘taken

with you when you retire for your delibe ration... This form

~ of verdict will be adequate for the expression of your ver-

dict in this case. Your foreman only will date and sign the

form reflecting your verdict. The form of verdict must

be returned to the clerk upon thes completion ®f your

deliberations. °

This being a criminal case, you will not hereafter be

allowed to separate until your deliberations have been

completed.

If 9%. becomes necessary during your deliberations to”

communicate with the Court, your foreman may send a

note by the Marshal. : > Never attempt to communicate with

the Court by any means other than a signed w riting. And

bear in mind that you are not to reveal to the Court or to

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78

any person how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise,

until you have reached an unanimous verdict.

Your meals and lodging, while you are heing kept to-

gether will be provided for you under the Marshal's direc-

tion, if your deliberations continue during a ported of of time

sufficient to require such provision.

As the Judge presiding over the trial, I shall be av ailable

in this building throughout the remainder of the present

day and until your verdicts have been returned, and shall

receive them promptly upon their return.

Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, that completes the

reading of the Court’s charge. Ladies and yentlemen of

the Jury, you will now fepair to your jury room while

counsel for both sides are given an opportunity to take

such exceptions as they may want to take to the Court’s

charge.

DEFENDAN'R® REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO 1.

(Much of this instruction was given as tendered-or in

slightly amended form. ‘However, the paragraph ap-

pearing in boldface was denied.)

INsTRUCTION No. 1.

The indictment charges that ‘in approximately January™

1954, Beatrice Foods Company, Roberts Dairy Company

and Alamito Dairy Company, and others, entered into a

combination and conspiracy to eliminate and suppress com-

petition in the sale of milk and cream to Offutt Air Force

Base and Veterans Hospital, and that the combination and

conspiracy consisted of a continuing agreement, under-

standing and concert of action among those three compa-

nies, the substantial terms of which were:

79

To fix and establish non-competitive prices and dis-

counts for milk and cream sold and distributed to the

Offutt Air Force Base;

To fix and establish non-competitive prices and dis-

counts for milk and cream sold and distributed by the

defendants to the Veterans Hospital ;

To allocate to the defendant Roberts, the bid contract

business of supplying milk and cream to the Veterans -

Hospital ; :

~ To alternately allokate to the defendants Alamito and

Beatrice the bid contract Dysiness of supplying milk

and cream to the Offutt Air Force Base.

The issue in this case is solely whether the Government has

proved the defendant guilty of the particular conspiracy

defined in the indictment. Evidence, if any, of any other

or different conspiracy is immaterial to the ifsue you are

to decide.” The price of milk to the housewife in Omaha or

_to grocery stores or other institutions is not in issue in this

case. (Denied.)

‘

>.

80

R APPENDIX C

\ dasa 74

.: _— Judgment.

Unrrep States Court oF AppEats,

ve tai Eighth Circuit.

> No. 16,899 ; Sictintn Termy, 1962

ee Beatrice Foops Co.,

Appellant,

“ws.

Unitep States or AMERICA.

AppEaL FROM the United States District Court for the

= aan Sa District of Nebraska.

THis CAUSE came on to be heard on the record from the

United States District Court for the ............ District

of Nebraska, and was argued by counsel. ;

On consIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here-ordered and

* adjudged by this Court, that the judgment and sentence

of the said District Court, in this cause, be, and the same

is — affirmed.

Seaueny 2, 1963.

Order entered in accordance with opinion:

° Rosert ©. TuckER,

Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals —

for the Eighth Circuit.

A al

Bry

. —

APPENDIX D. :

°

Constitution gf the United States, Amendment V:

“*No person shall be held to answer for a capital or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising. in

the land or naval forees, or in the Militia, when in

actual service in time of War or public danger, nor

shall any person be subject for the same offence ‘to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall, be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty. or property,

without due process. of law; nor shall private: prop-

erty be taken for public use, without just compensa-

tion.’’ ,

Constitution of: the United States, Amendment VI:

“In all criminal prosecutions, fhe accused shall

enjoy the righ® to a speedy and public trial, by an im-

partial jury of the State and district wherein the crime

shall have been:committed, which district shall have

been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed

of the nature and eause of the accusation; to be con-

fronted with the witnesses against him, to have com-

pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,

and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense:”’

Sherman Act, Section 1, (15 U.S. C.1):

‘Every contract, combination in the form of trust

or otherwisg or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or

commerce among the several States, or with foreign

nations, is hereby declared to be illegal: Provided,

-That nothing herein contained shall render illegal,

contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices

for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label

or container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or

name of the producer or distributor of such commodity

and which is in free and open competition with com-

moglities of the same general class produced or dis-

‘.

%3.*

ars

tributed by others, when contracts or agreements of

that description ave lawful as applied to intrastate

transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy

now or hereafter in effect in any’State, Territory, or

the District of Columbia in which such resale is to

be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported

for such resale, and the makjng of such contracts or

- agreements shall not be an unfair method of com-

petition under Section 5, as amended ang supplemented,

of the act entitled ‘An Act to ereatéra Federal Trade

Commission,.to define ‘its powers and duties, and for

other purposes,’ approved September 26, 1914: Pro-

vided further, That the “preceding proviso shall not

make lawful any contract or agreement, prov iding for

the establishment or maintenance of nrinimum resale

prices on any commodity herein involved, between man- -

~ufacturers, or between producers, or- between. whole-

salers, or .between: brokers, or between factors, or >

“between retailers, or- between persons, firms, or cor-_

’ porations in competition with each other, ° Every person

who shall make any contract or engage in any combina-

tion or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall

be deemed guilty of «a misdemeanor, and,.on convie!

tion thereof, shall he punished by fine not exceeding fifty

thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding

one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion

of the court.”’ af :

Clayton Act; Section 5(a) (15 U. S. ¢. 16(a)): e

‘*A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter

rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought:

by or on behalf of the United States under the anti-

trust laws to*the effect that a defendant has violated

said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such ,

defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any

other party against such defendant under said laws

or by the United States under section 4A, as to all

matters respecéing which said judgment or degxee

would be an estoppel as between the parties thersto

Provided, That'this section shall not apply to consent

judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has

been taken or To judgments or decrees entered in

actions under section 4A.”’

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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