Opposition Brief — In re Alker

Questions presented... ...................-.-.-

x | CITATIONS

Cases:

os Bracey v. United States, 142 F. 2d 85, certiorari

denied, 322 U.S. 762...................-

~ »: Bryant v. United States, 257 Fed. 378.._.___-

« Carlisi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51--...--_.__-

| __ Deli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232... -

e. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190... .__-

2. Fitts v. United States, 284 F. 2d 108....____-

» 2. Garland, Ex parte, 4 Wall. 333...........__-

-¢. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60__._____-

» Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339__.______-

e: Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84.....____-

¢: Rex v. Rookwood, 90 Eng. Repr. 1277.._____-

“Richards v. United States, 192 F. 2d 602,

ny certiorari denied, 342 U.S. 946... ______-

Smith v. U nited States, 236 F. 2d 260, certiorari

denied, 352 U. So

Sse tuktsvsceaeuduuéudes<auvedcaacce

Oon nN = =

Cases—Continued

United States v. 1,960 Acres of Land, etc., 54 F. py,

16

16

12

‘ 4 16

United States v. Weinberg, 226 F. 2d 161,

certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 933 10

United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 12

Vedin v. McConnell, 22 F. 2d 753 12

Wallamet R. T. Co. v. Oregon S. N. Co., Fed.

Cas. No. 17,106, 29 Fed. Cas. 88

Statutes:

Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 316, 5 U.S.C.

18 U.S.C. 371

26 U.S.C.:

30 A.L.R. 2d 893-897

2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 278

McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 43

3 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 980(3)

— -.

Gu the Supreme Court of the United States

OcrToBER TERM, 1962

No. 461

HooPer ENLOE DENTON ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF OPRTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.

3-7) is not yet reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on August 29, 1962 (R. 809-811; Pet. App. 1-2, 3).

The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

September 26, 1962. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support

the convictions of petitioners Phillips and Webb for

(1)

2

violation of the Internal Revenue laws relating to

liquor.

2. Whether various rulings on the evidence were

proper.

3. Whether the trial court properly denied motions

to suppress testimonial evidence challenged by peti-

tioners on the ground that it was obtained by deceit.

4. Whether the trial court properly charged the

jury on the defense of entrapment.

5. Whether the convictions were void because an

attorney from the Internal Revenue Service assisted

the Assistant United States Attorney at the trial.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 507 of Title 28 of the United States Code

provides in pertinent part:

(a) Except as otherwise provided by law,

it shall be the duty of each United States

attorney, within his district, to:

(1) Prosecute for all offenses against the

United States;

* * ~ *

STATEMENT

A twelve-count indictment returned in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Ten-

nessee charged the petitioners and two others with

conspiracy and various substantive offenses relating

to the manufacture, concealment and sale of untaxed

whiskey, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 26 U.S.C.

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3

5205(a) (2), 5605(a), 5691(a) and 7206(4) (R. 7-13).

Before trial, petitioners Denton and Webb moved to

suppress testimonial evidence to be given by govern-

ment agents on the ground that such evidence had

been obtained through use of fraud and deception

amounting to an unlawful trespass (R. 18-19, 21).

The motions were denied after a hearing (R. 22, 230-

231, 242). Following a trial by jury, Denton was

found guilty as charged on six counts. Phillips and

Webb were found guilty on two substantive counts

and were acquitted on the conspiracy count (R. 791).

On October 6, 1961, Denton was sentenced to concur-

rent terms of imprisonment of five years on three

counts, and to lesser concurrent terms on the remain-

ing three counts; Phillips was sentenced to concurrent

terms of imprisonment of one year on two counts, the

* Specifically, the indictment charged that Denton, Phillips,

Webb, Costner and Sutton conspired to transport and sell un-

taxed whiskey, to carry on the business of wholesale and retail

liquor dealers without having paid the special tax therefor, to

defeat and evade taxes due the United States on distilled

spirits, and to remove and conceal goods with the intent to

defraud the United States of taxes (count 1). The indictment

also charged that Denton (5 counts), Phillips (2 counts), Webb

(2 counts), Costner (5 counts) and Sutton (3 counts) possessed

and sold untaxed whiskey, removed and concealed whiskey with

the intent to defeat the assessment and collection of taxes, and

carried on the business of wholesale liquor dealers without hav-

ing paid the special tax therefor (counts 2-9) (R. 7-13).

Three counts (counts 10-12), together with two overt acts on

the conspiracy count (overt acts 9 and 10), were dismissed on

the government’s motion before trial (R. 244).

*Two co-defendants, Lonzo Sutton and Albert Costner, were

found guilty on three and six counts, respectively (R. 791).

4

sentence to commence at the expiration of a sentence

which he was then serving; and Webb was placed on

probation for five years on two counts (R. 24-25, 26-

27, 28-29). The convictions were affirmed on appeal

(R. 809-811; Pet. App. 1-2, 3-7).

The pertinent facts may be summarized as follows:

1. The chief government witnesses were Alcohol and

Tobacco Tax Investigator Artha Bryant and one

John Prevatte who operated in undercover capacities

in Cocke County, Tennessee, during the period

covered by the indictment. Prevatte was a paid

informer for the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division

and had been employed in that capacity at varying

intervals from about December 1958 down to the date

of the trial (R. 247, 308-309, 343, 372, 416-417, 430,

462, 464, 493). Prevatte’s compensation included

subsistence pay of $10.00 per day, together with a

prospect of receiving “rewards” for work in connec-

tion with the apprehension of major liquor violators

(R. 308-309, 344-346, 372, 417, 427-428, 431, 432).

In early July 1960, Prevatte was given a list of

“major violators” of the Internal Revenue Laws

relating to liquor in the Cocke County section of

Tennessee (R. 311, 313, 373, 490; see R. 431-432).

Petitioner Denton and co-defendant Albert Costner

were included on that list.

Prevatte and Bryant went to the Cosby section

of Cocke County to “play it by ear”—to be seen,

make contacts and meet people (R. 319). Prevatte

subsequently met a convict friend, one Swan Owenby

(R. 374). Owenby had ‘“‘gotten the word out’’ that

Prevatte was a large liquor dealer, and that Bryant

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5

was Prevatte’s driver (R. 319). With assistance from

Qwenby, Bryant and Prevatte purchased 15 cases of

moonshine whiskey from Costner in late July 1960

(R. 248-254, 312, 327, 374-376, 379, 388).

During July and August 1960, Prevatte frequented

the tavern of Scott Denton, brother of petitioner

Denton (R. 388-389), and told Scott that he was

interested in renting a place of business in the area

(R. 436, 459-460). When apprised that petitioner

Denton was having a business establishment built in

the area, Prevatte told Scott that he would be in-

terested in renting that establishment (R. 333).

On August 26, 1960, Scott introduced Prevatte to

petitioner Denton (R. 388, 390-391, 472). Prevatte

had a “genuine interest” in renting Denton’s pro-

posed business establishment in order “to establish

himself,’”’ and discussions concerning liquor were inci-

dental to this purpose (R. 323-327, 470-471). When

apprised that the building under eonstruction would

not be ready for rental until October or November

1960, Scott told Denton. that Prevatte wanted to

haul a few loads of whiskey until such time as he

could find a place of business (R. 329-330, 339, 390).

Prevatte said that he had a man to do the actual haul-

ing of whiskey for him (R. 393). After some discus-

sion on the subject, petitioner Denton agreed to sell

whiskey to Prevatte for $17.00 per case (R. 395).

At about 12:30 a.m. on August 29, 1960, Bryant and

Prevatte went to Denton’s house and parked a govern-

ment automobile in the back yard area (R. 395-396).

Prevatte introduced Bryant as his driver (R. 474).

After some conversation concerning liquor, Denton

6

told Prevatte and Bryant that he was taking a

**chance”’ on them, and that if he got into any trouble

over the proposed liquor sale, he would kill someone

(R. 263, 264, 397).

Early the next morning, Prevatte told Denton to

put 25 cases of whiskey in the automobile (R. 401).

Denton said that Prevatte and Bryant could not go

to the “stash,”’ and that he would send a boy to load

the automobile (R. 264). Shortly thereafter, Denton

went outside and said something, after which someone

drove off in an automobile (R. 265). At about this

time, petitioner Phillips was standing in the back

porch area of Denton’s house. Denton told Phillips

to be ready to clean the mud off the automobile when

the boy returned with the whiskey (R. 266). When

Denton, in the presence of Prevatte, Bryant and Phil-

lips, said that the ATU had “cut a lot of stills’’ in the

area, and that he had just purchased a still for $205,

Phillips inquired “if it wasn’t $270.00 that it cost’

(R. 270). Denton said that $65 was for the “worm”

(R. 270).

At about 9:15 a.m., Webb drove up in the govern-

ment automobile, and Denton, Phillips, Prevatte and

Bryant went outside (R. 274, 349-350, 402). Webb,

a son-in-law of Denton, said that he did not believe

the automobile “sat down too much considering it had

seventeen cases in the trunk compartment and eight

in the back seat’? (R. 275, 403). At the direction of

Denton, however, Webb, accompanied by Phillips,

drove the automobile to Costner’s house, which was a

short distance away, for some air (R. 276-277, 353-

354, 404). In the meantime, Prevatte paid Denton

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7

$425 for the whiskey out of government funds (R.

411). Prevatte and Bryant then drove to Costner’s

residence in another automobile, where they helped

Webb and Phillips put air in the tires and air lifts

of the loaded automobile (R. 279, 353-354, 406).

Phillips remarked that he wished he had all the whis-

key he helped load (R. 278). Bryant and Prevatte

drove to the vicinity of Greenville where they turned

over the whiskey to ATU agents (R. 281-282, 407,

482-483).

Eight days later, on September 6, 1960, at about

6:00 a.m., Bryant and Prevatte drove up to Denton’s

residence and parked a government automobile. Den-

ton met them, and asked if they had had extra springs

put on the car, and said that he had made plans to

have a man put some extra springs under the auto-

mobile to help support the load (R. 282-283). Pre-

vatte said that they wanted to pick up the whiskey and

leave that day because a holiday weekend was coming

up and their customers were out of whiskey (R. 284,

409). After Denton had purchased a large quantity

of paper bags for Prevatte (to be used in wrapping

the individual half-gallon jars of whiskey), Prevatte

paid Denton $425 from government funds (R. 287,

290, 299, 410-411). Denton told the two men that they

should pick up the whiskey at Costner’s house.

Shortly after Prevatte and Bryant arrived at Cost-

ner’s house, Denton entered that house and tested the

whiskey with a hydrometer (R. 296, 414). The auto-

mobile was loaded with 25 cases of whiskey which

Prevatte and Bryant later turned over to ATU agents

(R. 415-416, 483).

663140—62——2

Petitioners did not have a wholesale liquor dealer

tax stamp, and the liquor sold to Prevatte and Bryant

was untaxed (R. 481-483). After the apprehension

of the petitioners and their co-defendants, the Alco-

hol and Tobacco Tax Division paid Prevatte rewards

of $800 for work in connection with Denton and $100

for work in connection with Costner (R. 346; see R.

493).

2. Webb testified that he drove the government

automobile from Denton’s residence on August 29,

1960; that “something” in the back seat area of the

automobile was covered with a blanket but he did not

know what it was (R. 590-594). He later pumped

some air in the tires and “springs” of the automobile

(R. 595-596, 598). Phillips admitted that he assisted

Webb and others in pumping air into the tires of the

government automobile on August 29, 1960, but denied

knowledge of what was under the blanket in the auto-

mobile on that date (R. 566, 573, 578-579). Denton

testified that he had nothing to do with any whiskey

during the periods in question (R. 689, 700, 705-706,

711). He admitted that he obtained a quantity of

paper bags for Prevatte on September 6, 1960, and

that he went to Costner’s house later that day where,

at the request of Prevatte and Bryant, he tested some

whiskey (R. 691-692, 695-696, 721-722). He denied

any interest in the whiskey at Costner’s house (R.

699).

At the conclusion of the case, the court overruled

motions for acquittal on grounds of entrapment and

insufficiency of evidence (R. 743-744).

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9

ARGUMENT

1, There is no merit to the contention of petitioners

Phillips and Webb (Pet. 15-16) that the evidence is

insufficient to support their convictions. Webb ad-

mitted that he drove the car which carried the whiskey

and both Webb and Phillips helped in putting air in

the tires and air lifts. The jury could properly find

that these acts were done with knowledge and intent

to assist in the possession, sale and transfer of untaxed

whiskey, as charged in count five.’ Webb’s knowledge

was shown by the statement that he did not believe

that the car sat too low considering the fact that there

were 17 cases in the trunk and eight cases in the back

seat area. Phillips’ knowledge was shown by his re-

marks as to the cost of the still (see infra, pp. 9-10)

and his statement that he wished he had all the whis-

key he helped load (R. 278).

2. Petitioners objections to various items of evi-

dence (Pet. 13-15) were properly denied.

a. Testimony concerning the purchase of a distil-

lery.—At the trial, Bryant testified that on August 29,

1960, Denton remarked to him that the ATU had “cut

a lot of stills” in the area, and that he had purchased a

solid copper still for $205 (R. 269-270). At that

point, Phillips, who was nearby, asked Denton “‘if it

wasn’t $270.00 that it cost,” to which Denton replied

that the cost was $205, and that $65 was for the

*Since petitioners Phillips and Webb received equal concur-

rent sentences on counts 5 and 6—the only counts on which

they were convicted—their convictions may be sustained by

showing that the evidence supported the convictions on count 5.

See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 839, 359; Roviaro v. United

States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, fn. 6; Emspak v. United States, 349 US.

190, 195, fn. 9.

10

“worm” of the still (R. 270). Objection to this

testimony was overruled.

These admissions not only tended to show the

element of criminal intent on the part of Denton

and Phillips as to the various counts of the indict-

ment, but tended to establish the existence of the

general conspiracy to deal in illicit liquor and their

connection therewith. The evidence, therefore, was

admissible. See United States v. Weinberg, 226 F.

2d 161, 172 (C.A. 3), certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 933;

Smith v. United States, 236 F. 2d 260, 267-268 (C.A.

8), certiorari denied, 352 U.S. 909; Bracey v. United

States, 142 F. 2d 85, 87-88 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari

denied, 322 U.S. 762, and cases cited; Tandberg-

Hanssen v. United States, 284 F. 2d 331, 333 (C.A.

10) ; Fitts v. United States, 284 F. 2d 108, 110 (C.A.

10).

b. The cross-examination of Prevatte—Over objec-

tions of government counsel, the court permitted

counsel for the petitioners to cross-examine Prevatte

as to his activities in North Carolina subsequent to

September 6, 1960 (after the conspiracy was alleged

to have ended and after the last purchase of whiskey

had been made), concerning his activities in Ten-

nessee in 1961, and into his relationship with some

young women at Scott Denton’s tavern (R. 442-444,

445, 451-458). Prevatte testified fully as to his rela-

tionship with the ATU in the instant case, including

the matter of compensation. He admitted that he

had worked as an informer for the ATU in North

Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee. Prevatte

said that he had made certain untruthful statements

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ll

to Denton in the past (R. 449-450). When defense

counsel asked. Prevatte whether he saw “anything

wrong with telling a man a falsehood in order to get

him arrested?” the court sustained an objection by

government counsel (R. 450). Ata later point in the

cross-examination, the court refused to permit counsel

to examine Prevatte as to his activities in Kentucky

on matters which were then under investigation by

authorities there (R. 466-469).

Petitioners contend (Pet. 13-14) that the district

court erred in so limiting the cross-examination

beeause the areas sought to be covered bore upon the

credibility of Prevatte. These minor limitations in

the very liberal scope allowed for cross-examination

were, however, well within the permissible discretion

of the trial judge. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.

60, 83.

¢. The cross-examination of petitioner Denton as to

a felony for which he had been pardoned.—At the

trial, the court permitted the Assistant United States

Attorney, over objection of defense counsel, to ask

Denton whether he had been convicted in 1936 of

second-degree murder (R. 732-734). Denton ad-

mitted the date of the conviction and said that it had

been reduced to voluntary manslaughter, and that he

had subsequently received a pardon from the gov-

ernor (R. 734).

Petitioner Denton contends (Pet. 14-15) that in

view of the pardon, the prosecutor’s inquiry, was im-

proper. The short answer, however, is that a pardon

merely relieves a person of the penal and civil rights

consequences of a conviction of crime; it does not wipe

12

out the fact of conviction. In accordance with this

principle, the uniform rule in federal, state and Eng-

lish courts is that the credibility of witnesses may be

impeached by showing a prior conviction of felony

notwithstanding the fact that a full and unconditional

pardon had been granted. Richards v. United States,

192 F. 2d 602, 605-608 (C.A. D.C.), certiorari denied,

342 U.S. 946; Vedin v. McConnell, 22 F. 2d 753, 754

(C.A. 9); Bryant v. United States, 257 Fed. 378, 383

(C.A. 5); Wallamet R. T. Co. v. Oregon S. N. Co.,

Fed. Cas. No. 17,106, 29 Fed. Cas. 88, 90 (D. Ore.)

(1876) ; United States v. Jones, Fed, Case No. 15,493,

26 Fed. Cas. 644, 648 (C.C. D. N.Y.) (1824) ; see eases

collected in 30 A. L. R. 2d 893-897; Rea. v. Rookwood,

90 Eng. Repr. 1277 (1696); 2 Hale, Pleas of the

Crown, 278 (1847); See 3 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec.

380(3); MeCormick Evidence, Sec. 43 at p. 91. In

Carlisi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, this Court recognized

that a presidential pardon did not wipe out the fact

of conviction in holding that such a pardon did not

prevent a state from imposing increased punishment

as a second offender based on the conviction for which

the pardon had been granted.*

* United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, and Ex parte Garland,

4 Wall. 333, on which petitioner relies, are not to the contrary.

In the Wilson case, this Court merely held that federal courts

could not. take judicial notice of presidential pardons, that such

pardons would have to be pleaded or specifically brought before

the courts. The statement in Garland on which petitioners rely

was made in the context of a situation where the Court found

that Congress was endeavoring to impose additional punish-

ment for the pardoned act. Garland was cited to the Court in

Carlisi v. New York, supra.

13

In this case, moreover, the court was careful to in-

struct the jury throughout the trial that evidence of

prior convictions could be used by them only on the

issue of credibility—not as evidence of guilt on the

charges in the indictment (R. 546-547, 583, 600, 733,

735). The jury is presumed to have followed these

instructions. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84,

95; Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242,

3, Petitioners contend (Pet. 7-8) that the district

court erred in refusing to suppress the testimony of

Prevatte and Bryant regarding their contacts with

the petitioners, In other words, they argue that the

court should, as a matter of law, have found that the

conduct of the government agents amounted to en-

trapment, It is, however, well established that gov-

ernment agents may resort to a ruse to uncover

criminals so long as they do not induce an unwilling

or innocent person to commit a crime. Sherman vy.

United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-374; Sorrells vy.

United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-442, 451. There is

nothing in the record to indicate that government

agents implanted in the minds of the petitioners the

disposition to commit the instant offenses or that the

criminal conduct was produced by the “creative activ-

ity” of those agents. The ease with which the sales

Were effected shows that petitioners were already in

the illegal liquor business when the government agents

appeared on the scene. The issue of entrapment was

properly left for the jury to decide.

4. In its instructions on entrapment the court

distinguished between lawful and unlawful entrap-

ment. It said that the law forbids a conviction

14

wherever there is an unlawful entrapment which the

court defined as “[w]here a person has no previous

intent or purpose in violating the law but is induced

or persuaded by law enforcement officers to commit

a crime” (R. 775). It charged that the petitioners

should be acquitted if the jury found that they had

no previous intent to commit any offense, but did so

only because persuaded by some agent of the govern-

ment. The court defined lawful entrapment as that

conduct of government agents which provides people

who already possess the readiness and willingness to

break the law a favorable opportunity to do so (R.

775-776).

These instructions leave no room for petitioners’

complaint (Pet. 12) that the court erred in refusing

to charge the jury that the function of law-enforce-

ment officials is not the manufacture of crime, and

that entrapment occurs when the criminal conduct

is the product of the creative activity of law-enforce-

ment officials. In distinguishing between permissible

and impermissible conduct on the part of government

agents in this area, the court adequately covered the

substance of the requested instructions. The claim

(Pet. 12-13) that the court erred in refusing to charge

the jury that the petitioners should be acquitted if

they found “that the police authorities * * * first

suggested the commission of the criminal act to the

defendants or lured the defendants into committing

such criminal act’’ is devoid of merit. The fact that

law-enforcement officials ‘‘first suggested’’ a par-

ticular sale does not, ipso facto, constitute entrap-

ment. See Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386,

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—

15 ”

where the court held there was no entrapment as a

matter of law although the government agent, from

the start, stated that he was interested in buying

narcotics. ae

5. Before the trial commenced, the Assistant

United States Attorney in charge of the case intro-

duced to the court William P. Crewe, Assistant

Regional Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service,

and requested and received permission to have Mr.

Crewe “serve as counsel” (R. 44). No objections to

the presence of Mr. Crewe were made either at this

time or during the trial. During the trial, Mr. Crewe

examined two government witnesses, made one objec-

tion and delivered the opening argument to the jury

(R. 422, 480, 482, 798).

Petitioners’ contend (Pet. 9-10) that the district

court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to judgment be-

cause Mr. Crewe was not qualified by the required oath

of office to prosecute for the government. The short

answer, however, is that Mr. Crewe did not conduct

the prosecution or impinge upon the duty of the

United States Attorney to “prosecute * * * offenses

against the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 507, supra.

The prosecution was brought in the name of the

United States Attorney for the Eastern District of

Tennessee (R. 13, 40). The record shows that As-

sistant United States Attorney Cecil D. Meek was

present at all stages of the trial and directed the prose-

cution, including the pretrial proceedings, to its con-

clusion. The assistance rendered by Mr. Crewe—

limited to the direct examination of two rather incon-

sequential government witnesses and to the delivery

16

of a brief opening argument to the jury—did not di-

vest the United States Attorney of control of the case

or oust the district court of jurisdiction.’

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should

be denied.

ARCHIBALD Cox,

Solicitor General.

HERBERT J. MILLER, Jr.,

Assistant Attorney General.

BEATRICE ROSENBERG,

RicHarp W. ScHMUDE,

Attorneys.

OcTOBER 1962.

* Petitioners’ reliance upon United States v. Huston, 28 F. 2d

451 (N.D. Ohio), United States v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical

Co., 163 Fed. 66 (M.D. Tenn.) and United States v. 1,960 Acres

of Land, etc., 54 F. Supp. 867 (S.D. Cal.) is misplaced. In

Huston, the district court dismissed the indictment on the

ground that a special assistant to the Attorney General con-

ducted grand jury proceedings in a district to which his special

commission from the Attorney General did not apply. In Vir-

ginia-Carolina Chemical Co., the district court dismissed an in-

dictment on the ground that a special assistant to the United

States Attorney had conducted grand jury proceedings when

there existed no statutory authority for such conduct (7.e., prior

to the enactment of the Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 316, 5

U.S.C. 310, which confers such authority). In 1,960 Acres of

Land, etc., the district court determined that it had no juris-

diction to entertain a land condemnation case brought by 4

special assistant to the Attorney General on the ground that

only a United States Attorney, under the applicable statute,

could bring such a suit on behalf of the United States, and that,

in any event, the special assistant to the Attorney General had

no authority to re-delegate to other special assistants any

authority to proceed with the lawsuit.

U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962

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