Memoramdum in Opposition — Beaver v. United States

INDEX. ~

’ CITATIONS = +>

Cases: Sas - @

Adams v. Flemming, 276 F.2d 901...--2- ~~~ -

Brady vy. Ribicoff, 195 F. Supp: 35-2... -- = —--

* Druminski v. Ribicoff, 194 F. Supp, 798 2 ---.- .

Grindstaff v. Flemming, 188 F. Supp. 44<<- ~~ - ne

_ Sampson v. Flemming, 189 F. Supp. 725_~- ary.

~ Universal Camera, Corp. v..NALR.B., 340 Us S. rt -

Warehein v. Ribicoff, 194 'K Supp. 633..2:.2.... rats

Statutes

“Social Security’ Act, 49 Stat. 620, us hescaided:

Sethe 3-Gs Sc: 4th).-.---.--.---s

Section 215.(42°U.S.C. 415) .. AS ee

Section 216(i) (42 U.S.C. 416(3) 2-20-22 e

" Section 221 (42 U.S.C. 421)_. 22-222 -222- .

Section 223 (42 U SC. 423). Sree a per

Section 223(c) 42US WG Meee ccs ccs coresxs

(1) j

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Ae a Sa

gn ” Sagreme Court of the ited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1962

No. OTT é ’

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FRANCES I). PEARMAN, PETITIONER

ANTHONY J. CELEBREZZE, SECRETARY OF HEALTH,

| EDUCATION AND WELFARE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

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*

The petition im this case raises the single question

whether there was substantial-evidence in the admin-

istrative record to support the determination: of the

Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare that

petitioner was not under a disability within the mean-

ing of Sections 216(i) ( 1) and 223(c) of the Social

Security Act, as amended, 42. U.S.C. 416(i) and 423

(c), and therefore: was not eligible. for disability

‘benefits under the Aet. On the basis of their exam-

ination of. the record, both courts below concluded ,

that the administrative finding was amply supported.

This eénclusion is: clearly warranted and’ there is

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a

no question of general imp: tance calling for further

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review. ‘by this Court. .

Section 216(1) (1), which date with the establish-

ment af a period of disabilitv. defines disability as

the “inability. to engage in any substantial gainful

aetivity by reason’ .of any medically © determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or: to be of. long-continued and

indefinite duratiot."’ Section 223(¢), whieh deter- .

mines entitlement to disability insurance benefit

payments, contains a like definition. Both sections.

place the burden of proof upon the claimant.’ :

In this case, petitioner established that, at the time

of the filing of her applications for benefits, she had.

‘For those who qualify under its provisions. Section 216

of the Act (42 U.S.C. 416) provides @ period when neither, the

time elapsed nor the-age record of the disabled applicant will

be taken into account sin determining. msured status at the age

of 65 under 42 U.S.C. 414, 6r ony computing the amount of

benefits payable ubder 42 U.S.C. 415. Similarly, for those -

who qualify, Section 223 (42 U ria 423) provides for disability

insurance benefits. An applicant. like petitioner here, must

preve “inability to engage in any ‘substantial gainful activity

by reasoh of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be

* of long-continued and indefinite duration.” 42 U.S. 416(1) (1)

and 423(c)(2). «2; ;

_ * Petitioner filed her first application in 1957, iicking only

ut period of disability under Section 216(i) of the Act, 42

U.S.C. 416(i1) (Tr. 60-63). ° This was denied and _ petitioner

did not seek a hearing (Tr. 70). About two and a-half years

later, on October. 25,- 1960, petitioner tiled a second’. application

with the Bureau,’ seeking both a period of disability under

Section 216(i) of the Act arid disability ‘insurance benefits

* under Section 223, 42 U.S.C. 416(i) and 423 (Tr. 71-74).

“Tr.” referénces are to the administrative transcript, which

is part of the record before this Court.

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certain inspairments resulting fren an, automobile

_aceident in 1952: immobility or ankylosis of the-right

Knee, ankylosis of the right elbow: and an inability.

to make ta complete fist with her right hand ( Pet.

App. 14)... Impairments of this nature do net, low-

ever, invariably cause inability. to engage: in sub-

stantial gainful employment; they may or may not,

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depending upon all of ‘the individual cireumstances.

The administrative determination Was necessarily

based upon an evaluation of all of. the -evidence

- bearing upon petitioner's impairmertits and -capabili-

ties. This evidence showed that. by her own

admission, petitioner has been able to, engage iri a not

inconsiderable degree of activity, notwithstanding her

stiff knee and elbow and impaired and: She is able

to get around without help, to do most of her house-

work and to drive an automobile equipped with auto-

‘matic transmission (Tr. 34:58, 61, 64-65 ). She has

learned to do many things with her left hand and. can

write with her right hand when using a pen (Tr.

\ 51 164). . ;

“The evidence further disclosed that paditieae’ S age,

education and work experience were also fully con-

sistent with the ‘pe rformance of light’ work. Peti-

tioner was thirty-seven years old at the time of the

filing of her first application (Tr. 60). She is a’ high

school graduate and is reported to be very intelligent

*“Pet. App.” references are to ‘the petition for‘a writ of

certiorari. — \ |

and personable (‘T'r. 62, 65). Her werk experience —

is varied and she has the apparent ability to learn

new jobs (Tr, 38-42, 64465). Her own description of

her last position—working: with samples in a rayon

> plant—indicated that she was not merely performing

simple’ manual duties but was:ealled upon to assume .

a significant degree of responsibility (Fr. 41-42).

The South Carolina State Ageney of Voeational .

Rehabilitation, to whom petitioner’s 1960 application

was referred under Section 221 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. :

421, for a recommendation on. the question of -dis-—

ability, concluded that petitioner's abilities are. such

that she ought tobe able to return to the same type

of work (Tr. 87-89). .Her emplover wrote to. her,

following. he ‘r accident in “1952, stating that the, com-

pany desired her to return (Tr. 42). Nevertheless,

since the accide nt, pe titioner, has not sought to obtain

work or to ascertain What she might he able to do

(Tr. 36, 43, 52). As the Court of - ‘Appeils pointed

out, ‘this “ vonsideration Was properly taken into:

‘aecount by the Secretary’ (Pet. App. 15). See, also,

Adams v. Flemming, 276 F. 2d 901, 904 (CLA: =

~ Grindstaff v. Flemming, 188 F. Supp. 44 (W.D.N.C.)

Sampson v. Flemming, 189. F. Supp.-725 (D. Kan. ):

Wareheim v, Ribicoff, 194 F. Supp. 533. (D. Md.) ;

~ Druminski v- Ribicoff, 194 F. Supp. 798 (1D. Alaska) ;

Brady v: Ribicoff, 195 FL Supp. 35 (D. Md.).

In sum, on the admiiistrative record as a whole, the

Secretary was. fully justified in concluding that peti-

tioner®. impairments did not) preclude ».her from

engaging in any substantial gainful employment. -We

accordingly believe that there is no occasion for

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5 Bette

further review, see Unive gsal Came ra Corp. N.

~ NB. R.B., 340 US. 474, 490- qu. “The petition should

he denied. os

Respectfully sulianitved. .

1 fae Hinawy Cox,.

Nolte itor freneral,

Josep DD. Guiroyir, .

— Acting Assistant Attorney General.

: “ALAN S. RoseNTIAL,

“Joux CL ELpripcr,

ces. A florne ys.

DECEMBER 1962. “2

‘pact .

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