Record and brief — City of Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission
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No. 11-1545
Vide 11-1547
Title City of Arlington, Texas. et al. Petitioners
V
Federal Communications Commission. et al
Docketed June 28. 2012
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Case Nos.: (10-60039)
Decision Date January 23, 2012
Rehearing Denied: March 29. 2012
Questions
Presented
~~~Date~~~ ~~~~~~~ Proceedings and Orders ee
Jun 27 2012 Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due July 30, 2012)
Jul 242012 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including August 29. 2012. for ail
respondents.
Jul 302012 Brief amici curiae of National Water Resources Association. et al. filed
Aug 28 2012 Brief of respondents CTIA - The Wireless Associations. et a! in opposition filed VIDED
Aug 29 2012 Brief of respondents Federal Communications Commission, et al. in opposition filed
VIDED
Sep 11 2012 Reply of petitioner City of Arlington, Texas. et al. filed
Sep 12 2012 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of October 5. 2012.
Oct5 2012 Petition GRANTED limited to Question 1 presented by the petition The petition for a writ
of certiorari in No. 11-1547 is granted. The cases are consolidated and a total of one
hour is allotted for oral argument
Oct 31 2012 SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Wednesday. January 16, 2013.
Oct 31 2012 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs. in support of either party or of neither party
received from counse! for respondents CTIA - The Wireless Association and Verizon
Wireless. VIDED
Nov 62012 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs. in support of either party or of neither party
received from counsel for Intervenors. International Municipal Lawyers Association. et al
Nov 82012 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs. in support of either party or of neither party
received from counsel! for all petitioners. VIDED
Nov 15 2012 Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioners City of Arlington
Texas, et a! VIDED
Nov 19 2012 Brief of petitioners City of Arlington, Texas. et al. filed
Nov 19 2012 Brief of respondents International Municipal Lawyers Association, et al. in support of
petitioners filed VIDED
Nov 20 2012 Record received from U S.C.A for 5th Circuit. (1box)
Nov 21 2012 Brief amici curiae of American Farm Bureau Federation. et ai. filed VIDED.
Nov 21 2012 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs. in support of either party or of neither party
received from counsel for Cable Telecommunications and Technology Committee of the
New Orleans City Council. VIDED
Nov 26 2012 Brief amicus curiae of Southem Company filed VIDED (Distributed)
Nov 26 2012 Brief amici curiae of Nationa! Water Resources Association et al filed VIDED
(Distributed)
Nov 26 2012 Brief amici curiae of Cato Institute. et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Nov 26 2012 Brief amici curiae of Nationa! Governors Association. et al filed VIDED (Distributed)
Nov 27 2012 CIRCULATED
Dec 32012 Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioners GRANTED
Dec 32012 Motion for divided argument filed by respondent Celico Partnership c/b/a Verizon
Wireless. VIDED
Dec 12 2012 Brief of respondent Celico Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless filed VIDED (Distributed)
Dec 19 2012 Brief of respondents Federal Communications Commission, et al. filed. VIDED
Dec 192012 Brief amici curiae of AT&T Services Inc. et a! filed VIDED (Distributed)
Dec 21 2012 Brief amici curiae of T-Mobile USA, Inc., et a! filed. VIDED (Distributed)
Dec 26 2012 Motion for divided argument filed by petitioner Cable. Telecommunications. and
Technology Committee of the New Orleans City Counci) VIDED
Dec 26 2012 Brief amicus curiae of PCIA - The Wireless Infrastructure Association filed VIDED.
(Distributed)
Jan 42013 Motion for divided argument filed by respondent. Celico Patnership d/b/a Verizon
Wireless DENIED. VIDED
Jan 42013 Motion for divided argument filed by petitioner DENIED. VIDED
Jan 8 2013 _ Reply of petitioners City of Arlington Texas, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Jan$2013 Reply of respondents Internationa! Municipal Lawyers Association et al. in support of
petitioners filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Jan 10 2013 Motion for leave to file a reply brief on the merits filed by EMR Policy Institute. VIDED
Jan 16 2013 Argued. For petitioners: Thomas C. Goldstein. Washington. D. C. For respondents:
Donaid B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor Genera!. Department of Justice, Washington. D. C
Jan 22 2013 Motion for leave to file a reply brief on the merits DENIED.
PETITION
FOR
WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
li-doto
wate : Us
; uv
en. JUN 27 20:
AND ——-
BRIEFS IN THE Esha aoe
Supreme Court of the United States
CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS; CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
CALIFORNIA; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA;
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; COUNTY OF SAN
DIEGO, CALIFORNIA; AND TEXAS COALITION OF
CITIES FOR UTILITY ISSUES,
Petitioners,
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
THOMAS C. GOLDSTEIN
KEVIN K. RUSSELL
GOLDSTEIN & RUSSELL, P.C.
5225 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 404
Washington, DC 20015
(202) 362-0636
THOMAS D. BUNTON
SENIOR DEPUTY
COUNTY COUNSEL
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
1600 Pacific Highway
Room 355
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 531-6456
Counsel for Petitioner
County of San Diego, California
JOSEPH VAN EATON
Counsel of Record
JAMES R. HOBSON
MATTHEW K. SCHETTENHELM
BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 4300
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 785-0600
Joseph. VanEaton@bbklaw.com
Counsel for Petitioners
City of Arlington, Texas;
City of Los Angeles, California;
County of Los Angeles,
California; City of San Antonio,
Texas; and Texas Coalition of
Cities for Utility Issues
Library of Congress
Law Library
Questions Presented
This case involves a challenge to the FCC’s juris-
diction to implement §332(c)(7) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, titled “Preservation of Local Zon-
ing Authority.” Section 332(c)(7) imposes certain
limitations on State and local zoning authority over
the placement of wireless service facilities, but
authorizes the FCC to address only one of these
limitations; it states that no other provision “in this
Act” may “limit” or “affect” State and local authority
over wireless facilities placement. The FCC con-
cluded that other provisions “in this Act” authorize it
to adopt national zoning standards to implement
§332(c)(7). The Fifth Circuit deferred to the FCC’s
juricdictional determination applying Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but
acknowledged that “(t]he Supreme Court has not yet
conclusively resolved the question of whether Chev-
ron applies in the context of an agency’s determina-
tion of its own statutory jurisdiction, and the circuit
courts of appeals have adopted different approaches
to this issue.”
The case presents two questions:
1. Whether, contrary to the decisions of at least
two other circuits, and in light of this Court’s guid-
ance, a court should apply Chevron to review an
agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the FCC may use its general author-
ity under the Communications Act to limit or affect
State and local zoning authority over the placement
of personal wireless service facilities.
‘3
Parties to the Proceeding
Petitioners below are the City of Arlington,
Texas, and the City of San Antonio, Texas. Interve-
nors supporting the Petitioners are the Cable and
Telecommunications Committee of the New Orleans
City Council; the City of Carlsbad, California: the
City of Dallas, Texas; the City of Dubuque, Iowa: the
County of Fairfax, Virginia; the City of Glendale,
California; the City of Los Angeles, California; the
County of Los Angeles, California; the City of Port-
land, Oregon; the City of San Antonio, Texas; the
County of San Diego, California; the EMR Policy
Institute; the International Municipal Lawyers
Association; the National Association of Counties;
the National Association of Telecommunications
Officers and Advisors; the National League of Cities;
the Texas Coalition of Cities for Utility Issues; and
the United States Conference of Mayors.
Respondents are the United States of America
and the FCC. Intervenors supporting the Respon-
dents are CTIA-The Wireless Association and Cellco
Partnership.
None of the Petitioners is a non-governmental
corporation.
Table of Contents
LLL RC en TE OT i
a ii
Opimion and Order Below ......00cccccccccoscccccccsccsesccccseses 1
iia iceeceererninenitintnrnciidgnennsaneieemmenaniens 1
Statutory Provisions Involved ...................:.cceceeeeeeee 1
tea cccrnriemmntnnnennnets 3
Reasons for Granting the Writ ..............................- 12
I, The Lower Courts Are Divided Over
Chevron’s Application to Jurisdictional
rrr reictnaninitbnmennnien 13
A. There Is a Conflict Among the
Circuits as to Chevron’s
A oN 13
B. Chevron Should Not Apply to an
Agency’s Jurisdictional
TE 16
II. Applying Chevron Led the Court To
Expand the FCC’s Authority and To
Upset Congress’s Careful Jurisdictional
ae 21
III. This Case Allows the Court To Settle
Recurring Issues of National
lal acn ein cnnccinmmnnnaentaanen 30
EE AEE EO 32
APPENDIX
lV
Opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ee ee iiisintnteisihictnrennnedscesienes
Declaratory Ruling of the
Federal Communications
Commission, WT Docket No. 08-
165 (Nov. 18, 2009) ................0.0002.
Order on Reconsideration of the
Federal Communications
Commission, WT Docket No. 08-
165 (Aug. 3, 2010) .......cceccceceseseeeees
Fifth Circuit Denial of
Rehearing En Banc (Mar. 29,
ise eaiidciapiidebiicbiainaichabiiehpapacesaanadiniss
Vv
Table of Authorities
Page(s)
CASES
ACLU v. FCC,
823 F.3d 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1987)..................00..e000. 16
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.,
ET LEAL RE TE 18
AKM LLC v. Sec’y of Labor,
676 F.3d 762 GD.C. Cir. 3012) .............ccceccses.c00-. 16
Alliance v. Community Media v. FCC,
529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008)...........0...0..0ccceeeeee ee. 27
Altria Group Inc. v. Good,
I cual 29
American Library Ass'n v. FCC,
406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005)..............ccpeeeeeeeeeees 15
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,
LTE SETAE ee eae ae 27
Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
154 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1998)...............cccceeeeees 15
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs v. United
States,
be hy a eeepeeereeee 15
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,
4 | 8, SERENE passim
Comm’ of Internal Revenue v. Clark,
I 28
Duncan v. Walker,
see Reece 28
vi
Durable Mfg. Co. v. United States DOL,
578 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2009).............ccccccceceeeeeees 14
Gonzales v. Oregon,
I, I iit 20
Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA,
608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010)..........000000.....cc ee 15
Louisiana PSC v. FCC,
476 U.S. 355 (1986)........sceccseseseereeeeeeeees 25, 26, 27
Lyon County Bd. of Comm'rs v. EPA,
406 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2005)..............cccccececeeeeeees 15
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v.
United States,
I cil cilia 20
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi,
I 20
N. Am. Van Lines Inc. v. NLRB,
869 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ............. eee cece 15
N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor,
294 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2002)... 14, 15
Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Gorsuch,
685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982)...........ceccccceeeeeee eee i9
NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission
Corp.,
SOS F.Bb BEB Goa Cher. BBD nncocececccceccoceccscscesccccss 15
New York Shipping Asso. v. Federal Maritime
Com.,
854 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988)..............cccceseeesees 15
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FERC,
28 F.3d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1994)... ceeeeeeeeeees 15
vil
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,
BG Te, BD scictcersitccinnscccnscenan 4, 5, 13, 31
Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko,
Se Ce I eitirstnidiniinneicnsincsnnssinnnennennmiin 18
Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communs.
Enters., Inc.,
173 F.3d 9 (let Cir. 1998) ..........ssccccccsescccessessssseess 7
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,
LLC,
Oe 21
United States v. Mead Corp.,
ial arerrininicinnnseaienimniiantien 20, 21
United Transp. Union-Illinois Legislative Bd.
v. Surface Transp. Bd.,
183 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1999)..................cceeeeeeeeeee 14
STATUTES
er 1
i aaa iatmalal 30
i lene 11
SITE i oicsicsicthientasienetanininedniaseiiiiniaiiiaaieiliaemmaiaiaabiensaie 4
ESTEE eee tC 4
ail 4, 7,27
| Tae ene en TER, 26
aE I 4
ia iinrieiirccinidecnesieinniiniesbelindnemiaeaiell 3
ES, Geen passim
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Daniel A. Lyons, Tethering the Administra-
tive State- The Case Against Chevron Def-
erence for FCC Jurisdictional Claims, 36
Iowa J. Corp. L. 823 (2011)
Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling
Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L.
Rev. 989, 1008-09 (1999) ...........cscceeeseeceereees
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) (Conf.
IIIT susinsnsiececintarinesanteseiadadnediuaepsiabebiimnnniatnemadainies
H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10
Ti hisniniassiacinininncinicetenunininninsnitetpeniannaeomnanees
In re Annual Report and Analysis of
Competitive Market Conditions With
Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including
Mobile Services, Fifteenth Report,
WT Docket No. 10-133, FCC 11-103 at
Fr is BE seierecsecetntienpnicnnntiiiiens
In re Acceleration of Broadband Deployment:
Expanding the Reach and Reducing the
Cost of Broadband Deployment by
Improving Policies Regarding Public
Rights of Way and Wireless Facilities
Siting,
26 FCC Red. 5384 (2011) .........cceeee ee eeeee eee e eee
Nathan A. Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The
Rest is Silence: Chevron Jurisdiction,
Agency Deference, and Statutory Silences,
2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1497 (2009)..............004
ix
Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672 (2012)............... 16, 17
Thomas W. Merrill, Chevron’s Domain, 89
a 16, 17
Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference
and Agency Self-Interest, 13 Cornell J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 203 (2004) .......cc.cccccscecesscsceseseeseeeeseeees 17
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
Petitioners respectfully seek a writ of certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
Opinion and Order Below
The court’s opinion (App. 1a-68a) is reported at
668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012). The FCC’s Declaratory
Ruling (App. 69a-171a) is reported at 24 FCC Rcd.
13994 (Nov. 18, 2009) (“Declaratory Ruling”), recon-
sideration denied, 25 FCC Red. 11157 (Aug. 3, 2010)
(App. 172a-195a).
Jurisdicti
The court entered its judgment on January 23,
2012, and entered an order denying petitions for
rehearing en banc on March 29, 2012. (App. 195a-
196a). This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under
28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
Statutory Provisions Involved
Section 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of
1934 provides:
Preservation of local zoning authority.
(A) General authority. Except as provided in this
paragraph, nothing in this Act shall limit or affect
the authority of a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the
placement, construction, and modification of per-
sonal wireless service facilities.
(B) Limitations.
2
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facili-
ties by any State or local government or instrumen-
tality thereof—
(D shall not unreasonably discriminate among
providers of functionally equivalent services; and
(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of pro-
hibiting the provision of personal wireless services.
Gi) A State or local government or instrumental-
ity thereof shall act on any request for authorization
to place, construct, or modify personal wireless
service facilities within a reasonable period of time
after the request is duly filed with such government
or instrumentality, taking into account the nature
and scope of such request.
Gii) Any decision by a State or local government
or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place,
construct, or modify personal wireless service facili-
ties shall be in writing and supported by substantial
evidence contained in a written record.
(iv) No State or local government or instrumen-
tality thereof may regulate the placement, construc
tion, and modification of personal wireless service
facilities on the basis of the environmental! effects of
radio frequency emissions to the extent that such
facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations
concerning such emissions.
(vy) Any person adversely affected by any final ac-
tion or failure to act by a State or local government
or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent
with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after
3
such action or failure to act, commence an action in
any court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall
hear and decide such action on an expedited basis.
Any person adversely affected by an act or failure to
act by a State or local government or any instrumen-
tality thereof that is inconsistent with clause (iv)
may petition the Commission for relief.
(C) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph—
G) the term “personal wireless services” means
commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless
services, and common carrier wireless exchange
access services;
(ii) the term “personal wireless service facilities”
means facilities for the provision of personal wireless
services; and
(iii) the term “unlicensed wireless service” means
the offering of telecommunications services using
duly authorized devices which do not require indi-
vidual licenses, but does not mean the provision of
direct-to-home satellite services (as defined in sec
tion 303(v) [47 U.S.C. §303(v))).
* *« *
Other relevant statutory provisions appear in the
appendix.
Statement of the Case
This case concerns a dispute between local gov-
ernments and the FCC over whether the federal
agency may affect State and local authority over the
placement of wireless communications facilities by,
inter alia, establishing uniform FCC-mandated
deadlines for State and loca! action on zoning appli-
4
cations. Petitioners claimed that Congress deliber-
ately designed §332(c)(7) to prevent the FCC from
interfering with State and local zoning decisions:
Congress required State and local decisions to meet
certain standards, subject only to exclusive judicial
review (with one exception); it directed the FCC to
address radio frequency (RF)-emissions matters; and
it provided that “nothing” else “in this Act” may
“limit or affect” local authority over wireless facility
placement. The FCC claimed that it could establish
federal policy implementing §332(c)(7)(B) by using
four other provisions of the Act, 47 U.S.C. §§151,
154(i), 201(b), and 303).
Rather than resolve the dispute through de novo
review, the Fifth Circuit deferred to the FCC’s
jurisdictional determination, and then upheld the
FCC’s Declaratory Ruling.
1. Added to the Communications Act by the Tele-
communications Act of 1996,} §332(c)(7) establishes
what several justices of this Court have described as
an unusually “comprehensive” statutory scheme for
balancing the interests of the federal, state, and local
governments in deployment of wireless facilities.
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 131
(2005) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 129
(describing §332(c)(7) as “a comprehensive and
exclusive remedial scheme”) (Breyer, J., concurring).
1 Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996). The Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 is a series of amendments to the Commu-
nications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. §151 et seg. (the
“Communications Act” or the “Act”).
5
The House of Representatives initially had
passed language empowering the FCC to “prescribe
and make effective a policy regarding State and local
regulation of the placement, construction, modifica-
tion, or operation of facilities for the provision of
commercial mobile services.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-204
at 25, 1996 U.S.C.C_A.N. 10 (1995). App. 212a. The
bill directed the FCC to adopt “policies” requiring a
local government to act “within a reasonable period
of time after the request is fully filed with such
government or instrumentality.” Jd.
Congress, however, “ultimately rejected the na-
tional approach and substituted a system based on
cooperative federalism.” Rancho Palos Verdes, 544
U.S. at 128 (Breyer, J., concurring). In conference,
Congress opted for the current §332(c)(7) titled
“Preservation of Local Zoning Authority.” The stat-
ute consists of a paragraph with five limitations on
State and local zoning authority,? and an opening
“general authority” clause stating that “lelxcept as
provided in this paragraph, nothing in this Act shall
limit or affect” this State and loca] authority. 47
U.S.C. §332(c)(7)(A).
Section 332(c)(7) gives the FCC authority to ad-
dress only one of the statute’s limitations, the bar on
State and local siting decisions based on the envi-
ronmental effects of radio frequency (“RF”) emis-
2 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(7)(B)W-Gv).
6
sions.? Otherwise, it directs courts to resolve issues
arising under §332(c)(7) on an expedited basis. The
Conference Report confirmed that except for the
provisions concerning the effects of radio frequency
(“RF”) emissions, Congress intended for the courts to
have “exclusive jurisdiction over all other disputes
arising under this section.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-458
(1996) (Cong. Rep.) at 207-208. The Report directed
that “[alny pending [FCC] rulemaking concerning
the preemption of local zoning authority over the
placement, construction or modification of CMS
facilities should be terminated.” Jd. It further ex-
plained that the requirement that a local govern-
ment act within a “reasonable period of time” is not
intended “to give preferential treatment to the
personal wireless service industry in the processing
of requests, or to subject their requests to any but
the generally applicable time frames for zoning
decision.” Id. The statute’s generally-worded lan-
guage was not an invitation for federal policymak-
ing, but a direction to the court to consider State and
local practices in light of local circumstances.
2. For the next 13 years, the FCC did not regulate
State and local zoning authority under §332(c)(7),
except to address RF-emissions matters. Sec-
tion 332(c)(7) operated by allowing courts to apply
the statute to local facts, in what one court described
as a “refreshing experiment in federalism”: Con-
gress’s effort to “produce (albeit at some cost and
3 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(7)(B)Gv),(v). Congress separately authorized
the agency to make rules regarding RF emissions. Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56 §704(b).
7
delay for the carriers) individual solutions best
adapted to the needs and desires of particular com-
munities.” Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communs.
Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 17 (ist Cir. 1999).
3. In 2008, the wireless industry—led by CTIA-
The Wireless Association—filed a petition for a
declaratory ruling asking the FCC to, inter alia,
adopt short, uniform deadlines for State and local
action under §332(c)(7). States and local govern-
ments, including Petitioners, argued that the FCC
had no jurisdiction to issue any ruling under
§332(c)(7) other than a ruling related to RF emis-
sions. In 2009, in the Declaratory Ruling, the FCC
granted the industry its requested relief in signifi-
cant part.
a. The FCC ruled that it had authority to im-
plement §332(c)(7) pursuant to four provisions of the
Act outside of §332(c)(7)—§§1, 4@, 201(b), and
303(r). App. 87a (4 23). These provisions, with slight
variations, generally permit the FCC to “prescribe
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in
the public interest to carry out the provisions of this
Act.” 47 U.S.C. §201(b); App. 87a (4 23); the FCC’s
exercise of authority under these provisions gives
rise to remedies under Title IV of the Communica-
tions Act, 47 U.S.C. §401 et seg.
The FCC claimed that §332(c)(7)(A)—the preser-
vation clause stating that “nothing” else “in this Act”
may “limit” or “affect” State and local authority—
only forbids the agency from creating additional
“limitations” beyond those that the statute enumer-
ates. App. 90a, 134a (44 25, 64). The FCC did not
8
explain, however, how §332(c)(7)(A)’s preservation
clause allows it to use §§1, 4), 201(b), and 303(7) to
“affect” State and local authority. It recognized that
its ruling did affect local authority, stating, inter
alia, that State and local governments must act in
accordance not only with the statute, but with limi-
tations on local authority “as defined” by the agency.
App. 90a (4 25).
b. The FCC’s Declaratory Ruling adopted two ba-
sic rules.
First, the FCC addressed timing issues. Acknowl-
edging a conflict with the standards in particular
States and local governments, the FCC adopted
national standards defining what constitutes a State
or local government's “failure to act” if it does not
release a decision within “a reasonable period of time
after the request is duly filed... . taking into account
the nature and scope of such request.” App. 116a-
120a, {49 46-48. The FCC ruled that absent an appli-
cant’s agreement, if a State or local government does
not release its decision 90 days after the applicant
files a collocation application or within 150 days
after the filing of all other applications, it automati-
cally constitutes a “failure to act,” and presumptively
constitutes an unreasonable “period of time” on the
merits. App. 72a, 106a-108a, 11la-112a (4@ 4, 37,
42). Unless the applicant agrees otherwise, this
forces the State or local government into court on a
fixed timetable (regardless of how reasonable its
delay may be), and then requires the State or local
government to overcome the presumption on the
merits by explaining its delay. App. 1lla-112a (4
42).
9
The FCC stated that while its policy choice would
conflict with those of various States, its choices
accommodated reasonable State and local processes
“in most instances.” App 11l4a (§ 44).
The FCC noted that of the eight State statutes
discussed in its record, Connecticut law on its
fact authorizes “a longer process” (180 days)
than the FCC’s rules permit. App. 118a (4 48).
California requires applications to be proc-
essed within 60 days, after a 30-day review
period for completeness, but only if no envi-
ronmental review is required. App. 117a (cit-
ing Cal. Gov’t Code §§65940 & 65943). The
FCC chose not to provide for delays for envi-
ronmental reviews.
North Carolina has a “collocation” time period
of 45 days for processing after a 45-day review
period for application completeness, but only if
the collocation does not increase the height of
the facility. Otherwise, the time for action is
tied to the time for action on other land use
applications. App. 117a (citing N.C. Code Ann.
§153A-349.53). The FCC applied a different
test for determining whether the collocation
deadline should apply.
Minnesota requires applications to be proc-
essed within 60 days, which can be extended
an additional 60 days upon written notice to
the applicant. App. 117a (4 47, citing Minn.
Stat. Ann. §15.99). Under the FCC’s rules,
times can be extended, but only with the con-
sent of the applicant. App. 122a (4 49).
10
The FCC explained that a State’s choice for a longer
period for review would not preclude an applicant
from suing the State or local government using the
FCC’s new, shorter timelines. App. 120a (4 50)
(noting that the applicant “may bring suit under
§332(c)(7)(B)(v) after 90 days or 150 days, subject to
the 30-day limitation period on filing, and may
consider pursuing any remedies granted unaer the
State or local regulation when that applicable time
limit has expired.”).
Neither facet of the FCC’s new timing rules—its
fixed trigger for judicial review or its presumption
against local governments on the merits—existed
under §332(c)(7)(B)’s plain terms; the FCC pointed to
no court that had adopted them. In addition, because
the rules apply to only one class of zoning applica-
tion (those for the placement of “personal wireless
service facilities”), they have the effect of requiring a
State or local government to prioritize wireless
applications over other zoning matters.
Second, the FCC adopted a ruling under
§332(c)(7(B)@UD, which provides that a State or
local government “shall not prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wire-
less services.” The agency ruled that a State or local
government violates this provision if it denies an
application “solely because ‘one or more carriers
serve a given geographic market.” App. 127a-128a
(§ 56).
4. On January 14, 2010, the City of Arlington,
Texas, filed a petition for review with the Fifth
Circuit, which had jurisdiction pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
11
§402(a) and 28 U.S.C. §2344. The court initially
deferred review, then ruled after the FCC considered
petitions for reconsideration.‘
A central question was whether the FCC had ju-
risdiction to implement §332(c)(7). While the Fifth
Circuit expressly acknowledged that this Court had
not resolved the issue and that other circuits had
adopted conflicting approaches, it ruled that
Chevron required it to defer to the FCC’s own as-
sessment of its jurisdiction. App. 37a. The court
recognized that §332(c)(7)(A) limited the FCC's
authority, but ruled that if it were ambiguous, the
court “must defer” to the FCC’s permissible interpre-
tation. App. 40a. The court proceeded to deem the
statute ambiguous in various ways. App. 4la-45a.
The court reasoned that since the FCC’s general
authority under these other sections would ordinar-
ily apply to a Communications Act amendment,
Congress must “specifically restrict” the agency's
general authority, and “clearly remove” the agency’s
authority to apply these other Act provisions to
§332(c)(7). App. 42a.
The Fifth Circuit did not ask whether Congress
would intend the FCC to clarify any ambiguity in
this jurisdictional provision (or whether the FCC had
any special expertise to evaluate zoning decisions); it
did not apply any traditional statutory presumptions
* App. 10a. The City of San Antonio, Texas, joined a number of
other parties in intervening in support of this petition, and also
later filed its own petition for review after the agency’s denial
of reconsideration.
12
for interpretations of exceptions; and it did not
examine §332(c)(7)(A) in the context of other provi-
sions of the Communications Act, or of §332(c)(7)
itself. It proceeded to rule that “none of the cities’
arguments convince us that the FCC’s interpretation
of its statutory authority is impermissible.”
App. 51a.
Reasons for Granting the Writ
The decision below sharpens a significant diver-
gence among the circuit courts about Chevron’s
application to an agency’s determination of its own
jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit's approach—
effectively that statutory ambiguity alone allows an
agency to claim broad new authority—raises impor-
tant questions that this Court should resolve. The
court’s analysis inverts the doctrine that an agency
has only the authority Congress grants it, and
contravenes the principles underlying Chevron.
This case illustrates the problem with a standard
of review that transforms textual] ambiguity into a
jurisdictional grant. Section 332(c)(7) represented
Congress’s careful and comprehensive effort to
balance the State and local interests in managing
land use—a quintessential State function—with the
federal interests in encouraging national deployment
of wireless facilities. Through this “complex and
novel statutory scheme,” Congress rejected an FCC-
guided “national approach” to zoning, and instead
adopted a system of “cooperative federalism.” Ran-
cho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 123 (Breyer, J., con-
curring).
13
Section 332(c)(7)’s language, context, and unusu-
ally clear legislative history all indicate that the
FCC’s role under the statute is not general, but
specific: it extends only to a narrow, technical issue
(RF-emissions). Yet by applying Chevron to defer to
the FCC’s determination that it has general author-
ity to make rules governing the State and local
zoning process under §332(c)(7), the decision below
adopts the very “national approach” that Congress
considered and rejected. This has significant conse-
quences for State and local governments, including
for communities that have made different policy
choices about the appropriate time for local review.®
I. The Lower Courts Are Divided Over Chevron’s
Application to Jurisdictional Questions.
A. There Is a Conflict Among the Circuits as to
Chevron’s Application.
The Fifth Circuit correctly observed that its deci-
sion implicates a circuit conflict:
The Supreme Court has not yet con-
clusively resolved the question of
whether Chevron applies in the con-
text of an agency’s determination of its
own statutory jurisdiction, and the cir-
cuit courts of appeals have adopted
different approaches to the issue.
Some circuits apply Chevron deference
to disputes over the scope of an
5 See, eg. supra, at 9 (discussing Connecticut, California,
North Carolina, and Minnesota).
14
agency’s jurisdiction, some do not, and
some circuits have thus far avoided
taking a position. In this circuit, we
apply Chevron to an agency’s interpre-
tation of its own statutory jurisdiction.
App. 37a-38a Gnternal notes omitted). There is little
prospect that the conflict will be resolved without
this Court’s intervention.
1. The Seventh Circuit and Federal Circuit re-
view an agency’s determination of its statutory
jurisdiction de novo. The Seventh Circuit has re-
peatedly declined to apply a deferential standard to
jurisdictional questions. N. JI]. Steel Supply Co. v.
Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2002);
United Transp. Union-Iilinois Legislative Bd. v.
Surface Transp. Bd., 183 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir.
1999). The court has explained that “[a]lthough
agency determinations within the scope of delegated
authority are entitled to deference, it is fundamental
‘that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area
in which it has no jurisdiction.” Durable Mfg. Co. v.
United States DOL, 578 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir.
2009) (quoting Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494
U.S. 638, 650 (1990)).6 The Federal Circuit applies
the same standard. Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
2. The Fifth Circuit joins the Third, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuit at the opposite extreme. These courts
6 The Seventh Circuit has recognized that “the Supreme Court
has not definitively ruled on the issue.” N. Ill Steel Supply Co.,
294 F.3d at 847.
15
resolve jurisdictional questions by applying Chevron:
they do not independently analyze Congress’s juris-
dictional decisions. NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG
Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 355 (3d Cir. 2001)
citing Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley
Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 1988);
Lyon County Bd. of Comm'rs v. EPA, 406 F.3d 981,
983 (8th Cir. 2005); Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 608
F.3d 1131, 1145-1146 (10th Cir. 2010).
3. No court’s decisions more clearly demonstrate
the lower courts’ long struggle here than the D.C.
Circuit’s. While the court has applied Chevron to
jurisdictional questions, Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.
v. FERC, 28 F.3d 1281, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs v. United States,
101 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1996), it has also de-
clined to do so. New York Shipping Asso. v. Federal
Maritime Com., 854 F.2d 1338, 1362-1363 (D.C. Cir.
1988); N. Am. Van Lines Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596,
598 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In some cases, the court has
attempted to draw a distinction based on the nature
of the question before it. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n
v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting
that the FCC’s “self-serving invocation of Chevron
leaves out a crucial threshold consideration, /.e.,
whether the agency acted pursuant to delegated
authority.”); accord ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.3d 1554,
1567 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Most recently, Judge
Janice Rogers Brown authored a concurring opinion
in AKM LLC v. Sec’y of Labor, 675 F.3d 752, 766
(D.C. Cir. 2012), explaining that regardless of the
court’s “general” rule requiring Chevron deference, it
is improper on jurisdictional questions that present
16
“undisputed jurisdictional facts,” at least absent
“some clear indication from Congress that it has
delegated jurisdiction-defining authority.”
B. Chevron Should Not Apply to an Agency’s
Jurisdictional Determinations.
Both scholars and this Court’s teachings confirm
that Chevron should not apply automatically to an
agency’s jurisdictional] determinations.
1. Addressing what a leading article has called
“the most important—and vexing—question” involv-
ing Chevron’s domain, many legal scholars have
concluded that Chevron should not apply when an
agency interprets a statute to determine its own
jurisdiction.? They recognize that a no-deference rule
is “implicit in Chevron” and follows from the fact
that agencies “can act only to the extent that Con-
gress has delegated them the power to do so.” Sales,
2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 1532; see also Merrill, 89 Geo.
L.J. at 912-13. The scholars have noted that agencies
“have no comparative advantage in reading statutes”
over courts; Gellhorn, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1009;
, that an agency’s self-interest “may cloud its judg-
7 Thomas W. Merrill, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J: 833, 909-
911 (2009); Nathan A. Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is
Silence: Chevron Jurisdiction, Agency Deference, and Statutory
Silences, 2009 U. Tl. L. Rev. 1497 (2009); Nathan S. Chapman
& Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1786-87 (2012); Ernest Gellhorn & Paul
Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L.
Rev. 989, 1008-09 (1999); Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron
Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 203 (2004).
17
ment,” id., and that independent judicial review
furthers due process and enhances fairness and the
perception of fairness. Chapman, 121 Yale L.J. at
1786-87; Armstrong, 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at
268-285. Perhaps above all else, independent review
ensures that Congress’s judgments about the scope
of an agency's authority will be honored: “Just as
foxes should not guard henhouses, agencies should
not be entrusted to police the limits on their own
regulatory authority.” Sales, 2009 U. Ill L. Rev. at
1533.
This case demonstrates that these scholars have
it right, at least in cases like this one. Here, the FCC
has an interest in facilitating its own policy interests
by expanding its jurisdiction. Yet both Petitioners
and the FCC agree that Congress intended to limit
FCC authority in some respects; the question is how
much. Resolving this pure legal issue does not touch
on the agency’s specialized or technical expertise
over communications matters. Yet reading Chevron
to grant the agency discretion to make the jurisdic-
tional determination essentially allows the agency to
re-balance Congress’s careful statutory structure to
further its own interests.
2. While this Court has not definitely resolved
the issue, its cases at least suggest that the Fifth
Circuit approach—mechanically deferring to agency
jurisdictional determinations unless Congress has
“clearly removed” the authority to make those de-
terminations— as highly questionable.
a. Pre-Chevron, in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), the Court re-
18
fused to defer to a statutory interpretation of the
Administrator of the Fair Labor Standards Act
because “[t]he determination of the extent of author
ity given to a delegated agency by Congress is not
left for the decision of him in whom authority is
vested.” Id. at 616; see also Social Sec. Bd. v.
Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) (deciding the
limits of agency authority is a judicial function.”).
b. In Chevron itself, jurisdiction was not in
doubt. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). The decision does, however, shed impor-
tant light on the scope of the doctrine it announced.
Chevron concerned a provision of the Clean Air Act
that required certain States to establish a permit
program regulating “stationary sources” of air pollu-
tion. Id. at 840. The EPA defined “stationary source”
plantwide, rather than adopting a definition tied to
each pollution-emitting device at a plant. Jd. at 856.
Reviewing the agency’s order, the D.C. Circuit
decided that the purposes of the non-attainment
program required it to set-aside the agency’s policy
choice. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gor-
such, 685 F.2d 718, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
19
Adopting its now well-known test,’ the Court re-
versed, and upheld the EPA’s rule. Jd. at 728. The
Court explained that it had applied this deferential
approach whenever the “meaning or reach of a
statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies,
and a full understanding of the force of the statutory
policy in the given situation has depended upon
more than ordinary knowledge.” Id. at 844. As
discussed above, however, discerning the limits of an
agency's jurisdiction involves a purely legal, not a
policy, question that does not implicate agency
expertise.
c. In Chevron’s immediate aftermath, individual
Justices disputed whether the Court’s deference on
this policy question should also extend to basic
questions of the agency’s own jurisdiction, particu-
larly where the issue does not turn on matters
within an agency’s expertise.
In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi,
487 U.S. 354, 380-82 (1988), Justice Scalia wrote a
® Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-843 (“First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpreta-
tion. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
20
concurring opinion claiming that Chevron’s “rule of
deference applies even to an agency’s interpretation
of a statute designed to confine its authority” be-
cause there is no, “discernible line between an
agencys exceeding its authority and an agency’s
exceeding authorized application of its authority.” Id.
at 381.
Justice Brennan disagreed. Jd. at 387. He ex-
plained that “this Court has never deferred to an
agency's interpretation of a statute designed to
confine the scope of its jurisdiction.” Jd. Instead, he
said that “folur agency deference cases have always
been limited to statutes the agency was ‘entrusted to
administer” and “lalgencies do not ‘administer’
statutes confining the scope of their jurisdiction, and
such statutes are not ‘entrusted’ to agencies.” Jd. He
explained that the normal reasons for agency defer-
ence do not apply in this setting.
d. While the Court has still not resolved this
fundamental debate, it has established that a court
does not owe Chevron deference automatically, or
“merely because [a] statute is ambiguous and an
administrative official is involved.” Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006). Instead, a court
must first scrutinize whether “the agency’s generally
conferred authority and other statutory circum
stances” make apparent “that Congress would expect
the agency to be able to speak with the force of law
when it addresses ambiguity in the statute.” United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001);
21
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011).9
* - *
The Fifth Circuit’s automatic application of
Chevron to the FCC’s interpretation of this statutory
limit on its authority cannot be squared with Mead,
which requires a more searching examination of
Congress's intent, particularly “where an unusually
basic legal question is at issue.” NCTA v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 229 (2001). Had the Court considered the juris-
dictional issue de novo (as at least the Seventh and
Federal Circuits would), or engaged in a more care-
ful and searching examination of the statute, the
court would have found that the FCC lacks authority
to adopt the Declaratory Ruling. See, infra, Part I.
Il. Applying Chevron Led the Court To Expand the
FCC’s Authority and To Upset Congress’s Careful
Jurisdictional Balance.
Under the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of whether
§332(c)(7)(A) bars the FCC from using its general
authority in the Act to regulate the State and local
siting process under §332(c)(7), Chevron deference
played a decisive role.
® See also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132
S. Ct. 1836, 182 L. Ed. 2d 746, 759 (2012) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (noting that “a pre-Chevron determination that language
is ambiguous does not alone suffice; the pre-Chevron Court
must in addition have found that Congress wanted the particu-
lar ambiguity in question to be resolved by the agency.”)
22
1. Because the court accorded Chevron deference
to the FCC’s jurisdictional determination, it did not
seek the statute’s best reading; it asked only
whether the FCC’s interpretation was permissible.
The court deemed the statute ambiguous in various
ways,'° then applied Chevron’s second step to rule
that “none of the cities’ arguments convince us that
the FCC’s interpretation of its statutory authority is
impermissible.” App. 51a.
2. If the court had itself conducted a complete
statutory analysis applying traditional tools of
statutory construction, it would have found that
Congress did not intend for the FCC to make policy
affecting State and loca) authority in this area.
a. Section 332(c)(7)’s subject matter (local land
use processes) and the entities that implement these
processes (State and local governments) are not the
subjects of the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. §152.
The FCC has no experience in managing zoning, nor
is there an obvious national standard to which the
agency. could look (or did look) in deciding how much
time is required to process applications in particular
States or local communities. It is unlikely that
Congress would authorize the FCC to intrude into
10 App. 41a (§332(c)(7)(A) does not “unambiguously preclude”
FCC action); App. 41a (“§332(c)(7)(A) itself does not provide a
clear answer”); App. 42a (issue “remains unresolved”); App. 42a
(noting that Congress “did not clearly remove” FCC’s ability to
implement §332(c)(7)(A)); App. 42a-43a (Congress’s “silence”
leaves §332(c)(7)(A)’s effect on the FCC’s authority to adminis-
ter §332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations ambiguous) App. 43a (noting
that “one could read” §332(c)(7)(A) as the FCC does).
23
these areas without saying so expressly. Yet rather
than say so expressly, Congress granted the FCC
authority to act in one area (RF emissions) while
granting the courts exclusive jurisdiction to address
all other disputes arising under §332(c)(7).
b. The consequence of FCC regulation of State
and local land use processes is significant, as this
case illustrates. If the FCC deadlines pass (without
extension by mutual agreement), an applicant must
file a complaint within 30 days, triggering expedited
judicia] review. The State or local government’s
decision is presumptively unreasonable, and the
State or local government must expend resources to
defend its action. It must do so even if (to take an
example) the time was required to comply with State
environmental laws or to implement other policies
reflected in State and local deadlines. See, supra, at
9 (discussing State laws). The review and the ex-
pense are triggered not because the State and local
policies are unreasonable, but because the FCC
created a federal zoning policy. That is something
that the courts could not do, and have never done
under their case-specific approach to §332(c)(7).
It is unlikely that Congress intended to undercut
State and local laws without some indication it
intended to do so. Congress’s emphasis on judicial
review in §332(c)(7), while not determinative, cer-
tainly cuts against finding that Congress intended
the FCC to establish federal policies in this area.
Likewise, the conference report explains that
§332(c)(7)(B)Gi)’s requirement that a local govern-
ment act within a “reasonable period of time” is not
intended “to give preferential treatment to the
24
personal wireless service industry in the processing
of requests, or to subject their requests to any but
the generally applicable” zoning time frames. H.R.
Rep. No. 104-204 at 25, 1996 U.S.C.C.A_N. 10 (1995).
Yet, even if no cases are actually filed, the inevitable
effect of a policy that threatens States and local
governments with litigation if they do not meet FCC
deadlines is that State and local governments must
give precedence and special treatment to wireless
applicants at the expense of other zoning applicants
and policies.
2. a. Read in this context, the plain language of
§332(c)(7)(A)’s preservation clause is clear: it pre-
vents any other provision of the Communications Act
from “affect{ing]” or “limitfing]” State or local au-
thority. Section 332(c)(7), it follows, is both compre-
hensive and self-contained: the FCC may act where
§332(c)(7) gives it a role (to address RF matters), but
not elsewhere. The FCC therefore may not use §§1,
4(i), 201(b), and 303(r) to assert jurisdiction over
State and local zoning processes with respect to
matters that are addressed in §332(c)(7), e.g., to
define what constitutes “substantial evidence,” what
constitutes a “written record,” what constitutes a
“reasonable time” for action, and so on. As the FCC
itself recognized, its use of §§1, 4G), 201(b), and
303(r) to create national standards necessarily
“affects” and is intended to “affect” State and local
authority. App. 90a (§ 25) (noting that State and
local governments must comply with §332(c)(7) “as
defined herein”); see also App. 133a (J 62) (noting
that certain State and local decisions are “unaf-
fected” by its Declaratory Ruling).
25
b. The FCC’s reading cannot be squared with
§332(c)(7)(A)’s plain language. The FCC contends
that §332(c)(7)(A)’s preservation clause only forbids
it from creating “additional limitations” beyond
those enumerated in §332(c)(7)(B). The agency
therefore concludes that it may use §§1, 4(i), 201(b),
and 303(r) to establish national rules for local zoning
that are binding on States, local governments, and
the courts, if the rules relate to some matter men-
tioned in §332(c)(7)(B). Pet. App. 87a-91a (Ff 23-25).
But the “limits” created by the FCC’s rules—the
specific federal deadlines—are “additional limita-
tions” that appear nowhere in the Act. Moreover, the
FCC’s claim that the statute only prevents it from
creating additional “limits” reads the word “affect”
out of the statute. By selecting its preferred reading
of §332(c)(7) to advance its own policies, the FCC
necessarily affects State and local authority. Indeed,
the agency’s creation of an overriding federal stan-
dard “independent” of state standards, see supra,
has an additional “[e]ffect” on State law beyond the
court review contemplated by §332(c)(7) itself. Like-
wise, the agency’s presumption that State and local
governments have acted unreasonably—which
appears nowhere in §332(c)(7)’s text—"affects” State
and local authority.
The FCC’s reading of §332(c)(7) cannot be justi-
fied simply because §332(c)(7) appears in the Com-
munications Act, which the FCC generally imple-
ments. The Court’s decision in Louisiana PSC v.
FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 373 (1986) is analogous, and to
the contrary. The case concerned a preservation
clause stating that “except as provided” in certain
26
sections, “nothing in this Act shall be construed to
apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with
respect to” certain matters related to intrastate
service. The Court ruled that this clause forbids the
FCC from using another Act provision (47 U.S.C.
§220) to preempt intrastate depreciation practices.
The Court explained that the “nothing in this Act”
clause “fences off’ intrastate matters “from FCC
reach or regulation.” Jd. at 370. Likewise,
§332(c)(7)(A) fences off State and local authority
from “limits” or “affects” caused by §§1, 44), 201(b),
and 303(r)—and by any other provision of the Act.1!
Unless §332(c)(7) is read to have this “fencing off”
effect, it is hard to imagine its purpose. If Congress
had added §332(c)(7)’s limitations to the Act without
the “nothing in this Act” language, the FCC could
still only implement the limitations that Congress
established; it could not create new ones out of whole
cloth. The FCC (and Fifth Circuit applying Chevron)
thus reads §332(c)(7) as if the limiting language did
not exist. Tellingly, the FCC (and the Fifth Circuit)
found support for the FCC’s action in the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Alliance v. Community Media v.
FCC, 529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008). There, the court
11 The Fifth Circuit seems to have found it significant that the
Congress did not use the phrase “jurisdiction” in Section
332(c)(7A). App. 42a n.104. However, the logical reading of
Section 332(c)(7) is that it is broader, not narrower than the
clause at issue in Lousiana PSC, and seals off an entire subject
matter area from FCC action, direct or indirect. By contrast, in
Lousiana PSC, no one doubted that the FCC had authority to
address depreciation practices, so long as it did not assert
jurisdiction over intrastate depreciation rates.
27
found that the FCC could rely on its general rule-
making authority to implement §621(a)(1) of the
Communications Act, a provision that contains no
language limiting the applicability of “othe provi-
sions” of the Communications Act. 47! U.S.C.
§541(a)(1).
The Fifth Circuit’s approach here misconstrues
the Court’s decision in AT&T Carp. v. Iowa Utilities
Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). AT&T endorsed Justice
Breyer’s recognition that “Congress enacted [the]
language [lof §201(b)] in 1938,’ and . . . whether it
confers ‘general authority to make rules implement-
ing the more specific terms of a later enacted statute
depends upon what that later enacted statute con-
templates.’ AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 420 (emphasis
added); id. at 378 n.5 (finding Justice Breyer’s
statement “assuredly true.”). Section 332(c)(7)(A)
indicates what it “contemplates” expressly: nothing
in this Act” may “limit” or “affect” the State and local
authority that §332(c)(7) addresses. That Congress
may enact such a limitation is well-established: “An
agency may not confer power upon itself. To permit
an agency to expand its power in the face of a con-
gressiona! limitation on its jurisdiction would be to
grant to the agency power to override Congress.” La.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374-75. Requiring
Congress to do more to shield an area from FCC
policymaking—as the Fifth Circuit would—turns
this fundamental principle on its head.
c. Other interpretive tools indicate that Con-
gress intended to prevent the FCC from adopting
national regulations to implement §332(c)(7).
28
First, Petitioners’ statutory interpretation has
direct support in the statute’s legislative history: the
FCC’s has none. As explained, Congress rejected a
provision that would have granted the FCC the very
authority it exercised here in favor of §332(c)(7). The
conference report directs that the FCC must termi-
nate “[ajny pending [FCC] rulemaking concerning
the preemption of local zoning authority over the
placement, construction or modification of CMS
facilities.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-458 at 207-208 (1996)
(Conf. Report).
Second, this Court has indicated that courts
should avoid statutory interpretations that would
render other statutory language superfluous. Dun-
can v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The FCC’s
reading defies this canon. If the FCC is correct that
Congress intended and expected the FCC to use §§1,
4(i), 201(b), and 303(7) to address any matter men-
tioned in §332(c)(7), the specific grant of authority to
the FCC to address RF issues in §332(c)(7)(B) is
surplusage.
Third, this Court has instructed that “[iln con-
struing provisions .. . in which a general] statement
of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read
the exception narrowly in order to preserve the
primary operation of the provision.” Comm’ of
Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989).
The FCC’s interpretation defies this canon. It re-
quires a court to read the “except as provided in this
paragraph” broadly so that State and local authority
may be “limit[ed]” and “affectled]” not only by the
language “provided” in §332(c)(7)(B), but also by the
29
FCC’s implementation of this provided language
using §§1, 4G), 201(b), and 303().
Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s approach—requiring
ai unambiguous statement of Congressional in-
tent—requires it to ignore basic presumptions that
this Court has established. This Court has adopted a
presumption against preemption instructing that a
court must “begin .. . ‘with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the states [are] not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Altria
Group Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008), citing
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) (emphasis added). This assumption “applies
with particular force when Congress has legslated
in a field traditionally occupied by the States.” Jd.
This presumption supports Petitioners——nat the
FCC’s—interpretation, because only Petitioners’
reading would prevent federal preemption by agency
action where it is not Congress’s “clear and manifest”
intent.
* 2 *
In sum, the court’s resolution of this case turned
on its abbreviated and piecemeal Chevron analysis,
and its deference to an FCC jurisdictional determi-
nation that is inconsistent with the best reading of
§332(c)(7) considered as a whole. Review is appropri-
ate to ensure that §332(c)(7) is applied as Congress
intended.
30
Ill. Thig Case Allows the Court To Settle Recurring
Issues of National Importance.
This case presents recurring issues with serious
national ramifications both as a matter of adminis-
trative law, and under the Communications Act.
1. As a matter of administrative law, it is critical
that the Court clarify the recurring issue of whether
and how Chevron applies when an agency deter-
mines its own statutory jurisdiction. This very issue
is central in other important cases now pending in
the courts. See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Tethering the
Administrative State: The Case Against Chevron
Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims, 36 lowa J.
Corp. L. 823 (2011) (discussing FCC’s claim of au-
thority over the Internet).
But deferring to an agency’s jurisdictional conclu-
sion is especially intolerable when the courts of
appeals fail to do so uniformly. This permits an
agency’s jurisdictional claim and ensuing rules to be
binding in one circuit but not in others—a result
especially problematic because agency cases are
often assigned to courts of appeals randomly.
28 U.S.C. §2112. This creates a patchwork of “fed-
eral” rules, where results are determined by lottery.
This case presents a particularly strong vehicle for
resolving this issue given the strong indicia of Con-
gress’s intent, and the non-technical, purely legal
nature of the jurisdictional issue.
2. Resolving the FCC’s proper role with respect
to §332(c)(7) is of continuing and growing impor-
tance.
31
Allowing the FCC to interject itself into local zon-
ing processes and to make every local government
subject to federally-established zoning rules has a
direct effect on State and local governments. The
effect is legal (States and their processes would be
subject to federal administrative regulation); finan-
cial (federal rules and processes increase costs and
raise the spectre of increased litigation); and conse-
quential (the federal rules necessarily require local
governments that wish to avoid litigation to give
precedence to wireless zoning applications over other
applications). In Rancho Palos Verdes, these factors
were significant in determining that a §1983 remedy
was inconsistent with §332(c)(7)’s statutory scheme.
These factors also warrant granting the petition
here, to maintain Congress’s balance.
The issue is likely growing in importance. The
cellular industry estimates that there were approxi-
mately 10,000 cell sites at year end 2002. By year
end 2010, the number of cell sites had grown to
approximately 253,000, and the number continues to
grow—about 30,000 sites were added between 2010
and year end 2011.!2 The wireless industry has
already returned to the FCC and asked it to adopt
12 CTIA’s Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, available at
ttp:// ia. d_ 20 r j
.pdf (last accessed June 26, 2011); see also In re Annual Report
and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect
to Mobile Wireless, Including Mobile Services, Fifteenth
Report, WT Docket No. 10-133, FCC 11-103 at ¥ 310 (June 27,
2011) (@oting that one provider alone, Verizon, would need to
add between 17,400 and 27,400 sites to its network).
32
stricter rules. The agency recently released a far-
reaching Notice of Inquiry aimed at “[ilmproving
policies [rlegarding . . . [wlireless [flacilities [s]iting.”
In re Acceleration of Broadband Deployment: Ex-
panding the Reach and Reducing the Cost of Broad-
band Deployment by Improving Poligies Regarding
Public Rights of Way and Wireless Facilities Siting,
26 FCC Red. 5384 (2011). The FCC cited the De-
claratory Ruling (ff 13, 48 n.45), and stated its
belief that “the Commission has broad general
rulemaking authority that would allow it to issue
rules interpreting section[ ] . . . 332.” Id. at | 57; see
also id. at § 51. Therefore, the FCC is likely to use
the Fifth Circuit’s decision to assert broad and
sweeping authority to regulate all types of State,
local, and private property.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted.
33
Respectfully submitted,
Joseph Van Eaton
Counsel of Record
James R. Hobson
Matthew K. Schettenhelm
BEST BEST & KRIEGER, LLP
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 4300
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 785-0600
joseph. vaneaton@bbklaw.com
Counsel for Petitioners City of Arlington, Texas;
City of Los Angeles, California; County of Los
Angeles, California; City of San Antonio, Texas,
and Texas Coalition of Cities for Utilities Issues
Thomas C. Goldstein
Kevin K. Russell
GOLDSTEIN & RUSSELL, P.C.
5225 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 404
Washington, DC 20015
(202) 362-0636
Thomas D. Bunton
Senior Deputy County Counsel
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
1600 Pacific Highway
Room 355
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 531-6456
Counsel for Petitioner
County of San Diego, California
June 27, 2012
APPENDIX
la
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-60039
CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS; CITY OF SAN
ANTONIO, TEXAS,
Petitioners,
Vv.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.
On Petitions for Review of an Order of the
Federal Communications Commission
Before DAVIS, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge:
The City of Arlington, Texas and the City of
San Antonio, Texas seek review of a Declaratory
Ruling and subsequent Order on Reconsideration
that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) issued in response to a petition for a
declaratory ruling by a trade association of wireless
telephone service providers, CTIA—The Wireless
Association® (CTIA). In the proceeding before the
FCC, CTIA sought clarification of Sections 253 and
332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended,! regarding local review of wireless facility
147 U.S.C. §§ 253, 332(c)(7).
2a
siting applications. We deny Arlington’s petition for
review on the merits. We dismiss San Antonio’s peti-
tion for review because we lack jurisdiction to con-
sider it.
i
As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(TCA or the Act),2 Congress amended the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 by adding Section 332(c)(7). That
provision, codified as 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), restricts
the authority of state and local governments with
respect to decisions regarding the placement and
construction of wireless communications facilities. It
provides:
(7) Preservation of local zoning authority
(A) General authority
Except as provided in this paragraph,
nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the
authority of a State or local government or in-
strumentality thereof over decisions regarding
the placement, construction, and modification
of personal wireless service facilities.
(B) Limitations
Gi) The regulation of the place-
ment, construction, and modification of
personal wireless service facilities by
any State or local government or in-
strumentality thereof—
2 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
3a
(D shall not unreasonably
discriminate among provid-
ers of functionally equiva-
lent services; and
(1) shall not prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting
the provision of personal
wireless services.
Gi) A State or local government
or instrumentality thereof shall act on
any request for authorization to place,
construct, or modify personal wireless
service facilities within a reasonable
period of time after the request is duly
filed with such government or instru-
mentality, taking into account the na-
ture and scope of such request.
(iii) Any decision by a State or lo-
cal government or instrumentality
thereof to deny a request to place, con-
struct, or modify personal wireless ser-
vice facilities shall be in writing and
supported by substantial evidence con-
tained in a written record.
(iv) No State or local government
or instrumentality thereof may regulate
the placement, construction, and modi-
fication of personal wireless service fa-
cilities on the basis of the environ-
mental effects of radio frequency emis-
sions to the extent that such facilities
4a
comply with the Commission’s regula-
tions concerning such emissions.
(v) Any person adversely affected
by any final action or failure to act by a
State or local government or any in-
strumentality thereof that is inconsis-
tent with this subparagraph may,
within 30 days after such action or fail-
ure to act, commence an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction. The
court shall hear and decide such action
on an expedited basis. Any person ad-
versely affected by an act or failure to
act by a State or local government or
any instrumentality thereof that is in-
consistent with clause (iv) may petition
the Commission for relief.
Section 332(c)(7) seeks to reconcile two com-
peting interests—Congress’s desire to preserve the
traditional role of state and local governments in
regulating land use and zoning and Congress’s inter-
est in encouraging the rapid development of new
telecommunications technologies by removing the
ability of state and local governments to impede the
construction and modification of wireless communi-
cations facilities through delay or irrational deci-
sionmaking.? Section 332(c)(7)(A), by providing that
3 See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S.
113, 115 (2005) (“Congress enacted the [TCA] to promote
competition and higher quality in American
telecommunications services and to encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies. One of the
5a
“nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the au-
thority of a State or local government or instrumen-
tality thereof over decisions regarding the place-
ment, construction, and modification of personal
wireless service facilities,” acts to protect state and
local government authority. Section 332(c)(7)(B), on
the other hand, imposes “several substantive and
procedural limitations that subject [state and local
governments] to an outer limit upon their ability to
regulate personal wireless services land use issues.”*
In 2008, CTIA filed a petition for a declaratory
ruling with the FCC in which it requested that the
FCC clarify certain provisions of the Communica-
means by which it sought to accomplish these goals was
reduction of the impediments imposed by local governments
upon the installation of facilities for wireless communications,
such as antenna towers.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified Gov't of
Wyandotte Cnty., Kan. City, Kan., 546 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“Congress adopted the TCA in order to promote
competition and higher quality in telecommunications services
and to encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies. The TCA furthered these
goals by reducing the impediments that local governments
could impose to defeat or delay the installation of wireless
communications facilities such as cell phone towers, and by
protecting against irrational or substanceless decisions by local
authorities.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
4 Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 57 (ist Cir.
2001) Gnternal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
U.S. Cellular Corp. v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 364 F.3d 250,
253 (5th Cir. 2004) (observing that § 332(c)(7)(B) imposes
substantive and procedural limits on local governments’
exercise of zoning authority).
6a
tions Act of 1934, including several of § 332(c)(7)(B)’s
limitations. The petition asserted that ambiguities in
the statute had allowed local governments to impede
the placement and construction of wireless facilities,
harming consumers’ access to wireless services.
CTIA’s petition made four specific requests.
First, CTIA requested that the FCC provide
guidance on what constitutes a “failure to act” for
purposes of § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The FCC was requested
to clarify the time periods within which a state or
locality must act on wireless facility siting applica-
tions. The petition suggested that the Commission
find that there has been a failure to act if there is no
final action within 45 days from the submission of a
wireless facility application and within 75 days from
submission of other wireless siting facility applica-
tions.
Second, CTIA asked the FCC to find that, in
the event no final action was taken within the sug-
gested 45- and 75-day time periods, the application
would be deemed granted. Alternatively, CTIA pro-
posed that the FCC establish a presumption that, if
a zoning authority could not explain a failure to act
within the time frames, a reviewing court should
find a violation of § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and issue an in-
junction granting the underlying application.
Third, CTIA requested that the FCC interpret
§ 332(c)(7)(B)G), which bars state and local govern-
ments from taking action that would “prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting the provision of per-
7a
sonal wireless services.”5 CTIA noted that federal
courts had split on the question of whether that pro-
vision prevented state and local governments from
barring entry of additional wireless service providers
into a given market based solely on the existence of
another provider within that market. CTIA sug-
gested that the FCC declare that the existence of one
or more other carriers in a given geographic market
is not by itself a sufficient defense against a suit
seeking to enforce § 332(c)(7(B)@A(D.
Fourth and finally, CTIA requested the FCC
to declare that the TCA preempts any ordinance that
automatically requires a wireless carrier to seek a
variance, regardless of the type and location of the
wireless siting proposal. As support for this request,
CTIA pointed to 47 U.S.C. § 253, which provides in
pertinent part: “No State or local statute or regula-
tion, or other State or local legal requirement, may
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability
of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service.”?
647 U.S.C. § 332(c 74 BYWID.
6 Compare, e.g., Metheny v. Becker, 352 F.3d 458, 461 n.2 (1st
Cir. 2003) (observing that in the First Circuit “a provider is not
precluded from obtaining relief under the Act simply because
some other provider services the gap in question”), with AT&T
Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Va. Beach, 155
F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the statute “only
applies to ‘blanket prohibitions’ and ‘general bans or policies,’
not to individual zoning decisions”).
747 U.S.C. § 253(a).
8a
The FCC issued a public notice seeking com-
ment on CTIA’s petition, and the record reflects that,
in response to the notice, the FCC received dozens of
comments from wireless service providers, local zon-
ing authorities, and other interested parties. In
2009, the FCC issued the Declaratory Ruling, in
which it granted in part and denied in part CTIA’s
petition.®
With respect to CTIA’s request that the FCC
establish time frames in which state and local gov-
ernments must act on zoning requests, the FCC de-
clared that “a reasonable period of time” for purposes
of § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) presumptively would be 90 days
for personal wireless service facility siting applica-
tions requesting collocations® and 150 days for all
other applications.!°© The FCC further determined
that a lack of decision within these time frames
would constitute a failure to act under §
332(c)(7)(B)(v).11 The FCC stated, however, that per-
sonal wireless service providers and state or local
governments could, by mutual consent, extend the
prescribed time frames.!? In addition, the FCC con-
cluded that, if an applicant submits an incomplete
application, the time it takes for the applicant to re-
spond to a state or local government’s request for
6 24 FCC Red. 13994 (2009).
® Collocations involve modifications to already existing wireless
facilities.
10 24 FCC Red. 13994 4 32 (2009).
il Jd.
12 Id. at ¥ 32.
9a
additional information would not count toward the
90- or 150-day time frame if the state or local gov-
ernment notified the applicant that the application
was incomplete within 30 days of receiving the ap-
plication.!3
The FCC rejected CTIA’s proposal that the
FCC deem as granted applications on which final ac-
tion was not taken within the prescribed time
frames.!* The FCC observed that § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s
provision for a cause of action in a court of competent
jurisdiction based on a state or local government’s
“failure to act” indicated Congress’s “intent that
courts should have the responsibility to fashion ap-
propriate case-specific remedies.”!5 Accordingly, the
FCC concluded that, although the 90- and 150-day
time frames established by the Declaratory Ruling
were presumptively reasonable, state or local au-
thorities would have the opportunity in any given
case to rebut that presumption in court. !€
Finally, the FCC addressed CTIA’s request
that the FCC interpret § 332(c)(7)(B)G) and 47
U.S.C. § 253. With respect to § 332(c)(7)(B)Q@, the
FCC determined “that a State or local government
that denies an application for personal wireless ser-
vice facilities siting solely because ‘one or more car-
riers serve a given geographic market’ has engaged
13 Jd. at 4 53.
14 Td. at § 39.
15 Td.
16 Jd. at § 42.
10a
in unlawful regulation” that violates §
332(c)(7)(B)@UD’s prohibition on regulation that
“prohibits or hals] the effect of prohibiting the provi-
sion of personal wireless services.”!7 With respect to
§ 253, the FCC rejected CTIA’s request that the FCC
should rely upon that provision to preempt state
laws and local ordinances that require wireless ser-
vice providers to obtain a variance before siting fa-
cilities.1* The FCC noted that CTIA was not seeking
the preemption of any particular ordinance and “that
any further consideration of blanket variance ordi-
nances should occur within the factual context of
specific cases.”!9
Several organizations subsequently filed a pe-
tition for reconsideration, which the FCC ultimately
rejected in its Reconsideration Order. After the FCC
issued the Declaratory Ruling, but before it issued
the Reconsideration Order, the City of Arlington
filed a petition for review of the Declaratory Ruling
in this court. We issued an order holding Arlington’s
petition for review in abeyance pending the outcome
of the above-referenced petition for reconsideration.
After the FCC issued the Reconsideration Order, the
City of San Antonio, which had also intervened in
support of Arlington’s petition for review, filed;its
own petition seeking review of both the Declaratory
Ruling and the Reconsideration Order. We have also
17 Id. at J 55.
18 Id. at J 67.
19 Td.
lla
allowed several parties to intervene in support of or
in Opposition to the petitions.
IT
We first address an issue involving this court’s
jurisdiction. As we noted above, this case involves
two separate petitions for review—Arlington’s peti-
tion and San Antonio’s petition. Many of the issues
Arlington and San Antonio raise are the same. Both
cities claim (1) the FCC lacked statutory authority to
establish the 90- and 150-day time frames; (2) the
FCC’s 90- and 150-day time frames conflict with the
language of § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v); (3) the FCC’s
actions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law;
and (4) the FCC violated the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) because its establishment of the 90-
and 150-day time frames constituted a rulemaking
subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment require-
ments.
Each city also raises issues unique to its own
petition. Arlington raises a procedural due process
claim. San Antonio presents two additional issues:
(1) a challenge to the FCC’s interpretation of §
332(c)(7)(B)G@), and (2) a claim that the FCC failed to
comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act.2° The
FCC contends, however, that we lack jurisdiction to
consider San Antonio’s additional arguments be-
cause San Antonio did not timely file its petition for
review. Before we address the merits of the cities’
205 U.S.C. § 601 et seg.
12a
arguments, we must address the issue of our juris-
diction.
A
San Antonio filed its petition for review pur-
suant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), which provides that
“(alny proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul, or sus-
pend any order of the Commission ... shall be
brought as provided by and in the manner prescribed
in chapter 158 of Title 28.” Chapter 158 of Title 28
grants this court jurisdiction over “all final orders of
the Federal Communications Commission made re-
viewable by section 402(a) of Title 47.”21 Chapter 158
also states that a party seeking review of “a final or-
der reviewable under this chapter” must file a peti-
tion for review of the order within 60 days after en-
try of the order.?2 This 60-day period “is jurisdic;
tional and cannot be judicially altered or ex-
panded.”23
The FCC issued the Declaratory Ruling on
November 18, 2009. Arlington filed its petition fo
review of the Declaratory Ruling on January 14,
2010, within the 60-day period set forth in 28 U.S. C.
§ 2344. We have jurisdiction to consider that petition
and the issues Arlington raises. San Antonio, how-
ever, did not file its petition until October 1, 2010
well beyond the expiration of the 60-day period. Nev,
21 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).
22 Id. at § 2344.
23 Brazoria Cnty., Tex. v. EEOC, 391 F.3d 685, 688 (5th Cir.
2004) (quoting Texas v. United States, 749 F.2d 1144, 1146 (5th
Cir. 1985)).
13a
ertheless, San Antonio argues that its petition for
review of the Declaratory Ruling is timely because it
was filed within 60 days of the FCC’s issuance of the
Reconsideration Order.
It is the general rule that filing a petition for
reconsideration with the FCC will toll the 60-day pe-
riod for filing a petition for review of the agency’s ac-
tion in this court.24 As the FCC notes, however, San
Antonio did not file a petition for reconsideration of
the Declaratory Ruling. Rather, other parties af-
fected by the Declaratory Ruling filed the petition for
reconsideration that culminated in the Reconsidera-
tion Order, and San Antonio simply submitted com-
ments in support of that petition. The issue here,
then, is whether a petition for reconsideration filed
by one party to an agency action tolls § 2344’s 60-day
period for a party that did not file its own petition for
reconsideration.
We conclude that a petition for reconsidera-
tion filed by one party does not toll § 2344’s 60-day
period for parties that do not file petitions for recon-
sideration. We reach this decision because “finality
with respect to agency action is a party-based con-
cept.”25 It is well-established that “a petition for
24 See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 116 F.3d 593, 596-97 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Bellsouth Corp. v. FCC, 17 F.3d 1487, 1489-90 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (“[O]nce a party petitions the agency for reconsideration
of an order or any part thereof, the entire order is rendered
nonfinal as to that party.”).
25 Bellsouth Corp., 17 F.3d at 1489 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); see also W. Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 860
F.2d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[A]ln agency action can be final
l4a
agency reconsideration by one party does not affect
the right of other parties to seek judicial review.”26
In other words, the petition for reconsideration filed
in this case did not affect San Antonio’s right to file a
petition for review in this court as of the date the
FCC issued the Declaratory Ruling, and we would
have been able to exercise jurisdiction over such a
petition for review so long as San Antonio itself did
not file a petition for reconsideration. Because “there
is no principled way to distinguish between the con-
cept of finality for purposes of triggering the running
of a time limit for appeals and the concept of finality
for the purpose of appellate court jurisdiction,”27 we
conclude that San Antonio’s failure to petition for
reconsideration of the Declaratory Ruling rendered
the Declaratory Ruling a final agency decision with
respect to San Antonio both for purposes of confer-
ring jurisdiction on this court and for purposes of
triggering § 2344’s time period. San Antonio thus
for one party and nonfinal for another.”); Winter v. ICC, 851
F.2d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir. 1988) (“{IJn multi-party proceedings
one party may seek judicial review of an agency decision while
another party seeks administrative reconsideration, resulting
in both tribunals having jurisdiction. An agency decision may
thus be final for one purpose yet nonfinal for another
purpose.”).
26 Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. FERC, 361 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir.
2004); see also W. Penn Power Co., 860 F.2d at 586 (“It is well
established, for example, that when two parties are adversely
affected by an agency's action, one can petition for
reconsideration before the agency at the same time that the
other seeks judicial redetermination.”).
27 W. Penn Power Co., 860 F.2d at 585-86.
15a
had 60 days from November 18, 2009, to file a peti-
tion for review in this court of the Declaratory Rul-
ing. The city did not file its petition until October lI,
2010, months after its 60-day period to file a petition
for review had expired, and we lack jurisdiction to
consider the petition insofar as it challenges the De-
claratory Ruling.
B
San Antonio also argues we can consider its
petition, notwithstanding the fact that it was un-
timely with respect to the Declaratory Ruling, be-
cause the petition also challenges the FCC’s Recon-
sideration Order. There is no doubt that San Anto-
nio’s petition for review is timely insofar as it chal-
lenges the FCC’s Reconsideration Order. The Recon-
sideration Order is not a reviewable order, however,
because it merely denied rehearing of matters de-
cided in the Declaratory Ruling. It contained no new
or additional determinations. San Antonio did not
petition for reconsideration of the Declaratory Rul-
ing, and in such a situation, San Antonio cannot
challenge the rulings in the Declaratory Order by
challenging only the Reconsideration Order. As the
Supreme Court explained in ICC v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers: “where a party petitions an
agency for reconsideration on the ground of ‘material
error, i.e., on the same record that was before the
agency when it rendered its original decision, ‘an or-
der which merely denies rehearing of . . . [the prior]
order is not itself reviewable.”28 Here, the argu-
28 482 U.S. 270, 280 (1987) (quoting Microwave Commce'ns, Inc.
v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385, 387 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
16a
ments San Antonio raises in its petition for review,
and the arguments it submitted in support of the pe-
tition for reconsideration, all were originally pre-
sented to the agency during the proceedings leading
up to the issuance of the Declaratory Ruling. Accord-
ingly, in addition to lacking jurisdiction to review
San Antonio’s petition insofar as it challenges the
Declaratory Ruling, we also lack jurisdiction to con-
sider the petition as a challenge to the Reconsidera-
tion Order.
C
San Antonio maintains that we can consider
all of its arguments, even if we lack jurisdiction over
its petition for review, because it intervened in sup-
port of Arlington’s timely petition for review in this
court. Our precedent compels us to disagree. In Bra-
zoria County, Texas v. EEOC, *°we held that a party
could not rely on her timely intervention with re-
spect to another party’s petition for review to raise
matters outside the scope of the other party’s peti-
tion.°° We arrived at this holding because motions to
intervene must be filed within 30 days after filing pf
the petition for review?! —which itself must be filed
within 60 days after the agency’s final action®*—thus
creating a situation in which intervenors can request
review of issues as late as 90 days after the agency’s
29 391 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 2004).
30 Id. at 688-89.
31 See Fed. R. App. P. 15(d).
32 28 U.S.C. § 2344.
17a
final action. Because permitting an intervenor to
raise additional issues for review would contravene §
2344’s 60-day time period for filing petitions for re-
view, we observed that intervenors “are bound by the
issues raised in the petitions for review.”*5 Thus, we
generally limit intervenors to raising arguments ad-
dressing only those issues presented in the petitions
for review.*4
As discussed above, Arlington has raised five
issues. San Antonio’s argument that the FCC failed
to comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act and its
challenge to the FCC’s interpretation of §
332(c)(7)(B)G) do not relate to those issues, and we
lack jurisdiction to consider them. Accordingly, we
will hmit our discussion to only those issues Arling-
ton has raised. We will, however, consider the argu-
ments of San Antonio and other intervenors that re-
late to those issues.
iit
The cities contend the FCC violated the APA
when it established the 90- and 150-day time frames.
The APA identifies three types of agency proceed-
ings—rulemaking, adjudication, and licensing—and
88 Brazoria Cnty., Tex., 391 F.3d at 689 (quoting United Gas
Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 417, 437 (5th Cir. 1987)).
% Id. But see Kan. City S. Indus., Inc. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 423,
434-35 (5th Cir. 1990) (exercising jurisdiction over an issue
raised by an intervenor when the intervenor “filed its motion
for leave to intervene in the proceedings in this Court not only
within Rule 15(d)’s thirty-day filing requirement for
intervention motions but also within section 2344's sixty-day
filing requirement for petitions for review of ICC orders”).
18a
prescribes specific procedures applicable to those
proceedings.* When an agency engages in rulemak-
ing it must, subject to certain statutory exceptions,
satisfy the APA’s familiar notice-and-comment re-
quirements.** Adjudications, by contrast, are not
subject to those requirements.*’ The cities argue the
FCC violated the APA because the time frames con-
stitute new rules subject to the APA’s notice-and-
comment requirements for rulemaking and the FCC
failed to comply with the those requirements.
The FCC makes two arguments in response.
First, the FCC notes the Declaratory Ruling was the
product of adjudication, not rulemaking, and thus
was not subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment re-
quirements. Alternatively, the FCC suggests that
any new rules included in the Declaratory Ruling
were interpretive rules excepted from the notice-and-
comment requirements.
A
We first consider whether the 90- and 150-day
time frames were not subject to the APA’s notice-
and-comment requirements because the Declaratory
Ruling was the product of adjudication rather than
rulemaking. It is well-established that agencies can
choose to announce new rules through adjudication
35 See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 366 (5th Cir.
1999).
36 5 U.S.C. § 553.
37 Id. at § 554; Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 627
(5th Cir. 2001) (“There is no notice and comment requirement
for an agency adjudication.”).
19a
rather than rulemaking.** Agencies typically enjoy
“very broad discretion lin deciding] whether to pro-
ceed by way of adjudication or rulemaking.”®? The
notice-and-comment requirements for rulemaking
would ordinarily not apply to the FCC’s decision to
establish the time frames if the FCC exercised its
discretion to issue the Declaratory Ruling pursuant
to its adjudicative powers.
We examine two aspects of an agency action
when determining whether an agency action was a
rulemaking or an adjudication. First, we consider
the agency’s characterization of its own action.‘
Second, we must examine the ultimate product of
the agency action.*! Both of these considerations
38 See, e.g, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294
(1974) (observing that an agency “is not precluded from
announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding”);
Mobil Exploration & Producing N. Am., Inc. v. FERC, 881 F.2d
193, 198 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that an agency “may establish
rules of general application in either a statutory rulemaking
procedure or an individual adjudication”).
38 Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1141
(D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 294
(observing that “the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's
discretion”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)
(“[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by
individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); Am.
Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 797 (5th Cir.
2000) (“Agencies have discretion to choose between
adjudication and rulemaking as a means of setting policy.”).
# Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 797.
41 Td.
20a
lead us to agree with the FCC that the Declaratory
Ruling was the result of an adjudication and not a
rulemaking.
First, the FCC itself claims it was engaging in
adjudication when it issued the Declaratory Ruling.
As we have previously recognized, we “accord signifi-
cant deference to an agency’s characterization of its
own action.”42 This deference is not absolute, how-
ever. Otherwise, an agency would be able to escape
the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements simply
by labeling a rulemaking an adjudication.** Whether
the FCC’s action here constituted an adjudication or
a rulemaking ultimately turns on the attributes of
the Declaratory Ruling itself.
The Declaratory Ruling is designated as a
“Declaratory Ruling,” and it was issued pursuant to
47 C.F.R. § 1.2. Section 1.2 grants the FCC the
power to issue declaratory orders and is derivative of
§ 554(e) of the APA.44 Section 554(e) provides: “The
42 Id.
43 Cf Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (“It is well established that an agency may not
escape the notice and comment requirements... by labeling a
major substantive legal addition to a rule a mere
interpretation.”).
44 C.F.R. § 1.2(a) (“The Commission may, in accordance with
section 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, on motion or
on its own motion issue a declaratory ruling terminating a
controversy or removing uncertainty.”); see also Wilson v. A.H.
Belo Corp., 87 F.3d 393, 397 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Because 5
U.S.C. § 554(e) grants the FCC authority to issue ‘declaratory
orders,’ and because 47 C.F.R. § 1.2 is derived from § 554(e), it
appears that the terms ‘declaratory erder’ and ‘declaratory
21a
agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders,
and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory
order to terminate a controversy or remove uncer-
tainty.” Because § 554(e) is a subsection of the provi-
sion in the APA governing formal adjudication, we
have held that declaratory rulings issued pursuant
to its grant of authority are informal adjudications
under the APA.“ We see no reason to treat the De-
claratory Ruling differently: it was the product of ad-
judication.*®
B
Our conclusion that the Declaratory Ruling
resulted from adjudication does not end our review
of the FCC’s purported non-compliance with the
APA. Although, as noted above, agencies enjoy broad
discretion in choosing whether to establish a rule
ruling’ are used interchangeably.”).
45 See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 796-98 (treating a
declaratory order issued pursuant to § 554(e) as an informal
adjudication); Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1555 (5th
Cir. 1989) (same); see also Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC, 509 F.3d
531, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is no question that a
declaratory ruling can be a form of adjudication.” (internal
citation omitted)).
46 See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 798: Radiofone, Inc. v.
FCC, 759 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“There is no doubt
that the Commission’s action in this case was an adjudication
and not a rulemaking. It is captioned ‘Declaratory Ruling,’ a
category of action which, according to the Commission’s rules,
is taken ‘in accordance with section 5(d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act,’ 47 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1984). That subsection, now
codified at 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1982), pertains to adjudication.”
(internal footnote omitted)).
22a
through adjudication or rulemaking,‘’ that discre-
tion is not unlimited. The agency ultimately remains
subject to the constraints of the APA, which requires
courts to review the agency’s action to determine
whether it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”48 The Ninth Circuit, for example, has identified
certain situations in which an agency’s reliance on
adjudication instead of rulemaking constitutes an
abuse of discretion.49 Even though we conclude the
Declaratory Ruling was the product of an adjudica-
tion, we will consider whether the FCC abused its
discretion or otherwise violated the law by promul-
gating the 90- and 150-day time frames through ad-
judication rather than rulemaking.® On this point,
47 Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 797.
485 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
49 See MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1151
(9th Cir. 2008) (“An agency adjudication may require a notice
and comment period if it constitutes de facto rulemaking that
affects the rights of broad classes of unspecified individuals.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Miguel-
Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Of
course, in certain circumstances an agency may abuse its
discretion by announcing new rules through adjudication
rather than through rulemaking, such as when the rule
operates retroactively and disturbs settled expectations.”).
5° See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 798 (reviewing agency's
decision to proceed by adjudication rather than rulemaking for
abuse of discretion): see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]here may be situations where [an
agency's) reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of
discretion .. ..”).
23a
we harbor serious doubts as to the propriety of the
FCC’s choice of procedures.
Specifically, we note that the Declaratory Rul-
ing’s 90- and 150-day time frames bear all the hall-
marks of products of rulemaking, not adjudication.
Adjudications typically “resolve disputes among spe-
cific individuals in specific cases, whereas rulemak-
ing affects the rights of broad classes of unspecified
individuals.”5! In American Airlines, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Transportation, we held that the Depart-
ment of Transportation properly used § 554(e)’s de-
claratory ruling mechanism to resolve a dispute in-
volving the application of the federal law governing
airline service at Love Field airport.** In that case
we specifically observed that “because DOT's order
interpreted the rights of a small number of parties
properly before it, DOT did not abuse its discretion
by acting through an adjudicatory proceeding.”
Similarly, in Mobil Exploration & Producing
North America. Inc. v. FERC,5* we reviewed an
agency's decision to institute a new one-year time
limit for successors in interest in gas-producing
properties to obtain a new certificate of public con-
51 Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 448
(9th Cir. 1994); see also Providence Yakima Med. Ctr. v.
Sebelius, 611 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam);
San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., Inc., 612 F.3d 25, 33 n.3
(ist Cir. 2010).
52 202 F.3d at 797-98.
53 Td. at 798.
54 881 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1989).
24a
venience and necessity.55 The agency instituted the
new limit in the course of reviewing a particular suc”
cessor’s application for a certificate. Petitioners
challenged the limit on a number of grounds, includ-
ing that the limit should have been instituted using
the formal rulemaking procedure in the APA, and we
held that the agency did not abuse its discretion in
choosing to establish the limit through adjudication
rather than rulemaking.®’? In doing 60, we specifi-
cally noted that the new time limit was “a relatively
minor procedural requirement with limited effect”
due to the fact that there were “fewer than 250 large
producers that would be subject to the one-year suc-
cessor filing requirement.”®® Here, the FCC estab-
lished the 90- and 150-day time frames, not in the
course of deciding any specific dispute between a
wireless provider and a state or local government,
but in a proceeding focused exclusively on providing
an interpretation of § 332(c)(7)(B) that would apply
prospectively to every state and local government in
the United States.
It is true that an agency need not be pre-
sented with a specific dispute between two parties in
order to use § 554(e)’s declaratory ruling mechanism,
because § 554 does not limit an agency’s use of de-
claratory rulings to terminating controversies be-
tween parties. Section 554 also empowers agencies to
55 Id. at 195-96.
56 Jd. at 196.
57 Id. at 198-99.
58 Id. at 199.
25a
use declaratory rulings to “remove uncertainty,” and
there are cases suggesting an agency may use a de-
claratory ruling to issue interpretations of law that
are both general and prospective in their application
and divorced from a specific dispute between parties.
In Qwest Services Corp. v. FCC,®® the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit upheld the FCC’s use of a declaratory
ruling to announce that certain types of prepaid call-
ing cards were telecommunications services and that
their providers were subject to regulation under the
TCA.© In Chisholm v. FCC,® the District of Colum-
bia Circuit similarly upheld the FCC’s use of a de-
claratory ruling to determine the application of the
Communication Act’s equal-time provision to specific
types of appearances by political candidates.®* Nev-
ertheless, even these cases involved concrete and
narrow questions of law the resolutions of which
would have an immediate and determinable impact
on specific factual scenarios. Here, by contrast, the
FCC has provided guidance on the meaning of §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v) that is utterly divorced from
any specific application of the statute. The time
frames’ effect with respect to any particular dispute
arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) will only become clear
after adjudication of the dispute in a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. This is classic rulemaking.®
59 509 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
8 Td. at 536-37.
61 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
& Jd. at 364-66.
63 See Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442,
26a
Nevertheless, we need not decide whether the
FCC abused its discretion by failing to use notice-
and-comment rulemaking to establish the time
frames. We also do not address the FCC’s argument
that, even if it did engage in rulemaking, the rule-
making was interpretative rulemaking of the type
excepted from the APA’s notice-and-comment re-
quirements. We need not decide these questions
because any failure by the FCC to comply with the
APA in this case was harmless.®
“(T]he harmless error rule requires the party
asserting error to demonstrate prejudice from the
error.”®6 An agency’s failure to comply with the APA
448 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Rulemaking, in contrast, is prospective,
and has a definitive effect on individuals only after the rule
subsequently is applied.”).
645 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2).
6 See United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 930 (5th Cir.
2011) (“The APA demands that courts reviewing agency
decisions under the Act ‘[take] due account .. . of the rule of
prejudicial error.” (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §
706)); Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 613
F.3d 1112, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The harmless error rule
applies to agency action because ‘lilf the agency’s mistake did
not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it
would be senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration.”
(alteration in original) (quoting PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362
F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
6 Air Can. v. Dep't of Transp., 148 F.3d 1142, 1156 (D.C. Cir.
1998); see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1706
(2009) (“[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful
normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s
determination.”).
27a
is harmless when the agency’s mistake “clearly had
no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of
decision reached.”®7 In conducting the harmless error
inquiry, we inform our anaiysis with a number of po-
tentially relevant factors, including (1) “an estima-
tion of the likelihood that the result would have been
different”; (2) “an awareness of what body (jury,
lower court, administrative agency) has the author-
ity to reach that result”; (3) “a consideration of the
error’s likely effects on the perceived fairness, integ-
rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”;
and (4) “a hesitancy to generalize too broadly about
particular kinds of errors when the specific factual
circumstances in which the error arises may well
make all the difference.”®
The APA’s notice-and-comment procedures
are familiar:
Under the APA, agencies issuing rules must
publish notice of proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register and shall give interested per-
sons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making by allowing submission of comments.
In addition, the APA requires that publication
of a substantive rule shall be made not less
than 30 days before its effective date.®®
6? U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 1979)
(quoting Braniff Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.3d
453, 466 (D.C. Cir.1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68 Shinseki, 129 S. Ct. at 1707; see also Johnson, 632 F.3d at
930.
6 Johnson, 632 F.3d at 927 (internal quotation marks and
28a
When an agency fails to comply with the APA’s no-
tice and comment procedures, the touchstone is
“whether it is clear that the lack of notice and com-
ment did not prejudice the petitioner.””° In this case,
there is no indication that any failure of the FCC to
comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment proce-
dures prejudiced Arlington or the intervenors.
As an initial matter, the FCC published notice
of CTIA’s petition in the Federal Register, and the
notice requested comments on CTIA’s request that
the FCC “clarify the time period in which a state or
local zoning authority will be deemed to have failed
to act on a wireless facility siting application.””! The
notice also referenced CTIA’s requests that the FCC
establish specific time frames and implement a sys-
tem under which an application would be deemed
granted if a zoning authority failed to act within the
applicable time frame.7? It is true that the FCC la-
beled its published notice as a request for comment
on a “Petition for Declaratory Ruling” rather than as
a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” but, as the Dis
trict of Columbia Circuit has repeatedly held, such a
deficiency is not fatal because ““to remand solely be-
cause the Commission labeled the action a declara-
citations omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d).
70 Johnson, 632 F.3d at 931.
1. See Wireless Telecommunications Bureau seeks Comment on
Petition for Declaratory Ruling by CTIA, 73 Fed. Reg. 50972,
50972 (Aug. 29, 2008).
72 Id. at 50972-73.
29a
tory ruling would be to engage in an empty formal-
ity.””73
We also cannot ignore the fact that, after pub-
lishing the notice in the Federal Register, the FCC
received and considered comments from dozens of
interested parties, including several of the cities in-
volved in this litigation. Many of those comments
raised the very issues now raised before this court,
and the FCC addressed those issues in its Declara-
tory Ruling. Indeed, we are not aware of a single ar-
gument the cities now present to this court that was
not considered by the FCC in the agency proceedings
below. These facts call to mind our recent observa-
tions in United States v. Johnson:
The purpose of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing is to assure fairness and mature consid-
eration of rules having a substantial impact
on those regulated. The process allows the
agency to educate itself before adopting a final
order. In addition, public notice requires the
agency to disclose its thinking on matters that
will affect regulated parties. These goals,
however, may be achieved in cases where the
agency's decision-making process centered on
the identical substantive claims as those pro-
posed by the party asserting error, even if
there were APA deficiencies. It follows that
when a party’s claims were considered, even if
73 See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 40 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (quoting N.Y. State Comm'n on Cable Television v.
FCC, 749 F.2d 804, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
30a
notice was inadequate, the challenging party
may not have been prejudiced.”4
Finally, to the extent the FCC might have
failed to comply with the APA’s 30-day waiting pe-
riod before an adopted rule becomes effective, the cit-
ies have suggested no reason why any such waiting
period was needed in this case or demonstrated any
prejudice resulting from the FCC’s failure to delay
the effective date of the Declaratory Ruling. We note
that “the purpose of the thirty-day waiting period is
to give affected parties a reasonable time to adjust
their behavior before the final rule takes effect.””
On this point, the Declaratory Ruling itself recog-
nized the need “to give State and local governments
an additional period to review currently pending ap-
plications before an applicant might file suit.”76 The
FCC determined that, for all zoning applications
that had been pending for less than 90 days (with
respect to collocation applications) or 150 days (with
respect to all other applications) at the time of the
issuance of the Declaratory Ruling, state or local
governments would have an additional 90- or 150-
day period before their inaction would be presumed
unreasonable under the time frames.” For those ap-
plications that had been pending for longer than the
applicable time frame at the time of the Declaratory
7 Johnson, 632 F.3d at 931 (internal quotation marks,
brackets, and citations omitted).
78 Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
76 24 FCC Red. 13994 4 51 (2009).
17 Id.
3la
Ruling, the FCC determined state or local govern-
ments would have 60 days from the provision of no-
tice by the applicant before the applicant would be
able to seek judicial relief.7* The cities have not dem-
onstrated that the FCC’s approach here burdened
them in any way. Nor have they pointed to zoning
applications they were forced to address earlier due
to the FCC’s failure to comply with the 30-day wait-
ing period.
We conclude that any error in the FCC’s
choice to establish the time frames in the Declara-
tory Ruling instead of through notice-and-comment
rulemaking was plainly harmless. The cities received
notice of the issues pending before the FCC and had
the ability to comment on CTIA’s petition in the
agency proceedings. More than sixty cities, towns,
and villages, and scores of other governmental! enti-
ties or their representatives submitted comments in
response to the FCC’s notice. The FCC considered
and addressed all of the substantive issues the cities
now raise. Any deficiencies in the procedures leading
to the Declaratory Ruling do not justify vacating and
remanding the order.
IV
The cities also argue the FCC violated due
process when it issued the Declaratory Ruling. The
cities base this argument on their assertion that the
FCC failed to comply with 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(a)
when it considered CTIA’s petition. A note to that
regulation provides:
78 Id.
32a
In the case of petitions for declaratory ruling
that seek Commission preemption of state or
local regulatory authority and petitions for re-
lief under 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(v), the peti-
tioner must serve the original petition on any
state or local government, the actions of which
are specifically cited as a basis for requesting
preemption. Service should be made on those
bodies within the state or local governments
that are legally authorized to accept service of
legal documents in a civil context. Such plead-
ings that are not served will be dismissed
without consideration as a defective pleading
and treated as a violation of the ex parte rules
unless the Commission determines that the
matter should be entertained by making it
part of the record under § 1.1212(d) and the
parties are so informed.7®
The cities claim CTIA did not serve its petition on
the state and local governments whose delays served
as the impetus for CTIA’s petition. According to the
cities, CTILA’s failure to serve the petition necessi-
tated its dismissal and the FCC’s failure to do so re-
sulted in a denial of due process.
The FCC responds that its decision not to
dismiss CTIA’s petition was justified by its own in-
terpretation of § 1.1206(a). In the Declaratory Rul-
ing, the FCC concluded: “By its terms, the service
requirement does not apply to a petition that cites
examples of the practices of unidentified jurisdic-
7° 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(a) note 1.
33a
tions to demonstrate the need for a declaratory rul-
ing interpreting provisions of the Communications
Act.”® The FCC notes that CTIA’s petition did not
identify specific municipalities and that nothing in
its rules required the petition to do so.
Reduced to its essence, the cities’ claim is that
the FCC violated due process by failing to ensure
that CTIA’s petition was served on the specific state
and local governments whose delays caused CTIA to
petition the FCC for the Declaratory Ruling. We do
not believe that due process required such individual
service in this case because the FCC, in issuing the
Declaratory Ruling, was not adjudicating the legality
of the actions of those state and local governments.
The FCC was not confronted with a concrete dispute
the resolution of which would have an immediate ef-
fect on specific individuals.®! As noted above, in this
sense the Declaratory Ruling was more akin to a
rulemaking than the typical adjudication, and we
have observed that “[wlhen a rule is established
through statutory rulemaking, public notice and
hearing provide the necessary protection. . . . Such
notice is provided by publication of the proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register, and all parties
who will be affected by the rule are given an oppor-
tunity to challenge [the agency’s] action.”®? Here, the
80 24 FCC Red. 13994 4 68 (2009).
81 See Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442,
448 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[Blecause adjudications involve concrete
disputes, they have an immediate effect on specific individuals
(those involved in the dispute).”).
8 Mobil Exploration & Producing N. Am., Inc. v. FERC, 881
34a
FCC provided notice of CTIA’s petition in the Fed-
eral Register and allowed all interested parties to
provide comments on CTIA’s petition. Under the cir-
cumstances of this case, those procedures were ade-
quate to satisfy due process.
V
Regarding the determinations in the FCC’s
Declaratory Ruling, we begin with the cities’ sugges-
tion that the FCC lacked the statutory authority to
adopt the 90- and 150-day time frames. As noted
above, those time frames represent the FCC’s con-
struction of language in § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v). The
cities argue, however, that § 332(c)(7)(A) precludes
the FCC from exercising authority to implement that
language. The cities also note that § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)
places jurisdiction over disputes arising under §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi) in the courts and suggests that this
jurisdictional provision supports its proposed read-
ing of § 332(c)(7)(A).
The FCC, on the other hand, contends that it
possessed statutory authority to adopt the 90- and
150-day time frames pursuant to its general author-
ity to make such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the Communication Act’s pro-
visions.*8 The FCC argues that § 332(c)(7)(A) does
not bar the FCC from exercising this authority be-
cause the FCC interprets § 332(c)(7)(A) as merely
precluding the FCC from imposing additional limita-
F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Fla. Gas Transmission
Co. v. FERC, 876 F.2d 42, 44 (5th Cir. 1989).
83 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154@), 201(b), 303(z).
35a
tions on state and local government authority over
the wireless facility zoning process beyond those al-
ready provided for in § 332(c)(7)(B). Under the FCC’s
interpretation, the FCC retains the authority to im-
plement the limitations already set forth in §
332(c)(7)(B).
A
We ordinarily review an agency’s interpreta-
tion of the statutes it is charged with administering
using the Chevron two-step standard of review.™
Under Chevron, we first ask “whether Congress has
directly addressed the precise question at issue.”® If
Congress has addressed the question, “we must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.” If we determine that the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the precise question at
issue, however, we then “consider whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.”®7 “As long as the agency’s con-
struction of an ambiguous statute is permissible, it
8 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 796
(5th Cir. 2000).
8 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
86 Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 393 (5th Cir.
2008) (quoting Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
87 Natl Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 749 (5th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Chevron, 476 U.S. at 483) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
36a
must be upheld.”88 Although we engage in the Chev-
ron analysis when reviewing an agency’s interpreta-
tion of a statute it is charged with administering, we
do not use Chevron when reviewing an agency’s in-
terpretation of a statute it is not charged with ad-
ministering.®9
The issue in the instant case is whether the
FCC possessed statutory authority to administer §
332(c)(7)(B)Gii) and (v) by adopting the 90- and 150-
day time frames. Although it is clear that Chevron
review does not apply once it is determined that an
agency lacks authority to interpret a statute, the
parties dispute whether Chevron review should ap-
ply when we determine the extent of the agency’s ju-
risdiction. The FCC argues that an agency’s inter-
pretation of its own statutory authority is subject to
review under Chevron. The cities, on the other hand,
argue the issue presents “a pre-Chevron question of
law regarding the scope of the FCC’s authority” and
that such a question of law is subject to de novo re-
view.
The Supreme Court has not yet conclusively
resolved the question of whether Chevron applies in
the context of an agency’s determination of its own
statutory jurisdiction,” and the circuit courts of ap-
88 Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 796.
89 Td.
% See Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 2011)
(collecting cases and observing that the Supreme Court has yet
to resolve the debate over whether Chevron applies to disputes
about the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction).
37a
peals have adopted different approaches to the issue.
Some circuits apply Chevron deference to disputes
over the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction,®! some do
not,9? and some circuits have thus far avoided taking
a position.%3 In this circuit, we apply Chevron to an
agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdic-
tion, and therefore, we will apply the Chevron
framework when determining whether the FCC pos-
sessed the statutory authority to establish the 90-
and 150-day time frames.™
%1 See, e.g., Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1145-46
(10th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Of course, courts afford
considerable deference to agencies interpreting ambiguities in
statutes that Congress has delegated to their care, ...
including statutory ambiguities affecting the agency's
jurisdiction . . . .” (internal citations omitted)); P.R. Mar.
Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 552
(3d Cir. 1988) (“When Congress has not directly and
unambiguously addressed the precise question at issue, a court
must accept the interpretation set forth by the agency so long
as it 1s a reasonable one. . . . This rule of deference is fully
applicable to an agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction.”
(internal citation omitted)).
#2 See, e.g., N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 294 F.3d
844, 846-47 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that de novo review is
appropriate for questions involving an agency’s determination
of its own jurisdiction); Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d
1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reviewing agency's legal conclusion
regarding the scope of its own jurisdiction without deference to
the agency's determination).
93 See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237 (leaving the question
unanswered); O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (ist Cir.
1996) (same).
* Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 2007)
(observing that Chevron step one appliee to “challenges to an
38a
B
“At the first step of a Chevron analysis, we
must determine whether Congress has directly spo-
ken in a manner that reveals its expressed intent.”%
“We use the traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion to determine whether Congress has spoken to
the precise point at issue,”% and “[t}here is no better
or more authoritative expression of congressional in-
tent than the statutory text.”8? We determine the
plainness or ambiguity of the statutory text by refer-
encing “the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context
of the statute as a whole.”98 “[W]here the statutory
language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme
is coherent and consistent,’ the language of the stat-
agency's interpretation of a statute, as well as whether the
statute confers agency jurisdiction over an issue”); Tex. Office
of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 440-46 (5th Cir.
1999) (applying Chevron to a question concerning the scope of
the FCC’s statutory authority to provide universal service
support for schools, libraries, and rural health-care providers);
First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 42 F.3d 895, 901 (5th
Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“[T]his circuit has accorded deference
to an agency's determination of its own statutory authority.”).
95 Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir.
2008) (quoting Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
%6 Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 749 (5th
Cir. 2011) (citing Tex. Sav. & Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Fed.
Hous. Bd., 201 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2000)).
97 Med. Ctr. Pharm., 536 F.3d at 394.
98 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
39a
ute 1s usually where we end.”” If the statutory lan-
guage is susceptible to more than one reasonable in-
terpretation, however, it is ambiguous and we must
proceed to Chevron step two.!
As noted above, the FCC argues that its gen-
eral authority to make rules and regulations to carry
out the Communications Act includes the power to
implement § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v). One express
grant is found at 47 U.S.C. § 201(b), which provides
that “[t]he Commission may prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public inter-
est to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” The
Supreme Court has held the FCC’s rulemaking au-
thority under § 201(b) extends to provisions added by
the TCA because Congress passed the TCA as an
amendment to the Communications Act.!°! Congress
#® Med. Ctr. Pharm., 536 F.3d at 394 (quoting Robinson, 519
U.S. at 340).
100 See United States v. Hoang, 636 F.3d 677, 682 (5th Cir.
2011) (“It is familiar learning that ‘[a] statute is ambiguous if it
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation or
more than one accepted meaning.” (quoting In re Condor Ins.
Ltd., 601 F.3d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 2010)); Comacho v. Tex.
Workforce Comm'n, 408 F.3d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 2005)
(“Generally, a statute is ambiguous if it is ‘capable of being
understood in two or more possible senses or ways.” (quoting
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90 (2001)).
101 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999)
(“We think that the grant in § 201(b) means what it says: The
FCC has rulemaking authority to carry out the ‘provisions of
this Act,’ which include §§ 251 and 252, added by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.”); see also AT&T Commce'ns v.
BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 201).
40a
retains the ability to restrict its grant of power to an
agency, though, and the cities argue Congress in-
cluded language in the TCA precluding the FCC
from using the Communication Act’s grant of general
authority to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limita-
tions.!02 The cities point to § 332(c)(7)(A), which pro-
vides: “Except as provided in this paragraph, noth-
ing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority
of a State or local government or instrumentality
thereof over decisions regarding the placement, con-
struction, and modification of personal wireless ser-
vice facilities.” The cities also claim that §
332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s vesting of jurisdiction in the courts
to review disputes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)(Gi)
evinces Congress’s intent to remove jurisdiction over
§ 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) from the FCC.
The question we confront under Chevron is
whether these provisions unambiguously indicate
Congress’s intent to preclude the FCC from imple-
menting § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi and (v). If they do, the FCC
lacked statutory authority to issue the 90- and 150-
day time frames. If the provisions are ambiguous,
however, we must defer to the FCC’s interpreta-
tion—an interpretation under which the FCC pos-
sessed authority to issue the 90- and 150-day time
frames—so long as the FCC’s interpretation repre-
sents a reasonable construction of their terms. For
102 Cf. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 42 F.3d 895, 901
(5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“As part of its legislative powers,
Congress designates the scope of agency authority, and if
Congress so chooses, it can subsequently restrict or limit that
delegation of power to the agency.”).
4la
the following reasons, we conclude neither §
332(c)(7)(A) nor § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) unambiguously pre-
clude the FCC from establishing the 90- and 150-day
time frames.
First, we note that § 332(c)(7)(A), when it
states “[e]xcept as provided in this paragraph,” re-
moves § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations from its reach and
recognizes those limitations as legitimate intrusions
into state and local governments’ traditional author-
ity over zoning decisions. The fundamental question
then, is whether § 332(c)(7)(A), in restricting the
TCA’s limitations on state or local zoning authority
to only those contained in § 332(c)(7)(B), also pre-
cludes the FCC from implementing those limitations
by relying on its general rulemaking authority under
the Communications Act. This is a question to which
§ 332(c)(7)(A) itself does not provide a clear answer.
Section 332(c)(7)(A) states Congress’s desire to make
§ 332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations the only limitations con-
fronting state and local governments in the exercise
of their zoning authority over the placement of wire-
less services facilities, and thus certainly prohibits
the FCC from imposing restrictions or limitations
that cannot be tied to the language of § 332(c)(7)(B).
Whether the FCC retains the power of implementing
those limitations, however, remains unresolved.
Congress’s silence on this point is not without
implication. Had Congress intended to insulate §
332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations from the FCC’s jurisdiction,
one would expect it to have done so explicitly be-
cause Congress surely recognized that it was legis-
lating against the background of the Communica-
42a
tions Act’s general grant of rulemaking authority to
the FCC. The FCC’s general grant of authority
would ordinarily extend to amendments to the
Communications Act, like § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limita-
tions, in the absence of specific statutory limitations
on that authority,!°%? and Congress certainly knew
how to specifically restrict the FCC’s general author-
ity over the Communications Act as it clearly re-
stricted the FCC’s ability to use that authority in
other contexts.!%* Here, however, Congress did not
clearly remove the FCC’s ability to implement the
limitations set forth in § 332(c)(7)(B), and this Con-
gressional silence leaves § 332(c)(7)(A)’s effect on the
FCC’s authority to administer § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limita-
tions ambiguous.
Moreover, the _ cities’ reliance on §
332(c)(7)(B)(v) does not resolve § 332(c)(7)(A)’s ambi-
guity. The cities contend that, by establishing juris-
diction in the courts over specific disputes arising
under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi), Congress indicated its intent
to remove that provision from the scope of the FCC’s
general authority to administer the Communications
Act. The cities read too much into § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s
terms, however. Although § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) does
clearly establish jurisdiction in the courts over dis-
putes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gv), the provision
103 See AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 378.
104 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (listing specific exceptions to the
FCC’s authority over the Communications Act); La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369-76 (1986) (holding § 152(b)
“denies the FCC the power to preempt state regulation of
depreciation for intrastate ratemaking purposes”).
43a
does not address the FCC’s power to administer §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi in contexts other than those involving
a specific dispute between a state or local govern-
ment and persons affected by the government’s fail-
ure to act. Accordingly, one could read § 332(c)(7) as
a whole as establishing a framework in which a
wireless service provider must seek a remedy for a
state or local government’s unreasonable delay in
ruling on a wireless siting application in a court of
competent jurisdiction while simultaneously allow-
ing the FCC to issue an interpretation of §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi) that would guide courts’ determina-
tions of disputes under that provision.
The Sixth Circuit recently addressed a similar
statutory scheme in Alliance for Community Media
v. FCC.1% That decision involved provisions of the
Communications Act that delegated to municipali-
ties, in the form of local franchising authorities
(LFAs), the power to award cable franchises. The
provisions at issue further provided that an LFA
could not “unreasonably refuse to award an addi-
tional competitive franchise,”!°? and “endowed po-
tential entrants with a judicial remedy by entitlng
them to commence an action in a federal or state
court within 120 days after receiving a final, adverse
decision from an LFA.”!°% After the FCC promul-
gated rules delineating situations that would consti-
105 §29 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008).
106 Jd. at 768.
107 Td.
108 Jd.
44a
tute an unreasonable refusal to award a cable fran-
chise, petitioners claimed (among other arguments)
that the statute’s identification of courts as the fo-
rum for aggrieved cable operators to obtain relief de-
prived the FCC of statutory authority to exercise its
rulemaking power. The court rejected that argu-
ment, holding that “the availability of a judicial rem-
edy for unreasonable denials of competitive franchise
applications does not foreclose the agency’s rulemak-
ing authority over section 621(a)(1).”1 The decision
in Alliance for Community Media supports the con-
clusion that there is nothing inherently unreason-
able about reading § 332(c)(7) as preserving the
FCC’s ability to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) while
providing for judicial review of disputes under §
332(c)(7)(B) Gi) in the courts. 110 Section
332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s vesting in the courts of jurisdiction
over disputes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)(Gii) thus
does not unambiguously preclude the FCC from tak-
ing the action at issue in this case.
In sum, we conclude that § 332(c)(7) is am-
biguous with respect to the FCC’s authority to estab-
109 Jd. at 775.
110 Jd. at 776 (“[Wle believe that courts can grant deference to
the Order while maintaining their Congressionally-granted
authority to make factual determinations and provide relief to
aggrieved cable operators.”). Cf. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366, 385 (1999) (“While it is true that the 1996 Act
entrusts state commissions with the job of approving
interconnection agreements and granting exemptions to rural
LECs, these assignments . . . do not logically preclude the
[FCC’s] issuance of rules to guide the state-commission
judgments.” (internal citations omitted)).
45a
lish the 90- and 150-day time frames. Although the
statute clearly bars the FCC from using its general
rulemaking powers under the Communications Act
to create additional limitations on state and local
governments beyond those the statute provides in §
332(c)(7)(B), the statute is silent on the question of
whether the FCC can use its general authority under
the Communications Act to implement §
332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations. We proceed to Chevron
step two.
C
Once we determine that a statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to a question at issue, we
must defer to the agency’s resolution of the question
if the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute.!!! In addition to argu-
ing that the plain text of § 332(c)(7) precludes the
FCC from establishing the 90- and 150-day time
frames, the cities make a number of other arguments
that seemingly attack the permissibility of any con-
struction of the statute that would allow the FCC to
exercise the power that it did in this case. First, the
cities claim § 332(c)(7)’s legislative history supports
their proposed reading of § 332(c)(7) and not the
FCC’s. Second, they suggest that a construction of §
332(c)(7) that would grant the FCC authority to im-
plement § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations on state and lo-
cal government would conflict with the principle that
111 See, e.g., Tex. Clinical Labs, Inc. v. Sebelius, 612 F.3d 771,
775 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
46a
“if Congress intends to preempt a power tradition-
ally exercised by a state or local government, it must
make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.”!!2 Finally, they suggest the
FCC itself had long recognized that it lacked juris-
diction with respect to § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations.
These arguments are not persuasive.
Regarding the legislative history surrounding
the passage of § 332(c)(7), the cities note Congress
considered but ultimately did not enact a version of
the statute that directed the FCC to “prescribe and
make effective a policy regarding State and local
regulation of the placement, construction, modifica-
tion, or operation of facilities for the provision of
commercial mobile services.”!!3 The cities also point
to the Conference Report from the passage of the
TCA, which provides in pertinent part:
The conference agreement creates a new sec-
tion 704 which prevents Commission preemp-
tion of local and State land use decisions and
preserves the authority of State and local gov-
ernments over zoning and land use matters
except in the limited circumstances set forth
in the conference agreement. The conference
agreement also provides a mechanism for ju-
dicial relief from zoning decisions that fail to
comply with the provisions of this section. It is
112 City of Dallas, Tex. v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 347-48 (5th Cir.
1999) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991))
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
113 H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. 1, at 25 (1995).
47a
the intent of the conferees that other than un-
der section 332(c)(7)(B)Gv) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 as amended by this Act and
section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 the courts shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over all other disputes arising under this
section. Any pending Commission rulemaking
concerning the preemption of local zoning au-
thority over the placement, construction or
modification of CMS facilities should be ter-
minated.!14
The cities argue the FCC’s construction of § 332(c)(7)
contravenes this legislative history. The implication,
then, is that this legislative history clarifies any am-
biguity in § 332(c)(7)’s plain text and indicates Con-
gress’s intent to remove from the FCC the authority
to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v).
This argument fails, however, because the leg-
islative history itself is ambiguous. Although the leg-
islative history surrounding the passage of §
332(c)(7) indicates Congress intended the provision
to remove from the FCC the authority to make new
rules limiting or affecting state and local govern-
ment authority over wireless zoning decisions, the
legislative history, like the statute itself, is silent as
to the FCC’s ability te use its general rulemaking
power to provide guidance with respect to the limita-
tions § 332(c)(7)(B) expressly imposes on state and
local governments. In other words, the legislative
history does no more than indicate Congress’s intent
114 H_R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 207-08 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
48a
to bar the FCC from imposing additional limitations
on state and local government authority. It does not
indicate a clear intent to bar FCC implementation of
the limitations already expressly provided for in the
statute. Under these circumstances, we cannot con-
clude that the legislative history “is so clear and
compelling . . . that it leaves no doubt as to Con-
gress’s intent.”!15
The cities also suggest that interpreting §
332(c)(7) in a way that would allow the FCC to im-
plement § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v) conflicts with the
principle that “if Congress intends to preempt a
power traditionally exercised by a state or local gov-
ernment, it must make its intention to do so unmis-
takably clear in the language of the statute.”!!6 The
cities assert that the FCC’s new 90- and 150-day
time frames displace state laws establishing differ-
ent time frames.
The cities’ argument is unconvincing because
those state laws are already preempted, at least to
the extent that the state time limits violate §
332(c)(7)(B)G)’s requirement that state and local au-
thorities rule on zoning requests in a reasonable
amount of time. That section already acts to preempt
these state laws by creating a federal time frame de-
fined through reference to reasonableness. No one
118 Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 396 (Sth Cir.
2008).
116 City of Dallas, Tex., 165 F.3d at 347-48 (quoting Gregory,
501 U.S. at 460) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
49a
could plausibly argue, for example, that if a state
passed a law stating that local governments had ten
years to rule on such applications, § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi)
would not have the effect of preempting that law in-
sofar as an aggrieved party would likely be able to
petition a court for relief under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) well
before the expiration of the state’s time frame. FCC
action interpreting what amount of time is “reason-
able” under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) only further refines the
extent of the preemption that Congress has already
explicitly provided. We thus see no conflict between
the FCC’s ability to interpret § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limita-
tions on state and local government authority and
the principle that Congress must unmistakably indi-
cate its intent to preempt a power traditionally exer-
cised by state or local governments because Congress
has indicated a preference for federal preemption of
state and local laws governing the time frames for
wireless zoning decisions.!!7
Finally, the cities argue that “[uJntil its dra-
matic shift in the [Declaratory Ruling], the FCC had
long recognized the statutory limits on its jurisdic-
tion under Section 332(c)(7).” The cities claim the
FCC’s exercise of authority to interpret §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v) conflicts with the FCC’s own
longstanding interpretation of its jurisdiction. The
cities note that the Supreme Court, in New Process
111 Cf. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 379 n.6
(1999) (“This is, at bottom, a debate not about whether the
States will be allowed to do their own thing, but about whether
it will be the FCC or the federal courts that draw the lines to
which they must hew.”).
50a
Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,™8 made the following observa-
tion when interpreting the statute establishing the
NLRB’s quorum requirements: “That our interpreta-
tion of the delegation provision is consistent with the
Board’s longstanding practice is persuasive evidence
that it is the correct one, notwithstanding the
Board’s more recent view.”!19
We are not persuaded by this argument in
this case, however, because the FCC interpretations
to which the cities direct us do not adopt the position
that the FCC lacks authority to implement §
332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations. For example, in Jn re Fa-
cilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services
to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Ru-
ral Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-
Based Services, the FCC did observe that “Section
332(c)(7) generally preserves local authority over
land use decisions, and limits the Commission’s au-
thority in this area,”!2° but a review of that order
makes clear that the limitation to which the FCC
was referring was § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s grant of exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the courts over most disputes
arising under § 332(c)(7)(B).121 The FCC’s order in In
re Cingular Wireless L.L.C./22 and a letter from the
chief of the FCC’s Wireless Telecommunications Bu-
118 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
119 Jd. at 2641-42.
120 19 FCC Red. 24084 4 123 (2004).
121 Td. at n.368.
122 18 FCC Red. 13126 4 21 (2003).
5la
reau!23 gimilarly contained observations on the lim-
its of the FCC’s authority to consider petitions chal-
lenging specific state or local government action. As
already discussed, that § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) vests exclu-
sive jurisdiction in the courts to consider | specific
disputes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B) does not limit
the FCC’s ability to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)’s limi-
tations. Thus, the FCC’s acknowledgment of this
limitation hardly suggests that the FCC also recog-
nized a limit on its authority under § 201(b).
D
For the above reasons, we conclude the FCC is
entitled to deference with respect to its exercise of
authority to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi and (v). The
language of § 332(c)(7) is silent with respect to the
FCC’s power to exercise this authority, and none of
the cities’ arguments convince us that the FCC’s in-
terpretation of its statutory authority is impermissi-
ble. The FCC thus did not lack statutory authority to
establish the 90- and 150-day time frames.
VI
We now consider whether the 90- and 150-day
time frames themselves also pass muster under
Chevron. The time frames represent the FCC’s at-
tempt to implement § 332(c)(7)(B)G) and (v). Section
332(c)(7)(B)Gi) requires state and local governments
to “act on any request for authorization to place, con-
struct, or modify personal wireless service facilities
123 Letter from Michele C. Farquhar to Mr. Thomas E. Wheeler
(Jan. 13, 1997), 1997 WL 14744.
52a
within a reasonable period of time after the request
is duly filed with such government or instrumental-
ity, taking into account the nature and scope of such
request.” Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v) provides that any
person adversely affected by a state or local govern-
ment’s “failure to act” may “within 30 days after
such .. . failure to act, commence an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction.” In the Declaratory
Ruling, the FCC defined “a reasonable period of
time” for purposes of § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) as, presump-
tively, “90 days to process personal wireless service
facility siting applications requesting coliocations,
and... 150 days to process all other applications.”}4
The FCC also concluded that a lack of decision
within these time frames would constitute a failure
to act that would be actionable under §
332(c)(7)(B)(v). 125
A
As usual, we begin with the statutory text.
The FCC claims that § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and §
332(c)(7)(B)(v) are ambiguous and subject to FCC in-
terpretation. We agree. Specifically, we note that the
phrase “a reasonable period of time,” as it is used in
§ 332(c)(7)(B)Gi), is inherently ambiguous.!26 More-
124 24 FCC Red. 13994 4 32 (2009).
125 Td.
126 See Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 777 (6th
Cir. 2008) (observing that descriptors such as “reasonable” and
“unreasonable” are subject to multiple constructions); Orloff v.
FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he generality of
these terms—unjust, unreasonable—opens a rather large area
for the free play of agency discretion.” (internal quotation
53a
over, because the phrase “a reasonable period of
time” serves as a standard for determining when a
“failure to act” has occurred under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v),
the ambiguity in the phrase leaves room for agency
guidance on the amount of time state and local gov-
ernments have to act on wireless facility zoning ap-
plications before their delay constitutes a failure to
act under the statute that would trigger §
332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s 30-day limitations period on filing
an action in court. We thus owe substantial defer-
ence to the FCC’s interpretation of these terms, and
we will disturb the FCC’s interpretation only if it
represents an impermissible construction of §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v).127
B
The cities raise a number of arguments rele-
vant to the reasonableness of the FCC’s establish-
ment of the 90- and 150-day time frames. They claim
the FCC’s time frames represent unreasonable in-
marks omitted)); Capital Network Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 28 F.3d
201, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Because ‘just,’ ‘unjust,’ ‘reasonable,’
and ‘unreasonable’ are ambiguous statutory terms, this court
owes substantial deference to the interpretation the
Commission accords them.”).
127 See, e.g., Tex. Clinical Labs, Inc. v. Sebelius, 612 F.3d 771,
775 (5th Cir. 2010); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,
457-58 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“If we find the statute silent or
ambiguous with respect to the precise question at issue, we
proceed to the second step of Chevron analysis, asking whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. At this stage of Chevron analysis, we afford
substantial deference to the agency’s interpretation of statutory
language.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
54a
terpretations of the statute because they: (1) shift
the burden to state and local governments to demon-
strate in court that a delay in acting on a wireless
facility zoning application was reasonable, thus re-
versing the presumption against preemption; (2)
seek to force state or local government action by cre-
ating a heightened threat of litigation; (3) impose
new application completeness requirements: (4) cre-
ate a national standard for what constitutes a “rea-
sonable period of time”; and (5) contravene Congres-
sional intent by giving preferential treatment to the
wireless industry in the processing of zoning applica-
tions. After considering these arguments, however,
we conclude that the FCC’s 90- and 150-day time
frames are based on a permissible construction of §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi) and (v) and are thus entitled to Chev-
ron deference.
1
First, the cities observe that courts addressing
actions brought pursuant to § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) have
placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that a
state or local government has failed to comply with
one of § 332(c)(7)(B)’s requirements.128 They claim
the FCC’s time frames reverse this burden by creat-
ing a presumption that a state or local government
that fails to act on a zoning application within the
applicable 90- or 150-day time frame has “failed to
128 See, e.g., U.S. Cellular Corp. v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex.,
364 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The plaintiff carries the
burden of proving that no substantial evidence supports the
local government’s decision [in an action challenging the
decision under § 332(c)(7)(B)Gii)).”).
55a
act” under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The result, they argue,
is that “the ‘presumption against preemption’ is re-
placed with a presumption for preemption” because
the burden of proof rests on state and local govern-
ments to prove the reasonableness of their delay in
cases in which they have failed to act within the
time frames.
We disagree with this characterization of the
effect of the FCC’s presumption because it misstates
the typical effect of a presumption in a civil proceed-
ing. Federal Rule of Evidence 301, for example, de-
scribes the effect of presumptions in civil proceed-
ings in federal court. It provides:
In a civil case, unless a federal statute or
these rules provide otherwise, the party
against whom a presumption is directed has
the burden of producing evidence to rebut the
presumption. But this rule does not shift the
burden of persuasion, which remains on the
party who had it originally.}29
We have held that Rule 301 adopts a “bursting-
bubble” theory of presumption, under which “the
only effect of a presumption is to shift the burden of
producing evidence with regard to the presumed
fact.”1% “If the party against whom the presumption
operates produces evidence challenging the pre-
sumed fact, the presumption simply disappears from
the case.”131 In other words, once a party introduces
129 FED. R. EVID. 301.
130 Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 789 F.2d 1128, 1136 (5th Cir. 1986).
131 Jd. at 1136-37.
56a
rebuttal evidence sufficient to support a finding con-
trary to the presumed fact, the presumption evapo-
rates, and the evidence rebutting the presumption,
and its inferences, must be “judged against the com-
peting evidence and its inferences to determine the
ultimate question at issue.”!52 The burden of persua-
sion with respect to the ultimate question at issue
remains with the party on whom it originally
rested. !33
We see no reason why this general theory of
presumptions does not also apply to the presumption
created by the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling. In an ac-
tion seeking to enforce § 332(c)(7)(B)(Gii) against a
state or local government, the ultimate burden of
persuasion remains with the wireless facilities pro-
vider to demonstrate that the government unrea-
sonably delayed action on an application. True, the
132 McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 288
(3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133 See FED. R. EVID. 301 (moting “the burden of
persuasion ... remains on the party who had it origi-
nally”); cf St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 50P U.S.
502, 507 (1993) (“It is important to note, however,
that although the McDonnell Douglas presumption
shifts the burden of production to the defendant, the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.
In this regard it operates like all presumptions, as
described in Federal Rule of Evidence 301.” (internal
quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
57a
wireless provider would likely be entitled to relief if
it showed a state or local government’s failure to
comply with the time frames and the state or local
government failed to introduce evidence demonstrat-
ing that its delay was reasonable despite its failure
to comply. But, if the state or local government in-
troduced evidence demonstrating that its delay was
reasonable, a court would need to weigh that evi-
dence against the length of the government’s delay—
as well as any other evidence of unreasonable delay
that the wireless provider might submit—and de-
termine whether the state or local government’s ac-
tions were unreasonable under the circumstances.
2
The cities also argue that the 90- and 150-day
time frames represent unreasonable interpretations
of the statute because the time frames subject state
and local governments to a heightened risk of litiga-
tion by wireless service providers. The cities suggest
that this heightened risk “affects” state or local gov-
ernments and thus violates § 332(c)(7)(A). This ar-
gument is not convincing, however, because, al-
though the FCC’s time frames do provide some
amount of certitude as to when a state or local gov-
ernment has unreasonably failed to act under §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi), the time frames do not create any
new risk of litigation independent from the risk state
or local governments have always faced as a result of
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s vesting of jurisdiction in the courts
to hear disputes arising under § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). As
we have already discussed, § 332(c)(7)(A) does not
58a
apply to § 332(c)(7)(B)’s restrictions on state and lo-
cal governments.
3
The cities also take issue with the FCC’s de-
termination that the 90- and 150-day time frames do
not start to run with respect to an application if the
application is incomplete and the state or local gov-
ernment alerts the applicant to the application’s in-
completeness within 30 days of its submission. The
effect of this determination, they argue, is the impo-
sition of a new “completeness requirement” that has
no basis in § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
We disagree. The FCC’s decision to toll the
time frames when a state or local government con-
fronts an incomplete application accounts for the fact
that the completeness of an application affects the
ability of a decisionmaker to act on that application.
The FCC recognized that in such cases, a state or lo-
cal government could not be presumed to have acted
unreasonably simply because the government failed
to act on an application within the time frames. The
FCC also recognized, however, that a state or local
government that confronted an incomplete applica-
tion, but delayed alerting the applicant to the defi-
ciencies in the application, should be presumed to
have acted unreasonably if the government ulti-
mately did not act on the application within the time
frames. Thus, the FCC allowed for tolling of the 90-
and 150-day time frames in cases of incompleteness,
but also imposed a separate time frame for state and
local governments to notify applicants of incom-
pleteness in order to prevent state and local govern-
59a
ments from manipulating the process. This does not
strike us as an unreasonable application of §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi).134
To the extent the cities argue that state and
local governments often will not become aware of a
need for more information with respect to an appli-
cation until after the FCC’s 30-day tolling period has
expired, we again emphasize the limited effect of the
FCC’s 90- and 150-day time frames. The time frames
represent the FCC’s interpretation of what would
generally constitute an unreasonable delay under §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi), but a court will ultimately decide
whether state or local government action is unrea-
sonable in a particular case. Accordingly, if a state
or local government fails to meet the applicable time
frame because deficiencies in an application become
apparent more than 30 days after the application
was filed, the government would remain free to ar-
gue that it acted reasonably under the circum-
stances.
4
Fourth, the cities contend the 90- and 150-day
time frames are not reasonable interpretations of §
332(c)(7)(B)Gi) because the time frames apply na-
tionwide and thus cannot be squared with §
134 Cf Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 780 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“Courts are ‘generally unwilling to review line-
drawing performed by the Commission unless a petitioner can
demonstrate that lines drawn ... are patently unreasonable,
having no relationship to the underlying regulatory problem.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Covad Comm. Co. v. FCC, 450
F.3d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2006))).
60a
332(c)(7)(B)G’s command that what constitutes a
“reasonable period of time” should be determined by
taking into account “the nature and scope of such re-
quest.” This is an individualized determination, the
argument goes, and a national standard is incom-
patible with such a scheme. We cannot agree with
the cities on this point, however, because, as we have
already made clear, the 90- and 150-day time frames
do not eliminate the individualized nature of an in-
quiry into the reasonableness of a state or local gov-
ernment’s delay. The time frames do provide the
FCC’s guidance on what periods of time will gener-
ally be “reasonable” under the statute, of course, and
they might prove dispositive in the rare case in
which a state or local government submits no evi-
dence supporting the reasonableness of its actions.
But in a contested case, courts must still determine
whether the state or local government acted rea-
sonably under the circumstances surrounding the
application at issue.
5
Finally, the cities claim the FCC’s time frames
are unreasonable interpretations of § 332(c)(7)(B)
because they will require state and local govern-
ments to give wireless service providers preferential
treatment in the form of prioritized review of wire-
less zoning applications. They claim this result
clearly conflicts with Congress’s intent, and for sup-
port, point to the following passage from the Confer-
ence Report: “It is not the intent of this provision to
give preferential treatment to the personal wireless
service industry in the processing of requests, or to
6la
subject their requests to any but the generally appli-
cable time frames for zoning decision[s].”135 How-
ever, nothing in the FCC’s time frames necessarily
requires state and local governments to provide
greater preference to wireless zoning applications
than is already required by § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi itself.
The statute provides a clear directive that state and
local governments must rule on wireless zoning ap-
plications in a “reasonable amount of time,” and that
directive inherently preferences the personal wire-
less service industry because other types of state and
local zoning decisions are not subject to such a stan-
dard.!36 Moreover, as already noted, a state or local
government that fails to act on an application within
the FCC’s time frames remains free to argue that it
acted diligently with respect to the application, and
such an argument might include reference to the in-
ability of the government to address the wireless
zoning application within the time frames without
neglecting its other business.1!37
138 H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 208 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
136 Cf Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 396 (5th
Cir. 2008) (observing that appeals to statutory purpose only
overcome an agency’s interpretation of a statute’s text
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