Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari — Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court

| Supreme Court of ‘the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1962"

‘ee 3

‘COMPANIA ANONIMA VENEZOLANA DE

'_NAVEGACION their LINE), -

7 Petitioner,

a

A. J. PEREZ EXPORT COMPANY, ETC.,. and TYLER

REFRIGERATION CORPORATION, °

Respondents.

. RESPONDENTS’ £ IN- OPPOSITION TO PETITION

2 FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI | %.

oe SAMUEL C. GAINSBURGH

FA "940 National Bank of

KIERR and. GAINSBURGH New Orleans 12, Lx.

New Orleans, Louisiana are amin come

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

~ j .* . *-

OCTOBER "TERM, 1962

No. 527

Se EEN VENEZOLANA DE ‘NAVEGA- on

CION (VENEZUELAN LINE), |

‘Petitioner, *

versus

nd

-

A. J. PEREZ EXPORT COMPANY, ETC., and TYLER’

Nee - REFRIGERATION CORPORATION, ey ‘

Respondents,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOS TION ‘TO PETITION

‘FOR WRIT OF CER ORARI ae

* .-

oh

| Moy. It’ Please The Cotirt:

OPINIONS BELOW ; :

The petition omits’ the “Opinion” of the District + Cours

_which is in the form of Findings and Conclusions as fe- .

: — by Ryle 4614, of Supreme — oe a

These Findings and Conclusions are printed in Appendix

_ hereof. ar ox

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED .

> Petitionér would hav Court irifer that this. case”

involves confli ts betw n Cieuit and interpretation of .

\

®

\

“Congressional policy”, “the United States Shipping Act”

and a situation where there has been “favoring of a

by a common carrier”.

The plain truth is, as ‘appears from the Trial Court’s:

Findirigs of Fact, that the original carrier, the nominal peti-

tioner herein, has no interest; whatsoever, in this litigation,

_now or formerly, because THE CARRIER HAD. BEEN »

PAID THE FREIGHT CHARGES FOR ALL OF THE SHIP-

JEENTS INVOLVED before thesé suits were cael

. The only iniestion ever presented in this litigation was

whether the carrier’s agent, found to have been guilty of

laches,? should be allowed to reap.any benefits-from its un-

_ fair and inequitable conduct’in corisorting with a dishonest:

freight forwarder with whom that agen dealt. ‘throughout |

. the transactions i in suit.

_ The obvious’answer, the one. given by both lower courts,

_is that the agent should not prevail against these respond-

ents. é

e .

“THE FACTS

In the interest of brevity, respondents shall not attempt

te traverse in detail petitioner’s statement of the “Facts.”

Instead, we submit, that the facts of this case are those

found by the District Court, accepted in toto by the Court

~

{See Appendix “An, Finding No. 26.

2See Appendix “A” re Nos. 23 through 27; Conclusion Noe VI.

>" ra ; 3

-

| A of Appeals. and. unchallenged i petitioner. The facts” are .

contained in ne —. herect. wail

. \ “

: ARGUMENT |

Respondents have eee with petitioner's erudite .

recitation of so-called “Carrier Law”: the carrier must col-

" ject its freights. Howev er, here, the carrier has: collected its

freights* and, what is more, the respondents have. paid.

them.® Therefore, no aspect of this case requires, or even

allows, the application of any of the philosophies, policies

or legal principles upon which petitioner so hopefully relies. °

’ Since the carrier has collected the - proper amount of

charges for the shipment involved, and since the. respond-

_ent-shippers have paid that same amount to the freight

_forwarder with whom the carrier’s agent-colluded, there has

been neither a “failure of the carrier to collect”. nor a “favor-

ing of shippers”. s Py

Consequently, dims it says dust the. instant cmatiois:

opinion conflicts with the decision-of the Court of Appeals

the Tenth Circuit in Empire Petroleum Co. v. Sinclair

— is departing materially: from the

re : 7

Petitioner makes much of what: it. chooses to call an

“unpermitted .choice of Law of Subrogation.”

3R. pp. 375-382. ,

4R. p. 26; Appendix “Ar, Finding No. 26.

5R. p. 380, 381; Appendix ‘ ‘A”, Findings Nos. 17 and 23. —

6This is made abundantly clear by the opinion of the Court of *Ap-

als: 303 F.°2d at page 694.

pe

7282 F. 2d 913 (CCA 10th, 1960).

vi

“~

4

. “Subrogation here”, says petitioner, “is not derived from

~ Admiralty or from the English Equity, but arises exclu-

.Sively, from Louisiana Law of —— as a result of pay-

_ ment under a contract of re

formed. in Louisiana.”® ;

The first observation which must be a the fore-

going assertion is that, in so stating, the petitioner has

. apparently misread the Agency Agreement. Upon which it)

seeks to rely. $

t : ‘

_. By its own terms, the agreement was to be performed

_ in “the Gulf Ports, Baltimore and Philadelphia.”® Conse-

quently, how can petitioner say that Louisiana law is, any

more applicable to these transactions than Texas law, or __

Maryland law, or the jaw of the Commonwealth of Penn-

Sylvania! ©

The second observation required is with respect to peti-

. tioner’s reasoning that the subrogation law of Louisiana

must control because the agency agreement is “non-mari-

time” and it “becomes involved i in this case ny ~ way of

defense.”'°

_ To this contention we can but say that there is no Basis.

Apparently, petitioner concedes, as it must, that the cause

of action which it has sought to assert against these respond-

ents arises out of an alleged breach of a, maritime contract,

that is,'an ocean bill of ae several, ‘in fact." ' That such

®Petitioner’s Application, p. “<

‘ 90Opinion of the Court ‘of pA 303 F. 2d at page 695, n. 6.

10Petitioner’s

Application, p. 23. . ;

11The. libels herein contain the plain ayerment that the claims as-

therein are re “in a cause of contract, ci civil and maritime”:-

_— ’

-

nty made and to be per-

contracts’ are “maritime” is harélly open to dispute. 12 No-

where, in iff pleadings or proof, however, did petitioner ever.

sue these respondents on any agency or guaranty agree-

ment. Respondents did not plead any guaranty agreement

invplving the petitioner. The only place any such contract

of guaranty had in this litigation —was—to—establish - the |

' “capacity”? of Isbrandtsen to prosecute this action in the

name of Venezuelan line, after the latter was found to have

no real interest herein.'®

But, once petitioner’s capacity to pré@&cute the actions

was established, we respectfully submit that maritime law, .

not the law of any state, determihed the nature and extent -

of the substantive _ which could be asserted.

Thus, in the instant case, Isbrandtsen utilized this guaran-

ty merely to show that. it was not a “volunteer” in paying

" these freights to, the carrier. ‘Beyond that, the agreement

cannot be used to abrogate any maritime law deferises

which respondents possessed.'

The courts below, therefore, were not “free to choose”

the law’in the first place, and, consequently, Erie R. Co, v.

Tompkins'® i is oe irrelevant.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, and even assuming that

’ Loufsiana law were applicable here, the mere fact that our

“siibrogation” law happens to be in’ the form of codal

3 artes does not — = the Principles upon. -which

12See Gilmore and Black, — Law of Admiralty, pp. 20-21; 1 Bene-

dict, On Admiralty, p.

132 Benedict, On p

pp. 43, 88-8

14So. Pacific Co. v. Jensen, off. s. 205 491").

18304 U. S. 64 (1938). |

‘ile’

. it rests. As a matter of historical fact, our codified version

and. the so-called “equity” principles stem from a common

seed: the Roman or civil law.'* apne

Equity is no stranger to Louisiana jurisprudence.'? Even

in the face of literal statutory verbiagé, equitable—prins —————

ciples have been ¢pvoked to accomplish a just result by

Louisiana courts.'® Bree ak a | {

True it may be that Louisiana law is “express” to the.ex-.

tent of providing that one who is obligated to pay and pays

_ the debt of another is “subrogated” to the creditor’s rights

'8See Leigh v. Wright, 183 La. 765, 164 So. 794 (1938).

_ 2083 C.J.S. 578-580. . ae

\against ‘the co-debtor. However, the law Yoes not even

\

—E

allude to the situation extant here, where the party other-

wise: entitled to subrogation .has by its improper conduct ~

“created”, so to speak, the debt which is paid.'® .

In such circumstances; under Article 21 of the Louisiana

Civil Code of 1870, we submif that a Louisiana court would.

be at liberty to “decide actording to equity” by “an appeal

-- - to natural law and reason” which are the underlying

principles upon which the entire concept of “subrogation”

is founded.?° | ue aan

3 ¢

1683 C.J.S. 578-579.

“'7Article 21 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provides: “In afl.

civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound

to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably.

an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received

usages, where positive law is silent.” '

a.

'8This is implicit in the Trial’ Court’s Findings, particularly Find-

_ings Nos. 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 27: Appendix tg

see also ee III: Appendix “A”. ve ae

: ; 24 7

. & ,

' “In so doing, no court could be unmindful of the maxim

that: ‘ 7

WHERE ONE OF: TWO INNOCENT PERSONS

MUST SUFFER BY THE FRAUDULENT CON-. .

DUCT OF A THIRD, -THE.ONE WHO HAS; BY —~—~

HIS NEGLIGENCE OR FAILURE TO DO SOME: |

THING THAT A PRUDENT MAN UNDER THE

CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD HAVE DONE, EN- |

ABLED THE FRAUD TO.BE COMMITTED MUST

‘SUFFER THE LOSS OCCASIONED ee: at

The.Trial Court’s Finding i is that this inti ww visitien to,

‘assert a carrier's Tights, “knew... that(the-forwarder)

——.————had beer paid in’ full by respondents for the amount of the

i: freights here involved: _—.

aa “Se

%

. The Trial Court sana fougd that the ‘carrier’s

agent,.who. now seeks. to don the carrier’s shoes, followed -

its “collusion course” to curry the favor of the forwarder,

and thus advance its own selfish business interests.?%

Applying.the maxim to these facts, whether one reasons,

as did the Appellate Court bélow, that such citcumstances

preclude the carrier’s agent from seeking surogation,*4

or whether one reasons that the agent may seek and obtain —

’ subrogation, but, then, must return that which its improper

conduct caused these respondent-shippers to lose, the same >

: 2183 C.J.S. 504.

oS BIDE a: Pinte Ne 34

, @. 23 n oO.

NAS : #4Opinion ee ee 303 F. 2d at page 696.

: oPY

8

just result obtains: respondents are not called upon to pay =

these reget charges again. th

CONCLUSION Peeeoe

- Raguediane, inn what route is exiployed to arrive at the

just end result which has thus far’ obtained herein, there -/

is no merit to this application for certiorari _ the petition

' should be denied.

e

‘ Respectfully submitted,

_ Samuel’C, Gainsburgh

ae i 1740 National Bank of =

aie . Commerce Bldg... .

New Orleans: 12, Louisiana

*Proctor for. . |

SP

Of Counsel: . ;

KIERR and GAINSBURGH |

RAYMOND H. KIERR- ‘°

New Orleans, Louisiana 3 , »

\ . Q

¢ } ‘ x \

S\

&

(Titles Suited). ts

pe ae

aaentid line, during « 1954.

APPENDIX “A”

ccna

FINDINGS OF. FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

isc ' OF LAW.

ADMIRALTY NOS. 2793 & 2794 “

: )

»/

CHRISTENBERRY, J:

These two actions inv olve claims for ocean freight charges ra

on sevéral shipments which:respondents made via libelant’ sf

4

‘ins admit that libelant patient | its cohtracts

of carriage, but they deny liability ori the followin ‘grounds: a

“a that . the nominal fibelant a no real . nhatent in °

. this controversy. because it ‘has been paid ‘these freight

monies, either by reason of respondents’ payment thereof

toa freight forwarder or by reason of the fact that libelant’s

; agent eee ~ monies to libetant, or r by both;

(2) that the libelant is ennai to deny peyinent be- fs

cause of its conduct, through its agent; with the ee

forwarder; and or

(3) that the claims are stale ot tise hatred because of

libelant’s laches in — them..

*

The cases were consolidated for trial’because they involve.”

substantially. identical issues and were submitted by the

~

- (Filed: July 12, 1961

Fil soa 198)

-\>

10 >

“parties | upon their respective pleadisigs; evidence, exhibits .

and: rn after which the court took time to consider.

Now, upon due slain and pursuant to Segrend

- « Court Admiralty Rule 46-1/2, the court makes the ee

: Findings pi Fact “se Conclusions « Law:

"FINDINGS « OF FACT

1.

Libelant, Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion:

_ (hereinafter. referred to as Venezuelan Line), is;a foreign

corporation, engaged in ‘the steamship business, operating

ocean freighter service from the Port of New Orleans to

‘South America. . !

| hee eae

; 2 . . CY. P ie)

. Respondent, Tyler Refrigeration Corporation (herein- ~

- after referred to as Tyler), is an American corporation, with

its principal office's in Niles, Michigan.

3 ;

Respondent, A. J: Perez Export Company (hereinafter

_ referred to as Perez), is a partnership composed of Messrs: -

- A. J. and Louis Perez, with its Pe — in the City

' of New Orleans, Louisiana. 4

a

_

4.

*

During the year 1954, Libelant carried tive shipments of

_ ocean freight for Perez under the following bills of lading,

dates and for the freight charges ‘shown pow:

a

BaP Date “4 sPveighit Charge |

og eee EP Fl $ 2,961,09-

ae ak ‘37 5 eee Os, 822.19

6. 4/27 8. APTA

| ae 6/23/54 | 1,577.15

18 \ 6/11/54 + 1,506.52

‘TOTAL FREIGHTS $ 7,878.65

1 : . : , | he

mak _-

. During the same year, jibelant carried shred: shipments i

of ocean freight for Tyler under the following bills of

"lading, dates and for the freight changes showh below:

-B/L. Re Date $e Freight Charge

a eee

. a 7/30/54 === s«ss«2, 922.51

i Sn ao es

-TOTAL.FREIGHTS, | $ 460788

ae

In each of these eight transactions, Venezuelan Line was

_. represented by Isbrandtsen (New Orleans), Inc., (herein-

as

_ after referred to as Isbrandtseh), a Louisiana corporation, -

with its principal office in New Orleans..

SUA

The selection of libelant’s line and all érrangements for

- booking and clearing of the shipments were-made by Alonso

. Shipping Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Alonso),

a Louisiana corporation, having its domicile in New Or-

leans. . :

8.

The business. relationship between Isbrandtsen ind. Alonso

had begun in about 1949, at Which time Alonso applied. to

Isbrandgsen for “credit privileges” which, ‘after investiga-

tion by Isbrandtsen, Alonso received. .

. ,

- Rettie: respondent ever sought either ‘directly or in-

directly, any so-called “credit privileges” with libelant or +.

its agent, Isbrandtsen, nor did either respondent seek such

_-_ privileges for Alonso.

10,

On each of the transactions in suit, Alonso prepared the

- respective bills of lading’ on libelant’s forms which were 7

— to Alonso by Isbrandtsen. ,

: u.

After completing the information: on the: bills of lading - .

rélative to the cargo markings, shipper, consignee, vessel,

voyage and weights, Alonso returned the bills of lading to

. »Isbrandtsen for completion as to freight charges, at which.

time Isbrandtsen perforated several of the documents with:

the word “copy” thus indicating they were copies of original-

bills. of lading, and allowed Alonso to take-the ‘same, not- .

; a the multilithed ‘word ‘thereon; a .

BY : : ’ : ‘ CaN. Ls

* zn Lye

~ When the cargo was received’ on board the vessel, Is-':

brandtsen acting for likelant, then inserted by rubber stamp. ni

the words “Original — Freight to be Pre-Paid” and signed

several of the same bills-of lading, which Alonso’ then’ for- -

warded to the corisignees of the cargo overseas.

13.

After” receiving. the first! ces te multilithed

_ word “Prepaid”. and libelant’s authenticating “copy” per-

. foration thereon, Alonso forwarded the same to respondents w*

. with its statement for services rendered and expenses in-

- curred, including the ocean freight charges and, in all but

' two of the inst&nces in suit, received payment in full prior.

to the time that the so-called original bills -of lading’ were

- ever signed by ishgmditeen.

“14.

When libelant received the cargo on board and signed

. % ‘a

ee. ? ; &.°.

te Sosa a =

the bills of fading: ‘Aenea was allowed to receive them

without prepaying the freight charges; instead, Alonso

executed so-called “Due Bills” or “1.0.U.’s” which, in some

instances, included freight charges. for shippers other than 7

either a —

eas 15.

% .

_— due bills provided that they should be paid within

three days of their ‘respective dates, which correspond with .

the dates on the various bills of lading sued — herein.

16.

*

In addition to the fee which Aioosh charged ilies

on each of the shipments herein involved, Alonso was also

_ entitled to a commission of 2- 1/2. «per cent of the freight

charges from libelant, which amount. exceeded greatly

“scared S remuneration from respondents.

Saal Oe ee -

Both respondents had remitted all’ of the freight charges

and other amounts to Alonso long before. libelant made

any demand for payment upon ee

a

_ Alonso dealt on a more-or-less daily basis with: libelant,

| he Isbrandtsen, and«a running tabulation was kept

~ by libelant’s agent of thefmonies due from Alonso on ac- |

count of the due bills which Alonso signed.

'

o “ °

a a ;

, eer be

oy ee

~

the payment of these due bills was not a chronological meth-

od. of applying Alonso’ s remittances tg the oldest. due bill

first but, on the contrary, Alonso’s payments to Venezuelan |

were .applied against whatever due’bills, or items thereon,

which the particular remittance would completely liqui-

date. ab 32s wef

e no yet eae

ae @

: Neither respoident ever acquiesced in, or had any. knowl-_

edge of, this method of imputing payments.

.

.

° -

(. QI

, — 4

\

\

\

\

Because of the system penne by Isbrandtsen eid Alon- .

. so for ‘the payment of the freights by Alonso, it is impos-

sible to determine how much of respondents’ remittances .

to Alonso was used by libelant to apply to the shipments of |

- = others on which Alonso had also. been allowed credit priv-

ileges; the court infers, however, that this did occur over |

-the period between the first and the last —* made -

for r each respondent herein.

22. :

Notwithstanding the fact that the bills of _ oni

the pre-payment of freight charges, and - ‘notwithstanding |

the fact that the due bills signed by Alonso required pay-

ment within three days, neither libelant nor its agent ever

made any demand_ for payment of these allegedly unpaid

The system jiead _ libelant’s” ‘agent and Alonso for:

J

ie 16

freights upon either of these respondents, nor ‘gave them

any notice that it claimed Alonso had not paid the freights,

until May 9,.1955, almost eleven months after the first

shipment was made for Tyler; this delay ‘the court finds

both unreasonable and inexcusable. All demands for pay-

"ment were made by libelant upon Alonso Shipping Co.,

Ine. | |

23.

In the interim between the first shipment and the demand

upon respondents, Perez had remitted over Six Thousand

- Déllars and Tyler had remitted over Three Thousand Dol- |

lars. to the failing and apparently dishonest Alonso.’

‘Sh.

"Se

Libelant knew, through its agent, that Alonso had been

_ paid in full by tespondents for the amount of ‘the freights

here involved.

25.

_ Libelant’s failure, under these circumstances, to notify ©

respondents’ was highly.prejudicial to them, in view of the

financial difficulty into which libelant knew Alonso had

e

i Soe

, _ On May 24, 1955, libelant received payment in full for ee

the freights which are the subject Ofthese suits, by virtue

17°

. “ ; r P a ; : | a

of a remittance from its agent, Isbrandtsen, whom the court

finds to be the real party at interest in this litigation.

27.

The court finds further that the reason for Isbranditeen’s s

failure to apprise respondents of the true situation With

respect to Alonsé was the hope of gain on. the part of -

libelant’s agent and an attempt to curry the favor of Alonso

Shipping ‘Company, Inc. by not.exposing its defalcations

‘to respondents; This was of no benefit té respondents.

. ‘ zn , _&

= CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

a

‘The court has jurisdiction of the parties hereto and of the

subject matter, a suit to recover ocean freights, which is

within the: ‘admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the

"« United States,

,

IL: .

In Prien rigs an action must be ‘instituted by the real:

. party at interest. Benedict, on Admiralty, Vol. 2, p. 43.

| . However, it may also be said: that the legal subrogation

which occurred in favor of Isbrandtsen by virtue of its

payment of these freights to Venezuelan Line included the Lay

right to pursue its collection remedy in Venezuelan’s name.

Benedict, on Admiralty, Vol. 2, pp.,82-85. Because of the

_view taken by the court, this issue is moot; since Isbrandt-

sen was the alter ego of Venezuelan Line throughout the

transactions in Dit neither can acquire any better rights

*

apy

18

than the other against these respondents by virtue of any .

subrogation. See Am. Jur. Subrogation, Sec. 3; see. also

U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. hte 295 F. 847, |

—- 849 suet 5th, 1924).

III.

J

The ‘questién of whether Alonss was the agent of re-

_ spondents or of libelant, with respect to the collection of

',. the freights involved, is likewise immaterial, because this °

is not a situation in which the court deems it ‘pertinent to

determine this question. (But see Alcoa SS Co. v. Graver,

1953 AMC 844, 846 (C. Ct. N. Y., 1953) Furthermore, the

maxim, that as between an. innocent principal and an inno-

cent third party, - ‘the principal must bear the risk of his

agent’s infidelity, is inapplicable here because the big

“party”, Venezuelan Line, was not an “innocent. party”

view of its knowledge: of ‘Alonso’s defalcations and ~

failure to apprise these respondents thereof in order that

they, could’ have protected themselves by ee

their dealings.

IV.

. In the circumstances of this: case, libelant is estopped to

_ deny that, it has been paid in full for the freight charges’

- because of the fact that the conduct of its agent in cir- .

_’ culating the “Prepaid” copies of, and the. “Freight to be

Pre-paid” originals of, the bills of-lading induced these re-

spondents to settle their accounts with Alonso, to their*

patent detriment. Restatement of the Law of Agency, Sec-

~ -tion 183; See also Hyde v. Wolf, 4 La. 234, 236 (1832) and

2 Am. Jr., ‘Agency, See. = p. 276 and Sec. 399, p. 313.

a’

&

19

V.

In addition, the court cntiulie that libelant dealt with

Alonso as principal throughout these transactions, as evi-

denced by the facts that. it was Alonso’s ‘credit ‘which —— ee

. .—.was established with libelant’s agent ‘and no benefit inured

to respondents therefrom; the account was kept in_the

name of Alonso; ‘imputation of payments was made with-

- out regard to any considerations other than libelant’s con-

venience; and no demand was: ever made upon these re-—

spondents, except as an afterthought, on libelant’s \ part

until almost a year after the first transaction in each case.

In these circumstances, with knowledge of respondents’ e

identities from the inception of these transactions, libelant

cannot now look to respondents for payrnent. See 2-Am: Jr.,

_ Agency, Sec. 356, p. 277 and Hyde v. Wolf, supra; Alcoa °

Steamship Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. 1953 A.M.C.

844; cf Alcoa SS Co. v. a. Spring Corp, 1989 AMC.

1017. aay |

e tee

. . VI. . ° o

Even if it be said that these respondents must take the

consequences »f Alonso’s misapplication: of their funds

because Alonso was respondents’ agent, libelant and its «

agent were guilty. of such inexcusable delay in asserting

these claims and prejudiced respondents’ position. so severe-

ly. thereby: that ‘libelant and its agent are guilty of such

’ laches that it would: be inequitable to allow a@ither of them

to enforce these claims,-if any there were,.against re- .

- spondents. Czaplicki v. S. S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 US. *

525, 1956 AMC. 1465 ie) oi

20

VII.

_

eaiiiiiailn ios entitled-to a decree dintnieaing thine

ae at* libelant’s cost, which decree aes wrist been

- entered by the court.

New Orleans, Louisjatia, July 12, 1961.

/s/ Herbert W. Christenberry

_ UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE °

_. CERTIFICATE © - J

I, the "undersigned ‘member’ of the Bar of this Court, do

hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing -,

. brief upon proctor. for petitioner, James J. Morrison, Esq., . -

_ by delivering the same to his offices at 1007 National Bank

of Commerce Bldg., New Orleans, Louisiana, this’__ day

of November, ioe.

Samuel C.Gainsburgh.

a