Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Klein v. Walston & Co.

Supreme Court brief1963

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IN THE

Office Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

7s Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1962

719

No.

BORIS S. NADIAK,

Petitioner,

v8.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD.-and NAJEEB E.

HALABY, Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Agency,

Respondents.

© PETITION FOR A.WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Alian Milledge

Neal Rutledge

Counsel for Petitioner

601 Flagler Federal Building

111 N. E. 1st Street

Miami 32, Florida

Milledge, Rutledge & Milledge eS

Of Counsel ,

a

- INDEX

Citations to Opinions Below

Jurisdiction

Questions Presented

Constitutional Provision and Statute Involved

Statement

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Conclusion

—

7 in

Appendix A ‘Opinion of Court of Appeals Below)

Appendix B ‘Opinion and Order of Civil Aeronau- »

tics Board Below.)

Certificate of Service

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> AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases: Page

Ex parte Endo (1944) 323 U. S. 283 16

Korematsu vs. United States (1944), 323 US.214 + 16

Ex parte Milligan (1866), 4 Wallace 2. . ‘16

Nadiak vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 305 F.2d 588 a

(CA5, 1962) cs ese * YF

~ Specht vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 254 F.2d 905

(CA 8; 1958) ) 11

Leonard J. Specht, 25 C.A.B. 859 (1957) 16

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes: . °

_ Fifth Amendment, U. S. Constitution x. a

5 USC 1004 (a) (3) . ; ee 8

28 USC 1254 (1) ie 2

49 USC 1429 x 3-4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 16

49 USC 1486(f) ee ; 2

’ Rules of Civil Aeronautics Board. .

14 CFR 301.13 | . Sie 8

14 CFR 301.13(d) 2

14 CFR 301.18 — | ead 8

14 CFR 301.181) co

14 CFR 30189

14 CFR 301.30

14 CFR 301.45

14 CFR’ 301.46

14 CFR 301.50

> a Me

+

case on July 6, 1962.

IN THE

‘Supreme Court of the United States —

October Term, 1962

ae

No. 7 od e Poa

BORIS S. NADIAK, , te

Petitioner,

° |

US.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD and NAJEEB FE.

“HALABY, Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Agency,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI = ;

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Fifth Circuit, entered’ in the above-entitled

>

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The findings of the hearing examiner of the Civil

Aeronautics Board, dated February 24, 1961, may be

found in the record on appeal, pp. 142-237. The opinion

and order of the Civil Aeronautics Board, dated March

°

2

24, 1961, may be found in the record at pp. 118-138 and

is presented in Appendix B hereto. The opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,

printed in Appendix A hereto, is reported in 305 F.2d 588.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on July 6, 1962 (R. 1298). Rehearing was denied on Au-

gust 8, 1962. On November 2, 1962, this Court granted

an extension of time to, file this petition to and including |

January 4, 1963. .The jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voker under 28 USC § 1254 (1) and 49 USC § 1486(f).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Whether the Federal Aviation Administrator

had jurisdiction under proper coygtrumtion of the Fed-

eral Aviation Act of 1958 to inebeetr sens powers

: gratited him by Congress to revoke all the licenses of a

‘commercial airline pilot, where the “emergency” involved

was 23 alleged offenses spanning 10 years, the most re-

cent of wHich occurred eight months prior to the emer-

gency order, and of which the Administrator had knowl-.

edge for more than six months prior to the emergency

order; or in the alternative,

(2) Whether the use of emergency powers by the

Federal Aviation Administrator in an emergency order

charging a commercial airline pilot with 23 acts of mis-

conduct spanning 10 years, the most recent of which oc-

curred eight months prior to the emergency_ order, vio-

lated petitioner’s right to procedural due process under

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND

STATUTE INVOLVED — ° |...

The Constitutional provision involved ‘is the due:

process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution:

“No person shall * * * * be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of *

law: * * * *

The statutory frovision involved is ¥ 609, Federal

“Aviation Act of 1958, 49 USC § 1429, which provides as

follows: °

Reinspection or Reexamination; Amendment,

Suspension, or Revocation of Certificates; Noti-

fication; Hearing; Appeal to Board; Judicial

Review.

“Sec. 609. The Administrator m may, from time

to time, reinspect any civil aircrait, aircraft, en-

e gine, propeller, appliance, air navigation facility,

or air agency, or may reexamine any Civil air-

man. If, as a result of any such reinspection or

reexamination, or if, as a result of any other in-

vestigation made by the Administrator, he de-

terminies that safety in air commerce or air

transportation and the public interest requires,

@the Administrator may issue an order amend-

ing, modifying, suspending, or revoking, in whole

or in part, any type certificate, production cer-

tificate, airworthiness certificate, airman cer- ‘

tificate, air carrier operating certificate, air

—— facility certificate, or air agency

4 “

certificate. Prior to amending, modifying, sus-

pending, or revoking’ any of the foregoing cer-

tificates, the Administrator shall advise the

holder thereof as to any charges or other rea-

sons relied upon by the Administrator for his

proposed action and, except in cases of emer-

gency; shall provide the holder of such a certifi-

cate an opportunity to answer any charges and

. be heard as. to why such certificate should not

be amended, modified,. suspended, or revoked.

Any person whose certificate is affected by such

an order of the Administrator under this section

may appeal the Administrator’s order to the

Board and the Board may, after notice and

hearing, amend, modify, or reverse the Admin- —

istrator’s order if it finds that safety in air

- eommerce or air transportation and the public

interest dé not require affirmation of the Ad-

ministrator’s order. In the conduct of ‘its hear-

ings the Board shall not be bound by findings

of fact of the Administrator. The filing of an

appeal with the Board shall stay the effective-

ness of te Administrator’s order unless the Ad-

ministrator advises the Board that an emergency

exists w saféty in air commerce or air trans- |

portatisn requires the immediate effectiveness

of his. order, in which event the order shall re-

main effective and the Board shall finally dis-

pose of the appeal within sixty days after being

so advised by the Administrator. The person sub-

stantially affected by the Board’s order may

obtain judicial review of said order under the

provisions of section 1006, and the Administrator

shall be made a party to such proceedings.”

STATEMENT :

Petitioner is. a commercial airline pilot) who has

flown for more than 20 years and has flown in scheduled

air transportation for more than 12 years (R. 869%). He

has flown nearly 15,000 hours without accident or injuky

to passengers or equipment (R.&70'. He holds almost

every rating granted by the Federal Aviation Agency

(R. 869). He has never failed a flight check nor received

an unsatisfactory grade (R. 871).

°

On July 22, 1960, the Federal Aviation Administrator

proposed to suspend one of the licenses of the petitioner,

and to issue,in its place a temporary license. This pro-

“posed minor disciplinary-action was because of a reported

incident-on March 15, 1960 of petitioner’s having flown

too close to another aircraft. Petitioner resisted this pro-

posed discipline and the Administrator took no further

action to impose the suspension. But the Federal Avia-

tion Administrator then commenced a full-scale investi-

gation of petitioner, which took more than eight months

to complete (R. 276).

: 2.

On January 12, 1961, the Federal Aviation Adminis-

trator, General E. R. Quesada, acting under the cmer-

gency provisions of $ 609, Federal Aviation Act of 1958,

AS USC $1429, revoked all of the licenses of the peti-

tioner (Re 13-22). The order charged the petitioner wath

23 offenses. The most recent of these offenses wis 2l-

leged to have occurred on, May & 1960, over eight months

prior to the emergency order. The remaining 22 charve-

covered_a period back to #851, with five of the charee-

relating to “an unknown date” (R. 19,20, 21>. Petitioner

appealed this order to the Civi! Aeronautics Board and

a

«

6

on January 27, 1961, the Federal Aviation Administrat

filed a complaint alleging the same 23 offenses againft

petitioner (R. 1-12). On January 24,.1961, the Adminik-

trator notified the Civil Aeronautics Board of the eme

gency character of his order, thereby putting into effect

’ the sixty-day time limit on action by the Civil Aeronautics

Board imposed by § 609 of the Federal Aviation Act of

1958 (R. 22). This required the Civil Aeronautics Board

to hold the trial ‘and complete the appeal within 60 days.

A hearing was immediately ordered before a hearing

examiner of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which hearing

commenced February 13, 1961 and was completed on Feb-

fuary 24, 1961 (R. 251-1189). At the commencement of the

hearing, petitioner moved to‘dismiss the charges (R. 265)

~ on the ground, among others, that there was no showing

that an emergency existed, which motion was denied

(R.271). The hearing examiner found that substantially

all of the charges were proved and recommended that the

order of revocation of all licenses of petitioner be af-

firmed (R. 1189).

On March 24, 1961, the Civil Aeronautics Board, dis-

regarding 18 of the charges against petitioner and char-

acterizing many of them as “trivial” and “ambiguous as

to date” (R. 134), found five of the charges to be substan-

tial and proven (R. 118-138). The Board, nonetheless, af-

firmed the order of the Administrator revoking all of

petitioner’s licenses (R.138). The’ petitioner then ap-

pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit. The Court of Appeals, while highly critical of

“the blunderbuss nature of the charges” and the “sand-

bagging a pilot with a whole mass of old, trivial, petty or

insubstantial charges” (305 F.2d at 591), upheld the or-

ders of the Federal Aviation Administrator and the Civil

e

Aeronautics Board as not violating the fundamental rights

of petitioner.

Jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board ‘was

founded upon 49 USC § 1429, and jurisdiction of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

rested upon 49 USC § 1486. .

_. The Questions here presented were raised by Peti-

tioner bef*ie the Trial Examiner of the CAB below (R.

265, 2711; to the CAB (R.91); and were argued and con-

sidered by the Court of Appeals below as shown by its

“opinion in Appendix A; and in the Petition for Rehearing

to the Court of Appeals (R. 1299-1301).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Congress has granted vast and awesome emergency

powers to the Federal Aviation Administrator for use in

emergency to protect the safety of the American public.

At best, the use of these emergency powers works a sub-

stantial hardship upon any person against whose interest

these emergency powers are invoked. Upon the invoca-

tion of the emergency powers, a complete trial and ap-

peal must be held and concluded within sixty days. In

the instant case the Federal Aviation Administrator used

these powers when there was no emergency, and in a

manner never intended by Congr ess, anddn such a way

as to assure that the petitioner could not adequately de-

fend himself against the charges made.

Normal Procedures vs. Emergency Procedures

Normally, when the Federal Aviation Administrator

desires to suspend or revoke licenses of an airline pilot,

8

the pilot is informed of the proposed action and has an

opportunity to present evidence to the Administrator and

then to appeal to the Civil Aeronautics Board which must

grant him an opportunity again to present evidence as

well as arguments and written briefs. Under the normal

procedure there is no time limit other than that generally

provided in the Administrative Procedure Act which sim-

ply provides that, “In fixing the times and places for

hearings, due regard shall be had for the convenience and

“necessity of the parties or their peprerenanaves” [USC, -

Title 5, § 1004(a)(3)].

me

The Rules of the Civil Aeronautics Board provide for

‘defensive pleadings including motions to dismiss [CFR,

Title 14, § 301.18], and motions for more definite state-

ment {|CFR, Title 14, § 301.19]. They provide a flexible

time for the commencement of hearings depending in

part upon the convenience of the parties [CFR Title 14,

$ 301.30]. Extensions bs time may be granted for good

cause [CFR Title 14, § 301.13(d)]. The time restrictions

on pleadings [CFR Title 14, § 301.13] and on appellate

procedures [CFR Title 14, § 301.45, 301.46} are similar to

the time limitations of civil actions in the Federal courts.

However, when the emergency powers pyovided by

$ 609 Mf the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 are fvokea by

the Administrator, not only is the pilot grounded pending

the hearing and review by the Civil Aeronautics Board,

but from the date that the Administrator notifies the

Board of the emergency character of the order, the Board

has only 60 days.in which to permit pleadings, to hold the

hearing, to take testimony, to make initial findings and

couelusions, to permit preparation of written briefs, to

grant oral argument, and to dispose of the matter.

» &

”

&

aa

The statute and the CAB rules thereunder, make the

time limitations under the emergency procedures com-

pletely inflexible. There is allowed but eight days to plead

and then but eight days’to prepare for trial [CFR, Title

14, § 301.50|. The appellate time limitations are similarly

saliteeglh No extensions of time are permissible as the

Board has a Congressional mandate to complete the trial

_and appellate procedures within 60 days.

It seems clear when the emergency procedures are

contrasted with the normal procedures, that Congress in-

tended that the emergency procedures should be invoked

immediately upon a serious and patent ya to air

’ safety. Congress clearly did not intend that a pilot should

be required to defend his whole professional career on

short notice under the severe restrictions of the emer-

gency procedures.

ch

This “Emergency” &

The thrust of the charges against the petitioner was

that he lacked competent judgment. His high technical

proficiency and ability were conceded. No accident or in-

jury wag charged. No mental or physical deficiency was

alleged. Only his judgment was attacked, and even his

. judgment was not attacked on the basis of any recent

incidents.

The most recent incident of alleged bad judgment oc-

curred on May &, 1960, more than eight months prior to

the emergency order of. ‘anuary 12, 1961. The most serious

alleged offense occurred on March 15, 1960, an incident

involving a charge of flying too close te another aircraft.

The Administrator admitted that he had knowledge of this

10,

incident at least by April 25, 1960 (R. 276), and that he

then commenced the- investigation of petitioner from which

the other alleged offenses were discovered. On the basis

of this investigation, the Administrator proposed minor

disciplinary action against the petitioner on July 22, 1960.

Thus, with full knowledge of the alieged substantial of-

fenses against petitioner, the Administrator not only did

not declare an emergency but proposed under normal pro-

cedures to impose only minor sanctions against petitioner.

When the petitioner indicated that he wished to oppose the

Jul¥ 22, 1960 minor discipline by the Administrator, the -

Administrator declined to proceed further and declined to

hold hearings and took no further action. Consequently,

he permitted the petitioner to fly as a commercial airline

pilot for National Airlines, transporting thousands of

passengers over thousands of miles for another six months.

The Administrator clearly did not feel that any emergency

existed in July 1960.

What motivated the Administrator some six months

later to declare an “emergency” is not known.' No recent

act was alleged against petitioner in the emergency order

of January 12, 1961, but to the contrary, his conduct since

May 8, 1960, or for more than eight months while under

investigation and presumably under close observation was

apparently correct in every instance.

There is absolutely nothing in the Administrator's

emergency order, nor in the charges against petitioner,

nor anywhere in the entire record to justify the emer-

gency character of the proceedings. To the contrary, it

affirmatively appears that the Administrator, with knowl-

edge, and after three months of investigation, himself, in

'But see record pp. 871 and 872.

<?

1]

July, 1960, did not characterize the situation as an emer-

gency and did not even follow through on proposed minor

disciplinary action once begun.

The action of the Administrator in invoking the

emergency powers granted him by Congress was nothing

short of arbitrary, capricious and willful abuse of power.

The Contemplated Use of the Emergency Powers

When Congress established the 60-day time limit for

both trial and appeal in an air safety emergency, it nec-

essarily contemplated a recent and Serious situation, but

presumably it also had in mind the evidence that is avail-

able in the air industry, particularly that of automatic

recording devices and other scientific equipment whose

authenticity is not subject to the infirmities of human

observation, recollection and interpretation.

The charges against petitioner in the instant case

were based on oral testimony |R. 120], not on scientific

recording devices or taped records of conversations. Com-

pare Specht vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 254 F.2d 905 (CA

8, 1958). On the contrary, when the petitioner sought to

secure in his own defense the taped recordings of his con-

versations with control towers and other aircraft, he was

informed thatcthe Federal Aviation Agency itself had

routinely destroved the tapes in question [h. 1259]. Be-

cause of this very reason, thé rules of the CAB charac-

terize allegations of offenses more than six months old

as “stale” (CFR, Title 14, £ S0LD&te:). The petitioner,

however, was required to defend himself against 25

“stale” charges allegedly committed at various times over

the past decade and to have occurred at various places,

12

from Boston in the north, to Miami in the south, and

as far west as New Orleans. This he had to do under the

severe time limitations of the emergency provisions of

$ 609 of the Federal*Aviation Act.

CAB Concern

The Administrator presumably conducted his investi-

gation of petitioner from April 25, 1960 until January 12,

1961 with, of course, all the staff and facilities of his

agency at his disposal, to say nothing of the power of that

agency over the air industry. Upon the issuance of the

January 12, 1961 order and the notification to the CAB

of the “emergency,” the Administrator required the pe-

titioner in a matter of several weeks to defend himself

against the Agency’s months of investigation. It is not

surprising, therefore, that the hearing examiner of the

Civil Aeronautics Board found that 22 of the 23 charges

were proved and that the greater amount of evidence was

on the side of the Federal Aviation Agency.

The shotgun tactics used by the Administrator against

the petitioner gave some concern to the Civil Aeronautics

Board. The Board said in its opinion, “We fail to see what

useful purpose is served in an emergency proceeding such

as this by the inclusion of trivial and ill-defined charges,

and such action can only serve to clutter the record with

evidence directed toward establishing, refuting, or ex-

plaining them” (R. 134). In attempting to rationalize the

impossible position in which petitioner was placed by the

Administrator’s use of the emergency provisions, the

Board said, in its opinion, “It is true, of course, that the

accelerated time periods required to meet the 60-day stat-

utory period provided under the emergency provisions of

section 609 place an added burden on the respondent as

well as all others concerned, particularly in a situation

like the present where numerous violations are involved.

This, however, is largely the unavoidable result of the

statutory scheme which the Congress had deemed essen-

tial in furtherance of the overriding interest of air safety”

(R. 133).

The petitioner’s predicament in this case is clearly

not the unavoidable result of the statutory scheme estab-

lisned by Congress, but is the result of the deliberately

chosen course of action of the Administrator.

This case was to be won or lost before the hearing

examiner. °’The Board, in its opinion, finds its function

limited to deciding “whether the findings of the Examiner

are supported by substantial, reliable or probative evi-

dence” (R. 120). On the record made, the Board concluded,

“Here the Examiner's findings are predicated in large

measure on his acceptance of the testimony of the com-

plainant’s witnesses and his rejection of the conflicting

testimony of respondent” (R. 120).

It is no assistance to the petitioner that the Board

disregarded 18 of the charges against him. At the time

for taking testimony he had to defend a!! 28 charges.

Were he clairvoyant, he might have concentrated his ef-

forts on the five charges the Board ultimately determined

to he substantial and proved. However, it cannot be said

that the remaining 18 charges were insignificant, for not

only were several of the 18 similar to the five relied upon

by the Board, but inasmuch as the petitioner’s judgment.

not his ability. was in question, presumably each of the

charges was significant. That each and every charge was

14

significant was clearly the opinion not only of the Admin-

istrator but also of the hearing examiner who refused to

dismiss even the most trivial charges and found all but

one of the charges to have been proven.

Petitioner respectfully submits that it is too pat and

superficial to deal with the shotgun tactics of the Ad-

ministrator as a matter simply of “cluttering up the rec-

rd” and then proceed to pick five of the 23 charges as

the basis for an order depriving a man of his livelihood, |

Concern of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals likewise expressed concern.

Its opinion upholding the result seems to turn on the

doctrine of “harmless error.” The court said in reference

to the shotgun tactics‘of the Administrator, “We combed

every page of this record to make sure that the decision

was not infected with this practice.” 305 F.2d at 591.

The logical deficiency of this statement is patent.

The lack of an opportunity to prepare afi adequate de-

fense to a multiplicity of charges allegedly occurring over

ten years and at places thousands of miles apart will not

affirmatively appear in a record. Only if one were suc-

cessful in his defense, or if the evidence against one were

of a type not susceptible of contradiction or qualification,

could the lack of adequate time to defend be “harmless

error.” Here the whole case rests upon the hearing exam-

iner’s and the Boafd’s “acceptance of the testimony of the

complainant's witnesses and... . rejection of the conflict-

ing testimony of respondent.” The deprivation of the

fundamental rights of petitioner in this case is anything

but harmless.’ The fact that a man fights to defend him-

g

1d :

self with the only means available, in this case his own

testimony, does not mean that he Mas had the opportunity

of a fair trial. 6

The Sanction

One final observation should be made. The sanction

imposed against petitioner was the revocation of all of

his licenses including even his student license. While

technically the revocation is only for one year. the peti-

uioner is required to begin at the bottom rung of the FAA

license structure and again attempt to ascend to the

various commercial ratings. So far, he has been refused

permissior even to apply for a student license, although

the year has expired. Inasmuch as lack of competent

judgment was the basis of the erder revoking all his li-

censes, it is reasonable to assume that petitioner has

little chance of resuming his livelihood as a commercial

airline pilot in the future.

The significance of this observation is that the sanc-

tion imposed was effectively that of depriving petitioner

of his livelihood as a commercial airline pilot and was' the

most severe sanction available. The CAB based its affirm-

ance of the revocation of all licenses of petitioner on peti-

tioner’s “flagrant disregard” of rules of air safety. Even

if the petitioner could not, in a.fair hearing with ade-

quate defense, completely exonerate himself ofall the

charges, the type of sanction imposed depends upon the

quality of petitioner's responsibility for the offenses

charged. Upon this issue an adequate defense would he of

critical significance.

16

Novelty and importance of Questions Involved

Thé question of the power of the Federal Aviation

Administrator to invoke his emergency powers under

: 609 of the Act when no “emergency” exists has not here-

tofore been considered by this Court or by any of the -

eleven United States courts of appeals. In view of the

awesome nature of such power and the corresponding pos-

sibilities of abuse, the question is clearly one of national

importance in the administration of the Act and should

be settled by the considered review and decision: of this

Court. Especially is this so since the CAB has heretofore

held under the predecessor Civil Aeronautics Act that it

lacked authority to review the invocation of emergency

powers by the“Administrator. Leonard J. Specht, 25 C.A.B.

859, 892 (1957). The CAB is apparently persisting in

this same view under the 1958 Act, despite its powers of

review under § 609, as demonstrated by the instant case.

Petitioner respectfully submits that Congress did not in-

tend that the wrongful invocation of emergency powers

when ‘no emergency basis therefor exists and when such

powers are used to deny due process should stand forever

uncorrected by any agency or court. Compare Korematsu

v. United States (1944), 323 U.S. 214, with Ex parte Endo

(1944), 323 U.S. 283, and Ex parte Milligan (1866), 4 Wal-

lace 2. |

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this:petition for a writ

of certiorari should be granted:

Respectfully submitted,

. Allan Milledge

Pa Neal Rutledge

601 Flagler Federal Building

111 N. E. Ist Street

Miami 32, Florida

Counsel for Petitioner

Milledge, Rutledge & Milledg Pie

Of Counsel

- APPENDIX A

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

| FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19136

e

BORIS S. NADIAK,

Appellant,

versus :

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD and NAJEEB E.

HALABY, Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Agency, ~ ‘

Appellees.

s

—@

Petition for Review of Orders of the Civil Aeronautics

Board sitting at Washington, D.C.‘

(July 6, 1962)

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and BROWN and BELL,

_ Circuit Judges.

“BROWN, Circuit Judge: This case presents the

basic question of whether the proceedings relating to the

grounding of a commercial airline pilot were procedurally

correct. After a careful reading of every word of 1234 ©

typewritten foolscap pages, plus Q-odd documentary ex-

“hibits, we are convinced that they were, and affirm the

decision of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).

3

App. 2

2 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board

There is no doubt regarding the technical proficiency

of this: pilot. He has flown for more than 20 years—almost

15,000 hours—and during :that time he has never had an

accident which damaged an aircraft or injured a passen-

ger. He has held almost every possible certificate from the

FAA, and has been employed.in scheduled air transporta-

tion for over 12 years as the holder of an Airline Transport

Pilot Certificate. He has never failed a flight check, nor

even received an unsatisfactory- grade. But his technical

proficiency is not in issue here—nor was it below. The Ad-

ministrator’s emergency revocation of Nadiak’s Airman

Certificate was based on a lack of the necessary judgment

and responsibility.

On July 22, 1960, the Administrator proposed to sus-

pend Nadiak’s Airline Transport Certificate“for.60 days.

and to issue injts place a temporary Commercial Pilot

Certificate. This proposed minor-wing-clipping was _ be-

cause of a reported incident on’ March 15, 1960, of his hav-

ing flown tod close to another aircraft in violation of cer-

tain Civil Aeronautics Regulations. His resistance to this

order and his appeal to the Civil Aeronautics Board pre-

cipitated «a full scale investigation, which took over 8

months to complete, covering several thousand miles and

brought into review 12 years of Nadiak’s professional ca-

reer. The result Was an emergency order on January 12,

1961, by the Administrator. This completely grounded

Nadiak by yvevoking all of his certificates.' After a full

'This emergency order is authorized by $609 of the Federal Avia-

tion Act of 1958, 49 USCA $1429. The effect of the Administrator’s

determination that am emergency exists is to’ give immediate effective-

ness to his order. Because of the peremptory nature of such an order,

an immediate appeal to the CAB by the aggrieved person is permitted.

The appeal must be finally disposed of by that Board within 60 days.

The order in this case provided that Nadiak, could make applica-

App. 3

-" Boris S. Nadiak vv. Cicil Acronauties Board . ae

hearing by an Examiner, the CAB affirmed the Adminis-

trator’s action, and the present Petition for Review fol-

lowed. : -

We feel it important to ‘state at the outset that while

we affirm the order in this case, we join with the CAB in

registering our disapproval of one aspect of the practice

followed in this proceeding. While we conclude without any

reservation whatsoever that no prejudicial harm to Nadiak

occurred as a result of it, the blunderbuss ynature of the

~ charges is the sole thing which gave us any. real concern.,

We combed every page of this record to make sure that the

decision was_pot infected. by this practice. Considering

the awesome nature of the Administrator’s power when

invoked in an emergency proceeding, we think that the

FAA should be more selective than it was here in the spec-

ification of charges. What we have particular reference to

‘is the bringing of some 23 charges, many of which are

vague and trivial, in a proceeding of this nature when time .

for investigation and preparation of defenses is neces-

sarily limited by the statutory timetable. For example, one

of the charges brought three years later in 1961 stated

that “On or about April 18, 1958, | Nadiak| * * A ae

for duty * * * two minutes prior to scheduled departure

time * * * *” Another charged him with “carrying a case

of beer under his arm * * * on several occasions in 1956

tion for another Pilot Certificate after one yea> from the date of the

order, As the one-year period has now elapsed, there is every reason

to assu ie that the Administrator will fully comply with its obligation

eo afforl proper and fair consideration to any such application by

Nadiak. Nothing we say or imply is to be construed as an opposition

to such post-suspensiun relief. Indeed, since it is public safety, and not

punishment, which undergirds the whole stututory scheme and the dis-

ciplinary proceeding, restoration of certification, complete or partial

is a legitimate concern in the exercise of the expert judgment of the

Administrator.

a

App. 4

4 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board

* * * Still another, presumably relating to his qualifi-

cation to hold an Airman’s Certificate, stated that “On

or about May 23, 1956, |Nadiak] * * * pushed [a power

mower | across the ramp at Miami, Florida.”

While we fully appreciate the zealousness of the Ad-

_ministrator in carrying out his assigned responsibilities

of promoting safety in the air lanes and the practical prob-:

lems in doing so within limited time schedules, funda-

mental notions of fair play dictate that one called upon

to defend truly serious charges in an emergency proceed-

ing ought not to have adjudication of such substantial mat-

ters exposed to the possibility of inflammatory contamina-

tion by stale or trivial incidents. We find ourselves in full

agreement with the CAB when, after ruling on the five and

only major charges, it made a “general observation con-

cerning the nature of the remaining charges in the Admin-

- istrator’s complaint, none of which, * * * are pertinent to

our disposition of this proceeding.” Thus, continued the

CAB, “Our examination of them indicates that many ap-

pear trivial and some are ambiguous as to the date upon

which the incident is alleged to have taken place. We fail

to see what useful purpose is served in an emergency pro-

ceeding such as this by the inclusion of trivial and ili-de-

fined charges, and such action can only serve to clutter the

- record with evidence directed toward establishing, refut-

ing, or explaining them.”

To this we would only add the caveat that avoidance

of the practice is more than a janitorial necessity to pre-

vent cluttering up a record. Sandbagging a pilot with a

whole mass of old, trivial, petty or insubstantial charges

may adversely affect fundamental rights. Serious charges

are to be seriously tried as serious charges. The CAB, in

2

App. 5

/ Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board 5

its role of the tribunal adjudicating charges filed by the

Administrator, must, as would a Court in relation to the

prosecution, see that charges fairly meet the demands of

our fundamental concepts of a fair trial.

Without translating it specifically into any particular

claim of error by CAB, Nadiak stresses that he was one

of the few remaining “scab” pilots at National Airlines,

and that almost all evidence against him was presented

by Union members. Even though many witnesses testified

that he was an “unpopular” pilot, no evidence was ad-

mitted which would\require a reversal on this ground. At

one time there were approximately 100 nonunion pilots

employed by National. Many of these, including Nadiak,

incurred the wrath of the Union pilots by flying during

the strike against National in 1948. Since that time, their

number has dwindled to less than 20. But with these facts

standing alone, we are unable to perceive just what Na-

diak’s counsel would have us do. With proper enthusiasm

he sought to impeach adverse witnesses by showing a con-

scious effort by the Union and its members to “first

ground [Nadiak| and then drive {him| from the air lanes

altogether,” Flight Engineers v. American Airlines, Inc.,

5 Cir., 1962, — F.2d —, — [No. 19055, June 7, 1962).

But the CAB may well have thought this effort backfired.

Typical of such testimony was the cross examination by

Nadiak’s counsel of one of the Union copilots.

“Q. Were you aware of |Nadiak’s| activities

during the National strike about ten vears ago?

“A. Tam aware that he is a non-ALP Ae mem-

ber, a nonunion pilot, ves.

“Q. Do you like that?

‘ App. 6

6 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board

“A. The best way I can answer that question

is either yea or nay for this reason, that during

that winter period the majority of Captains fly-

ing out of the New York base were non-ALPA

pilots, and I could show my flight log to show that

90% of the pilots I flew with were nonunion

pilots. The fact that Captain Nadiak was non-

union had no bearing whatsoever.”

Of this we can only say at this point that while

credibility choices were available to the Examiner, they

are not open to us. We must take the record as we find it.

Whether, as the CAB found, the contention of Union-in-

duced hostility toward Nadiak would merely “go to the

question of motivation rather than to the factual accuracy

of the testimony rendered,” or would destroy altogether

the credibility of the Union witnesses, was a matter con-

fided to the trier of fact.

Turning now to the assigned errors, we find the usual

one on review of administrative action—that the order is

not supported by substawtial evidence. But even reducing

the matter to the only five major charges which the CAB

sustained, — of evidence to support these is stag-

gering. Admfttedly, there was conflicting evidere on al-

most ,every charge, but our function is not to weigh the

evidence to determine who should win the swearing match.

The function of a reviewing Court is to accept the findings

of fact made by the administrative body if there is sub-

stantial evidence in the record considered as a whole to

support those findings. Federal Aviation, Act, $1006/e),

49 USCA $1486/e) ; 5 USCA $1009/e); ef NLR v. Wal-

ton Manufacturing Co., 1962, Va. ,ena C ,.7

App. 7

Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board 7

L. Ed. 829; NLRB v. Ferguson, 5 Cir., 1958, 257 F.2d 88,

90; Specht v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 8 Cir., 1958, 254

F.2d 905, 913. Here there is ample evidence.

o The next contention is that the sanction is too severe.

Under the order the pilot was completely grounded. Na-

diak’s contention is that even accepting the entire mass of

adverse evidence as true, it goes only to show that Nadiak

is not qualified to be a pilot in command of an airplane

carrying passengers. It does not, the argument continues,

show that, for example, he would not be a qualified copilot,

or pilot of a lesser rating. But with that, the Administra-

tor, several experts, the Examiner, and the CAB as a mat-

ter of aeronautical expertness disagreed. Nadiak on abun-

dant evidence was found to have (1) passed too close to

another aircraft and violated regulations specifying pro-

cedure to follow in overtaking other airplanes, (2) vio-

lated an airportcttaffic pattern by turning right after a

take-off and his company’s safety rules by taking off with

an excessive tail wind, (3) landed his aircraft at a time

when the ceiling was below prescribed minimums, (4) de-

viated from flight clearances without obtaining amended

clearances, and (5) violated other regulations by flying

b

through and in close proximity to clouds while operating ~

under VFR ‘(Visual Flight Rules).

Though we do not have the benefit of the technical

background of the two expert agencies charged with pro-

moting safety in the air lanes, we know enough to see that

the agency could properly regard these charges as quite

serious. Such practices would endanger not only the air-

craft piloted, along with its passengers, but other people,

aircraft and property as well. More than that, what was

3

>

App. &

ss Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board

at issue was Nadiak’s judgment and responsible use of it

while in the air. The law is fortunately sensible enough

to recognize that in a highly technical area the evaluation

of action and appropriate disciplinary sanction necessarily

requires that the agency be vested with a wide range of

discretion in the imposition of penalties. Walver v. CAB,

2 Cir., 1958, 251 F.2d 954. Our review of the sanction im-

posed is confined to the inquiry of whether there was an

abuse of discr:tion. We find no such abuse here. Cf. Gar-

ber v. CAB, 2 Cir., 1960, 276 F.2d 321; Specht v. CAB,

8 Cir., 1958, 254 F.2d 905; Sisto v. CAB, D.C. Cir., 1949,

179 F.2d 47; Carey v. CAB, 1 Cir., 1960, 275 F.2d 518,

522. And if this seems now or later to be too harsh, amel-

ioration may be sought by Nadiak’s making application

for a certificate upon the expiration of one year from the

date of the order. See note 1, supra.

The last group of assigned errors charged that the

Examiner made numerous errors in his rulings during the

course of the hearing. These are that the Examiner erro-

neously (1) failed to dismiss the complaint because the

#

complete administrative file was not produced,’ (2) did

not require the production of certain tangible evidence, and

(3) allowed Nadiak to be unduly prejudiced by the ad-

mission of hearsay evidence. .

Taking these rulings in reverse order, we find no

merit in the complaints about hearsay. Upon a caréful re-

view of the entire record, we find that most of the evidence

admitted over objection was not subject to the hearsay ex-

clusion anyway. In other words, under the traditional rules

~ 2At oral argument, Nadiak’s ‘counsei stated that the case should

turn on this point.

App.

Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board 9

was admissible. But if as to some

f evidence the traditional rules

would have excluded th® Questioned evidence, its admission

does not constitute error requiring reversal of this case

because the technical rules of evidence that govern pro-

cedures in the courts are not necessarily applicable to ad-

ministrative proceedings, Administrative Procedure Act,

S71e), 5USCA 8100616); Falsone v. United States, 5 Cir.

1953, 205 F.2d 734, 742, n. 14, cert. den. 346 U.S. 864, 74

S.Ct. 108, 98 L.Ed. 375; 1 Wigmore, Evidence $4c¢ at 47-48.

Furthermore, even if the evidence in question were ex-

cluded, there would still be’substantial evidence to sustain

the findings. Sisto v. CAB, D.C. Cir, 1949, 179 F.2d 47,

51. That weuld reduce it then to a question whether its

erroneous admission infected the proceedings or critical

fact findings. There is no basis for any such conclusion

here. .

of evidence, the evidence

of these isolafed bits

The assigned error of not producing certain tangible

evidence borders on the frivolous. Early in the proceedings,

Nadiak filed an Application for Production of Docu-

mentary and Tangible Evidence. We find it unnecessary

to rule on the duty of the agency to produce under such

circumstances because the next day the FAA responded

with a letter enclosing much of the requested data. telling

how other parts of it could be obtained, and explaining

that the remainder was not available as it had been rou-

tinely destroyed before the institution of the investigation

into Nadiak’s flight safety practices. In short the FAA

produced all they had of the requested material. No more

could be required.

Lastly—and from his viewpoint most important (see

note 2, supra) —Nadiak asserts that the order should be

App. 10

10 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Acronautes Board

reversed because of the failure of the Administrator to pro-

duce his entire file before the Examiner and CARB. This,

he says, is beenuse the file “would add measurably to the

evidence showing qualification.” This rests upon his con-

tention that proceedings before the CAB are appellate in

nature and that their decision should be based upon the

record as a whole. Reliance is placed on the fact that £609,

49 USCA $1429, provides for “an appeal” to the Board.

How proceedings lasting over a week with a parade of wit-

nesses being examined and cross examined can be called

appellate in nature escapes us. Section 609 certainly does

not sustain it. For that same section provides that the

Board is not bound by the Administrator’s findings of

facts, and the Rules of Practice place the burden of proof

upon the Administrator.’

But we do not quibble over nomenclature. “As near

as we can understand it,* the asserted error comes down to

this. The Examiner ‘and the Board should have received

— and therefore read —— the whole investigatory file of

the Administrator. This, he claimed, would have re-

vealed material that “would add measurably to the evi-

dence showing | Nadiak’s| qualification.”

This was not sought for discovery. Nor was it a

dem Arom time to time for a Jencks-like look at a

pa lar witness’ prior written statement. It was,

rather. a broad contention that the whole file should

somehow become a part of the record to give the Board

and the “Examiner the opportunity to review those many

findings of investigation * * * in favor of |Nadiak| * * *”

14 CFR §301.321b). | . -

4This point, and just what Nadiak’s contentions were with respect

to it. was the subject of painstaking inquiry on the oral argument We

have viewed it from every angle remotely suggested —

App. 11

Boris S, Nadiak e. Civd Aeronautics Bord ll

without which “the Examiner cfinnot make a fair deter-

mination * * *.”

But this would destroy the whole structave so care-

fully designed by Congress to separate “completely the in-

quisitorial functions from the adjudicatory function.” This

would be to surrender the long and hard-Sought gains of

the Administrative Procedure Act. See especially <35'¢),

Tid', F USCA S31004¢6), 10061d). Riss & Co. Tne. v.

United States, 1951, 341 ULS, 907, 71 S. Ct. 620, 95 ].. Ed.

1345. reversing 06 F, Supp. 452; Wong Yang Sung v. VWe-

Grath, 1950, 559 U.S. 33, 70 8. Ct. 445, 94 L. Ed. 616.

osfind since the public has a big stake in these proceedings,

the Board was not required to acquiesce in the beguiling

importunities that this undisclosed material coming from

unspecified persons and ucquired under unrevealed cir-

cumstances would soméhow “help him.” The Board was

expected to puss on these serious charges by a proceeding

Which would in all vital respects give the Administrator

and respondent a fair chance to meet and test evidence

offered for and against the complaint. [t is the considered

judgment of Congress that the interest of neither the pub-

lic nor the person under charge is adequately cared for if

the adjudicatory tribunal is to have access to the ex parte

partisan views of the investigatory-prosecutorial staff or

to the material assembled by their efforts. T.S.C. Motor

Fix iqht Lines. fie. asf Unite d States, S.D. Tex., 1960, 186

F. Supp. 777. 740. The wish of a particular pilot that

this fundamental principle be relaxed did not make the

Board's rejection of it-an error.

‘This approach was specifically followed in the overhaul and

marked changes in national air megulatory statutes. See Legislative

History on Federal Aviation Act of 1958, expressiv adopting the stand-

ards of the Administrative. Procedure Act, 1958 US. Code Cong. &

Adm News, p. 3741, 3747-48 ‘

App. 12

12 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Ac:enautics Board

The public — including judges who fly — has a vita)

interest in air safety. Responsibility for air safety has

been placed in the administrative hands of those deemed

by Congress to have an expert competence. Air safety

was of primary importance in the adjudication of this

case: The determination was that air safety would be

promoted by the certificate revocation..After permissible

credibility choices, the findings were that numerous regu-

lations and rules of the air lanes — which must not be

ignored or taken lightly — had heen violated. Those

findings were supported by substantial evidence in a hear-

ing which was fair and regular. There it ends.

AFFIRMED.

App. 13

APPENDIX B

Order No. S-1098 .

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD -

WASHINGTON, D. £¢.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office fn Washington, D. C.,

on the 24th day of March, 1961

,

NAJEEB E. HALABY,

Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency,

Complainant,

VS.

BORIS S.°NADIAK,

vo

\ Docket SE-177

OPINJON AND ORDER

BY THE BOARD: \

This proceeding is before the Board on appeal by

respondent, Boris S. Nadiak, from the Initial Decision’

of Examiner Joseph C. Caldwell, Jr., affirming the Ad-

'The Initial Decision was rendered orally at the conclusign of the -

hearing A copy of the transcript is attached hereto

r

Respondent.

~

App. 14

ministrator’s emergency order,’ which revoked respond-

ent’s airman certificate and provided that he-was ineli-

gible to apply¢for another pilot certificate for one year.

The Initial Decision is based on numerous findings of vio-

lations of.the Civil Air Regulations, including careless and

reckless operation endangering the lives and property of

others: The Examiner concluded on the basis of the record

that the respondent does not measure up to the standards

required by public safety and public interest, in that re-

spondent’s conduct demopstrates that he does not possess

the attributes of a pilot-in-command and that he lacks the

qualification and fitness required of the holder of an

airline transport pilot rating and certificate.

Respondent and the Administrator have filed briefs

with the Board. Oral argument has been heard, and the

case stands submitted for decision.

Respondent requests ‘that the Examiner’s order be

reversed and the action dismissed. He contends that the

Administrator has not adduced substantial, reliable, or

probative evidence to prove his allegations. Moreover,

respondent argues that the Administrator has produced

little, if any, evidence going to the respondent’s qualifi-

cations, and, indeed, that much of the Administrator’s

evidence, although proffered for other purposes, estab-

lishes that respondert has the quaiifications relating to

' judgment, degree of care, and responsibility to’ hold his

2Pursuant to Section 609 of the Act, which provides in pertinent

part ag follows: “The filing of an appeal with the Board shall stay the

effectiveness of the Administrator's order, unless the Administrator

advises the Board that an emergency exists and safety in air commerce

or air transportation requires the immediate effectiveness of his order,

in which event the order shail remain effective and the Board shall

finally dispose of the appeal within sixty days after being so advised

by the Administrator.” By letter docketed on January ,25, 1961, the

> mammal advised the Board of the emergency character of his

order -

a

v

* App. 15.

airline transport rating. In any event, respondent argues

that the Administrator’s case would*only warrant action

against his airline transport pilot rating and would not

require action against his remaining airman certificates

and ratings. The Administrator urges that the Initial

Decision be affirmed.

© After consideration of the contentions of the parties

in light of the record, we conclude that the appeal should

be denied, and that the Administrator’s ordef of revoca-

tion should be affirmed. The findings of the Examiner

.. Yelating to the major charges, in the complaint (para-

XU graphs | IV ‘through VIII) are supported by substantial,

- reliable, and probative evidence.’ In our view, the serious-

ness of these violations warrants the sanction imposed by

the Administrator in his order, which was affirmed by

the Examiner, irrespective of the validity of other alle-

gations contained in the complaint. Accordingly, we find

iL unnecessary “to pass on the re&pondent’s contentions

with respect to the remaining charges.

At the outset we wish to make clear the framework

in which we are considering the issues,in this proceeding

and to comment upon certain general contentions which

permeate respondent’s defense. As provided jin Section

301.47 of our Rules ‘of Practice, we are concerned here

. with whether the findings of the Examiner are supported

by substantial, reliable, or probative evidence. In any

proceeding such as this, not infrequently conflicts in

testimony will arise, and the Examiner. of necessity will

be called upon to resolve them. ‘Because of the role the

Examiner plays in the development of the record, the

‘Except to the extent note.. hereinafter with respect to the charges

in paragraphs V and VI of the complaint. \

9

App. 16

Board, of course, must accord substantial weight to his

conclusions on which of alternative or conflicting versions

of the facts are worthy of belief.’

Here the Examiner's findings are predicated in large

measure on his acceptance of the testimony of complain-

ant’s witnesses and his rejection of the conflicting testi-

mony of respondent. Respondent appears to challenge this .

result because, in his view, (1) the Administrator’s case

“depends primarily on the testimony of Air Line Pilots

Association members, who he asserts were hostile to

respondent; and (2) the fact that the Administrator took

action against him.at a time when he was involved in a

labor dispute with National Airlines somehow contributed

to this result. However, the Examiner specifically re-

jected these allegations, and respondent has shown noth-

ing that would demonstrate error in Examiner’s findings

in this regard. Further, at best, respondent’s contentions

go to the question of motivation rather than to the factual

accuracy of the testimony rendered. All of these matters

were argued fully before the Examiner, he heard the

\ “testimony of the witnegses, and he had the opportunity

to observe their demeanor and manner of testifying.

Based on our examination of the record, we are satisfied

that there is no foundation for a conclusion that the Ex-

aminer acted incorrectly, in any respect material to this

decision, in the judgments he reached on credibility. ;

+) 4

1. Paragraph IV of the Complaint

With respect to the allegations of this paragraph,

the Examiner. found that on March 15, 1960, respondent,

4Administrator v. Specht, Order $-825, September 9, 1957, aff'd sub

nom. Specht v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 254 F. 2d 905 (8th Cir. 19 5).

App. 17

(11 while approaching the Patrick Henry Airport at New-

port News, Virginia, operated a DC-6 which was overtak-

ing a Piper PA-18, and 4id not pass on the right, in viola-

tion of Section 60.14 (di‘eof the Civil Air Regulations;

and (2) operated the DC-6 aireraft in such close proximity

to the PA-18 as to create a collision hazard, in violation of

Section 60.15 of the C.A.R.’. The Examiner found that

respondent’s operation was careless and reckless, endan-

gering the life and property of others, in violation of See-

tion 60.12 of the\C.A:R.° eo A

The respondent contends, inter alia, that the Examiner

erred in failing to consider Section 60.14/e). of the C.A.R.’

and, in this connection, that respondént’s was the leading

aircraft. However, the PA-18 was engaged in a touch-and-

go landing, and under Section 60.14(e) clearly had the

right-of-way in approaching the airport, since it was at

a lower altitude. Respondent is also mistaken in his belief

that the record does not show that respondent was in-

formed that the PA-18 was on a touch-and-go landing.

‘The transcript reads ‘Section 60.14'b)." However, the complaint

was amended at the hearing to correct a typographical error, thus con-

forming to the order of revication. (T. 401.)

6360.14(d): “An aircraft that is being overtaken has the right-of-

way, and the overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending, or in

horizontal flight: shall keep out of the way of the ther aircraft by

altering its course to the right, and no subsequent change in the rela-

tive positions of the two aircraft shall absolve the Wertaking aircraft

from this obligation until it is entirely past and clear; * * *”

$60.15: “No person shall operate’ an aircraft in such proximity to

other aircraft as to create a collision hazard. No person shall operate

an aircraft in formation flight when passengers are carried for hire.

No aircraft shall be operated in formation flight except by prearrange-

ment between the pilots in command of such aircraft.”

*$6@.12: “No person shall’ operate an aircraft in a careless or reck-

less manner so as to endanger the life or property of others. * * *"

°$60.14(e): “Aircraft, while on the final approach to land, or while

landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or operating

on the surface. When two or more aircraft are approaching an airport

for the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has the

right-of-way, but it shall not take advantage of this rule-to cut in in

front of another which is on final approach to land, or to overtake that

aircran, * * *7

App. 18 »

On the contrary, this fact was,brought out on the direct

examination of respondent’s: witness Scherer,; who was

copilot.of the DC-6.""

Moreover, while we have not had the Examiner’s ad-

vantage of observing the demeanor of the respondent on

the witness stand, the cold record before us does not

reflect favorably on respondent’s credibility with respect

to the incident. He testified first “that the longest time

that I was on base leg would have been under a minute,”

and ‘in almost the same breath asserted that “[t|he base.

leg- was of some minutes duration.”'’ The witness also

denied that he had complained ahout light aircraft being

given preference over his on other occasions,'’ but a docu-

ment-executed in his own handwriting on March 24, 1960,

complained of being held up several months before at

Patrick Henry by “touch and go‘circle and bounce air-

craft.”"). Finally, respondent testified that the tower

operator apologized to him, saying he was sorry that the

light plane apparently failed to observe a red light that

he had directed at it.'* All five of the complainant’s wit-

nesses denied either that a red light was given the PA-18

or that there was a radio communication about a red light,

and even the copilot, who testified for respondent, does

not remember any voice communications about the red

light; nor did he at any time see a red light directed at*

the PA-18."° |

In view of the state of the record on this allegation,

it is clear that the Examiner’s finding is well supported.

}

10T. 132.

11T. 708.

12T. 715.

1sComplainant’s Exh. 23.

14T. 638.

ST. 136.

App. 19

2. a V of the Complaint

The Examiner found that May 24, 1960, respond-

ent, piloting a DC-6 from the Patriek Henry Airport (1)

executed a right turn on takeoff from Runway 6, and

thereby failed to comply with the traffic pattern pre-

scribed for the airport, in violation of Section 60; Ste)

of the C.A.R.;"" and (2) departed downwind at a time

when a 15 knot tail wind existed, in violation of the Com-

pany Flight Manual.’ The Examiner found that by these

actions respondent operated the aircraft in a careless and

reckless manner, so as to endanger the life and property

of others, in violation of Section 60.12.

Respondent contends that the Examiner's findings fail

to consider the official weather report at Patrick Henry

Airport_at the time of the alleged downwind takeoff

showing thé wind to be 7 and & knots from the west.

However, the record shows that respondent took off at

approximately 1345 Eastern time while the official

weather reports were for 1258 and 1355. The Examiner's

finding has ample support since the: record establishes

that the local controller, based on personal observation of —

the wind instruments available to him, advised respondent

immediately prior to his takeoff that the wind was west

southwest at 15." ‘i

« . a

'6360.18(c): “Aircraft operating from an airport shall conform to

the traffic patterns prescribed for that airport;”

17Manual requirements ar®set forth in Sections 40.50 through 40.53

of the Civil Air Regulations.

° \sAlthough respondent does not raise the question, we will modify

the Examiner's finding indicating that the respondent was advised three

times that the wind was 15 knots. Thus, the record shows that the

testimony of the local controller is that, when respondent was cleared -

to Runway 24, he was given the wind direction and velocity as west

southwest at 8 to 10 knots; that when respondent requested Runway 6, °

the controller gave him the wind velocity as between 12 and i4 knots:

and that within one minute of respondent's takeoff, the controller gave

respondent the wind again as west southwest at 15 knots and cared

e

ff

App. 20

Respondent also urges that the Examiner failed to

consider exhibits which confirmed an agreement between.

appropriate authorities allowing right turns from Run-

way 6. But this agreement was not in effect at the time

of the incident involyed here, and, in any event, required

a prior clearance from air traffic control for such action.

3. Paragraph VI of the Complaint ~* .

The Examiner found that on May 8, 1960, respondent,

(1) operating a DC-6 aircraft landed at Logan Interna-

tional Airport, Boston, Mass., when the ceiling and visi-

bility were below the prescribed minimums for landing,

violating Section 40.406 of the C.A.R.;'’ and (2) on this

occasion operated the DC-6 aircraft in wilfull disregard

of company instructions regarding the ceiling and visi-

hifit-- 'anding minimums for said airport. The Examiner

found that respdéndent thereby operated the aircraft in

a reckless and careless manner.so as to endanger the life —

and property of others, in violation of Section 60.12. |

Respondent contends that the Examiner should not

have accepted the copilot’s testimony that the ceiling was

below the prescribed minimum at the time sof landing

him for takeoff. The testimony therefore shows that respondent was

advised of a 15 knot wind only once and the finding is modified accord-

ingly. This modification however, does not affect the Examiner's ulti-

mate finding. Indeed, the record shows that under Company Flight

Manual provisions no downwind takeoff was allowed in a DC-6 when

the tail wind exceeded 8.5 knots. :

19$40.406(a): “Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) of

this section, irrespective of any clearance which may be obtained from

air traffic control, no airplane shall take off or land under IFR when

the ceiling or ground visibility reported by the U. S. Weather Bureau

or by a source approved by the Weather Bureau is less than the mini-

mum approved for the airport when used as a regular airport?

The Examiner's finding that the visibility was below the prescribed

minimum was apparently inadvertent, since he rec ized that the

runway visual range was 2800 feet whereas the pfeatribed minimum

with respect to visibility was 2600 feet (Appendix, p. 895)

App. 21

inasmuch as, in accordance with Section 40.406(¢) of the

regulations,’ respondent, as pilot-in-command, had found

the weather conditions to be better than the preseyjped

minimums. Further, respondent asserts that his evalua-

tion of the weather conditions is supported by the o¥ ficial

Weather observation at 1932, 17 minutes after he landed,

showing weather above the.prescribed minimums. ~*

~ j

We find the respondent's contentions unpersuasive.

Certainly the provisions of Section 40.406(e) do not mean

that the FAA and the Board are bound io accept as final

the respohdent’s subjective assessment of the weather

conditions which in fact existed at the time he landed.

The respondent’s contentions in this regard are subject

to inquiry, and it Was for the Hearing Examiner to judge

initially whether the respondent’s 6r * 1e copilot’s version .

of the incident was correct. We find nothing unreason-

able in the Examiner’s giving greater weight to the testi-

mony of the copilot..' The official weather report showed

a ceiling of 100 feet at 1916, approximately the time of °

the landing, which supports the copilot’s testimony that

° * Me

the aircraft. broke out of. the overcast at 120 feet® The

fact that the ceiling was 200 feet Tthe prescribed mini-~

20$40.406(c}: “An instrument approach procedure may be executed

when the weather report prepared by the U. S. Weather Bureau or by

a source approved by the Weather Bureau indicates that the ceiling or

visibility is less than approved minimum for landing, if the airport is ”

served by ILS and PAR in operative condition and both are used by the

pilot, and tfrereafter a landing may be made, if weather conditions

equal to or better than the prescribed minimums are found to exist by

the pilot in command upon reaching the authorized landing minimum

altitude.” : :

.7!Other evidence of record shows the cdpilot to be a more reliable

-witness. Thus, respondent testified that prior to departing from Balti-

more a check of the weatHer in Boston showed that it “was then ap-

proaching limits, that it was within limits.” (T, 648.) The copilot, on

the other hand, testified that @n arrival at Baltimore respondent and

he checked the weather and the weather a , Boston had been below

minimums for several hours and still was. (T. 186.) The trip log and

the official weather observations for East Boston (Respondent's Exh. E:

Gomplainant’s Exh. 3) confirm 7“ copilot's testimony.

©

App. 22

e

mum) at 1932, ther$fore, does not impair the Examiner's

finding that respgndent landed in weather below the

prescribed minimum.

There is no question that respondent inlanding at

Boston with a reported ceiling of less than 200 feet vio-

lated an operations bulletin of National dated April 1,

1959.27, Respondent’s contention that he was in compliance

with an operations memorandum of March .20, 4950,” is

of no validity, since the later bulletin clearly modified

and superseded this memorandum.”

4. Paragraph VII of the Complaint

-The Examiner found that on April 25, 1960, respond-

ent, in piloting a 1049H Constellation aircraft during

climbout to V295 airway after departing Miami VFR,

(1) operated the aircraft closer than 500 feet vertically

under and 1000 feet over cloud formations, and therefore

violated Section 60.30 of the C.A.R.;?° (2) received an

22Complainant’s Exh. 25. This bulletin provided, inter aha, “It should

be noted that the R.V.R. minimums at ,Idlewild and Boston carry an

additional restriction of a 200 foot ceiling; therefore, a reported ceiling

of 200 feet or better must exist befor landing may be made on the

R.V.R. runway at these airports even though, the R.V.R. value is equal

to or better than minimum.” (Emphasis added.)

# 23:Complainant’s Exh. B. This earlier bulletin read, “When RVR

is hereafter reported in feet, it will automatically indicate that ceiling

height is not a part of legal requirements; that is, RVR alone is con-

troling for landings on the runway coneerned.” d

24We find it unnecessary to determine whether in addition to vio-

lating the Civil Air Regulations, respondent also disregarded company

instructiong in failing to terminate the flight at Providence. Respond-

ent’s action in landing at Boston when the ceiling was below the pre-

scribed minimum supports the Examiner's finding of careless and reck-

less operation.

25$60.30(a)(1): “Aircraft shall not be flown VFR less than 500

feet vertically under, 1,000 feet vertically over, and 2,000 feet horizon-

tally from any cloud formation except that, in the continental control

area. aircraft shall not be flown VFR less than 1,000 feet vertically and

one mile horizontally from any cloud formation. Aircraft shall not be

flown VFR within a control zone beneath the ceiling when the ceiling

is less than 1,000 feet.”

App. 23

IFR clearance from Air Traffic control to maintain 9000

feet, and then deviated from that clearance without first

having obtained an amended clearance and that he there-

fore violated Section 60.21 of the@ AR. and (3) later

received an amended clearance to 11,000 feet but: when

a request for further emendment to 7000 feet was unan-

swered, proceeded on down te that level and then to 1100

feet and flew at that level for 20 or 30 minutes Without

un amended clearance. The Examiner found respondent's

conduct to constitute careless and reckless operation

endangering the life and property of others, in violation

of Section “0.12.

Respondent asserts that the Examiner failed to con-

sider the conflict in testimony between the Administra-

tor’s witness and the fiight engineer, who testified on

behalf of respondent. In addition, respondent alludes to

certain exhibits which he contends were not considered

by the Examiner.

We conclude that the Examiner's findings are sup-

ported by the evidence. The Examiner determined that

the copilot, Cover, gave a more reliable version sof the

events of the flight than did the respondent. Although

the testimony of the flight engineer, Bartish, does not

corroborate Cover’s testimony, neither does it confirm

that of respondent. The flight engineer's testimony is

“$6021: “When an air traffie clearance has been obtained ‘under

either VFR or IFR rules, the pilot in command of the aircraft shall not

deviate from the provisions thereof unless an amended clearance is

obtained. In case emergency authority is used to deviate from. the

provision of an air traffic clearance, the pilot in command shall notifs

air traffic control as soon as possible and, if necessary, obtain an

amended clearance. However, nothing in this section shall prevent a

pilot, operating on an IFR traffic clearance, from notifying air traffic

control that he is canceling his IFR flight pian and proceeding under

VFR: PROVIDED. That he is operating in VFR weather conditions

when he takes such actien"

App. 24

of scant assistance because he was unable to remember

much relating to the flight. Thus, he testified that while

he knew that portions of the flight were under VFR con-

ditions, he could not recall what portions of the flight

were so operated, or whether parts of the flight were

conducted under IFR clearances.*”’ He was unable to tes-

tify if they operated under IFR conditions at any time

during the flight, with one exception.*> He did distinctly

recall looking out in the vicinity of Atlantic City, that

they were “kind of high” there, and weather conditions .

at that particular time were VI'R.*’ This testimony does

not conflict with Cover’s that they were on ATC clear-

ance at 11,000 feet to just south of Atlantic City, and at

this point the weather started coming down and the plane

descended to 7000 feet and then to 1100 feet."’ Since Cover’ °

testified that weather conditions changed near Atlantic

city, Bartish could easily have made his observation prior

to the change and the testimony of both is reconcilable.

And we find nothing in the documentary evidence to

which respondent refers (the trip log, weather observa-

tions at Miami and West Palm Beach, Florida, and a

Jepeo Avigation Chart) whi¢h would justify overturning

the Examiner’s findings.

5. Paragraph VIII of the Complaint °

The Examiner found that on April 4, 1958, the re-

spondent, operating a Constellation on a VFR flight from

New York to Miami, flew through and in close proximity

to clouds without an IFR clearance, in violation of Section

60.30 of the C.A.R.; and that operation of the aircraft

27T. 562

2sT. 611.

2°T. 595

wT. 472

App. 25

under these conditions constitutes careless and reckless

operation of an aircraft endangering the life and prop-

erty of others, in violation of Section 60.12.

Respondent contends that the testimony of the Ad-

ministrator’s witn@&’s, the copilot on the flight, was im-

peached by respondent's exhibits showing a clearance

from the Norfolk Center and later a cancellation of the

clearance, respondent's trip log which was prepared by

the Administrator’s witness, and the testimony of +e-

spohdent’s witness, the flight engineer.

s

It is our conelusion that the Examiner's findings are

supported by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.

The Examiner determined that the testimony of respond-

ent's copilot, Gupiinski, should be accepted in preference

to that of respondent. Thé record would sustain placing

little or no reliance upon the testimony of respondent's

witness, Bartish, as supporting the testimony of the re-

spondent. For example, Bartish testified on direct exami-

nation that he recalled no argument or conversation in

the cockpit concerning flying under instriment- econdi-

tions without such a clearance.’ On cross-examination

he contradicted this previous testimony by-stating that

he thought there was a discussion between Guminski and

respondent as to the legality of respondent's being able

to fly VFR on top and “a few words were said.” Nor

does the fact that the respondent operated during a por-

tion of the trip with an IFR clearance undermine the

copilot’s testimony that at times respondent operated

under instrument conditions without an instrument clear-

ance:

“SYP. 593, 597-8.

27 608

- ° . App. 26

6. Miscellaneous Contentions

In view of the foregoing findings of violation, no

useful purpose would be served by proceeding to rule on

the remaining charges since, based on the charges we

have already found established, we are convinced that the

Administrator’s order of revocation should be affirmed.

However, before discussing the question of sanction, we

wish to comment on certain other contentions of the

respondent. | }

‘ -

The respondent takes the position that the proceed-

ings before the Board on appeal from the Administrator's

order are essentially appellate in nature, involving a de-

termination, among other things, of whether the Admini-

strator’s order is supported by evidence. In this connec-

tion, respondent maintains that the Administrator had

the duty of presenting all the evidence his investigation

developed, whether favorable or unfavorable to the re-

spondent, for the Board’s consideration. Respondent con-

tends that in view of the Administrator’s failure to submit

all the results of his investigation, the Examiner erred in

denying respondent’s motion to dismiss. He also com- —

plains generaliy of the size of the record developed and

the expedition with which the proceeding was handled.

While Section 609 of the Act speaks of an “appeal” to

the Board, it is clear that such proceedings are not appel-

late in the usual sense. On the contrary, they are full-

scale, de novo, adversary hearings, a fact which & ap-

parent from the language of Section 609" and the Board’s

3Section 609 provides in pertinent part, “In the conduct of its.

hearings the Board shall not de bound by findings of fact of the Ad-

ministrator.” See also H. Rept. 2360, p. 8; H. Rept. 2556, p. 89 «Confer-

ence Report): S. Rept. 1811; Cong. Rec, p. 14738

, App. 27

Rules of Practice. Under the Rules, the Administrator.

has the burden of proving the allegations in his com-

plaint.* Where, as here, the respondent has been fairly

placed on notice of the violations charged, has had ample

opportunity to answer them, and the facts have been

found on the bases of the evidence submitted, in our view

the requirements of the statute are satisfied. It is true,

of course, that the accelerated time periods required to

meet the 60-day statutory period provided under the emer-

gency provisions of Section 609 place an added burden on

the respondent as well as all others concerned, particu-

larly in a situation like the present where numerous viola--

tions are involved. This, however, is largely the unavoid-

able result of the statutory scheme which the Congress

has deemed essential in furtherance of the overriding

interests of air safety. Nothing has been presented which

would warrant us in concluding that respondent has ‘not

been accorded full protection of his procedural rights.

One final matter warrants comment. .Respondent

contends that his rights were substantially impaired when

the Examiner denied his “request to exclude from the :

hearing rdom during the course of the testimony the wit- .

ness Tamalis, the FAA Air Carrier Inspector assigned to

National Airlines. Respondent urges that Tamalis should

have been excluded because he was a witness, and also

because’ the National flight crews who would appear as

“Section 301.32¢b). ,

‘sWe do, however, wish to make a general obset vation concerning

the nature of the remaining charges in the Administrator's complaint,

none of which, as, previously indicated, are pertinent to our disposition

of this proceeding. Our examination of them indicates that many up-

pear trivial and some are &mbiguous as to the date upon which the

incident is alleged to have taken place. We fail to See what useful

purpose is served in an emergen; proceeding such as this by the in-

clusion of trivial and ill-defined charges, and such action can only serve

to clutter the record with evidence directed toward establishing, refut-

ing, or explaining them.

App. 28 ‘ :

witnesses would be reluctant to testify. The “Examiner

denied respondefit’s request upon the representation of

the Administrator’s counsel that Tamalis’ presence was

necessary to guide him on certain technical matters that

might arise, and respondent has made no showing that

he was, in fact, in any way prejudiced by this action.

- Under the circumstances we find ho°prejudicial’ error in

the Examiner's ruling.

7. Sanction

' Having found that the Administrator has established

the major charges contained in his complaint, we turn

now to the question of sanction: The Administrator,

whose stake is large in the promotion of air safety, has

determined that revocation of respondent’s airman certi-

ficate is required because his conduct demonstrates that

he cannot be trusted as a pilot in any capacity. On the

basis of the record, the Examiner has reached the same

‘conclusion,: finding that the respondent demonstrably

does not possess the attributes required of a pilot-in-com-

mand and lacks the qualifieations and fitness required of

the holder of an airline transport pilot rating and certifi-

cate. Accordingly, he would affirm the Administratér’s

emergency order.of revocation. Respondent’s position is

that, assuming the existence of violations which we have |

found, at most action would be warranted only against

his airline transport pilot rating.

After careful consideration of all pertinefit factors,

we. agree with the sanction imposed by the Examiner and

we find that this sanction is required by safety in air

commerce or air transportation and the public interest. It

would be difficult to conceive of a moré flagrant disre-

i) os

App. 29

gard of applicable safety staridards than are exhibited by

this record. Thus the evidence shows, and we have found,

that respondent has deviated from applicable safety.

standards by conduct which resulted in careless and

reckless operation, failure. to maintain the required sepa-

ration from clouds, and there are incidents of landing

when weather conditions were below the prescribed mini-

mums, failing to give the right-of-way, creating a colli-

sion hazard, failure to conform to the traffie pattern

prescribed fan. airport, and deviating from an air

traffic clearance. Each of these violations involves a

most serious infraction of the Civil Air Regulations ;

taken together they constitute a gross affront to air

safety and the public interest which the Board cannet

permit or condone.

We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent

has never failed a line check or a six-months’ proficiency

check. Technical proficiency in, manipulating the controls

of aircraft on certain oceasiqns when respondent was sub-

ject to observation does not establish that responden:

possesses the requir degree of care, Judgement, and

responsibility, for technical proficiency is not alone the

measure of the qualifications essential for an airline

pilot.” On the ether hand, a record of such serious and

unjustified violations of the Civil Air Regulations in the

last three vears — none of which involved a lack of pre-

ficiency in manipulating the controls is more than

enough, in our view, to establish that respondent does not

possess the required degree of judgment.

We have also given consideration to limiting the

‘Administrator v. Specht, supra, Order S-825. pp 5-8) 254 Fo 2d.

pp. 915-917. As the Board said on p. 8 of its opinion, “The pilot whe

can control his plane but cannot control humself es moto safe pales

é App. 30

sanction to the loss of respondent’s Airline Transport

Pilot Rating, and permitting him to retain his certificate.

Thus, in the Specht case, the Board revoked Specht’s pilot-

in-command privileges only, since as a co-pilot Specht

would be under the supervision of other pilots-in-com-

mand.’ However, we do not believe that such a sanction

would afford the public sufficient protection in the case

of respondent. While Specht acted in anger on a single

instance, respondent has deliberately piloted in disregard

of the air safety ruies on a number of occasions, demon-

strating a pattern of conduct which renders him com-

pletely untrustworthy.” In this connection, as pointed

out by the Administrator, under the Civil Air Regulations

the holder of a commercial pilot certificate can operate

as second in command of large aircraft in scheduled and

irregular air carrier operations, and as a pilot-in-com-

mand of small aircraft utilized in irregular air carrier

operations. The Administrator also points out that weré

the respondent permitted to hold a private pilot certi-

ficate, he could operate as pilot-in-command of aircraft

not engaged in air carrier or commercial operations and

could also carry passengers so long as the flight was not

eunducted for compensation or hire. It is clear therefore

that, although the technical proficiency required in these

other pilot categories may vary, respondent nonetheless

esac .

"In a comparable situation, respondent acted even more denger-

ousiy than Specht. The TWA pilot, in anger over not receiving an alti-

tude to which he regarded -himself entitled, declared an emergency

which be knew did not exist and climbed through space known by him

to be oceupied by another airliner. Air traffic control was thereby

cognizant of Specht's action. Respondent, however, made such a change

in altitude without the knowledge of. air traffic control. Thus, on the

April 25, 1960, flight from Miaimi to New York, respondent had obtained

an IFR clearanee to maintain 9,000 feet. Although no emergency ex-

isted, he later desired to climb to 17,500 feet, but was unable to secure

an amended clearance because of communication difficulties. Respond-

ent, nevertheless, climbed to his desired altitude, although he knew

thaf an Eastern Air Lines flight was operating two minutes behind

him at 11,000 feet 7]

App.°31

would be expected to possess and exercise a very high

degree of care, judgment, and responsibility, characteris-

ties which the record establishes are lacking in the re-

spondent. In vieof respondent’s flagrant disregard of

or indifference to the rules of air safety, his, demon-

strated lack of the required qualities of care, judgment,

and responsibility, and all other factors héretofore dis-

cussed, we can only conclude that respondent’s Airman’s

Certificate. and all ratings and privileges held by him

should be revoked. ue?

We have considered the remaining contentions ad-

vanced by the respondent in support of his appeal and

find that they are without substantial merit.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED: |

1. -That, except to the extent indicated herein,

respondent’s appeal from the Examiner’s Initial Decision

be, and it hereby is, denied.

2. That the Administrator’s Order of Emergency

Revocation, dated January 12, 1961, revoking respondent’s

Airman Certificate No. 143266 be, and it hereby is, af-

firmed.

Boyd, Chairman, Gurney, Minetti and_ Géillilland,

Members of the Board, concurred in the above opinion and

order. Murphy, Vice Chairman, did not take part in the

_ decision.

s/ Robert C. Lester

. Robert C. Lester

(SEAL) Secretary

/

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

“a e .

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing

Petition for Writ of Certiorari was served by air mail

this

day of January, 1963, upen:

Honorable Archibald Cox

Solicitor General of the United States

partment of Justice

ttn Avenue and Ninth Street

W)shington, D.C.

Honorable John H. Wanner

General Counsel

Civil Aeronautics Board

Universal Building

Washington, D.C.

Honorable Daggett H. Howard

General Counsel ,

Federal Aviation Agency

1711 New York Avenue

Washington, D.C.

Robert C. Chalfonte, Esquire

Trial Attorney

Federal Aviation Agency

1711 New York Avenue

Washington, D.C.

Of Counsel

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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