Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Willems Industries, Inc. v. United States

APR 12 1962

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBER TERM, 1961

yo, 867

LELAND A. CHAPPELLE, Petitioner

v.

Duper C. SHARP, eT AL., Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Sommers T. Brown

Pav. M. RHODES

Counsel for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

Ruopes, Simms & Brown

612 Barr Building

Washington 6, D. C.

seuaamnidenmauanal

Panes ov Braces S. Assess, Waemmasen. D.C. -

*

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

Opinions Below 2. oi. 2c cccccccccccvcccsccccccvcccsce 2

ices icsebaabes ener grtteeeeeeettes 2

Question Presented ........ sGvenb ibe beweseerdyede’ 2

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved ..... 3

Statement of the eR se ee ar a ood 3

ReaSons er Se SO WOUND a ka nicvreesccecsonsé 6

Decision Below in Conflict With Prior Decisions of

That Same Court and Contrary to Rules of Prac-

tice Established by This Court for Lower Courts.. 7

Even If Procedure Below Was Acceptable, Decision

Below Is Contrary to Law of Cases From This

SE Secswatsrebsbwesse Seeiadvesate vevdeeeees 10

Case Presents Question of Sufficient Importance to

Warrant This Court’s Attention ................ 13

NS ee aan ee OE ee ibe nh abe napaahane 14

CITATIONS

CasEs :

American Federation of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F. 2d

ee, Oe, Os Os cb oescecctevesecees

SE is SE ET Os Ep pc ticdchcvcenecencese 11

Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 349 P. 2d 289 .... 12

Callaway v. Hamilton Nat. Bk. of Wash., 90 U. S.

I Oe ey Be We OND cbc ccccvesctcscress 8, 10

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41.0... cc cccccccccces 12

Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368 .............. 10, 11, 12

Hammond v. Hopkwns, 143 U.S. 224 ............... 8

Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F. 2d 655, cert. den. 323 U. S.

773, reh. den. 323 U. S. 817, affm’d 324 U.S. 200.. 11

Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 ............. 11

Mount Vernon Savings Bank v. Wardman, 84 U. S.

Ba ah Ey BED BBO OOD ccccccccccccccccces 10

Subject Index Continued

Page

Pfister v. Cow Gulch Oil Co., 189 F. 2d 311; cert. den.

Rea ae ey ee ee eee

Riley v. Titus, 89 U. 8. App. D. C. 79, 190 F. 2d 653;

cert. den. 342 U.S. 855; reh. den. 342 U. S. 889 ....8, 10

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. 8.1 .............. 10

Sis v. Boarman, 11 App. D. C. 116 .............4... ll

Swart v. Johnson, 48 Cal. App. 2d 824, 120 P. 2d 699 12

Wieman v. Uppdegraft, 344 U.S. 183 ..........4... 6

STATUTES:

el ee Gi EN SEED cccssendicscvredsesens 2

Be ee Oh ae EE vevcccsacecscesscoas 3, 5, 7, la

BD Wie Ws Bip as BED Secdccedtevevecccs 3, 5, 7, 9, la

ConsTITUTIONAL Provisions:

Constitution of U. S., Fifth Amendment ...........

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1961

No.

LeLanD A. CHAPPELLE, Petitioner

v.

Duptey CO. Suarp, er au., Respondents

_

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

To the Honorable Chief Justice of the United States

And the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court

of the United States:

Leland A. Chappelle, petitioner herein, by his attor-

nheys, prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia affirming the dismissal of

petitioner’s cause.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The District Court wrote no opinion or findings of

fact. (J. A. 9).* The judgment of the Court of

Appeals has not been officially reported, but is printed

as Appendix B to this petition, infra, p. 3a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was dated

and entered on November 22, 1961. Appellant’s peti-

tion for rehearing was denied on January 15, 1962.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to

28 U. 8. C. Section 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In the opinion of petitioner, the questions presented

in this case are:

1. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may

the defense of laches be raised by a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted ?

2. Does the time lapse of thirty-four and one-half

months, per se, that is, without any showing of preju-

dice to result from a change of circumstances, consti-

tute laches, so as to bar in its entirety a civil action

by a wrongfully discharged government employee seek-

ing reinstatement, a clearing of his employment records,

and lost pay?

* Page 9 of Joint Appendix of Brief for Appellant in Court

of Appeals.

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

3

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

This case involves questions relating to:

1. Rules 8(¢) and 12(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, 28 U. 8, C., F. B.C. P. 8(¢) and 12(b),

which are printed in Appendix A, infra, p. 1a.

2. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States, which is also printed in Appendix A,

infra, p. 2a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

solely on the facts pleaded in the complaint and the

date established by the affidavit.

Petitioner is a United States citizen and an experi-

enced firefighter who was employed by the Department

of the Air Force at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam.

He was a Schedule A employee (Excepted Appoint-

ment) who had served his probationary period and held

4 permanent status, which was within Tenure Group I

for reduction in force purposes. His civil service grade

was GS-081-10, $/4,

4

Following several denials by intermediate appeal

authorities, petitioner’s removal was reviewed by the

Grievance Review Committee of the Office of the See-

retary of the Air Force; and, based upon that review,

the Secretary ordered that petitioner be restored to

his position or to one of “like seniority, status

and pay”’.

That restoration order was issued under date of

December 20, 1956, but no action was taken by the local

personnel office to reinstate petitioner until February

26, 1957, when he was notified that he was being given

a “*Temporary Appointment”’ in a job in the civil serv-

ice grade of GS-081-11, 8/2. This position was in

Tenure Group III for reduction in force purposes. |

That purported restoration obviously was not a

compliance with the order of the Secretary that peti-

tioner be restored to a “‘ position of like seniority, status,

and pay’’. It was temporary rather than permanent;

it was in grade 11 step 2 rather than in grade 10 step 4;

and it was within Tenure Group III rather than Ten-

ure Group I for reduction in force purposes. And on

February 27, 1957, the very next day after the pur-

ported notice of restoration, petitioner was served with

notice that it was necessary to “‘separate you by redue-

tion in force because of a required reduction in per-

sonnel’’,

Petitioner was separated pursuant to that notice

and he remains so separated. He diligently pursued

his avenues for administrative relief and exhausted

them on August 1, 1957. During the almost two and

one-half years in which he was seeking to recover his

job and status by administrative actions, and since the

final administrative denial therein, petitioner remained,

and is now, a resident of the Island of Guam. He ob-

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

5

tained other work as a means of earning a livelihood

but was unable to find a position comparable in pay and

other respects to that which had been taken from him.

On June 17, 1960, petitioner filed action in the

United States District Court for the District of Colum-

bia seeking equitable reliefs in the forms of a declara-

tory judgment rendering null and void the adminis-

trative actions which had deprived him of his job and

a mandatory injunction ordering a clearing of his

employment records a proper job reinstatement with

acerued seniority and status, and an award for mone-

tary loss. Federal jurisdiction was founded upon the

Act of June 25, 1948, ¢, 646; 62 Stat. 930; U.S.C. Title

28, sec. 1331, 1332.

Respondents, without having answered the complaint,

moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted. The sole grounds relied

Petitioner opposed the motion on the grounds that,

under Rule 8(¢) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure, the defense of laches may not be raised in that

manner; and that even if it could be so raised, there

were not sufficient facts before the court to sustain the

defense.

The district court treated the motion as a motion

for summary judgment pursuant to Rules 12(b) and

56, F.R.C.P., and entered summary judgment dismiss-

ing the complaint.

Petitioner appealed, and the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed on

6

the grounds that the time interval of thirty-four and

one-half months between the date of exhaustion of the

administrative remedies and the date of filing of the

civil action constituted laches and, therefore, peti-

tioner’s claim was barred.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

By affirming the District Court’s dismissal of peti-

tioner’s complaint, the Court of Appeals has sustained,

in the process by which petitioner has been and is being

deprived of his job and federal employee status, two

additional departures from established law and the due

process of law to which petitioner is entitled.

The actions of the local personnel office is patently

failing to comply with the Secretary’s restoration

order, and in holding up any restoration action for a

period in excess of two months for the obvious purpose

of setting the stage for the reduction in force action

which was to follow within the twenty-four hours imme-

diately following the purported restoration, were gross,

arbitrary, and discriminatory deprivations of petition-

er’s rights to his job and status. Those rights are guar-

anteed protection by the ‘‘due process’’ clause of the

Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United

States, and petitioner is entitled to effect that protection

through the courts (Wieman v. Uppdegraft, 344 U.S.

183, 192).

When petitioner took his case to the courts, the courts

below refused to require that the respondents follow

the rules of procedure under which cases are to be

heard and in accordance with which petitioner at-

tempted to prosecute his case. Those rules have been

enacted as laws of the United States and the refusal by

the courts to enforce them led to the dismissal of peti-

COPY BOUND CLOSE INCENTEDS

7

tioner’s case in violation of law and in the absence

of the “‘due process” contemplated and assured by

them.

In ruling upon the issue of laches which was treated

as raised in petitioner’s case, the courts below also

departed from the law as established by prior decisions

of this Court. By applying incorrect rules of law,

those courts have concluded that petitioner is not en-

titled to any relief and have refused to hear his case.

Decision Below in Conflict With Prior Decisions of That Same

Court and Contrary to the Rules of Practice Established

By This Court

Without having answered to petitioner’s complaint

in the trial court, respondents moved to have the com-

plaint dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted. In their argument in support

of that motion, respondents relied solely upon the

defense of laches. No deficiency in the cause stated in

the complaint was alleged. It is clear, therefore, that

it was not a failure to state a claim that respondents

wished to put into issue—it was rather a defense to the

claim stated.

But Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure provides in pertinent part that:

8... (ce) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to

a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirm-

atively accord and satisfaction, . . +) + » oy laches,

+ ++) +++, and any other matter constituting an

avoidance or affirmative defense. .

And Rule 12(b) then requires that:

... Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for

relief in any pleading . . . shall be asserted in the

responsive pleading thereto if one is required. ...

8

The Rules are clear, therefore, in their requirement

that in order to raise the affirmative defense of laches

against a claim made in a complaint, said defense must

be asserted in the answer thereto, and may not be

raised by a motion to dismiss. (See Riley v. Titus,

89 U.S. App. D.C. 79, 190 F. 2d 653, 656, cert. den.,

342 U.S. 855, 72 S. Ct. 82, 96, L. Ed. 644, reh. den.,

342 U.S. 889, 72 S. Ct. 179, 96 L. Ed. 667; Callaway v.

Hamilton Nat. Bk. of Wash., 90 U.S. App. D.C. 228,

195 F. 2d 556, 562).

The reasonableness and desirability of such a rule

is made clear when we bear in mind that laches is an

equitable defense and, as such, can be determined and

applied or rejected only after a weighing of the equities

of the case in the light of all relevant facts. (Hammond

v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224, 250, 12 S. Ct. 418, 36 L. Ed.

134; Pfister v. Cow Gulch Oil Co., 189 F. 2d 311, cert.

den., 342 U.S. 887, 72 S. Ct. 177, 96 L. Ed. 665). Those

same facts will of necessity be relied upon and inter-

woven with other facts to be relied upon in the presenta-

tion or defense of the other issues of the case, and to

allow such an expansive and all-embracing issue as

laches to be singled out for a separate determination

would be tantamount to allowing the party raising it to

put the party against whom it is asserted to the intoler-

able task of a multiple proof of his claim—once to over-

come the assertion of laches, and again on the trial of

the merits.

The foregoing considerations apply with unusual

force and vigor in the case now before the Court because

the petitioner, although a native of the United States,

is and for some time has been a resident of the Island

of Guam, and to require multiple proofs in this case

would work peculiar prejudice and hardship upon him.

CORY ROLIND Cl OeCE IM Pe Aareo

9

That the Rules do not contemplate that the defense of

laches may be raised by motion is further evidenced

by the fact that Rule 12(b) specifically enumerates

certain defenses which, as exceptions to the general

rule may be made by motion; but laches is not included

among those exceptions. And again, the apparent rea-

son is that those exceptions consist of defenses technical

in nature and factually unrelated to the general issues.

The issues involved in the determination of the defenses

of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of

process, and insufficiency of service of process, as ex-

amples of those excepted defenses, will turn on facts

independent of and unrelated to the facts needed in

the determination of substantive issues of the case

itself. But that is not the situation with the issue of

laches, since, as has been pointed out, the determina-

tion thereof requires a weighing and balancing of the

equities of the case.

It is clear, therefore, that a party’s cause should

not be tested against the defense of laches solely on the

facts alleged in the complaint and the time interval

involved. In federal pleading a party is not required

to anticipate and plead against the defense of laches.

He should not include such matter in his complaint

and he is entitled to have the defendant plead and

prove all the essential elements of the defense.

Petitioner relied upon this point in the trial court

but was overruled. He urged it again before the Court

of Appeals but that Court ignored it in its decision.

Petitioner asked for a rehearing for the reason that

no consideration was given to it in the decision but

rehearing was denied.

In refusing to address itself to the question, the

Court of Appeals silently has refused to follow the rule

10

which it had laid down in the Riley and Gallaway cases,

supra.

The federal rules of civil procedure have the force

and effect of statutes. (Sitbbach v. Wilson & Co., 312

U.S. 1, 7, 13; American Federation of Musicians v.

Stein, 213 F. 2d 679, cert. den. 348 U.S. 873.) As such

they are controlling of the procedure to be followed

in the federal courts, and the court is without authority

to vary that procedure to the clear prejudice of a

litigant.

Even If Procedure Below Was Acceptable, Decision Below Is

Contrary to Law of Cases From This Court

The only fact offered by respondents in support of

their motion to dismiss on the ground of laches was the

fact that approximately thirty-four (34) months had

elapsed between the date of petitioner’s exhaustion of

his administrative remedies and the date on which he

filed suit.

But it is firmly settled law that a time delay alone

does not constitute laches. As this Court said in Galli-

her v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373, 12 S. Ct. 873, 36

L. Ed. 738:

.. . laches is not, like limitation, a mere matter

of time; but principally a question of the inequity

of permitting the claim to be enforced, an inequity

founded upon some change in the condition or

relation of the property of the parties.

Before the doctrine of laches may be applied, there-

fore, it must have been shown that the enforcement of

the asserted right would work an injustice upon the

party pleading the laches (See: Mount Vernon Savings

Bank v. Wardman, 84 U.S. App. D.C. 343, 173 F. 2d

COPY BOUND Ct Neb mw ecesees

11

The respondents in this case put in no evidence tend-

ing to establish that they would be prejudiced by a

granting of the reliefs sought.

The courts below, however, dismissed petitioner’s

complaint upon respondents’ showing of the single fact

that there had been a time lapse of approximately

thirty-four (34) months prior to his institution of the

suit. In so doing, the courts treated that period of

delay as laches per se as to the entire complaint.

of one of the parties,

It is clear, therefore, that a time lapse of thirty-four

34) months does not constitute laches per se, and the

12

make it of first importance that he should promptly

take the action requisite to effectively assert his

rights, to the end that if his contention be justified,

the government may be disturbed as little as pos-

sible, and that two salaries shall not be paid for a

single service.

But the public policy considerations which were

controlling in that case are not present in this case.

The factual situations of the two cases are significantly

different.

In this case the petitioner was purportedly reinstated

on one day and then removed by reduction in force

on the next day. It is clear that he never occupied a

job or position that has been filled by another employee.

It is equally clear that the government would be no

more disturbed by being required to properly reinstate

him now than it would have been if it had been required

to do so at an earlier time.

It is possible that he might not be entitled to lost

pay during the entire period that lapsed before he

brought suit, but that is a question which the trial

court should pass upon after hearing the facts relating

to the delay. The complaint should not have been

dismissed in the absence of respondents’ establishment

beyond doubt that petitioner could not prove any set

of circumstances entitling him to any of the reliefs

prayed for. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46. The

defense of laches is a creature of equity, intended to

protect a defendant who has been prejudiced by a delay

in bringing action (Galliher v. Cadwell, supra) and

as such it should not be treated as a device for punish-

ing a delinquent plaintiff when some or all of the

relief sought can be granted without prejudice to the

defendant (See: Swart v. Johnson, 48 Cal. App. 2d

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

13

824, 120 P. 2d 699; Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567,

349 P, 2d 289).

Case Presents Question of Sufficient Importance to Warrant

This Court's Attention

This case presents questions of paramount public

interest and importance. Petitioner has been deprived

of his federal employment and status by arbitrary and

discriminatory conduct on the part of certain govern-

ment officials. He has sought the aid of the courts but

has been denied the right to have his case heard accord-

ing to the laws setting forth the rules of procedure for

the hearing of cases. And finally, he has had his cause

dismissed without regard to and in violation of the

rule of law on the substantive question raised.

The aforementioned violations of petitioner’s indi-

vidual liberties and rights is sufficient to bring the

matter before this Court and to cause the Court to

extend its arm in protection of those rights. But even

more is at stake. The excellence and integrity of a

government are tested and judged according to the

concern it manifests for the rights of its subjects.

Arbitrary and discriminatory tactics are violative and

destructive of such qualities, and such tactics have no

place within our governmental departments or system.

If we are to expect others to follow our lead, our

standards certainly must be higher than that.

If the fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed

rights of the citizens and the virtues of our system of

government are to be fostered and safeguarded, peti-

tioner’s case should be heard.

14

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Sommers T. Brown

Pav. M. Rxopes

Counsel for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

Ruopes, Simms & Brown

612 Barr Building

Washington 6, D. C.

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APPENDIX A

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved

28 U.S.C., F.R.C.P. 8(c) and 12(b):

Rule 8(c), General Rules of Pleading—A ffiirmative De-

fenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall

set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitra-

tion and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence,

discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of con-

sideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,

license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds,

statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter con-

stituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.

Rule 12(b), Defenses and Objections—How Presented.

Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any

pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or

third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive plead-

ing thereto if one is required, except that the following

defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by

motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,

(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper

venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of

service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable

party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be

made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.

No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one

or more other defenses or objections in a responsive plead-

ing or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief

to which the adverse party is not required to serve a respon-

sive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in

law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion assert-

ing the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the

Pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

matters outside the pleading are presented to and not

excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one

-

f

Rule 56, and all pa

acd te Ee lati aces petioaes te ac a

motion by Rule 56.

Constitution of United States, Fifth Amendment

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-

wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-

ment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land

or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service

in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be

subject to the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of

life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case

to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

shall private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation.

3a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 16310

Letamp A. Cuarreiiz, Appellant

v.

Duvizy C. Suanr, Secretary of the Department of the

Air Force, et al., Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

Decided November 22, 1961

Mr. Sommers T. Brown, with whom Mr. Paul M. Rhodes

was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Nathan J. Paulson, Assistant United States Attor-

ney, for appellees. Mr. David C. Acheson, United States

Attorney, Mr. Charles T. Duncan, Principal Assistant

United States Attorney, aud Miss Doris H. Spangenburg,

Assistant United States Atiorney, were on the brief for

appellees.

Before Paerrrmax, Wasutworon and Bunoer, Circuit

Judges.

pay for the period of his unemployment. His appeal to

the Civil Service Commission was adversely decided on

4a

August 1, 1957. He filed his complaint June 17, 1960,

This was thirty-four and one-half months after the final ”

administrative action on his removal. The defendant

officials moved to dismiss, filing in support an affidavit

reciting facts which upon their face posed the problem

of laches. Plaintiff filed an opposition, in which he re.

ferred to the defendants’ ‘‘attempting to raise the issue

of laches’’. The trial court entered summary judgment,

The plaintiff’s case was barred by laches. The law

on the point was established by Arant v. Lane’ in 1919 and

has consistently been applied by the federal courts in many -

cases since then.2, The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

1249 U.S. 367, 372.

2F.g., Norris v. United States, 257 U.S. 77 (1921); Nicholas.

v. United States, 257 U.S. 71 (1921); Jones v. Summerfield, 105

U.S. App. D.C. 140, 265 F. 2d 124 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361

U.S. 841 (1959); Drown v. Higley, 100 U.S. App. D.C. 326, 244°

F. 24 774 (D.C. Cir. 1957); O’Connor v. Summerfield, 99 U.S.

App. D.C. 249, 239 F. 2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Haas v. Overholser,

96 U.S. App. D.C. 22, 223 F. 2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Sawyer

v. Stevens, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 267, 221 F. 2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1954),

cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959 (1955); Davis v. Summerfield, 95 U.S.

App. D.C. 78, 219 F. 2d 510 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 349 US.

965 (1955); Grasse v. Snyder, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 352, 192 F. 2d.

35 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Caswell v. Morgenthau, 69 App. D.C. 15, 987

F. 2d 296 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 596 (1938). q

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER