Record and brief — City of Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission

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Text

No. 11-1545

Vide 11-1547

Title City of Arlington, Texas. et al. Petitioners

V

Federal Communications Commission. et al

Docketed June 28. 2012

Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Case Nos.: (10-60039)

Decision Date January 23, 2012

Rehearing Denied: March 29. 2012

Questions

Presented

~~~Date~~~ ~~~~~~~ Proceedings and Orders ee

Jun 27 2012 Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due July 30, 2012)

Jul 242012 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including August 29. 2012. for ail

respondents.

Jul 302012 Brief amici curiae of National Water Resources Association. et al. filed

Aug 28 2012 Brief of respondents CTIA - The Wireless Associations. et a! in opposition filed VIDED

Aug 29 2012 Brief of respondents Federal Communications Commission, et al. in opposition filed

VIDED

Sep 11 2012 Reply of petitioner City of Arlington, Texas. et al. filed

Sep 12 2012 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of October 5. 2012.

Oct5 2012 Petition GRANTED limited to Question 1 presented by the petition The petition for a writ

of certiorari in No. 11-1547 is granted. The cases are consolidated and a total of one

hour is allotted for oral argument

Oct 31 2012 SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Wednesday. January 16, 2013.

Oct 31 2012 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs. in support of either party or of neither party

received from counse! for respondents CTIA - The Wireless Association and Verizon

Wireless. VIDED

Nov 62012 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs. in support of either party or of neither party

received from counsel for Intervenors. International Municipal Lawyers Association. et al

Nov 82012 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs. in support of either party or of neither party

received from counsel! for all petitioners. VIDED

Nov 15 2012 Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioners City of Arlington

Texas, et a! VIDED

Nov 19 2012 Brief of petitioners City of Arlington, Texas. et al. filed

Nov 19 2012 Brief of respondents International Municipal Lawyers Association, et al. in support of

petitioners filed VIDED

Nov 20 2012 Record received from U S.C.A for 5th Circuit. (1box)

Nov 21 2012 Brief amici curiae of American Farm Bureau Federation. et ai. filed VIDED.

Nov 21 2012 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs. in support of either party or of neither party

received from counsel for Cable Telecommunications and Technology Committee of the

New Orleans City Council. VIDED

Nov 26 2012 Brief amicus curiae of Southem Company filed VIDED (Distributed)

Nov 26 2012 Brief amici curiae of Nationa! Water Resources Association et al filed VIDED

(Distributed)

Nov 26 2012 Brief amici curiae of Cato Institute. et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Nov 26 2012 Brief amici curiae of Nationa! Governors Association. et al filed VIDED (Distributed)

Nov 27 2012 CIRCULATED

Dec 32012 Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioners GRANTED

Dec 32012 Motion for divided argument filed by respondent Celico Partnership c/b/a Verizon

Wireless. VIDED

Dec 12 2012 Brief of respondent Celico Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless filed VIDED (Distributed)

Dec 19 2012 Brief of respondents Federal Communications Commission, et al. filed. VIDED

Dec 192012 Brief amici curiae of AT&T Services Inc. et a! filed VIDED (Distributed)

Dec 21 2012 Brief amici curiae of T-Mobile USA, Inc., et a! filed. VIDED (Distributed)

Dec 26 2012 Motion for divided argument filed by petitioner Cable. Telecommunications. and

Technology Committee of the New Orleans City Counci) VIDED

Dec 26 2012 Brief amicus curiae of PCIA - The Wireless Infrastructure Association filed VIDED.

(Distributed)

Jan 42013 Motion for divided argument filed by respondent. Celico Patnership d/b/a Verizon

Wireless DENIED. VIDED

Jan 42013 Motion for divided argument filed by petitioner DENIED. VIDED

Jan 8 2013 _ Reply of petitioners City of Arlington Texas, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Jan$2013 Reply of respondents Internationa! Municipal Lawyers Association et al. in support of

petitioners filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Jan 10 2013 Motion for leave to file a reply brief on the merits filed by EMR Policy Institute. VIDED

Jan 16 2013 Argued. For petitioners: Thomas C. Goldstein. Washington. D. C. For respondents:

Donaid B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor Genera!. Department of Justice, Washington. D. C

Jan 22 2013 Motion for leave to file a reply brief on the merits DENIED.

PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

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wate : Us

; uv

en. JUN 27 20:

AND ——-

BRIEFS IN THE Esha aoe

Supreme Court of the United States

CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS; CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

CALIFORNIA; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA;

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; COUNTY OF SAN

DIEGO, CALIFORNIA; AND TEXAS COALITION OF

CITIES FOR UTILITY ISSUES,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

THOMAS C. GOLDSTEIN

KEVIN K. RUSSELL

GOLDSTEIN & RUSSELL, P.C.

5225 Wisconsin Avenue, NW

Suite 404

Washington, DC 20015

(202) 362-0636

THOMAS D. BUNTON

SENIOR DEPUTY

COUNTY COUNSEL

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

1600 Pacific Highway

Room 355

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 531-6456

Counsel for Petitioner

County of San Diego, California

JOSEPH VAN EATON

Counsel of Record

JAMES R. HOBSON

MATTHEW K. SCHETTENHELM

BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP

2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Suite 4300

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 785-0600

Joseph. VanEaton@bbklaw.com

Counsel for Petitioners

City of Arlington, Texas;

City of Los Angeles, California;

County of Los Angeles,

California; City of San Antonio,

Texas; and Texas Coalition of

Cities for Utility Issues

Library of Congress

Law Library

Questions Presented

This case involves a challenge to the FCC’s juris-

diction to implement §332(c)(7) of the Communica-

tions Act of 1934, titled “Preservation of Local Zon-

ing Authority.” Section 332(c)(7) imposes certain

limitations on State and local zoning authority over

the placement of wireless service facilities, but

authorizes the FCC to address only one of these

limitations; it states that no other provision “in this

Act” may “limit” or “affect” State and local authority

over wireless facilities placement. The FCC con-

cluded that other provisions “in this Act” authorize it

to adopt national zoning standards to implement

§332(c)(7). The Fifth Circuit deferred to the FCC’s

juricdictional determination applying Chevron

U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but

acknowledged that “(t]he Supreme Court has not yet

conclusively resolved the question of whether Chev-

ron applies in the context of an agency’s determina-

tion of its own statutory jurisdiction, and the circuit

courts of appeals have adopted different approaches

to this issue.”

The case presents two questions:

1. Whether, contrary to the decisions of at least

two other circuits, and in light of this Court’s guid-

ance, a court should apply Chevron to review an

agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the FCC may use its general author-

ity under the Communications Act to limit or affect

State and local zoning authority over the placement

of personal wireless service facilities.

‘3

Parties to the Proceeding

Petitioners below are the City of Arlington,

Texas, and the City of San Antonio, Texas. Interve-

nors supporting the Petitioners are the Cable and

Telecommunications Committee of the New Orleans

City Council; the City of Carlsbad, California: the

City of Dallas, Texas; the City of Dubuque, Iowa: the

County of Fairfax, Virginia; the City of Glendale,

California; the City of Los Angeles, California; the

County of Los Angeles, California; the City of Port-

land, Oregon; the City of San Antonio, Texas; the

County of San Diego, California; the EMR Policy

Institute; the International Municipal Lawyers

Association; the National Association of Counties;

the National Association of Telecommunications

Officers and Advisors; the National League of Cities;

the Texas Coalition of Cities for Utility Issues; and

the United States Conference of Mayors.

Respondents are the United States of America

and the FCC. Intervenors supporting the Respon-

dents are CTIA-The Wireless Association and Cellco

Partnership.

None of the Petitioners is a non-governmental

corporation.

Table of Contents

LLL RC en TE OT i

a ii

Opimion and Order Below ......00cccccccccoscccccccsccsesccccseses 1

iia iceeceererninenitintnrnciidgnennsaneieemmenaniens 1

Statutory Provisions Involved ...................:.cceceeeeeeee 1

tea cccrnriemmntnnnennnets 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ ..............................- 12

I, The Lower Courts Are Divided Over

Chevron’s Application to Jurisdictional

rrr reictnaninitbnmennnien 13

A. There Is a Conflict Among the

Circuits as to Chevron’s

A oN 13

B. Chevron Should Not Apply to an

Agency’s Jurisdictional

TE 16

II. Applying Chevron Led the Court To

Expand the FCC’s Authority and To

Upset Congress’s Careful Jurisdictional

ae 21

III. This Case Allows the Court To Settle

Recurring Issues of National

lal acn ein cnnccinmmnnnaentaanen 30

EE AEE EO 32

APPENDIX

lV

Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

ee ee iiisintnteisihictnrennnedscesienes

Declaratory Ruling of the

Federal Communications

Commission, WT Docket No. 08-

165 (Nov. 18, 2009) ................0.0002.

Order on Reconsideration of the

Federal Communications

Commission, WT Docket No. 08-

165 (Aug. 3, 2010) .......cceccceceseseeeees

Fifth Circuit Denial of

Rehearing En Banc (Mar. 29,

ise eaiidciapiidebiicbiainaichabiiehpapacesaanadiniss

Vv

Table of Authorities

Page(s)

CASES

ACLU v. FCC,

823 F.3d 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1987)..................00..e000. 16

Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.,

ET LEAL RE TE 18

AKM LLC v. Sec’y of Labor,

676 F.3d 762 GD.C. Cir. 3012) .............ccceccses.c00-. 16

Alliance v. Community Media v. FCC,

529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008)...........0...0..0ccceeeeee ee. 27

Altria Group Inc. v. Good,

I cual 29

American Library Ass'n v. FCC,

406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005)..............ccpeeeeeeeeeees 15

AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,

LTE SETAE ee eae ae 27

Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,

154 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1998)...............cccceeeeees 15

Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs v. United

States,

be hy a eeepeeereeee 15

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,

4 | 8, SERENE passim

Comm’ of Internal Revenue v. Clark,

I 28

Duncan v. Walker,

see Reece 28

vi

Durable Mfg. Co. v. United States DOL,

578 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2009).............ccccccceceeeeeees 14

Gonzales v. Oregon,

I, I iit 20

Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA,

608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010)..........000000.....cc ee 15

Louisiana PSC v. FCC,

476 U.S. 355 (1986)........sceccseseseereeeeeeeees 25, 26, 27

Lyon County Bd. of Comm'rs v. EPA,

406 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2005)..............cccccececeeeeeees 15

Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v.

United States,

I cil cilia 20

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi,

I 20

N. Am. Van Lines Inc. v. NLRB,

869 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ............. eee cece 15

N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor,

294 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2002)... 14, 15

Natural Resources Defense Council v.

Gorsuch,

685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982)...........ceccccceeeeeee eee i9

NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission

Corp.,

SOS F.Bb BEB Goa Cher. BBD nncocececccceccoceccscscesccccss 15

New York Shipping Asso. v. Federal Maritime

Com.,

854 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988)..............cccceseeesees 15

Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FERC,

28 F.3d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1994)... ceeeeeeeeeees 15

vil

Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,

BG Te, BD scictcersitccinnscccnscenan 4, 5, 13, 31

Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko,

Se Ce I eitirstnidiniinneicnsincsnnssinnnennennmiin 18

Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communs.

Enters., Inc.,

173 F.3d 9 (let Cir. 1998) ..........ssccccccsescccessessssseess 7

United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,

LLC,

Oe 21

United States v. Mead Corp.,

ial arerrininicinnnseaienimniiantien 20, 21

United Transp. Union-Illinois Legislative Bd.

v. Surface Transp. Bd.,

183 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1999)..................cceeeeeeeeeee 14

STATUTES

er 1

i aaa iatmalal 30

i lene 11

SITE i oicsicsicthientasienetanininedniaseiiiiniaiiiaaieiliaemmaiaiaabiensaie 4

ESTEE eee tC 4

ail 4, 7,27

| Tae ene en TER, 26

aE I 4

ia iinrieiirccinidecnesieinniiniesbelindnemiaeaiell 3

ES, Geen passim

Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Daniel A. Lyons, Tethering the Administra-

tive State- The Case Against Chevron Def-

erence for FCC Jurisdictional Claims, 36

Iowa J. Corp. L. 823 (2011)

Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling

Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L.

Rev. 989, 1008-09 (1999) ...........cscceeeseeceereees

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) (Conf.

IIIT susinsnsiececintarinesanteseiadadnediuaepsiabebiimnnniatnemadainies

H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10

Ti hisniniassiacinininncinicetenunininninsnitetpeniannaeomnanees

In re Annual Report and Analysis of

Competitive Market Conditions With

Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including

Mobile Services, Fifteenth Report,

WT Docket No. 10-133, FCC 11-103 at

Fr is BE seierecsecetntienpnicnnntiiiiens

In re Acceleration of Broadband Deployment:

Expanding the Reach and Reducing the

Cost of Broadband Deployment by

Improving Policies Regarding Public

Rights of Way and Wireless Facilities

Siting,

26 FCC Red. 5384 (2011) .........cceeee ee eeeee eee e eee

Nathan A. Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The

Rest is Silence: Chevron Jurisdiction,

Agency Deference, and Statutory Silences,

2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1497 (2009)..............004

ix

Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.

McConnell, Due Process as Separation of

Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672 (2012)............... 16, 17

Thomas W. Merrill, Chevron’s Domain, 89

a 16, 17

Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference

and Agency Self-Interest, 13 Cornell J.L. &

Pub. Pol’y 203 (2004) .......cc.cccccscecesscsceseseeseeeeseeees 17

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Petitioners respectfully seek a writ of certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit.

Opinion and Order Below

The court’s opinion (App. 1a-68a) is reported at

668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012). The FCC’s Declaratory

Ruling (App. 69a-171a) is reported at 24 FCC Rcd.

13994 (Nov. 18, 2009) (“Declaratory Ruling”), recon-

sideration denied, 25 FCC Red. 11157 (Aug. 3, 2010)

(App. 172a-195a).

Jurisdicti

The court entered its judgment on January 23,

2012, and entered an order denying petitions for

rehearing en banc on March 29, 2012. (App. 195a-

196a). This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under

28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

Statutory Provisions Involved

Section 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of

1934 provides:

Preservation of local zoning authority.

(A) General authority. Except as provided in this

paragraph, nothing in this Act shall limit or affect

the authority of a State or local government or

instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the

placement, construction, and modification of per-

sonal wireless service facilities.

(B) Limitations.

2

(i) The regulation of the placement, construction,

and modification of personal wireless service facili-

ties by any State or local government or instrumen-

tality thereof—

(D shall not unreasonably discriminate among

providers of functionally equivalent services; and

(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of pro-

hibiting the provision of personal wireless services.

Gi) A State or local government or instrumental-

ity thereof shall act on any request for authorization

to place, construct, or modify personal wireless

service facilities within a reasonable period of time

after the request is duly filed with such government

or instrumentality, taking into account the nature

and scope of such request.

Gii) Any decision by a State or local government

or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place,

construct, or modify personal wireless service facili-

ties shall be in writing and supported by substantial

evidence contained in a written record.

(iv) No State or local government or instrumen-

tality thereof may regulate the placement, construc

tion, and modification of personal wireless service

facilities on the basis of the environmental! effects of

radio frequency emissions to the extent that such

facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations

concerning such emissions.

(vy) Any person adversely affected by any final ac-

tion or failure to act by a State or local government

or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent

with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after

3

such action or failure to act, commence an action in

any court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall

hear and decide such action on an expedited basis.

Any person adversely affected by an act or failure to

act by a State or local government or any instrumen-

tality thereof that is inconsistent with clause (iv)

may petition the Commission for relief.

(C) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph—

G) the term “personal wireless services” means

commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless

services, and common carrier wireless exchange

access services;

(ii) the term “personal wireless service facilities”

means facilities for the provision of personal wireless

services; and

(iii) the term “unlicensed wireless service” means

the offering of telecommunications services using

duly authorized devices which do not require indi-

vidual licenses, but does not mean the provision of

direct-to-home satellite services (as defined in sec

tion 303(v) [47 U.S.C. §303(v))).

* *« *

Other relevant statutory provisions appear in the

appendix.

Statement of the Case

This case concerns a dispute between local gov-

ernments and the FCC over whether the federal

agency may affect State and local authority over the

placement of wireless communications facilities by,

inter alia, establishing uniform FCC-mandated

deadlines for State and loca! action on zoning appli-

4

cations. Petitioners claimed that Congress deliber-

ately designed §332(c)(7) to prevent the FCC from

interfering with State and local zoning decisions:

Congress required State and local decisions to meet

certain standards, subject only to exclusive judicial

review (with one exception); it directed the FCC to

address radio frequency (RF)-emissions matters; and

it provided that “nothing” else “in this Act” may

“limit or affect” local authority over wireless facility

placement. The FCC claimed that it could establish

federal policy implementing §332(c)(7)(B) by using

four other provisions of the Act, 47 U.S.C. §§151,

154(i), 201(b), and 303).

Rather than resolve the dispute through de novo

review, the Fifth Circuit deferred to the FCC’s

jurisdictional determination, and then upheld the

FCC’s Declaratory Ruling.

1. Added to the Communications Act by the Tele-

communications Act of 1996,} §332(c)(7) establishes

what several justices of this Court have described as

an unusually “comprehensive” statutory scheme for

balancing the interests of the federal, state, and local

governments in deployment of wireless facilities.

Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 131

(2005) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 129

(describing §332(c)(7) as “a comprehensive and

exclusive remedial scheme”) (Breyer, J., concurring).

1 Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996). The Telecommu-

nications Act of 1996 is a series of amendments to the Commu-

nications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. §151 et seg. (the

“Communications Act” or the “Act”).

5

The House of Representatives initially had

passed language empowering the FCC to “prescribe

and make effective a policy regarding State and local

regulation of the placement, construction, modifica-

tion, or operation of facilities for the provision of

commercial mobile services.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-204

at 25, 1996 U.S.C.C_A.N. 10 (1995). App. 212a. The

bill directed the FCC to adopt “policies” requiring a

local government to act “within a reasonable period

of time after the request is fully filed with such

government or instrumentality.” Jd.

Congress, however, “ultimately rejected the na-

tional approach and substituted a system based on

cooperative federalism.” Rancho Palos Verdes, 544

U.S. at 128 (Breyer, J., concurring). In conference,

Congress opted for the current §332(c)(7) titled

“Preservation of Local Zoning Authority.” The stat-

ute consists of a paragraph with five limitations on

State and local zoning authority,? and an opening

“general authority” clause stating that “lelxcept as

provided in this paragraph, nothing in this Act shall

limit or affect” this State and loca] authority. 47

U.S.C. §332(c)(7)(A).

Section 332(c)(7) gives the FCC authority to ad-

dress only one of the statute’s limitations, the bar on

State and local siting decisions based on the envi-

ronmental effects of radio frequency (“RF”) emis-

2 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(7)(B)W-Gv).

6

sions.? Otherwise, it directs courts to resolve issues

arising under §332(c)(7) on an expedited basis. The

Conference Report confirmed that except for the

provisions concerning the effects of radio frequency

(“RF”) emissions, Congress intended for the courts to

have “exclusive jurisdiction over all other disputes

arising under this section.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-458

(1996) (Cong. Rep.) at 207-208. The Report directed

that “[alny pending [FCC] rulemaking concerning

the preemption of local zoning authority over the

placement, construction or modification of CMS

facilities should be terminated.” Jd. It further ex-

plained that the requirement that a local govern-

ment act within a “reasonable period of time” is not

intended “to give preferential treatment to the

personal wireless service industry in the processing

of requests, or to subject their requests to any but

the generally applicable time frames for zoning

decision.” Id. The statute’s generally-worded lan-

guage was not an invitation for federal policymak-

ing, but a direction to the court to consider State and

local practices in light of local circumstances.

2. For the next 13 years, the FCC did not regulate

State and local zoning authority under §332(c)(7),

except to address RF-emissions matters. Sec-

tion 332(c)(7) operated by allowing courts to apply

the statute to local facts, in what one court described

as a “refreshing experiment in federalism”: Con-

gress’s effort to “produce (albeit at some cost and

3 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(7)(B)Gv),(v). Congress separately authorized

the agency to make rules regarding RF emissions. Telecommu-

nications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56 §704(b).

7

delay for the carriers) individual solutions best

adapted to the needs and desires of particular com-

munities.” Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communs.

Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 17 (ist Cir. 1999).

3. In 2008, the wireless industry—led by CTIA-

The Wireless Association—filed a petition for a

declaratory ruling asking the FCC to, inter alia,

adopt short, uniform deadlines for State and local

action under §332(c)(7). States and local govern-

ments, including Petitioners, argued that the FCC

had no jurisdiction to issue any ruling under

§332(c)(7) other than a ruling related to RF emis-

sions. In 2009, in the Declaratory Ruling, the FCC

granted the industry its requested relief in signifi-

cant part.

a. The FCC ruled that it had authority to im-

plement §332(c)(7) pursuant to four provisions of the

Act outside of §332(c)(7)—§§1, 4@, 201(b), and

303(r). App. 87a (4 23). These provisions, with slight

variations, generally permit the FCC to “prescribe

such rules and regulations as may be necessary in

the public interest to carry out the provisions of this

Act.” 47 U.S.C. §201(b); App. 87a (4 23); the FCC’s

exercise of authority under these provisions gives

rise to remedies under Title IV of the Communica-

tions Act, 47 U.S.C. §401 et seg.

The FCC claimed that §332(c)(7)(A)—the preser-

vation clause stating that “nothing” else “in this Act”

may “limit” or “affect” State and local authority—

only forbids the agency from creating additional

“limitations” beyond those that the statute enumer-

ates. App. 90a, 134a (44 25, 64). The FCC did not

8

explain, however, how §332(c)(7)(A)’s preservation

clause allows it to use §§1, 4), 201(b), and 303(7) to

“affect” State and local authority. It recognized that

its ruling did affect local authority, stating, inter

alia, that State and local governments must act in

accordance not only with the statute, but with limi-

tations on local authority “as defined” by the agency.

App. 90a (4 25).

b. The FCC’s Declaratory Ruling adopted two ba-

sic rules.

First, the FCC addressed timing issues. Acknowl-

edging a conflict with the standards in particular

States and local governments, the FCC adopted

national standards defining what constitutes a State

or local government's “failure to act” if it does not

release a decision within “a reasonable period of time

after the request is duly filed... . taking into account

the nature and scope of such request.” App. 116a-

120a, {49 46-48. The FCC ruled that absent an appli-

cant’s agreement, if a State or local government does

not release its decision 90 days after the applicant

files a collocation application or within 150 days

after the filing of all other applications, it automati-

cally constitutes a “failure to act,” and presumptively

constitutes an unreasonable “period of time” on the

merits. App. 72a, 106a-108a, 11la-112a (4@ 4, 37,

42). Unless the applicant agrees otherwise, this

forces the State or local government into court on a

fixed timetable (regardless of how reasonable its

delay may be), and then requires the State or local

government to overcome the presumption on the

merits by explaining its delay. App. 1lla-112a (4

42).

9

The FCC stated that while its policy choice would

conflict with those of various States, its choices

accommodated reasonable State and local processes

“in most instances.” App 11l4a (§ 44).

The FCC noted that of the eight State statutes

discussed in its record, Connecticut law on its

fact authorizes “a longer process” (180 days)

than the FCC’s rules permit. App. 118a (4 48).

California requires applications to be proc-

essed within 60 days, after a 30-day review

period for completeness, but only if no envi-

ronmental review is required. App. 117a (cit-

ing Cal. Gov’t Code §§65940 & 65943). The

FCC chose not to provide for delays for envi-

ronmental reviews.

North Carolina has a “collocation” time period

of 45 days for processing after a 45-day review

period for application completeness, but only if

the collocation does not increase the height of

the facility. Otherwise, the time for action is

tied to the time for action on other land use

applications. App. 117a (citing N.C. Code Ann.

§153A-349.53). The FCC applied a different

test for determining whether the collocation

deadline should apply.

Minnesota requires applications to be proc-

essed within 60 days, which can be extended

an additional 60 days upon written notice to

the applicant. App. 117a (4 47, citing Minn.

Stat. Ann. §15.99). Under the FCC’s rules,

times can be extended, but only with the con-

sent of the applicant. App. 122a (4 49).

10

The FCC explained that a State’s choice for a longer

period for review would not preclude an applicant

from suing the State or local government using the

FCC’s new, shorter timelines. App. 120a (4 50)

(noting that the applicant “may bring suit under

§332(c)(7)(B)(v) after 90 days or 150 days, subject to

the 30-day limitation period on filing, and may

consider pursuing any remedies granted unaer the

State or local regulation when that applicable time

limit has expired.”).

Neither facet of the FCC’s new timing rules—its

fixed trigger for judicial review or its presumption

against local governments on the merits—existed

under §332(c)(7)(B)’s plain terms; the FCC pointed to

no court that had adopted them. In addition, because

the rules apply to only one class of zoning applica-

tion (those for the placement of “personal wireless

service facilities”), they have the effect of requiring a

State or local government to prioritize wireless

applications over other zoning matters.

Second, the FCC adopted a ruling under

§332(c)(7(B)@UD, which provides that a State or

local government “shall not prohibit or have the

effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wire-

less services.” The agency ruled that a State or local

government violates this provision if it denies an

application “solely because ‘one or more carriers

serve a given geographic market.” App. 127a-128a

(§ 56).

4. On January 14, 2010, the City of Arlington,

Texas, filed a petition for review with the Fifth

Circuit, which had jurisdiction pursuant to 47 U.S.C.

11

§402(a) and 28 U.S.C. §2344. The court initially

deferred review, then ruled after the FCC considered

petitions for reconsideration.‘

A central question was whether the FCC had ju-

risdiction to implement §332(c)(7). While the Fifth

Circuit expressly acknowledged that this Court had

not resolved the issue and that other circuits had

adopted conflicting approaches, it ruled that

Chevron required it to defer to the FCC’s own as-

sessment of its jurisdiction. App. 37a. The court

recognized that §332(c)(7)(A) limited the FCC's

authority, but ruled that if it were ambiguous, the

court “must defer” to the FCC’s permissible interpre-

tation. App. 40a. The court proceeded to deem the

statute ambiguous in various ways. App. 4la-45a.

The court reasoned that since the FCC’s general

authority under these other sections would ordinar-

ily apply to a Communications Act amendment,

Congress must “specifically restrict” the agency's

general authority, and “clearly remove” the agency’s

authority to apply these other Act provisions to

§332(c)(7). App. 42a.

The Fifth Circuit did not ask whether Congress

would intend the FCC to clarify any ambiguity in

this jurisdictional provision (or whether the FCC had

any special expertise to evaluate zoning decisions); it

did not apply any traditional statutory presumptions

* App. 10a. The City of San Antonio, Texas, joined a number of

other parties in intervening in support of this petition, and also

later filed its own petition for review after the agency’s denial

of reconsideration.

12

for interpretations of exceptions; and it did not

examine §332(c)(7)(A) in the context of other provi-

sions of the Communications Act, or of §332(c)(7)

itself. It proceeded to rule that “none of the cities’

arguments convince us that the FCC’s interpretation

of its statutory authority is impermissible.”

App. 51a.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

The decision below sharpens a significant diver-

gence among the circuit courts about Chevron’s

application to an agency’s determination of its own

jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit's approach—

effectively that statutory ambiguity alone allows an

agency to claim broad new authority—raises impor-

tant questions that this Court should resolve. The

court’s analysis inverts the doctrine that an agency

has only the authority Congress grants it, and

contravenes the principles underlying Chevron.

This case illustrates the problem with a standard

of review that transforms textual] ambiguity into a

jurisdictional grant. Section 332(c)(7) represented

Congress’s careful and comprehensive effort to

balance the State and local interests in managing

land use—a quintessential State function—with the

federal interests in encouraging national deployment

of wireless facilities. Through this “complex and

novel statutory scheme,” Congress rejected an FCC-

guided “national approach” to zoning, and instead

adopted a system of “cooperative federalism.” Ran-

cho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 123 (Breyer, J., con-

curring).

13

Section 332(c)(7)’s language, context, and unusu-

ally clear legislative history all indicate that the

FCC’s role under the statute is not general, but

specific: it extends only to a narrow, technical issue

(RF-emissions). Yet by applying Chevron to defer to

the FCC’s determination that it has general author-

ity to make rules governing the State and local

zoning process under §332(c)(7), the decision below

adopts the very “national approach” that Congress

considered and rejected. This has significant conse-

quences for State and local governments, including

for communities that have made different policy

choices about the appropriate time for local review.®

I. The Lower Courts Are Divided Over Chevron’s

Application to Jurisdictional Questions.

A. There Is a Conflict Among the Circuits as to

Chevron’s Application.

The Fifth Circuit correctly observed that its deci-

sion implicates a circuit conflict:

The Supreme Court has not yet con-

clusively resolved the question of

whether Chevron applies in the con-

text of an agency’s determination of its

own statutory jurisdiction, and the cir-

cuit courts of appeals have adopted

different approaches to the issue.

Some circuits apply Chevron deference

to disputes over the scope of an

5 See, eg. supra, at 9 (discussing Connecticut, California,

North Carolina, and Minnesota).

14

agency’s jurisdiction, some do not, and

some circuits have thus far avoided

taking a position. In this circuit, we

apply Chevron to an agency’s interpre-

tation of its own statutory jurisdiction.

App. 37a-38a Gnternal notes omitted). There is little

prospect that the conflict will be resolved without

this Court’s intervention.

1. The Seventh Circuit and Federal Circuit re-

view an agency’s determination of its statutory

jurisdiction de novo. The Seventh Circuit has re-

peatedly declined to apply a deferential standard to

jurisdictional questions. N. JI]. Steel Supply Co. v.

Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2002);

United Transp. Union-Iilinois Legislative Bd. v.

Surface Transp. Bd., 183 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir.

1999). The court has explained that “[a]lthough

agency determinations within the scope of delegated

authority are entitled to deference, it is fundamental

‘that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area

in which it has no jurisdiction.” Durable Mfg. Co. v.

United States DOL, 578 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir.

2009) (quoting Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494

U.S. 638, 650 (1990)).6 The Federal Circuit applies

the same standard. Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,

154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

2. The Fifth Circuit joins the Third, Eighth, and

Tenth Circuit at the opposite extreme. These courts

6 The Seventh Circuit has recognized that “the Supreme Court

has not definitively ruled on the issue.” N. Ill Steel Supply Co.,

294 F.3d at 847.

15

resolve jurisdictional questions by applying Chevron:

they do not independently analyze Congress’s juris-

dictional decisions. NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG

Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 355 (3d Cir. 2001)

citing Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley

Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 1988);

Lyon County Bd. of Comm'rs v. EPA, 406 F.3d 981,

983 (8th Cir. 2005); Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 608

F.3d 1131, 1145-1146 (10th Cir. 2010).

3. No court’s decisions more clearly demonstrate

the lower courts’ long struggle here than the D.C.

Circuit’s. While the court has applied Chevron to

jurisdictional questions, Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.

v. FERC, 28 F.3d 1281, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1994);

Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs v. United States,

101 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1996), it has also de-

clined to do so. New York Shipping Asso. v. Federal

Maritime Com., 854 F.2d 1338, 1362-1363 (D.C. Cir.

1988); N. Am. Van Lines Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596,

598 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In some cases, the court has

attempted to draw a distinction based on the nature

of the question before it. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n

v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting

that the FCC’s “self-serving invocation of Chevron

leaves out a crucial threshold consideration, /.e.,

whether the agency acted pursuant to delegated

authority.”); accord ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.3d 1554,

1567 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Most recently, Judge

Janice Rogers Brown authored a concurring opinion

in AKM LLC v. Sec’y of Labor, 675 F.3d 752, 766

(D.C. Cir. 2012), explaining that regardless of the

court’s “general” rule requiring Chevron deference, it

is improper on jurisdictional questions that present

16

“undisputed jurisdictional facts,” at least absent

“some clear indication from Congress that it has

delegated jurisdiction-defining authority.”

B. Chevron Should Not Apply to an Agency’s

Jurisdictional Determinations.

Both scholars and this Court’s teachings confirm

that Chevron should not apply automatically to an

agency’s jurisdictional] determinations.

1. Addressing what a leading article has called

“the most important—and vexing—question” involv-

ing Chevron’s domain, many legal scholars have

concluded that Chevron should not apply when an

agency interprets a statute to determine its own

jurisdiction.? They recognize that a no-deference rule

is “implicit in Chevron” and follows from the fact

that agencies “can act only to the extent that Con-

gress has delegated them the power to do so.” Sales,

2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 1532; see also Merrill, 89 Geo.

L.J. at 912-13. The scholars have noted that agencies

“have no comparative advantage in reading statutes”

over courts; Gellhorn, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1009;

, that an agency’s self-interest “may cloud its judg-

7 Thomas W. Merrill, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J: 833, 909-

911 (2009); Nathan A. Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is

Silence: Chevron Jurisdiction, Agency Deference, and Statutory

Silences, 2009 U. Tl. L. Rev. 1497 (2009); Nathan S. Chapman

& Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,

121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1786-87 (2012); Ernest Gellhorn & Paul

Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L.

Rev. 989, 1008-09 (1999); Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron

Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub.

Pol’y 203 (2004).

17

ment,” id., and that independent judicial review

furthers due process and enhances fairness and the

perception of fairness. Chapman, 121 Yale L.J. at

1786-87; Armstrong, 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at

268-285. Perhaps above all else, independent review

ensures that Congress’s judgments about the scope

of an agency's authority will be honored: “Just as

foxes should not guard henhouses, agencies should

not be entrusted to police the limits on their own

regulatory authority.” Sales, 2009 U. Ill L. Rev. at

1533.

This case demonstrates that these scholars have

it right, at least in cases like this one. Here, the FCC

has an interest in facilitating its own policy interests

by expanding its jurisdiction. Yet both Petitioners

and the FCC agree that Congress intended to limit

FCC authority in some respects; the question is how

much. Resolving this pure legal issue does not touch

on the agency’s specialized or technical expertise

over communications matters. Yet reading Chevron

to grant the agency discretion to make the jurisdic-

tional determination essentially allows the agency to

re-balance Congress’s careful statutory structure to

further its own interests.

2. While this Court has not definitely resolved

the issue, its cases at least suggest that the Fifth

Circuit approach—mechanically deferring to agency

jurisdictional determinations unless Congress has

“clearly removed” the authority to make those de-

terminations— as highly questionable.

a. Pre-Chevron, in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit

Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), the Court re-

18

fused to defer to a statutory interpretation of the

Administrator of the Fair Labor Standards Act

because “[t]he determination of the extent of author

ity given to a delegated agency by Congress is not

left for the decision of him in whom authority is

vested.” Id. at 616; see also Social Sec. Bd. v.

Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) (deciding the

limits of agency authority is a judicial function.”).

b. In Chevron itself, jurisdiction was not in

doubt. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S.

837 (1984). The decision does, however, shed impor-

tant light on the scope of the doctrine it announced.

Chevron concerned a provision of the Clean Air Act

that required certain States to establish a permit

program regulating “stationary sources” of air pollu-

tion. Id. at 840. The EPA defined “stationary source”

plantwide, rather than adopting a definition tied to

each pollution-emitting device at a plant. Jd. at 856.

Reviewing the agency’s order, the D.C. Circuit

decided that the purposes of the non-attainment

program required it to set-aside the agency’s policy

choice. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gor-

such, 685 F.2d 718, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

19

Adopting its now well-known test,’ the Court re-

versed, and upheld the EPA’s rule. Jd. at 728. The

Court explained that it had applied this deferential

approach whenever the “meaning or reach of a

statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies,

and a full understanding of the force of the statutory

policy in the given situation has depended upon

more than ordinary knowledge.” Id. at 844. As

discussed above, however, discerning the limits of an

agency's jurisdiction involves a purely legal, not a

policy, question that does not implicate agency

expertise.

c. In Chevron’s immediate aftermath, individual

Justices disputed whether the Court’s deference on

this policy question should also extend to basic

questions of the agency’s own jurisdiction, particu-

larly where the issue does not turn on matters

within an agency’s expertise.

In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi,

487 U.S. 354, 380-82 (1988), Justice Scalia wrote a

® Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-843 (“First, always, is

the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the

precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that

is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,

must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not

directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does

not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would

be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpreta-

tion. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect

to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the

agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the

statute.”) (internal footnotes omitted).

20

concurring opinion claiming that Chevron’s “rule of

deference applies even to an agency’s interpretation

of a statute designed to confine its authority” be-

cause there is no, “discernible line between an

agencys exceeding its authority and an agency’s

exceeding authorized application of its authority.” Id.

at 381.

Justice Brennan disagreed. Jd. at 387. He ex-

plained that “this Court has never deferred to an

agency's interpretation of a statute designed to

confine the scope of its jurisdiction.” Jd. Instead, he

said that “folur agency deference cases have always

been limited to statutes the agency was ‘entrusted to

administer” and “lalgencies do not ‘administer’

statutes confining the scope of their jurisdiction, and

such statutes are not ‘entrusted’ to agencies.” Jd. He

explained that the normal reasons for agency defer-

ence do not apply in this setting.

d. While the Court has still not resolved this

fundamental debate, it has established that a court

does not owe Chevron deference automatically, or

“merely because [a] statute is ambiguous and an

administrative official is involved.” Gonzales v.

Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006). Instead, a court

must first scrutinize whether “the agency’s generally

conferred authority and other statutory circum

stances” make apparent “that Congress would expect

the agency to be able to speak with the force of law

when it addresses ambiguity in the statute.” United

States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001);

21

Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United

States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011).9

* - *

The Fifth Circuit’s automatic application of

Chevron to the FCC’s interpretation of this statutory

limit on its authority cannot be squared with Mead,

which requires a more searching examination of

Congress's intent, particularly “where an unusually

basic legal question is at issue.” NCTA v. Brand X

Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J.,

concurring); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.

218, 229 (2001). Had the Court considered the juris-

dictional issue de novo (as at least the Seventh and

Federal Circuits would), or engaged in a more care-

ful and searching examination of the statute, the

court would have found that the FCC lacks authority

to adopt the Declaratory Ruling. See, infra, Part I.

Il. Applying Chevron Led the Court To Expand the

FCC’s Authority and To Upset Congress’s Careful

Jurisdictional Balance.

Under the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of whether

§332(c)(7)(A) bars the FCC from using its general

authority in the Act to regulate the State and local

siting process under §332(c)(7), Chevron deference

played a decisive role.

® See also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132

S. Ct. 1836, 182 L. Ed. 2d 746, 759 (2012) (Scalia, J., concur-

ring) (noting that “a pre-Chevron determination that language

is ambiguous does not alone suffice; the pre-Chevron Court

must in addition have found that Congress wanted the particu-

lar ambiguity in question to be resolved by the agency.”)

22

1. Because the court accorded Chevron deference

to the FCC’s jurisdictional determination, it did not

seek the statute’s best reading; it asked only

whether the FCC’s interpretation was permissible.

The court deemed the statute ambiguous in various

ways,'° then applied Chevron’s second step to rule

that “none of the cities’ arguments convince us that

the FCC’s interpretation of its statutory authority is

impermissible.” App. 51a.

2. If the court had itself conducted a complete

statutory analysis applying traditional tools of

statutory construction, it would have found that

Congress did not intend for the FCC to make policy

affecting State and loca) authority in this area.

a. Section 332(c)(7)’s subject matter (local land

use processes) and the entities that implement these

processes (State and local governments) are not the

subjects of the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. §152.

The FCC has no experience in managing zoning, nor

is there an obvious national standard to which the

agency. could look (or did look) in deciding how much

time is required to process applications in particular

States or local communities. It is unlikely that

Congress would authorize the FCC to intrude into

10 App. 41a (§332(c)(7)(A) does not “unambiguously preclude”

FCC action); App. 41a (“§332(c)(7)(A) itself does not provide a

clear answer”); App. 42a (issue “remains unresolved”); App. 42a

(noting that Congress “did not clearly remove” FCC’s ability to

implement §332(c)(7)(A)); App. 42a-43a (Congress’s “silence”

leaves §332(c)(7)(A)’s effect on the FCC’s authority to adminis-

ter §332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations ambiguous) App. 43a (noting

that “one could read” §332(c)(7)(A) as the FCC does).

23

these areas without saying so expressly. Yet rather

than say so expressly, Congress granted the FCC

authority to act in one area (RF emissions) while

granting the courts exclusive jurisdiction to address

all other disputes arising under §332(c)(7).

b. The consequence of FCC regulation of State

and local land use processes is significant, as this

case illustrates. If the FCC deadlines pass (without

extension by mutual agreement), an applicant must

file a complaint within 30 days, triggering expedited

judicia] review. The State or local government’s

decision is presumptively unreasonable, and the

State or local government must expend resources to

defend its action. It must do so even if (to take an

example) the time was required to comply with State

environmental laws or to implement other policies

reflected in State and local deadlines. See, supra, at

9 (discussing State laws). The review and the ex-

pense are triggered not because the State and local

policies are unreasonable, but because the FCC

created a federal zoning policy. That is something

that the courts could not do, and have never done

under their case-specific approach to §332(c)(7).

It is unlikely that Congress intended to undercut

State and local laws without some indication it

intended to do so. Congress’s emphasis on judicial

review in §332(c)(7), while not determinative, cer-

tainly cuts against finding that Congress intended

the FCC to establish federal policies in this area.

Likewise, the conference report explains that

§332(c)(7)(B)Gi)’s requirement that a local govern-

ment act within a “reasonable period of time” is not

intended “to give preferential treatment to the

24

personal wireless service industry in the processing

of requests, or to subject their requests to any but

the generally applicable” zoning time frames. H.R.

Rep. No. 104-204 at 25, 1996 U.S.C.C.A_N. 10 (1995).

Yet, even if no cases are actually filed, the inevitable

effect of a policy that threatens States and local

governments with litigation if they do not meet FCC

deadlines is that State and local governments must

give precedence and special treatment to wireless

applicants at the expense of other zoning applicants

and policies.

2. a. Read in this context, the plain language of

§332(c)(7)(A)’s preservation clause is clear: it pre-

vents any other provision of the Communications Act

from “affect{ing]” or “limitfing]” State or local au-

thority. Section 332(c)(7), it follows, is both compre-

hensive and self-contained: the FCC may act where

§332(c)(7) gives it a role (to address RF matters), but

not elsewhere. The FCC therefore may not use §§1,

4(i), 201(b), and 303(r) to assert jurisdiction over

State and local zoning processes with respect to

matters that are addressed in §332(c)(7), e.g., to

define what constitutes “substantial evidence,” what

constitutes a “written record,” what constitutes a

“reasonable time” for action, and so on. As the FCC

itself recognized, its use of §§1, 4G), 201(b), and

303(r) to create national standards necessarily

“affects” and is intended to “affect” State and local

authority. App. 90a (§ 25) (noting that State and

local governments must comply with §332(c)(7) “as

defined herein”); see also App. 133a (J 62) (noting

that certain State and local decisions are “unaf-

fected” by its Declaratory Ruling).

25

b. The FCC’s reading cannot be squared with

§332(c)(7)(A)’s plain language. The FCC contends

that §332(c)(7)(A)’s preservation clause only forbids

it from creating “additional limitations” beyond

those enumerated in §332(c)(7)(B). The agency

therefore concludes that it may use §§1, 4(i), 201(b),

and 303(r) to establish national rules for local zoning

that are binding on States, local governments, and

the courts, if the rules relate to some matter men-

tioned in §332(c)(7)(B). Pet. App. 87a-91a (Ff 23-25).

But the “limits” created by the FCC’s rules—the

specific federal deadlines—are “additional limita-

tions” that appear nowhere in the Act. Moreover, the

FCC’s claim that the statute only prevents it from

creating additional “limits” reads the word “affect”

out of the statute. By selecting its preferred reading

of §332(c)(7) to advance its own policies, the FCC

necessarily affects State and local authority. Indeed,

the agency’s creation of an overriding federal stan-

dard “independent” of state standards, see supra,

has an additional “[e]ffect” on State law beyond the

court review contemplated by §332(c)(7) itself. Like-

wise, the agency’s presumption that State and local

governments have acted unreasonably—which

appears nowhere in §332(c)(7)’s text—"affects” State

and local authority.

The FCC’s reading of §332(c)(7) cannot be justi-

fied simply because §332(c)(7) appears in the Com-

munications Act, which the FCC generally imple-

ments. The Court’s decision in Louisiana PSC v.

FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 373 (1986) is analogous, and to

the contrary. The case concerned a preservation

clause stating that “except as provided” in certain

26

sections, “nothing in this Act shall be construed to

apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with

respect to” certain matters related to intrastate

service. The Court ruled that this clause forbids the

FCC from using another Act provision (47 U.S.C.

§220) to preempt intrastate depreciation practices.

The Court explained that the “nothing in this Act”

clause “fences off’ intrastate matters “from FCC

reach or regulation.” Jd. at 370. Likewise,

§332(c)(7)(A) fences off State and local authority

from “limits” or “affects” caused by §§1, 44), 201(b),

and 303(r)—and by any other provision of the Act.1!

Unless §332(c)(7) is read to have this “fencing off”

effect, it is hard to imagine its purpose. If Congress

had added §332(c)(7)’s limitations to the Act without

the “nothing in this Act” language, the FCC could

still only implement the limitations that Congress

established; it could not create new ones out of whole

cloth. The FCC (and Fifth Circuit applying Chevron)

thus reads §332(c)(7) as if the limiting language did

not exist. Tellingly, the FCC (and the Fifth Circuit)

found support for the FCC’s action in the Sixth

Circuit’s decision in Alliance v. Community Media v.

FCC, 529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008). There, the court

11 The Fifth Circuit seems to have found it significant that the

Congress did not use the phrase “jurisdiction” in Section

332(c)(7A). App. 42a n.104. However, the logical reading of

Section 332(c)(7) is that it is broader, not narrower than the

clause at issue in Lousiana PSC, and seals off an entire subject

matter area from FCC action, direct or indirect. By contrast, in

Lousiana PSC, no one doubted that the FCC had authority to

address depreciation practices, so long as it did not assert

jurisdiction over intrastate depreciation rates.

27

found that the FCC could rely on its general rule-

making authority to implement §621(a)(1) of the

Communications Act, a provision that contains no

language limiting the applicability of “othe provi-

sions” of the Communications Act. 47! U.S.C.

§541(a)(1).

The Fifth Circuit’s approach here misconstrues

the Court’s decision in AT&T Carp. v. Iowa Utilities

Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). AT&T endorsed Justice

Breyer’s recognition that “Congress enacted [the]

language [lof §201(b)] in 1938,’ and . . . whether it

confers ‘general authority to make rules implement-

ing the more specific terms of a later enacted statute

depends upon what that later enacted statute con-

templates.’ AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 420 (emphasis

added); id. at 378 n.5 (finding Justice Breyer’s

statement “assuredly true.”). Section 332(c)(7)(A)

indicates what it “contemplates” expressly: nothing

in this Act” may “limit” or “affect” the State and local

authority that §332(c)(7) addresses. That Congress

may enact such a limitation is well-established: “An

agency may not confer power upon itself. To permit

an agency to expand its power in the face of a con-

gressiona! limitation on its jurisdiction would be to

grant to the agency power to override Congress.” La.

Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374-75. Requiring

Congress to do more to shield an area from FCC

policymaking—as the Fifth Circuit would—turns

this fundamental principle on its head.

c. Other interpretive tools indicate that Con-

gress intended to prevent the FCC from adopting

national regulations to implement §332(c)(7).

28

First, Petitioners’ statutory interpretation has

direct support in the statute’s legislative history: the

FCC’s has none. As explained, Congress rejected a

provision that would have granted the FCC the very

authority it exercised here in favor of §332(c)(7). The

conference report directs that the FCC must termi-

nate “[ajny pending [FCC] rulemaking concerning

the preemption of local zoning authority over the

placement, construction or modification of CMS

facilities.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-458 at 207-208 (1996)

(Conf. Report).

Second, this Court has indicated that courts

should avoid statutory interpretations that would

render other statutory language superfluous. Dun-

can v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The FCC’s

reading defies this canon. If the FCC is correct that

Congress intended and expected the FCC to use §§1,

4(i), 201(b), and 303(7) to address any matter men-

tioned in §332(c)(7), the specific grant of authority to

the FCC to address RF issues in §332(c)(7)(B) is

surplusage.

Third, this Court has instructed that “[iln con-

struing provisions .. . in which a general] statement

of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read

the exception narrowly in order to preserve the

primary operation of the provision.” Comm’ of

Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989).

The FCC’s interpretation defies this canon. It re-

quires a court to read the “except as provided in this

paragraph” broadly so that State and local authority

may be “limit[ed]” and “affectled]” not only by the

language “provided” in §332(c)(7)(B), but also by the

29

FCC’s implementation of this provided language

using §§1, 4G), 201(b), and 303().

Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s approach—requiring

ai unambiguous statement of Congressional in-

tent—requires it to ignore basic presumptions that

this Court has established. This Court has adopted a

presumption against preemption instructing that a

court must “begin .. . ‘with the assumption that the

historic police powers of the states [are] not to be

superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the

clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Altria

Group Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008), citing

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230

(1947) (emphasis added). This assumption “applies

with particular force when Congress has legslated

in a field traditionally occupied by the States.” Jd.

This presumption supports Petitioners——nat the

FCC’s—interpretation, because only Petitioners’

reading would prevent federal preemption by agency

action where it is not Congress’s “clear and manifest”

intent.

* 2 *

In sum, the court’s resolution of this case turned

on its abbreviated and piecemeal Chevron analysis,

and its deference to an FCC jurisdictional determi-

nation that is inconsistent with the best reading of

§332(c)(7) considered as a whole. Review is appropri-

ate to ensure that §332(c)(7) is applied as Congress

intended.

30

Ill. Thig Case Allows the Court To Settle Recurring

Issues of National Importance.

This case presents recurring issues with serious

national ramifications both as a matter of adminis-

trative law, and under the Communications Act.

1. As a matter of administrative law, it is critical

that the Court clarify the recurring issue of whether

and how Chevron applies when an agency deter-

mines its own statutory jurisdiction. This very issue

is central in other important cases now pending in

the courts. See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Tethering the

Administrative State: The Case Against Chevron

Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims, 36 lowa J.

Corp. L. 823 (2011) (discussing FCC’s claim of au-

thority over the Internet).

But deferring to an agency’s jurisdictional conclu-

sion is especially intolerable when the courts of

appeals fail to do so uniformly. This permits an

agency’s jurisdictional claim and ensuing rules to be

binding in one circuit but not in others—a result

especially problematic because agency cases are

often assigned to courts of appeals randomly.

28 U.S.C. §2112. This creates a patchwork of “fed-

eral” rules, where results are determined by lottery.

This case presents a particularly strong vehicle for

resolving this issue given the strong indicia of Con-

gress’s intent, and the non-technical, purely legal

nature of the jurisdictional issue.

2. Resolving the FCC’s proper role with respect

to §332(c)(7) is of continuing and growing impor-

tance.

31

Allowing the FCC to interject itself into local zon-

ing processes and to make every local government

subject to federally-established zoning rules has a

direct effect on State and local governments. The

effect is legal (States and their processes would be

subject to federal administrative regulation); finan-

cial (federal rules and processes increase costs and

raise the spectre of increased litigation); and conse-

quential (the federal rules necessarily require local

governments that wish to avoid litigation to give

precedence to wireless zoning applications over other

applications). In Rancho Palos Verdes, these factors

were significant in determining that a §1983 remedy

was inconsistent with §332(c)(7)’s statutory scheme.

These factors also warrant granting the petition

here, to maintain Congress’s balance.

The issue is likely growing in importance. The

cellular industry estimates that there were approxi-

mately 10,000 cell sites at year end 2002. By year

end 2010, the number of cell sites had grown to

approximately 253,000, and the number continues to

grow—about 30,000 sites were added between 2010

and year end 2011.!2 The wireless industry has

already returned to the FCC and asked it to adopt

12 CTIA’s Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, available at

ttp:// ia. d_ 20 r j

.pdf (last accessed June 26, 2011); see also In re Annual Report

and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect

to Mobile Wireless, Including Mobile Services, Fifteenth

Report, WT Docket No. 10-133, FCC 11-103 at ¥ 310 (June 27,

2011) (@oting that one provider alone, Verizon, would need to

add between 17,400 and 27,400 sites to its network).

32

stricter rules. The agency recently released a far-

reaching Notice of Inquiry aimed at “[ilmproving

policies [rlegarding . . . [wlireless [flacilities [s]iting.”

In re Acceleration of Broadband Deployment: Ex-

panding the Reach and Reducing the Cost of Broad-

band Deployment by Improving Poligies Regarding

Public Rights of Way and Wireless Facilities Siting,

26 FCC Red. 5384 (2011). The FCC cited the De-

claratory Ruling (ff 13, 48 n.45), and stated its

belief that “the Commission has broad general

rulemaking authority that would allow it to issue

rules interpreting section[ ] . . . 332.” Id. at | 57; see

also id. at § 51. Therefore, the FCC is likely to use

the Fifth Circuit’s decision to assert broad and

sweeping authority to regulate all types of State,

local, and private property.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ

of certiorari should be granted.

33

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph Van Eaton

Counsel of Record

James R. Hobson

Matthew K. Schettenhelm

BEST BEST & KRIEGER, LLP

2000 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 4300

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 785-0600

joseph. vaneaton@bbklaw.com

Counsel for Petitioners City of Arlington, Texas;

City of Los Angeles, California; County of Los

Angeles, California; City of San Antonio, Texas,

and Texas Coalition of Cities for Utilities Issues

Thomas C. Goldstein

Kevin K. Russell

GOLDSTEIN & RUSSELL, P.C.

5225 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 404

Washington, DC 20015

(202) 362-0636

Thomas D. Bunton

Senior Deputy County Counsel

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

1600 Pacific Highway

Room 355

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 531-6456

Counsel for Petitioner

County of San Diego, California

June 27, 2012

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-60039

CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS; CITY OF SAN

ANTONIO, TEXAS,

Petitioners,

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondents.

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Federal Communications Commission

Before DAVIS, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge:

The City of Arlington, Texas and the City of

San Antonio, Texas seek review of a Declaratory

Ruling and subsequent Order on Reconsideration

that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC

or Commission) issued in response to a petition for a

declaratory ruling by a trade association of wireless

telephone service providers, CTIA—The Wireless

Association® (CTIA). In the proceeding before the

FCC, CTIA sought clarification of Sections 253 and

332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, as

amended,! regarding local review of wireless facility

147 U.S.C. §§ 253, 332(c)(7).

2a

siting applications. We deny Arlington’s petition for

review on the merits. We dismiss San Antonio’s peti-

tion for review because we lack jurisdiction to con-

sider it.

i

As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996

(TCA or the Act),2 Congress amended the Communi-

cations Act of 1934 by adding Section 332(c)(7). That

provision, codified as 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), restricts

the authority of state and local governments with

respect to decisions regarding the placement and

construction of wireless communications facilities. It

provides:

(7) Preservation of local zoning authority

(A) General authority

Except as provided in this paragraph,

nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the

authority of a State or local government or in-

strumentality thereof over decisions regarding

the placement, construction, and modification

of personal wireless service facilities.

(B) Limitations

Gi) The regulation of the place-

ment, construction, and modification of

personal wireless service facilities by

any State or local government or in-

strumentality thereof—

2 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.

3a

(D shall not unreasonably

discriminate among provid-

ers of functionally equiva-

lent services; and

(1) shall not prohibit or

have the effect of prohibiting

the provision of personal

wireless services.

Gi) A State or local government

or instrumentality thereof shall act on

any request for authorization to place,

construct, or modify personal wireless

service facilities within a reasonable

period of time after the request is duly

filed with such government or instru-

mentality, taking into account the na-

ture and scope of such request.

(iii) Any decision by a State or lo-

cal government or instrumentality

thereof to deny a request to place, con-

struct, or modify personal wireless ser-

vice facilities shall be in writing and

supported by substantial evidence con-

tained in a written record.

(iv) No State or local government

or instrumentality thereof may regulate

the placement, construction, and modi-

fication of personal wireless service fa-

cilities on the basis of the environ-

mental effects of radio frequency emis-

sions to the extent that such facilities

4a

comply with the Commission’s regula-

tions concerning such emissions.

(v) Any person adversely affected

by any final action or failure to act by a

State or local government or any in-

strumentality thereof that is inconsis-

tent with this subparagraph may,

within 30 days after such action or fail-

ure to act, commence an action in any

court of competent jurisdiction. The

court shall hear and decide such action

on an expedited basis. Any person ad-

versely affected by an act or failure to

act by a State or local government or

any instrumentality thereof that is in-

consistent with clause (iv) may petition

the Commission for relief.

Section 332(c)(7) seeks to reconcile two com-

peting interests—Congress’s desire to preserve the

traditional role of state and local governments in

regulating land use and zoning and Congress’s inter-

est in encouraging the rapid development of new

telecommunications technologies by removing the

ability of state and local governments to impede the

construction and modification of wireless communi-

cations facilities through delay or irrational deci-

sionmaking.? Section 332(c)(7)(A), by providing that

3 See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S.

113, 115 (2005) (“Congress enacted the [TCA] to promote

competition and higher quality in American

telecommunications services and to encourage the rapid

deployment of new telecommunications technologies. One of the

5a

“nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the au-

thority of a State or local government or instrumen-

tality thereof over decisions regarding the place-

ment, construction, and modification of personal

wireless service facilities,” acts to protect state and

local government authority. Section 332(c)(7)(B), on

the other hand, imposes “several substantive and

procedural limitations that subject [state and local

governments] to an outer limit upon their ability to

regulate personal wireless services land use issues.”*

In 2008, CTIA filed a petition for a declaratory

ruling with the FCC in which it requested that the

FCC clarify certain provisions of the Communica-

means by which it sought to accomplish these goals was

reduction of the impediments imposed by local governments

upon the installation of facilities for wireless communications,

such as antenna towers.” (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)); T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified Gov't of

Wyandotte Cnty., Kan. City, Kan., 546 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th

Cir. 2008) (“Congress adopted the TCA in order to promote

competition and higher quality in telecommunications services

and to encourage the rapid deployment of new

telecommunications technologies. The TCA furthered these

goals by reducing the impediments that local governments

could impose to defeat or delay the installation of wireless

communications facilities such as cell phone towers, and by

protecting against irrational or substanceless decisions by local

authorities.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

4 Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 57 (ist Cir.

2001) Gnternal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also

U.S. Cellular Corp. v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 364 F.3d 250,

253 (5th Cir. 2004) (observing that § 332(c)(7)(B) imposes

substantive and procedural limits on local governments’

exercise of zoning authority).

6a

tions Act of 1934, including several of § 332(c)(7)(B)’s

limitations. The petition asserted that ambiguities in

the statute had allowed local governments to impede

the placement and construction of wireless facilities,

harming consumers’ access to wireless services.

CTIA’s petition made four specific requests.

First, CTIA requested that the FCC provide

guidance on what constitutes a “failure to act” for

purposes of § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The FCC was requested

to clarify the time periods within which a state or

locality must act on wireless facility siting applica-

tions. The petition suggested that the Commission

find that there has been a failure to act if there is no

final action within 45 days from the submission of a

wireless facility application and within 75 days from

submission of other wireless siting facility applica-

tions.

Second, CTIA asked the FCC to find that, in

the event no final action was taken within the sug-

gested 45- and 75-day time periods, the application

would be deemed granted. Alternatively, CTIA pro-

posed that the FCC establish a presumption that, if

a zoning authority could not explain a failure to act

within the time frames, a reviewing court should

find a violation of § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and issue an in-

junction granting the underlying application.

Third, CTIA requested that the FCC interpret

§ 332(c)(7)(B)G), which bars state and local govern-

ments from taking action that would “prohibit or

have the effect of prohibiting the provision of per-

7a

sonal wireless services.”5 CTIA noted that federal

courts had split on the question of whether that pro-

vision prevented state and local governments from

barring entry of additional wireless service providers

into a given market based solely on the existence of

another provider within that market. CTIA sug-

gested that the FCC declare that the existence of one

or more other carriers in a given geographic market

is not by itself a sufficient defense against a suit

seeking to enforce § 332(c)(7(B)@A(D.

Fourth and finally, CTIA requested the FCC

to declare that the TCA preempts any ordinance that

automatically requires a wireless carrier to seek a

variance, regardless of the type and location of the

wireless siting proposal. As support for this request,

CTIA pointed to 47 U.S.C. § 253, which provides in

pertinent part: “No State or local statute or regula-

tion, or other State or local legal requirement, may

prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability

of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate

telecommunications service.”?

647 U.S.C. § 332(c 74 BYWID.

6 Compare, e.g., Metheny v. Becker, 352 F.3d 458, 461 n.2 (1st

Cir. 2003) (observing that in the First Circuit “a provider is not

precluded from obtaining relief under the Act simply because

some other provider services the gap in question”), with AT&T

Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Va. Beach, 155

F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the statute “only

applies to ‘blanket prohibitions’ and ‘general bans or policies,’

not to individual zoning decisions”).

747 U.S.C. § 253(a).

8a

The FCC issued a public notice seeking com-

ment on CTIA’s petition, and the record reflects that,

in response to the notice, the FCC received dozens of

comments from wireless service providers, local zon-

ing authorities, and other interested parties. In

2009, the FCC issued the Declaratory Ruling, in

which it granted in part and denied in part CTIA’s

petition.®

With respect to CTIA’s request that the FCC

establish time frames in which state and local gov-

ernments must act on zoning requests, the FCC de-

clared that “a reasonable period of time” for purposes

of § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) presumptively would be 90 days

for personal wireless service facility siting applica-

tions requesting collocations® and 150 days for all

other applications.!°© The FCC further determined

that a lack of decision within these time frames

would constitute a failure to act under §

332(c)(7)(B)(v).11 The FCC stated, however, that per-

sonal wireless service providers and state or local

governments could, by mutual consent, extend the

prescribed time frames.!? In addition, the FCC con-

cluded that, if an applicant submits an incomplete

application, the time it takes for the applicant to re-

spond to a state or local government’s request for

6 24 FCC Red. 13994 (2009).

® Collocations involve modifications to already existing wireless

facilities.

10 24 FCC Red. 13994 4 32 (2009).

il Jd.

12 Id. at ¥ 32.

9a

additional information would not count toward the

90- or 150-day time frame if the state or local gov-

ernment notified the applicant that the application

was incomplete within 30 days of receiving the ap-

plication.!3

The FCC rejected CTIA’s proposal that the

FCC deem as granted applications on which final ac-

tion was not taken within the prescribed time

frames.!* The FCC observed that § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s

provision for a cause of action in a court of competent

jurisdiction based on a state or local government’s

“failure to act” indicated Congress’s “intent that

courts should have the responsibility to fashion ap-

propriate case-specific remedies.”!5 Accordingly, the

FCC concluded that, although the 90- and 150-day

time frames established by the Declaratory Ruling

were presumptively reasonable, state or local au-

thorities would have the opportunity in any given

case to rebut that presumption in court. !€

Finally, the FCC addressed CTIA’s request

that the FCC interpret § 332(c)(7)(B)G) and 47

U.S.C. § 253. With respect to § 332(c)(7)(B)Q@, the

FCC determined “that a State or local government

that denies an application for personal wireless ser-

vice facilities siting solely because ‘one or more car-

riers serve a given geographic market’ has engaged

13 Jd. at 4 53.

14 Td. at § 39.

15 Td.

16 Jd. at § 42.

10a

in unlawful regulation” that violates §

332(c)(7)(B)@UD’s prohibition on regulation that

“prohibits or hals] the effect of prohibiting the provi-

sion of personal wireless services.”!7 With respect to

§ 253, the FCC rejected CTIA’s request that the FCC

should rely upon that provision to preempt state

laws and local ordinances that require wireless ser-

vice providers to obtain a variance before siting fa-

cilities.1* The FCC noted that CTIA was not seeking

the preemption of any particular ordinance and “that

any further consideration of blanket variance ordi-

nances should occur within the factual context of

specific cases.”!9

Several organizations subsequently filed a pe-

tition for reconsideration, which the FCC ultimately

rejected in its Reconsideration Order. After the FCC

issued the Declaratory Ruling, but before it issued

the Reconsideration Order, the City of Arlington

filed a petition for review of the Declaratory Ruling

in this court. We issued an order holding Arlington’s

petition for review in abeyance pending the outcome

of the above-referenced petition for reconsideration.

After the FCC issued the Reconsideration Order, the

City of San Antonio, which had also intervened in

support of Arlington’s petition for review, filed;its

own petition seeking review of both the Declaratory

Ruling and the Reconsideration Order. We have also

17 Id. at J 55.

18 Id. at J 67.

19 Td.

lla

allowed several parties to intervene in support of or

in Opposition to the petitions.

IT

We first address an issue involving this court’s

jurisdiction. As we noted above, this case involves

two separate petitions for review—Arlington’s peti-

tion and San Antonio’s petition. Many of the issues

Arlington and San Antonio raise are the same. Both

cities claim (1) the FCC lacked statutory authority to

establish the 90- and 150-day time frames; (2) the

FCC’s 90- and 150-day time frames conflict with the

language of § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v); (3) the FCC’s

actions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-

cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law;

and (4) the FCC violated the Administrative Proce-

dure Act (APA) because its establishment of the 90-

and 150-day time frames constituted a rulemaking

subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment require-

ments.

Each city also raises issues unique to its own

petition. Arlington raises a procedural due process

claim. San Antonio presents two additional issues:

(1) a challenge to the FCC’s interpretation of §

332(c)(7)(B)G@), and (2) a claim that the FCC failed to

comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act.2° The

FCC contends, however, that we lack jurisdiction to

consider San Antonio’s additional arguments be-

cause San Antonio did not timely file its petition for

review. Before we address the merits of the cities’

205 U.S.C. § 601 et seg.

12a

arguments, we must address the issue of our juris-

diction.

A

San Antonio filed its petition for review pur-

suant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), which provides that

“(alny proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul, or sus-

pend any order of the Commission ... shall be

brought as provided by and in the manner prescribed

in chapter 158 of Title 28.” Chapter 158 of Title 28

grants this court jurisdiction over “all final orders of

the Federal Communications Commission made re-

viewable by section 402(a) of Title 47.”21 Chapter 158

also states that a party seeking review of “a final or-

der reviewable under this chapter” must file a peti-

tion for review of the order within 60 days after en-

try of the order.?2 This 60-day period “is jurisdic;

tional and cannot be judicially altered or ex-

panded.”23

The FCC issued the Declaratory Ruling on

November 18, 2009. Arlington filed its petition fo

review of the Declaratory Ruling on January 14,

2010, within the 60-day period set forth in 28 U.S. C.

§ 2344. We have jurisdiction to consider that petition

and the issues Arlington raises. San Antonio, how-

ever, did not file its petition until October 1, 2010

well beyond the expiration of the 60-day period. Nev,

21 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).

22 Id. at § 2344.

23 Brazoria Cnty., Tex. v. EEOC, 391 F.3d 685, 688 (5th Cir.

2004) (quoting Texas v. United States, 749 F.2d 1144, 1146 (5th

Cir. 1985)).

13a

ertheless, San Antonio argues that its petition for

review of the Declaratory Ruling is timely because it

was filed within 60 days of the FCC’s issuance of the

Reconsideration Order.

It is the general rule that filing a petition for

reconsideration with the FCC will toll the 60-day pe-

riod for filing a petition for review of the agency’s ac-

tion in this court.24 As the FCC notes, however, San

Antonio did not file a petition for reconsideration of

the Declaratory Ruling. Rather, other parties af-

fected by the Declaratory Ruling filed the petition for

reconsideration that culminated in the Reconsidera-

tion Order, and San Antonio simply submitted com-

ments in support of that petition. The issue here,

then, is whether a petition for reconsideration filed

by one party to an agency action tolls § 2344’s 60-day

period for a party that did not file its own petition for

reconsideration.

We conclude that a petition for reconsidera-

tion filed by one party does not toll § 2344’s 60-day

period for parties that do not file petitions for recon-

sideration. We reach this decision because “finality

with respect to agency action is a party-based con-

cept.”25 It is well-established that “a petition for

24 See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 116 F.3d 593, 596-97 (D.C. Cir.

1997); Bellsouth Corp. v. FCC, 17 F.3d 1487, 1489-90 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (“[O]nce a party petitions the agency for reconsideration

of an order or any part thereof, the entire order is rendered

nonfinal as to that party.”).

25 Bellsouth Corp., 17 F.3d at 1489 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted); see also W. Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 860

F.2d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[A]ln agency action can be final

l4a

agency reconsideration by one party does not affect

the right of other parties to seek judicial review.”26

In other words, the petition for reconsideration filed

in this case did not affect San Antonio’s right to file a

petition for review in this court as of the date the

FCC issued the Declaratory Ruling, and we would

have been able to exercise jurisdiction over such a

petition for review so long as San Antonio itself did

not file a petition for reconsideration. Because “there

is no principled way to distinguish between the con-

cept of finality for purposes of triggering the running

of a time limit for appeals and the concept of finality

for the purpose of appellate court jurisdiction,”27 we

conclude that San Antonio’s failure to petition for

reconsideration of the Declaratory Ruling rendered

the Declaratory Ruling a final agency decision with

respect to San Antonio both for purposes of confer-

ring jurisdiction on this court and for purposes of

triggering § 2344’s time period. San Antonio thus

for one party and nonfinal for another.”); Winter v. ICC, 851

F.2d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir. 1988) (“{IJn multi-party proceedings

one party may seek judicial review of an agency decision while

another party seeks administrative reconsideration, resulting

in both tribunals having jurisdiction. An agency decision may

thus be final for one purpose yet nonfinal for another

purpose.”).

26 Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. FERC, 361 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir.

2004); see also W. Penn Power Co., 860 F.2d at 586 (“It is well

established, for example, that when two parties are adversely

affected by an agency's action, one can petition for

reconsideration before the agency at the same time that the

other seeks judicial redetermination.”).

27 W. Penn Power Co., 860 F.2d at 585-86.

15a

had 60 days from November 18, 2009, to file a peti-

tion for review in this court of the Declaratory Rul-

ing. The city did not file its petition until October lI,

2010, months after its 60-day period to file a petition

for review had expired, and we lack jurisdiction to

consider the petition insofar as it challenges the De-

claratory Ruling.

B

San Antonio also argues we can consider its

petition, notwithstanding the fact that it was un-

timely with respect to the Declaratory Ruling, be-

cause the petition also challenges the FCC’s Recon-

sideration Order. There is no doubt that San Anto-

nio’s petition for review is timely insofar as it chal-

lenges the FCC’s Reconsideration Order. The Recon-

sideration Order is not a reviewable order, however,

because it merely denied rehearing of matters de-

cided in the Declaratory Ruling. It contained no new

or additional determinations. San Antonio did not

petition for reconsideration of the Declaratory Rul-

ing, and in such a situation, San Antonio cannot

challenge the rulings in the Declaratory Order by

challenging only the Reconsideration Order. As the

Supreme Court explained in ICC v. Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers: “where a party petitions an

agency for reconsideration on the ground of ‘material

error, i.e., on the same record that was before the

agency when it rendered its original decision, ‘an or-

der which merely denies rehearing of . . . [the prior]

order is not itself reviewable.”28 Here, the argu-

28 482 U.S. 270, 280 (1987) (quoting Microwave Commce'ns, Inc.

v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385, 387 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).

16a

ments San Antonio raises in its petition for review,

and the arguments it submitted in support of the pe-

tition for reconsideration, all were originally pre-

sented to the agency during the proceedings leading

up to the issuance of the Declaratory Ruling. Accord-

ingly, in addition to lacking jurisdiction to review

San Antonio’s petition insofar as it challenges the

Declaratory Ruling, we also lack jurisdiction to con-

sider the petition as a challenge to the Reconsidera-

tion Order.

C

San Antonio maintains that we can consider

all of its arguments, even if we lack jurisdiction over

its petition for review, because it intervened in sup-

port of Arlington’s timely petition for review in this

court. Our precedent compels us to disagree. In Bra-

zoria County, Texas v. EEOC, *°we held that a party

could not rely on her timely intervention with re-

spect to another party’s petition for review to raise

matters outside the scope of the other party’s peti-

tion.°° We arrived at this holding because motions to

intervene must be filed within 30 days after filing pf

the petition for review?! —which itself must be filed

within 60 days after the agency’s final action®*—thus

creating a situation in which intervenors can request

review of issues as late as 90 days after the agency’s

29 391 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 2004).

30 Id. at 688-89.

31 See Fed. R. App. P. 15(d).

32 28 U.S.C. § 2344.

17a

final action. Because permitting an intervenor to

raise additional issues for review would contravene §

2344’s 60-day time period for filing petitions for re-

view, we observed that intervenors “are bound by the

issues raised in the petitions for review.”*5 Thus, we

generally limit intervenors to raising arguments ad-

dressing only those issues presented in the petitions

for review.*4

As discussed above, Arlington has raised five

issues. San Antonio’s argument that the FCC failed

to comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act and its

challenge to the FCC’s interpretation of §

332(c)(7)(B)G) do not relate to those issues, and we

lack jurisdiction to consider them. Accordingly, we

will hmit our discussion to only those issues Arling-

ton has raised. We will, however, consider the argu-

ments of San Antonio and other intervenors that re-

late to those issues.

iit

The cities contend the FCC violated the APA

when it established the 90- and 150-day time frames.

The APA identifies three types of agency proceed-

ings—rulemaking, adjudication, and licensing—and

88 Brazoria Cnty., Tex., 391 F.3d at 689 (quoting United Gas

Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 417, 437 (5th Cir. 1987)).

% Id. But see Kan. City S. Indus., Inc. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 423,

434-35 (5th Cir. 1990) (exercising jurisdiction over an issue

raised by an intervenor when the intervenor “filed its motion

for leave to intervene in the proceedings in this Court not only

within Rule 15(d)’s thirty-day filing requirement for

intervention motions but also within section 2344's sixty-day

filing requirement for petitions for review of ICC orders”).

18a

prescribes specific procedures applicable to those

proceedings.* When an agency engages in rulemak-

ing it must, subject to certain statutory exceptions,

satisfy the APA’s familiar notice-and-comment re-

quirements.** Adjudications, by contrast, are not

subject to those requirements.*’ The cities argue the

FCC violated the APA because the time frames con-

stitute new rules subject to the APA’s notice-and-

comment requirements for rulemaking and the FCC

failed to comply with the those requirements.

The FCC makes two arguments in response.

First, the FCC notes the Declaratory Ruling was the

product of adjudication, not rulemaking, and thus

was not subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment re-

quirements. Alternatively, the FCC suggests that

any new rules included in the Declaratory Ruling

were interpretive rules excepted from the notice-and-

comment requirements.

A

We first consider whether the 90- and 150-day

time frames were not subject to the APA’s notice-

and-comment requirements because the Declaratory

Ruling was the product of adjudication rather than

rulemaking. It is well-established that agencies can

choose to announce new rules through adjudication

35 See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 366 (5th Cir.

1999).

36 5 U.S.C. § 553.

37 Id. at § 554; Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 627

(5th Cir. 2001) (“There is no notice and comment requirement

for an agency adjudication.”).

19a

rather than rulemaking.** Agencies typically enjoy

“very broad discretion lin deciding] whether to pro-

ceed by way of adjudication or rulemaking.”®? The

notice-and-comment requirements for rulemaking

would ordinarily not apply to the FCC’s decision to

establish the time frames if the FCC exercised its

discretion to issue the Declaratory Ruling pursuant

to its adjudicative powers.

We examine two aspects of an agency action

when determining whether an agency action was a

rulemaking or an adjudication. First, we consider

the agency’s characterization of its own action.‘

Second, we must examine the ultimate product of

the agency action.*! Both of these considerations

38 See, e.g, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294

(1974) (observing that an agency “is not precluded from

announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding”);

Mobil Exploration & Producing N. Am., Inc. v. FERC, 881 F.2d

193, 198 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that an agency “may establish

rules of general application in either a statutory rulemaking

procedure or an individual adjudication”).

38 Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1141

(D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 294

(observing that “the choice between rulemaking and

adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's

discretion”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)

(“[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by

individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the

informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); Am.

Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 797 (5th Cir.

2000) (“Agencies have discretion to choose between

adjudication and rulemaking as a means of setting policy.”).

# Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 797.

41 Td.

20a

lead us to agree with the FCC that the Declaratory

Ruling was the result of an adjudication and not a

rulemaking.

First, the FCC itself claims it was engaging in

adjudication when it issued the Declaratory Ruling.

As we have previously recognized, we “accord signifi-

cant deference to an agency’s characterization of its

own action.”42 This deference is not absolute, how-

ever. Otherwise, an agency would be able to escape

the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements simply

by labeling a rulemaking an adjudication.** Whether

the FCC’s action here constituted an adjudication or

a rulemaking ultimately turns on the attributes of

the Declaratory Ruling itself.

The Declaratory Ruling is designated as a

“Declaratory Ruling,” and it was issued pursuant to

47 C.F.R. § 1.2. Section 1.2 grants the FCC the

power to issue declaratory orders and is derivative of

§ 554(e) of the APA.44 Section 554(e) provides: “The

42 Id.

43 Cf Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C.

Cir. 2000) (“It is well established that an agency may not

escape the notice and comment requirements... by labeling a

major substantive legal addition to a rule a mere

interpretation.”).

44 C.F.R. § 1.2(a) (“The Commission may, in accordance with

section 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, on motion or

on its own motion issue a declaratory ruling terminating a

controversy or removing uncertainty.”); see also Wilson v. A.H.

Belo Corp., 87 F.3d 393, 397 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Because 5

U.S.C. § 554(e) grants the FCC authority to issue ‘declaratory

orders,’ and because 47 C.F.R. § 1.2 is derived from § 554(e), it

appears that the terms ‘declaratory erder’ and ‘declaratory

21a

agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders,

and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory

order to terminate a controversy or remove uncer-

tainty.” Because § 554(e) is a subsection of the provi-

sion in the APA governing formal adjudication, we

have held that declaratory rulings issued pursuant

to its grant of authority are informal adjudications

under the APA.“ We see no reason to treat the De-

claratory Ruling differently: it was the product of ad-

judication.*®

B

Our conclusion that the Declaratory Ruling

resulted from adjudication does not end our review

of the FCC’s purported non-compliance with the

APA. Although, as noted above, agencies enjoy broad

discretion in choosing whether to establish a rule

ruling’ are used interchangeably.”).

45 See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 796-98 (treating a

declaratory order issued pursuant to § 554(e) as an informal

adjudication); Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1555 (5th

Cir. 1989) (same); see also Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC, 509 F.3d

531, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is no question that a

declaratory ruling can be a form of adjudication.” (internal

citation omitted)).

46 See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 798: Radiofone, Inc. v.

FCC, 759 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“There is no doubt

that the Commission’s action in this case was an adjudication

and not a rulemaking. It is captioned ‘Declaratory Ruling,’ a

category of action which, according to the Commission’s rules,

is taken ‘in accordance with section 5(d) of the Administrative

Procedure Act,’ 47 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1984). That subsection, now

codified at 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1982), pertains to adjudication.”

(internal footnote omitted)).

22a

through adjudication or rulemaking,‘’ that discre-

tion is not unlimited. The agency ultimately remains

subject to the constraints of the APA, which requires

courts to review the agency’s action to determine

whether it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with

law.”48 The Ninth Circuit, for example, has identified

certain situations in which an agency’s reliance on

adjudication instead of rulemaking constitutes an

abuse of discretion.49 Even though we conclude the

Declaratory Ruling was the product of an adjudica-

tion, we will consider whether the FCC abused its

discretion or otherwise violated the law by promul-

gating the 90- and 150-day time frames through ad-

judication rather than rulemaking.® On this point,

47 Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 797.

485 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

49 See MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1151

(9th Cir. 2008) (“An agency adjudication may require a notice

and comment period if it constitutes de facto rulemaking that

affects the rights of broad classes of unspecified individuals.”

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Miguel-

Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Of

course, in certain circumstances an agency may abuse its

discretion by announcing new rules through adjudication

rather than through rulemaking, such as when the rule

operates retroactively and disturbs settled expectations.”).

5° See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 798 (reviewing agency's

decision to proceed by adjudication rather than rulemaking for

abuse of discretion): see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416

U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]here may be situations where [an

agency's) reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of

discretion .. ..”).

23a

we harbor serious doubts as to the propriety of the

FCC’s choice of procedures.

Specifically, we note that the Declaratory Rul-

ing’s 90- and 150-day time frames bear all the hall-

marks of products of rulemaking, not adjudication.

Adjudications typically “resolve disputes among spe-

cific individuals in specific cases, whereas rulemak-

ing affects the rights of broad classes of unspecified

individuals.”5! In American Airlines, Inc. v. Depart-

ment of Transportation, we held that the Depart-

ment of Transportation properly used § 554(e)’s de-

claratory ruling mechanism to resolve a dispute in-

volving the application of the federal law governing

airline service at Love Field airport.** In that case

we specifically observed that “because DOT's order

interpreted the rights of a small number of parties

properly before it, DOT did not abuse its discretion

by acting through an adjudicatory proceeding.”

Similarly, in Mobil Exploration & Producing

North America. Inc. v. FERC,5* we reviewed an

agency's decision to institute a new one-year time

limit for successors in interest in gas-producing

properties to obtain a new certificate of public con-

51 Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 448

(9th Cir. 1994); see also Providence Yakima Med. Ctr. v.

Sebelius, 611 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam);

San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., Inc., 612 F.3d 25, 33 n.3

(ist Cir. 2010).

52 202 F.3d at 797-98.

53 Td. at 798.

54 881 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1989).

24a

venience and necessity.55 The agency instituted the

new limit in the course of reviewing a particular suc”

cessor’s application for a certificate. Petitioners

challenged the limit on a number of grounds, includ-

ing that the limit should have been instituted using

the formal rulemaking procedure in the APA, and we

held that the agency did not abuse its discretion in

choosing to establish the limit through adjudication

rather than rulemaking.®’? In doing 60, we specifi-

cally noted that the new time limit was “a relatively

minor procedural requirement with limited effect”

due to the fact that there were “fewer than 250 large

producers that would be subject to the one-year suc-

cessor filing requirement.”®® Here, the FCC estab-

lished the 90- and 150-day time frames, not in the

course of deciding any specific dispute between a

wireless provider and a state or local government,

but in a proceeding focused exclusively on providing

an interpretation of § 332(c)(7)(B) that would apply

prospectively to every state and local government in

the United States.

It is true that an agency need not be pre-

sented with a specific dispute between two parties in

order to use § 554(e)’s declaratory ruling mechanism,

because § 554 does not limit an agency’s use of de-

claratory rulings to terminating controversies be-

tween parties. Section 554 also empowers agencies to

55 Id. at 195-96.

56 Jd. at 196.

57 Id. at 198-99.

58 Id. at 199.

25a

use declaratory rulings to “remove uncertainty,” and

there are cases suggesting an agency may use a de-

claratory ruling to issue interpretations of law that

are both general and prospective in their application

and divorced from a specific dispute between parties.

In Qwest Services Corp. v. FCC,®® the District of Co-

lumbia Circuit upheld the FCC’s use of a declaratory

ruling to announce that certain types of prepaid call-

ing cards were telecommunications services and that

their providers were subject to regulation under the

TCA.© In Chisholm v. FCC,® the District of Colum-

bia Circuit similarly upheld the FCC’s use of a de-

claratory ruling to determine the application of the

Communication Act’s equal-time provision to specific

types of appearances by political candidates.®* Nev-

ertheless, even these cases involved concrete and

narrow questions of law the resolutions of which

would have an immediate and determinable impact

on specific factual scenarios. Here, by contrast, the

FCC has provided guidance on the meaning of §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v) that is utterly divorced from

any specific application of the statute. The time

frames’ effect with respect to any particular dispute

arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) will only become clear

after adjudication of the dispute in a court of compe-

tent jurisdiction. This is classic rulemaking.®

59 509 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

8 Td. at 536-37.

61 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

& Jd. at 364-66.

63 See Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442,

26a

Nevertheless, we need not decide whether the

FCC abused its discretion by failing to use notice-

and-comment rulemaking to establish the time

frames. We also do not address the FCC’s argument

that, even if it did engage in rulemaking, the rule-

making was interpretative rulemaking of the type

excepted from the APA’s notice-and-comment re-

quirements. We need not decide these questions

because any failure by the FCC to comply with the

APA in this case was harmless.®

“(T]he harmless error rule requires the party

asserting error to demonstrate prejudice from the

error.”®6 An agency’s failure to comply with the APA

448 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Rulemaking, in contrast, is prospective,

and has a definitive effect on individuals only after the rule

subsequently is applied.”).

645 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2).

6 See United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 930 (5th Cir.

2011) (“The APA demands that courts reviewing agency

decisions under the Act ‘[take] due account .. . of the rule of

prejudicial error.” (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §

706)); Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 613

F.3d 1112, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The harmless error rule

applies to agency action because ‘lilf the agency’s mistake did

not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it

would be senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration.”

(alteration in original) (quoting PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362

F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).

6 Air Can. v. Dep't of Transp., 148 F.3d 1142, 1156 (D.C. Cir.

1998); see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1706

(2009) (“[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful

normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s

determination.”).

27a

is harmless when the agency’s mistake “clearly had

no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of

decision reached.”®7 In conducting the harmless error

inquiry, we inform our anaiysis with a number of po-

tentially relevant factors, including (1) “an estima-

tion of the likelihood that the result would have been

different”; (2) “an awareness of what body (jury,

lower court, administrative agency) has the author-

ity to reach that result”; (3) “a consideration of the

error’s likely effects on the perceived fairness, integ-

rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”;

and (4) “a hesitancy to generalize too broadly about

particular kinds of errors when the specific factual

circumstances in which the error arises may well

make all the difference.”®

The APA’s notice-and-comment procedures

are familiar:

Under the APA, agencies issuing rules must

publish notice of proposed rulemaking in the

Federal Register and shall give interested per-

sons an opportunity to participate in the rule

making by allowing submission of comments.

In addition, the APA requires that publication

of a substantive rule shall be made not less

than 30 days before its effective date.®®

6? U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 1979)

(quoting Braniff Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.3d

453, 466 (D.C. Cir.1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

68 Shinseki, 129 S. Ct. at 1707; see also Johnson, 632 F.3d at

930.

6 Johnson, 632 F.3d at 927 (internal quotation marks and

28a

When an agency fails to comply with the APA’s no-

tice and comment procedures, the touchstone is

“whether it is clear that the lack of notice and com-

ment did not prejudice the petitioner.””° In this case,

there is no indication that any failure of the FCC to

comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment proce-

dures prejudiced Arlington or the intervenors.

As an initial matter, the FCC published notice

of CTIA’s petition in the Federal Register, and the

notice requested comments on CTIA’s request that

the FCC “clarify the time period in which a state or

local zoning authority will be deemed to have failed

to act on a wireless facility siting application.””! The

notice also referenced CTIA’s requests that the FCC

establish specific time frames and implement a sys-

tem under which an application would be deemed

granted if a zoning authority failed to act within the

applicable time frame.7? It is true that the FCC la-

beled its published notice as a request for comment

on a “Petition for Declaratory Ruling” rather than as

a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” but, as the Dis

trict of Columbia Circuit has repeatedly held, such a

deficiency is not fatal because ““to remand solely be-

cause the Commission labeled the action a declara-

citations omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d).

70 Johnson, 632 F.3d at 931.

1. See Wireless Telecommunications Bureau seeks Comment on

Petition for Declaratory Ruling by CTIA, 73 Fed. Reg. 50972,

50972 (Aug. 29, 2008).

72 Id. at 50972-73.

29a

tory ruling would be to engage in an empty formal-

ity.””73

We also cannot ignore the fact that, after pub-

lishing the notice in the Federal Register, the FCC

received and considered comments from dozens of

interested parties, including several of the cities in-

volved in this litigation. Many of those comments

raised the very issues now raised before this court,

and the FCC addressed those issues in its Declara-

tory Ruling. Indeed, we are not aware of a single ar-

gument the cities now present to this court that was

not considered by the FCC in the agency proceedings

below. These facts call to mind our recent observa-

tions in United States v. Johnson:

The purpose of notice-and-comment rulemak-

ing is to assure fairness and mature consid-

eration of rules having a substantial impact

on those regulated. The process allows the

agency to educate itself before adopting a final

order. In addition, public notice requires the

agency to disclose its thinking on matters that

will affect regulated parties. These goals,

however, may be achieved in cases where the

agency's decision-making process centered on

the identical substantive claims as those pro-

posed by the party asserting error, even if

there were APA deficiencies. It follows that

when a party’s claims were considered, even if

73 See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 40 (D.C.

Cir. 2005) (quoting N.Y. State Comm'n on Cable Television v.

FCC, 749 F.2d 804, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

30a

notice was inadequate, the challenging party

may not have been prejudiced.”4

Finally, to the extent the FCC might have

failed to comply with the APA’s 30-day waiting pe-

riod before an adopted rule becomes effective, the cit-

ies have suggested no reason why any such waiting

period was needed in this case or demonstrated any

prejudice resulting from the FCC’s failure to delay

the effective date of the Declaratory Ruling. We note

that “the purpose of the thirty-day waiting period is

to give affected parties a reasonable time to adjust

their behavior before the final rule takes effect.””

On this point, the Declaratory Ruling itself recog-

nized the need “to give State and local governments

an additional period to review currently pending ap-

plications before an applicant might file suit.”76 The

FCC determined that, for all zoning applications

that had been pending for less than 90 days (with

respect to collocation applications) or 150 days (with

respect to all other applications) at the time of the

issuance of the Declaratory Ruling, state or local

governments would have an additional 90- or 150-

day period before their inaction would be presumed

unreasonable under the time frames.” For those ap-

plications that had been pending for longer than the

applicable time frame at the time of the Declaratory

7 Johnson, 632 F.3d at 931 (internal quotation marks,

brackets, and citations omitted).

78 Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

76 24 FCC Red. 13994 4 51 (2009).

17 Id.

3la

Ruling, the FCC determined state or local govern-

ments would have 60 days from the provision of no-

tice by the applicant before the applicant would be

able to seek judicial relief.7* The cities have not dem-

onstrated that the FCC’s approach here burdened

them in any way. Nor have they pointed to zoning

applications they were forced to address earlier due

to the FCC’s failure to comply with the 30-day wait-

ing period.

We conclude that any error in the FCC’s

choice to establish the time frames in the Declara-

tory Ruling instead of through notice-and-comment

rulemaking was plainly harmless. The cities received

notice of the issues pending before the FCC and had

the ability to comment on CTIA’s petition in the

agency proceedings. More than sixty cities, towns,

and villages, and scores of other governmental! enti-

ties or their representatives submitted comments in

response to the FCC’s notice. The FCC considered

and addressed all of the substantive issues the cities

now raise. Any deficiencies in the procedures leading

to the Declaratory Ruling do not justify vacating and

remanding the order.

IV

The cities also argue the FCC violated due

process when it issued the Declaratory Ruling. The

cities base this argument on their assertion that the

FCC failed to comply with 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(a)

when it considered CTIA’s petition. A note to that

regulation provides:

78 Id.

32a

In the case of petitions for declaratory ruling

that seek Commission preemption of state or

local regulatory authority and petitions for re-

lief under 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(v), the peti-

tioner must serve the original petition on any

state or local government, the actions of which

are specifically cited as a basis for requesting

preemption. Service should be made on those

bodies within the state or local governments

that are legally authorized to accept service of

legal documents in a civil context. Such plead-

ings that are not served will be dismissed

without consideration as a defective pleading

and treated as a violation of the ex parte rules

unless the Commission determines that the

matter should be entertained by making it

part of the record under § 1.1212(d) and the

parties are so informed.7®

The cities claim CTIA did not serve its petition on

the state and local governments whose delays served

as the impetus for CTIA’s petition. According to the

cities, CTILA’s failure to serve the petition necessi-

tated its dismissal and the FCC’s failure to do so re-

sulted in a denial of due process.

The FCC responds that its decision not to

dismiss CTIA’s petition was justified by its own in-

terpretation of § 1.1206(a). In the Declaratory Rul-

ing, the FCC concluded: “By its terms, the service

requirement does not apply to a petition that cites

examples of the practices of unidentified jurisdic-

7° 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(a) note 1.

33a

tions to demonstrate the need for a declaratory rul-

ing interpreting provisions of the Communications

Act.”® The FCC notes that CTIA’s petition did not

identify specific municipalities and that nothing in

its rules required the petition to do so.

Reduced to its essence, the cities’ claim is that

the FCC violated due process by failing to ensure

that CTIA’s petition was served on the specific state

and local governments whose delays caused CTIA to

petition the FCC for the Declaratory Ruling. We do

not believe that due process required such individual

service in this case because the FCC, in issuing the

Declaratory Ruling, was not adjudicating the legality

of the actions of those state and local governments.

The FCC was not confronted with a concrete dispute

the resolution of which would have an immediate ef-

fect on specific individuals.®! As noted above, in this

sense the Declaratory Ruling was more akin to a

rulemaking than the typical adjudication, and we

have observed that “[wlhen a rule is established

through statutory rulemaking, public notice and

hearing provide the necessary protection. . . . Such

notice is provided by publication of the proposed

rulemaking in the Federal Register, and all parties

who will be affected by the rule are given an oppor-

tunity to challenge [the agency’s] action.”®? Here, the

80 24 FCC Red. 13994 4 68 (2009).

81 See Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442,

448 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[Blecause adjudications involve concrete

disputes, they have an immediate effect on specific individuals

(those involved in the dispute).”).

8 Mobil Exploration & Producing N. Am., Inc. v. FERC, 881

34a

FCC provided notice of CTIA’s petition in the Fed-

eral Register and allowed all interested parties to

provide comments on CTIA’s petition. Under the cir-

cumstances of this case, those procedures were ade-

quate to satisfy due process.

V

Regarding the determinations in the FCC’s

Declaratory Ruling, we begin with the cities’ sugges-

tion that the FCC lacked the statutory authority to

adopt the 90- and 150-day time frames. As noted

above, those time frames represent the FCC’s con-

struction of language in § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v). The

cities argue, however, that § 332(c)(7)(A) precludes

the FCC from exercising authority to implement that

language. The cities also note that § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)

places jurisdiction over disputes arising under §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi) in the courts and suggests that this

jurisdictional provision supports its proposed read-

ing of § 332(c)(7)(A).

The FCC, on the other hand, contends that it

possessed statutory authority to adopt the 90- and

150-day time frames pursuant to its general author-

ity to make such rules and regulations as may be

necessary to carry out the Communication Act’s pro-

visions.*8 The FCC argues that § 332(c)(7)(A) does

not bar the FCC from exercising this authority be-

cause the FCC interprets § 332(c)(7)(A) as merely

precluding the FCC from imposing additional limita-

F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Fla. Gas Transmission

Co. v. FERC, 876 F.2d 42, 44 (5th Cir. 1989).

83 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154@), 201(b), 303(z).

35a

tions on state and local government authority over

the wireless facility zoning process beyond those al-

ready provided for in § 332(c)(7)(B). Under the FCC’s

interpretation, the FCC retains the authority to im-

plement the limitations already set forth in §

332(c)(7)(B).

A

We ordinarily review an agency’s interpreta-

tion of the statutes it is charged with administering

using the Chevron two-step standard of review.™

Under Chevron, we first ask “whether Congress has

directly addressed the precise question at issue.”® If

Congress has addressed the question, “we must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-

gress.” If we determine that the statute is silent or

ambiguous with respect to the precise question at

issue, however, we then “consider whether the

agency's answer is based on a permissible construc-

tion of the statute.”®7 “As long as the agency’s con-

struction of an ambiguous statute is permissible, it

8 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 796

(5th Cir. 2000).

8 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States,

131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

86 Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 393 (5th Cir.

2008) (quoting Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

87 Natl Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 749 (5th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Chevron, 476 U.S. at 483) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

36a

must be upheld.”88 Although we engage in the Chev-

ron analysis when reviewing an agency’s interpreta-

tion of a statute it is charged with administering, we

do not use Chevron when reviewing an agency’s in-

terpretation of a statute it is not charged with ad-

ministering.®9

The issue in the instant case is whether the

FCC possessed statutory authority to administer §

332(c)(7)(B)Gii) and (v) by adopting the 90- and 150-

day time frames. Although it is clear that Chevron

review does not apply once it is determined that an

agency lacks authority to interpret a statute, the

parties dispute whether Chevron review should ap-

ply when we determine the extent of the agency’s ju-

risdiction. The FCC argues that an agency’s inter-

pretation of its own statutory authority is subject to

review under Chevron. The cities, on the other hand,

argue the issue presents “a pre-Chevron question of

law regarding the scope of the FCC’s authority” and

that such a question of law is subject to de novo re-

view.

The Supreme Court has not yet conclusively

resolved the question of whether Chevron applies in

the context of an agency’s determination of its own

statutory jurisdiction,” and the circuit courts of ap-

88 Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 796.

89 Td.

% See Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 2011)

(collecting cases and observing that the Supreme Court has yet

to resolve the debate over whether Chevron applies to disputes

about the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction).

37a

peals have adopted different approaches to the issue.

Some circuits apply Chevron deference to disputes

over the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction,®! some do

not,9? and some circuits have thus far avoided taking

a position.%3 In this circuit, we apply Chevron to an

agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdic-

tion, and therefore, we will apply the Chevron

framework when determining whether the FCC pos-

sessed the statutory authority to establish the 90-

and 150-day time frames.™

%1 See, e.g., Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1145-46

(10th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Of course, courts afford

considerable deference to agencies interpreting ambiguities in

statutes that Congress has delegated to their care, ...

including statutory ambiguities affecting the agency's

jurisdiction . . . .” (internal citations omitted)); P.R. Mar.

Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 552

(3d Cir. 1988) (“When Congress has not directly and

unambiguously addressed the precise question at issue, a court

must accept the interpretation set forth by the agency so long

as it 1s a reasonable one. . . . This rule of deference is fully

applicable to an agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction.”

(internal citation omitted)).

#2 See, e.g., N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 294 F.3d

844, 846-47 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that de novo review is

appropriate for questions involving an agency’s determination

of its own jurisdiction); Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d

1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reviewing agency's legal conclusion

regarding the scope of its own jurisdiction without deference to

the agency's determination).

93 See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237 (leaving the question

unanswered); O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (ist Cir.

1996) (same).

* Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 2007)

(observing that Chevron step one appliee to “challenges to an

38a

B

“At the first step of a Chevron analysis, we

must determine whether Congress has directly spo-

ken in a manner that reveals its expressed intent.”%

“We use the traditional tools of statutory construc-

tion to determine whether Congress has spoken to

the precise point at issue,”% and “[t}here is no better

or more authoritative expression of congressional in-

tent than the statutory text.”8? We determine the

plainness or ambiguity of the statutory text by refer-

encing “the language itself, the specific context in

which that language is used, and the broader context

of the statute as a whole.”98 “[W]here the statutory

language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme

is coherent and consistent,’ the language of the stat-

agency's interpretation of a statute, as well as whether the

statute confers agency jurisdiction over an issue”); Tex. Office

of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 440-46 (5th Cir.

1999) (applying Chevron to a question concerning the scope of

the FCC’s statutory authority to provide universal service

support for schools, libraries, and rural health-care providers);

First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 42 F.3d 895, 901 (5th

Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“[T]his circuit has accorded deference

to an agency's determination of its own statutory authority.”).

95 Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir.

2008) (quoting Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

%6 Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 749 (5th

Cir. 2011) (citing Tex. Sav. & Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Fed.

Hous. Bd., 201 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2000)).

97 Med. Ctr. Pharm., 536 F.3d at 394.

98 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).

39a

ute 1s usually where we end.”” If the statutory lan-

guage is susceptible to more than one reasonable in-

terpretation, however, it is ambiguous and we must

proceed to Chevron step two.!

As noted above, the FCC argues that its gen-

eral authority to make rules and regulations to carry

out the Communications Act includes the power to

implement § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v). One express

grant is found at 47 U.S.C. § 201(b), which provides

that “[t]he Commission may prescribe such rules and

regulations as may be necessary in the public inter-

est to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” The

Supreme Court has held the FCC’s rulemaking au-

thority under § 201(b) extends to provisions added by

the TCA because Congress passed the TCA as an

amendment to the Communications Act.!°! Congress

#® Med. Ctr. Pharm., 536 F.3d at 394 (quoting Robinson, 519

U.S. at 340).

100 See United States v. Hoang, 636 F.3d 677, 682 (5th Cir.

2011) (“It is familiar learning that ‘[a] statute is ambiguous if it

is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation or

more than one accepted meaning.” (quoting In re Condor Ins.

Ltd., 601 F.3d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 2010)); Comacho v. Tex.

Workforce Comm'n, 408 F.3d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 2005)

(“Generally, a statute is ambiguous if it is ‘capable of being

understood in two or more possible senses or ways.” (quoting

Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90 (2001)).

101 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999)

(“We think that the grant in § 201(b) means what it says: The

FCC has rulemaking authority to carry out the ‘provisions of

this Act,’ which include §§ 251 and 252, added by the

Telecommunications Act of 1996.”); see also AT&T Commce'ns v.

BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 201).

40a

retains the ability to restrict its grant of power to an

agency, though, and the cities argue Congress in-

cluded language in the TCA precluding the FCC

from using the Communication Act’s grant of general

authority to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limita-

tions.!02 The cities point to § 332(c)(7)(A), which pro-

vides: “Except as provided in this paragraph, noth-

ing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority

of a State or local government or instrumentality

thereof over decisions regarding the placement, con-

struction, and modification of personal wireless ser-

vice facilities.” The cities also claim that §

332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s vesting of jurisdiction in the courts

to review disputes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)(Gi)

evinces Congress’s intent to remove jurisdiction over

§ 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) from the FCC.

The question we confront under Chevron is

whether these provisions unambiguously indicate

Congress’s intent to preclude the FCC from imple-

menting § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi and (v). If they do, the FCC

lacked statutory authority to issue the 90- and 150-

day time frames. If the provisions are ambiguous,

however, we must defer to the FCC’s interpreta-

tion—an interpretation under which the FCC pos-

sessed authority to issue the 90- and 150-day time

frames—so long as the FCC’s interpretation repre-

sents a reasonable construction of their terms. For

102 Cf. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 42 F.3d 895, 901

(5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“As part of its legislative powers,

Congress designates the scope of agency authority, and if

Congress so chooses, it can subsequently restrict or limit that

delegation of power to the agency.”).

4la

the following reasons, we conclude neither §

332(c)(7)(A) nor § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) unambiguously pre-

clude the FCC from establishing the 90- and 150-day

time frames.

First, we note that § 332(c)(7)(A), when it

states “[e]xcept as provided in this paragraph,” re-

moves § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations from its reach and

recognizes those limitations as legitimate intrusions

into state and local governments’ traditional author-

ity over zoning decisions. The fundamental question

then, is whether § 332(c)(7)(A), in restricting the

TCA’s limitations on state or local zoning authority

to only those contained in § 332(c)(7)(B), also pre-

cludes the FCC from implementing those limitations

by relying on its general rulemaking authority under

the Communications Act. This is a question to which

§ 332(c)(7)(A) itself does not provide a clear answer.

Section 332(c)(7)(A) states Congress’s desire to make

§ 332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations the only limitations con-

fronting state and local governments in the exercise

of their zoning authority over the placement of wire-

less services facilities, and thus certainly prohibits

the FCC from imposing restrictions or limitations

that cannot be tied to the language of § 332(c)(7)(B).

Whether the FCC retains the power of implementing

those limitations, however, remains unresolved.

Congress’s silence on this point is not without

implication. Had Congress intended to insulate §

332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations from the FCC’s jurisdiction,

one would expect it to have done so explicitly be-

cause Congress surely recognized that it was legis-

lating against the background of the Communica-

42a

tions Act’s general grant of rulemaking authority to

the FCC. The FCC’s general grant of authority

would ordinarily extend to amendments to the

Communications Act, like § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limita-

tions, in the absence of specific statutory limitations

on that authority,!°%? and Congress certainly knew

how to specifically restrict the FCC’s general author-

ity over the Communications Act as it clearly re-

stricted the FCC’s ability to use that authority in

other contexts.!%* Here, however, Congress did not

clearly remove the FCC’s ability to implement the

limitations set forth in § 332(c)(7)(B), and this Con-

gressional silence leaves § 332(c)(7)(A)’s effect on the

FCC’s authority to administer § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limita-

tions ambiguous.

Moreover, the _ cities’ reliance on §

332(c)(7)(B)(v) does not resolve § 332(c)(7)(A)’s ambi-

guity. The cities contend that, by establishing juris-

diction in the courts over specific disputes arising

under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi), Congress indicated its intent

to remove that provision from the scope of the FCC’s

general authority to administer the Communications

Act. The cities read too much into § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s

terms, however. Although § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) does

clearly establish jurisdiction in the courts over dis-

putes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gv), the provision

103 See AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 378.

104 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (listing specific exceptions to the

FCC’s authority over the Communications Act); La. Pub. Serv.

Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369-76 (1986) (holding § 152(b)

“denies the FCC the power to preempt state regulation of

depreciation for intrastate ratemaking purposes”).

43a

does not address the FCC’s power to administer §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi in contexts other than those involving

a specific dispute between a state or local govern-

ment and persons affected by the government’s fail-

ure to act. Accordingly, one could read § 332(c)(7) as

a whole as establishing a framework in which a

wireless service provider must seek a remedy for a

state or local government’s unreasonable delay in

ruling on a wireless siting application in a court of

competent jurisdiction while simultaneously allow-

ing the FCC to issue an interpretation of §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi) that would guide courts’ determina-

tions of disputes under that provision.

The Sixth Circuit recently addressed a similar

statutory scheme in Alliance for Community Media

v. FCC.1% That decision involved provisions of the

Communications Act that delegated to municipali-

ties, in the form of local franchising authorities

(LFAs), the power to award cable franchises. The

provisions at issue further provided that an LFA

could not “unreasonably refuse to award an addi-

tional competitive franchise,”!°? and “endowed po-

tential entrants with a judicial remedy by entitlng

them to commence an action in a federal or state

court within 120 days after receiving a final, adverse

decision from an LFA.”!°% After the FCC promul-

gated rules delineating situations that would consti-

105 §29 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008).

106 Jd. at 768.

107 Td.

108 Jd.

44a

tute an unreasonable refusal to award a cable fran-

chise, petitioners claimed (among other arguments)

that the statute’s identification of courts as the fo-

rum for aggrieved cable operators to obtain relief de-

prived the FCC of statutory authority to exercise its

rulemaking power. The court rejected that argu-

ment, holding that “the availability of a judicial rem-

edy for unreasonable denials of competitive franchise

applications does not foreclose the agency’s rulemak-

ing authority over section 621(a)(1).”1 The decision

in Alliance for Community Media supports the con-

clusion that there is nothing inherently unreason-

able about reading § 332(c)(7) as preserving the

FCC’s ability to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) while

providing for judicial review of disputes under §

332(c)(7)(B) Gi) in the courts. 110 Section

332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s vesting in the courts of jurisdiction

over disputes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)(Gii) thus

does not unambiguously preclude the FCC from tak-

ing the action at issue in this case.

In sum, we conclude that § 332(c)(7) is am-

biguous with respect to the FCC’s authority to estab-

109 Jd. at 775.

110 Jd. at 776 (“[Wle believe that courts can grant deference to

the Order while maintaining their Congressionally-granted

authority to make factual determinations and provide relief to

aggrieved cable operators.”). Cf. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,

525 U.S. 366, 385 (1999) (“While it is true that the 1996 Act

entrusts state commissions with the job of approving

interconnection agreements and granting exemptions to rural

LECs, these assignments . . . do not logically preclude the

[FCC’s] issuance of rules to guide the state-commission

judgments.” (internal citations omitted)).

45a

lish the 90- and 150-day time frames. Although the

statute clearly bars the FCC from using its general

rulemaking powers under the Communications Act

to create additional limitations on state and local

governments beyond those the statute provides in §

332(c)(7)(B), the statute is silent on the question of

whether the FCC can use its general authority under

the Communications Act to implement §

332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations. We proceed to Chevron

step two.

C

Once we determine that a statute is silent or

ambiguous with respect to a question at issue, we

must defer to the agency’s resolution of the question

if the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissi-

ble construction of the statute.!!! In addition to argu-

ing that the plain text of § 332(c)(7) precludes the

FCC from establishing the 90- and 150-day time

frames, the cities make a number of other arguments

that seemingly attack the permissibility of any con-

struction of the statute that would allow the FCC to

exercise the power that it did in this case. First, the

cities claim § 332(c)(7)’s legislative history supports

their proposed reading of § 332(c)(7) and not the

FCC’s. Second, they suggest that a construction of §

332(c)(7) that would grant the FCC authority to im-

plement § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations on state and lo-

cal government would conflict with the principle that

111 See, e.g., Tex. Clinical Labs, Inc. v. Sebelius, 612 F.3d 771,

775 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).

46a

“if Congress intends to preempt a power tradition-

ally exercised by a state or local government, it must

make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the

language of the statute.”!!2 Finally, they suggest the

FCC itself had long recognized that it lacked juris-

diction with respect to § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations.

These arguments are not persuasive.

Regarding the legislative history surrounding

the passage of § 332(c)(7), the cities note Congress

considered but ultimately did not enact a version of

the statute that directed the FCC to “prescribe and

make effective a policy regarding State and local

regulation of the placement, construction, modifica-

tion, or operation of facilities for the provision of

commercial mobile services.”!!3 The cities also point

to the Conference Report from the passage of the

TCA, which provides in pertinent part:

The conference agreement creates a new sec-

tion 704 which prevents Commission preemp-

tion of local and State land use decisions and

preserves the authority of State and local gov-

ernments over zoning and land use matters

except in the limited circumstances set forth

in the conference agreement. The conference

agreement also provides a mechanism for ju-

dicial relief from zoning decisions that fail to

comply with the provisions of this section. It is

112 City of Dallas, Tex. v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 347-48 (5th Cir.

1999) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991))

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

113 H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. 1, at 25 (1995).

47a

the intent of the conferees that other than un-

der section 332(c)(7)(B)Gv) of the Communica-

tions Act of 1934 as amended by this Act and

section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of

1996 the courts shall have exclusive jurisdic-

tion over all other disputes arising under this

section. Any pending Commission rulemaking

concerning the preemption of local zoning au-

thority over the placement, construction or

modification of CMS facilities should be ter-

minated.!14

The cities argue the FCC’s construction of § 332(c)(7)

contravenes this legislative history. The implication,

then, is that this legislative history clarifies any am-

biguity in § 332(c)(7)’s plain text and indicates Con-

gress’s intent to remove from the FCC the authority

to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v).

This argument fails, however, because the leg-

islative history itself is ambiguous. Although the leg-

islative history surrounding the passage of §

332(c)(7) indicates Congress intended the provision

to remove from the FCC the authority to make new

rules limiting or affecting state and local govern-

ment authority over wireless zoning decisions, the

legislative history, like the statute itself, is silent as

to the FCC’s ability te use its general rulemaking

power to provide guidance with respect to the limita-

tions § 332(c)(7)(B) expressly imposes on state and

local governments. In other words, the legislative

history does no more than indicate Congress’s intent

114 H_R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 207-08 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).

48a

to bar the FCC from imposing additional limitations

on state and local government authority. It does not

indicate a clear intent to bar FCC implementation of

the limitations already expressly provided for in the

statute. Under these circumstances, we cannot con-

clude that the legislative history “is so clear and

compelling . . . that it leaves no doubt as to Con-

gress’s intent.”!15

The cities also suggest that interpreting §

332(c)(7) in a way that would allow the FCC to im-

plement § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v) conflicts with the

principle that “if Congress intends to preempt a

power traditionally exercised by a state or local gov-

ernment, it must make its intention to do so unmis-

takably clear in the language of the statute.”!!6 The

cities assert that the FCC’s new 90- and 150-day

time frames displace state laws establishing differ-

ent time frames.

The cities’ argument is unconvincing because

those state laws are already preempted, at least to

the extent that the state time limits violate §

332(c)(7)(B)G)’s requirement that state and local au-

thorities rule on zoning requests in a reasonable

amount of time. That section already acts to preempt

these state laws by creating a federal time frame de-

fined through reference to reasonableness. No one

118 Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 396 (Sth Cir.

2008).

116 City of Dallas, Tex., 165 F.3d at 347-48 (quoting Gregory,

501 U.S. at 460) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

49a

could plausibly argue, for example, that if a state

passed a law stating that local governments had ten

years to rule on such applications, § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi)

would not have the effect of preempting that law in-

sofar as an aggrieved party would likely be able to

petition a court for relief under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) well

before the expiration of the state’s time frame. FCC

action interpreting what amount of time is “reason-

able” under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) only further refines the

extent of the preemption that Congress has already

explicitly provided. We thus see no conflict between

the FCC’s ability to interpret § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limita-

tions on state and local government authority and

the principle that Congress must unmistakably indi-

cate its intent to preempt a power traditionally exer-

cised by state or local governments because Congress

has indicated a preference for federal preemption of

state and local laws governing the time frames for

wireless zoning decisions.!!7

Finally, the cities argue that “[uJntil its dra-

matic shift in the [Declaratory Ruling], the FCC had

long recognized the statutory limits on its jurisdic-

tion under Section 332(c)(7).” The cities claim the

FCC’s exercise of authority to interpret §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v) conflicts with the FCC’s own

longstanding interpretation of its jurisdiction. The

cities note that the Supreme Court, in New Process

111 Cf. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 379 n.6

(1999) (“This is, at bottom, a debate not about whether the

States will be allowed to do their own thing, but about whether

it will be the FCC or the federal courts that draw the lines to

which they must hew.”).

50a

Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,™8 made the following observa-

tion when interpreting the statute establishing the

NLRB’s quorum requirements: “That our interpreta-

tion of the delegation provision is consistent with the

Board’s longstanding practice is persuasive evidence

that it is the correct one, notwithstanding the

Board’s more recent view.”!19

We are not persuaded by this argument in

this case, however, because the FCC interpretations

to which the cities direct us do not adopt the position

that the FCC lacks authority to implement §

332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations. For example, in Jn re Fa-

cilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services

to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Ru-

ral Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-

Based Services, the FCC did observe that “Section

332(c)(7) generally preserves local authority over

land use decisions, and limits the Commission’s au-

thority in this area,”!2° but a review of that order

makes clear that the limitation to which the FCC

was referring was § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s grant of exclu-

sive jurisdiction to the courts over most disputes

arising under § 332(c)(7)(B).121 The FCC’s order in In

re Cingular Wireless L.L.C./22 and a letter from the

chief of the FCC’s Wireless Telecommunications Bu-

118 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).

119 Jd. at 2641-42.

120 19 FCC Red. 24084 4 123 (2004).

121 Td. at n.368.

122 18 FCC Red. 13126 4 21 (2003).

5la

reau!23 gimilarly contained observations on the lim-

its of the FCC’s authority to consider petitions chal-

lenging specific state or local government action. As

already discussed, that § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) vests exclu-

sive jurisdiction in the courts to consider | specific

disputes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B) does not limit

the FCC’s ability to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limi-

tations. Thus, the FCC’s acknowledgment of this

limitation hardly suggests that the FCC also recog-

nized a limit on its authority under § 201(b).

D

For the above reasons, we conclude the FCC is

entitled to deference with respect to its exercise of

authority to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi and (v). The

language of § 332(c)(7) is silent with respect to the

FCC’s power to exercise this authority, and none of

the cities’ arguments convince us that the FCC’s in-

terpretation of its statutory authority is impermissi-

ble. The FCC thus did not lack statutory authority to

establish the 90- and 150-day time frames.

VI

We now consider whether the 90- and 150-day

time frames themselves also pass muster under

Chevron. The time frames represent the FCC’s at-

tempt to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)G) and (v). Section

332(c)(7)(B)Gi) requires state and local governments

to “act on any request for authorization to place, con-

struct, or modify personal wireless service facilities

123 Letter from Michele C. Farquhar to Mr. Thomas E. Wheeler

(Jan. 13, 1997), 1997 WL 14744.

52a

within a reasonable period of time after the request

is duly filed with such government or instrumental-

ity, taking into account the nature and scope of such

request.” Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v) provides that any

person adversely affected by a state or local govern-

ment’s “failure to act” may “within 30 days after

such .. . failure to act, commence an action in any

court of competent jurisdiction.” In the Declaratory

Ruling, the FCC defined “a reasonable period of

time” for purposes of § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) as, presump-

tively, “90 days to process personal wireless service

facility siting applications requesting coliocations,

and... 150 days to process all other applications.”}4

The FCC also concluded that a lack of decision

within these time frames would constitute a failure

to act that would be actionable under §

332(c)(7)(B)(v). 125

A

As usual, we begin with the statutory text.

The FCC claims that § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and §

332(c)(7)(B)(v) are ambiguous and subject to FCC in-

terpretation. We agree. Specifically, we note that the

phrase “a reasonable period of time,” as it is used in

§ 332(c)(7)(B)Gi), is inherently ambiguous.!26 More-

124 24 FCC Red. 13994 4 32 (2009).

125 Td.

126 See Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 777 (6th

Cir. 2008) (observing that descriptors such as “reasonable” and

“unreasonable” are subject to multiple constructions); Orloff v.

FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he generality of

these terms—unjust, unreasonable—opens a rather large area

for the free play of agency discretion.” (internal quotation

53a

over, because the phrase “a reasonable period of

time” serves as a standard for determining when a

“failure to act” has occurred under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v),

the ambiguity in the phrase leaves room for agency

guidance on the amount of time state and local gov-

ernments have to act on wireless facility zoning ap-

plications before their delay constitutes a failure to

act under the statute that would trigger §

332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s 30-day limitations period on filing

an action in court. We thus owe substantial defer-

ence to the FCC’s interpretation of these terms, and

we will disturb the FCC’s interpretation only if it

represents an impermissible construction of §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v).127

B

The cities raise a number of arguments rele-

vant to the reasonableness of the FCC’s establish-

ment of the 90- and 150-day time frames. They claim

the FCC’s time frames represent unreasonable in-

marks omitted)); Capital Network Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 28 F.3d

201, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Because ‘just,’ ‘unjust,’ ‘reasonable,’

and ‘unreasonable’ are ambiguous statutory terms, this court

owes substantial deference to the interpretation the

Commission accords them.”).

127 See, e.g., Tex. Clinical Labs, Inc. v. Sebelius, 612 F.3d 771,

775 (5th Cir. 2010); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,

457-58 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“If we find the statute silent or

ambiguous with respect to the precise question at issue, we

proceed to the second step of Chevron analysis, asking whether

the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of

the statute. At this stage of Chevron analysis, we afford

substantial deference to the agency’s interpretation of statutory

language.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

54a

terpretations of the statute because they: (1) shift

the burden to state and local governments to demon-

strate in court that a delay in acting on a wireless

facility zoning application was reasonable, thus re-

versing the presumption against preemption; (2)

seek to force state or local government action by cre-

ating a heightened threat of litigation; (3) impose

new application completeness requirements: (4) cre-

ate a national standard for what constitutes a “rea-

sonable period of time”; and (5) contravene Congres-

sional intent by giving preferential treatment to the

wireless industry in the processing of zoning applica-

tions. After considering these arguments, however,

we conclude that the FCC’s 90- and 150-day time

frames are based on a permissible construction of §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v) and are thus entitled to Chev-

ron deference.

1

First, the cities observe that courts addressing

actions brought pursuant to § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) have

placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that a

state or local government has failed to comply with

one of § 332(c)(7)(B)’s requirements.128 They claim

the FCC’s time frames reverse this burden by creat-

ing a presumption that a state or local government

that fails to act on a zoning application within the

applicable 90- or 150-day time frame has “failed to

128 See, e.g., U.S. Cellular Corp. v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex.,

364 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The plaintiff carries the

burden of proving that no substantial evidence supports the

local government’s decision [in an action challenging the

decision under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gii)).”).

55a

act” under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The result, they argue,

is that “the ‘presumption against preemption’ is re-

placed with a presumption for preemption” because

the burden of proof rests on state and local govern-

ments to prove the reasonableness of their delay in

cases in which they have failed to act within the

time frames.

We disagree with this characterization of the

effect of the FCC’s presumption because it misstates

the typical effect of a presumption in a civil proceed-

ing. Federal Rule of Evidence 301, for example, de-

scribes the effect of presumptions in civil proceed-

ings in federal court. It provides:

In a civil case, unless a federal statute or

these rules provide otherwise, the party

against whom a presumption is directed has

the burden of producing evidence to rebut the

presumption. But this rule does not shift the

burden of persuasion, which remains on the

party who had it originally.}29

We have held that Rule 301 adopts a “bursting-

bubble” theory of presumption, under which “the

only effect of a presumption is to shift the burden of

producing evidence with regard to the presumed

fact.”1% “If the party against whom the presumption

operates produces evidence challenging the pre-

sumed fact, the presumption simply disappears from

the case.”131 In other words, once a party introduces

129 FED. R. EVID. 301.

130 Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 789 F.2d 1128, 1136 (5th Cir. 1986).

131 Jd. at 1136-37.

56a

rebuttal evidence sufficient to support a finding con-

trary to the presumed fact, the presumption evapo-

rates, and the evidence rebutting the presumption,

and its inferences, must be “judged against the com-

peting evidence and its inferences to determine the

ultimate question at issue.”!52 The burden of persua-

sion with respect to the ultimate question at issue

remains with the party on whom it originally

rested. !33

We see no reason why this general theory of

presumptions does not also apply to the presumption

created by the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling. In an ac-

tion seeking to enforce § 332(c)(7)(B)(Gii) against a

state or local government, the ultimate burden of

persuasion remains with the wireless facilities pro-

vider to demonstrate that the government unrea-

sonably delayed action on an application. True, the

132 McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 288

(3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

133 See FED. R. EVID. 301 (moting “the burden of

persuasion ... remains on the party who had it origi-

nally”); cf St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 50P U.S.

502, 507 (1993) (“It is important to note, however,

that although the McDonnell Douglas presumption

shifts the burden of production to the defendant, the

ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that

the defendant intentionally discriminated against

the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.

In this regard it operates like all presumptions, as

described in Federal Rule of Evidence 301.” (internal

quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).

57a

wireless provider would likely be entitled to relief if

it showed a state or local government’s failure to

comply with the time frames and the state or local

government failed to introduce evidence demonstrat-

ing that its delay was reasonable despite its failure

to comply. But, if the state or local government in-

troduced evidence demonstrating that its delay was

reasonable, a court would need to weigh that evi-

dence against the length of the government’s delay—

as well as any other evidence of unreasonable delay

that the wireless provider might submit—and de-

termine whether the state or local government’s ac-

tions were unreasonable under the circumstances.

2

The cities also argue that the 90- and 150-day

time frames represent unreasonable interpretations

of the statute because the time frames subject state

and local governments to a heightened risk of litiga-

tion by wireless service providers. The cities suggest

that this heightened risk “affects” state or local gov-

ernments and thus violates § 332(c)(7)(A). This ar-

gument is not convincing, however, because, al-

though the FCC’s time frames do provide some

amount of certitude as to when a state or local gov-

ernment has unreasonably failed to act under §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi), the time frames do not create any

new risk of litigation independent from the risk state

or local governments have always faced as a result of

§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s vesting of jurisdiction in the courts

to hear disputes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). As

we have already discussed, § 332(c)(7)(A) does not

58a

apply to § 332(c)(7)(B)’s restrictions on state and lo-

cal governments.

3

The cities also take issue with the FCC’s de-

termination that the 90- and 150-day time frames do

not start to run with respect to an application if the

application is incomplete and the state or local gov-

ernment alerts the applicant to the application’s in-

completeness within 30 days of its submission. The

effect of this determination, they argue, is the impo-

sition of a new “completeness requirement” that has

no basis in § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).

We disagree. The FCC’s decision to toll the

time frames when a state or local government con-

fronts an incomplete application accounts for the fact

that the completeness of an application affects the

ability of a decisionmaker to act on that application.

The FCC recognized that in such cases, a state or lo-

cal government could not be presumed to have acted

unreasonably simply because the government failed

to act on an application within the time frames. The

FCC also recognized, however, that a state or local

government that confronted an incomplete applica-

tion, but delayed alerting the applicant to the defi-

ciencies in the application, should be presumed to

have acted unreasonably if the government ulti-

mately did not act on the application within the time

frames. Thus, the FCC allowed for tolling of the 90-

and 150-day time frames in cases of incompleteness,

but also imposed a separate time frame for state and

local governments to notify applicants of incom-

pleteness in order to prevent state and local govern-

59a

ments from manipulating the process. This does not

strike us as an unreasonable application of §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi).134

To the extent the cities argue that state and

local governments often will not become aware of a

need for more information with respect to an appli-

cation until after the FCC’s 30-day tolling period has

expired, we again emphasize the limited effect of the

FCC’s 90- and 150-day time frames. The time frames

represent the FCC’s interpretation of what would

generally constitute an unreasonable delay under §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi), but a court will ultimately decide

whether state or local government action is unrea-

sonable in a particular case. Accordingly, if a state

or local government fails to meet the applicable time

frame because deficiencies in an application become

apparent more than 30 days after the application

was filed, the government would remain free to ar-

gue that it acted reasonably under the circum-

stances.

4

Fourth, the cities contend the 90- and 150-day

time frames are not reasonable interpretations of §

332(c)(7)(B)Gi) because the time frames apply na-

tionwide and thus cannot be squared with §

134 Cf Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 780 (6th

Cir. 2008) (“Courts are ‘generally unwilling to review line-

drawing performed by the Commission unless a petitioner can

demonstrate that lines drawn ... are patently unreasonable,

having no relationship to the underlying regulatory problem.”

(alteration in original) (quoting Covad Comm. Co. v. FCC, 450

F.3d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2006))).

60a

332(c)(7)(B)G’s command that what constitutes a

“reasonable period of time” should be determined by

taking into account “the nature and scope of such re-

quest.” This is an individualized determination, the

argument goes, and a national standard is incom-

patible with such a scheme. We cannot agree with

the cities on this point, however, because, as we have

already made clear, the 90- and 150-day time frames

do not eliminate the individualized nature of an in-

quiry into the reasonableness of a state or local gov-

ernment’s delay. The time frames do provide the

FCC’s guidance on what periods of time will gener-

ally be “reasonable” under the statute, of course, and

they might prove dispositive in the rare case in

which a state or local government submits no evi-

dence supporting the reasonableness of its actions.

But in a contested case, courts must still determine

whether the state or local government acted rea-

sonably under the circumstances surrounding the

application at issue.

5

Finally, the cities claim the FCC’s time frames

are unreasonable interpretations of § 332(c)(7)(B)

because they will require state and local govern-

ments to give wireless service providers preferential

treatment in the form of prioritized review of wire-

less zoning applications. They claim this result

clearly conflicts with Congress’s intent, and for sup-

port, point to the following passage from the Confer-

ence Report: “It is not the intent of this provision to

give preferential treatment to the personal wireless

service industry in the processing of requests, or to

6la

subject their requests to any but the generally appli-

cable time frames for zoning decision[s].”135 How-

ever, nothing in the FCC’s time frames necessarily

requires state and local governments to provide

greater preference to wireless zoning applications

than is already required by § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi itself.

The statute provides a clear directive that state and

local governments must rule on wireless zoning ap-

plications in a “reasonable amount of time,” and that

directive inherently preferences the personal wire-

less service industry because other types of state and

local zoning decisions are not subject to such a stan-

dard.!36 Moreover, as already noted, a state or local

government that fails to act on an application within

the FCC’s time frames remains free to argue that it

acted diligently with respect to the application, and

such an argument might include reference to the in-

ability of the government to address the wireless

zoning application within the time frames without

neglecting its other business.1!37

138 H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 208 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).

136 Cf Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 396 (5th

Cir. 2008) (observing that appeals to statutory purpose only

overcome an agency’s interpretation of a statute’s text

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Record and brief — City of Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission · 568 U.S. 936 | Frix