Appendix — Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1963
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
: ~FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
‘ No. 8049
: as is Ab “me
John E. Parks, Jr, and Robert M. Foote and Albert
McHugh and Paul Ziegler and Silvio Stamerro, Individ-
> ually an? as Representatives of the members of loca! .28,
~ LBZE.W.. ina Class Action, and Local Union 28, Inter-_
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Q. Appellees and Cross- Appellants;
Versus .
International Brotherhood of Ilectrical Workers,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
a Local Union No. 24 (fBEW), ee
‘ Intervenor, — \ ;
’ . > au
Cross-Arperats FROM THE UNItED STATES DIstRICT
CourT FOR THE Pisrricr or MaryLanp, vt BaLtrore.
Roszet C. ‘Trromsen, District’ J ence. :
otras:
iene June ‘14, 1962. Deci ‘ed January 23, 1963.)
¢
s
‘
I UA RES ep la tit top 2 A
' Before Sopeiorr, Chief tudien, an : SoPE k and J. SPENCER
Beir, Cirenit Judges.
s John Henry [ewin and Thomas X. Dunn (Robert R.
: Bair, and Venable, Paetjer & I[loward on brief) for
Appellant and Cross-Appellee; George Cochran Doub ,
(Weinberg and Green on brief) for Intervenor-Appel- b
lant; Melvin J. Sykes ( Patrick A. O'\Doherty on prief)
for “Appellees and gre Appellants ; and J. Albert: Woll
and Theodore J. St. Antoine on brief for American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organ- °
izations as Amicus Curiae. ss
SoBELOFF, Chief Judge:
A dispute between af international union and one of its
~ component local unions which led to the revocation of the
local’s charter and the establishment of a new local em-
bracing its jurisdiction, occasioned two suits against the
international. One was brought by the local union and the
other by five of its members in behalf of the membership,
both suits seeking declaratory judgments and injunctive
relief to restore the local to good standing in the interna-
tional and to obtain incidental relief, The two suits have
been consolidated. The revocation action complained of
was taken by the International Brotherhood of Electrical
workers (IBEW) after its Local Union No. 28-IBEW
(Local 28) went out on strike without obtaining the ap-
proval of the IBEW International President (IP) in con-
travention of the IBEW Constitution and failed to return
to work in defiance of his repeated directions to do so. The
strike was undertaken by the Local to enforce demands
made by it in the course of contract negotiations with the
Maryland Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors
Association.
The plaintiffs contended below that the IP had no con.”
stitutional authority to refuse permission for the strike or
to revoke Local 28’s charter for disregard of his order.
They further contended that even if constitutionally author-
ized, the action was invalid because: (1) it was in breach
of a duty owed to the Local and its members, and was |
taken in bad faith for improper reasons; (2) the Local
was not afforded a fair hearing before a properly consti-
tuted tribunal; and (3) the revocation Was unjust and an
unreasonably severe sanction in the circumstances,
sg
tanith il Nati
e ee ee shad
istddnitde ight oo wa Sti.
PW ae baw ee Cele ag:
3
More particularly, the plaintiffs maintained that the IP
improperly collaborated with the National Electrical Con-
tractors Association (NECA) during Local 28's collective
bargaining negotiations. with the Maryland Chapter of
NECA; illegally sought to impose a perpetual collective
bargaining agreement on the Local; and harbored animos-
ity toward the\ Local and its leadership because of their
efforts to maintain local autonomy. Moreover, they as-
serted that by deciding the charges against Local 28 when
his own good faith was called into question, the IP denied
the Local a fair hearing—a defect which was not cured by
the appellate review of the IBEW International Executive
Council. @
The International replied that the revocation was justi-
fied because by engaging in a strike contrary to the IP's
order, Local 28 was in clear violation of the IBEW Con-
stitution ; that the revocation was reasonable and necessary
to maintain proper union discipline, did not result from
improper motives on the part of the IP, and was enforced
only after fair procedures provided in accordance with
law and the IBEW Constitution. It contended that, in
any event, the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by their own
unclean hands and failure to exhaust intra-union remedies.
The defendant also raised serious jurisdictional defenses.’
1. The two cases rest on separate legal bases, although the same events are
relied cn as grounds for relief. The individual members’ action, Parks, et al. v.
IBEW, was brought under §§ 101, 102, 302, 304, 609 of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 (29 U.S.C.A, §§ 411, 412, 482,
464, S29) for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that revocation of
the charter constituted unreasonably severe discipline of the members without a
fair hearing, and also amounted to institution of a trusteeship over the Local.
The District Judge ruled for the plaintiffs on the first: ground, but found no
evidence that the revocation was used as a means of circumventing the Act's
trusteeship limitations. The Local’s action, Union No. 28-IBEW v. IBEW,
4
~~“
The District Judge, after hearing evidence and argu-
ment for twenty-two days, held that the strike did require
approval of the IP. He further held that there was 1 > suf-
ficient evidence that the IP had been moved by “express or
particular malice, i.¢., ill-will, spite, a grudge, or a desire
to be revenged on a patticular person or persons, resulting
in a deliberate intention to commit an injury.” 203 F.
Supp. at 309. Nevertheless he concluded that the IP had
acted from “mixed motives” amounting to “legal malice”
in forbidding the strike and in revoking the charter. With
respect to the fairness of the hearing and the Severity of
the discipline, the Jndge, Aipheld :the plaintiffs.
| x ;
The decree ordered the restoration of the charter ‘of
local 28 and all appiirtenant rights and privileges. It en-
joined Any retrial or future charges against that Local for .
any past conduct involving the issues in the instant cases,
but did not preclude the proper officials of the defendant.
from pressing charges for such past misconduct against
certain members who were the sjngleaders in defying the
IP’s order forbidding the strike. The decree expressly
did not enjoin disciplinary action for breaches of the’ de-
-fendant’s Constitution occurring after the decree, including
continuation of the present strike after reasonable notice
from the IP “issued with proper motives.” The charter of
Local 24, which was organized by IBEW to take over the
jurisdiction of Local 28, was ordered revoked. The plain-
tiffs’ claims for damages and counsel fees were denied.
‘4
« Was instituted under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a)) on the grounds that the IBEW Constitu-
tion was a “contract * * * between * * * labor organizations” within the meaniag
of that section, and that the IP’s actions amounted to a ‘breach of that contract
entitling the Local to injunctive relief and damages. /The District Judge granted
injunctive relief but denied damages and counsel fées.|
¥rom the order of the District Judge for the restoration
of the charter of’Local 28 and the revocation ot the charter
of the newly created substitute, Local Union No. 24, the
International appeals. From the denial of additional re-
lief requested by the plaintiffe? they appeal. Local 24 has
intervened on appeal claiming that as it was not a party to
the action in the court below, that court’s decree could not
alter its status.
I. FACTS .
The nature and complexity of the issues raised require
not only close examination of the proximately operative
facts, but also of the context in which the dispute developed.
Particularly is it necessary to study the relationship, within
the electrical contracting industry, of the IBEW with its
component local unions and individual members, and with
the principal employers’ association, NECA. One cannot
decide the issue of “breach of duty owed the Local and its
members” without first considering carefully what, were
the respective duties resting in the IP, the Local, and its
members.”
Organization and Structure of the IBEW *.
The IBEW, one of eighteen members of the AFL-CIO
Building and Construction Trades Department, is about
seventy years old and has 750,000 members organized into
almost 1800 component local unions. About 150,000 of
SS 9
2. In addition to the District Court's decision now under review, reported as
Parkg v. IBEW, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md. 1962), there have been several
earlier District Court opinions that bear upon the present case. See Executive
Board, Local 28 v. IBEW, 184 F. Supp. 649 (D. Md. 1960) ; Local 28 v. Mary-
land Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 194 F.Supp. 491, 194 F.
Supp. 494 (D. Md. 1961) ; Local 28 v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99 (D. Md. 1961).
6
these members work if the electrical construction mdustry.
These belong to locals in the United States and Canada
having about 800 working agreements with chapters of
NECA and a few other employer associations.’
local 28 received its charter from the IBEW in 1900,
and through the years it has served as the uncertified bar-
gaining represemtative for its members. As of June 1,
1961, it: had about 1400 members, most of whom were
employed in the electrical construction industry in Balti-
more City and the ten nearby Maryland counties. As
authorized by the IBEW ‘Constitution, it includes among
its members supervisory and managerial personnel who
are restricted from voting or attending meetings. (IBEW
Const. Art. XVII, § 6). See §-14(a) of the LMRA, 29
U.S.GA. § 164(a).*. The Local operated a hiring hall and
provided a local pension and other benefit funds. Its
welfare assets amounted to between one-half and three-
quarters of a million dollars.
3. NECA is a national association ot employers in the construction industry ;
"it is comprised of local chapters representing electrical contractors in particular
geographic areas for purposes of collective bargaining. Some contractors who
are not members also designate WECA or an area chapter as their collective
bargaining agent.
The Maryland Chapter represents 26 electrical contractors doing approx-
imately 80% of the major construction in and around Baltimore ; over the years
the Maryland Chapter has vegotiated successjve collective bargaining agreements
with Local 28
NECAtoffers advice and assistance to its chapters in collective bargaining
matters. For years NECA and I BFW have conferred on a national level to
further their common interest in stabilizing labor relations in thévelectrical
construction industry. The principal vehicle for advancing this common purpose
is the Council on Industrial Relations fér the Flectrical Contracting Industry
of the United States and Canada. (CIR or Council). %.
4. Its leadership includes former supervisors and contractors to whom these
restrictions do not apply. The inc'lusion of such active members in a union is
not illegal, and is traditional in thiis' industry.
The organizational structure of the I1}EW and the re-
lations, rights and duties therein are pervasively governed
by the International Constitution.’ The International Con-,
vention (IC), comprised of representatives % the locals,
is the ultimate governing body. During intervals between
conventions control is in the International Executtye Coun-
cil (IEC), composed of nine members meeting quarterly,
the International President and subsidiary officers.
Actualiy, effective control of IBEW activitieS is en-
trusted to the IP who, since 1955, has been Gordon M.
Freeman. He is empowered to decide all controversies in-
cluding questions of law (.Art. IV, § 3(2)); to remove
International officers for cause and to fill vacancies by
appointment (Art. IV, § 2); to enter into agreements with
national or international labor organizations or associa-
tions of. employers, or with companies doing an interstate
business in electrical work, to cover the entire jurisdiction
of the IBEW (Art. IV, § 3(12)). “The I.P. can, in any
situation, delegate the powers of his office to an Interna-
tional Representative, Vice-President or Assistant.” (Art.
IV, § 4). He may also appoint “a referee who may or
may not be a member, to take testimony and report to
him.” (Art. IV, § 3(11)).
The IP’s authority over local yhions is notably extensive.
(See Art. IV, § 3(8), (9), (10); Arts. XV & XVIT).
Locals receive their charters only upon his authorization.
(Art. XV, § 1). He assigns the locals their jurisdiction,
can merge or amalgamate locals or suspend or revoke a
local’s charter if it does not organize or protect its juris-
diction. (Art. XV, §§ 2-4). In addition, ‘when. necessary
5. Many of the material provisions of the Constitution are set forth in 197 F.
Supp. at 102 n. 2.
°
to protect or advance the interests of its members, the IP
can take charge of the affairs of any local, (Art. IV, §
3(9)); he can also remove or suspend local. officers for
various reasons. (Art. IV, § 3(10)).
Locals may not affiliate with central labor councils and
the like without his permission. (Art. XVII, § 5). Al-
though locals are empowered to make their own bylaws
and working rules, these are null and void if they conflict
with the International Constitution.* And all bylaws,
amendments and rules and all agreements of any kind are
null and void unless approved by the IP who has the right
to “correct” them to conform to the IBEW’s Constitution
and policies. (Art. XVII, §§ 7-9). In addition, no agree-
ment can be abrogated without his approval. (Art. XVII,
§ 11); and no general work stoppage can be undertaken
without his consent and “‘[t]he I.P., or his representative,
_ has the power at any time to enter any situation or con-
troversy involving a L.U. [Local Union] or any of its
members, and the decision of the I.P., direct or through
his representative, shall be accepted by the L.U. and its
officers, subject to appeal to the I.E.C. and IL.C.” (Art.
XVII, §,13). By way of ultimate enforcement sanction,
the IP. is empowered: ae
*“Either to suspend or revoke the charter of any
_L.U., or have the I.S. [International Secretary] re-
ject the per capita tax from any L.U. that fails or
refuses to observe the laws and rules of the I.B.E.W.”
(Art. TV. § 3(8)). . '
<innaiinDiiniesiinieiiee .
6. Questions of conflict are necessarily decided by the IP who is empowered
to decide all questions of law. (Art. IV, § 3(2)).
4
b Wi) eal °
cation for membership admission to a local union con-
stitutes a contract between the member, the local, the
IBEW and all other members. (Art. XXII, § 3). Each
new member is required to take an oath of allegiance .to
the IBEW and to conform to its Constitution and laws.
(Art. XXII, § 4). A member niay be penalized for violat-
ing the IBEW “Constitution and the rules herein, or the
bylaws, working agreements, or trade and working rules
of a L.U.” or for “working in the interest of any organi-
zation or cause which is detrimental to, or opposed to, the
The Constitution oe that acceptance of an appli-
a
A.B.E.W.” (Art. XXVII, § 2(2), (9)). The IP is em-
powered to file charges against a member before the IEC.
(Art. IV, § 3(7)).’ a z
eo:
_ All decisions of the IP are subject to appeal, first to the
IEC, meeting quarterly, and then to the International
Convention, meeting every four years. (Art. IV, § 3(2)).
The IEC is also empowered to try local unions or mem-
bers, and may revoke or suspend charters or memberships.
(Art. IX, § 4; see cso Art. 1X,§ 6). No appeal is recog-
nized unless there is compliance with the decision from
which the appeal is ‘taken and all appeals must be taken
within 30 days of the decision which is being appealed.
' (Art. XXVIT, §§ 16, 17):
7. Provision is also made for automatic expulsion of a member or q local for
resorting to a court of law without having fully exhausted internal remedies.
(Art. XXVII, § 1 and Art. XVII, § 1). Even advising such resort is penalized.
(Art. XXVII, § 2(1)). The legality of some of these provisions, in the face of
§§ 609 and 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, 29 U-S.C.A. §§=5 and 411(a) (4),
might be difficult to defend. See § 101(b) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 4110b).
10
The Council on Industrial Relations
(CIR or Council)
The Council, a bipartite body consisting of NECA and
IEW representatives, was founded in 1920 by the [BEW
and a predecessor employers’ association. It consists of 12
persons, six representing each member organization, and
additional alternates to assure the presence of at least four
representatives of each organization at its quarterly meet-
ings. There is a co-chairmanship of the chief executive of
each organization; at all times pertinent to this case the
co-chairmen have been Gordon Fteeman, IP of the IBEW,
_and Paul M. Geary, Executive Vice-President of NECA.
While not strictly an arbitration body, primarily because
the Council contains no neutral outsiders and exercises the
power to alter the terms of agreements between IBEW
locals and NECA chapters in its discretion, the Council
functions to render final and binding decisions on collec-
tive bargaining issues submitted to it when local negotia-
tions have reached an impasse. Its decisions must be
unanimous, ‘each representative voting separately. Al-
though most disputes are decided upon submission of both
parties, unilateral submissions are accepted when the col-
lective bargaining agreement contains a Council clause
and the subinitting party has attempted in good faith but
failed to effect a local settlement and has notified the other
party of its intention to file and invited it to join the sub-
mission. Council decisions are reached in executive session
after hearing argument and no final decision is reached
until the Council adjourns, when the parties are simul-
taneously notified of the Council's action.
The Council's principal purpose is “to remove the causes
ae eT
EE eer SA eee
° 11
of friction and dispute in the electrical contracting indus-
try” by providing a forum for conciliation and settleme:*
of controversies between IBEW locals and NECA chap-
ters. It has aided in creating a relatively “strikeless”
climate within the electrical construction industry, and it
is tindisputed that by and large it has served the parties
well over the years.
Council Clauses
With the encouragement of the two national organiza-
tions, IBEW and NECA, most collective bargaining agree-
ments between IBEW locals and NECA chapters contain
some form of Council clause. There are variations, but gen-
erally clauses require submission to the Council for binding
decision of all disputes arising during the term of the agree-
ment and proposed changes at the end of any contract year
when the parties’ fail to arrive at an agreement locally.
Most Council clauses have in the past provided that the
agreement was to run from year to year “unless changed
as iy * * provided” in the agreement. It had been generally
assumed that such contracts were “evergreen,” that 1s, it
was considered that they were terminable only upon mutual
consent of the parties or permission of the C ouncil and
that a unilateral attempt to terminate would be a dispute
to be referred to the Council.
In August, 1959, NECA circulated to its chapters copies
of a uniform Council clause, referred to in the evidence as
the “yellow sheet” clause because it was printed on yellow
paper. This was ungmbiguous in its “evergreen” charac-
ter and specified that it was to “continue in effect from
year to year * * * unless changed or terminated in the way
12
later provided herein. * * * Notice -by either party of a
desire to terminate the agreement [would] be handled in
the same manner as a proposed change.” (Emphasis
added.) In 1956 the Council had adopted a policy of re-
quiring the inclusion of “evergreen” Council clauses
“where the matter of the Council agreement was in dis-
pute.” The District Court found that the IP had not made
this policy known to the local unions or all the other In-
ternational officers. It is undisputed that both the IBEW
and NECA favor the inclusion of the broadest possible
Council clauses in collective bargaining agreements be-
- tween IREW locals and NECA chapters.
Actually, only 20 of the some 800 collective bargaining
agreements between IBEW locals and NECA chapters
contain the “yellow sheet” “evergreen” clause. Eighteen
of these were imposed by the Council itself; only two orig- |
inated in local negotiations. Controversy over the meariing
of the particular @ouneil clause in the 1958 agreement
between I.ocal 28 and‘ the Maryland Chapter, over inclu-
sion of the recommended ‘‘yellow_ sheet” Council clause in
their new agreement and over the legality of such a clause,
forms a significant part of the present dispute.
Relations Between Lecal 28 and
the International Prior to 1961
Since it is-part of the plaintiffs theory that the IP was
unlawfully motivated in his actions, particularly by alleged
ill-will originating in earlier misunderstandings between
IBEW ard Local 28, we turn now to those events. —
Since 1958 two factions, one led by Eveson and Beck-
eee rae
13
\
hardt\and the other by King and Rost, have vied for con-
trol of Local 28. Although in the summer of that year
Eveson was elected President, King was re-elected Busi-
ness Manager and Rost, Financial Secretary. In Septem-
ber, 1958, Eveson, acting within the Local, attempted to
bring its:financial policies into line with its bylaws. When
orders of Local 28’s Executive Hoard supporting Eveson’s
efforts were ignored, he preferred charges against King
and Rost by letter of January 26, 1959, addressed to
IBEW Regional Vice-President Blankenship. On January
-.31,-1959, he requested an investigation by the IEC. On
February 9, 1959, the IP sent International Representative
Goidel to confer with the officers of the Local. Goidel im-
posed a trusteeship.” Thereafter he removed Eveson front -
office, but retained King and Rost, and stispended- the
Local’s bylaws and the meetings of the Executive Board
and general membe®hip.
» Among other acts objectionable to the local membership,
Goidel,.in a referendum on November °17, 1959, made two
_ proposals relating to dues and assessments. The first in-
volved a substantial increase in dues and the second the
elimination of certain existing benefits. Over 75% of the
members abstained from the balloting. On December 11,
1959, seven members of the Local, the present leadership,
without first exhausting their internal remedies, filed sunt
in the federal District Court of Maryland to enjoin certi-"
fication of the result of the referendum. About that time
8. On October 14, 1959, in accordance with the requirements of § 301 of the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 461, the International filed an initial trusteeship report
with the United States Department of Labor stating that the trusteeship had
been imposed because “the factionalism in the Local Union has prevented the
officers thereof from properly organizing the electrical industry within the
jurisdiction of the said Local Union.”
8
,
charges.
“
14
the IP mooted. the cause by refusing, because of the paucity
of the vote, to accept the result of the referendum.
In March, 1960, Goidel, with the help of the IBEW
General ‘Counsel, filed charges with the IEC against the
members.who had brought the suit in December, 1959.
Their failure to exhaust inte ral remedies was ihe basis
of the charges. On March 22; 1960, the Executive Board
of Local 28 responded by suing in the District Court, under
Title II] of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-66, to set
aside the trusteeship.° The members of Local 28, against
whom Goidel had filed charges, sued in the same court to
enjoin the International from proceeding upon those
10
Again the International mooted these cases.'® There is
“wo evidence of further difficulties between the International
and local 28 from August, 1960, to March, 1961.
local 28 and the Maryland Chapter ™
Contract Negotiations ,
~
Ss
Over the years local 28 and the Maryland Chapter nego-
9. On May 11, 1960, Judge R. Dorsey Watkins denied a motion to dismiss this
complaint. Executive Roard, Local 28 », IREW, 184 F. Supp. 649 (D. Md.
1960).
10. On September 16, 1960, the LEC unanimonsly iccommended that no action
(be taken on the charges filed by Goidel. The reason stated was that there was
confusien as to the meaning of ‘the recently enacted LMRDA in regard to its
effect on the doctrine of exhaustion of internal remedies and the accused men
. had acted on information received from a Labor Department official.
In addition, elections were held within Local 28 in July, 1960; Eveson was
re-elected Presidert and Beckhardt was elected Business Manager in the place
of King. On August 5, 1960, the IP unconditionally terminated the tgpsteeshi-
pursuant to his earlier order deted June 30.
15
tiated a series of contracts containing Council clauses. The
most recent of the series was agreed upon on March 7,
1958, and was duly approved by International President
Freeman. It provided that it should take tifect April 1,
1958, and remain in effect through March 31 of each suc-
ceeding year unless changed as provided therein; that
notice specifyi ing proposed changes must be submitted at
least 60 days prior to April 1 of the contract year; that
there should be no stoppage of work because of any pro-
posed changes; and that the original agreement should re-
main in effect until all proposals had been satistactorily
resolved. The contract directed that matters in dispute,
“which the local negotiators failed to resolve, should be
referred to the Council whose decision would be “final and
11
binding on both parties.” ‘
From 1922 to 1958 no dispute with respect to wages had
been submitted to the Council by Local 28 or the Maryland
Chapter. in 1958, .1959, and 1960 wage and related dis-
putes were referred ‘to the Couricil, which granted Local 28
hourly wage increases of 15¢, 17-Yo¢, and IC. in these
three years, respectively. The court below found, and it is
not contested, that the increases granted were “not untair
or unreasonable under all the circumstances.”” 203 F. Supp.
at 299.
)
The form of “Council clause” in the 1952 agreement
provided for submission of “proposed changes” to the
Council but, unlike some clauses prior to 1955, did not
refer to termination. Taking the position that the contract
was unilaterally terminable at the end of any contract year,
11. Provisions of this contract are more fully set forth in Local 28 v. Mary-
land Chapter, 194 F. Supp. 494, 495-96 (D. Md. 1961).
at Ae 16
' Local 28, °on January 12, 1961, notified the Maryland
Chapter in writing of its intention to terminate the exist-
*ing contract in the event that it could not be modified to the
muttial satisfaction of the parties." “
In the ten meetings that followed between February 6.
and March 31, the parties remained far apart. Locaf 28
firmly insisted on a two-year contract, a 35¢ per hour in-,
crease the first year and a 30¢ increase the second, or
alternatively a one-year contract with a 35¢ wage increase.
At times during the negotiations the Local proposed a
three-year contract—“35¢ for the first year and * * *
comparable amounts for two years thereafter.” 203 F. ,
Supp. at 299...Such increases were claimed to be neces-
sary.to bring the union wage in Baltimore into line with
the wage rates in Washington, Philadelphia, Wilmington
and other large mearby cities. The Maryland Chapter, on
the other hand, initially offered only 2¢ per hour more for
each year. This offer was raised on March 27 to 5¢ per
hour in return for a reduction in the number of paid holi-
days demanded by the union. The Chayier insisted that
this was as much as was economically feasible in view of
the strong competition of non-union contractors in Balti-
more. The relative weakness of union labor in the, Balti-
more market made it unreasonable, said the- Chapter, to
insist on wage scales here comparable to other cities where
union contractors do not face stiff non-union competition.
The Maryland Chapter further contended that the cOMtract
oer be terminated unilaterally without Council ap<
pro ,
> -
-
©>
12. Consistent with this stand, and in fulfillment of its statutory obligation,
§ 8(d) of LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d), on February 24, Logal 28 also sent a
“Notice to Mediation Agencies” to the federal and state agencies, notifying them
that a dispute existed concerning the collective bargaining agreement, and of the
proposed termination of the agreement. %
en
17 ,
; ‘
kal 28, “after notitving the Maryland Chapter of its
intention to do so, brought an action on March 28, 1901,
in the District Court tor a declaratory judgment upholding
its right to terminate the agreement as of April, 1, 1901.
On March 31 it notitied the Chapter that it considered the
agreement |terminated. Thereafter, local bargaining ses-
sions were temporarily suspended. ‘ -
These developments were brought to the attention of
the membership in a meeting of Local 28 on April 1, 1961,
at which time the members were cautioned by’ business
Manager Beckhardt ° ‘to preBare yourseli economically tor
the worst” but not to take any “action yourself that will - .
embarfass yourself or the Union” as a strike prior to deci-
sion in the declaratory judgment suit might endanger, the
assets of the Local. The International learned of these oc-
currences in correspondence from Beckhardt ‘to Interra-
tional Vice-President Blankenship, and through a meeting
‘on April 11, between International: Representative Frapk
Adams, who had been sent to Baltimore to assist in nego-
tiations when NECA sent a representative to aid the
Maryland Chapter, and officers of the Local.- The Interna
tional was also informed of the Local’s demand for an
immediate 35¢ wage increase and of its intention to strike
\
_if necessary to achieve it. “ae
i
The Districi Judge found that the Local reasonably
believed it had. the support of the International in its et-
forts to obtain a substantial increase. ‘This finding is ‘ap-
parently based on the correspondence ‘betw een Beckhardt
aa IVP Blankenship. Precisely what Blankenship wrote —
>: “I assure you that Local Union 28 will have my °
pion as well as any other IBEW Local Union that is
consistent with the working agreement, IBEW constitution
e
ve
‘and policy and ede ral and State laws.” (Emphasis
added.) Moreover, as the -court. also found, International
cea agrees gaa told the Local in “April: that in Its
wage gquands it wa shooting for the mgon.”
.
-
While its International Representative was attempting
to assist Local 28 in the negotiations, IBEW = was con-
ferring With the Marykind Chapter and with NECA in
the first-of several meetings concerning. the litigation com-
menced by the Local. Thus, on April 7, 1961, Louis
Sherman, General Counsel for IBEW, met with James P.
(iafland, attorney for the Maryland Chapter, a with
other representatives of the Chapter and of NECA, at the
Washington ottices of NECA to obtain information on the.
status-of the case and ‘the. legal issues involved. The testi-
mony establishes that an underlying purpose was to
determine whether [BT V or the Council should sascha
in the litigation. One ot the complaints. of the, ‘LOecal i
that it was not turrently informed of these meefings.
On April 171901, the Chapter’s motion to dismiss ~
action against it was. demied, set 194 Fo Supp. 491;
\pril 21, the Chapter formally invited the Local to join tn
the submission of issues to the Councii land notined the
Local that gtherwise tt wor'd do so umilaterally; and on’
\pril 28, the Chapter flea .ts case before the Council,
presenting ali issues (previously: exchanged $&tween, the
partigs, sincluding the issue of “termination of the con-
tract, , ‘ z ‘ss
-
fu the meantime, on April 25, aie a tormal strike
vote, and without having sought or received permission
strike from the IP. about half of the members of Local 2
went out on strike. Ostensibiy a wild cat strmke, the ie
°
*
6 ap -) ; 19
“ : :
trict Judge found that it was in tact subject to the control
of Eveson and Beckhardt, and of O'Doherty, local 28's
, attorney.”
*
Collective bargaining between the Local and the Chapter
was resumed on April 27, and the Council scheduled a
hearing tor May 15 on the issues submittad by the Mary:
land Chapter. On May 4 Local 28 filed another suit in the’
District Court to enjoin any decision by the Council based
on the unilateral submission.” This suit was eomsolidated
with the earlier decl ratory judgment action against the
- Maryland Chapter and a hearing was held on May 10 and
11. At its conclusion the District Judge orally announced
his decis¥on that the Local had the right to and did etfee:
‘tively términate its agreement on March 31, 1461; as the
terms of i agreement did not require the issue of termi
nation toe submitted to the Council. The court inti
mated, without finding it necessary to decide, ‘that if the
contract weré construed to be perpetual it would: be invalid.
Opinion, May 16, 194 F. Supp. 494.
9 “At the court’s suggestion, the parties agreed to continue
to bargain, in good faith, thes Maryland Chapter agreed: to
_ take any appeal promptly,’and the Local Union agreed with
the concurrénce of the large number of its members:in the
courtroom to return its members to work and to rerhain
: at work tuntil a decision of the’ Court4r Appeals was
rendered “or until July 31, 1961, i@ no,appeal is take n,”
194 F. Supp. at 502. The court further suggested that the
parties voluntarily submit their differences to the Council
Bi _ h- Other than to note its surprise, the Local makes no effort,to contest this
finding, except to point out that the finding was not that the strike was caused
by the Local's leadership. j e
y
*o
ere
for conciliation, refusing either to require arbitration as
requested by the Chapter or to enjoin the Council from
rendering a decision as requested by the Local.
Thereupon, the members of Local 28 returned to ‘work.
“The local negotiafors resumed their meetings on May 13.
There was discussion -of-a possible wage increase of 50¢
over a three-year period, an amount substantially higher
than the last offer on May 5 which had been 5¢ for 1961,
5 for 1962, and 10 for 1963, a total increase of 20¢ under
a three-year contract otherwise unchanged. By letter of
May 14, Beckhardt reported to Freeman that eg pana
was coming up with * ‘far more substantial o \d
On. May 15, the Maryland Chapter’s submission, came
on for hearing before the Council. Local 28 did not appear,
but sent a letter to the Council setting forth its reasons
and accusing the Chapter of not bargaining in good faith.
The Chapter representatives informed the Council of *the
court's ruling of May 11, and requested that no_binding
determination be reached but that the Council confine itself
to an advisory opinion. There is evidence that Freeman
‘became angry and ordered the Chapter to proceed with
its case.
+ .
After the hearing, the Council met in executive session
for an hour and a half. The District Court found, on con-
flicting evidence, that a tentative decision was reached with
_ the approval of. the IP allowing a 10¢ per hour wage in-
crease. The existing contract was to remain otherwise
unchanged. At this particular stage, apparently, there was
no insistence on an “evergreen” clause. Final action, how-
ever, was deferred and on June 2 the Council announced:
that in view of. the — litigation no decision would
be issued. :
\
t
e
2}
In the meantime, an May“18, the negotiating committee
met and management again increased its. ofter—l0¢ for.
1961, 10¢ for 1962, 2nd 5¢ for 1963. Though the Chapter’s —
» new offer of 10¢ for 1964 coincided to that extent with
the Council’s tentative decision of, May 15, the District.
Judge found as a ‘fact that Local 28 had failed to prove
that knowledge of the tentative decision reached the
Chapter. |
The Chapter promptly noted its appeal front the judg-
ment of the District Court in the declaratory. judgment
case. Thereafter, sometime before June 2, Freeman and
Geary (the ‘NECA chief executive) conferred; Geary G
stated that he was recommending dismissal of the appeal,
and Freeman assured him that he. would do all that he
could to see that Local 28 would submit to the Council all
" issues, concerning a new contract, which were not resolved
on ‘& local level. At a further meeting on June 2 in
Sherman’s office between him, Geary and the attorneys
for NECA and the Maryland Chapter, it was decided that
the appeal’ should be dismissed. Shortly thereafter, Geary
sent a representative to advise the Maryland Chapter with
respect to its negotiations, particularly to ask for the Coun-
: cil’s recommended “yellow sheet” Council clause. At the
next bargaining session on June 5, the Chapter’s proposed
terms for a new one-year cortract were a 10¢ wage in-
crease plus the “yellow shéet” Council clause.
:
; The June Strike
The Maryland Chapter dismissed its appeal on June 9. )
Local 28 held a strike meeting on June 13. Answering a
question from the floor as to whether the IP had consented
to the strike, Business Manager Beckhardt falsely an- ,
#.
— 22
S
cwered that the Local had been given the “‘green"light.”
‘The vote was 740 to 79 in favor of a strike to begin June
16. By telegram of June 14, the Local notified the IP of
the strike, adding, * ‘Any instructions from you would be
appreciated.”
. The IP’s telegraphic reply of June 15 advised that a
strike without his eonsent would be a‘ violation of the
Constitution. He reminded the Local that in the recent
~ case against the Maryland Chapter it was agreed, that the
members of» the Local Union would return’ to Avork and
continue working until decision on appeal or until July 31
if no appeal were taken. The parties, he added, had agreed
to continue bargaining in good faith. He noted that the
Chapter s appeal: had been - dismissed, and that it had been
agreed that the members would “continue at: »Work during
collective bargaining®* * * until July 31, 1961. He refused
his consent to a_strike-or other work stoppage, and. in- -
structed the officers to permit no such strike. The reasons
he gave for his refusal were that the Local was violating
the suggestions ‘of the court, that it had not asked permis-
sion to strike in advance, that it was the general policy of
IBEW to faver reference of all collective bargaining dis-
putes to the Council when the agreement contained a Coun-
° 7 cil clause, and that. he felt that a Council clause could be
acgotien which would be acceptable to both parties.
The IP" s telegram was received befare the strike began,
but the local officers did not then inform the members.
* The telegram was discussed at a meeting of the Local’s
Executive Board on June 16. A meeting of the membership
was called for June 22, and in the meantime, on June 19,
* the strike was allowed to begin. On Jiihe 19, the Local: |
answered the IP by telegram, and the next day its officers
>
23
met him in Washington. In justification of the strike,
was argued to Freeman that the Local's agreement avith
the court was to work only until an appeal was taken and
decided. and that the appeal had been taken: and dismissed ;
that the Maryland Chapter was not bargaining in good
faith in insisting on a perpetual Council clause; that on >
account of this the Local was fiting charges with the
NLRB: and that Local 28 had good hopes of suecess and
had already signed up a few individual contractors at the
35¢ figure.”* The local officers also contended that this was
not.a general work stoppage within the constitutional pro-
s
hibition.
Freeman again refused to consent to the strike. He
wished the Local suceess in its negotiations, but repeated
that he wanted issues which the parties were unable to
resolve to be referred to the Council. He said he would
do nothing until the meeting of the Local called for June
23. and the Local’s officers, though refusing to promise to
~ send the men back to work, agreed to read the IP’s tele-
gram to the members at that meeting.
S
The meeting of June 22 was attended by an Interna-
tional Representative sent by Freeman. Local 28's at-
torney, O'Doherty, read the IP’s telegram ‘and addressed
the membtrs at length. He expressed disagreement with
the IP’s interpretation of the IBEW Constitutien and
criticised the International and the Maryland Chapter.
O'Doherty called for a vote of “non-concurrence” with
the IP. which was overwhelmingly given. '
¢
°
-——_ os
14. These agreements providing-for a 35M wage increase were subject, however;
to the condition that ghe Local would refund the différence between that figure
and any lesser amount ultimately agreed upon with the Chapter.”
24
-
Meetings of the local negotiators had been held on June
“12. On June.16 and 17 they met before a Federal Medi-
ator, and there were additional meetings in June but no
satisfactory. accord was-reached. Local 28 would not re-
cede from its demand for a 35¢ wage increase for 1961
other than to offer to split its demand by accepting 10¢
April 1, 10¢ August 1, and [5¢ December 1, 1961. The
Maryland Chapter, on the other hand, while raising its
affer on June 16 to a 20¢ increase for 1961 as part of a°
three-year contract, insisted on a “‘yellow sheet” Council
clause which was unacceptable to the Local. Collective
bargaining ceased on July 6, when the Maryland —
broke off negotiations.”
The Charter Revocation
2 @ % °
After Local 28 voted to disobey the IP’s order not to
strike, Freeman»never waivered in his determination to
assert the authority of the International and to terminate
the unauthorized strike. .
i <2
Shortly after the strike began, he gave Geary his as- |
surance that he would do whatever he could to obtain
other union employees for. the NECA contractors, and
g
15. Local 28 filed charges on June 19 before the NLRB accusing the Maryland
‘ Chaptef of bargaining in bad ‘aith in insisting on a perpetual contract. This
charge was dismissed without p: sjudice on July 6, after the Chapter took the
_ position before an NLRB examiner that it wanted such a contract but was not
insisting on it. The same day, the Chapter, at the suggestion of its attorney and
of the NECA Eastern Regignal Director, broke off collective bargaining nego-
tiations, charging Local 28 with failure to bargain in good faith. On July 27,
Local 28 Sled charges against the Chapter and two of its member contractors
alleging coercion of members, and on October 3, 1961, chasged the Chapter be-
fore the NLRB with a failure to bargain in good faith from April 4, 1961. The
plaintiffs’ counsel have attested in their brief that the Labor Board has suspended
‘its proceedings on these charges pending the disposition of the current litigation.
° \
-_ ‘ :
some men were brought to Baltimore to work. He also
jnformed other unions in the building trades that Local
28’s picket lines need not be honored. On June 23, he
notified Local 28 that he was sending International Repre-’
sentative Alfted Terry to investigate the work stoppage.
Terry arrived in Baltimore on ‘June 23 clothed with
authority to investigate not only the strike but also the
possibility of establishing a new local in Baltimore- On
the 26th he auet with officers of the Local, and on the 28th
sent the IP a memorandum.reporting on the Local leader-_
ship’s attitude and its request that the IBEW stay out of
the situation. ~~
On June 23, O'Doherty wrote Freéman reiterating the
Local’s position’ and asking for International support.
Freeman’s reply on July 7 characterized the Local’s action
* as a challenge to the authority of the IBEW, and he in- .
formed O'Doherty that charges had been filed against the
a * seg The same day the International served on Local 28
{
an order, prepared by IBEW counsel and ‘signed by Free-
man, requiring it to show cause before an independent
referee on July 17, why its charter should not be revoked
for engaging in a strike in violation of Art. XVII, § 13
. of the IBEW Constitution.” The specific charges related
BN the strikes of June and of- April 25 to May 16. The
referee was appointed pursuant to Art. IV, § 3(11) of
the Constitution to take testimony, make findings of fact,
and report to the IP, bur Freeman reserved to himseif all
questions of law as well as the ultimate decision.
16. Copies of this order were soit to each member ‘of Local 28 on July 7
together with copies: of the correspondence between the IP and O'Doherty. On
July 14, Freeman wrote ahother letter to each member. He included*a copy of
the Constitution and explained the effect revocation would have on them. He
further explained their obligations to the International and assured them that
the Local could not validly discipline them for returning to work.
26
Sein and’ Sherman: met with Beckhardt and
O'Doherty on July 12 in Washington at the latter’s re-
quest. The Local indicated its unwillingness to go to the
Council and its fear’ that a continuous “yellow sheet’’
- Council clause might be imposed upon it by the Council,
and suggested that the terms of 'a new contract be referred _
to independent arbitration. This offer Freeman rejected,
stating: “* * * if we are going to have arbitration, why
-not take advantage of existing machinery that has proven
_ satisfactory for a number: of years?” He refused to “as-
sure the Local. that it would not be required to accept the
“yellow sheet” clause. :
)
Although during examination of the IP the District
Judge appeared to assume that the Local had knowledge,
at the time of this meeting, of the Council’s poli¢y of im-
*. posing an “evergreen” clause when the issue of termination
came before it, in his decision he found that the IP did .
not then inform the Local of. this policy. However this-
may be, it is clear that the IP_jgsigyed that the Local must
_seturn to work and submit gliamikesolved issues to+the
Council to avoid: disciplinary actfon.
Prior to the hearing before the independent referee, the
Locat:requested the right to examine the IP and certain
other International officers, but Freeman refused to. ap-
pear because “in the final analysis [he] would have to
make a decision in the case.” The charges were prosecuted -
by IBEW General’ Counsel Sherman, but were limited .to
the strike of June 16, as Sherman withdrew the charges
relating to April “for-the purpose of expediting the pro- _
ceeding.”” On July 25, the referee reported his findings to
the IP that the Local had gone out on strike on June 19°
andacontinued the strike without requesting or receiving
© ®
?
Ww
r
2 27
consent of the IP, that this was a work stoppage requiring
the IP’s permission, that by his telegram of June’ 15 the
IP had refused his consent, and that this fact was known
in sufficient time to have canceled the strike.
After hearing:atgument from’O’Doherty and Sherman
on July 28, the IP indicated his view that Local 28 was in
violation of the Constitution, but deferred his decision
pending further review. His decision, prepared with the
advice of the General Counsel, Sherman, and rendered on .
August 1, concluded that Local 28 had deliberately and
willfully violated the IBEW Constitution. He ordered the
Local’s charter revoked, its jurisdiction transferred to a
new local union, and appropriate legal steps to collect and
administer or distribute the Local’s assets and trust funds.
‘He Uirected that the order should take effect on August 7,
unless, in the meantime, the members took anew the [BE W
Oath of Obligation, terminated the strike, and agreed to
refer all unresolved collective bargaining issues to the
Council for final and binding decision. His direction added, -
“it being understood that the Local shall not be required’
to accept the Council clause ruled terminable by Chief
Judge Thomsen [in the Local 28 ve Md. Chapter” case]
decided May 16, 1961." Copies of the order were mailed
to*all members of Local 28). with a letter from Freeman
explaining the action that must be taken to comply and
the consequences to the Local and its members: of failure
_to comply. — a .
On August 2, Local 28 noted its appeal to the IEC from
we by decision. On Atigust 5, by a vote of 991 to 2, its
°
17. The text of this order is set forth in 197 F. Supp. at 104 n.4.
28
&
members supported the officers in their defiance of the
IP’s order. | a8 aa ‘
=
Meanwhile, on July 17, while. the independent referee's
hearing was in progtgss, Local 28iled an action in the |
District Court against the IBEW and the IP alleging
breach of the IP’s duty to the Local in the course he was
following regarding the strike, and that his intent was to
require the Local to surrender its autonomy. The District
Judge refused to issue a preliminary injunction. He found®
that no denial of procedural due process had been shown
by any fact all ed or presented at that time, and that it
chad not beer’ demonstrated that the appeal taken by Local
28 to the IEC woild be futile, delayed or otherwise un-
reasonable. He dismissed the complaint “without preju-
dice.” Local 28 v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99. Qn August)
14, the individuals’ complaint was filed in the District
Court in Parks, et al. v. IBEW.
j |
On September 12, 1961, Local 28’s appeal to the IEC
was heard.® Counsel was allowed to present argument and
read from depositions of F reeman and Geary with respect
to the IP’s good faith in revoking the charter. After sup-
plemental ‘briefs were filed, the IEC, on September 30,
affirméd the IP’s order in every particular, holding “beyond
question” that the IP had conducted himself properly in
revoking the charter. The District Court refused to find
that the IEC .was prejudiced. The reinstitution of legal
action by Local’28 followed on October 18.- °
‘ eo
Local 24 3
| ° r -. @
During July, before'the revocation, International Repre-
sentative’ Terry remained in Baltimore making himself
|
available to the members of Local 38 to explain the posi-,
tion of the International with? regard to gthe strike. On
August 27 a charter was granted to Local 24. The initial
membership, numbering about 30, adopted bylaws and
elected temporary officers. It included’a number of Local
28 members who had been supervisory personnel and offi-
cers of key members-of the Chapter, but who had resigried R
their offices in their companies. When permanent officers
were elected, hov ever, several hundred men had sjoined
Local 24.
In September, an agreement was reached between Local
24 and the Maryland Chapter for a 25¢ wage increase for
each of two years. This agreement originally contained é
the continuous. “yellow sheet” Council clause, but it Was »
deleted by IP Freeman who testified that he did s6 tog
make the contract accord vweth the court’s earlier ruling.
On October 27) Freeman wrote to each member of Local, =
28 stating the IBEW position that: members transferring -
to Local 24 would not lose their interest in the funds of 28.
As of March 31, 1962, Local 24, which was an oe Ny
union accepting all applicatiorss for membership from é
qualified electricians, ‘had some 1300 smembers,° of whom
_ 240 ‘had transferr@d from Local 28, Local 28 was a
“closed union,”, limiting membership to increase the’ em- ;
ployment opportunities of its members.”
.
18. The District Judge found that Local 24 had been from its inception and
continued to be dominated by the ternational. ‘On appeal Local 24 argued that
encouragement and aid in its establishment was an appropriate exercise of the -
International’s function.
The District Court found that two leading contractors of the Maryland
Chapter had cooperated with Terry, in the?formation of Local 24. On appeal
Local 24 argues that this finding and any legal consequences are matters within
the exclusive purview of the NLRB.
g
“¢
30 Peper Oks
II]. LEGAL DISCUSSION. °
Although courts are. generally reluctant to roe ay A
internal union matters, at common law they have, never-
theless, established various norms to determine the legality
and fairness of union disciplinary action. Professor, now
Soliciter General, Cox has commented that a number of .
broadly procedural requirements have been .imiposed upon
union actien by the .state courts As the District Court -
found,, the few: published decisions touching upon -issues
involved in the revocation or suspension of a local union’s
_ charter have generally taken the view that the procedural
requirements governing the expulsion or suspension of an -
individual member likewise govern revocation or suspen-
sion of a local’s charter. Although many of’ the decisions
‘addressed themselves primarily to procedural aspects of
fair hearirig, there is no indication against a carry-over
19. “Upon the theory that improper expulsion violates the, member’s interest
in the organization’s property or a contract between hint and other. members
thade up of the constitution and by-laws or, in recent years, upon the ground:
that there is a tortious interference with an advantageous relationship,Sthe
state will set an expulsion aside upon any of five grounds: wa
“(1) The procedure v.vlated the union's constitution or by-laws.
“(2) The constitution or by-laws did not authorize expulsion for the a
offense. . w-
“(3) The procedure, althouglf it conformed to the union’s constitution ana
by- laws, did not afford the member a fair hearing.
“(4) The expulsion, although it was authorized by the union’s constitution
and by-laws, was unreasonable” contrary to ‘public policy,’- or contrary to
‘natural justice.’ '
“(S$) The expulsion was in bad faith because the purported ground was
only a pretense for getting rid of a troublesome mefnber.”
Cox, “Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,”
58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 835-36 (1960). Accord, Cox, “The Role of Law in Pre- °
serving Union Democracy,” 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 615 (1959); see Sherman,
“The ‘Individual Member and the* Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,”.54 Nw. L. Rev.
803, 820-21 (1960) ; Summers, “American Legislation ,for Union Democracy,”
25 Modern > wm 4 273, 279-83' (1962) ; see generally, Summers, “The Law of
31 ;
to include the more substantive of Professor Cox’s five
requirements.”° | .
While these standards for judicial intervention were .
developed under state common law, it was appropriate for
the District Court to. aecept Professor Cox’s formulation
as a guide for decision in these cases arising under federal
aw. The Supreme Court has told us that in fashioning
federal law in suits brought under, section 301i upon col-
lective bargaining agreements, “state live: 1f compatible
with the purpose, of § 301, may be resorted to in order: to
find the-rule that will best effectuate the federal “policy.”
Textile Workers vz Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957).- It has’not been suggested if this case that the
same may not be done in suits based on “contracts * nas
between * * * labor organizations.” In addition, it Is ap-
w . 7
Union, Disciptine : What: the Courts Do ip Fact,”. 70 Yale L. J. 175 (1960);
Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Bev. 1049
(1951) ; Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397 (1952). wi
20. See Ellis v. AFL. 48°Cal. App.2d 440, 120 P.2d 79 (1941); Hatch v.
Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 233 Il. App. 495 (1924);
Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128 N.F. 704 (1920) ; Mixed Local v.
Hotel & Restauran? Employees International, 212 Minn. 587, 593, 4 N.W.2d
771, 775 (1942); Naylor zw. Harkins, 11 N.J> 435, 94 A:2d 825 (1953) ‘affirming
issuance of a preliminary injunction), 32. N.J. Super. 559, 571, 109 A.2d 19, 26
(App. Div. 1954), ordering a permanent injunction and. r@ersing, 27 N.J. Super.
594, 99 A.2d 849 (Chancery, Div. 1953); Mayer @. Liutcheson, 18 N.Y.S.2d 691
(Sup. Ct.), reversed oa other grounds, 260 App. Diy. 130. 20 N.Y.S.2d 698 ©
(1940), aff'd 285 N.Y. 832, 35 N.E.2a 501 (1941); Moore <. Moreschi, 179
Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S.2d 208, aff'd without opinion, 265 App. Div. 989, 40
N.Y.S.2d 334 aff'd with modifications as to scope of injunction, 291 N.Y. 81,
50 N.E.2d 552, modified according to mandate, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 4602
(1943) ; Shrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1948), 192 Misc.
603, 81 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1948), 194 Misc. 138, 86 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1949) ; Inter-
national Union of Operating Engincers wv Pierce, 321 S.W,2d 914, 918, 9190
(Tex., S.@ 1959) ; Washington Local Lodge No. 104 v. International Brother- .
hood of Boilermakers, 33 Wash.2d i 68-71, 203 P.2d 1019, 1058-59 (1949) ; see
also, Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1403 (1952); 87 C.J.S. Trade Unions
(1954) § 45. . *
2
32 a
,
propriate for federal courts, relatively inexperienced in
handling interna! union cases, to look to existimg state law
concepts in applying the new provisions*of the LMRDA.*
) .
The District Court’s Opinion |
In deciding the merits the District Court specifically
held that -Local 28 called the June strike in violation of
Art. XVII, § 13 of the IBEW Constitution, which re-
quired the IP’s authorization, and that the Local failed to
take the opportunity available under Art. IV, § 3(2) and
Art. XVII, § 13 of the IBEW Constitution, to appeal to
the IEC from the IP’s determination that this was a strike
requiring his consent. In addition, it held that when the
IP later revoked Local 28’s charter, as he was empowered
to do, see Art. IV, § 3(8).6f£ the IBEW Constitution, he
was motivated in part by a legitimate desire to punish the
Local and its members for conducting an unauthorized
and forbidden strike.
The court nevertheless concluded that the IP’s action
’ breached his and the Intefnational’s fidyciary obligation
to Local 28 under the International Constitution, and
thereby also violated rights of the Local’s members which
are protected by the LMRDA.
First, the District Court held that the revocation hear-
ing was not‘fair because the IP was not an impartial and
é
_ 21. Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact,”
70 Yale L.J. 175, 176-77 (1960); see Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
. Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 78-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); cf.,
Highway Truck Drivers\Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617 (E.D..Pa.),
aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 284°F 2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 833 (1961).
®, °
33
.a
‘
unbiased judge. Although the IEC was’ found to be un- *
biased, the court concluded that the.review by that body
did not cure the defects in the initial proceeding for the,
review was appellate only and rot a trial de novo. Second,
the court held that the IP’s action had been partially moti-
vated by “improper reasons,” in breach of his and the
International’s fiduciary obligation owing under the In-
ternational: Constitution. Finally, the court concluded that
the sanction imposed was unreasonable and unjust under
all the circumstances’ in that the rank and file members
had been innocently caught in the middle of a dispute
between the leaderships of the Local and International.
eS
N 7
Obligations Of and To IBEW
or .
While clearly correct in its recognition of the theoretical
basis for judicial intervention, we think that the court
erred*n applying these principles to the facts it had found.
Althougli there is no hint of ‘corruption and-the court spe-
cifically declared that there was no sufficient evidence that
the IP was moved by “express or particular malice, i.e.
ill-wiii, Spite, a grudge or a desire to be revenged on a 4,
particular person or persons, resulting in a deliberate, in-
tention to. commit an injury,” it nevertheless*held that
the IP “did act willfully and intentionally, for the purpose,»
inter alia; of imposing severe’ discipline on the members of
Local 28, and without due regard for the duty he owed
to them, as well as the IBEW as a whole. In that sense
his action amounted to legal malice.” 203 F. Supp. at 309.
The primary basis for the holding of “legal malice”
‘was that the IP had acted f¥om “mixed motives” to im-
pose the discipline.
e
34
2
What are these “mixed motives”? The court found that
though the IP had acted “to maintain necessary union
discipline” (Jd. at 308) and was iintainted by express or
particular ‘malice, ill-will, etc., he had improperly moved
“to.rid himself of troublesome leadership in the Baltimore
_ _ area, and to discipline the members of Local 28 for their
refusal to agree to submit. their disputes to the Council
and for having brought several suits against him and the
IBEW.” Jd. at 308. The wrongful ingredient in the
“mixed motives” cannot be that the IP acted to rid him-
self of troublesome leadership or to discipline members ;
he is .clearly empowered to do both of “these things—
especially in response to an unauthorized strike; as the
court ifself recognized. The. imputed impropriety rests on
the court’s finding that the IP was moved not only by the
unauthorized strike but also by the fact that the plaintiffs”
had earlier brought suits challenging the International and
refused to submit disputes to the Council. It is plain that
the court’s decision is almost, wholly based upon a belief.
that because of the manner in which the International re-
sisted thegt-ocal’s will in collective bargaining, it breached
its fiduciary obligation to the Local and its members. This
| needs to be examimed.
Before discussing the propriety of the intervention by
the International in the Local’s collective bargaining, it
is appropriate to note that the District Court found that
the IP had been motivated in part by a legitimate desire
to discipline the Local, its members and officers, for having
engaged in an urf@ithorized strike even after his repeated
orders ‘to return to work.
The calling“of a strike is such 4 momentous step»in a
labor controversy that it is usually subjected to strict con-
35.
g
trol by international unions.” The strike is a weapon that.
can bring an employer to his knees; but .the effect on the
employer can be too devastating for the union’s own good.
In addition, a strike can result in undue loss of produc-
tion, harmful to the public, and a strike can waste a
union’s funds and otherwise weaken it in jts continuing
effort to better its adherents’- wages and working condi-
. tions.
-
over the ee ‘apon assures that generally only intelli-
gent and responsible use will be made of it after the greater
interésts Of the international and the general econe my-have
been considered. Such is the potential harm from indis-
ecriminate resort to strikes that Professor Summers has
commented that an international ts justine gin adopting
severe disciplinary measures, including ess indi-
c
It is widely ¥elt that vesting control in the international
‘a:
C
vidual members or revocation of a local yuu harter,
when an unauthorized strike has been undért: iken. Sum-
mers, “Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv.
yr Rev. 1049, 1065-606 (1951).
“The refusal to sanction the June strike cannot be said to
be a breach of a fiduciary duty owed the plaintiffs under
the Constitution. If the IP believed that an appropriate
Council clause could be negotiated and that Tocal 28 was
excessive in its demands and “shooting for’the moon,” it
was his*prerogative to restrain the Local, and if possible
to counteract its headstrong determination to wage a strike
that could adversely affect the cause of his international
% *o =
22. Barbash. Labor's Grass Reots (1901) pp. 150-51; Letserson, American
Trade Union Democracy (1959) p. 321; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the
Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L. J. 1460, 1462 (1962).
6
3 _&
+ 36 a
&
organization.” -His duty was to 750,000 members, not
merely to a few who might gain a short-range advantage
that could prove costly to the parent body, the employers,
the. public and, in the long run, Yo the plaintiffs them-
selves.** The International was dealing day by day with
many chapters of NECA and the International's relations
with NECA were important to the welfare of all 150,000
who worked in the construction industry. ;
Severe measures were taken against the Local, but only
after full opportunity had been given the strikers, first to
comply with the IP’s back-to-work order and later, in the
revocation decision itself, to redeem themselves. That this
may be the first instance in which this International re-
voked a logal’s charter for going out on,an unauthorized
strike is not particularly relevant, since there is apparently
23. The District Judge found that jin refusing consent to the strike “the IP
was * * * primarily moved by a desire to acquire and retain as much control
as he cold over the negotiations .with the Maryland Chapter, because he dis-
trusted Eveson, Beckhardt and O'Doherty and other leaders of the group that —
controlled Local g, as the result of previous difficulties * * *." 203 F. Supp.
at 302.
Under the International Constitution it cannot be said that the IP could
not legitimately desire to intervene in the negotiations. In addition, the District
Judge specifically held that thi§ was a strike requiring the IP’s consent and
that the IP’s refusal was not appealed to the LEC, 203 F. Supp. at 306, in
which case the plaintiff's have waived judicial review of this action of the IP.
Thus, while the refusal to sanction the strike must be taken as valid and can-
not be impeached directly, the re®ult of the court's decision is to impeach it
indirectly. The revocation was the lawful means chosen by the IP to termi-
nate the forbidden strike as well as to discipline the recalcitrants. -In the
circumstances it would seem to have been the only effective means to restore
industrial peace.
24. The District Court in fact observed that a_35¢ increase “would have
brought Local 28's scale about in line with neighboring cities, although it may
have been unrealistic in view of the strong non-union situation in Baltimore.”
203 F. Supp. at 302 n.24.
9
>
no precedent for the obdurate persistence of this Local
after ample warnings. | - ,
Although this court recognizes that in determining the
validity of disciplinary proceedings there is an obligation
to draw upon standards of fairness beyond those expressed
or embraced in the union constitution, much more is in
question here than the mere propriety of an act of disei-
pline., Even as formulated by the District Judge, the issues
invalve considerations ef basie union policy and struc:
ture. i.e.. how shall the power over collective bargaining
be distributed within the labor organization?
e &
What has been granted the pant body as its proper
yrovince in collective bargaining and what has been ‘re-
tained by the localperhaps it is more acctirate to put it
the other way: what has been retained by the parent and
what has been granted to the subordinate—is a matter of
internal govertiment resting upon the contract the local
and its members have made in accepting a charter irom
the parent. This court is advertent to the prevailing policy
favoring internal union democracy*” and, of course, it
recognizes that in appropriate cases courts may intervene
to redress grievances arising from the imposition of dis-
cipline upon locals or individual members; but, in the
absence of specific legislation, it does not lie within the
authority of a court to give effect to its general preferences
between international power,gnd local autonomy in mat-
ters of collective bargaining. Questions as to how rela-
o
SS
25. See the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et. seq; see also, e.g., Cox, “Internal
Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,” 58 Mth. L.
Rev. 819, 829-31 (1960); Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democ-
racy,” 25 Modern L. Rev. 273, 273-79 (1962).
ee Ber ae
m7]
tions ‘between an international and its local might best Be
regulated are for internal settlement er for Congress,
which possesses the legislative -power. ‘Judges lack -that
power even when they are convinced of the desirability of
. improvements in the law. =
{
~ Although state courts have traditionally exercised some
supervisory function over local-international relations,”
and the federal courts are now erapowered to intervene in
some afeas under a nomber of provisions of the LMRDA,
federal judges may not, on their own, cure whatever detficien-
cies they may think exist in the pattern the parties have
iashioned, | ray
In return for the strength the local gets from the inter-
“national it accepts a measure of international control,’
This is plainly spelled out in this Union's Constitution,
and as a rule such a structural arrarigement has been
- theighi iwcessaly itt the labor movement. As Professor
tarbash has written, “When a local union makes a col-
lective bargajning decision which seriously prejudices larger
interests in the union, these latter are to all intents and
purposes being excluded from a voice in a decision on
L)
&
26. See, e.g., Cohn, . “The International and the Local Uaien: "-11 N.Y.U.
Ann. Conf. Labor 7 (1958); Summers, “Union Schism in Perspective: Flexi-
ble Doctrines, Double Standards and Projected parle 45 Va. L. Rev! 261
(1959).
27. The Dicttict Court correctly. recognized that :
“The evidence in thé instant cases; however, makes it clear that those
[worthy] results {of the Council's service] have been achieved through a
tight control over the agreements of most lotal unions by the international
officers of the IBEW, particularly the ]P, at the cost of a large measure of
the autonomy of the local unions. The IBEW Constitution gives at least lip
service to the principle that the local unions shall Go the collective bargain-
° = ‘i Vv
> 39
se28
which (democratically ) they have a right to. be hdrd.
The broad mandate of power to the IP made by the
Union Constitution is designed to be used by him_to pro-
mot® such methods of collective bargaining as seem con-
ducive to the interests of the entire organization. If the
policy of the IBEW is to favor the Council device, or 1f
in the IP's discretion it seems suitable in a particular in-
stance, oc if-in his judgment an impending strike is not an
appropriate bargaining weapon, there is nothing in the
law that Sorbids his insisting that the’ local accede to his
judgment. When the IBEW's Constitution and its experi-
ence over the years are broaght into focus, such insistence
by the IP in this case could well have been thought by him
the only feasible method of accomplishing a peaceful and
proper solution of the dispute between I.ocal 28 and the
Maryland Chapter.
We have seen in the statement of facts how completely
committed the IBEW has been over a span of decades to
the policy of requiring its locals to bargain collectively
before the CIR, the chosen instrument for the resolution
of disagreements which could not be settled at the local
level. And it is undisputed that this policy has served the
ing for their members put it a > contains provisions which appear to author-
ize the control over the affairs of the local unions exercised by the IP.
“The provisions which shall be included in the constitution and ‘the policies
which shall be followed by the officers are matters for the union as a whole
to decide, subject to the restraints imposed by law. Federal courts may
impose such restraints only within the jurisdictional limits provided by Con-
gressional enactments, and must follow the policies established by the. statutes, _
as interpreted by authoritative decisions.” 203 F. Supp. at 310.
28. Barbash, “Power and the Pattern of Union Government”, 9 Lab. a! J.
628, 633 (1958); see also, Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship
Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1462 (1962); cf. Spitz, Democracy and the
Challenge of Power (1958) pp. 82-84. 4
t \*
-
/
:
~~
‘&
xz
40
parties. well over the years.” The IP, as a witness in court,
made no concealment of the fact that he favors Council
clauses in all agreeménts and that he has on occasion used -
pressure on reluctant locals to accept them, even to the
extent of ¢hreatening to transfer one local’s jurisdiction to
another.
Additionally, the conferences between IBEW, NECA
and Maryland Chapter officials, relative to the Council
and other matters of mutual concern, e.g., the meetings in
which it was decided not to appeal from the Dist¥ict
Court’s order ruling the 1958 agreement terminable, can-
not in fairness be cast in the sinister terms of a breach of
fiduciary obligation to the Local. Even as it spoke of the
International’s duty to the Local the court itself recognized
that “the officers of the International and of NECA: have
~~ e
29. During the trial in Local 28's action to determine the terminability of the
1958 agreement the court declared: ’
“I am not saying that the arbitration clause is not a very good thing. It .
obviously has been a splendid thing for the industry. It has prevented strikes
=
and the whole system is a good system.
7) * ¢- * * @
the years it has.done a fine job * * *,”
In its opinion the court said: @ .
“Certainly, it is highly. desirable that the local unions of the IBEW and the
chapters of NECA take advantage of the, services of the Council; the evi-
. dence shows that it has served all parties well over the years.” 194 F. Supp.
at 501-02. -' . ma
In the opinion under review the District Judge concluded that the wage
increases granted by the Council to the Local in 1958, 1959, and 1960 were:
~“ * * * not unfair-or unreasonable under ‘all the circumstances, including the
wage rates of comparable building trades in Baltimore, where unions are
not as strong as in Philadelphia, Wilmington and Washington.” 203 F.
Supp. at 299.
And most ‘specifically the court stated :
“I adhere to the view that the Council has served th® parties well over the
years. Wages have steadily increased, in line with other comparable build-
ing trades, and there have been remarkably few strikes.” 203 F. Supp. at 310,
« I do not make any criticism of the Council, * * * it is perfectly obvious over
a
vu
ts 4]
ast
‘
a common interest in the Council as a means of stabilizing
labor relations in the industry, which renders a large:
measure of cooperation between the two national organi-
zations reasonable and desirable.” 203 F. Supp. at 300
n:22.°°
ce
While there is talk by the plaintiffs of local autonoiny,
it is plain that under theeInternational Constitution the
‘Jocal can neither make r nor abrogate a collective ae re
agreement without the IP’s sanction. (Art. XVII, NS
11). That official is authorized to intervene in local nego= °
tiations at any stage and may ‘negotiate agreements cover-
ing the entire industry, thereby pre-empting the locdl’s
autonomy. (Art. XVIP, § 13; Art. IV, § 3(12)). The
. . é e |e . . . . . be
policy underlying this Union's Constitution and its prac-
tice has been to permit the International's intervention, if
that ‘is deemed nécessary tO prevent an infterruption in the
30. Findings that IBEW, NECA atid Maryland Chapter officials cooperated
in the founding of Local 24 by dissident members of Local 24 including super-
visory personnel of two employers who had resigned their supervisory positions
to take a more active part in union activities, were also a part of the res gestae
that led the court to hold that the IP acted with “legal or constructive makece.”
We are ‘of ‘the opinion that, in this industry where there is admittedly close
rapport between employers and the union and relatively free mobility between
the employer and ‘employee categories, the activities shown to have occurred
during the formation Sf the new kocal cannot be said to have breached a
fiduciary obligation owed by the International to the existing Local and its.
mem rs. e
ile not a breach of fiduciary obligation under the facts in this case, to
the extent that there may be employer domination of the new Local, as ‘com-
prehended under § 8(a)te) of the LMRA, 29. U:S.C.A. § 158(a)(2), tl
matter is for the Labor Board to rectify.
To qhe extent that members of Local 28 who hereafter join Local 24 may
be denied equal ‘re within Local 24, in violation of § 101(a)¢¥) of the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A, 8 411 (a) (1), the plaintiffs are complaining of matters
that may more properly be raised in new proceedings where concrete facts of
alleged specific denials of equal right to particular individuals may be adduced.
ef,, eg, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 ¢1961),
42
work when a breakdown has o¢curred in the local negotia=
tions. The durability of the Council evidences that partic-
ipation of the International is the accepted format of
collective bargaining in this industry.”
Here it was not misconduct or a violation of fiduciary
obligation for the IP to press for the reference of all .un-
resolved bargaining issues between the Local, and the
Maryland Chapter to the Council for final solutién. This
is all that the District Court found the IP had-told Geary,
NECA chief executive, that he would do. The IP's deci-
sion denying permission to strike and his revocation order
were corisistent with this. ;
One of the unresolved issues between the Local and the
Chapter was whether a Council clause should be included
in the collective bargaining agreement and, if so, what, its
scope should be. Even if it is assumed that at the time of
the strike the IP was irrevocably committed ? the impo-
sition on the: Local of. a “yellow sheet” ‘levergreen”
clause,” such a clause would do no more than-keep the
parties negotiating during a dispute instead of engaging
in industria} warfare. As Professor John T. Dunlop,
t
31. Although the general literature bearing directly on international. union
intervention in local negotiations is sparse, there are indications of a tendency
towar! increased international control in collective bargaining. .See Barbash,
Labor's Grass Roots (1961) 149-50; Leiserson, American Trade Union Democ-
racy (1959) 287-88; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the. Trusteeship Imbrog-
lio,” 71 Yale L. J. 1460, 1462-63 (1962) ; see also, Pierson, “Multi-Employer
Bargaining,” in Bakke, Kerr and Anrod, Unions, Management and the Public .
(1960) 343-49; Slichter, Healy and Livernash, The — of Collective Bar-
gain.ng on Management (1960) 927-30.
32. The evidence on this pelat | was conflicting. Although the District Judge
intimated that the IP was so committed, he made no specific finding to this
effect. See 203 F. Supp. at 298, 302 n.27, 304,
>
43
Cc : . . tte p
\ |
Chairman of the Department of Economics at Harvard,
University, a man vastly experienced in labor negotiation’
procedures, testiffed at the t “Prial:
~“The facts of life are that the parties really don’t
have much opportunity for divorce * * * and they
are going to have to work out an agreement before
a strike, or after a strike * * *.”"*
This being the reality of industrial life, it cannot be.said
by a court: that as a matter of law the IP overstepped his
authority or ‘ignored or breached his obligation to the .
Local by pressing for « stich a Council clause,
_ Without actually deciding the question, the District
Judge made known his belief that an “evergreen” clause,
making the “issue of termination justicible before the
Countil, would be illegal. He chose, however, to rest his
decision on the ground that, aside from the questions that
were debated concerning the “yellow sheet” clause, the
IP’s conduct was an attempt to usurp the Local’s role in
collective bargaining. .This court is of the opinion that
even assuming that an “evergreen” clause would be un-
ilaterally terminable under .§ 8(d) of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C.A. J ISB t it was still within the right of the
33. See also, Chamberlain, “Collective Bargaining and the Concert of Con-
tracts,” 48 Colum. L. Rev. 829 (1948); Kotif, “Labor Agreements n Collec-
tive Bargaining,” 6 N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. Lab. 1, 5-6 (1953); Summers “Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass,” 2 Buffalo
L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1952) ; Goldberg, “Labor Arbitration—A*Symposiwn: Intro-
duction,” 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 359-61 (1962).
34, See Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ;
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Ledge 751, IAM, 91 F,
Supp. 596, 603 (W.D. Wash.°1950), aff'd: per curiam, 188 F.2d 356 (%h Cir.),
IP to insist, as a matter of policy within the union organ-
ization, that such .a ‘clause be accepted. Even if we
assume the correctness of the District Court’s obitur dic-
‘tum that the “yellow sheet” clause was. illegal, in the sense
that it was tinenforceable, it was certainly not_so evil or
contra bona mores as to ‘vitiate the IP’s constitutional ”
powers to control colléetive bargaining. |
2
4 .
It has been argued, however, that the “evergreen” clause
is defective, perhaps: illegal, as a divestiture of the.statu-
torily protected power, of the union to strike. “The pres-
ence of economic weapons m reserve, ‘and their actual
exercise on occasion by the parties,” the Supreme Court
has said, “is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley Acts have recegnized.” ‘NLRB v. In-
surance Agents’ International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489
(1960).. But it is not the purpose of the law to ampose a
straight jacket on the format of collective bargaining or
to require that the partiێs always maintain economic: force
as an alternative. The Court has in fact recognized that
economic weapons may be relinquished, at least for a time,
and particularly in exchange for an agreement. 'to settle
disputes by arbitration, . see «Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); Teamsters Local v.
Lucas Flou¥ Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962),°° which is°
”
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821 (1951); cf., Boston Printing Pressnsen’§ Union v.
Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956), aff’d. 241 F.2d 787 (Ast Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957) ; Couch v. Prescolite Mfg. Corp., 191 F. Supp.
737 (W.D. Ark. 1961); In re Valencia Baxt Express, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 103
(D.P-R. 1961) ; but cf., Division 892 v. M.K. & O. Transit Lines, 210 F. Supp.
351 (N.D. Okla. 1962). (Holding, although a contract had been terminated -
arbitration could still be demanded in respect to the terms of the new contract).
35. There the Court stated that “the basic policy of national labor legislation
{is to promote the drbitral process as a substitute for econon¥ warfare.” Id.
at 103. es
the use of economic force.
45
-
+ ‘ we cay
om
the. touchstone of the practice of peaceful industrial self-
government. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577-82 (1960). ‘Submis-.
sion to the Council’ is not élasSical arbitration, but re-
sembles it sufficiently to. fall within the afbit of this
policy, >
Q ,
Even if
economié Aveapons perpetually, there is nothing in the law
- 7 E . .
union cannot be compelled to relinquish
“to suggest that it fhay not volantarily forebear from the.
use Gf force as long as it chooses to do so. At most, the
International can he said to have attempted to compel one
of its component bodies to do this. It is not for the courts
- to say that a superior union body cannot require its sub-
ordinate to look to high level bargaining Yather than to. -
2 .
°
‘Actually, adoption of the more stringent Council clause
would not surrender the strike weapon irretrievably; it
wotld merely fortify the provision in the Constitution
vesting control over this we: apon in the International. It
would remain within the power of the International to
‘restore the strike weapon to a local. The District Court
. found that “‘[t]he IP had given hi consent to a nui gber
_ of strikes where a Council clause appeared in the contract
* * *” 203 F. Supp. at-302 n.26. Apparently this was
done without disturbing the Council machinery. More-
-over, the International, could: work within the Council for
the termination of an “evergreen” agreement. The point
is that while the IP*can be said to have attempted to com-
pel the Local to forebear from resorting to the strike, the
IBEW its. . did not surrender the strike instrument. It’,
is not for the court to say that the International could not
put this restraint on its Local.
46 ;
z . ¢
It ‘should be emphasized that we are not called upon to
determine whether aad under what circumstances a per-
petual agreement between a labor organization. and an
employer may or may not be enforceable. What is before
us is an internal union agreement vesting extensive powers
in an international *body-——incliding the power. to veto the
use of the strike weapon by its local unions. It this Inter-
national insists that its locals shall “complete the collective
bargaining process before the Council, composed equally
of representatives of the International Union and of the
Employer Association, such insistence is certainly not il-
legal. Nor does it™become illegal if the International seeks
to etthance the stability of this system hy requiring that
not only proposed alterations in the collective bargaining
agreement but its termination as well shall be a justicible
sestte before the Council. The impact of the court’s deci-
sion in this case is to impose a method of collective bar-
gaining different from that contemplated in the Union
‘Constitution, long and satisfactorily used by employer and
employees. This it cannot do.
o
Earlier Sitits
The final purportedly improper ingredient in the “mixed
motives” was that, as the court found, the IP was partly
influenced to revoke Local 28’s charter because suits had
been brought challenging the authority of the IBEW,
without first exhausting available internal remedies. As
the basis for this finding the court cites the fact that the
IP had “stated publicly that he ‘hated’ the Landrum-Griffin
Act because it protected access to the courts by union
members.” 203 F. Supp. at 302, 304..This finding would
appear to relate-to an address made by the IP before the
60th,Convention pf NECA in October, 1961—two months
after the revocation order. |
——
v
PA
’
47
There were in fact three suits filed prior to. 1961—on
December 11, 1959, March 22, 1960, and apparently in
April, 1960. The last two were dismissed on November 9
and December 20, 1960, and the District Court found that
“(f]Jrom*August 1960 until March 1961*the relations. be-
tween local 28 and the International officers were appar-
ently friendly.” 203 F. Supp. at 299. The unauthorized
strike.did not occur until the middle of June, 1961, and
the Local’s charter was revoked by an order dated August
1.1961.
Accepting this finding of some relation between the
earlier suits and the IP’s actions, we think it may not be
given controlling significance over the array of valid and
legitimate motives shown and the court’s unequivocal find-
ing absolving the IP from Jexpress or particular malice,
i.e. ill-will, spite, a grudge, or a de&ire to be revenged on
a particular person or persons, resulting in a deliberate
intention to.commit an injury.” 203 FF. Supp. at 309." It
would bea distortion of the reéord to elevate this factor
to a posifion of pre-eminence, blotting out the permissible
reasons for revocation of the charter.”
This court recognizes that should it be demonstrated # an
appropriate case thit the basic reason for union discipline
was that the plaintiff had resorted to a court of law to
36. ‘This opinion has already demonstrated that other assailed elements of
the “mixed motives,” found by the District Court, were neither in fact nor
law improper. @
37. Compare the instant case with, e.g., Nelson v. Brotherhood of Painters,
Local 386, 47 L.R.R.M. 2441, 41 L.C. par. 16,755 (D. Minn. 1961); Moore v.
Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S.2d 208, aff’d without dpinion, 265 App. Div.
989,.40 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff'd with minor modifications, 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E.2d
352, modified according to mandate, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943).
y 48 *
?
secure his rights and that other reasons were mere shams,
such discipline wouldy most likely be invalid both as a
breach of fiduciary obligation and because it is prohibited
under §§ 609 and 101(a) (4) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 529 and 411(a)(4).% But such a case would be dif-
ferent front the present one. That the reasons given by
the IP for the revocation here are not shams is amply
established By the District Court’s reservation of the In-
ternational’s right to retry the leaders of Local 28.
Fair Hearing .
The common law clearly requires that, to be valid, ex-
pulsion of a member or a subordinate body must be ren-
dered after a “fair hearing.” See, e.g., Cox, “Internal?
Affairs of Unions Under-the Labor Reform Act of 1959,”
58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 835-36 (1960). The elements of
such a “fair hearing” often resemble constitutional due
process requirements and generally encompass full notice
and a reasonable opportunity to be heard—including the
right to present evidence and the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses.“ There is also a body of l@w
e |
—_—_—__——— ; ° »
38. See Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 191 F. Supp. 347, 351-52, 194
F. Supp. 664 (D. Del. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
1962). :
39. We reject the ae of, the defendant that since under the Constitu-
tion the Local agrees, t charter may be revoked without a hearing, the
hearing given by the IP be beyond challenge. At common law, and now
under the LMRDA, the requirement of a fair hearing exists regardless of
whether the Union Constitution provides that sanctions may be imposed with-
out any hearing. See, Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1410-13 (1952) ; § 101(a)
(5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 4ll1(a) (5). Br
40. See, e.g., Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do
in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175,°200-06 (1960) ; Cox, “The Role of Law in Preserv- 7
¢ ing Union Democracy,” 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 616 (1959).
.
. 49
requiring trial. of an accused before an unbiased tribunal.“
Some commentators seem to think that the courts should”
play a more active role in reviewing not only specific bias,
e.g., pre-judgment or use of discipline pretextuously, but
also built-in bias, e.g., combined prosecuting and judicial
functions and use of “yes men.” They have, however,
generally recognized either that the courts have not been
empowered to do this or that they are unable to reach such
bias for it “is an inevitable. product of the procedure
itself.”
s
The District Court, without passing on the question bf.
whether the IP had the authority to decide this case, held
“it was one which he should have referred to the IEC or
some other impartial tribunal * * *, [aS] the propriety of
his own action and his own good faith and motives in
_ refusing consent to the’strike and in preparing, filing and
pressing the charges were being calied into questicn.”* 203 -
F. Supp. at 307. This supposed defect was held-not to
have been cured by review by the IEC. Although the
court found th@ the IEC was not prejudiced, it held that
the review was in the naturg*pf an appeal, not a trial de ~ 4
novo. We do not agree that, on the facts in this case as
established in the court's findings, there was a procedural+
deféct in the trial before the IP justifying a court of law’
to‘interfere with and to overturn the action taken.
41. See Ibid; Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline? What the Courts
Do in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175, 204-05 (1960); Summers, “Legal Limitations
‘on Union Discipline,” 6 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1982-83 (1951) ; Annotation, 21
A.L.R.24 1397, 1425-28 (1952). —
42. Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union. Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1049, 1083 (1951); see Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democ-
racy,” 25 Modern L. Rev. 273, 288-89 (1962) ; Aaron, “The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 873-75 (1960) ;
Wollett & Lampman, “The Law of Union Factionalism—The Case of the
Sailors,” 4 Stan. L. Rev. 177, 213 (1952) ; Note, 48 Va. L: Rev. 78, 90 (1962).
50
ry
In’ the first place, the IP was clearly empowered, by the
International Constitution, to decide the issues involved
in the revocation proceedings and to revoke the Local’s
charter. The IP’ is empowered, as we have seen, “It]o
decide all questions of law, disputes or questions in con-
troversy however arising, all fis decisions being subj -ct
to appeal, first to the I.E.C. and then the I.C. * * *.” He
as also specifically authorized “le]ither to suspend or re-
voke the charter of any L.U., or have the I.S. reject the’
per capita tax from any L.U. that fails or refuses to
observe the laws and rules of the I.B.E.W." (Art. TV. §
3(2). (8)). And it is provided, in addition, that tiothing
+n the Constitution shall be construedto conflict with any
provision of Article IV, enumerating the powers of the
IP. (Art. FV, § 5).° ; ‘
The real basis for the argument that the IP was biased
is that he was, in a sense, both prosecutor and judge. It
is quite true that he ordered the charges to be brought
and conferred with the International's General C ounsel
in their formulation as well as in the preparation of the
revocation order. But it is also true that the basis ‘fon the
charges was that the Local had struck in defiance of his
repeated admonitions and had reiected his collective bar-
gaining orders.” And there can be no doubt that the
Constitution vested in the IP these combined prosecuting
and judicial functions.”
Although the charge was defiance of the orders that
the IP had issued, his actions in issuing the orders and in
42. It should be noted, however, that the initial factual inquiry was made,
not by the IP, but by a referee found by the District Judge to be “fair and
impartial.” 203 F.Supp. at 307.
¢?
51
their vindication were official not personal. If we are to
give effect to the District Court’s finding exonerating the
IP of “express or particular malice, i.e, ill-will,” ete. (see
203 F. Supp. 509), it cannot hessaid that in. ordering
charges to be brought he wi as acting to vindicate a
_ personal affront rather than the interesr’ot the Union.
m
It may well be theught desirable for unions to adopt
hearing procedures that keep trial functions separate, but
the federal courts are not empowered so to restructure
the disciplinary procedures of unions. Cf., Summers,
“Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” o4 Hary. 1.
Rev. 1049, 1083 (1951) (implied). Some unterns, like the
United Automobile Workers, have responded to the pres
sure for fairness in internal triai proceedings by establish-
ing, essentially yxtern: al to the union organization, inde-
pendent public review boards having the tinal word in
disciplinary matters." Such unions would appear to have
gone far to separate prosecuting and ultimate judicial
functions. But, in the absence of a ciear congressional
authorization, it is not for the federal courts to compel
such measures.“ This is, in effect: what the District
Court's decision has done.
43. See Brooks, “Impartial Public Review of Qutcrnal Coton Disputes:
Experiment in Democratic Self-Discipline,” 22 Ohio St. L. Rev. 8 (1961);
Oberer, “Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor. Some Reflections,” 58 Mich.
L. Rev. 55 (1959); Aaruof® “The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 874 (1960).
44. Professor Summers reports that Senator McClellan's proposal to require
that impartial arbitrators determine disciplinary matters was deleted from the
final draft of the LMRDA.. Summers, “American Legislation for Union, De-
mocracy,” 25 Modern L. Rev. #3, 289 (1902). Compare § 101(a) (65@® )- of
the McClellan Amendment, 105 Daily Cong. Rec. 5810 (April 22, 1959), Legis.
- Hist. of the LMRDA, Vol. II, p. 1162, verted 101(a)(5) of the LMRKDA,
29 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a) (5).
52
Separation of functions is not an absolute due process
prerequisite to fairness in administrative proceedings, see
2 Davis. Administrative Law Treatise § 13.02; in internal
union proceedings it traditionally, and under the LMRDA,
has also not been deemed a requirement of fairness.“
Courts. federal courts especially, are justified in ruling a
union tribunal biased only upon a demonstration that it
has been substantially actuated by improper motives—in
other words, only upon a showing of specific prejudice.
This element has-been found absent from the presént case.
Severity of the Sanction
The District Court showed a commendable concern to
protect those members #f Local 28 who refused to join
Local 24 against hardship-resulting from the charter rev-
ocation—a concern which carried over in favor of the
Local itself, though not its leaders. However attractive
the court’s solution may appear, we find no basis or
authority for the court to compel this distinction to be
made between leaders and rank and file. Moreover, in the
- circumstances of this case there evould seem to be no justi-
fication for permitting a retrial of the officers and léaders,
but befere another tribunal, and setting aside the action
against the Local and proscribing any retrial of it or
further proceedings based upon this offense.
The general membership cannot on this record be cast
in the role of blameless victims. If they were for a time
misled by their local leaders as to the IP’s refusal to
©
45. See. ex. Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democracy,” 25
Modern L. Rev. 273, 288-89 (1962); Aaron, “The Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 874 (1960).
53 :
authorize or approve the strike, it is undisputed yhat when
they later learned the truth they supported these leadets
willingly enough in flouting the International. ‘This they
did in disregard of the District _Judge's clear caution
given May 11, 1961, in open court ‘in the presence of sev-
eral hundred mem d despite three personal letters
from the IP sent/to each member. Upon the facts found
we cannot say that for their sake the sanction imposed
upon the Local must be nullified. The ‘itamediate result
might be an amelioration tor these members; in the long
view such a jadicial directive, even if permissible, could
break down their most effective organizational agency.
At all events, a court is not empowered to grant the dis-
pensation in this case.
46. “(The Court) Have you considered the fact that if you do ge on strike
or if you do refuse to go ahead with this policy which the International has
set up and which afb of the other local umons go atong with and strike
the International would very likely revoke your charter with whatever loss
there is.
“It would seem to me that they have either got to end this whole agree-
ment with these people or revoke your charter, one or the other.
“You are running an awiully close risk, and if you pgople understand that
eyou are running that risk if you go on strike and it you terminate the agree-
ment. without going thtough with this plan, what has certainly up to this
point been clearly demonstrated unless there is evidence to the contrary that
this is the plan and policy of thé Iaternational Union and that it has worked
out to the satisfaction of the Umon as a whole as well as to the employers
as a whole over the years.
“And you people yourselves have taken advantage of tic arbitration pro-
visions within the last three years. So that it is a matter which has been
gone ahead with.
“Now, at the present time I] am very much inclined to think that you have
a right to terminate, but once you terminate, I think you then can't expect to
come to the Court and ask for protectior against the International, if you
terminate and strike.,
“(Mr. O'Doherty) Yes.
“(The Court) Then you have great risks and you ought to do it with
your eyes open. I am not saying what the legal effect is, but it may be severe.”
v
0 84
Ill. secs oincsbanliy QUESTIONS
32
1ffaddition to the defenses” on the merits, the defendant
interposes a series of defenses on jurisdictional grounds.
We have deemed it better to defer the discussion of these
questions till now, when the reader has been made familiar
with the factual background.
Labor Management Reiations « Act Fr
As the basis for district court jurisdiction, ‘Local 28
relies upon § 301(a) of the L MR. \, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a),
which provides:
“Suits for violation of contracts between employer ,
and a labor organization representing employees in
an industry affecting, commerce as défined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United
States havitg jurisdiction of the parties, without re-
spect to va teenage in controversy or without regard
to the citiz¢nship of the parties.” (Emphasis added. )
4 g
Concluding that the Local’s suit was’based upon violations
of a “contract” (the International Constitution) between
“labor organizations” (Local 28 and the IBEW) as both
, terms are used in section 301(a), the District Court held
it had jurisdiction under that provision. Although the is-
, sue is by no means free from doubt, we are inclined to
agree.
_The Supreme Court has only recently focused its atten-
tion on the “between any such labor organizations” clause.
In Retail Clerks International Ass’n 0. Lion Dry G oods,
Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962), it concludéd that the word
“contfacts” as used in section 301(a) was not limited to
collective bargaining agreements but was broad enough
te-comprehend-strike settlement agreements, — In reaching
. ‘ ‘
this result the Court reasoned that the term “contracts”:
had to be broader than collective bargaining agreements,
otherwise the “between: any such labor organizations” |
clause would have been surplusage—which it was not—
for a collective bargaining agreement between a union as
‘an employer and another union as representative of em-
ployees would be a contract “between An employer and a
labor organization.” 369 U.S. at 20-27" So saying, the
Court cited with favor United Textile Workers v, Textile
Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958), a°case in
which the Court of. Appeals affirmed enforcement, under
section 301(a), of an AFL-CIO. sponsored no-raiding :
agreement between two international unions.
©
Although it is now clear that at least some “contracts,”
not. collective bargaining agreements, between at least
some types of “labor® organizations” are enforceable under
section 301(a), the Supreme Court-has not yet addressed
itself to the particular questions which eoncern us here,
namely, (1) whether, an international’s constitution is a
“gontract” within’ the meaning of section 301(a) and (2)
whether a local «nion and its international parent .are
“labor organizations” within the-meaning of that section.
There is almost no congressional history pertaining to
the “between any such labor organizations” clause. This
clause was inserted in section 301(a) in conference only
shortly before the bill’s passage, and there is nothing to
indicate what Congress specifically intended by its inelu-
sion. Plausible arguments have been made that the clause
.
4
56
should be interpreted as granting jurisdiction only over
-suits for violations of contracts that, like the AFL-CIO
no-raiding agreements, have been freely negotiated be-
tween wholly autonomous or separate labor organiza-
tions.’ This interpretation, opposing jurisdiction in suits
like that of Local 28, is fundamentally grounded in the
belief that Congress did not intend federal courts to be-
come entangled in contrdéversies within what is really a
single union organization, and that it would be inappro-
priate for them to act in this area." )
Congressional history relating to provisions of the 1947
LMRA, other than section 301(a), tends to negative a
congressional purpose to effect extensive and detailed stat-
utory regulation of internal union affairs.” This history
a a
47. See Meltzer, “The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over
Labor Relations : 11,” 59 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 297 n.287 (1959) ; Note, “Apply-
. ing the’*Contracts Between’ Labor Organizations’ Clause of Taft-Hartley Sec-
; tion 301. A Plea for Restraint,” O Yalg L. J. 299 (1959).
48. See Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine
Workers, 95 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Loca? 33, laternational Hod Car-
riers v. Mason Tenders District Gampcil, 186 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
aff'd on other grownds, 201 F.2d 498% 2d Cir. 1961); cf., Snoots v. Vejlupek,
8&7 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1949) ; Kriss v. White, 87 F. Supp. 734 4S5.D.N.Y.
1949).
‘Courts have also been concerned with pdssible conflicts between a broad
interpretation of the “between any such labér organizations” clause and the
Norris-LaGuardia and National Labor Relations Acts. See Local 33, Inter-
national Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders District Council, 186 F. Supp. 737
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd om other grounds, 291 F.2d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J. concurring specially) ; international Union of Doli Workers v.
_ Metal Polishers International Union, 180 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1960). See
also, Note, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 202 (1959). The problems of accommodating
the several labor statutes will be considered later. “
49. Provisions regulating¢t detail certain aspects of internal union affairs,”
by declaring, some acts to be unfair labor practices (thereby remediable by
the Labor Board), were deleted in the House-Senate Conference. See House
Rep. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, p. 46, in 1 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 550; 93 Cong.
Rec. 6859 (June 12, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 1623 (Senator, Tait,
Supplementary Analysis of the Labor. Bill as Passed, discussing § 8(b)(5));
wn
a
*
ee
- may only indicate that Congress did not mean at the time
to regulate by detailed substantive legislation enforceable
by the Labor Board the relations between individual mem-
bers and unions. Such a congressional purpose is not
necessarily inconsistent with a vesting in the—federal dis-
trict courts of jurisdiction to enforce contractual obliga-
tions agreed upon by an international and its locals.
The most that can T% said with certainty is that Con-
gress did not anticipate the problem. Looking to expres-
sions of congressional purpose in regard to other provisions
of the Act, it is possible to infer that had Congress con-
sidered, the problem it would have limitec section 301 (a)
jurisdiction so that federal courts would not thereby be in
a pogtign to settle such internal disputes. It is also pos-
sible, however, to conclude that Congress would have
_ deemed it appropriate for federal courts to exercise juris-
diction over such disputes because, as the present one, they
have traumatic industrial and economic repercussions. See
Q
Compare §§ 7 & 8, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157 & 158, with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. Ist
Sess., §§ 7(b) & &(c), in 1 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 49-50, 52-56; see also, 93+
Cong. Rec. 6443 (June 5, 1947), 2. Legis. Hist. LLMRA at 1540 (Senator Taft
on § 8(b) (5)) 3293 Cong. Rec. 6503 (June 6, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. LMRA at
1879 (Senator Murray, summary of differences between conference agreement .
and bill passed by Senate, discussing § &(b)¢5)). “
In addition, tg assute that § 8(b)(1)(A) of LMRA, 29 U.S.G@A. § 158 b)
(1) (A), did not interfere with union membership, policy, the proviso was added
that “this paragraph shall not impair the right of a ‘abor organization ta
prescribe ‘its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem
bership therein.” Sce 93 Cong. Rec. 4271-73 (April 30, 1947), 2 Legis. ‘Hid.
LMRA at 1139-43 (debate on proviso); cf, eg. 93 Cong. Rec. 4197 (April
29, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. of LMRA at 1097 (Senator Tait discussing what is
now § 8(a)(3)). ns
It should be noted that in 1959, with the passage of LMRDA, 29 U®.C.A.
§ 401 et seq., Congress did undertake extensive and detailed statutory regulation
of certain aspects of internal union affairs and organization.
-
\
58. Rare:
aa
§ 1(b) of the 1.MRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141(b)." Moreover
in interpreting the “between an employer and’a labor or-
ganization” clause, the Supreme Cotrt has consistently -
favored ,the broad view of section 301(a) jurisdiction.”
In ‘the absence of a clear. expresston of congressional
intention to the contrary, we consider it permissible to
adopt the more literal. interpretation of the “between any
such labor organizations” clause—sthe interpretation that
would support’ jurisdiction in this case.” + *
: mete ARE . ‘, : >
“4 Jocal union is a “labor organization” within, the defi-
i) ; ‘
' 4
50. It has been suggested that a holding, of jurisdiction under § 301 (a)
.
“would tend to promote at least two congressional policies. (1) A major pur-
pose of §,301(a) is to overcome state law jurisdictional difficulties and thereby
make unions Samenable to suits as entities’ and to subject their funds to judg-
ments for violations of contracts. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368
US. 502, §11-13 (1962). Section 301(a) juristictibn in cases like Local 28's
would make this responsibility more effective. (2) In 1959, with the passage
of the Labor Management Relations and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.A.°§ 401,
et. seq., Congress undertook extensive and detailed statutory regulatton of cer-
tain aspects of internal union affairs. It is suggested that even assuming the
LMRDA and § 301(a) may not be construed in pari imateria, it would servé
congressional policy to- construe § 301(a) broadly, thereby making a whole
remedy available in a’ federal cour@ when the same conduct inflicts injury,
adjudicable under LMRDA, upon individual members and also injury, not adju-
dicable uhder LMRDA, upon local unions. ,
51. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957¥; Retail Clerks
International Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962); Teamsters
Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,
371 U.S. 195 (1962). -
$2. See Local 33, International Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders District
~ Council,; 291 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1961); Local 2608, Lumber Workers, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. » Millmen’s Local 1495, United Brotherhood of
Carpente#@, 109 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Caf. 1958); see also, Burlesque Artists
Ass'n v.. American Guild of Variety Artists, 187 TF. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,”, 72 Yale
L.J. 1460, 1485-87 n.150°(1962).
¢
4
nifion of '$-2(5) of the NL RA, 29 U.S.E.A..§ 152(5). 2g
In addition, “contract” as used in section 301(a) should
be taken to include union constitutions. The Supreme
Court itself Has recognized that under state law this.is
~ the generally acce,ted characterization of union constitu-
tidns." : ‘
-
As we think our discussion of ‘de merits makes clear;
this court fully recognizes its weighty obligation not to
expand this initial grant of jurisdiction. into a carte blanche
for unrestrained judicial inventiveness: in the .areds of
union structure and collective bargaining policy. The fed-
eral courts, in exercising jurisdiction under this clause of
section 301(a), are basically réstricted to effectuating
existing congressional policy. Cf., “Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U:S; 448, 456-57 (1957). Qur dis-
agreement with the decision under review is not‘on the
question of section 301(a) jurisdiction to entertain actions
for alleged breaches of inter-union contracts; but we take,
the view that Congress has: not addpted the substantive
policies upon which the court’s decision on the merits was
prédicated. It does not lie within a federal court’s power
or djscretion to remake the cohtract by dintroducing even
salutary provisions not Weiensayrty prescribed or neces-
° sarily saeco
.
o
53. See NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 124 F.24 SP (Othe Cir. 1941),
aff'd, 318 U.S. 9 ( (1943) : : cf? NLRB v. ‘Highland Park Mfa. Co., 34¥ U.S
322 (1951).
oe ,
54. International Ass'n of Machinists c. Gonsales, 356 U.S. 617, 618-19
(1958) ; see also, Cleveland Orchestra Committee v. Cleveland’ Federation oj
Musicians? 303 F.2d 229, 230 (6th Cir. 1962); Rosen v. District Council No. 9,
198 F. Supp. 46, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
be]
60.
Jurisdiction to Issue an Injunction in Suit of |
Local 28—Effect of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
The defendant next argues that even if initially there |
is jurisdiction under § 301(a) of the LMRA over Local »
28’s suit, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § ‘101,
et seq., denies the. District Court jurisdiction to issue an
injunction, in this dispute. .The’ District Court held that
the case of the Local does not fall within the classes set
forth ir section 4° in which injunctions’ are ‘absolutely pro-
hibited, and that the case did not involve a “labor dispute”
as used in section 7 and as defined in seé¢tion., 13(c)s
Acknowledging that the issue is debata! ie, we agree with
the District Court’s conclusion that, notwithstanding the
Norris-Il_aGuardia Act, jurisdiction would exist in a proper
case to issue a mandatory injunction.
‘
§5. The relevant provisions of the, Norris-LaGuardia Act include: Section
1, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101: © ;
“No court of the United States * *.* shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformity with the provision
‘of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or per-
«manent injunction be issued cortrary to the public policy expressed in this
chapter.” '
Section 4, 29 U.S.C.A. § 104:
“No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving
or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined)
from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: [Em-
phasis added] )
“(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any rela-
tion of employment ;
“(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor ‘organization or of
any employer organization * * *; .
.- ** © & @ ‘
“(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts
heretofore specified; and
°
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed it-
self to the problem of accommodating the “between any
such labor organizations” clause of § 301(a) of the LMRA
and the Norris-l_aGuardia Act, it has said enough to pro-
<2
.
“(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified * * * .”
Section 7, 29 U.S.C.A. § 107, provides that an injunction will ial lie in any
case growing out of a “labor dispute” except after aneadversary hearing where
there is testimony in support of the Jeeations of the complaint to the erfect—
(a) That unlawful and illegal acts have been thre: ateneg and will be car-
ried out unless enjoined ;
“(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant's property
will follow :
~ “(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted
upon complainant by the glenial wr relief than will be inflicted upon defend-
ants by the granting of relief; he
“(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
“(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complain-
ant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.”
Section 8, 29 U.S.C.A. § 108, provides that fo injunction shall issue unless
complainait has made’every reasonable attempt to settle the dispute-—including
negotiation, government-sponsored mediation or voluntary. arbitraticn.
Section 13, 29 U.S.C.A. § 113, contains definitions :
“(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when
the case involves persons who are, engaged in the same industry, trade,
craft, or occupatior; or have a direct or indirect interest therein; * * * or
who are’ members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or
employees, whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or
associations of employers ‘and one or more employees or associations of «
employees; * * * or (3) between one or more employees or associations of
employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when
the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a ‘labor dispute’
(as defined in this section} of ‘persons participating or interested’, therein
(as defined in this section).
* * © * * a
“(c) The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the dispu-
tants stand in the proximate relationship of employer @nd employee.”
62
‘>
«
vide useful* guide lines for disposition of the issue as it
arises in this case.”
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 Ud. 448
(1957), the Court first recognized the broad scope of fed-
eral court jurisdiction that Congress had granted under
§ 301(a) of the LMRA. Holding that an arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement was enforce-
able ynder section 301(a), the Court also held that, not-
withstanding the prohibitions and requirements of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, a mandatory injunction would lie
to compel arbitration. The Court pointed out that histor
ically arbitration was not one of the acts, listed in Norris:
LaGuardia § 4, in respect of which the power to enjoin
had been abused,” and that in fact Congress indicated, in
section 8 of the Norris-l.aGuardia Act, its policy of favor-
ing labor arbitration. It was held, moreover, that there
was no policy justification “for restricting § 301(a) to
,
‘
———— A
90. Preliminarily, it should be noted that the Act does not apply to all cir-
cumstances in which, on its face, it might be thought to apply. We know that
injunctions have been upheld which were issyed (1) to compel arbitration,
Textile Workers. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) ; (2) to enjoin a strike
by a railway union over “minor disputes” cognizable by the Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, see Brotherhoud of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indi-
ana RR, 353 U.S. 30, 39-42 (1957) ; (3) to compel an employer to bargain with
a certified union, Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 562-63
(1937) ; and (4): to compel a union to per@rm its statutory duty of fair rep-
resentation, Graham v. Brotherhood of Railroad Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237-40
(1949) ;-Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
57. In the recent case of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S: 195, 212
(1962), the Court distinguished the situation involving an injunction directed
against a strike, in violation of- a no-strike clause, from Lincoln Mills on the
grounds that in Lincoln Mills “—a mandatory injunction to carry out an agree-
ment to arbitrate—did not enjoin any one of the kinds of conduct which the
specific prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew from the injunc-
tive powers of United States Courts.”
qlee
a
63 Li
damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract
to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural
requirements [of § 7] of that | Norris-laGuardia] Act.”
353 U.S. at 458. %
The injunctive relief sought by [Local 28—restoration
of its charter, ete.—may also be said not to be “a part and
parcel of the abuses against which the Aet,”’ as indicated
by the specific matters listed, in section 4, was directed.
353 U.S. at 458. Here, likéwise, the injunction sought
would not have the proximate effect of “prohibit[ing]
any person or ‘persons participating or interested in such
dispute * * * from doing * * * any of the” acts listed in
section 4. (29 U.S.C.A.°§ 104—emphasis adde).
J .
The crucial question remaining is whether the Local's
case involved a “labor dispute” as detined in section 13(¢)
and used in section 7. If so, that section’s procedural re-
quirements precedent to the issuance of an injunction were
not met in this case and the injunction should not have
been granted. There is little doubt that at its root this
controversy is concerfed with a “labor dispute” as liter-
ally defined by section 13 of the Act. But this case is no
more directly concerned with what is a “labor dispute”
than was Lincoln Mills, yet there the Court held that:
“Though a literal reading might bring the dispute
within the terms of the Act [citation omitted], we
see no justification for restricting § 301(a) to dam-
age suits, leaving specific peg formance of a céntract
to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite pro-
cedural requirements of that Act.” 353 U.S. at 458.
Up
64 ¢ ,
See also, Sinclair Refining Co. vz Atkingpn, 370 U.S. 195,
212; id. at 219 (Justice Brennan's formulation to the
%
same effect ).
Of course, in its decision the Court also relied on its
view that there is a cl@ir congressional policy favoring
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes.
It cannot be said with complete confidence that there is
similarly a clear congressional policy favoring federal
court enforcement of inter-union contracts of the character
at issue in the Local 28 case. But, if it is held (see pp.
54-59 supra) that Congress by section 301 (a) did conter
upon federal courts jurisdiction over such suits, it would
be as inappropriate here as it would have been in Lincoln
Mills to insist upon the stringent procedural requirements
of section 7 when manifestly the matter here enjoined
“was not a part and parcel o1 the abuses against which
the Act was aimed.” 353 U.S. at 458.
Pre-emption and Primary Iurisdiction
Problems in the Local’s Suit
The defendant further contends that the complaint of
Local 28 involves matters arguably subject to § 7 or § 8
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 and 158, and is there-
fore, under San Dieyo Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959), subject to the Labor Board’s exclu-
sive primary jurisdiction. Although phases of the Local's
case involve an alleged breach of the IBEW Constitution,
defendant argues that the case is also arguably concerned
with unfair labor practices. And because the same basic
facts and contentions provide the foundation of both
types of possible actions, the defendant argues that the
a.
65
c
District Judge, despite his efforts, could not separate the
various elements of the case.” :
— Recently the Supreme Court held that in cases under the
“between an employer and a labor organization” clause ot
section 301 thg presemption doctrine of Garmon is not
relevant, regardless of whether the employer's coffluct is
arguably or concededly an unfair labor practice within the
Labor Board’s jurisdiction.” Since we have reached the
conclusion that the District Court had jurisdiction over
this suit under section 301(a), we think it not inappro-
priate to conclude further that the teaching of these deci
sions is applicable here.” Cf.. United Textile Workers &.
Textile Workers Unien, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir, 1958);
Lecal 33, International Hod Carriers 7. Mason Tenders
District Council, 201, F.2d 496, 502-05 (2d Cir 1961)
ae
58 The District Court held that ite was not recnred wholly te yield to the
jurisdiction of the Labor Board. Specitically the court held that at had ne
jurisdiction in Local 28's case “to decide whethes the Marviand Chapter tailed
to bargain in good faith,” 203 F Supp at 2030 or whether the TREW “eon
spired with and encouraged the Maryland Chapnes not to hargain tairly,” 1
at 203, or whether “the International attempted to Soerce the members of Local
* . ‘ -
28 in the exercise of the rights protected by sec 7° * *° Jd at 208 n 11
59. Smith v. Evenmag News Assn. 371 US. 198 (I%2) sce Charles Dowd
Ror Co. v. Covrtney, 368 U.S S02, 513 (1962): Teamsters Local > Lucas Flour
Co, 369 US. 95, 101 nO (1962): Atkinson > Sinclar Refining ¢ -
. 238, 245 n.5 (1962); see also Tertile Workers * Arista Vol ;
533 (4th Cir, 1951) agit
13 F 2d 829
0 The recent Supreme Court decisions mvolved the “between an emplover
and a labor organization” clause; it 1s there fore nece ssary te review the policy
considerations that justify applying the Smith rule to the “between any such
labor organizations” clause of § 301/a)
First, it is clear that Congress did not mean to authorize the Labor Board
to concern itself generally with matters of internal union discipline and struc
ture. Seg n.49, supra; see also, e.g, International Association of Machinists ©
Gonsales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). J
. While it is very possible that some of the tacts may be
invoked as the basis for both types of controversies, this
does not mean that the District Court in an appropriate
case must yield the full measure of its jurisdiction. and
await the Board’s determinations.. At most, the court
must merely avoid “affect{ing] the jurisdict on of the
N.L.R.B. to remedy unfair labor practices as su-h.” The
District Court did all that could be required of it by gen- |
erally avoiding decisions tantamount to findings and con-
clusions ay to whether or not unfair labor practices had
been committed.
Parks: Cause of Action
As to the Parks case the International argues that it
should have been dismissed for tailure to state a claim
entitling the plaintiffs to reliet under §$§ 101¢a) and 609
—_————$—
£
Second, there can be no doubt that, just as the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements has been left to the courts, see ( harles Doud Bex Co
vt. + APS OSD, $13 (2942), most matters directly concerning interna!
union activities, insofar as they are regulated at all, have been left to the
courts. See Gonzales, supra; Bussey v. Plumbers Local No. 3, 286 F.2d 165
(10th Cir. 1961); Kekont v. Shochtay-Garos Union, Local 446, 205 F. Supp.
284, 291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1962), Rodertson » Banana Handlers Local 1800, 183
F. Supp. 423, 425-26 (E.D Louisiana 1990) ; see also, Highway Truck Drivers
Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617 (ELD. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 284
F.2d 162 (3d Cit. 1960), cert. demed, 365 U.S. 833 (1961) (implied). ‘
61. Teamsters Vocal y Lucas Flour Co. 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962); cf.,
Burlington Truck ‘ines, Inc. v. Umited States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962), the Court
stated that “[i]i * * * there are situations in which serious problems will arise
whieh Amount
67
of the LMRDA, 29 ULS.C.A. §§ 411 (a) and 529." To
resolve this question it is necessary to determine whether
the order of revocation “otherwise disciplined” the Local's
members within the nteaning of sections 101 (a )( 5)" and
600." So far as we can determine, this question is one
of first impression. The phrase, “otherwise disciplined,”
i. not defined in the statute and a review of the legislative
history has not revealed any particular meaning attached
to it by Congress. Finally, there have heen few decisions
construing this phrase," except as it may relate to the
°
62. This, of course, is not strictly a jurisdi€tional challenge but rather an
att@k on the merits. Rell 2 Hood, 327 U.S. 678%, @B2 (1946). Jurisdiction
over this cause is. founded on § 102 of the LMRDA, 29 US ¢ AS 412, which
provides that: ;
“Any person whose rights secured hy the provistotis of this subchapter have
heen, infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil getion
in a district court of the United States for such relret Cine lnding myunetions)
as may be appropriate.”
Section 09, 20 U S.C ASS 52% provides that
“The provisions otf section 412 of this title shall be applieable an enforce
ment. of this. section.”
63. “No member of any labor organization may be fined suspended, ex-
pelled, or otherwise discipimed except for nonpayment of dues by such orgam-
zation or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served
with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his
defense: (C) afforded a full and fair hearing ~ ( Emphasis added)
64. “It shali be unlawful for any labor organization, or any “officer, agent,
shop steward, dr other representative of a labor organization, or any emplovee
\ thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or othertetse discaplme any of its members
for exercising any ‘right to which he 1s entitled under the provisions of this
chapter. * * * " (Emphasis added.)
63. Cases in which it was held that the plaintiffs were “Otherwise disct-
plined”: Detroy v American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir),
. cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961), reversing on other grounds, 189 F. Supp.
373 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) : Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, 194 F Supp. 187 CE.D.
Pa. 1961) ; 205 F. Supp. 284, 289 CE.D. Pa. 1962); Duluhery v. Marine Cooks
Union, 199 F. Supp. 270, 273 (S.D. Cal. 1961), Gross © Kennedy, 183 F
Supp. 750, 755-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
Cases in which it was held that the plaintiffs were not “otherwise disci
plined”: Seeley v. Rratherhood of Paiters, 308 F.2d 52. 58-60 (Sth Cir.
2A
« removal of officers.”
We are disposed to: the view that the plaintiffs have
stated claims under the Act. While it is true that the rev- <
ocation order directly affects only Local 28, not the in-
dividual plaintiffs, it would seem unduly technical to say
that if the revocation were invalid and indirectly resulted
in injury, to these individuals, they may not be heard, to
complain under the LMRDA. On this point there are
some helpful precedents in the state courts. At common
law, examining the practical effect of revocation or sus- (|
pension of a local’s charter, they appear to have taken the /
: position that such action disciplines the local’s members.” /
And, in the absence of a clear congressional purpose to
the contrary, in construing the Labor Reform Statute we
cannot disregard the practical impact of this revocation
on the individual members. Bey =
4
eae ecanesaiel
Ne
—— n the present case, the IP's order does affect the indi-
viduals in their status as members of the union.” That is,
1962) ; Allen ». Armored Car Chauffeurs Local 820, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J.
1960). L
66. See, e.g., Sheridan v. United Brotherhog of Carpenters, 191 F. Supp.
347, 352-53, 194 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D. Del. 1961), reversed, 306 F.2d 152,
156-57 (3d Cir. 1962) (only Kalodner, J. for reversing on this ground) ;
Mamula v. Local 1211, United Steelworkers, 202 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
. »’
67. See Modre v. Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 485, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 208, 216, aff'd
without opinion, 265 App. Div. 989, 40 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff'd with modifications as
to scope of injunction, 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E.2d 552, modified according to man-
date, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943); see also Washington Local
a , Lodge No. 104.%. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 33 Wash.2d 1,
68-71, 74-75, 203 P.2d 1019, 1058-59, 1061 (1949); Hatch v. Grand Lodge
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 233 Ill. App. 495 (1924) ; Gardner v. |
Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128 N.E. 704 (1920).
68. This is undoubtedly a factor for consideration in determining whether
challenged action constitutes “‘other discipline.” See, e.g., Seeley v. Brother-
hood of Painters, 308 F.2d 52, 58-60 (Sth Cir. 1962).
‘
Pol
69
¢
although there is some uncertainty as to how the members’
rights in the various local and international pension and
welfare funds will be affected, there can be little doubt
that the revocation order does touch these rights. In addi-
tion, as a_preximate result of the International’s action,
members of Local 28 have suffered a loss of employment
opportunities.” “a ;
In alleging that by revoking the Local's chartet the IP
“suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined” the mem-
bers without.a full and fair hearing, the plaintiffs stated
a claim under section 101 (a)(5).° They also made suff-
cient allegations to state a claim that by revoking the
Local's charter the IP acted, in violation of section 609, °
to “suspend, expel, or otHerwise discipline” the members
for exercising rights to which they were entitled under
the provisions of. the LMRDA-—-specitically the right to
hring suit guaranteed by section 101(a)(4). The plain.
tiffs’ failure was in the proof of their claims. .
°
o
69. This is also a relevant factor. See Detroy v American Guild of Variety
Artists, supra; Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos U'nion, supra: Gross v Kennedy,
supra; but cf. Allen v. Armored Car-Chanffeurs Local 820, supra
70. It would appear that, regarding this section, the District Court based
its decision in part upon the conclusion that the hearing was unfair not only
procedurally but also in that the IP had breached his fiduciary obligation and
had imposed an unduly severe sanction—-thus, the court has read substantive
guarantees into the’ “fair hearing” requirement See l ion Trusteeships: A
Report to the Congress, U.S. Dep't of Labor, BLMR (1962) 131; Anderson,
“Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale LJ. 1460, 1482
(1962). Having held, on the merits, that the IP neither breached his fiduciary
obligation nor imposed an unduly severe sanction. this court will reserve judg-
ment on the mooted question of whether § J01¢ a)(5) protects substantive or
merely procedural rights.
wo
70
Possible Conflict Between Parks Action
and NLRB Jurisdiction
Another jurisdictional point advanced by the IBEW
is that the District Court was required, even in the Parks
action, which is based upon the Bill of Rights provisions
(Title 1) and § 609 of the LMRDA, to deter to the exclu-
sive primary jurisdiction of the Labor Board, because at
least elements @i the case are arguably subject to § 7 or
§8 of the NLRA. See San Diego Building Trades Council
’ vy. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). The District
Court was entirely correct in declaring this challenge to
ig Jarisdiction “unavailing.”
The LMRDA has created new federal rights to be en-
joyed by union members.” These rights are to be enforced
in the federal courts. See 8 102 of the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C.A. § 412; Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
Artists, supra. The fact that the Act preserves to union
members all remedies “under any State or Federal law or
fore any court or other tribunal * * *,” § 103 of the
LARRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 413; see also § 603(a), 29
U.S.C.A. § 523(a), only means thai the new federal pro-
tection was superimposed on protection already available
in other forums, “reinforcing and not supplanting it.”
Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the
Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175, 176 (1960). This
does not mean that the District Court must abstain from
exercising its jurisdiction under section 102 when elements
of the matter at issue are arguably subject to the Labor
71. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 236 F.2d 75, 78 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union,
Local 205 F. Supp. 284, 291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Roberts v. Banana
Handlers, Local 1800, 183 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Louisiana 1960).
Board’s jurisdiction.” Congress did not intend that be-
fore securing the rights it made enforceable in federal
courts, individuals should wait for the Labor Board to
pass upon such matters as might also be within its com
petence.™
_ Obviously, since\§ 102 of the LMRDA, 29 ULS.C.A,
§ 412, expressly provides that relief may include injunc-
tions, the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia \ct are
inapplicable.
Title 111 of the BL” Trusteeships
The plaintiffs assert that by revoking and reissuing the
charter conveying IBEW jurisdiction in the Baltimore
area, the IP achieved the same objectives as he might
have attained through a. formal trusteeship and his action
should therefore be held to have constituted the imposition
of a trusteeship.** So denominating the IP's action, the
plaintiffs reason that the trusteeship provisions of the
ILMRDA have been violated.”
72. See Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, Local 446, 205 F. Supp. 284, 290-92
(E.D. Pa. 1962); Robertson v. Banana Handlers, Local 1800. 183 F. Supp. 423
(E.D. Louisiana, 1960); cf., International Association of Machinists v. Gon-
sales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Bussey v. Phombers Local No. & 286 F.2d 165
(10th Cir. 1961) ; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). And in
our own circuit, cf., Textile Workers >. Arista Mu’> Co. 193 F. 2d 529, 533
(4th Cir. 1951).
73. See Robertson v. Banana Handlers, Local 1800. supra; cf, Rekant &
Shochtay-Gasos Union, Local 446, supra; International Asseciation of Ma-
chinists v. Gonzales, supra; Bussey v. Plumbers Local No. 3, supra
74. Section 3(h) of the LMRDA defines a trusteeship as “any receivership,
trusteeship or other method of supervision or control whereby a labor organi-
zation suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under
its constitution or bylaws.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 402(h).
75. Section 302, 29 U.S.C_A. § 462, limits the lawiul reasons tor which a
trusteeship may be imposed.’ Section 304(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 464(c), provides
-
in t ;
72
Preliminarily, a question to be determined is whether
the District Court was empowered to exercise jurisdiction
over this private action for alleged violations-of Title IIl
of the LMRDA, The* jurisdictional, provision of Title
III, § 304(a), 29 UA.C.A. § 464(a), provides that:
/
‘2
_ “Upon thy” written complaint of any member or
subordinate body of a labor organization alleging that
such organization has violated the provisions of this
title (except section 461 of this title) the Secretary
shall investigate the complaint and if the Secretary
finds probable cause to bgheve that such violation has
occurred and has not been remedied he shall, without
disclosing the identity of the complainant, bring a
civil action in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the labor organization for such
relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.
Any member or subordinate body of a labor organi-
zation affected by any violation of this subchapter
_ (éxcept section. 461 of this title) may bring a civil
action in any district court of the United States hav-
ing jurisdiction of the labor organization for such
relief (including injunctions ) as may be appropriate.”
‘ &
Several district courts have interpreted this to mean that
individual members or subordinate bodies may not bring
a civil action until full resort has been had to the adminis-
that a trusteeship will be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months only
if “established by a labor organization in conformity with the, procedural re-
quirements of its constitution and bylaws and authorized or ratified after a fair
hearing either before the executive board or before such other body as may be
provided in accordance with its constitution or bylaws * * *.” .
“.°
trative remedies available before the Secretary of Labor.”
In_a litigation involving I-ocal 28 and the .IBEW, prior
but’ pertinent to the present one, District Judge R. Dorsey
Watkins had occasion to pass upon this very question.
After a scholarly analysis, he concluded that, at least until
the Secretary of Labor. does bring suit, a private action
‘can be maintained under § 304(a) of the LMRDA. Ex-
ecutive Board, Local 28 7. IBEW, 184 F. Supp. 649, 653-
59 (D. Md. 1960)."7 In this well reasoned view that
section 304(a) does not require recourse to that particular
administrative remedy and action of the Secretary before
a private suit may be entertained, this court coneurs,
Upon review of the evidence, however, Judge Thomsen®
concluded that while it is possible for revocation to be used
as a means of evading-the trusteeship provisions of Title
IlI> it was not proven that revocation was so used.” Al-
though the question is exceedingly close, see Anderson,
“Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship [mbroglio,” 71
Yale L. J. 1460, 1478-85 (1962), this court is not per-
” suaded that the District Court’s disposition of the trustee-
ship question should be overturned.
76. See Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F. Supt, 300, 304-06 (S.D. Cal. 1960);
Flaherty v. United Steelworkers, 46 L.R.R M. 2483, 3006, 41 1.C. par. 16,517
(S.D. Cal. 1960); Cor v. Hutcheson, 204 F. Supp. 442, 446 05.) Ind. 1962) ;
Risso v. Ammond, 182 F. Supp. 456, 471-72 (DN J) 19)
77. Accord, Vars v. International Bhd. of [ert rmakers, 204 F. Supp. 245,
246-47 (D. Coni. 1962) ; see Palisades Lodge No. 173 7 Brotherhood of Ratl-
way Clerks, 47 L.R.R.M. 2605, 41 L.C., par. 16,666 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (by im-
plication) ; see also, Anderson, “Landrum-Griffn and the Trusteeship Imbrog
lio,” 71 Yale L J. 1460, 1498-500 (1962). Note, 48 Va. .. Kev. 78, 96-97 (1962).
78. At least two naocae appear to agree that revocation and reissuance
of a chamer should, atgheast under some circumstances, be held to constitute
the imposition of a trusteeship. See Horowitz, “Possible Effects o1 LMRDA’s
Provisions,” in Symposium on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (1961), egited by. Slovenko, 458, 563; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin
74
Exhaustion of Internal Remedies—in Both Suits '
™ v
The defendant maintains that both actions should have
been dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust the
reasonable internal remedies that were available to them.
Having filed their suits over a year ago, both Local 28°
and the individual plaintiffs, failed to appeal to the Inter-
national Convention which met this past September aiter
the appeal in this case was argued. In addition, the indi-
vidual plaintiffs in the Parks suit never did appeal to the
IEC from the IP’s revocation order.”
We think that the individual plaintiffs need not have
been actual parties to. the proceeding before the LEC. They
were not themselves direct parties to the revocation order
or proceedings and, since the two cases, Local 28's and
Parks’, are based upon a’common foundation, Local 28's
appeal to the IEC preserved the rights of the individuals
who now challenge the revocation order.
Plaintiffs” failure to appeal. to the Convention did not
bar disposition of the cases by the District Court. ° Al-
though there is a common law doctrine that parties are
not entitled to judicial relief until they have ®xhausted
. - e.
and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L. J. 1460, 1478-85 (1962). “fing
Department of Labor adopted the position: i
“that a revocation of a charter, properly conducted and in accordance with a
labor organization's constitution and bylaws, does not create a trusteeship. * * *
The Department has also determined that nothfng in the Act prevents the
creation of a new local, even though it may be composed primarily of the same
individuals formerly belonging to the trusteed local that had its charter re-
voked.” Union Trusteeships: A Report to the Congress, U.S. Dept..of Labor.
BLMR (1962) -33§4.
79. In the earlier injunction proceeding brought by Local 28, Judge Thomsen
denied relief &ince the Local had not pursuéd the available internal remedy
before the IEC. Local 28 v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99, 107-08 (D. Md. 1961).
NJ
4
©
intra-union remedies, there are a number aw ell-recognized
exceptions “which have substantially qualified if not nulli-
fied the rule.” Exceptions are recoznized when resort to
the internal appeal would be unreasonablysburdensome. be-
cause of delay likely to result in irreparable injury.”
In addition to the common law doctrine, as qualified by
its exceptions, there is now § 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA,
20 USCA. § 411(a)(4).% The Second Circuit has
squarely held that the proviso in section 101 (a) (4) is ap-
plicable as a limitation on jurisdiction in suits brought in
the federal courts under section 102 for violations of Title —
| of the LMRDA, Detroy 7. American Guild of Variety
Artists, 286 F 2d 75. 77-78 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 306
U.S. 929 (1961). Not only does section 101(a)(4) gov-
ern the exhaustion! question in the Parks action, but since
it provides an authoritative expression of congressional.
labor policy, it is, insofar as it may modify the common
law exhaustion doctrine, a prime source upon which the
court should draw in forfnulating the federal law in decid-
ing the Local’s case. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
80. Summers, “i Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1049, 1086 (1951) ; accord, Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286
F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 ,U.S. 929° (1961): see also, Cox, “The
Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,” 72 Uarve L. Rev. 609, 614-15
(1959).
81. Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union .Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Rev
1049, 1086-92 (1951); Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the
Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale’ L. J., 175, 207-10 (1960); Annotation, 168
A.L.R. 1462, 1468-82 (1947). . <
: ©
82. “No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereot to
institute an action in any court, or in proceeding before any administrative
agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officer: are
\ x
The four-month limitation in the proviso. has been
subjected to various interpretations.” We agree, however,
with the District Court’s conclusion that “whatever con-
struction is placed” on this proviso (230 F. Supp. at 296),
~ these suits are barred neither by the statutory limitation
nor by common law exhaustion doctrine. When these suits
were brought, all internal remedies, available within four
months of revocation, had been exhausted. To insist upon
full exhaustion of remedies would be to impose an un-
reasonable delay in the adjudication of plaintiffs’ rights
and would-result in irreparable harm to plaintiffs.”*
CONCLUSION p
Parent unions have played a useful role in bringing a
measure of order and stability to the labor market. Per-
haps their best contribution has been in restraining their
component bodies from reckless resort to work- stoppages |
and strikes. If in some quarters abuses have,arisen that.
require correction, there should be legislation. But courts
, should not step in and, in order to achieve immediate objec-
tives thought to be desirable, establish a rule that locals
may with impunity defy their parent unions and strike at
will. By the judicial application of ad hoc standards, in in
named as defendants or respondents i in such action or proceeding, 2s Provided,
That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing proce-
dures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization,
before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations
or any officer thereof * * *.”
83. Eg., compare Detroy, supra, with Harris v. International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, Local 1291, 205 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
84. See Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in
Fact,” 70 ‘Yale L. J..175, 208 (1960); see also Cox, “The Role.of Law in |
Preserving Union Democracy,” 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609 614 (1959). °
\ 7
the pursuit of what is called democracy in union govern-
ment, we will have succeeded only in introducing, not de-
mocracy, but chaos. ‘Fhis would not only tend to disinte-
grate the iabor movement, but the irresponsibility thus
generated could have serious implications for employers
and others as well.
We conclude that while the consolidated cases are within
the court’s jurisdiction, there was no sufficient basis for
holding that the [REW or its IP breached a fiduciary obli-
~ation to Lo@al 28 or ifs members, or that the hearing was
\. :king in fairness, or that r&ocation was an unduly severe
sanction. The Local’s claim based on breach of contract
under the Taft-Hartley Act therefore fails and the charter
revocation did not violate the members’ rights under §§
191(a) and 609 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 411{a)
and 609.
We are not unmindful that the interests of the members
of Local 28 in the various local and international pension
and benefit funds have been made uncertain by the févo-
cation. Whether the International or the Local has title
to the Local’s funds and other,assets was not litigated in
these cases and we do not pass upon this.” We note, how-
ever, that the revocation order anticipated the Interna-
tional’s taking steps to assure that the members of Local
28 will not. suffer unnecessary“féss of financial benefits.
Moreover, there is no indication that the rank and file
members of the outcast local will be unable to preserve
their memberships in the IBEW. by accepting the invita-
tion extendec them to join Local 24 or by transferring to
some other local.
a
78 °
The District Court's decision must for the reasons
stated be reversed, and the case is remanded for further
orders consistent with this opinion.”
Reversed and remanded
Sorer, Circuit Judge, dissenting :
- The power of the District Court to entertain these suits
is clearly demonstrated in the concluding portion of the
court’s opinion, and with this conclusion I concur. How-
ever, the ultimate conclusion of the court, reversir,y the
judgment of the District Court, involves an endorsement
and approval of the conduct of Freeman, the all-powerful
president of the IBEW, in trying and punishing Local 28
and its members, and with this conclusion I am obliged to
dissent, since the behavior of the IP was plainly at vari-
ance wi established principles of due process and fair
play. The opinion embraces the theory that “basic union
policy and structure” require that the dominant power be
lodged in the parent body and’ pursues this theme so
steadily in the course of an elaborate discussion that in
the end little head is given to the arbitrary manner in
which the IP exercised his power.
85. Of possible interest in this connection are Cohn, “The international and
the Local Union,” 11 N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. Labor 7 (1958); Summers, “Umon
Schism in Perspective: Flexible Doctrines, Double Standards and Projected
Answers,” 45 Va. L. Rev. 261 (1959) ; Note, “Disposition of Union Assets on
Disaffiliation,” 45 Va. L. Rev. 244 (1959) ; Annotation, 23 A L.R.2d 1209 (1952).
86. If this court should be in error in any of these conclusions, we are of the
opinion that the order of the District Court still requires revision. While the
revocation would be void, the International should, in that event, be given the
opportunity to retry the Local before a. properly constituted tribunal.
a o\
?
a
79
A brief resume of the conduct of fhe IP, based upon
undisputed evidence, demonstrates to‘ my mind that the
District Court was correct in finding that the local union
and its members were denied their fundamental rights.
The IP was a stern and resolute individual, determined
to have his own way not only when he was executing the
powers conferred upon’ him by the constitution of the
IRE V but also in those areas in which the local union
members were entitled to some freedom of choice. His
attitude toward anything that tenued to diminish his power
is shown by a public statement in a speech in 1961 at the
convention of -an association of electrical contractors
known as NECA. He said that he “hated” the Landrum-
Griffin Act. The fact that Congress itself deemed it neces-
sary to formulate a bill of rights for the protection of the
individual workers found no favor in his eyes. Accord-~
ingly, it is not surprising to learn that the Local had much
provocation from the IP himself when it ventured to strike
without his consent. The current labor dispute involved
two major items—a demand of the workers for an increase
in wages of 35 cents an hour in place of an increase of 2
cents an hour offered by NECA, and a determined stand
by the Local in opposition to the insertion of a “council
clause” which would strip the Local of its power to termi-
nate a contract at the end of the year and lodged the
power of decision in the CIR.* In this dispute the IP
promised the Local his support, but in tact he worked in
harmony with NECA. He tried hard to persuade the Local
togdopt the obnoxious clause and alse to accept a raise of
10 cents an hour recommended by the IEC although he
®The District Court held in an earlier suit brought by the -Local against the
Maryland Chapter of NECA, 194 F. Supp. 494, that the Local had the right to
terminate the contract at the end of the year; no appeal was taken from the
decision.
$U
was aware that the Local had obtained contracts with a
number of independent contractors entitling the workers
to an increase in wages.of 35 cents per hour.\ In order to
break the strike the IP brought in workers from outside
the State, and persuaded union men in other trades not
to respect the Local’s picket line. The IP was angry with
the union because it would not do his bidding and it Is
obvious that instead of supporting the Local in the dispute
he used his weight in support of the employing contractors.
It was in this attitude and under these circumstances
that the IP came to judgment. He had the right under
the IBEW constitution to institute charges against the
Local for striking without his consent and also the right
to sit in judgment in the case. He exercised both rights.
He appointed a referee to hear the charges preliminarily
but reserved to himself the final decision. He had to de-
cide wiherehe should condemn the Local for striking
without his consent and without his orders and what
punishment, if any, he should inflict. He was not obliged
to hear the case himself since, under the constitution ot ~
the International, it could have been referred to the IEC,
a body of international officers appointed to govern the
union between meetings of the international convention.*
He knew that he had opposed the working employees and
favored NECA in.the negotiations that preceded! the strike
and that his own conduct was one of the matters that
should be taken into consideration in deciding: the case.
Indeed, he was aware that he ought not to sit im the case,
for he refused to submit to examination as a witness, say-
ing that he could not be a witness because he had to make
*The appeal was taken in this case to the IEC but, as the District Judge
pointed out in his opinion, the IEC did not try the case de novo but upon the
record made up by the IP.
a
81
‘ ‘
the ultimate decision in the case. Nevertheless, he did sit;
and again he gave evidence that he was not bound by any
rules of fair play, for during the trial he did not hesitate
to confer with the prosecuting attorney out of the presence
of the attorney for the local union.
In view of this narrative, it is futile to suggest, as does
the opinion of the court, that “the real basis for the argu-
ment that the IP was biased is that he was, in a sense, both
prosecutor and judge.” The trier of the cause in an in-
ternal union dispute or in an administrative proceeding
does not cease to be a judge because he is empowered also
to act as prosecutor. He may not ignore the established
principles of due process in order to obtagn his own ends.
. .
It is plain that the IP was not qualified to pass judgment
in Yee case and, particularly, to determine the kind of pun-
ishment to be inflicted for violation of the union rules.
This is shown not only by what is set forth above but also
by the extremely severe punishment which he inflicted upon
the local union and its members by revoking the Loeal’s ©
charter, as is shown in the opinion of the District Court.
This was the only case in which the IP had refused his
consent to a strike by a Local union. when it desired to
strike in order to maintain its position in a legitimate labor
dispute. Not only did the IP withhold his consent to the
strike in the instant case, but, when the strike took place
against his will, he imposed the severest discipline within
his power: Under all these circumstances it Is improper
to approve the actions of the IP especially in these days
when the rights and constitutional ‘safeguards of a person
accused of crime and of a person convicted of crime are
so meticulously observed. One would suppose that the
same protection should be afforded a lawabiding working
man even if, in the exercise of his-rights of collective bar-
‘ 82
gaining, he exceeds the bounds of propriety. For these
reasons: and those expressed in the opinion of Judge
‘Thomsen I dissent. See Calabrese v. The United Associa-
tion of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada,
_et als. (D.N.). December 21, 1962)
83
LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT
$2, 29 U.S.C. $401 (Declaration of Findings. Purposes
and Policy):
(a) The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it con-
tinues to be the responsibility of the Federal Government
to protect employees’ rights to organize, choose their own
represéntatives, bargain collectively, and otherwise engage
in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection,
that the relations between employers and labor organiza-
tions and the millions of workers they represent have a sub-
stantial impact on the commerce of the Nation; and that
in order to accomplish the objective of a free flow of com-
merce it is essential that labor organizations, employers, °
and their officials adhere to the highest standards of re-
sponsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs
of their organizations, particularly as they affect, labor-
management rc iations. +, ae
\ ;
(b) The Congress further finds, from recent investiga-
tions in the labor and management fields, that there have
been a number of instances of breach of tr
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