Respondent Brief in Opposition — Pfeiffer Electric Co. v. Texas
Supreme Court brief1963
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Yn the Supreme Court of the Wnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1962
No. 838
CHARTER WIRE, INC., PETITIONER
v. age
Unirep States oF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIOKARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The findings of fact, discussion, and conclusions of
law of the district court (R. 147-161) * are not offici-
ally reported. The opinion of the court of appeals
(Pet. 21-27) is reported at 309 F. 2d 878.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on November 28, 1962 (Pet. 28). The petition for
writ of certioran was filed on- February 16, 1963,,
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).
14R” references are to the appendix to the petitioner's brief
in the court of appeals.
870001—63 (1)
2
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, on the facts of this qse, the courts below
correctly held that certain payments by the taxpayer-
corporation to its stockholders were not payments of
interest on indebtedness within the meaning of Section
23(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and Section |
163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, but non-
deductible dividend distributions.
STATEMENT &
&
The taxpayer is a Wisconsin corporation engaged
in the business of drawing and rolling Wire. It was
formed in 1946 to take over the assets and business
of a partnership composed of three iYdividuals. In
exchange for the assets of the’ partnership, each of
the partners received a portion of $66,805.74 in prom-
issory notes (representing the book value of the trans-
ferred assets)... In exchange for a total of $680, each
partner received the same percentage of the corpora-
tion’s stock as the amount of the notes that partner
received bore to the total of the notes distributed.
The former partners became directors and officers of
the new corporation and remained directors and off-
cers through the years in question. The parties main-
tained proportionate holdings of stock and notes. (R.
148-151; Pet. 22-23.)
From March 1947 to Mareh 1954 the stockholders
subordinated their notes to obligations arising from
corporate bank borrowings. Interest was paid regu-
larly on the notes, except that in 1947, in order to meet
taxpayer’s trade obligations and because of a desire to
maintain its record of discounting bills, the directors
3
voted to suspend payments of such mterest, which were
in fact suspended for a three-month period, (CR. 151-
153; Pet. 23-24.)
In 1953, taxpayer negotiated for the hiring of J.
Willard Marshall for an executive position, Mar-
shall was interested in coming with the taxpayer only
if he were allowed to buy an interest in it. He was
allowed to buy stock, and, after a suggestion that he
make a loan to the corporation, he did so and received
a note in an amount which bore the same ratio to the
total amount of all the notes outstanding as his share
of voting stock bore to the total voting stock then
issued. (R. 154-155; Pet. 24.)
In 1954, the outstanding notes, which had a matu-
rity date of January 31, 1956, were replaced by a new
issue of notes with a maturity date of January 31,
1960, and which contained new and different: terms
(R. 155-156; Pet. 24). |
During the vears 1952, 1953, 1954, and 1955, the
taxpayer paid to the shareholder-noteholders a total
of $15,489.38 and deducted the payments as interest on
its tax returns (R. 148). The Commissioner's deter-
mination that the payments represented dividend dis-
tributions rather than interest was sustained by the
distriet court (R. 158-161), and the court of appeals
affirmed ( Pet. 21-28).
ARGUMENT
The decision of the court below is correct and is
not in conflict with any other decision, It affirms
the district court's finding that certain transfers of
assets and money made to the taxpayer-corporation
4
‘by its shareholderg in exchange for corporate notes
were capital investments rather than loans, and that
purported interest payments made by the corpora-
tion to the shareholders in fact represented non-
deductible dividend distributions.
In so holding, the court below applied the prinei-
ples established by this Court in John Kelley Co.
v. Commisstoner (decided with Talbot Mills vy.
Commissoncr), 326 U.S. 521, that the question
whether an advance by a stockholder to a corpora-
tion represents a loan or a capital contribution is
essentially one of fact (326 U.S. at 526) and that
“[t}here is no one characteristic, not even exclusion
from management, wh ch can be said to be decisive
in the determination of whether the obligations are
risk investments in the corporations or debts”’ (326
U.S. at 530). See also P. M. Finance Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 302 F. 2d 786 (C.A. 3); Brake & Electric
Sales Corp. v. United States, 287 F. 426 (C.A. 1);
O. H. Kruse Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, 279
F. 2d 123, 125-120 (C.A. 9); Gilbert’ v. Com-
missioner, 248 F. 2d 399, 406-407, and 262 F. 2d 512,
513-514 (CLA. 2), certioran demed, 359 U.S. 1002;
Gregg Uo. of Delaware v. Commrssioner, 239 F. 2d
498, 501-302 (C.A. 2), certioram denied, 353 U.S.
946: Rowan v. United States, 219 F. 2d 51, 55
(C.A. 5); Arlington Park Jockey Club v. Sauber,
262 F. 2d 902, 905 (CLA. 7): Commissioner ¥.
Meridian & Thirteenth R. Co., 132 F. 2d 182, 185
(C.A. 7): Note, Thin Capitalization and Tar Avotd-
ance, 55 Columbia L. Rev. 1054 (1955): Goldstein,
Corporats Indebtedness to Shareholders: “Thin
ra.
+
i
Capttalization”’ and Related Problems, 16 Tax L.
Rev. 1 (1960); Hellerstein, Planning the Corpora-
tion, Seventh Annual Tulane Tax Institute 416, 429
et seq. (1958). ‘The form of the purported loan
transaction ix not determinative of the question, and
the taxpaver has the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderanee of the evidence that the advances were
not risk investments. John Kelley Co. v. Com-
misstoner, supra, 326 U.S. at 530; P. M. Finance
Corp. v. Commissioner, supra, 302 F. ial at 789; O. H.
Kruse Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, supra, 279
F. 2d at 125; Arltngion Park Jockey Club v. Sauber,
supra, 262 F. 2d at 905; Gregg Co. of Delaware v.
Commissioner, supra, 239 F. 2d at 502; Gilbert v.
Commissioner, 262 F. 2d 512, 513 (CLA. 2), certioran
denied, 359 U.S. 1002; Gooding Amusement Co. Vv.
Commissioner, 236 F. 2d 159, 166 (CLA. 6), certioran
denied, 352 U.S. 10381; Matthiessen v. Commissioner,
194 F. 2d 659, 661 (CLA. 2); NSechniteer ¥. Com
missioner, 13 T.C. 43, 60, affirmed per curtam, 183 F.
2d 70 (CLA. 9), certioran demed, 340 U.S. 911.
The evidence recited i detail by both courts below
warrants the district court’s conelusion that the
‘notes’? issued by the taxpayver-corporation to its
shareholders evidenced an equity interest rather than
a genuine creditor interest. and consequently that the
‘‘interest” paid to the stockholders represented non-
deductible returns on a capital investment. The
original notes were received by the stockholder
officers for all the physical assets of their prior part-
nership transferred to the corporation. Notes were
held proportionately to stockholdings and proportion-
' 6
ate holding of stock and notes was carefully main-
tained when I. W. Marshall was allowed to pur-
chase an equity interest in’ the -corporation. The
stockholders disregarded the terms of the notes when
their interests™?ts2 stockholders | and officers could
otherwise best) be served. Thus, interest was de-
forred in 1947 when the corporation was short of”
cash; the noteholders subordinated their notes to
bank loans: and, when the corporation was engaged
in improving and expanding its operations, the ma-
turity date was extended, a provision for automatic
maturity on the death of the holder was removed,
mb the interest rate was lowered, The dealings with
J. W. Marshall, culminating in his purchase of stock
and a note, clearly retleet that the stockholders con-
sidered the contributions represented by their notes
as part of the eqautv capital of the corporation. The
holding of the court below (Pet. 21-27) that) the
totality of the facts indieates “a risk-eapital invest-
nent is clearly correct.
Taxpacer’s arveument that certain formal eriteria
should be adopted to determine when an instrument
Isa debt obligation (Pet. 12-15) should be addressed
to Congress, not te this Court. [ndeed, as taxpaver
hetes, proposals for such legislation have been sug,
vested, but until such time as Congress sees fit: to
change the law, the decision as to whether advances
to a corporation are in stbstance capital contribu-
tions or loans depends upon all the facts im the par-
theular case, ne one of them being determinative.
Since determination of the question depends upon
wae”
7 : s
the particular record made before the trial court,
the taxpayer's suggestions of contliet: are plainly
without merit. :
ie CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a wre
of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted?
Ancuipat Cox,:
Solteitor General,
Lovis F. Onerporrer,
Assistant Atlorney General.
Davin O. WALTER,
‘ Ricnanp. J. Hema,
Tet Aflorie ys.
S
Marcu M63.
©. GOV. \MMENT PRINTING OF FicEe 1065
$
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.