Appendix — Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1963

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

: ~FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

‘ No. 8049

: as is Ab “me

John E. Parks, Jr, and Robert M. Foote and Albert

McHugh and Paul Ziegler and Silvio Stamerro, Individ-

> ually an? as Representatives of the members of loca! .28,

~ LBZE.W.. ina Class Action, and Local Union 28, Inter-_

national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

Q. Appellees and Cross- Appellants;

Versus .

International Brotherhood of Ilectrical Workers,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

a Local Union No. 24 (fBEW), ee

‘ Intervenor, — \ ;

’ . > au

Cross-Arperats FROM THE UNItED STATES DIstRICT

CourT FOR THE Pisrricr or MaryLanp, vt BaLtrore.

Roszet C. ‘Trromsen, District’ J ence. :

otras:

iene June ‘14, 1962. Deci ‘ed January 23, 1963.)

¢

s

‘

I UA RES ep la tit top 2 A

' Before Sopeiorr, Chief tudien, an : SoPE k and J. SPENCER

Beir, Cirenit Judges.

s John Henry [ewin and Thomas X. Dunn (Robert R.

: Bair, and Venable, Paetjer & I[loward on brief) for

Appellant and Cross-Appellee; George Cochran Doub ,

(Weinberg and Green on brief) for Intervenor-Appel- b

lant; Melvin J. Sykes ( Patrick A. O'\Doherty on prief)

for “Appellees and gre Appellants ; and J. Albert: Woll

and Theodore J. St. Antoine on brief for American

Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organ- °

izations as Amicus Curiae. ss

SoBELOFF, Chief Judge:

A dispute between af international union and one of its

~ component local unions which led to the revocation of the

local’s charter and the establishment of a new local em-

bracing its jurisdiction, occasioned two suits against the

international. One was brought by the local union and the

other by five of its members in behalf of the membership,

both suits seeking declaratory judgments and injunctive

relief to restore the local to good standing in the interna-

tional and to obtain incidental relief, The two suits have

been consolidated. The revocation action complained of

was taken by the International Brotherhood of Electrical

workers (IBEW) after its Local Union No. 28-IBEW

(Local 28) went out on strike without obtaining the ap-

proval of the IBEW International President (IP) in con-

travention of the IBEW Constitution and failed to return

to work in defiance of his repeated directions to do so. The

strike was undertaken by the Local to enforce demands

made by it in the course of contract negotiations with the

Maryland Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors

Association.

The plaintiffs contended below that the IP had no con.”

stitutional authority to refuse permission for the strike or

to revoke Local 28’s charter for disregard of his order.

They further contended that even if constitutionally author-

ized, the action was invalid because: (1) it was in breach

of a duty owed to the Local and its members, and was |

taken in bad faith for improper reasons; (2) the Local

was not afforded a fair hearing before a properly consti-

tuted tribunal; and (3) the revocation Was unjust and an

unreasonably severe sanction in the circumstances,

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istddnitde ight oo wa Sti.

PW ae baw ee Cele ag:

3

More particularly, the plaintiffs maintained that the IP

improperly collaborated with the National Electrical Con-

tractors Association (NECA) during Local 28's collective

bargaining negotiations. with the Maryland Chapter of

NECA; illegally sought to impose a perpetual collective

bargaining agreement on the Local; and harbored animos-

ity toward the\ Local and its leadership because of their

efforts to maintain local autonomy. Moreover, they as-

serted that by deciding the charges against Local 28 when

his own good faith was called into question, the IP denied

the Local a fair hearing—a defect which was not cured by

the appellate review of the IBEW International Executive

Council. @

The International replied that the revocation was justi-

fied because by engaging in a strike contrary to the IP's

order, Local 28 was in clear violation of the IBEW Con-

stitution ; that the revocation was reasonable and necessary

to maintain proper union discipline, did not result from

improper motives on the part of the IP, and was enforced

only after fair procedures provided in accordance with

law and the IBEW Constitution. It contended that, in

any event, the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by their own

unclean hands and failure to exhaust intra-union remedies.

The defendant also raised serious jurisdictional defenses.’

1. The two cases rest on separate legal bases, although the same events are

relied cn as grounds for relief. The individual members’ action, Parks, et al. v.

IBEW, was brought under §§ 101, 102, 302, 304, 609 of the Labor Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 (29 U.S.C.A, §§ 411, 412, 482,

464, S29) for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that revocation of

the charter constituted unreasonably severe discipline of the members without a

fair hearing, and also amounted to institution of a trusteeship over the Local.

The District Judge ruled for the plaintiffs on the first: ground, but found no

evidence that the revocation was used as a means of circumventing the Act's

trusteeship limitations. The Local’s action, Union No. 28-IBEW v. IBEW,

4

~~“

The District Judge, after hearing evidence and argu-

ment for twenty-two days, held that the strike did require

approval of the IP. He further held that there was 1 > suf-

ficient evidence that the IP had been moved by “express or

particular malice, i.¢., ill-will, spite, a grudge, or a desire

to be revenged on a patticular person or persons, resulting

in a deliberate intention to commit an injury.” 203 F.

Supp. at 309. Nevertheless he concluded that the IP had

acted from “mixed motives” amounting to “legal malice”

in forbidding the strike and in revoking the charter. With

respect to the fairness of the hearing and the Severity of

the discipline, the Jndge, Aipheld :the plaintiffs.

| x ;

The decree ordered the restoration of the charter ‘of

local 28 and all appiirtenant rights and privileges. It en-

joined Any retrial or future charges against that Local for .

any past conduct involving the issues in the instant cases,

but did not preclude the proper officials of the defendant.

from pressing charges for such past misconduct against

certain members who were the sjngleaders in defying the

IP’s order forbidding the strike. The decree expressly

did not enjoin disciplinary action for breaches of the’ de-

-fendant’s Constitution occurring after the decree, including

continuation of the present strike after reasonable notice

from the IP “issued with proper motives.” The charter of

Local 24, which was organized by IBEW to take over the

jurisdiction of Local 28, was ordered revoked. The plain-

tiffs’ claims for damages and counsel fees were denied.

‘4

« Was instituted under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act

(LMRA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a)) on the grounds that the IBEW Constitu-

tion was a “contract * * * between * * * labor organizations” within the meaniag

of that section, and that the IP’s actions amounted to a ‘breach of that contract

entitling the Local to injunctive relief and damages. /The District Judge granted

injunctive relief but denied damages and counsel fées.|

¥rom the order of the District Judge for the restoration

of the charter of’Local 28 and the revocation ot the charter

of the newly created substitute, Local Union No. 24, the

International appeals. From the denial of additional re-

lief requested by the plaintiffe? they appeal. Local 24 has

intervened on appeal claiming that as it was not a party to

the action in the court below, that court’s decree could not

alter its status.

I. FACTS .

The nature and complexity of the issues raised require

not only close examination of the proximately operative

facts, but also of the context in which the dispute developed.

Particularly is it necessary to study the relationship, within

the electrical contracting industry, of the IBEW with its

component local unions and individual members, and with

the principal employers’ association, NECA. One cannot

decide the issue of “breach of duty owed the Local and its

members” without first considering carefully what, were

the respective duties resting in the IP, the Local, and its

members.”

Organization and Structure of the IBEW *.

The IBEW, one of eighteen members of the AFL-CIO

Building and Construction Trades Department, is about

seventy years old and has 750,000 members organized into

almost 1800 component local unions. About 150,000 of

SS 9

2. In addition to the District Court's decision now under review, reported as

Parkg v. IBEW, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md. 1962), there have been several

earlier District Court opinions that bear upon the present case. See Executive

Board, Local 28 v. IBEW, 184 F. Supp. 649 (D. Md. 1960) ; Local 28 v. Mary-

land Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 194 F.Supp. 491, 194 F.

Supp. 494 (D. Md. 1961) ; Local 28 v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99 (D. Md. 1961).

6

these members work if the electrical construction mdustry.

These belong to locals in the United States and Canada

having about 800 working agreements with chapters of

NECA and a few other employer associations.’

local 28 received its charter from the IBEW in 1900,

and through the years it has served as the uncertified bar-

gaining represemtative for its members. As of June 1,

1961, it: had about 1400 members, most of whom were

employed in the electrical construction industry in Balti-

more City and the ten nearby Maryland counties. As

authorized by the IBEW ‘Constitution, it includes among

its members supervisory and managerial personnel who

are restricted from voting or attending meetings. (IBEW

Const. Art. XVII, § 6). See §-14(a) of the LMRA, 29

U.S.GA. § 164(a).*. The Local operated a hiring hall and

provided a local pension and other benefit funds. Its

welfare assets amounted to between one-half and three-

quarters of a million dollars.

3. NECA is a national association ot employers in the construction industry ;

"it is comprised of local chapters representing electrical contractors in particular

geographic areas for purposes of collective bargaining. Some contractors who

are not members also designate WECA or an area chapter as their collective

bargaining agent.

The Maryland Chapter represents 26 electrical contractors doing approx-

imately 80% of the major construction in and around Baltimore ; over the years

the Maryland Chapter has vegotiated successjve collective bargaining agreements

with Local 28

NECAtoffers advice and assistance to its chapters in collective bargaining

matters. For years NECA and I BFW have conferred on a national level to

further their common interest in stabilizing labor relations in thévelectrical

construction industry. The principal vehicle for advancing this common purpose

is the Council on Industrial Relations fér the Flectrical Contracting Industry

of the United States and Canada. (CIR or Council). %.

4. Its leadership includes former supervisors and contractors to whom these

restrictions do not apply. The inc'lusion of such active members in a union is

not illegal, and is traditional in thiis' industry.

The organizational structure of the I1}EW and the re-

lations, rights and duties therein are pervasively governed

by the International Constitution.’ The International Con-,

vention (IC), comprised of representatives % the locals,

is the ultimate governing body. During intervals between

conventions control is in the International Executtye Coun-

cil (IEC), composed of nine members meeting quarterly,

the International President and subsidiary officers.

Actualiy, effective control of IBEW activitieS is en-

trusted to the IP who, since 1955, has been Gordon M.

Freeman. He is empowered to decide all controversies in-

cluding questions of law (.Art. IV, § 3(2)); to remove

International officers for cause and to fill vacancies by

appointment (Art. IV, § 2); to enter into agreements with

national or international labor organizations or associa-

tions of. employers, or with companies doing an interstate

business in electrical work, to cover the entire jurisdiction

of the IBEW (Art. IV, § 3(12)). “The I.P. can, in any

situation, delegate the powers of his office to an Interna-

tional Representative, Vice-President or Assistant.” (Art.

IV, § 4). He may also appoint “a referee who may or

may not be a member, to take testimony and report to

him.” (Art. IV, § 3(11)).

The IP’s authority over local yhions is notably extensive.

(See Art. IV, § 3(8), (9), (10); Arts. XV & XVIT).

Locals receive their charters only upon his authorization.

(Art. XV, § 1). He assigns the locals their jurisdiction,

can merge or amalgamate locals or suspend or revoke a

local’s charter if it does not organize or protect its juris-

diction. (Art. XV, §§ 2-4). In addition, ‘when. necessary

5. Many of the material provisions of the Constitution are set forth in 197 F.

Supp. at 102 n. 2.

°

to protect or advance the interests of its members, the IP

can take charge of the affairs of any local, (Art. IV, §

3(9)); he can also remove or suspend local. officers for

various reasons. (Art. IV, § 3(10)).

Locals may not affiliate with central labor councils and

the like without his permission. (Art. XVII, § 5). Al-

though locals are empowered to make their own bylaws

and working rules, these are null and void if they conflict

with the International Constitution.* And all bylaws,

amendments and rules and all agreements of any kind are

null and void unless approved by the IP who has the right

to “correct” them to conform to the IBEW’s Constitution

and policies. (Art. XVII, §§ 7-9). In addition, no agree-

ment can be abrogated without his approval. (Art. XVII,

§ 11); and no general work stoppage can be undertaken

without his consent and “‘[t]he I.P., or his representative,

_ has the power at any time to enter any situation or con-

troversy involving a L.U. [Local Union] or any of its

members, and the decision of the I.P., direct or through

his representative, shall be accepted by the L.U. and its

officers, subject to appeal to the I.E.C. and IL.C.” (Art.

XVII, §,13). By way of ultimate enforcement sanction,

the IP. is empowered: ae

*“Either to suspend or revoke the charter of any

_L.U., or have the I.S. [International Secretary] re-

ject the per capita tax from any L.U. that fails or

refuses to observe the laws and rules of the I.B.E.W.”

(Art. TV. § 3(8)). . '

<innaiinDiiniesiinieiiee .

6. Questions of conflict are necessarily decided by the IP who is empowered

to decide all questions of law. (Art. IV, § 3(2)).

4

b Wi) eal °

cation for membership admission to a local union con-

stitutes a contract between the member, the local, the

IBEW and all other members. (Art. XXII, § 3). Each

new member is required to take an oath of allegiance .to

the IBEW and to conform to its Constitution and laws.

(Art. XXII, § 4). A member niay be penalized for violat-

ing the IBEW “Constitution and the rules herein, or the

bylaws, working agreements, or trade and working rules

of a L.U.” or for “working in the interest of any organi-

zation or cause which is detrimental to, or opposed to, the

The Constitution oe that acceptance of an appli-

a

A.B.E.W.” (Art. XXVII, § 2(2), (9)). The IP is em-

powered to file charges against a member before the IEC.

(Art. IV, § 3(7)).’ a z

eo:

_ All decisions of the IP are subject to appeal, first to the

IEC, meeting quarterly, and then to the International

Convention, meeting every four years. (Art. IV, § 3(2)).

The IEC is also empowered to try local unions or mem-

bers, and may revoke or suspend charters or memberships.

(Art. IX, § 4; see cso Art. 1X,§ 6). No appeal is recog-

nized unless there is compliance with the decision from

which the appeal is ‘taken and all appeals must be taken

within 30 days of the decision which is being appealed.

' (Art. XXVIT, §§ 16, 17):

7. Provision is also made for automatic expulsion of a member or q local for

resorting to a court of law without having fully exhausted internal remedies.

(Art. XXVII, § 1 and Art. XVII, § 1). Even advising such resort is penalized.

(Art. XXVII, § 2(1)). The legality of some of these provisions, in the face of

§§ 609 and 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, 29 U-S.C.A. §§=5 and 411(a) (4),

might be difficult to defend. See § 101(b) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 4110b).

10

The Council on Industrial Relations

(CIR or Council)

The Council, a bipartite body consisting of NECA and

IEW representatives, was founded in 1920 by the [BEW

and a predecessor employers’ association. It consists of 12

persons, six representing each member organization, and

additional alternates to assure the presence of at least four

representatives of each organization at its quarterly meet-

ings. There is a co-chairmanship of the chief executive of

each organization; at all times pertinent to this case the

co-chairmen have been Gordon Fteeman, IP of the IBEW,

_and Paul M. Geary, Executive Vice-President of NECA.

While not strictly an arbitration body, primarily because

the Council contains no neutral outsiders and exercises the

power to alter the terms of agreements between IBEW

locals and NECA chapters in its discretion, the Council

functions to render final and binding decisions on collec-

tive bargaining issues submitted to it when local negotia-

tions have reached an impasse. Its decisions must be

unanimous, ‘each representative voting separately. Al-

though most disputes are decided upon submission of both

parties, unilateral submissions are accepted when the col-

lective bargaining agreement contains a Council clause

and the subinitting party has attempted in good faith but

failed to effect a local settlement and has notified the other

party of its intention to file and invited it to join the sub-

mission. Council decisions are reached in executive session

after hearing argument and no final decision is reached

until the Council adjourns, when the parties are simul-

taneously notified of the Council's action.

The Council's principal purpose is “to remove the causes

ae eT

EE eer SA eee

° 11

of friction and dispute in the electrical contracting indus-

try” by providing a forum for conciliation and settleme:*

of controversies between IBEW locals and NECA chap-

ters. It has aided in creating a relatively “strikeless”

climate within the electrical construction industry, and it

is tindisputed that by and large it has served the parties

well over the years.

Council Clauses

With the encouragement of the two national organiza-

tions, IBEW and NECA, most collective bargaining agree-

ments between IBEW locals and NECA chapters contain

some form of Council clause. There are variations, but gen-

erally clauses require submission to the Council for binding

decision of all disputes arising during the term of the agree-

ment and proposed changes at the end of any contract year

when the parties’ fail to arrive at an agreement locally.

Most Council clauses have in the past provided that the

agreement was to run from year to year “unless changed

as iy * * provided” in the agreement. It had been generally

assumed that such contracts were “evergreen,” that 1s, it

was considered that they were terminable only upon mutual

consent of the parties or permission of the C ouncil and

that a unilateral attempt to terminate would be a dispute

to be referred to the Council.

In August, 1959, NECA circulated to its chapters copies

of a uniform Council clause, referred to in the evidence as

the “yellow sheet” clause because it was printed on yellow

paper. This was ungmbiguous in its “evergreen” charac-

ter and specified that it was to “continue in effect from

year to year * * * unless changed or terminated in the way

12

later provided herein. * * * Notice -by either party of a

desire to terminate the agreement [would] be handled in

the same manner as a proposed change.” (Emphasis

added.) In 1956 the Council had adopted a policy of re-

quiring the inclusion of “evergreen” Council clauses

“where the matter of the Council agreement was in dis-

pute.” The District Court found that the IP had not made

this policy known to the local unions or all the other In-

ternational officers. It is undisputed that both the IBEW

and NECA favor the inclusion of the broadest possible

Council clauses in collective bargaining agreements be-

- tween IREW locals and NECA chapters.

Actually, only 20 of the some 800 collective bargaining

agreements between IBEW locals and NECA chapters

contain the “yellow sheet” “evergreen” clause. Eighteen

of these were imposed by the Council itself; only two orig- |

inated in local negotiations. Controversy over the meariing

of the particular @ouneil clause in the 1958 agreement

between I.ocal 28 and‘ the Maryland Chapter, over inclu-

sion of the recommended ‘‘yellow_ sheet” Council clause in

their new agreement and over the legality of such a clause,

forms a significant part of the present dispute.

Relations Between Lecal 28 and

the International Prior to 1961

Since it is-part of the plaintiffs theory that the IP was

unlawfully motivated in his actions, particularly by alleged

ill-will originating in earlier misunderstandings between

IBEW ard Local 28, we turn now to those events. —

Since 1958 two factions, one led by Eveson and Beck-

eee rae

13

\

hardt\and the other by King and Rost, have vied for con-

trol of Local 28. Although in the summer of that year

Eveson was elected President, King was re-elected Busi-

ness Manager and Rost, Financial Secretary. In Septem-

ber, 1958, Eveson, acting within the Local, attempted to

bring its:financial policies into line with its bylaws. When

orders of Local 28’s Executive Hoard supporting Eveson’s

efforts were ignored, he preferred charges against King

and Rost by letter of January 26, 1959, addressed to

IBEW Regional Vice-President Blankenship. On January

-.31,-1959, he requested an investigation by the IEC. On

February 9, 1959, the IP sent International Representative

Goidel to confer with the officers of the Local. Goidel im-

posed a trusteeship.” Thereafter he removed Eveson front -

office, but retained King and Rost, and stispended- the

Local’s bylaws and the meetings of the Executive Board

and general membe®hip.

» Among other acts objectionable to the local membership,

Goidel,.in a referendum on November °17, 1959, made two

_ proposals relating to dues and assessments. The first in-

volved a substantial increase in dues and the second the

elimination of certain existing benefits. Over 75% of the

members abstained from the balloting. On December 11,

1959, seven members of the Local, the present leadership,

without first exhausting their internal remedies, filed sunt

in the federal District Court of Maryland to enjoin certi-"

fication of the result of the referendum. About that time

8. On October 14, 1959, in accordance with the requirements of § 301 of the

LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 461, the International filed an initial trusteeship report

with the United States Department of Labor stating that the trusteeship had

been imposed because “the factionalism in the Local Union has prevented the

officers thereof from properly organizing the electrical industry within the

jurisdiction of the said Local Union.”

8

,

charges.

“

14

the IP mooted. the cause by refusing, because of the paucity

of the vote, to accept the result of the referendum.

In March, 1960, Goidel, with the help of the IBEW

General ‘Counsel, filed charges with the IEC against the

members.who had brought the suit in December, 1959.

Their failure to exhaust inte ral remedies was ihe basis

of the charges. On March 22; 1960, the Executive Board

of Local 28 responded by suing in the District Court, under

Title II] of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-66, to set

aside the trusteeship.° The members of Local 28, against

whom Goidel had filed charges, sued in the same court to

enjoin the International from proceeding upon those

10

Again the International mooted these cases.'® There is

“wo evidence of further difficulties between the International

and local 28 from August, 1960, to March, 1961.

local 28 and the Maryland Chapter ™

Contract Negotiations ,

~

Ss

Over the years local 28 and the Maryland Chapter nego-

9. On May 11, 1960, Judge R. Dorsey Watkins denied a motion to dismiss this

complaint. Executive Roard, Local 28 », IREW, 184 F. Supp. 649 (D. Md.

1960).

10. On September 16, 1960, the LEC unanimonsly iccommended that no action

(be taken on the charges filed by Goidel. The reason stated was that there was

confusien as to the meaning of ‘the recently enacted LMRDA in regard to its

effect on the doctrine of exhaustion of internal remedies and the accused men

. had acted on information received from a Labor Department official.

In addition, elections were held within Local 28 in July, 1960; Eveson was

re-elected Presidert and Beckhardt was elected Business Manager in the place

of King. On August 5, 1960, the IP unconditionally terminated the tgpsteeshi-

pursuant to his earlier order deted June 30.

15

tiated a series of contracts containing Council clauses. The

most recent of the series was agreed upon on March 7,

1958, and was duly approved by International President

Freeman. It provided that it should take tifect April 1,

1958, and remain in effect through March 31 of each suc-

ceeding year unless changed as provided therein; that

notice specifyi ing proposed changes must be submitted at

least 60 days prior to April 1 of the contract year; that

there should be no stoppage of work because of any pro-

posed changes; and that the original agreement should re-

main in effect until all proposals had been satistactorily

resolved. The contract directed that matters in dispute,

“which the local negotiators failed to resolve, should be

referred to the Council whose decision would be “final and

11

binding on both parties.” ‘

From 1922 to 1958 no dispute with respect to wages had

been submitted to the Council by Local 28 or the Maryland

Chapter. in 1958, .1959, and 1960 wage and related dis-

putes were referred ‘to the Couricil, which granted Local 28

hourly wage increases of 15¢, 17-Yo¢, and IC. in these

three years, respectively. The court below found, and it is

not contested, that the increases granted were “not untair

or unreasonable under all the circumstances.”” 203 F. Supp.

at 299.

)

The form of “Council clause” in the 1952 agreement

provided for submission of “proposed changes” to the

Council but, unlike some clauses prior to 1955, did not

refer to termination. Taking the position that the contract

was unilaterally terminable at the end of any contract year,

11. Provisions of this contract are more fully set forth in Local 28 v. Mary-

land Chapter, 194 F. Supp. 494, 495-96 (D. Md. 1961).

at Ae 16

' Local 28, °on January 12, 1961, notified the Maryland

Chapter in writing of its intention to terminate the exist-

*ing contract in the event that it could not be modified to the

muttial satisfaction of the parties." “

In the ten meetings that followed between February 6.

and March 31, the parties remained far apart. Locaf 28

firmly insisted on a two-year contract, a 35¢ per hour in-,

crease the first year and a 30¢ increase the second, or

alternatively a one-year contract with a 35¢ wage increase.

At times during the negotiations the Local proposed a

three-year contract—“35¢ for the first year and * * *

comparable amounts for two years thereafter.” 203 F. ,

Supp. at 299...Such increases were claimed to be neces-

sary.to bring the union wage in Baltimore into line with

the wage rates in Washington, Philadelphia, Wilmington

and other large mearby cities. The Maryland Chapter, on

the other hand, initially offered only 2¢ per hour more for

each year. This offer was raised on March 27 to 5¢ per

hour in return for a reduction in the number of paid holi-

days demanded by the union. The Chayier insisted that

this was as much as was economically feasible in view of

the strong competition of non-union contractors in Balti-

more. The relative weakness of union labor in the, Balti-

more market made it unreasonable, said the- Chapter, to

insist on wage scales here comparable to other cities where

union contractors do not face stiff non-union competition.

The Maryland Chapter further contended that the cOMtract

oer be terminated unilaterally without Council ap<

pro ,

> -

-

©>

12. Consistent with this stand, and in fulfillment of its statutory obligation,

§ 8(d) of LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d), on February 24, Logal 28 also sent a

“Notice to Mediation Agencies” to the federal and state agencies, notifying them

that a dispute existed concerning the collective bargaining agreement, and of the

proposed termination of the agreement. %

en

17 ,

; ‘

kal 28, “after notitving the Maryland Chapter of its

intention to do so, brought an action on March 28, 1901,

in the District Court tor a declaratory judgment upholding

its right to terminate the agreement as of April, 1, 1901.

On March 31 it notitied the Chapter that it considered the

agreement |terminated. Thereafter, local bargaining ses-

sions were temporarily suspended. ‘ -

These developments were brought to the attention of

the membership in a meeting of Local 28 on April 1, 1961,

at which time the members were cautioned by’ business

Manager Beckhardt ° ‘to preBare yourseli economically tor

the worst” but not to take any “action yourself that will - .

embarfass yourself or the Union” as a strike prior to deci-

sion in the declaratory judgment suit might endanger, the

assets of the Local. The International learned of these oc-

currences in correspondence from Beckhardt ‘to Interra-

tional Vice-President Blankenship, and through a meeting

‘on April 11, between International: Representative Frapk

Adams, who had been sent to Baltimore to assist in nego-

tiations when NECA sent a representative to aid the

Maryland Chapter, and officers of the Local.- The Interna

tional was also informed of the Local’s demand for an

immediate 35¢ wage increase and of its intention to strike

\

_if necessary to achieve it. “ae

i

The Districi Judge found that the Local reasonably

believed it had. the support of the International in its et-

forts to obtain a substantial increase. ‘This finding is ‘ap-

parently based on the correspondence ‘betw een Beckhardt

aa IVP Blankenship. Precisely what Blankenship wrote —

>: “I assure you that Local Union 28 will have my °

pion as well as any other IBEW Local Union that is

consistent with the working agreement, IBEW constitution

e

ve

‘and policy and ede ral and State laws.” (Emphasis

added.) Moreover, as the -court. also found, International

cea agrees gaa told the Local in “April: that in Its

wage gquands it wa shooting for the mgon.”

.

-

While its International Representative was attempting

to assist Local 28 in the negotiations, IBEW = was con-

ferring With the Marykind Chapter and with NECA in

the first-of several meetings concerning. the litigation com-

menced by the Local. Thus, on April 7, 1961, Louis

Sherman, General Counsel for IBEW, met with James P.

(iafland, attorney for the Maryland Chapter, a with

other representatives of the Chapter and of NECA, at the

Washington ottices of NECA to obtain information on the.

status-of the case and ‘the. legal issues involved. The testi-

mony establishes that an underlying purpose was to

determine whether [BT V or the Council should sascha

in the litigation. One ot the complaints. of the, ‘LOecal i

that it was not turrently informed of these meefings.

On April 171901, the Chapter’s motion to dismiss ~

action against it was. demied, set 194 Fo Supp. 491;

\pril 21, the Chapter formally invited the Local to join tn

the submission of issues to the Councii land notined the

Local that gtherwise tt wor'd do so umilaterally; and on’

\pril 28, the Chapter flea .ts case before the Council,

presenting ali issues (previously: exchanged $&tween, the

partigs, sincluding the issue of “termination of the con-

tract, , ‘ z ‘ss

-

fu the meantime, on April 25, aie a tormal strike

vote, and without having sought or received permission

strike from the IP. about half of the members of Local 2

went out on strike. Ostensibiy a wild cat strmke, the ie

°

*

6 ap -) ; 19

“ : :

trict Judge found that it was in tact subject to the control

of Eveson and Beckhardt, and of O'Doherty, local 28's

, attorney.”

*

Collective bargaining between the Local and the Chapter

was resumed on April 27, and the Council scheduled a

hearing tor May 15 on the issues submittad by the Mary:

land Chapter. On May 4 Local 28 filed another suit in the’

District Court to enjoin any decision by the Council based

on the unilateral submission.” This suit was eomsolidated

with the earlier decl ratory judgment action against the

- Maryland Chapter and a hearing was held on May 10 and

11. At its conclusion the District Judge orally announced

his decis¥on that the Local had the right to and did etfee:

‘tively términate its agreement on March 31, 1461; as the

terms of i agreement did not require the issue of termi

nation toe submitted to the Council. The court inti

mated, without finding it necessary to decide, ‘that if the

contract weré construed to be perpetual it would: be invalid.

Opinion, May 16, 194 F. Supp. 494.

9 “At the court’s suggestion, the parties agreed to continue

to bargain, in good faith, thes Maryland Chapter agreed: to

_ take any appeal promptly,’and the Local Union agreed with

the concurrénce of the large number of its members:in the

courtroom to return its members to work and to rerhain

: at work tuntil a decision of the’ Court4r Appeals was

rendered “or until July 31, 1961, i@ no,appeal is take n,”

194 F. Supp. at 502. The court further suggested that the

parties voluntarily submit their differences to the Council

Bi _ h- Other than to note its surprise, the Local makes no effort,to contest this

finding, except to point out that the finding was not that the strike was caused

by the Local's leadership. j e

y

*o

ere

for conciliation, refusing either to require arbitration as

requested by the Chapter or to enjoin the Council from

rendering a decision as requested by the Local.

Thereupon, the members of Local 28 returned to ‘work.

“The local negotiafors resumed their meetings on May 13.

There was discussion -of-a possible wage increase of 50¢

over a three-year period, an amount substantially higher

than the last offer on May 5 which had been 5¢ for 1961,

5 for 1962, and 10 for 1963, a total increase of 20¢ under

a three-year contract otherwise unchanged. By letter of

May 14, Beckhardt reported to Freeman that eg pana

was coming up with * ‘far more substantial o \d

On. May 15, the Maryland Chapter’s submission, came

on for hearing before the Council. Local 28 did not appear,

but sent a letter to the Council setting forth its reasons

and accusing the Chapter of not bargaining in good faith.

The Chapter representatives informed the Council of *the

court's ruling of May 11, and requested that no_binding

determination be reached but that the Council confine itself

to an advisory opinion. There is evidence that Freeman

‘became angry and ordered the Chapter to proceed with

its case.

+ .

After the hearing, the Council met in executive session

for an hour and a half. The District Court found, on con-

flicting evidence, that a tentative decision was reached with

_ the approval of. the IP allowing a 10¢ per hour wage in-

crease. The existing contract was to remain otherwise

unchanged. At this particular stage, apparently, there was

no insistence on an “evergreen” clause. Final action, how-

ever, was deferred and on June 2 the Council announced:

that in view of. the — litigation no decision would

be issued. :

\

t

e

2}

In the meantime, an May“18, the negotiating committee

met and management again increased its. ofter—l0¢ for.

1961, 10¢ for 1962, 2nd 5¢ for 1963. Though the Chapter’s —

» new offer of 10¢ for 1964 coincided to that extent with

the Council’s tentative decision of, May 15, the District.

Judge found as a ‘fact that Local 28 had failed to prove

that knowledge of the tentative decision reached the

Chapter. |

The Chapter promptly noted its appeal front the judg-

ment of the District Court in the declaratory. judgment

case. Thereafter, sometime before June 2, Freeman and

Geary (the ‘NECA chief executive) conferred; Geary G

stated that he was recommending dismissal of the appeal,

and Freeman assured him that he. would do all that he

could to see that Local 28 would submit to the Council all

" issues, concerning a new contract, which were not resolved

on ‘& local level. At a further meeting on June 2 in

Sherman’s office between him, Geary and the attorneys

for NECA and the Maryland Chapter, it was decided that

the appeal’ should be dismissed. Shortly thereafter, Geary

sent a representative to advise the Maryland Chapter with

respect to its negotiations, particularly to ask for the Coun-

: cil’s recommended “yellow sheet” Council clause. At the

next bargaining session on June 5, the Chapter’s proposed

terms for a new one-year cortract were a 10¢ wage in-

crease plus the “yellow shéet” Council clause.

:

; The June Strike

The Maryland Chapter dismissed its appeal on June 9. )

Local 28 held a strike meeting on June 13. Answering a

question from the floor as to whether the IP had consented

to the strike, Business Manager Beckhardt falsely an- ,

#.

— 22

S

cwered that the Local had been given the “‘green"light.”

‘The vote was 740 to 79 in favor of a strike to begin June

16. By telegram of June 14, the Local notified the IP of

the strike, adding, * ‘Any instructions from you would be

appreciated.”

. The IP’s telegraphic reply of June 15 advised that a

strike without his eonsent would be a‘ violation of the

Constitution. He reminded the Local that in the recent

~ case against the Maryland Chapter it was agreed, that the

members of» the Local Union would return’ to Avork and

continue working until decision on appeal or until July 31

if no appeal were taken. The parties, he added, had agreed

to continue bargaining in good faith. He noted that the

Chapter s appeal: had been - dismissed, and that it had been

agreed that the members would “continue at: »Work during

collective bargaining®* * * until July 31, 1961. He refused

his consent to a_strike-or other work stoppage, and. in- -

structed the officers to permit no such strike. The reasons

he gave for his refusal were that the Local was violating

the suggestions ‘of the court, that it had not asked permis-

sion to strike in advance, that it was the general policy of

IBEW to faver reference of all collective bargaining dis-

putes to the Council when the agreement contained a Coun-

° 7 cil clause, and that. he felt that a Council clause could be

acgotien which would be acceptable to both parties.

The IP" s telegram was received befare the strike began,

but the local officers did not then inform the members.

* The telegram was discussed at a meeting of the Local’s

Executive Board on June 16. A meeting of the membership

was called for June 22, and in the meantime, on June 19,

* the strike was allowed to begin. On Jiihe 19, the Local: |

answered the IP by telegram, and the next day its officers

>

23

met him in Washington. In justification of the strike,

was argued to Freeman that the Local's agreement avith

the court was to work only until an appeal was taken and

decided. and that the appeal had been taken: and dismissed ;

that the Maryland Chapter was not bargaining in good

faith in insisting on a perpetual Council clause; that on >

account of this the Local was fiting charges with the

NLRB: and that Local 28 had good hopes of suecess and

had already signed up a few individual contractors at the

35¢ figure.”* The local officers also contended that this was

not.a general work stoppage within the constitutional pro-

s

hibition.

Freeman again refused to consent to the strike. He

wished the Local suceess in its negotiations, but repeated

that he wanted issues which the parties were unable to

resolve to be referred to the Council. He said he would

do nothing until the meeting of the Local called for June

23. and the Local’s officers, though refusing to promise to

~ send the men back to work, agreed to read the IP’s tele-

gram to the members at that meeting.

S

The meeting of June 22 was attended by an Interna-

tional Representative sent by Freeman. Local 28's at-

torney, O'Doherty, read the IP’s telegram ‘and addressed

the membtrs at length. He expressed disagreement with

the IP’s interpretation of the IBEW Constitutien and

criticised the International and the Maryland Chapter.

O'Doherty called for a vote of “non-concurrence” with

the IP. which was overwhelmingly given. '

¢

°

-——_ os

14. These agreements providing-for a 35M wage increase were subject, however;

to the condition that ghe Local would refund the différence between that figure

and any lesser amount ultimately agreed upon with the Chapter.”

24

-

Meetings of the local negotiators had been held on June

“12. On June.16 and 17 they met before a Federal Medi-

ator, and there were additional meetings in June but no

satisfactory. accord was-reached. Local 28 would not re-

cede from its demand for a 35¢ wage increase for 1961

other than to offer to split its demand by accepting 10¢

April 1, 10¢ August 1, and [5¢ December 1, 1961. The

Maryland Chapter, on the other hand, while raising its

affer on June 16 to a 20¢ increase for 1961 as part of a°

three-year contract, insisted on a “‘yellow sheet” Council

clause which was unacceptable to the Local. Collective

bargaining ceased on July 6, when the Maryland —

broke off negotiations.”

The Charter Revocation

2 @ % °

After Local 28 voted to disobey the IP’s order not to

strike, Freeman»never waivered in his determination to

assert the authority of the International and to terminate

the unauthorized strike. .

i <2

Shortly after the strike began, he gave Geary his as- |

surance that he would do whatever he could to obtain

other union employees for. the NECA contractors, and

g

15. Local 28 filed charges on June 19 before the NLRB accusing the Maryland

‘ Chaptef of bargaining in bad ‘aith in insisting on a perpetual contract. This

charge was dismissed without p: sjudice on July 6, after the Chapter took the

_ position before an NLRB examiner that it wanted such a contract but was not

insisting on it. The same day, the Chapter, at the suggestion of its attorney and

of the NECA Eastern Regignal Director, broke off collective bargaining nego-

tiations, charging Local 28 with failure to bargain in good faith. On July 27,

Local 28 Sled charges against the Chapter and two of its member contractors

alleging coercion of members, and on October 3, 1961, chasged the Chapter be-

fore the NLRB with a failure to bargain in good faith from April 4, 1961. The

plaintiffs’ counsel have attested in their brief that the Labor Board has suspended

‘its proceedings on these charges pending the disposition of the current litigation.

° \

-_ ‘ :

some men were brought to Baltimore to work. He also

jnformed other unions in the building trades that Local

28’s picket lines need not be honored. On June 23, he

notified Local 28 that he was sending International Repre-’

sentative Alfted Terry to investigate the work stoppage.

Terry arrived in Baltimore on ‘June 23 clothed with

authority to investigate not only the strike but also the

possibility of establishing a new local in Baltimore- On

the 26th he auet with officers of the Local, and on the 28th

sent the IP a memorandum.reporting on the Local leader-_

ship’s attitude and its request that the IBEW stay out of

the situation. ~~

On June 23, O'Doherty wrote Freéman reiterating the

Local’s position’ and asking for International support.

Freeman’s reply on July 7 characterized the Local’s action

* as a challenge to the authority of the IBEW, and he in- .

formed O'Doherty that charges had been filed against the

a * seg The same day the International served on Local 28

{

an order, prepared by IBEW counsel and ‘signed by Free-

man, requiring it to show cause before an independent

referee on July 17, why its charter should not be revoked

for engaging in a strike in violation of Art. XVII, § 13

. of the IBEW Constitution.” The specific charges related

BN the strikes of June and of- April 25 to May 16. The

referee was appointed pursuant to Art. IV, § 3(11) of

the Constitution to take testimony, make findings of fact,

and report to the IP, bur Freeman reserved to himseif all

questions of law as well as the ultimate decision.

16. Copies of this order were soit to each member ‘of Local 28 on July 7

together with copies: of the correspondence between the IP and O'Doherty. On

July 14, Freeman wrote ahother letter to each member. He included*a copy of

the Constitution and explained the effect revocation would have on them. He

further explained their obligations to the International and assured them that

the Local could not validly discipline them for returning to work.

26

Sein and’ Sherman: met with Beckhardt and

O'Doherty on July 12 in Washington at the latter’s re-

quest. The Local indicated its unwillingness to go to the

Council and its fear’ that a continuous “yellow sheet’’

- Council clause might be imposed upon it by the Council,

and suggested that the terms of 'a new contract be referred _

to independent arbitration. This offer Freeman rejected,

stating: “* * * if we are going to have arbitration, why

-not take advantage of existing machinery that has proven

_ satisfactory for a number: of years?” He refused to “as-

sure the Local. that it would not be required to accept the

“yellow sheet” clause. :

)

Although during examination of the IP the District

Judge appeared to assume that the Local had knowledge,

at the time of this meeting, of the Council’s poli¢y of im-

*. posing an “evergreen” clause when the issue of termination

came before it, in his decision he found that the IP did .

not then inform the Local of. this policy. However this-

may be, it is clear that the IP_jgsigyed that the Local must

_seturn to work and submit gliamikesolved issues to+the

Council to avoid: disciplinary actfon.

Prior to the hearing before the independent referee, the

Locat:requested the right to examine the IP and certain

other International officers, but Freeman refused to. ap-

pear because “in the final analysis [he] would have to

make a decision in the case.” The charges were prosecuted -

by IBEW General’ Counsel Sherman, but were limited .to

the strike of June 16, as Sherman withdrew the charges

relating to April “for-the purpose of expediting the pro- _

ceeding.”” On July 25, the referee reported his findings to

the IP that the Local had gone out on strike on June 19°

andacontinued the strike without requesting or receiving

© ®

?

Ww

r

2 27

consent of the IP, that this was a work stoppage requiring

the IP’s permission, that by his telegram of June’ 15 the

IP had refused his consent, and that this fact was known

in sufficient time to have canceled the strike.

After hearing:atgument from’O’Doherty and Sherman

on July 28, the IP indicated his view that Local 28 was in

violation of the Constitution, but deferred his decision

pending further review. His decision, prepared with the

advice of the General Counsel, Sherman, and rendered on .

August 1, concluded that Local 28 had deliberately and

willfully violated the IBEW Constitution. He ordered the

Local’s charter revoked, its jurisdiction transferred to a

new local union, and appropriate legal steps to collect and

administer or distribute the Local’s assets and trust funds.

‘He Uirected that the order should take effect on August 7,

unless, in the meantime, the members took anew the [BE W

Oath of Obligation, terminated the strike, and agreed to

refer all unresolved collective bargaining issues to the

Council for final and binding decision. His direction added, -

“it being understood that the Local shall not be required’

to accept the Council clause ruled terminable by Chief

Judge Thomsen [in the Local 28 ve Md. Chapter” case]

decided May 16, 1961." Copies of the order were mailed

to*all members of Local 28). with a letter from Freeman

explaining the action that must be taken to comply and

the consequences to the Local and its members: of failure

_to comply. — a .

On August 2, Local 28 noted its appeal to the IEC from

we by decision. On Atigust 5, by a vote of 991 to 2, its

°

17. The text of this order is set forth in 197 F. Supp. at 104 n.4.

28

&

members supported the officers in their defiance of the

IP’s order. | a8 aa ‘

=

Meanwhile, on July 17, while. the independent referee's

hearing was in progtgss, Local 28iled an action in the |

District Court against the IBEW and the IP alleging

breach of the IP’s duty to the Local in the course he was

following regarding the strike, and that his intent was to

require the Local to surrender its autonomy. The District

Judge refused to issue a preliminary injunction. He found®

that no denial of procedural due process had been shown

by any fact all ed or presented at that time, and that it

chad not beer’ demonstrated that the appeal taken by Local

28 to the IEC woild be futile, delayed or otherwise un-

reasonable. He dismissed the complaint “without preju-

dice.” Local 28 v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99. Qn August)

14, the individuals’ complaint was filed in the District

Court in Parks, et al. v. IBEW.

j |

On September 12, 1961, Local 28’s appeal to the IEC

was heard.® Counsel was allowed to present argument and

read from depositions of F reeman and Geary with respect

to the IP’s good faith in revoking the charter. After sup-

plemental ‘briefs were filed, the IEC, on September 30,

affirméd the IP’s order in every particular, holding “beyond

question” that the IP had conducted himself properly in

revoking the charter. The District Court refused to find

that the IEC .was prejudiced. The reinstitution of legal

action by Local’28 followed on October 18.- °

‘ eo

Local 24 3

| ° r -. @

During July, before'the revocation, International Repre-

sentative’ Terry remained in Baltimore making himself

|

available to the members of Local 38 to explain the posi-,

tion of the International with? regard to gthe strike. On

August 27 a charter was granted to Local 24. The initial

membership, numbering about 30, adopted bylaws and

elected temporary officers. It included’a number of Local

28 members who had been supervisory personnel and offi-

cers of key members-of the Chapter, but who had resigried R

their offices in their companies. When permanent officers

were elected, hov ever, several hundred men had sjoined

Local 24.

In September, an agreement was reached between Local

24 and the Maryland Chapter for a 25¢ wage increase for

each of two years. This agreement originally contained é

the continuous. “yellow sheet” Council clause, but it Was »

deleted by IP Freeman who testified that he did s6 tog

make the contract accord vweth the court’s earlier ruling.

On October 27) Freeman wrote to each member of Local, =

28 stating the IBEW position that: members transferring -

to Local 24 would not lose their interest in the funds of 28.

As of March 31, 1962, Local 24, which was an oe Ny

union accepting all applicatiorss for membership from é

qualified electricians, ‘had some 1300 smembers,° of whom

_ 240 ‘had transferr@d from Local 28, Local 28 was a

“closed union,”, limiting membership to increase the’ em- ;

ployment opportunities of its members.”

.

18. The District Judge found that Local 24 had been from its inception and

continued to be dominated by the ternational. ‘On appeal Local 24 argued that

encouragement and aid in its establishment was an appropriate exercise of the -

International’s function.

The District Court found that two leading contractors of the Maryland

Chapter had cooperated with Terry, in the?formation of Local 24. On appeal

Local 24 argues that this finding and any legal consequences are matters within

the exclusive purview of the NLRB.

g

“¢

30 Peper Oks

II]. LEGAL DISCUSSION. °

Although courts are. generally reluctant to roe ay A

internal union matters, at common law they have, never-

theless, established various norms to determine the legality

and fairness of union disciplinary action. Professor, now

Soliciter General, Cox has commented that a number of .

broadly procedural requirements have been .imiposed upon

union actien by the .state courts As the District Court -

found,, the few: published decisions touching upon -issues

involved in the revocation or suspension of a local union’s

_ charter have generally taken the view that the procedural

requirements governing the expulsion or suspension of an -

individual member likewise govern revocation or suspen-

sion of a local’s charter. Although many of’ the decisions

‘addressed themselves primarily to procedural aspects of

fair hearirig, there is no indication against a carry-over

19. “Upon the theory that improper expulsion violates the, member’s interest

in the organization’s property or a contract between hint and other. members

thade up of the constitution and by-laws or, in recent years, upon the ground:

that there is a tortious interference with an advantageous relationship,Sthe

state will set an expulsion aside upon any of five grounds: wa

“(1) The procedure v.vlated the union's constitution or by-laws.

“(2) The constitution or by-laws did not authorize expulsion for the a

offense. . w-

“(3) The procedure, althouglf it conformed to the union’s constitution ana

by- laws, did not afford the member a fair hearing.

“(4) The expulsion, although it was authorized by the union’s constitution

and by-laws, was unreasonable” contrary to ‘public policy,’- or contrary to

‘natural justice.’ '

“(S$) The expulsion was in bad faith because the purported ground was

only a pretense for getting rid of a troublesome mefnber.”

Cox, “Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,”

58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 835-36 (1960). Accord, Cox, “The Role of Law in Pre- °

serving Union Democracy,” 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 615 (1959); see Sherman,

“The ‘Individual Member and the* Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,”.54 Nw. L. Rev.

803, 820-21 (1960) ; Summers, “American Legislation ,for Union Democracy,”

25 Modern > wm 4 273, 279-83' (1962) ; see generally, Summers, “The Law of

31 ;

to include the more substantive of Professor Cox’s five

requirements.”° | .

While these standards for judicial intervention were .

developed under state common law, it was appropriate for

the District Court to. aecept Professor Cox’s formulation

as a guide for decision in these cases arising under federal

aw. The Supreme Court has told us that in fashioning

federal law in suits brought under, section 301i upon col-

lective bargaining agreements, “state live: 1f compatible

with the purpose, of § 301, may be resorted to in order: to

find the-rule that will best effectuate the federal “policy.”

Textile Workers vz Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457

(1957).- It has’not been suggested if this case that the

same may not be done in suits based on “contracts * nas

between * * * labor organizations.” In addition, it Is ap-

w . 7

Union, Disciptine : What: the Courts Do ip Fact,”. 70 Yale L. J. 175 (1960);

Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Bev. 1049

(1951) ; Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397 (1952). wi

20. See Ellis v. AFL. 48°Cal. App.2d 440, 120 P.2d 79 (1941); Hatch v.

Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 233 Il. App. 495 (1924);

Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128 N.F. 704 (1920) ; Mixed Local v.

Hotel & Restauran? Employees International, 212 Minn. 587, 593, 4 N.W.2d

771, 775 (1942); Naylor zw. Harkins, 11 N.J> 435, 94 A:2d 825 (1953) ‘affirming

issuance of a preliminary injunction), 32. N.J. Super. 559, 571, 109 A.2d 19, 26

(App. Div. 1954), ordering a permanent injunction and. r@ersing, 27 N.J. Super.

594, 99 A.2d 849 (Chancery, Div. 1953); Mayer @. Liutcheson, 18 N.Y.S.2d 691

(Sup. Ct.), reversed oa other grounds, 260 App. Diy. 130. 20 N.Y.S.2d 698 ©

(1940), aff'd 285 N.Y. 832, 35 N.E.2a 501 (1941); Moore <. Moreschi, 179

Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S.2d 208, aff'd without opinion, 265 App. Div. 989, 40

N.Y.S.2d 334 aff'd with modifications as to scope of injunction, 291 N.Y. 81,

50 N.E.2d 552, modified according to mandate, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 4602

(1943) ; Shrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1948), 192 Misc.

603, 81 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1948), 194 Misc. 138, 86 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1949) ; Inter-

national Union of Operating Engincers wv Pierce, 321 S.W,2d 914, 918, 9190

(Tex., S.@ 1959) ; Washington Local Lodge No. 104 v. International Brother- .

hood of Boilermakers, 33 Wash.2d i 68-71, 203 P.2d 1019, 1058-59 (1949) ; see

also, Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1403 (1952); 87 C.J.S. Trade Unions

(1954) § 45. . *

2

32 a

,

propriate for federal courts, relatively inexperienced in

handling interna! union cases, to look to existimg state law

concepts in applying the new provisions*of the LMRDA.*

) .

The District Court’s Opinion |

In deciding the merits the District Court specifically

held that -Local 28 called the June strike in violation of

Art. XVII, § 13 of the IBEW Constitution, which re-

quired the IP’s authorization, and that the Local failed to

take the opportunity available under Art. IV, § 3(2) and

Art. XVII, § 13 of the IBEW Constitution, to appeal to

the IEC from the IP’s determination that this was a strike

requiring his consent. In addition, it held that when the

IP later revoked Local 28’s charter, as he was empowered

to do, see Art. IV, § 3(8).6f£ the IBEW Constitution, he

was motivated in part by a legitimate desire to punish the

Local and its members for conducting an unauthorized

and forbidden strike.

The court nevertheless concluded that the IP’s action

’ breached his and the Intefnational’s fidyciary obligation

to Local 28 under the International Constitution, and

thereby also violated rights of the Local’s members which

are protected by the LMRDA.

First, the District Court held that the revocation hear-

ing was not‘fair because the IP was not an impartial and

é

_ 21. Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact,”

70 Yale L.J. 175, 176-77 (1960); see Detroy v. American Guild of Variety

. Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 78-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); cf.,

Highway Truck Drivers\Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617 (E.D..Pa.),

aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 284°F 2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,

365 U.S. 833 (1961).

®, °

33

.a

‘

unbiased judge. Although the IEC was’ found to be un- *

biased, the court concluded that the.review by that body

did not cure the defects in the initial proceeding for the,

review was appellate only and rot a trial de novo. Second,

the court held that the IP’s action had been partially moti-

vated by “improper reasons,” in breach of his and the

International’s fiduciary obligation owing under the In-

ternational: Constitution. Finally, the court concluded that

the sanction imposed was unreasonable and unjust under

all the circumstances’ in that the rank and file members

had been innocently caught in the middle of a dispute

between the leaderships of the Local and International.

eS

N 7

Obligations Of and To IBEW

or .

While clearly correct in its recognition of the theoretical

basis for judicial intervention, we think that the court

erred*n applying these principles to the facts it had found.

Althougli there is no hint of ‘corruption and-the court spe-

cifically declared that there was no sufficient evidence that

the IP was moved by “express or particular malice, i.e.

ill-wiii, Spite, a grudge or a desire to be revenged on a 4,

particular person or persons, resulting in a deliberate, in-

tention to. commit an injury,” it nevertheless*held that

the IP “did act willfully and intentionally, for the purpose,»

inter alia; of imposing severe’ discipline on the members of

Local 28, and without due regard for the duty he owed

to them, as well as the IBEW as a whole. In that sense

his action amounted to legal malice.” 203 F. Supp. at 309.

The primary basis for the holding of “legal malice”

‘was that the IP had acted f¥om “mixed motives” to im-

pose the discipline.

e

34

2

What are these “mixed motives”? The court found that

though the IP had acted “to maintain necessary union

discipline” (Jd. at 308) and was iintainted by express or

particular ‘malice, ill-will, etc., he had improperly moved

“to.rid himself of troublesome leadership in the Baltimore

_ _ area, and to discipline the members of Local 28 for their

refusal to agree to submit. their disputes to the Council

and for having brought several suits against him and the

IBEW.” Jd. at 308. The wrongful ingredient in the

“mixed motives” cannot be that the IP acted to rid him-

self of troublesome leadership or to discipline members ;

he is .clearly empowered to do both of “these things—

especially in response to an unauthorized strike; as the

court ifself recognized. The. imputed impropriety rests on

the court’s finding that the IP was moved not only by the

unauthorized strike but also by the fact that the plaintiffs”

had earlier brought suits challenging the International and

refused to submit disputes to the Council. It is plain that

the court’s decision is almost, wholly based upon a belief.

that because of the manner in which the International re-

sisted thegt-ocal’s will in collective bargaining, it breached

its fiduciary obligation to the Local and its members. This

| needs to be examimed.

Before discussing the propriety of the intervention by

the International in the Local’s collective bargaining, it

is appropriate to note that the District Court found that

the IP had been motivated in part by a legitimate desire

to discipline the Local, its members and officers, for having

engaged in an urf@ithorized strike even after his repeated

orders ‘to return to work.

The calling“of a strike is such 4 momentous step»in a

labor controversy that it is usually subjected to strict con-

35.

g

trol by international unions.” The strike is a weapon that.

can bring an employer to his knees; but .the effect on the

employer can be too devastating for the union’s own good.

In addition, a strike can result in undue loss of produc-

tion, harmful to the public, and a strike can waste a

union’s funds and otherwise weaken it in jts continuing

effort to better its adherents’- wages and working condi-

. tions.

-

over the ee ‘apon assures that generally only intelli-

gent and responsible use will be made of it after the greater

interésts Of the international and the general econe my-have

been considered. Such is the potential harm from indis-

ecriminate resort to strikes that Professor Summers has

commented that an international ts justine gin adopting

severe disciplinary measures, including ess indi-

c

It is widely ¥elt that vesting control in the international

‘a:

C

vidual members or revocation of a local yuu harter,

when an unauthorized strike has been undért: iken. Sum-

mers, “Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv.

yr Rev. 1049, 1065-606 (1951).

“The refusal to sanction the June strike cannot be said to

be a breach of a fiduciary duty owed the plaintiffs under

the Constitution. If the IP believed that an appropriate

Council clause could be negotiated and that Tocal 28 was

excessive in its demands and “shooting for’the moon,” it

was his*prerogative to restrain the Local, and if possible

to counteract its headstrong determination to wage a strike

that could adversely affect the cause of his international

% *o =

22. Barbash. Labor's Grass Reots (1901) pp. 150-51; Letserson, American

Trade Union Democracy (1959) p. 321; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the

Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L. J. 1460, 1462 (1962).

6

3 _&

+ 36 a

&

organization.” -His duty was to 750,000 members, not

merely to a few who might gain a short-range advantage

that could prove costly to the parent body, the employers,

the. public and, in the long run, Yo the plaintiffs them-

selves.** The International was dealing day by day with

many chapters of NECA and the International's relations

with NECA were important to the welfare of all 150,000

who worked in the construction industry. ;

Severe measures were taken against the Local, but only

after full opportunity had been given the strikers, first to

comply with the IP’s back-to-work order and later, in the

revocation decision itself, to redeem themselves. That this

may be the first instance in which this International re-

voked a logal’s charter for going out on,an unauthorized

strike is not particularly relevant, since there is apparently

23. The District Judge found that jin refusing consent to the strike “the IP

was * * * primarily moved by a desire to acquire and retain as much control

as he cold over the negotiations .with the Maryland Chapter, because he dis-

trusted Eveson, Beckhardt and O'Doherty and other leaders of the group that —

controlled Local g, as the result of previous difficulties * * *." 203 F. Supp.

at 302.

Under the International Constitution it cannot be said that the IP could

not legitimately desire to intervene in the negotiations. In addition, the District

Judge specifically held that thi§ was a strike requiring the IP’s consent and

that the IP’s refusal was not appealed to the LEC, 203 F. Supp. at 306, in

which case the plaintiff's have waived judicial review of this action of the IP.

Thus, while the refusal to sanction the strike must be taken as valid and can-

not be impeached directly, the re®ult of the court's decision is to impeach it

indirectly. The revocation was the lawful means chosen by the IP to termi-

nate the forbidden strike as well as to discipline the recalcitrants. -In the

circumstances it would seem to have been the only effective means to restore

industrial peace.

24. The District Court in fact observed that a_35¢ increase “would have

brought Local 28's scale about in line with neighboring cities, although it may

have been unrealistic in view of the strong non-union situation in Baltimore.”

203 F. Supp. at 302 n.24.

9

>

no precedent for the obdurate persistence of this Local

after ample warnings. | - ,

Although this court recognizes that in determining the

validity of disciplinary proceedings there is an obligation

to draw upon standards of fairness beyond those expressed

or embraced in the union constitution, much more is in

question here than the mere propriety of an act of disei-

pline., Even as formulated by the District Judge, the issues

invalve considerations ef basie union policy and struc:

ture. i.e.. how shall the power over collective bargaining

be distributed within the labor organization?

e &

What has been granted the pant body as its proper

yrovince in collective bargaining and what has been ‘re-

tained by the localperhaps it is more acctirate to put it

the other way: what has been retained by the parent and

what has been granted to the subordinate—is a matter of

internal govertiment resting upon the contract the local

and its members have made in accepting a charter irom

the parent. This court is advertent to the prevailing policy

favoring internal union democracy*” and, of course, it

recognizes that in appropriate cases courts may intervene

to redress grievances arising from the imposition of dis-

cipline upon locals or individual members; but, in the

absence of specific legislation, it does not lie within the

authority of a court to give effect to its general preferences

between international power,gnd local autonomy in mat-

ters of collective bargaining. Questions as to how rela-

o

SS

25. See the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et. seq; see also, e.g., Cox, “Internal

Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,” 58 Mth. L.

Rev. 819, 829-31 (1960); Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democ-

racy,” 25 Modern L. Rev. 273, 273-79 (1962).

ee Ber ae

m7]

tions ‘between an international and its local might best Be

regulated are for internal settlement er for Congress,

which possesses the legislative -power. ‘Judges lack -that

power even when they are convinced of the desirability of

. improvements in the law. =

{

~ Although state courts have traditionally exercised some

supervisory function over local-international relations,”

and the federal courts are now erapowered to intervene in

some afeas under a nomber of provisions of the LMRDA,

federal judges may not, on their own, cure whatever detficien-

cies they may think exist in the pattern the parties have

iashioned, | ray

In return for the strength the local gets from the inter-

“national it accepts a measure of international control,’

This is plainly spelled out in this Union's Constitution,

and as a rule such a structural arrarigement has been

- theighi iwcessaly itt the labor movement. As Professor

tarbash has written, “When a local union makes a col-

lective bargajning decision which seriously prejudices larger

interests in the union, these latter are to all intents and

purposes being excluded from a voice in a decision on

L)

&

26. See, e.g., Cohn, . “The International and the Local Uaien: "-11 N.Y.U.

Ann. Conf. Labor 7 (1958); Summers, “Union Schism in Perspective: Flexi-

ble Doctrines, Double Standards and Projected parle 45 Va. L. Rev! 261

(1959).

27. The Dicttict Court correctly. recognized that :

“The evidence in thé instant cases; however, makes it clear that those

[worthy] results {of the Council's service] have been achieved through a

tight control over the agreements of most lotal unions by the international

officers of the IBEW, particularly the ]P, at the cost of a large measure of

the autonomy of the local unions. The IBEW Constitution gives at least lip

service to the principle that the local unions shall Go the collective bargain-

° = ‘i Vv

> 39

se28

which (democratically ) they have a right to. be hdrd.

The broad mandate of power to the IP made by the

Union Constitution is designed to be used by him_to pro-

mot® such methods of collective bargaining as seem con-

ducive to the interests of the entire organization. If the

policy of the IBEW is to favor the Council device, or 1f

in the IP's discretion it seems suitable in a particular in-

stance, oc if-in his judgment an impending strike is not an

appropriate bargaining weapon, there is nothing in the

law that Sorbids his insisting that the’ local accede to his

judgment. When the IBEW's Constitution and its experi-

ence over the years are broaght into focus, such insistence

by the IP in this case could well have been thought by him

the only feasible method of accomplishing a peaceful and

proper solution of the dispute between I.ocal 28 and the

Maryland Chapter.

We have seen in the statement of facts how completely

committed the IBEW has been over a span of decades to

the policy of requiring its locals to bargain collectively

before the CIR, the chosen instrument for the resolution

of disagreements which could not be settled at the local

level. And it is undisputed that this policy has served the

ing for their members put it a > contains provisions which appear to author-

ize the control over the affairs of the local unions exercised by the IP.

“The provisions which shall be included in the constitution and ‘the policies

which shall be followed by the officers are matters for the union as a whole

to decide, subject to the restraints imposed by law. Federal courts may

impose such restraints only within the jurisdictional limits provided by Con-

gressional enactments, and must follow the policies established by the. statutes, _

as interpreted by authoritative decisions.” 203 F. Supp. at 310.

28. Barbash, “Power and the Pattern of Union Government”, 9 Lab. a! J.

628, 633 (1958); see also, Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship

Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1462 (1962); cf. Spitz, Democracy and the

Challenge of Power (1958) pp. 82-84. 4

t \*

-

/

:

~~

‘&

xz

40

parties. well over the years.” The IP, as a witness in court,

made no concealment of the fact that he favors Council

clauses in all agreeménts and that he has on occasion used -

pressure on reluctant locals to accept them, even to the

extent of ¢hreatening to transfer one local’s jurisdiction to

another.

Additionally, the conferences between IBEW, NECA

and Maryland Chapter officials, relative to the Council

and other matters of mutual concern, e.g., the meetings in

which it was decided not to appeal from the Dist¥ict

Court’s order ruling the 1958 agreement terminable, can-

not in fairness be cast in the sinister terms of a breach of

fiduciary obligation to the Local. Even as it spoke of the

International’s duty to the Local the court itself recognized

that “the officers of the International and of NECA: have

~~ e

29. During the trial in Local 28's action to determine the terminability of the

1958 agreement the court declared: ’

“I am not saying that the arbitration clause is not a very good thing. It .

obviously has been a splendid thing for the industry. It has prevented strikes

=

and the whole system is a good system.

7) * ¢- * * @

the years it has.done a fine job * * *,”

In its opinion the court said: @ .

“Certainly, it is highly. desirable that the local unions of the IBEW and the

chapters of NECA take advantage of the, services of the Council; the evi-

. dence shows that it has served all parties well over the years.” 194 F. Supp.

at 501-02. -' . ma

In the opinion under review the District Judge concluded that the wage

increases granted by the Council to the Local in 1958, 1959, and 1960 were:

~“ * * * not unfair-or unreasonable under ‘all the circumstances, including the

wage rates of comparable building trades in Baltimore, where unions are

not as strong as in Philadelphia, Wilmington and Washington.” 203 F.

Supp. at 299.

And most ‘specifically the court stated :

“I adhere to the view that the Council has served th® parties well over the

years. Wages have steadily increased, in line with other comparable build-

ing trades, and there have been remarkably few strikes.” 203 F. Supp. at 310,

« I do not make any criticism of the Council, * * * it is perfectly obvious over

a

vu

ts 4]

ast

‘

a common interest in the Council as a means of stabilizing

labor relations in the industry, which renders a large:

measure of cooperation between the two national organi-

zations reasonable and desirable.” 203 F. Supp. at 300

n:22.°°

ce

While there is talk by the plaintiffs of local autonoiny,

it is plain that under theeInternational Constitution the

‘Jocal can neither make r nor abrogate a collective ae re

agreement without the IP’s sanction. (Art. XVII, NS

11). That official is authorized to intervene in local nego= °

tiations at any stage and may ‘negotiate agreements cover-

ing the entire industry, thereby pre-empting the locdl’s

autonomy. (Art. XVIP, § 13; Art. IV, § 3(12)). The

. . é e |e . . . . . be

policy underlying this Union's Constitution and its prac-

tice has been to permit the International's intervention, if

that ‘is deemed nécessary tO prevent an infterruption in the

30. Findings that IBEW, NECA atid Maryland Chapter officials cooperated

in the founding of Local 24 by dissident members of Local 24 including super-

visory personnel of two employers who had resigned their supervisory positions

to take a more active part in union activities, were also a part of the res gestae

that led the court to hold that the IP acted with “legal or constructive makece.”

We are ‘of ‘the opinion that, in this industry where there is admittedly close

rapport between employers and the union and relatively free mobility between

the employer and ‘employee categories, the activities shown to have occurred

during the formation Sf the new kocal cannot be said to have breached a

fiduciary obligation owed by the International to the existing Local and its.

mem rs. e

ile not a breach of fiduciary obligation under the facts in this case, to

the extent that there may be employer domination of the new Local, as ‘com-

prehended under § 8(a)te) of the LMRA, 29. U:S.C.A. § 158(a)(2), tl

matter is for the Labor Board to rectify.

To qhe extent that members of Local 28 who hereafter join Local 24 may

be denied equal ‘re within Local 24, in violation of § 101(a)¢¥) of the

LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A, 8 411 (a) (1), the plaintiffs are complaining of matters

that may more properly be raised in new proceedings where concrete facts of

alleged specific denials of equal right to particular individuals may be adduced.

ef,, eg, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 ¢1961),

42

work when a breakdown has o¢curred in the local negotia=

tions. The durability of the Council evidences that partic-

ipation of the International is the accepted format of

collective bargaining in this industry.”

Here it was not misconduct or a violation of fiduciary

obligation for the IP to press for the reference of all .un-

resolved bargaining issues between the Local, and the

Maryland Chapter to the Council for final solutién. This

is all that the District Court found the IP had-told Geary,

NECA chief executive, that he would do. The IP's deci-

sion denying permission to strike and his revocation order

were corisistent with this. ;

One of the unresolved issues between the Local and the

Chapter was whether a Council clause should be included

in the collective bargaining agreement and, if so, what, its

scope should be. Even if it is assumed that at the time of

the strike the IP was irrevocably committed ? the impo-

sition on the: Local of. a “yellow sheet” ‘levergreen”

clause,” such a clause would do no more than-keep the

parties negotiating during a dispute instead of engaging

in industria} warfare. As Professor John T. Dunlop,

t

31. Although the general literature bearing directly on international. union

intervention in local negotiations is sparse, there are indications of a tendency

towar! increased international control in collective bargaining. .See Barbash,

Labor's Grass Roots (1961) 149-50; Leiserson, American Trade Union Democ-

racy (1959) 287-88; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the. Trusteeship Imbrog-

lio,” 71 Yale L. J. 1460, 1462-63 (1962) ; see also, Pierson, “Multi-Employer

Bargaining,” in Bakke, Kerr and Anrod, Unions, Management and the Public .

(1960) 343-49; Slichter, Healy and Livernash, The — of Collective Bar-

gain.ng on Management (1960) 927-30.

32. The evidence on this pelat | was conflicting. Although the District Judge

intimated that the IP was so committed, he made no specific finding to this

effect. See 203 F. Supp. at 298, 302 n.27, 304,

>

43

Cc : . . tte p

\ |

Chairman of the Department of Economics at Harvard,

University, a man vastly experienced in labor negotiation’

procedures, testiffed at the t “Prial:

~“The facts of life are that the parties really don’t

have much opportunity for divorce * * * and they

are going to have to work out an agreement before

a strike, or after a strike * * *.”"*

This being the reality of industrial life, it cannot be.said

by a court: that as a matter of law the IP overstepped his

authority or ‘ignored or breached his obligation to the .

Local by pressing for « stich a Council clause,

_ Without actually deciding the question, the District

Judge made known his belief that an “evergreen” clause,

making the “issue of termination justicible before the

Countil, would be illegal. He chose, however, to rest his

decision on the ground that, aside from the questions that

were debated concerning the “yellow sheet” clause, the

IP’s conduct was an attempt to usurp the Local’s role in

collective bargaining. .This court is of the opinion that

even assuming that an “evergreen” clause would be un-

ilaterally terminable under .§ 8(d) of the LMRA, 29

U.S.C.A. J ISB t it was still within the right of the

33. See also, Chamberlain, “Collective Bargaining and the Concert of Con-

tracts,” 48 Colum. L. Rev. 829 (1948); Kotif, “Labor Agreements n Collec-

tive Bargaining,” 6 N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. Lab. 1, 5-6 (1953); Summers “Judicial

Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass,” 2 Buffalo

L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1952) ; Goldberg, “Labor Arbitration—A*Symposiwn: Intro-

duction,” 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 359-61 (1962).

34, See Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ;

Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Ledge 751, IAM, 91 F,

Supp. 596, 603 (W.D. Wash.°1950), aff'd: per curiam, 188 F.2d 356 (%h Cir.),

IP to insist, as a matter of policy within the union organ-

ization, that such .a ‘clause be accepted. Even if we

assume the correctness of the District Court’s obitur dic-

‘tum that the “yellow sheet” clause was. illegal, in the sense

that it was tinenforceable, it was certainly not_so evil or

contra bona mores as to ‘vitiate the IP’s constitutional ”

powers to control colléetive bargaining. |

2

4 .

It has been argued, however, that the “evergreen” clause

is defective, perhaps: illegal, as a divestiture of the.statu-

torily protected power, of the union to strike. “The pres-

ence of economic weapons m reserve, ‘and their actual

exercise on occasion by the parties,” the Supreme Court

has said, “is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner

and Taft-Hartley Acts have recegnized.” ‘NLRB v. In-

surance Agents’ International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489

(1960).. But it is not the purpose of the law to ampose a

straight jacket on the format of collective bargaining or

to require that the partiێs always maintain economic: force

as an alternative. The Court has in fact recognized that

economic weapons may be relinquished, at least for a time,

and particularly in exchange for an agreement. 'to settle

disputes by arbitration, . see «Textile Workers v. Lincoln

Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); Teamsters Local v.

Lucas Flou¥ Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962),°° which is°

”

cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821 (1951); cf., Boston Printing Pressnsen’§ Union v.

Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956), aff’d. 241 F.2d 787 (Ast Cir.),

cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957) ; Couch v. Prescolite Mfg. Corp., 191 F. Supp.

737 (W.D. Ark. 1961); In re Valencia Baxt Express, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 103

(D.P-R. 1961) ; but cf., Division 892 v. M.K. & O. Transit Lines, 210 F. Supp.

351 (N.D. Okla. 1962). (Holding, although a contract had been terminated -

arbitration could still be demanded in respect to the terms of the new contract).

35. There the Court stated that “the basic policy of national labor legislation

{is to promote the drbitral process as a substitute for econon¥ warfare.” Id.

at 103. es

the use of economic force.

45

-

+ ‘ we cay

om

the. touchstone of the practice of peaceful industrial self-

government. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf

Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577-82 (1960). ‘Submis-.

sion to the Council’ is not élasSical arbitration, but re-

sembles it sufficiently to. fall within the afbit of this

policy, >

Q ,

Even if

economié Aveapons perpetually, there is nothing in the law

- 7 E . .

union cannot be compelled to relinquish

“to suggest that it fhay not volantarily forebear from the.

use Gf force as long as it chooses to do so. At most, the

International can he said to have attempted to compel one

of its component bodies to do this. It is not for the courts

- to say that a superior union body cannot require its sub-

ordinate to look to high level bargaining Yather than to. -

2 .

°

‘Actually, adoption of the more stringent Council clause

would not surrender the strike weapon irretrievably; it

wotld merely fortify the provision in the Constitution

vesting control over this we: apon in the International. It

would remain within the power of the International to

‘restore the strike weapon to a local. The District Court

. found that “‘[t]he IP had given hi consent to a nui gber

_ of strikes where a Council clause appeared in the contract

* * *” 203 F. Supp. at-302 n.26. Apparently this was

done without disturbing the Council machinery. More-

-over, the International, could: work within the Council for

the termination of an “evergreen” agreement. The point

is that while the IP*can be said to have attempted to com-

pel the Local to forebear from resorting to the strike, the

IBEW its. . did not surrender the strike instrument. It’,

is not for the court to say that the International could not

put this restraint on its Local.

46 ;

z . ¢

It ‘should be emphasized that we are not called upon to

determine whether aad under what circumstances a per-

petual agreement between a labor organization. and an

employer may or may not be enforceable. What is before

us is an internal union agreement vesting extensive powers

in an international *body-——incliding the power. to veto the

use of the strike weapon by its local unions. It this Inter-

national insists that its locals shall “complete the collective

bargaining process before the Council, composed equally

of representatives of the International Union and of the

Employer Association, such insistence is certainly not il-

legal. Nor does it™become illegal if the International seeks

to etthance the stability of this system hy requiring that

not only proposed alterations in the collective bargaining

agreement but its termination as well shall be a justicible

sestte before the Council. The impact of the court’s deci-

sion in this case is to impose a method of collective bar-

gaining different from that contemplated in the Union

‘Constitution, long and satisfactorily used by employer and

employees. This it cannot do.

o

Earlier Sitits

The final purportedly improper ingredient in the “mixed

motives” was that, as the court found, the IP was partly

influenced to revoke Local 28’s charter because suits had

been brought challenging the authority of the IBEW,

without first exhausting available internal remedies. As

the basis for this finding the court cites the fact that the

IP had “stated publicly that he ‘hated’ the Landrum-Griffin

Act because it protected access to the courts by union

members.” 203 F. Supp. at 302, 304..This finding would

appear to relate-to an address made by the IP before the

60th,Convention pf NECA in October, 1961—two months

after the revocation order. |

——

v

PA

’

47

There were in fact three suits filed prior to. 1961—on

December 11, 1959, March 22, 1960, and apparently in

April, 1960. The last two were dismissed on November 9

and December 20, 1960, and the District Court found that

“(f]Jrom*August 1960 until March 1961*the relations. be-

tween local 28 and the International officers were appar-

ently friendly.” 203 F. Supp. at 299. The unauthorized

strike.did not occur until the middle of June, 1961, and

the Local’s charter was revoked by an order dated August

1.1961.

Accepting this finding of some relation between the

earlier suits and the IP’s actions, we think it may not be

given controlling significance over the array of valid and

legitimate motives shown and the court’s unequivocal find-

ing absolving the IP from Jexpress or particular malice,

i.e. ill-will, spite, a grudge, or a de&ire to be revenged on

a particular person or persons, resulting in a deliberate

intention to.commit an injury.” 203 FF. Supp. at 309." It

would bea distortion of the reéord to elevate this factor

to a posifion of pre-eminence, blotting out the permissible

reasons for revocation of the charter.”

This court recognizes that should it be demonstrated # an

appropriate case thit the basic reason for union discipline

was that the plaintiff had resorted to a court of law to

36. ‘This opinion has already demonstrated that other assailed elements of

the “mixed motives,” found by the District Court, were neither in fact nor

law improper. @

37. Compare the instant case with, e.g., Nelson v. Brotherhood of Painters,

Local 386, 47 L.R.R.M. 2441, 41 L.C. par. 16,755 (D. Minn. 1961); Moore v.

Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S.2d 208, aff’d without dpinion, 265 App. Div.

989,.40 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff'd with minor modifications, 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E.2d

352, modified according to mandate, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943).

y 48 *

?

secure his rights and that other reasons were mere shams,

such discipline wouldy most likely be invalid both as a

breach of fiduciary obligation and because it is prohibited

under §§ 609 and 101(a) (4) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A.

§§ 529 and 411(a)(4).% But such a case would be dif-

ferent front the present one. That the reasons given by

the IP for the revocation here are not shams is amply

established By the District Court’s reservation of the In-

ternational’s right to retry the leaders of Local 28.

Fair Hearing .

The common law clearly requires that, to be valid, ex-

pulsion of a member or a subordinate body must be ren-

dered after a “fair hearing.” See, e.g., Cox, “Internal?

Affairs of Unions Under-the Labor Reform Act of 1959,”

58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 835-36 (1960). The elements of

such a “fair hearing” often resemble constitutional due

process requirements and generally encompass full notice

and a reasonable opportunity to be heard—including the

right to present evidence and the right to confront and

cross-examine witnesses.“ There is also a body of l@w

e |

—_—_—__——— ; ° »

38. See Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 191 F. Supp. 347, 351-52, 194

F. Supp. 664 (D. Del. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.

1962). :

39. We reject the ae of, the defendant that since under the Constitu-

tion the Local agrees, t charter may be revoked without a hearing, the

hearing given by the IP be beyond challenge. At common law, and now

under the LMRDA, the requirement of a fair hearing exists regardless of

whether the Union Constitution provides that sanctions may be imposed with-

out any hearing. See, Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1410-13 (1952) ; § 101(a)

(5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 4ll1(a) (5). Br

40. See, e.g., Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do

in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175,°200-06 (1960) ; Cox, “The Role of Law in Preserv- 7

¢ ing Union Democracy,” 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 616 (1959).

.

. 49

requiring trial. of an accused before an unbiased tribunal.“

Some commentators seem to think that the courts should”

play a more active role in reviewing not only specific bias,

e.g., pre-judgment or use of discipline pretextuously, but

also built-in bias, e.g., combined prosecuting and judicial

functions and use of “yes men.” They have, however,

generally recognized either that the courts have not been

empowered to do this or that they are unable to reach such

bias for it “is an inevitable. product of the procedure

itself.”

s

The District Court, without passing on the question bf.

whether the IP had the authority to decide this case, held

“it was one which he should have referred to the IEC or

some other impartial tribunal * * *, [aS] the propriety of

his own action and his own good faith and motives in

_ refusing consent to the’strike and in preparing, filing and

pressing the charges were being calied into questicn.”* 203 -

F. Supp. at 307. This supposed defect was held-not to

have been cured by review by the IEC. Although the

court found th@ the IEC was not prejudiced, it held that

the review was in the naturg*pf an appeal, not a trial de ~ 4

novo. We do not agree that, on the facts in this case as

established in the court's findings, there was a procedural+

deféct in the trial before the IP justifying a court of law’

to‘interfere with and to overturn the action taken.

41. See Ibid; Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline? What the Courts

Do in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175, 204-05 (1960); Summers, “Legal Limitations

‘on Union Discipline,” 6 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1982-83 (1951) ; Annotation, 21

A.L.R.24 1397, 1425-28 (1952). —

42. Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union. Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Rev.

1049, 1083 (1951); see Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democ-

racy,” 25 Modern L. Rev. 273, 288-89 (1962) ; Aaron, “The Labor-Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 873-75 (1960) ;

Wollett & Lampman, “The Law of Union Factionalism—The Case of the

Sailors,” 4 Stan. L. Rev. 177, 213 (1952) ; Note, 48 Va. L: Rev. 78, 90 (1962).

50

ry

In’ the first place, the IP was clearly empowered, by the

International Constitution, to decide the issues involved

in the revocation proceedings and to revoke the Local’s

charter. The IP’ is empowered, as we have seen, “It]o

decide all questions of law, disputes or questions in con-

troversy however arising, all fis decisions being subj -ct

to appeal, first to the I.E.C. and then the I.C. * * *.” He

as also specifically authorized “le]ither to suspend or re-

voke the charter of any L.U., or have the I.S. reject the’

per capita tax from any L.U. that fails or refuses to

observe the laws and rules of the I.B.E.W." (Art. TV. §

3(2). (8)). And it is provided, in addition, that tiothing

+n the Constitution shall be construedto conflict with any

provision of Article IV, enumerating the powers of the

IP. (Art. FV, § 5).° ; ‘

The real basis for the argument that the IP was biased

is that he was, in a sense, both prosecutor and judge. It

is quite true that he ordered the charges to be brought

and conferred with the International's General C ounsel

in their formulation as well as in the preparation of the

revocation order. But it is also true that the basis ‘fon the

charges was that the Local had struck in defiance of his

repeated admonitions and had reiected his collective bar-

gaining orders.” And there can be no doubt that the

Constitution vested in the IP these combined prosecuting

and judicial functions.”

Although the charge was defiance of the orders that

the IP had issued, his actions in issuing the orders and in

42. It should be noted, however, that the initial factual inquiry was made,

not by the IP, but by a referee found by the District Judge to be “fair and

impartial.” 203 F.Supp. at 307.

¢?

51

their vindication were official not personal. If we are to

give effect to the District Court’s finding exonerating the

IP of “express or particular malice, i.e, ill-will,” ete. (see

203 F. Supp. 509), it cannot hessaid that in. ordering

charges to be brought he wi as acting to vindicate a

_ personal affront rather than the interesr’ot the Union.

m

It may well be theught desirable for unions to adopt

hearing procedures that keep trial functions separate, but

the federal courts are not empowered so to restructure

the disciplinary procedures of unions. Cf., Summers,

“Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” o4 Hary. 1.

Rev. 1049, 1083 (1951) (implied). Some unterns, like the

United Automobile Workers, have responded to the pres

sure for fairness in internal triai proceedings by establish-

ing, essentially yxtern: al to the union organization, inde-

pendent public review boards having the tinal word in

disciplinary matters." Such unions would appear to have

gone far to separate prosecuting and ultimate judicial

functions. But, in the absence of a ciear congressional

authorization, it is not for the federal courts to compel

such measures.“ This is, in effect: what the District

Court's decision has done.

43. See Brooks, “Impartial Public Review of Qutcrnal Coton Disputes:

Experiment in Democratic Self-Discipline,” 22 Ohio St. L. Rev. 8 (1961);

Oberer, “Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor. Some Reflections,” 58 Mich.

L. Rev. 55 (1959); Aaruof® “The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

Act of 1959,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 874 (1960).

44. Professor Summers reports that Senator McClellan's proposal to require

that impartial arbitrators determine disciplinary matters was deleted from the

final draft of the LMRDA.. Summers, “American Legislation for Union, De-

mocracy,” 25 Modern L. Rev. #3, 289 (1902). Compare § 101(a) (65@® )- of

the McClellan Amendment, 105 Daily Cong. Rec. 5810 (April 22, 1959), Legis.

- Hist. of the LMRDA, Vol. II, p. 1162, verted 101(a)(5) of the LMRKDA,

29 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a) (5).

52

Separation of functions is not an absolute due process

prerequisite to fairness in administrative proceedings, see

2 Davis. Administrative Law Treatise § 13.02; in internal

union proceedings it traditionally, and under the LMRDA,

has also not been deemed a requirement of fairness.“

Courts. federal courts especially, are justified in ruling a

union tribunal biased only upon a demonstration that it

has been substantially actuated by improper motives—in

other words, only upon a showing of specific prejudice.

This element has-been found absent from the presént case.

Severity of the Sanction

The District Court showed a commendable concern to

protect those members #f Local 28 who refused to join

Local 24 against hardship-resulting from the charter rev-

ocation—a concern which carried over in favor of the

Local itself, though not its leaders. However attractive

the court’s solution may appear, we find no basis or

authority for the court to compel this distinction to be

made between leaders and rank and file. Moreover, in the

- circumstances of this case there evould seem to be no justi-

fication for permitting a retrial of the officers and léaders,

but befere another tribunal, and setting aside the action

against the Local and proscribing any retrial of it or

further proceedings based upon this offense.

The general membership cannot on this record be cast

in the role of blameless victims. If they were for a time

misled by their local leaders as to the IP’s refusal to

©

45. See. ex. Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democracy,” 25

Modern L. Rev. 273, 288-89 (1962); Aaron, “The Labor-Management Report-

ing and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 874 (1960).

53 :

authorize or approve the strike, it is undisputed yhat when

they later learned the truth they supported these leadets

willingly enough in flouting the International. ‘This they

did in disregard of the District _Judge's clear caution

given May 11, 1961, in open court ‘in the presence of sev-

eral hundred mem d despite three personal letters

from the IP sent/to each member. Upon the facts found

we cannot say that for their sake the sanction imposed

upon the Local must be nullified. The ‘itamediate result

might be an amelioration tor these members; in the long

view such a jadicial directive, even if permissible, could

break down their most effective organizational agency.

At all events, a court is not empowered to grant the dis-

pensation in this case.

46. “(The Court) Have you considered the fact that if you do ge on strike

or if you do refuse to go ahead with this policy which the International has

set up and which afb of the other local umons go atong with and strike

the International would very likely revoke your charter with whatever loss

there is.

“It would seem to me that they have either got to end this whole agree-

ment with these people or revoke your charter, one or the other.

“You are running an awiully close risk, and if you pgople understand that

eyou are running that risk if you go on strike and it you terminate the agree-

ment. without going thtough with this plan, what has certainly up to this

point been clearly demonstrated unless there is evidence to the contrary that

this is the plan and policy of thé Iaternational Union and that it has worked

out to the satisfaction of the Umon as a whole as well as to the employers

as a whole over the years.

“And you people yourselves have taken advantage of tic arbitration pro-

visions within the last three years. So that it is a matter which has been

gone ahead with.

“Now, at the present time I] am very much inclined to think that you have

a right to terminate, but once you terminate, I think you then can't expect to

come to the Court and ask for protectior against the International, if you

terminate and strike.,

“(Mr. O'Doherty) Yes.

“(The Court) Then you have great risks and you ought to do it with

your eyes open. I am not saying what the legal effect is, but it may be severe.”

v

0 84

Ill. secs oincsbanliy QUESTIONS

32

1ffaddition to the defenses” on the merits, the defendant

interposes a series of defenses on jurisdictional grounds.

We have deemed it better to defer the discussion of these

questions till now, when the reader has been made familiar

with the factual background.

Labor Management Reiations « Act Fr

As the basis for district court jurisdiction, ‘Local 28

relies upon § 301(a) of the L MR. \, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a),

which provides:

“Suits for violation of contracts between employer ,

and a labor organization representing employees in

an industry affecting, commerce as défined in this

chapter, or between any such labor organizations,

may be brought in any district court of the United

States havitg jurisdiction of the parties, without re-

spect to va teenage in controversy or without regard

to the citiz¢nship of the parties.” (Emphasis added. )

4 g

Concluding that the Local’s suit was’based upon violations

of a “contract” (the International Constitution) between

“labor organizations” (Local 28 and the IBEW) as both

, terms are used in section 301(a), the District Court held

it had jurisdiction under that provision. Although the is-

, sue is by no means free from doubt, we are inclined to

agree.

_The Supreme Court has only recently focused its atten-

tion on the “between any such labor organizations” clause.

In Retail Clerks International Ass’n 0. Lion Dry G oods,

Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962), it concludéd that the word

“contfacts” as used in section 301(a) was not limited to

collective bargaining agreements but was broad enough

te-comprehend-strike settlement agreements, — In reaching

. ‘ ‘

this result the Court reasoned that the term “contracts”:

had to be broader than collective bargaining agreements,

otherwise the “between: any such labor organizations” |

clause would have been surplusage—which it was not—

for a collective bargaining agreement between a union as

‘an employer and another union as representative of em-

ployees would be a contract “between An employer and a

labor organization.” 369 U.S. at 20-27" So saying, the

Court cited with favor United Textile Workers v, Textile

Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958), a°case in

which the Court of. Appeals affirmed enforcement, under

section 301(a), of an AFL-CIO. sponsored no-raiding :

agreement between two international unions.

©

Although it is now clear that at least some “contracts,”

not. collective bargaining agreements, between at least

some types of “labor® organizations” are enforceable under

section 301(a), the Supreme Court-has not yet addressed

itself to the particular questions which eoncern us here,

namely, (1) whether, an international’s constitution is a

“gontract” within’ the meaning of section 301(a) and (2)

whether a local «nion and its international parent .are

“labor organizations” within the-meaning of that section.

There is almost no congressional history pertaining to

the “between any such labor organizations” clause. This

clause was inserted in section 301(a) in conference only

shortly before the bill’s passage, and there is nothing to

indicate what Congress specifically intended by its inelu-

sion. Plausible arguments have been made that the clause

.

4

56

should be interpreted as granting jurisdiction only over

-suits for violations of contracts that, like the AFL-CIO

no-raiding agreements, have been freely negotiated be-

tween wholly autonomous or separate labor organiza-

tions.’ This interpretation, opposing jurisdiction in suits

like that of Local 28, is fundamentally grounded in the

belief that Congress did not intend federal courts to be-

come entangled in contrdéversies within what is really a

single union organization, and that it would be inappro-

priate for them to act in this area." )

Congressional history relating to provisions of the 1947

LMRA, other than section 301(a), tends to negative a

congressional purpose to effect extensive and detailed stat-

utory regulation of internal union affairs.” This history

a a

47. See Meltzer, “The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over

Labor Relations : 11,” 59 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 297 n.287 (1959) ; Note, “Apply-

. ing the’*Contracts Between’ Labor Organizations’ Clause of Taft-Hartley Sec-

; tion 301. A Plea for Restraint,” O Yalg L. J. 299 (1959).

48. See Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine

Workers, 95 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Loca? 33, laternational Hod Car-

riers v. Mason Tenders District Gampcil, 186 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),

aff'd on other grownds, 201 F.2d 498% 2d Cir. 1961); cf., Snoots v. Vejlupek,

8&7 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1949) ; Kriss v. White, 87 F. Supp. 734 4S5.D.N.Y.

1949).

‘Courts have also been concerned with pdssible conflicts between a broad

interpretation of the “between any such labér organizations” clause and the

Norris-LaGuardia and National Labor Relations Acts. See Local 33, Inter-

national Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders District Council, 186 F. Supp. 737

(S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd om other grounds, 291 F.2d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1961)

(Friendly, J. concurring specially) ; international Union of Doli Workers v.

_ Metal Polishers International Union, 180 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1960). See

also, Note, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 202 (1959). The problems of accommodating

the several labor statutes will be considered later. “

49. Provisions regulating¢t detail certain aspects of internal union affairs,”

by declaring, some acts to be unfair labor practices (thereby remediable by

the Labor Board), were deleted in the House-Senate Conference. See House

Rep. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, p. 46, in 1 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 550; 93 Cong.

Rec. 6859 (June 12, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 1623 (Senator, Tait,

Supplementary Analysis of the Labor. Bill as Passed, discussing § 8(b)(5));

wn

a

*

ee

- may only indicate that Congress did not mean at the time

to regulate by detailed substantive legislation enforceable

by the Labor Board the relations between individual mem-

bers and unions. Such a congressional purpose is not

necessarily inconsistent with a vesting in the—federal dis-

trict courts of jurisdiction to enforce contractual obliga-

tions agreed upon by an international and its locals.

The most that can T% said with certainty is that Con-

gress did not anticipate the problem. Looking to expres-

sions of congressional purpose in regard to other provisions

of the Act, it is possible to infer that had Congress con-

sidered, the problem it would have limitec section 301 (a)

jurisdiction so that federal courts would not thereby be in

a pogtign to settle such internal disputes. It is also pos-

sible, however, to conclude that Congress would have

_ deemed it appropriate for federal courts to exercise juris-

diction over such disputes because, as the present one, they

have traumatic industrial and economic repercussions. See

Q

Compare §§ 7 & 8, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157 & 158, with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. Ist

Sess., §§ 7(b) & &(c), in 1 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 49-50, 52-56; see also, 93+

Cong. Rec. 6443 (June 5, 1947), 2. Legis. Hist. LLMRA at 1540 (Senator Taft

on § 8(b) (5)) 3293 Cong. Rec. 6503 (June 6, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. LMRA at

1879 (Senator Murray, summary of differences between conference agreement .

and bill passed by Senate, discussing § &(b)¢5)). “

In addition, tg assute that § 8(b)(1)(A) of LMRA, 29 U.S.G@A. § 158 b)

(1) (A), did not interfere with union membership, policy, the proviso was added

that “this paragraph shall not impair the right of a ‘abor organization ta

prescribe ‘its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem

bership therein.” Sce 93 Cong. Rec. 4271-73 (April 30, 1947), 2 Legis. ‘Hid.

LMRA at 1139-43 (debate on proviso); cf, eg. 93 Cong. Rec. 4197 (April

29, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. of LMRA at 1097 (Senator Tait discussing what is

now § 8(a)(3)). ns

It should be noted that in 1959, with the passage of LMRDA, 29 U®.C.A.

§ 401 et seq., Congress did undertake extensive and detailed statutory regulation

of certain aspects of internal union affairs and organization.

-

\

58. Rare:

aa

§ 1(b) of the 1.MRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141(b)." Moreover

in interpreting the “between an employer and’a labor or-

ganization” clause, the Supreme Cotrt has consistently -

favored ,the broad view of section 301(a) jurisdiction.”

In ‘the absence of a clear. expresston of congressional

intention to the contrary, we consider it permissible to

adopt the more literal. interpretation of the “between any

such labor organizations” clause—sthe interpretation that

would support’ jurisdiction in this case.” + *

: mete ARE . ‘, : >

“4 Jocal union is a “labor organization” within, the defi-

i) ; ‘

' 4

50. It has been suggested that a holding, of jurisdiction under § 301 (a)

.

“would tend to promote at least two congressional policies. (1) A major pur-

pose of §,301(a) is to overcome state law jurisdictional difficulties and thereby

make unions Samenable to suits as entities’ and to subject their funds to judg-

ments for violations of contracts. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368

US. 502, §11-13 (1962). Section 301(a) juristictibn in cases like Local 28's

would make this responsibility more effective. (2) In 1959, with the passage

of the Labor Management Relations and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.A.°§ 401,

et. seq., Congress undertook extensive and detailed statutory regulatton of cer-

tain aspects of internal union affairs. It is suggested that even assuming the

LMRDA and § 301(a) may not be construed in pari imateria, it would servé

congressional policy to- construe § 301(a) broadly, thereby making a whole

remedy available in a’ federal cour@ when the same conduct inflicts injury,

adjudicable under LMRDA, upon individual members and also injury, not adju-

dicable uhder LMRDA, upon local unions. ,

51. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957¥; Retail Clerks

International Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962); Teamsters

Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,

371 U.S. 195 (1962). -

$2. See Local 33, International Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders District

~ Council,; 291 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1961); Local 2608, Lumber Workers, United

Brotherhood of Carpenters v. » Millmen’s Local 1495, United Brotherhood of

Carpente#@, 109 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Caf. 1958); see also, Burlesque Artists

Ass'n v.. American Guild of Variety Artists, 187 TF. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.

1958); Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,”, 72 Yale

L.J. 1460, 1485-87 n.150°(1962).

¢

4

nifion of '$-2(5) of the NL RA, 29 U.S.E.A..§ 152(5). 2g

In addition, “contract” as used in section 301(a) should

be taken to include union constitutions. The Supreme

Court itself Has recognized that under state law this.is

~ the generally acce,ted characterization of union constitu-

tidns." : ‘

-

As we think our discussion of ‘de merits makes clear;

this court fully recognizes its weighty obligation not to

expand this initial grant of jurisdiction. into a carte blanche

for unrestrained judicial inventiveness: in the .areds of

union structure and collective bargaining policy. The fed-

eral courts, in exercising jurisdiction under this clause of

section 301(a), are basically réstricted to effectuating

existing congressional policy. Cf., “Textile Workers v.

Lincoln Mills, 353 U:S; 448, 456-57 (1957). Qur dis-

agreement with the decision under review is not‘on the

question of section 301(a) jurisdiction to entertain actions

for alleged breaches of inter-union contracts; but we take,

the view that Congress has: not addpted the substantive

policies upon which the court’s decision on the merits was

prédicated. It does not lie within a federal court’s power

or djscretion to remake the cohtract by dintroducing even

salutary provisions not Weiensayrty prescribed or neces-

° sarily saeco

.

o

53. See NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 124 F.24 SP (Othe Cir. 1941),

aff'd, 318 U.S. 9 ( (1943) : : cf? NLRB v. ‘Highland Park Mfa. Co., 34¥ U.S

322 (1951).

oe ,

54. International Ass'n of Machinists c. Gonsales, 356 U.S. 617, 618-19

(1958) ; see also, Cleveland Orchestra Committee v. Cleveland’ Federation oj

Musicians? 303 F.2d 229, 230 (6th Cir. 1962); Rosen v. District Council No. 9,

198 F. Supp. 46, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

be]

60.

Jurisdiction to Issue an Injunction in Suit of |

Local 28—Effect of the Norris-LaGuardia Act

The defendant next argues that even if initially there |

is jurisdiction under § 301(a) of the LMRA over Local »

28’s suit, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § ‘101,

et seq., denies the. District Court jurisdiction to issue an

injunction, in this dispute. .The’ District Court held that

the case of the Local does not fall within the classes set

forth ir section 4° in which injunctions’ are ‘absolutely pro-

hibited, and that the case did not involve a “labor dispute”

as used in section 7 and as defined in seé¢tion., 13(c)s

Acknowledging that the issue is debata! ie, we agree with

the District Court’s conclusion that, notwithstanding the

Norris-Il_aGuardia Act, jurisdiction would exist in a proper

case to issue a mandatory injunction.

‘

§5. The relevant provisions of the, Norris-LaGuardia Act include: Section

1, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101: © ;

“No court of the United States * *.* shall have jurisdiction to issue any

restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or

growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformity with the provision

‘of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or per-

«manent injunction be issued cortrary to the public policy expressed in this

chapter.” '

Section 4, 29 U.S.C.A. § 104:

“No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-

straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving

or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-

ticipating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined)

from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: [Em-

phasis added] )

“(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any rela-

tion of employment ;

“(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor ‘organization or of

any employer organization * * *; .

.- ** © & @ ‘

“(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts

heretofore specified; and

°

Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed it-

self to the problem of accommodating the “between any

such labor organizations” clause of § 301(a) of the LMRA

and the Norris-l_aGuardia Act, it has said enough to pro-

<2

.

“(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or

violence the acts heretofore specified * * * .”

Section 7, 29 U.S.C.A. § 107, provides that an injunction will ial lie in any

case growing out of a “labor dispute” except after aneadversary hearing where

there is testimony in support of the Jeeations of the complaint to the erfect—

(a) That unlawful and illegal acts have been thre: ateneg and will be car-

ried out unless enjoined ;

“(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant's property

will follow :

~ “(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted

upon complainant by the glenial wr relief than will be inflicted upon defend-

ants by the granting of relief; he

“(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

“(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complain-

ant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.”

Section 8, 29 U.S.C.A. § 108, provides that fo injunction shall issue unless

complainait has made’every reasonable attempt to settle the dispute-—including

negotiation, government-sponsored mediation or voluntary. arbitraticn.

Section 13, 29 U.S.C.A. § 113, contains definitions :

“(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when

the case involves persons who are, engaged in the same industry, trade,

craft, or occupatior; or have a direct or indirect interest therein; * * * or

who are’ members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or

employees, whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or

associations of employers ‘and one or more employees or associations of «

employees; * * * or (3) between one or more employees or associations of

employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when

the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a ‘labor dispute’

(as defined in this section} of ‘persons participating or interested’, therein

(as defined in this section).

* * © * * a

“(c) The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms

or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation

of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange

terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the dispu-

tants stand in the proximate relationship of employer @nd employee.”

62

‘>

«

vide useful* guide lines for disposition of the issue as it

arises in this case.”

In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 Ud. 448

(1957), the Court first recognized the broad scope of fed-

eral court jurisdiction that Congress had granted under

§ 301(a) of the LMRA. Holding that an arbitration

clause in a collective bargaining agreement was enforce-

able ynder section 301(a), the Court also held that, not-

withstanding the prohibitions and requirements of the

Norris-LaGuardia Act, a mandatory injunction would lie

to compel arbitration. The Court pointed out that histor

ically arbitration was not one of the acts, listed in Norris:

LaGuardia § 4, in respect of which the power to enjoin

had been abused,” and that in fact Congress indicated, in

section 8 of the Norris-l.aGuardia Act, its policy of favor-

ing labor arbitration. It was held, moreover, that there

was no policy justification “for restricting § 301(a) to

,

‘

———— A

90. Preliminarily, it should be noted that the Act does not apply to all cir-

cumstances in which, on its face, it might be thought to apply. We know that

injunctions have been upheld which were issyed (1) to compel arbitration,

Textile Workers. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) ; (2) to enjoin a strike

by a railway union over “minor disputes” cognizable by the Railroad Adjust-

ment Board, see Brotherhoud of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indi-

ana RR, 353 U.S. 30, 39-42 (1957) ; (3) to compel an employer to bargain with

a certified union, Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 562-63

(1937) ; and (4): to compel a union to per@rm its statutory duty of fair rep-

resentation, Graham v. Brotherhood of Railroad Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237-40

(1949) ;-Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).

57. In the recent case of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S: 195, 212

(1962), the Court distinguished the situation involving an injunction directed

against a strike, in violation of- a no-strike clause, from Lincoln Mills on the

grounds that in Lincoln Mills “—a mandatory injunction to carry out an agree-

ment to arbitrate—did not enjoin any one of the kinds of conduct which the

specific prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew from the injunc-

tive powers of United States Courts.”

qlee

a

63 Li

damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract

to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural

requirements [of § 7] of that | Norris-laGuardia] Act.”

353 U.S. at 458. %

The injunctive relief sought by [Local 28—restoration

of its charter, ete.—may also be said not to be “a part and

parcel of the abuses against which the Aet,”’ as indicated

by the specific matters listed, in section 4, was directed.

353 U.S. at 458. Here, likéwise, the injunction sought

would not have the proximate effect of “prohibit[ing]

any person or ‘persons participating or interested in such

dispute * * * from doing * * * any of the” acts listed in

section 4. (29 U.S.C.A.°§ 104—emphasis adde).

J .

The crucial question remaining is whether the Local's

case involved a “labor dispute” as detined in section 13(¢)

and used in section 7. If so, that section’s procedural re-

quirements precedent to the issuance of an injunction were

not met in this case and the injunction should not have

been granted. There is little doubt that at its root this

controversy is concerfed with a “labor dispute” as liter-

ally defined by section 13 of the Act. But this case is no

more directly concerned with what is a “labor dispute”

than was Lincoln Mills, yet there the Court held that:

“Though a literal reading might bring the dispute

within the terms of the Act [citation omitted], we

see no justification for restricting § 301(a) to dam-

age suits, leaving specific peg formance of a céntract

to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite pro-

cedural requirements of that Act.” 353 U.S. at 458.

Up

64 ¢ ,

See also, Sinclair Refining Co. vz Atkingpn, 370 U.S. 195,

212; id. at 219 (Justice Brennan's formulation to the

%

same effect ).

Of course, in its decision the Court also relied on its

view that there is a cl@ir congressional policy favoring

enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes.

It cannot be said with complete confidence that there is

similarly a clear congressional policy favoring federal

court enforcement of inter-union contracts of the character

at issue in the Local 28 case. But, if it is held (see pp.

54-59 supra) that Congress by section 301 (a) did conter

upon federal courts jurisdiction over such suits, it would

be as inappropriate here as it would have been in Lincoln

Mills to insist upon the stringent procedural requirements

of section 7 when manifestly the matter here enjoined

“was not a part and parcel o1 the abuses against which

the Act was aimed.” 353 U.S. at 458.

Pre-emption and Primary Iurisdiction

Problems in the Local’s Suit

The defendant further contends that the complaint of

Local 28 involves matters arguably subject to § 7 or § 8

of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 and 158, and is there-

fore, under San Dieyo Building Trades Council v. Garmon,

359 U.S. 236 (1959), subject to the Labor Board’s exclu-

sive primary jurisdiction. Although phases of the Local's

case involve an alleged breach of the IBEW Constitution,

defendant argues that the case is also arguably concerned

with unfair labor practices. And because the same basic

facts and contentions provide the foundation of both

types of possible actions, the defendant argues that the

a.

65

c

District Judge, despite his efforts, could not separate the

various elements of the case.” :

— Recently the Supreme Court held that in cases under the

“between an employer and a labor organization” clause ot

section 301 thg presemption doctrine of Garmon is not

relevant, regardless of whether the employer's coffluct is

arguably or concededly an unfair labor practice within the

Labor Board’s jurisdiction.” Since we have reached the

conclusion that the District Court had jurisdiction over

this suit under section 301(a), we think it not inappro-

priate to conclude further that the teaching of these deci

sions is applicable here.” Cf.. United Textile Workers &.

Textile Workers Unien, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir, 1958);

Lecal 33, International Hod Carriers 7. Mason Tenders

District Council, 201, F.2d 496, 502-05 (2d Cir 1961)

ae

58 The District Court held that ite was not recnred wholly te yield to the

jurisdiction of the Labor Board. Specitically the court held that at had ne

jurisdiction in Local 28's case “to decide whethes the Marviand Chapter tailed

to bargain in good faith,” 203 F Supp at 2030 or whether the TREW “eon

spired with and encouraged the Maryland Chapnes not to hargain tairly,” 1

at 203, or whether “the International attempted to Soerce the members of Local

* . ‘ -

28 in the exercise of the rights protected by sec 7° * *° Jd at 208 n 11

59. Smith v. Evenmag News Assn. 371 US. 198 (I%2) sce Charles Dowd

Ror Co. v. Covrtney, 368 U.S S02, 513 (1962): Teamsters Local > Lucas Flour

Co, 369 US. 95, 101 nO (1962): Atkinson > Sinclar Refining ¢ -

. 238, 245 n.5 (1962); see also Tertile Workers * Arista Vol ;

533 (4th Cir, 1951) agit

13 F 2d 829

0 The recent Supreme Court decisions mvolved the “between an emplover

and a labor organization” clause; it 1s there fore nece ssary te review the policy

considerations that justify applying the Smith rule to the “between any such

labor organizations” clause of § 301/a)

First, it is clear that Congress did not mean to authorize the Labor Board

to concern itself generally with matters of internal union discipline and struc

ture. Seg n.49, supra; see also, e.g, International Association of Machinists ©

Gonsales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). J

. While it is very possible that some of the tacts may be

invoked as the basis for both types of controversies, this

does not mean that the District Court in an appropriate

case must yield the full measure of its jurisdiction. and

await the Board’s determinations.. At most, the court

must merely avoid “affect{ing] the jurisdict on of the

N.L.R.B. to remedy unfair labor practices as su-h.” The

District Court did all that could be required of it by gen- |

erally avoiding decisions tantamount to findings and con-

clusions ay to whether or not unfair labor practices had

been committed.

Parks: Cause of Action

As to the Parks case the International argues that it

should have been dismissed for tailure to state a claim

entitling the plaintiffs to reliet under §$§ 101¢a) and 609

—_————$—

£

Second, there can be no doubt that, just as the enforcement of collective

bargaining agreements has been left to the courts, see ( harles Doud Bex Co

vt. + APS OSD, $13 (2942), most matters directly concerning interna!

union activities, insofar as they are regulated at all, have been left to the

courts. See Gonzales, supra; Bussey v. Plumbers Local No. 3, 286 F.2d 165

(10th Cir. 1961); Kekont v. Shochtay-Garos Union, Local 446, 205 F. Supp.

284, 291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1962), Rodertson » Banana Handlers Local 1800, 183

F. Supp. 423, 425-26 (E.D Louisiana 1990) ; see also, Highway Truck Drivers

Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617 (ELD. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 284

F.2d 162 (3d Cit. 1960), cert. demed, 365 U.S. 833 (1961) (implied). ‘

61. Teamsters Vocal y Lucas Flour Co. 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962); cf.,

Burlington Truck ‘ines, Inc. v. Umited States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).

In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962), the Court

stated that “[i]i * * * there are situations in which serious problems will arise

whieh Amount

67

of the LMRDA, 29 ULS.C.A. §§ 411 (a) and 529." To

resolve this question it is necessary to determine whether

the order of revocation “otherwise disciplined” the Local's

members within the nteaning of sections 101 (a )( 5)" and

600." So far as we can determine, this question is one

of first impression. The phrase, “otherwise disciplined,”

i. not defined in the statute and a review of the legislative

history has not revealed any particular meaning attached

to it by Congress. Finally, there have heen few decisions

construing this phrase," except as it may relate to the

°

62. This, of course, is not strictly a jurisdi€tional challenge but rather an

att@k on the merits. Rell 2 Hood, 327 U.S. 678%, @B2 (1946). Jurisdiction

over this cause is. founded on § 102 of the LMRDA, 29 US ¢ AS 412, which

provides that: ;

“Any person whose rights secured hy the provistotis of this subchapter have

heen, infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil getion

in a district court of the United States for such relret Cine lnding myunetions)

as may be appropriate.”

Section 09, 20 U S.C ASS 52% provides that

“The provisions otf section 412 of this title shall be applieable an enforce

ment. of this. section.”

63. “No member of any labor organization may be fined suspended, ex-

pelled, or otherwise discipimed except for nonpayment of dues by such orgam-

zation or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served

with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his

defense: (C) afforded a full and fair hearing ~ ( Emphasis added)

64. “It shali be unlawful for any labor organization, or any “officer, agent,

shop steward, dr other representative of a labor organization, or any emplovee

\ thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or othertetse discaplme any of its members

for exercising any ‘right to which he 1s entitled under the provisions of this

chapter. * * * " (Emphasis added.)

63. Cases in which it was held that the plaintiffs were “Otherwise disct-

plined”: Detroy v American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir),

. cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961), reversing on other grounds, 189 F. Supp.

373 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) : Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, 194 F Supp. 187 CE.D.

Pa. 1961) ; 205 F. Supp. 284, 289 CE.D. Pa. 1962); Duluhery v. Marine Cooks

Union, 199 F. Supp. 270, 273 (S.D. Cal. 1961), Gross © Kennedy, 183 F

Supp. 750, 755-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)

Cases in which it was held that the plaintiffs were not “otherwise disci

plined”: Seeley v. Rratherhood of Paiters, 308 F.2d 52. 58-60 (Sth Cir.

2A

« removal of officers.”

We are disposed to: the view that the plaintiffs have

stated claims under the Act. While it is true that the rev- <

ocation order directly affects only Local 28, not the in-

dividual plaintiffs, it would seem unduly technical to say

that if the revocation were invalid and indirectly resulted

in injury, to these individuals, they may not be heard, to

complain under the LMRDA. On this point there are

some helpful precedents in the state courts. At common

law, examining the practical effect of revocation or sus- (|

pension of a local’s charter, they appear to have taken the /

: position that such action disciplines the local’s members.” /

And, in the absence of a clear congressional purpose to

the contrary, in construing the Labor Reform Statute we

cannot disregard the practical impact of this revocation

on the individual members. Bey =

4

eae ecanesaiel

Ne

—— n the present case, the IP's order does affect the indi-

viduals in their status as members of the union.” That is,

1962) ; Allen ». Armored Car Chauffeurs Local 820, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J.

1960). L

66. See, e.g., Sheridan v. United Brotherhog of Carpenters, 191 F. Supp.

347, 352-53, 194 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D. Del. 1961), reversed, 306 F.2d 152,

156-57 (3d Cir. 1962) (only Kalodner, J. for reversing on this ground) ;

Mamula v. Local 1211, United Steelworkers, 202 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. Pa. 1962).

. »’

67. See Modre v. Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 485, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 208, 216, aff'd

without opinion, 265 App. Div. 989, 40 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff'd with modifications as

to scope of injunction, 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E.2d 552, modified according to man-

date, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943); see also Washington Local

a , Lodge No. 104.%. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 33 Wash.2d 1,

68-71, 74-75, 203 P.2d 1019, 1058-59, 1061 (1949); Hatch v. Grand Lodge

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 233 Ill. App. 495 (1924) ; Gardner v. |

Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128 N.E. 704 (1920).

68. This is undoubtedly a factor for consideration in determining whether

challenged action constitutes “‘other discipline.” See, e.g., Seeley v. Brother-

hood of Painters, 308 F.2d 52, 58-60 (Sth Cir. 1962).

‘

Pol

69

¢

although there is some uncertainty as to how the members’

rights in the various local and international pension and

welfare funds will be affected, there can be little doubt

that the revocation order does touch these rights. In addi-

tion, as a_preximate result of the International’s action,

members of Local 28 have suffered a loss of employment

opportunities.” “a ;

In alleging that by revoking the Local's chartet the IP

“suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined” the mem-

bers without.a full and fair hearing, the plaintiffs stated

a claim under section 101 (a)(5).° They also made suff-

cient allegations to state a claim that by revoking the

Local's charter the IP acted, in violation of section 609, °

to “suspend, expel, or otHerwise discipline” the members

for exercising rights to which they were entitled under

the provisions of. the LMRDA-—-specitically the right to

hring suit guaranteed by section 101(a)(4). The plain.

tiffs’ failure was in the proof of their claims. .

°

o

69. This is also a relevant factor. See Detroy v American Guild of Variety

Artists, supra; Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos U'nion, supra: Gross v Kennedy,

supra; but cf. Allen v. Armored Car-Chanffeurs Local 820, supra

70. It would appear that, regarding this section, the District Court based

its decision in part upon the conclusion that the hearing was unfair not only

procedurally but also in that the IP had breached his fiduciary obligation and

had imposed an unduly severe sanction—-thus, the court has read substantive

guarantees into the’ “fair hearing” requirement See l ion Trusteeships: A

Report to the Congress, U.S. Dep't of Labor, BLMR (1962) 131; Anderson,

“Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale LJ. 1460, 1482

(1962). Having held, on the merits, that the IP neither breached his fiduciary

obligation nor imposed an unduly severe sanction. this court will reserve judg-

ment on the mooted question of whether § J01¢ a)(5) protects substantive or

merely procedural rights.

wo

70

Possible Conflict Between Parks Action

and NLRB Jurisdiction

Another jurisdictional point advanced by the IBEW

is that the District Court was required, even in the Parks

action, which is based upon the Bill of Rights provisions

(Title 1) and § 609 of the LMRDA, to deter to the exclu-

sive primary jurisdiction of the Labor Board, because at

least elements @i the case are arguably subject to § 7 or

§8 of the NLRA. See San Diego Building Trades Council

’ vy. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). The District

Court was entirely correct in declaring this challenge to

ig Jarisdiction “unavailing.”

The LMRDA has created new federal rights to be en-

joyed by union members.” These rights are to be enforced

in the federal courts. See 8 102 of the LMRDA, 29

U.S.C.A. § 412; Detroy v. American Guild of Variety

Artists, supra. The fact that the Act preserves to union

members all remedies “under any State or Federal law or

fore any court or other tribunal * * *,” § 103 of the

LARRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 413; see also § 603(a), 29

U.S.C.A. § 523(a), only means thai the new federal pro-

tection was superimposed on protection already available

in other forums, “reinforcing and not supplanting it.”

Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the

Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175, 176 (1960). This

does not mean that the District Court must abstain from

exercising its jurisdiction under section 102 when elements

of the matter at issue are arguably subject to the Labor

71. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 236 F.2d 75, 78 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union,

Local 205 F. Supp. 284, 291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Roberts v. Banana

Handlers, Local 1800, 183 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Louisiana 1960).

Board’s jurisdiction.” Congress did not intend that be-

fore securing the rights it made enforceable in federal

courts, individuals should wait for the Labor Board to

pass upon such matters as might also be within its com

petence.™

_ Obviously, since\§ 102 of the LMRDA, 29 ULS.C.A,

§ 412, expressly provides that relief may include injunc-

tions, the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia \ct are

inapplicable.

Title 111 of the BL” Trusteeships

The plaintiffs assert that by revoking and reissuing the

charter conveying IBEW jurisdiction in the Baltimore

area, the IP achieved the same objectives as he might

have attained through a. formal trusteeship and his action

should therefore be held to have constituted the imposition

of a trusteeship.** So denominating the IP's action, the

plaintiffs reason that the trusteeship provisions of the

ILMRDA have been violated.”

72. See Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, Local 446, 205 F. Supp. 284, 290-92

(E.D. Pa. 1962); Robertson v. Banana Handlers, Local 1800. 183 F. Supp. 423

(E.D. Louisiana, 1960); cf., International Association of Machinists v. Gon-

sales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Bussey v. Phombers Local No. & 286 F.2d 165

(10th Cir. 1961) ; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). And in

our own circuit, cf., Textile Workers >. Arista Mu’> Co. 193 F. 2d 529, 533

(4th Cir. 1951).

73. See Robertson v. Banana Handlers, Local 1800. supra; cf, Rekant &

Shochtay-Gasos Union, Local 446, supra; International Asseciation of Ma-

chinists v. Gonzales, supra; Bussey v. Plumbers Local No. 3, supra

74. Section 3(h) of the LMRDA defines a trusteeship as “any receivership,

trusteeship or other method of supervision or control whereby a labor organi-

zation suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under

its constitution or bylaws.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 402(h).

75. Section 302, 29 U.S.C_A. § 462, limits the lawiul reasons tor which a

trusteeship may be imposed.’ Section 304(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 464(c), provides

-

in t ;

72

Preliminarily, a question to be determined is whether

the District Court was empowered to exercise jurisdiction

over this private action for alleged violations-of Title IIl

of the LMRDA, The* jurisdictional, provision of Title

III, § 304(a), 29 UA.C.A. § 464(a), provides that:

/

‘2

_ “Upon thy” written complaint of any member or

subordinate body of a labor organization alleging that

such organization has violated the provisions of this

title (except section 461 of this title) the Secretary

shall investigate the complaint and if the Secretary

finds probable cause to bgheve that such violation has

occurred and has not been remedied he shall, without

disclosing the identity of the complainant, bring a

civil action in any district court of the United States

having jurisdiction of the labor organization for such

relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.

Any member or subordinate body of a labor organi-

zation affected by any violation of this subchapter

_ (éxcept section. 461 of this title) may bring a civil

action in any district court of the United States hav-

ing jurisdiction of the labor organization for such

relief (including injunctions ) as may be appropriate.”

‘ &

Several district courts have interpreted this to mean that

individual members or subordinate bodies may not bring

a civil action until full resort has been had to the adminis-

that a trusteeship will be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months only

if “established by a labor organization in conformity with the, procedural re-

quirements of its constitution and bylaws and authorized or ratified after a fair

hearing either before the executive board or before such other body as may be

provided in accordance with its constitution or bylaws * * *.” .

“.°

trative remedies available before the Secretary of Labor.”

In_a litigation involving I-ocal 28 and the .IBEW, prior

but’ pertinent to the present one, District Judge R. Dorsey

Watkins had occasion to pass upon this very question.

After a scholarly analysis, he concluded that, at least until

the Secretary of Labor. does bring suit, a private action

‘can be maintained under § 304(a) of the LMRDA. Ex-

ecutive Board, Local 28 7. IBEW, 184 F. Supp. 649, 653-

59 (D. Md. 1960)."7 In this well reasoned view that

section 304(a) does not require recourse to that particular

administrative remedy and action of the Secretary before

a private suit may be entertained, this court coneurs,

Upon review of the evidence, however, Judge Thomsen®

concluded that while it is possible for revocation to be used

as a means of evading-the trusteeship provisions of Title

IlI> it was not proven that revocation was so used.” Al-

though the question is exceedingly close, see Anderson,

“Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship [mbroglio,” 71

Yale L. J. 1460, 1478-85 (1962), this court is not per-

” suaded that the District Court’s disposition of the trustee-

ship question should be overturned.

76. See Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F. Supt, 300, 304-06 (S.D. Cal. 1960);

Flaherty v. United Steelworkers, 46 L.R.R M. 2483, 3006, 41 1.C. par. 16,517

(S.D. Cal. 1960); Cor v. Hutcheson, 204 F. Supp. 442, 446 05.) Ind. 1962) ;

Risso v. Ammond, 182 F. Supp. 456, 471-72 (DN J) 19)

77. Accord, Vars v. International Bhd. of [ert rmakers, 204 F. Supp. 245,

246-47 (D. Coni. 1962) ; see Palisades Lodge No. 173 7 Brotherhood of Ratl-

way Clerks, 47 L.R.R.M. 2605, 41 L.C., par. 16,666 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (by im-

plication) ; see also, Anderson, “Landrum-Griffn and the Trusteeship Imbrog

lio,” 71 Yale L J. 1460, 1498-500 (1962). Note, 48 Va. .. Kev. 78, 96-97 (1962).

78. At least two naocae appear to agree that revocation and reissuance

of a chamer should, atgheast under some circumstances, be held to constitute

the imposition of a trusteeship. See Horowitz, “Possible Effects o1 LMRDA’s

Provisions,” in Symposium on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

Act of 1959 (1961), egited by. Slovenko, 458, 563; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin

74

Exhaustion of Internal Remedies—in Both Suits '

™ v

The defendant maintains that both actions should have

been dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust the

reasonable internal remedies that were available to them.

Having filed their suits over a year ago, both Local 28°

and the individual plaintiffs, failed to appeal to the Inter-

national Convention which met this past September aiter

the appeal in this case was argued. In addition, the indi-

vidual plaintiffs in the Parks suit never did appeal to the

IEC from the IP’s revocation order.”

We think that the individual plaintiffs need not have

been actual parties to. the proceeding before the LEC. They

were not themselves direct parties to the revocation order

or proceedings and, since the two cases, Local 28's and

Parks’, are based upon a’common foundation, Local 28's

appeal to the IEC preserved the rights of the individuals

who now challenge the revocation order.

Plaintiffs” failure to appeal. to the Convention did not

bar disposition of the cases by the District Court. ° Al-

though there is a common law doctrine that parties are

not entitled to judicial relief until they have ®xhausted

. - e.

and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L. J. 1460, 1478-85 (1962). “fing

Department of Labor adopted the position: i

“that a revocation of a charter, properly conducted and in accordance with a

labor organization's constitution and bylaws, does not create a trusteeship. * * *

The Department has also determined that nothfng in the Act prevents the

creation of a new local, even though it may be composed primarily of the same

individuals formerly belonging to the trusteed local that had its charter re-

voked.” Union Trusteeships: A Report to the Congress, U.S. Dept..of Labor.

BLMR (1962) -33§4.

79. In the earlier injunction proceeding brought by Local 28, Judge Thomsen

denied relief &ince the Local had not pursuéd the available internal remedy

before the IEC. Local 28 v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99, 107-08 (D. Md. 1961).

NJ

4

©

intra-union remedies, there are a number aw ell-recognized

exceptions “which have substantially qualified if not nulli-

fied the rule.” Exceptions are recoznized when resort to

the internal appeal would be unreasonablysburdensome. be-

cause of delay likely to result in irreparable injury.”

In addition to the common law doctrine, as qualified by

its exceptions, there is now § 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA,

20 USCA. § 411(a)(4).% The Second Circuit has

squarely held that the proviso in section 101 (a) (4) is ap-

plicable as a limitation on jurisdiction in suits brought in

the federal courts under section 102 for violations of Title —

| of the LMRDA, Detroy 7. American Guild of Variety

Artists, 286 F 2d 75. 77-78 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 306

U.S. 929 (1961). Not only does section 101(a)(4) gov-

ern the exhaustion! question in the Parks action, but since

it provides an authoritative expression of congressional.

labor policy, it is, insofar as it may modify the common

law exhaustion doctrine, a prime source upon which the

court should draw in forfnulating the federal law in decid-

ing the Local’s case. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,

353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).

80. Summers, “i Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Rev.

1049, 1086 (1951) ; accord, Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286

F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 ,U.S. 929° (1961): see also, Cox, “The

Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,” 72 Uarve L. Rev. 609, 614-15

(1959).

81. Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union .Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Rev

1049, 1086-92 (1951); Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the

Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale’ L. J., 175, 207-10 (1960); Annotation, 168

A.L.R. 1462, 1468-82 (1947). . <

: ©

82. “No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereot to

institute an action in any court, or in proceeding before any administrative

agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officer: are

\ x

The four-month limitation in the proviso. has been

subjected to various interpretations.” We agree, however,

with the District Court’s conclusion that “whatever con-

struction is placed” on this proviso (230 F. Supp. at 296),

~ these suits are barred neither by the statutory limitation

nor by common law exhaustion doctrine. When these suits

were brought, all internal remedies, available within four

months of revocation, had been exhausted. To insist upon

full exhaustion of remedies would be to impose an un-

reasonable delay in the adjudication of plaintiffs’ rights

and would-result in irreparable harm to plaintiffs.”*

CONCLUSION p

Parent unions have played a useful role in bringing a

measure of order and stability to the labor market. Per-

haps their best contribution has been in restraining their

component bodies from reckless resort to work- stoppages |

and strikes. If in some quarters abuses have,arisen that.

require correction, there should be legislation. But courts

, should not step in and, in order to achieve immediate objec-

tives thought to be desirable, establish a rule that locals

may with impunity defy their parent unions and strike at

will. By the judicial application of ad hoc standards, in in

named as defendants or respondents i in such action or proceeding, 2s Provided,

That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing proce-

dures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization,

before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations

or any officer thereof * * *.”

83. Eg., compare Detroy, supra, with Harris v. International Longshore-

men's Ass'n, Local 1291, 205 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Pa. 1962).

84. See Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in

Fact,” 70 ‘Yale L. J..175, 208 (1960); see also Cox, “The Role.of Law in |

Preserving Union Democracy,” 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609 614 (1959). °

\ 7

the pursuit of what is called democracy in union govern-

ment, we will have succeeded only in introducing, not de-

mocracy, but chaos. ‘Fhis would not only tend to disinte-

grate the iabor movement, but the irresponsibility thus

generated could have serious implications for employers

and others as well.

We conclude that while the consolidated cases are within

the court’s jurisdiction, there was no sufficient basis for

holding that the [REW or its IP breached a fiduciary obli-

~ation to Lo@al 28 or ifs members, or that the hearing was

\. :king in fairness, or that r&ocation was an unduly severe

sanction. The Local’s claim based on breach of contract

under the Taft-Hartley Act therefore fails and the charter

revocation did not violate the members’ rights under §§

191(a) and 609 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 411{a)

and 609.

We are not unmindful that the interests of the members

of Local 28 in the various local and international pension

and benefit funds have been made uncertain by the févo-

cation. Whether the International or the Local has title

to the Local’s funds and other,assets was not litigated in

these cases and we do not pass upon this.” We note, how-

ever, that the revocation order anticipated the Interna-

tional’s taking steps to assure that the members of Local

28 will not. suffer unnecessary“féss of financial benefits.

Moreover, there is no indication that the rank and file

members of the outcast local will be unable to preserve

their memberships in the IBEW. by accepting the invita-

tion extendec them to join Local 24 or by transferring to

some other local.

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78 °

The District Court's decision must for the reasons

stated be reversed, and the case is remanded for further

orders consistent with this opinion.”

Reversed and remanded

Sorer, Circuit Judge, dissenting :

- The power of the District Court to entertain these suits

is clearly demonstrated in the concluding portion of the

court’s opinion, and with this conclusion I concur. How-

ever, the ultimate conclusion of the court, reversir,y the

judgment of the District Court, involves an endorsement

and approval of the conduct of Freeman, the all-powerful

president of the IBEW, in trying and punishing Local 28

and its members, and with this conclusion I am obliged to

dissent, since the behavior of the IP was plainly at vari-

ance wi established principles of due process and fair

play. The opinion embraces the theory that “basic union

policy and structure” require that the dominant power be

lodged in the parent body and’ pursues this theme so

steadily in the course of an elaborate discussion that in

the end little head is given to the arbitrary manner in

which the IP exercised his power.

85. Of possible interest in this connection are Cohn, “The international and

the Local Union,” 11 N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. Labor 7 (1958); Summers, “Umon

Schism in Perspective: Flexible Doctrines, Double Standards and Projected

Answers,” 45 Va. L. Rev. 261 (1959) ; Note, “Disposition of Union Assets on

Disaffiliation,” 45 Va. L. Rev. 244 (1959) ; Annotation, 23 A L.R.2d 1209 (1952).

86. If this court should be in error in any of these conclusions, we are of the

opinion that the order of the District Court still requires revision. While the

revocation would be void, the International should, in that event, be given the

opportunity to retry the Local before a. properly constituted tribunal.

a o\

?

a

79

A brief resume of the conduct of fhe IP, based upon

undisputed evidence, demonstrates to‘ my mind that the

District Court was correct in finding that the local union

and its members were denied their fundamental rights.

The IP was a stern and resolute individual, determined

to have his own way not only when he was executing the

powers conferred upon’ him by the constitution of the

IRE V but also in those areas in which the local union

members were entitled to some freedom of choice. His

attitude toward anything that tenued to diminish his power

is shown by a public statement in a speech in 1961 at the

convention of -an association of electrical contractors

known as NECA. He said that he “hated” the Landrum-

Griffin Act. The fact that Congress itself deemed it neces-

sary to formulate a bill of rights for the protection of the

individual workers found no favor in his eyes. Accord-~

ingly, it is not surprising to learn that the Local had much

provocation from the IP himself when it ventured to strike

without his consent. The current labor dispute involved

two major items—a demand of the workers for an increase

in wages of 35 cents an hour in place of an increase of 2

cents an hour offered by NECA, and a determined stand

by the Local in opposition to the insertion of a “council

clause” which would strip the Local of its power to termi-

nate a contract at the end of the year and lodged the

power of decision in the CIR.* In this dispute the IP

promised the Local his support, but in tact he worked in

harmony with NECA. He tried hard to persuade the Local

togdopt the obnoxious clause and alse to accept a raise of

10 cents an hour recommended by the IEC although he

®The District Court held in an earlier suit brought by the -Local against the

Maryland Chapter of NECA, 194 F. Supp. 494, that the Local had the right to

terminate the contract at the end of the year; no appeal was taken from the

decision.

$U

was aware that the Local had obtained contracts with a

number of independent contractors entitling the workers

to an increase in wages.of 35 cents per hour.\ In order to

break the strike the IP brought in workers from outside

the State, and persuaded union men in other trades not

to respect the Local’s picket line. The IP was angry with

the union because it would not do his bidding and it Is

obvious that instead of supporting the Local in the dispute

he used his weight in support of the employing contractors.

It was in this attitude and under these circumstances

that the IP came to judgment. He had the right under

the IBEW constitution to institute charges against the

Local for striking without his consent and also the right

to sit in judgment in the case. He exercised both rights.

He appointed a referee to hear the charges preliminarily

but reserved to himself the final decision. He had to de-

cide wiherehe should condemn the Local for striking

without his consent and without his orders and what

punishment, if any, he should inflict. He was not obliged

to hear the case himself since, under the constitution ot ~

the International, it could have been referred to the IEC,

a body of international officers appointed to govern the

union between meetings of the international convention.*

He knew that he had opposed the working employees and

favored NECA in.the negotiations that preceded! the strike

and that his own conduct was one of the matters that

should be taken into consideration in deciding: the case.

Indeed, he was aware that he ought not to sit im the case,

for he refused to submit to examination as a witness, say-

ing that he could not be a witness because he had to make

*The appeal was taken in this case to the IEC but, as the District Judge

pointed out in his opinion, the IEC did not try the case de novo but upon the

record made up by the IP.

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81

‘ ‘

the ultimate decision in the case. Nevertheless, he did sit;

and again he gave evidence that he was not bound by any

rules of fair play, for during the trial he did not hesitate

to confer with the prosecuting attorney out of the presence

of the attorney for the local union.

In view of this narrative, it is futile to suggest, as does

the opinion of the court, that “the real basis for the argu-

ment that the IP was biased is that he was, in a sense, both

prosecutor and judge.” The trier of the cause in an in-

ternal union dispute or in an administrative proceeding

does not cease to be a judge because he is empowered also

to act as prosecutor. He may not ignore the established

principles of due process in order to obtagn his own ends.

. .

It is plain that the IP was not qualified to pass judgment

in Yee case and, particularly, to determine the kind of pun-

ishment to be inflicted for violation of the union rules.

This is shown not only by what is set forth above but also

by the extremely severe punishment which he inflicted upon

the local union and its members by revoking the Loeal’s ©

charter, as is shown in the opinion of the District Court.

This was the only case in which the IP had refused his

consent to a strike by a Local union. when it desired to

strike in order to maintain its position in a legitimate labor

dispute. Not only did the IP withhold his consent to the

strike in the instant case, but, when the strike took place

against his will, he imposed the severest discipline within

his power: Under all these circumstances it Is improper

to approve the actions of the IP especially in these days

when the rights and constitutional ‘safeguards of a person

accused of crime and of a person convicted of crime are

so meticulously observed. One would suppose that the

same protection should be afforded a lawabiding working

man even if, in the exercise of his-rights of collective bar-

‘ 82

gaining, he exceeds the bounds of propriety. For these

reasons: and those expressed in the opinion of Judge

‘Thomsen I dissent. See Calabrese v. The United Associa-

tion of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and

Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada,

_et als. (D.N.). December 21, 1962)

83

LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT

$2, 29 U.S.C. $401 (Declaration of Findings. Purposes

and Policy):

(a) The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it con-

tinues to be the responsibility of the Federal Government

to protect employees’ rights to organize, choose their own

represéntatives, bargain collectively, and otherwise engage

in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection,

that the relations between employers and labor organiza-

tions and the millions of workers they represent have a sub-

stantial impact on the commerce of the Nation; and that

in order to accomplish the objective of a free flow of com-

merce it is essential that labor organizations, employers, °

and their officials adhere to the highest standards of re-

sponsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs

of their organizations, particularly as they affect, labor-

management rc iations. +, ae

\ ;

(b) The Congress further finds, from recent investiga-

tions in the labor and management fields, that there have

been a number of instances of breach of tr

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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