Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Weinstein v. New York
Supreme Court brief1963
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
ss +
IN THE ; ‘
Supreme, Court of the United States —
Ocroper Term, 1962.
, No. 8 3 2
BEATRICE FOODS CO., ’
& x Petitioner,
US.
«
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,”
, Respondent,
s
: : ¥ % :
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF*“CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT (AND APPENDICES). r)
he
* Grorce B. CHRISTENSEN,
bie Counsel for Petitioner. ~
b]
I
Sr
- Wiystox, Straws, SMITH & PATTERSON,
38 South Déarbern Street,
Chicago % Minois,
frzceraLp, Hamer, Brown & Lrany.e
Insurance Building,
Omaha 2, Nebraska,
Of Counsel.
THE GUNTHORP. WARREN PRINTING COMPANY, CHICAGO
INDEX. o
Appendices 2 ° RAGE
(A) Court of Appeals Opinion anes eee 27
(B) Charge to the Jury .................. sa 60
(Cp) SUMBMIORE oo ee cc cern e ence eseeceseens 80
(D) Constitutional and Statutory” Provisions see On
ng SET TREE SEE een ePKLKR Naas Kee - 25
Jarisdiction unice k EW RESAA WHER SONGS OE CSA REQ OOK Reis 2
Opinion Below .... MGM kivaka' pina ias lana ae ot
Questions Presented [ha SdG se SS* CORREA OCEAN ELAN EW KES ‘2
Reasons for Granting SP aRRR ERR ae aos 13
UGS Arie scan eck cetgaeenes seeeweenene oe Pes
“. List or AuTHORITIEs.
ye) me eee ace vas 19
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607, 613...... + 20
Brinegar v.4’nited States, 338 U.S. 160) 174.......... 14
~ DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.’S. 353, 362...........6. ww
" Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217.....0.... 23
7 Flintkote. Company,v. Lysfjord, 246 F’. 20 368........ 23,
™ Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 415.......21, 23
) Holland v. United States, 348 U.S; 121, 1388.......... 14
Janko v. United States, 281 F. 2d 156, Rev *d. 366 U.S.
TUR er GSA dk BE Ook 4K 5 NERS ERAWA SLA Whee d hae LORS 22
_ Kotteakos’ y. United States, 328 U. S.-750, 164 eh ks of 22, 24
" Krulew itch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, Re , 29"
__ __hatwak-v-Pnited States, 344 U. S. 604, 617.......... 23
it
= Meyer v. T. J. MeCarthy Steamship Company, 183 F.
og Supp. G54, GOT... 6... eee eee eee ees 7 out
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-21)... .-. 19, 21
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributs
ing Carporation, 346 U.S. 537, Eras NA ecrarr oie 17
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96....... Pruebas 1 .
‘United States v. Borden, 111 F. Supp. 562, aff'd.
relevant part, 347 U.S. 5142... 66 eee «16
United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313, 32! ep re ere 24
Yates v. United-States, 304 UL. S. 298, 312..... Pp raetre 21
?
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
-OcroserR Term, 1962.
: a” '
Be tet
BEATRICE FOODS CO.,” ’
Petitioner,
vs.
- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
2
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT.OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH: CIRCUIT (AND APPENDICES).
: Y
Beatrice Foods Co. prays that a writ of certiorari issue
to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered herein. (Judgment
appears as Appendix C.)
°
OPINIONS BELOW. .
The opinion of the Court of Appeals has not’ yet been.
Ss
_ reported and is printed as Appendix A hereto. (Peti- °
tioner raises no point here as to Section 1 of the opinion,
‘‘Challenge to the grand jury array?’ pp. 29 to 37 infra,
and it will be unnecessary for this Court to study those
pages. )
¢
eae | 3.
JURISDICTION.
Judgment of’ the Court of Appeals was entered January
2, 1963. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
‘U.S. C., See. 1254(1). Time for this petition was extended
by Mr. Justice Brennan to February 27, 1963.
"<2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
. 1. ) .
/
e
May a-criminal conviction under the Sherman Act. be
permitted where the’ Government’s’ direct evidence ex-
pressly negatives the conspiracy charged and its cireum-
° stantial evidence is as consistent with innocence as with
guilt? °
«aE at ag a
Where the prosecutor repeatedly argues to the jury that
he has proved a ‘‘blatant’’ crime other than the one charged
~ {in the indictment (and also has proved the one charged),
is it a violation of due process and of the right to an indict-
1ature and cause of the accusation for
the jury that it must find the defend-”
ant guilty if it believes the other, non-alleged crime was
proved?
»
“In what at best for the Government is a close or doubt-
ful criminal case has a defendant’s right to a fair jury
* trial been properly weiglied when a court fails to consider ~
the cumulative prejudice of multiple evidentiary and. in-
structional errors? ;
“
Where a timely, sworn motion is made for dismissal of
an indictment.(and for production of the grand jury. min-
utes to support the averments of the motian), because the
os “ =
P
——- —— &
3
prosecutor i invaded the province of the grand jury and pro-
cured the indictment by accusing witnesseQof perjury, by
repeatedly stating that the crime, the possible existence of -
which was for the jury to determine, had in fact been com-
mitted, and by making other evaluative statements, is it a
denial of due process and a defendant's right of confronta-
tion for the District Court to refuse access to the jury
minutes, to examine them in camera and then hold that the °
motion to dismiss should be denied becatse, in the District
Court’s opinion, the minutes did not support the motion?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
v INVOLVED.
Constitution of the United States, Amendments
V and VI. '
15 U.S. C. 1, 26 Stat. 209 (Shérman Act).
‘15 U.S. C. 16(a), 38 Stat, 731 (Clayton Act).
(Texts are set forth in Appendix, D.)
7
STATEMENT. |
Petitioner was fndicted fer allegedly conspiring with
‘Roberts Dairy Company and Alamito Dairy Company to
eliminatesand suppress competition in the sale of milk and
cream to Offutt Air Force Base and to United States
Véterans Hospital; both near Omaha, from January 1954
to April 1957. ‘ioe? 3
The indictment, 2s the Court of Appeals recognizes
(p. 48, infra), was ‘‘very confined’’; it did not charge
defendants with illegally maintaining uniform prices, al-
though the fact, necessarily well known to the grand jury,
“was that there were uniform prices to the public and to
dealers in the Omaha area before, during, and after the
indictment period. The indictment alleged no illegality in
this. On-so-talled bid business with large consumers such
9
4
@
as hospitals and the Aif Base, members of the industry, in.
cluding defendants, offered non-uniform discounts, Le..
non-uniform net prices, from the prevailing wholesale
price. oe
The indictment‘Specified the asserted crime was (1) ‘‘to
fix and establish [not uniform, but] non-competitive
prices and discounts for milk and cream sold to Offutt Air
Force Base”’ and to Veterans Hospital, and (2) to allocate
to Roberts Dairy the business of Veterans Hospital and -
to allocate to Alamito and Beatrice alternately the business
at the Air Force Base (Ct. File pp. 1-8).’
‘The asserted conspiracy thus was alleged not to be in
the general market area in which several operators could, .
or might, participate for all or part of time alleged. j It
was alleged to ve a tri-partite affair essentially to split the
Gpyvernment business three ways. | If it existed at all it
necessarily had to be tri-partite because agreement
by Alamito and Beatrice on prices at Air Base would be
~ valueless unless Roberts agreed not to upset it; agreement _
by Beatrice alone,with Roberts to ‘‘allocate’’ to the latter
the Hospital business would be ineffective without the con-
currence of Alamito’ in the supposed ‘‘allocation.”’ The
case had to stand on a tripod or it could not stand at all.
- Roberts and Alamito, to avoid the hazard of litigation,
pleaded nolo. Beatrice pleaded not guilty.
On the trial, officials of Roberts,and Alamito were called
as Government witnesses but did not support the Govern-
ment’s theories; they denied the existence of the asserted
conspiracy. At the close of the Government’s evidence
Beatrice stood on its motion for acquittal. The jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty. Post trial motions were over-
ruled and pétitioner was fined $15,000.
1. Under practice of the 8th Circuit the record was not printed
for use of the Court of Appeals and has not been printed for this
application. Such particular material as it is believed the Court
may wish to examine in connection with this petition is printed
as Appendices hereto. ;
THE EVIDENCE. . ws
The Government }roduced no evidertee of any meeting
or agreement between defenglants with respect to the Air
Base or Veterans Hospital wsiness which was —“
on sealed bids. boty
On the Contrary, the Government produced the wholesale
manager of Alamito, who testified that he determined what
Alamito's. bids would be, that he never knew what his com-
petitors were geing to do, and that he attended bid open-
ings to find out what ther had done (R. 99-103). A] mem-
ber of the Executive and Pr icing ¢ ‘ommittees of Roberts tes-
tified it made its genetal prices without conffiltation with
anyone (R.177). With respect to the failure Of wrts to
bid for Air Base business during and after the idictment :
period, the Government's own evidence showed that im-
mediatély preceding ‘the alleged conspiracy period a dis-
pute developed between Roberts and the Air Base over
the latter's practices of taking what Roberts believed to.
be unearned ‘‘cash diseounts*” (R. T9s- 199) ; that there-
upon Roberts ceased bidding for the Air Force business
although it contintted to seek business with the Veterans’
"Administration. see ee @
The Government’s case was based on (a) the contention
that the alleged ‘‘pattern’’ of bidding was a circumstance -
tending to indicate collasion; (b) an alleged declaration
(hearsay and outside the presence of petitioner), by a de-
ceaseff route manager of Alamito, not sh@wn to be a policy
miker of that company, made to one Vavra that {t was the
‘policy’? of ‘the companies’’ to rotate.the Air Base busi:
Ness ; (c) twé conversations, over two years after the sup-
snae conspiyacy supposedly had been in operation, be-
tween a Roberts mafager and?a Beatrice manager tliat
‘*had te do with matters affecting the area generally and
* * * not directed specifically. to. business at the Base .
and the Hospital’? (Op. p. 50, infra). ’
.
6 -
The history of the bidding is in the two following tabu-
lations: * Ne i
OFrFruTT Arr Force Basz * >
TRADE. DISCOUNTS wiper
Successful aaa | Underscoréd.
q Period Alamito " . Beatrice Roberts.
2 1-51to ‘8-31-51 0% ‘0% ° 0% :
i1- 1-51 to 2-29-52: 0% $1% 0%
3- 1-52 to™ 8-31-52 0% 0% 0%
( 4-21-52 to 8-31-52 0% 2% 1% -
9 1-f2to 2-28-53 0% «~ NoBid - 0% 9
3 1-88to 83153 °° .0% # \ 26%" 0%
9- 1-53 to 11-30-53 ~ 0% § om “24% 2% cash (3. 96%)
1% 1-53to 2-2854 . 0% 5% .+.° 2%
3 1B4to 5-31-54 2% 0% 0% ,
6 154to S314 Be, O% 0%
9- 1-54 to 11-30-54 « 0% 2% 0%
12-14to 22855” ON" 2% =? 0% | Asserted
3- 1-55to 5-31-55 ° * 2% id 0% ) Conspiracy
6- 1-55 to 11-30-55 2% 19, . 0% | Period
12. 1-55 to 5-31-56 1% 2% * 0%"
“& 1-56 to 11-30-56 2% 1% % 0%
12- 1-56to 5-31-57 1% 2% O%
6 1-57 to 11-30-57 2% 1% 0%**
12- 1-57 to 5-31-58 14% 0% 0% .
6- 1-58 to 11-30-58 0% 0% » 0%
% ; = bs
: eee
Sosoeveetiy Appears on All’ Government Charts as "4%.
**QOn 1 Item Roberts Bid 6% and Was Awarded Partial Contract.
ee? Cash Discounts 30 Dass or Over Considered Trade Discounts.
3 .
& ‘
we
~
e
~, Veterans HospiraL 2-
TRADE DISCOUNTS BID*****
Successful Bidder Underscded.
Period Alamito Beatrice . Rerts
4- 1-51to 631-51 . * 0% 414% 0% ,
7- 1-51 to 9-31-51 0% ° “0% 0%
10- 1-5ito 6-30-52 0%-10%,cash 714% ° 0%
7-1-52to 9-31-52" * 0% 0% 1%
10- 1-52 to 12-31-52 No Bid 1% - 0%
1- 1-53to -3-31-5 0% U% 0%
‘ 4- 1-53 to Hotes 0% 1% 2%
71-53 to 9-31-53 3% . O7%° ‘0%
10- 1-53 to 12-31-53 0% S% .«,° 0%
1- L54te 3-31-04, 0% - b% 2% =
4- 1-t to 6-30-54 0% 0% 2% |
7- 1-54to012-20-54 ‘ NpBid** No Bid** 14%" see
‘I. 1-55to 630-55 + NoBides 1% . i
7- 1-55 te 12-31-55 No Bid No Bid 2% . (con-
1- 1-56 to 3-31-56 0% 0% 2% =f spiracy
£ 1-56 to 6-30-56 0% 7 0% .°"% ~ 2% Period
7-. 1-56 to 12-31-56 No Bid** 0% * 2%
1- 157 to 6-30-57 . NoBia °O0%,° —2%560
7- 1-57 to & 30-58 214m eee" No Bid * No Bid
7- 1-58 to $20. as - "No Bid 5% > NoBid
* Bi d 2%, ‘Alternate Period. ; .
** Bid 0% Alternate Period. * 2 =: :
eee 11% ‘or 6 Mo. Rather Than 2% for 12 Mo. he cepted. =
*#*** One Item at No. Discount.
#9¢¢* Cosh Discomnts 30 Days or Over Considered .Trade Discounts.
%
In Addition, the Government was permitted, over objec-
tion, to show bids defendants arid others had made at two
‘Omaha. hospitals showing different competitors and lower
‘net prices than those offered the Government installations.
The Government statistician admitted he did not know
whether the private business in fact was comparable or
whether the Government was seeking to compare ‘‘an apple
and an orange’’ (R, 300-302); there Was no proof ‘that the
volume’ of bnsiness, ‘times and manner of delivery, valida-
_tion of delivery tickets, ete., required by the elaborate Gov-
“9
—.
8
ernment contracts, pertained to this private business.
Nevertheless, the eviden@ was permitted to go in. The
bids showed that at least three dairies which did not wish
to bid for the Government business 4id bid for that of the
Oriaha hospitals. Tabulation of these bids showed :
Discounts From WHovesate List Prices OFFERED AND
SuccessFuL Bipper to University Hospitau
JUNE 16, 1954 THROUGH JUNE 15, 1957.
Contract Period Goodrich Roberts Alamito Beatrice
6-16-54 to 12-15-54 14.2%* 5% "15% no bid
12-16-54to 6-15-55 18.5%* 12%%% 0% 64%
6-16-55 to 12-15-55 15.6% ** 15%** 0% 10%
12-16-55 to 6-15-56 1WR%* 0% - 11% 10%
6-16-56 to 12-15-56 12.8%* O% * 10% 5%
12-16-56to 615-57 - 11.2%99° 0% wgeeee Weer"
‘* Awarded contract-
~ ** Awarded one-half contract,
*** Awarded contract except for two items A
e*** Awarded contract, for one item. iF a (Ex 37A-37F) |
‘Discounts From WHoLesaLe List Price OFFERFD TO
‘Sr. Josepu’s Hosprrau o
Date ry Royal Goodrich Grobeck Roberts Alamito Beatrice
1954 1st half «10% -4214% 12% %* 12%% 8%9C13% " 0 , 2%
1954 2nd half 10% 1214%* 12%% uptol0% 2%
1955 10% 10%* 121446% 12% + nobid nobid
1956 10% 10%* 1514% aptol0% 10% ° 10%
1957 10% 10%* 15146% 0 nobid 10%
(Ex 38A-381L)
ee em
* Approximately.
It will be observed from these tabulatioys that other
dairies which did not bid at all for the Government business
believed the Omaha hospital business highly desirable and
bid steep discounts to obtain it.
a
got eg
GENERAL MARKET CONDITIONS.
A federal milk marketing order required defendants to
pay identical prices for raw milk (R. 182-134). General
retail and wholesale prices fon°milk and cream) ir. the
Omaha area were uniform before, during and after the
period ofthe asserted conspiracy at the Government wm-
stallations and the Grand. Jury did not -alleqe that -the
general uniformity was wrongful.
Nonetheless, on ‘trial the Government proved (over ob-
jection), that one Zinsmaster, Sales Manager of Roberts,
telephoned one Klesath, then Omaha Manager fot peti-
tioner, in late July 1956 (over two years after the sup-
posed conspiracy as to the Goveryment installations sup-
posedly had- been formed), and:
“* * * told me [| Klesath] that, ‘diie to the increase
in our-cost for fluid milk in the market that we would
have a general over-alleprice increase of one cent a
quart on retail and wholesale,’ © * * and IT told him
that I would prepare my prices and be ready to go
“up on August: Ist.’ (R. 77.)
That just before Christmas 1956,
. ‘*Zinsmgster told me that on January first we would
change our wholesale price from ten, to twelve per
-eent to give the grocers a largertbaygin of profit.
1 told him I would figure my wholesale price to meet
with theirs.’” (R. 78.) +
- Whatever these conversations may have meant, or however
they may be construed, they patently do not pertain to the
asserted conspiracy for which petitioner Was indicted and
the Court of Appeals so recognizes (p. 90, infra).
In arguing to the jury the prosecutor departed entirely
from the indictment, He repeatedly asserted that the Gov-
ernment had proved crimes not alleged in the ipgictment
%
10
and did so in context’to lead the jury to believe such other
- asserted crimes were ‘‘the’’ alleged:
_‘*Mr. Klesath’s testimony is some of the most re-
markable.¢estimony ever to fall from the lips of a
witness in the trial of an anti-trust chse. Here is direct,
positive evidence of a price fixing on the wholesale
price of milk in a market. (R. 330.) neon :
‘The crime in this instance is the fixing of prices.
“The Supreme Court has declared. that an agree-
> ment to fix prices with-a competitor is illegal. That is
the cfime. . ;
_«* ** They were going to fix the price of milk on
August Ist in this market, and therefore they violated
the Antitrust Law. (R. 332.)
‘*But to fix it g9nce was not enough. tn December
of 1956, the same year, Mr. Klesath received another
telephone call from Mr.° Zinstnaster. This occurred
shortly before Christmas, to scheme and plan to increase
the price of milk in the Omaha market on January-1,
1957, and $n this occasion not onK’ was the wholesale
price of milk to be increased but the stores had been
complaining, and they also inercased the discount fiom
ten to twelve per cent, which in effect, of course, low-
ered the price of milk to the stores. >
‘‘Ladies and gentlemen, this is another blatant price
fixing upon the part of these two men. Both repre-
sented defendants in this case, Roberts and Beatrice.”’
(R. 333.): © «
INSTRUCTIONS.
The Court of Appeals opinion fails to set forth the
instructions. We include them as Appendix B and, to aid
analysis, print in bold face the many pertions which author-
. ize or direct conviction on charges or thedries not made in
the indictment. Although three of the instructions correctly
& informed the jury that petitioner was indicted for gllegedly
conspiring with two other dairy companies to allocate
contracts and maintain non-competitive prices at the two
Government installations, in at ‘least ten other places
a
& dt n
(leaving out of count incidental references), the jury was
told that petitioner was charged with conspiring to fix
prices generally on dairy products ‘tin the Omaha area™’
(R. 381-386); one instruction told the jury that such was
‘“‘the main charge."* A) peremptory instruction directed
“the jury:
“Tf you determine that defendant agreed or con-
spired to fix, stabilize, or’ control prices, or agreed
to maintain uniform and non-competitive prices on
dairy products in interstate — in the Omaha
area, you'must find them [sie guilty notwithstanding
the,motives or purposes of the defendant in so agree-
ing or acting.”’ (R. 3s4, infra pp. 69-70.) g
At least five times abstract instructions Aold the jury
. Ss . . 2 ¢ .
that a conspiracy. to maintain uniform prices was illegal
(R. 376, 382, 384, 885; see p. 68 ef seq., diifra). Conversely,
the Court denied petifioner’s request for an instruction
which would have told: the jury:
‘*The issue in this ese solely whether the Govern-
ment has proved the.@eiendant guilty of the particular
conspiracy defined in the indictment. Evidence, if
any, of any other or different conspiracy, is immaterial
to the issue you are to decide. The price of milk to
the housewives in-Omaha or to the grocery stores or
other institutions is not in issue in this.ease.’’ (Court
File pp. 214, 215, 78-79, trfra.)
“
MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE INDICTMENT
IMPROPERLY OBTAINED.
Before trial petitjoner presented a sworn motion based
upon voice recortied statements made by three of the-wit-
nesses before -the grand jury immediately after their
appearances in which they detailed how the prosecutor, in
interrogating them, had accu#ed them of perjury when they
denied any ‘*deal,’’ répeatedly had asserted there was in
fact a conspiracy, that it was an ‘‘open and shut”’ case, and
otherwise had invaded the jury’s province of determining
Q
?
me ;
_ whether the witnesses were truthful and whether there was
- probable cause for believing any crime. whatsoever had been °
committed.
These almost gontemporaneously recorded statements
v
were_as‘accurate_a_ description of the occurrences as _pos-
»
. . . o. . . . -
sible to provide save for minutes of the jury. It was prayed
that they be produced and that the indictment be dismissed.
The Court failed to rule upow the motion,’let the ‘case go
to trial, and after verdict denied the motion on the ground
that he had examined the minutes ue camera and deter-
mined they did ‘not support’ the motion. At- no time
either before, during, or after trial, did the prosecntor who
handfed the grand jury proceedings and participated in
the trial deny the allegations of the motion.
$
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION.
The Court of Appeals held that “although some might
‘regard the case as not a strong one”’ (op. p. 49, infra),
(1) the naked bid pattern at the Government installations,
as contrasted with the naked bid patterns at the private hos-
pitals, coupled with the evidence as to the Klesath conversa-
tions as to the area generally, was sufficient to overcome the
Government's own direct evidence denying the asserted con-
spiracy given by Alamito’s Wholesale Manager and par-
tially given by the Roberts official, and would authorize 4
jury to find defendant guilty ‘‘because [the latter] was not
so affirinatively adverse as to necessitate an acquittal’’;
(2) it could not ‘say that the. instructions, although.
repeatedly authorizing a guilty verdict if the jury holieved———
defendant guilty of any anti-trust offense in the Omaha
area, ‘‘did not adequately present the issues in a form .
understandable to the jury’’;
(3) the trial court would not have abused its dis--
cretion had it refused, to examine the grand ‘jury minutes,
13
___ therefore its in camera study of them and resulting denial
of the motion-to dismiss the indictment did not constitute a
secret reception of évidence, a denial of due process, or a
deprival of the confrontation guaranty of the Sixth Amend-
tent, °
.
e
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.
"his case, in totality, presents, on a simple record, the
fundamental question of whether one criminally accused
of violating the anti-trust laws has fewer proteetions in
criminal procedures than those accused of other crimes.
Phas the point here as to the prosecutors misconduct
before the erand jury was finalfy disposed of on the ground,
‘in view of the antitrust character of this case lwe find? |
: nothing| prejudierally oft nsive to the ends of justtee”
(p. 42. infra.) This, despite the fact that the Court of
Appeals, after reading the grand jury minuygys, was unable-
to find that in fact the prosecutor had not accused wit.
~ nesses of perjury, violently commented on their credibility
and done other things normally regarded as improper.
And so with other points: the Vavra testimony as to
what was said to him by a dead man not shown to have
been in a position of relevant authority ino an asserted
co-conspirator company is held admissible (p. 55, infra);
vet the Court of Appeals rightly is so unsure of that ruling
as not to be willing to rely on the testimony in deciding
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict
(p. 49 infrag, Instead, and incongruously, it relies on the
Klesath conversations (p. 50, infra) which it agrees djd
not pertain to thet very confined’’ conspiracy alleged but
to area practices G0), infra) not claimed to be unlaw-
ful, which well could be innocent, and must, in this, case,
he so presumed.
Instructions which repeatedly authorized or directed con-
viction on grounds wholly outside the ‘tvery confined”’
s « a
/
\
&
14
* ‘
indictment are excused, in substantial part, because this
was ‘‘a complicated criminal ease’; but it was not so until
the District Court composed a charge which complicated it
by roaming: the fields of anti-trust and conspiracy law
generally rather than Kewing to the:**very confined’’ con-
spiracy alleged. .
\
In a circumstantial evidence case not even lip service is
paid to the rule that the circumstances must be inconsistent
with any reasonable hypethesis of innocence. That suen
weil would be reasonable on this record -is shown by
the Cot of Appeals’ statement, **" * ° it might have been
possible for us to decide the issue atherwise’’ (p. 59, infra).
The Government's burden of proving a defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt in any criminal case, anti-Arust
or otherwise, is not even considered. (Brinegar v. United
States, 388 U.S. 160, 174.) Instead a new, undefined, and
ower standard, wholly alien to federal eriminal law, is
applied in weighing the Government's evidence, i.e., was it
‘so affirmatively adverse |to the Government's contention]
as to necessitate an acquittal”’ (p. £9, infra)? This seems to
say that in a criminal. case a defendant’ must prove his
innocence, Whatever the ‘‘afirmatively adrerse”’ doctrine.
may precisely mean, it was applied, and its application was
an inroad into the standard of proof beyond a reagnable
doubt. The doctrine is out of accord with the teaching of
this Court in Holland vy. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138
that the Government must always prove every element of
an-offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The matter is one of
serious importance meriting this Court’s examination.
The ‘<affirmatively adverse’’ ruling is coupled with the .
Court’s observation (p. 54, infra) ‘‘that Beatrice has
made no record,”’ sefircely an accurate description of the
fact that Beatrice stood on its motion for acquittal. How-
15
?
ever that may be, implicit in the opinion, is ‘the motif
that as long #s there was anything in the record“against
Beatrice, whether it_established guilt heyond a reasonable
doubt or not, Beatrice stood mute at its peril. This, we
suggest, comports neither the law nor the record. If the
record, at the close of the Government’s case did not estab-
lish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, there was,no reason
for Beatrice to go ahead and its failure so to do could not
create an inference against it. Moreover, the Government
asked thie jury to believe respectable officers of Alamito and
Roberts who effectively denied the’ asserted conspiracy—
swith the Government ‘thus showing that Alamito and
Roberts di not engage in the asserted conspiracy, the
ease collapsed.
,
Without Arguing the points (they can be explored
properly-ouly if the writ be granted), we submit it is a cer-
tainty that similar rulings would not have been made in
a Mann Act.or narcoties case. Explicit and implicit in
the instant opinion is the thee ‘tin view of the antitrust
character of this case’, normal standards of crimingl pro-
cedure and evidence may be relaxed. This Court has never
so held. Such a doctrine should be stamped out before it
spreads to result in other unjust. convictions, personal or
corporate, in the many criminal anti-trust cases now pend-
ing, Persous accused of business crimes are as entitled to
fair treatment as those aceused of white slavery or sub-
version.
We suggest that because of the increasing frequency of
criminal anti-trust cases it is in the best interest of the
federal court system that this ease, in which several facets
of the basie problem are presented clearly in a relatively
concise and uncomplicated record, be reviewed.
We believe the proper ‘rule to be that when the Anti-
¢ 0. 4
16
trust Division resorts to criminal proceedings it must ac-
cept, and be held to, normal standards of criminal pro-
cedure and proof. The Division heretofore has obtained,
and can continue to obtain (where warranted), convictions .
an that basis. If, as here, it procures only a ‘‘very con-
fined’* indictment, its proofs, arguments and jury instruc-
tions must similarly be ‘very eonfined,’* so that the citizen
is. not placed in peril of conviction on other matters; its
proof must show guilt beyénd a reasonable doubt. It is not
up to a defendafit to produce evad@ice ‘‘afirmatively ad-
verse’? to the Government's contentions unless the latter
be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
or Sherman Act convictions are dire matters. Not only may
they result in imprisonment as well as heavy fines, but they
carry the additional consequence, not present in most erim-
inal situations, of creating, under Section 5 of the Clayton,
- Aet, a prima facie case for treble damage civil liability.
Strong reason exists, therefore, for examination of tl)
instant unsettling opinion and for announéement of cleér
rules emphasizing the necessity of adherence to, rather
than relaxation of, traditional criminal standards in anti-
trust prosecutions. 7
: I.
The Court of Appeals has departed entirely’ from the
substantive standards laid down in United States v. Bordeh,
-347 U. S.514. Borden was a civil case in which the Govern-
ment, as hefe, contended that a ‘‘pattern”’ of bidding for
public business in dairy products established collusive bid-
ding in violation of the Sherman Act. Additionally, the
Government there adduced evidence that in a few instances
some dairies wete told by others not to bid for certain busi-
ness. (This element not present here:) The District Court
held against the Government (111 F. Supp. 562). On appeal
the Government conceded its case, As made, was insufficient
‘but contended certain evidence had erroneously been, ex-
} ’ .
; ° .
—&& ‘ .
’
©
4
17
cluded which would have established a.Sherman Act viola-
tion. This Court held that even had the additional evidence
been received it would not establish a case; a fortiori the
same-result should fotlow in this, a criminal case. (Cf.
Theatre Enterprises, Inc., v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corporation, 846 U.S. 537, 541: **Cirgumstantial evidence
- . L %,
of consciously parallel behavior may have made- heavy in-
roads into the traditional judicial;attitude toward conspir-
» vey; but ‘conscious parallelism’ has not vet read conspiracy”
out of the Sherman Act entirely.’’) Z :
Moreover, the Government here produced and vouched
for Prall, Alamito’s sales manager who testified that he
decided on Alamito’s bids; because he never knew what
his competitors were going to do he attended bid openings
and took with him scratch or tally sheets by which he ~
could: follow and record the bids. This evidence, true and
uncontradicted, cut the heart out of the asserted colispiracy.
_ When there was utterly no evidence of consyfiring by- either:
Alamito or Roberts as to the Government business there
simply was no on? left for Beatrice to have conspired with.
Under the evidence, and Borden, acquittal should have beea
directed. :
Although the Court’of Appeals describes Borden at some
* length (pp. 51-53 infra), it never suggests on what tenable
ground it mgy be distinguished; nor how, if a ciril case
was not made in Borden, a crimimal one of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was made here; nor how the Government
may proffer Prall as a believable direct witness that there
was no conspiracy and simultaieously rely on equivocal
circumstantial evidence, insufficient under Borden, to make
a liar of him.
The opinion makes an argument to the effect that the
naked bid {‘pattern’’ may be read as indicative of conspir-
acy. But nea syllable of economic or expert testimony was
offered that the bids were inconsistent with competitive be-
a
s
b
a ae ee
havior by men of varying business judgment. On the face
of the naked figures it would be fully as logical to say that.
the parties were in a conspiracy in 1951 and 1952 when
twice all three refused to offer any discount, or in 1993
when on one occasion Beatrice put in no bid whatsoever and
Alamito and Roberts offered no discount.
The Government itself proved that. in late 1953 Roberts
. got into a dispute with the Air Force over its practice of
taking what Roberts believed to be unwarranted cash dis-
counts; ample reason was shown for Roberts not to do
business with the Air Force for some time thereafter.
The opinion says that the non-existent conspiracy must
have ceased with the bids’ for the period commencing
June 1, 1957, (and here the opinion shifts its system of
accounting from entire to partial contracts), beeause at
that tinte, although Alamito bid 2% for the entire contract
and Beatrice bid 1% Roberts bid 6% (not 8% as errone-
_ ously stated in th» opinion), for a portion of the contract—
milk in gallons. The conclusion is obviously pure guess
work. * ,
The vice of the situation is supposed to adhere in the
fact that commencing March 1, 1954, Alamito had the Air
Base for six months, Beatrice then had it for six months,
Alamito got it for six mouths, then Beatrice took it away
for a quarter. In the following quarter it swung back to
Alamito, then it went to Beatrice. Since the supposed con-
spiracy supposedly has been over the principal contract has
stayed with Alamito. And by June 1, 1958 no one offered a
discount! Such a history rather than showing rigidity or
unreality, shows that the business swung back and forth
before and during the indictment period; that the competi-
tors repeatedly changed positions trying to outguess each
other and yet to obtain the business on a profitable basis.
The proof is less sufficient to establish conspiracy than it
was in Borden. We say, and no witness has testified to the
contrary, that it shows perfect nip and tuck competition.
*
19
There can be no bid business on a standaré item in which.
some yea¥s after the bidding has taken place, someone can- ;
not go baefand say\that if A had done*his, or B done that,
the business would have gone differently. If such divina-
tion by hindsight iY permitted to take’the place of evidence
and establish criminal conspiggey, many honest businessmen
are in imminent danger of. jail. ;
Il. se
It ixfrightening that the jury was not merely authorized
to bring in a guilty verdict on grounds-—an Omaha”
conspiracy—not alleged in the indictment but was given
a preemptory instruction so to do (pp. 69-70, infra).
Heretofore it has been constitutional doctrine that per-
mitting, much less directing, conyiction on a charge not
contained in the indictment should be regarded either as
a denial of due pracess, (DeJorige vy. Oregon, 299.0, S. 353,
362; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88°96) or as an se
ment of the indictment (Stirone v. United-States, 361 U.
912, 217-219) which ever, since Ev parte Bain, 121 U, S.
has been regarded as offensive to the Fifth veut ety
Those principles are set al naught by the instant opinion,
The prices, either of fluid milk or other dairy products
on the Omaha‘ genera® market, were immaterial. The
bids to the Government installations which were placed in
evidence all contained their own prices in dollar figures
and discount terms. Since it was not alleged that these
prives were too high,or too low with respect to Omaha
area prices, reference‘to the latter was wholly immaterial
and improper. .
But the Omaha prices were put in fover a ae and
they were uniform. The proseentor put} he Klesath
conversations, which the Court of Appe: a oe pertained
to area prices and not to the Government installations, and
¢ a 7 20 i
e
then repeatedly told the jury that the Omaha prices had
been fixed in criminal violation of ‘the very law under which
petitioner had been. indicted (Seep. 40, supra). Thus
stood the case when the District Court composed its charge.
The court permitted counsel to tender instructions but
afforded no opportunity for diseussion of them, or of the
charge before it was delivered. Much grossly misleading
and utterly improper material was inserted that neither
side had suggested. = ae: We
The charge contains much improper abstract exhorta-
tion, is difficult to follow, and its contradictory instructions
admit of no reconciliation. It. ties the Klesath conversa-—
tions into the Government business (p. 67, infra) with witich :
the Court of Appeals finds ,the conversations: were not
concerned. The Court of Appéals excuses the charge on>
the ground that the jury probably was not confused. This
is neither the legal test nor is it reasonable. We find at
least 18 places where the charge travels beyond the in-
dictment to refer to-the issue as one ‘‘to fix, stabilize,
or control prices, or * * * to maintain. uniform and -non-
‘competitive prices of dairy products in interstate commerce
within the Omaha-area”’ (pp. 69-70, infra), or, as concerning
‘fa combination or conspiracy to fix, control or maintain
' prices of dairy products in‘the Omaha area”’ (p. 70, intra),
ete. At other places the jury was told it, must find beyond.
a reasonable doubt not that the conspiracy alleged in the
indictment was proved but that ‘‘a*’ conspiracy existed. As
against at least 18 of these variations we make, only 7
inetances in which the jury, one way or another, was di-
- rected to the actual charge of the indictment, i
~ In Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607, 613 this.
Court said :
“© * Here then are three different and conflieting
theories regarding a charge designed to guide the
jury in determining guilt, and yet we are ash — to
2
.
%
‘)
Ped °
‘ 21
&
sustain the conviction on the assumption that the jury
was properly guided. * * * A conviction ought not to
res on an equivocal direction to the jury on a basic
issue.’
The ‘iniisiiton at bar is worse. There is reason to think
that the. Distriet Court itself had become: confused for it
refused to give an instruction that prices te the Omaha
housewife or grocery stores were notin issue (pp. 78-79,
infra)., Paraphrasing from Stirone v. United States, 361
U. 8, 212, 219:
6% *
6
* because of the court’s admission of evidence
and undey its charge this [believed Omaha dairy
products offense] might havesbeen the basis upon
D. which the trial jury -convieted petitioner. If so [it] -
was convicted on a charge thie grand. jury never made
against [ite]. This was fatal error.
we Grunewald vo U nited States, 353 U.S. 391, 415; Yates
.U nited States, 394 U0. S..298, 312.)
Antitrust cases frequently lend ipesediees to confusion
—the statute is in broad terms buf usually is applied against
a fairly complex business transaction, only-certain features
of which are alleged to be iHegal. The jury, constitutionally,
ean bring in a verdict only on those features. Tythe proper
exercise of its-;superyisory powers we respectfully suggest .
it would be appropriate for this Court to point out that
there is a special duty on trial judBys to strive for the ut-
most clarity of «structions in ane Ke rather than to
stray afield. . ’ . ary
Ill.
ry
x That thePe was error in what should have been a rela-
jively simple trial the Court of Appeals agrees. However,
it says no single” error was sufficiently prejudicial to
require reversal. We respectfully disagree. But it is
clear that the Court ignored entirely, and failed to assess,
22
the cumulative offect of a chain of errors. It departed from
the standard of Kotteakos v. United: States, 32% U. S. 750,
764 that it ‘‘must take Account of what the error meant
to [the jury], not.singled out and standing alone, but in
relation to aH else that happened.’
Nor did the Court of Appeals give any consideration to
the accepted dectrine that errors which might not require
reversal in a clear ease, require it in a close one which
might have gone either way as the ¢ ‘ourt says was the fact:
here (p. 50, infra). The Court of Appeals has fallen into
the same error in assessing prejudice as it didi in Janko Vv.
- United States, 281_F. 2d 156 where it held newspaper pub-
licity was not prejudicial. This Court rev ersed on the peti-
tion for certiorari (366 U, S. 716). Let us list some of the
prejudicial errors hére: ‘
1. Major Anderson, handsome and in uniform, testified
that his secretary said on-the occasion of a bid opening,
“‘T wonder whose turn it is today; these hjds are rotated
among the firms’? (R. 139-140)... This was given, at the
prosecution’s peril, after strenuous objections. There was.
no possible way by which it could be made. competent.
Nevertheless, the proseentor persisted. The viciously prej-
udicial accusation was made. Tt was then stricken, The
Court of Appeals says that is a sufficient cure. How-
ever, that, ‘‘all practic ing lawyers: know to be grea oe
fiction.’? (Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453.)
9. One Vatra, a one-time route driver for Alamito
Dairy, testified, over objection, that his deceased former
supervisor MeCarthy had told hyn it was the policy of
Alamito and. Beatrice to switeh the Air Force business
every six months (R. 210-212). No foundation was laid
to show that the deceased MeCarthy ever had been in posi-
tion to determine or to know what ‘the ‘‘policy’’ of his
own employer, -Alamito, was, and certainly. not. that of
Beatrice. McCarthy himself, if alive, could not have given
- this evidence even as against Alamito for his authority was
®
so 4
23
not shown, tior was the declaration one in furtherance of the
conspiracy. (Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 217;
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U8 S. 604, 617; Flintkote
Company v. Lysfjord, 246 F. 2d 368 (9 Cir., 1957), ¢.d.
355 U.S. 835.) But here it was held admissible®in double
hearsay form against Beatrice on the theory that there
was unspetified ‘‘independent progf*’ of the asserted ‘con-
spiracy:(p. 55, infra), This seareely disposes of the point
that there was. no proof sufficient to show MeCarthy
was ina position of relevant authority to make admissions
‘Ww which would have been allmissibleeven as against Alamito.
Apparently the ‘independent proof’? which would justify
admigsions of a qualified agent of alleged co-conspirator
Alamito is the Klesath-Zinsmaster conversations; how-
ever, those did not pertain to the conspiracy alleged but
to area practices. :
3. The. Klesath conversafions are construed to prove
that Beatrice and “Roberts agreed to fix general prices to
Omaha housewives and retailers. We demur; but in any
event the Court of Appeals held these conversations did
not pertain to the asserted conspiracy at issue, This evi-
dence again should lot have been received. :
4. In any event petitioner was faced with (a) an in-
acinissible declaration by an Air Force secretary that ‘* the
firms’? rotate bids: (b) a so-called admission bysan unquali-
fied dead man that his employer, Alamito, and Beatri ice had
1 “‘poliey’’,of shifting the Air Force business; (¢) an al-
leged ‘*Omaha’’ price-fixing conspiracy ee obi in the
indictment: (d) a vehement argument by The prosecutor.
that the ‘*Klesath evygdence as to Omaha was some of the
most remarkable testimony ever to come from the mouth
of a witness in an anti-trust case’? and showed ‘*blatant”’
crimes, or “the” crime; (e) instructions from the trial
court nae authorizing and directing the jnry to re-
°
turn a verdict of ‘guilty on an ‘impermissible ground.”””
(Cf. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 415.)
24
The@umulative effect of a continuous chain of prejudicial .
errors was bound to, and did, result in a verdict against
petitioner. Due process may not require an error-free
trial but, it does require that the sum total of a chain of
error, in What at best was a close case for the Government,
be considered in determining whether a trial was fair
(Kotteakos v. United States, 323 U.S. 750, 764). However,
nowhere did the Court of Appeals do this. In failing so to
do it has departed so far from accepted standards of judicial
review as to warrant supervisory review ‘by this Court.
IV.
The opinion cites many cases dea'ing with generalities
as to grand juries but avoids the real problem here:
An affidavit was filed, not in general terms but averring
specifically and in detail, that three specific wijnesses had
been accused of perjury, or other misconduct, by the
prosecutor before the grand jury and that the grand jury
repeatedly had been told by the prosecutor that crime in
fact had been committed. If this was true, the indictment
should have been dismissed.-. United States v. Wells, 163
F. 313, 325-326. TheProsecutor made no denial whatsoever
of the charges against him, nor did he assert, until long
-after the trial, that the affidavit was any frm of hearsay
(a gebatable question, cf. Meyer v: T. J. McCarthy Steam-
ship Company, 183 F. Supp. 654, 657). ae one
_ Production of the minutes covering testimony of the
three witnesses would have settled the matter. They were
not produced. Instead the District Court read them secretly
and. — that they did not support the motion. On
appeal, The minutes of course, were not part of the record.
The Court of Appeals sent for, and read them. It then found,
not that the prosecuto® had not done precisely what he&®
was charged with, but that it found nothing in the grand
e ‘
+
.
.
ne
jury proceedings ‘which, in view of the anti-trust char-
acter of this case, is prejudicially offensive to the ends of
justice’? (p. 42, infra). What the court's finding means,
what dandante the Court applied, no one, under this
Star Chamber procedure, can have any possible idea.
Certainly the opinion is consistent with the view that in
anti-trust proceedings prosecutors can tell grand juries that>
witnesses are lying and can tell them that crime has been
‘committed. :
Evidence has been received and .weighed against peti-
tioner in violation of its right under the Sixth Amendment
to be confronted with the evidence against jt and in vio-
lation of the due process gyarantee of the Rirth Amend-
ment. .
. CONCLUSION.
It is respectfully submitted that the Government's case
fell so far short of proving the commission of a erime
beyond a. reasonable doubt that this Court: may believe
it appropriate on this petition to reverse the - judgment
with directions for entry of one of acquittal, Certainly if:
that not be done, such grave questions are raised that the
pgtition should be granted.
o3Respectfully submitted,
‘GeorGE B. CurisTENSEN,
Counsel for Petitioner.
Winston, Strawn, Situ & PaTTERSON,
38 South Dearborn Street,
Chicago 3, Illinois,
FirzceraLD, Hamer, Brown & Leanty,
Insurance Building,
Omaha 2, Nebraska,
Of Counsel.
February 12, 1963.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.