Opposition Brief — Baker v. Federal Aviation Administration

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In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

JOHN H. BAKER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

STUART M. GERSON

Assistant Attorney General

LEONARD SCHAITMAN

ROBERT M. LOEB

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 514-2217

BEST AVAILABLE COPY”

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals properly rejected petitioners’

challenge to the Federal Aviation Adminisiration’s denial

of their request for an exemption from an FAA regulation

(14 C.F.R. 121.383) prohibiting persons over the age of sixty

from piloting large commercial airliners.

(I)

eters a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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A SERIE er 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int'l vy. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892

(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962

ee tee bn 5 6 5 4 as a a 0.8 2° whe eaee 6, 7

Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 758 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.

i sn ww bee Fan 1]

Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988) ...2, 3, 6,

7, 8, 10

Grav v. FAA, $94 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979) ... 8

Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1979) .. 8

O’Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (9th Cir.

a ag et Ml ile a 7

Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.

ee kee ea eka 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978) .... 6,7,

8, 9, 10

Statutes and regulations:

Federal Aviation Administration of 1958, 49 U.S.C.

NS. ore CE a

TET NT yeu eseu evens 9

ccc be ereen es 2,7,9

a ce ks kk oe ek oe ene 2

me are, pees eee (1962) ............... 7

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IV

Regulations — Continued: Page

14 C.F.R.:

Pt. ii:

RE ig irs Pena Sage eas 4

Pt. 121:

REM tt he owt eee 6

Ba errs 2

Sections 121-385-121.389 ............. 6

Miscellaneous:

24 Fed. Reg. (1959):

i a aa Sot Sake 4 ado 48 ae Rok 2

8 ere nee eee eres eee 6

oe eM ere 2

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 90-1049

JOHN H. BAKER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-

cuit is reported at 917 F.2d 318. Pet App. la-19a. The order

of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administra-

tion (FAA) is unreported. Pet. App. 2la-83a.

JURISDICTION

The order of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-

cuit affirming the FAA’s decision was entered on October

31, 1990. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

January 2, 1991. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. In 1959, pursuant to its statutory authority to pro-

mote safety in air commerce, the Federal Aviation Ad-—

ministration (FAA) promulgated a regulation (now codified

at 14 C.F.R. 121.383(c)) prohibiting individuals over the

age of sixty from piloting commercial airline jets seating

more than thirty passengers. The FAA explained that the

“age sixty” rule is based upon: 1) studies indicating that sud-

den incapacity and other risks due to medical impairments

become significantly more frequent when a person reaches

the age sixty; and 2) the fact that the possibility of such in-

capacity and other problems occurring cannot be accurate-

ly predicted as to any specific individual. See Pet. App.

28a-29a; 24 Fed. Reg. 9767 (1959). See also 49 Fed. Reg.

14,695 (1984).

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that the FAA

“may grant” exemptions to its general rules if it “finds that

such action would be in the public interest.” 49 U.S.C.

1421(c). Although over the years a number of individuals

have sought exemptions from the “age sixty” rule, none has

ever been granted. See Pet. App. 2a.

2. In 1986, petitioners filed for exemptions from the

FAA’s age sixty rule. Specifically, petitioners argued that

a battery of tests devised by an expert panel (assembled by

petitioners) could be used as a basic protocol for assessing

the fitness of pilots over the age of sixty. See Aman v. FAA,

856 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1988). Petitioners claimed that:

1) pilots over sixty who passed the battery of tests were no

more likely to cause an accident due to sudden incapacita-

tion or undetected deterioration than a pilot under age sixty;

and 2) older pilots who passed the tests were actually safer

than their younger counterparts when their respective ex-

perience was taken into account. /d. at 952. See also Pet.

App. 2a. The FAA denied the petition for exemption and

petitioners sought review (under 49 U.S.C. 1486(a)).

3

3. The Seventh Circuit upheld the FAA’s ruling in part.

The court held that the FAA “adduced substantial evidence

supporting its rejection of the contention that the petitioners’

protocol, combined with existing methods of operational

testing, would screen out all increased risks of incapacita-

tion or undetected skill deterioration among pilots older than

60.” Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d at 957; see also id. at 954.

The court, however, held that “the FAA failed to set forth

a sufficient factual or legal basis for its rejection of the peti-

tioners’ claim that older pilots’ edge in experience offsets

any undetected physical losses.” id. at 957. The court

remanded the case to the agency to provide findings and

explanations with regard to that claim. /bid.; see also Pet.

App. 2a. Further, the court ordered the FAA to explain why

the agency had a inore flexible exemption policy for pilots

under the age of sixty with heart disease or alcoholism prob-

lems. 856 F.2d at 957; Pet. App. 7a.

4. To implement the Seventh Circuit’s directive, the

FAA opened a 30-day comment period to receive comments

on the issue of “age versus experience.” Pet. App. 24a. Ap-

proximately 178 comments were received. In addition, peti-

tioners filed three additional supplements to explain why

they should be granted exemptions. /bid.

After reviewing the comments and the additional infor-

mation provided by the petitioners, the Administrator issued

an order denying the exemptions and explaining the reasons

for the denials. Pet. App. 21a-83a. The order analyzed the

comments and additional evidence, and concluded that there

was not sufficient proof that the experience of a pilot off-

sets the “danger of deterioration” associated with the aging

process. /d. at 8a, 24a-66a. The Administrator found the

comments and studies relied upon by petitioners to be faulty

and inconclusive. See, e.g., id. at 40a-46a, 50a-58a, 66a.

The Administrator also concluded that the anecdotal

evidence submitted by petitioners (regarding heroic acts per-

4

formed by pilots approaching or over the age of sixty) did

not evidence a pattern from which any valid assumptions

could be made, and did not demonstrate that experience

offsets the dangers associated with sudden incapacitation

and undetected deterioration. /d. at 46a-S0a.

Further, the Administrator explained that the agency’s

policy regarding exemptions to the age sixty rule was not

inconsistent with the agency’s approach to special issuances

for pilots under the age of sixty with an identifiabie medical

condition:

For the person with known disease, the prognosis of

the disease can be assessed and specific tests or evalua-

tions identified to monitor the condition.* * * Where

[a special issuance] is granted, the condition in ques-

tion has been clearly identified, and the agency has been

able to develop a means of assessment and surveillance

- specifically designed to demonstrate the individual’s

capabilities and to identify any adverse changes. * * *

Such is not the case in aging, since there are no gencrally

applicable medical tests that can, at this time, adequate-

ly determine which individual pilots are subject to in-

capacitation * * *,

Pet. App. 68a-69a.

Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. 11.25, the FAA held that the peti-

tioners failed to provide reasons why the granting of such

exemptions would not adversely affect safety or would

otherwise provide a level of safety equal to that provided

by strict adherence to the age sixty rule. Pet. App. 69a.

5. Petitioners again sought review of the FAA’s order

in the Seventh Circuit. The court of appeals affirmed the

FAA’s order. The court agreed with the Administrator that

petitioners’ studies and analysis did not present “a persuasive

statistical record.” Pet. App. 4a. The court held that peti-

tioners’ anecdotal evidence was not especially relevant given

the fact that none of the pilots before the court were ones

who performed the “aeronautical miracles.” /d. at 3a-4a.

The court recognized it was petitioners’ burden to show that

they deserved an exemption, and concluded that petitioners

failed to carry their burden of establishing that the Ad-

ministrator acted improperly in concluding that the public

interest in safety wou'd not be served by granting the ex-

emptions sought. /d. at 3a, 8a-9a. The court stated, “we

cannot justify a conclusion that, on average, experience suf-

ficiently offsets possible age-related impairment of health

or skills to clearly guarantee a net constancy or increase in

safety.” Jd. at 2a.

Further, the court rejected petitioners’ challenge to the

agency’s rationale for issuing exemptions to younger pilots

with specific medical problems that can be safely monitored,

while not issuing exemptions to pilots over sixty. The court

found that petitioners had not demonstrated that the agen-

cy’s distinction was invalid “either theoretically or practical-

ly.” Pet. App. 7a.!

ARGUMENT

The FAA’s “age sixty” rule, prohibiting persons over the

age of sixty from piloting large commercial passenger jets,

has been upheld by every court that has addressed its validi-

ty. Moreover, every court that has examined the FAA’s strict

approach to exemptions from the age sixty rule has upheld

the agency’s exemption policy, as well as the specific ex-

emption denials. Here, the court of appeals correctly upheld

' Judge Will dissented. Pet. App. 9a-19a. The dissent argued that

the FAA must further justify its finding that pilots over sixty “are

significantly more prone to medical catastrophe than other pilots.” /d.

at I4a. Further, the dissent argued that the FAA policy of refusing to

grant any exemptions to the age sixty rule was not warranted by the

evidence or by common sense. /d. at 17a.

6

the FAA’s decision in ruling that petitioners had failed to

demonstrate adequately that granting them exemptions from

the age sixty rule would benefit public safety. The present

case was correctly decided and does not conflict with the

decision of any other court of appeals, or of this Court.

Accordingly, further review by this Court is not warranted.

1. The FAA adopted the “age sixty” rule in 1959 based

upon concerns about the danger posed to the public when

a pilot of a large commercial jet is suddenly physically in-

capacitated. After extensive study, the Administrator found

that “sudden incapacitation due to heart attacks or strokes

become more frequent as men approach age sixty and pre-

sent medical knowledge is such that it is impossible to predict

with accuracy those individuals most likely to suffer at-

tacks.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int'l vy. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892,

898 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).

Because of the high risks at stake (which are elevated by

the fact that older pilots with established seniority tend to

fly the largest and fastest airplanes), the Administrator

barred any person from piloting large commercial jets after

reaching his sixtieth birthday. [bid.; 24 Fed. Reg. 9767-9768

(1959). See, also Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893, 897-898

(2d Cir. 1979).?

Since adoption of the age sixty rule, numerous parties

have challenged the reasonableness of the rule and its fac-

tual predicate. However, every court to address the issue

has upheld the FAA’s regulation. See, e.g., Starrv. FAA,

2 The age sixty rule does not, however, require the pilot to retire.

He may still continue to pilot private and commercial jets outside of

the coverage of 14 C.F.R. Pt. 121 (see 14 C.F.R. 121.1), and can, if

certified, continue to work in the cockpit of large commercial crafts

covered by Part 121 in a position other than pilot (e.g., flight engineer

or navigator). See Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d at 948; 14 C.F.R.

121.385-121.389.

5

589 F.2d 307, 312-314 (7th Cir. 1978); O’Donnell v. Shaffer,

491 F.2d 59, 61-62 (9th Cir. 1974); Air Line Pilots Ass’n

Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898. The courts have recog-

nized that although there may be difference of opinion and

conflicting evidence, Congress has granted the FAA the

Statutory responsibility for air passenger safety and that the

agency’s rule is adequately supported and well within the

agency’s authority. See Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d at

899-900; Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 312-313; Air Line Pilots

Ass’n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898.

Despite the unanimous judicial acceptance of the age sixty

rule, the FAA has recognized that the rule is not indelible.

The agency has continued to research and examine whether

new advances in medical science can identify individual

pilots over the age of sixty who do not pose a risk to public

safety. See Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 312 (the FAA has

“not shirked its duty” to examine new advances).* The courts

have recognized the FAA’s continuing efforts and have held

that the FAA may continue to adhere to the age sixty rule

“as long as it continues to consider new advances in medical

technology.” Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 314.

2. Petitioners here, like others before them, have sought

to circumvent the FAA’s age sixty rule by seeking exemp-

tions from the rule under 49 U.S.C. 1421(c), which states

the FAA “may grant” exemptions to its general rules if it

“finds that such action would be in the public interest.” Peti-

tioners’ arguments do not seek merely to justify individual

exemptions, but rather are frontal attacks on the

reasonableness of adhering to the age sixty rule. See Pet.

18-19; Aman, 856 F.2d at 949 n.2. The FAA’s response to

> For example, the FAA reviewed both a Navy study of the health

histories of 1,000 pilots, and a study by the National Institutes of Health

(see 49 U.S.C. 1421 note (1982)), and determined to retain the age sixty

rule See Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d at 948.

petitioners and others seeking exemptions has been that it

will not grant the exemption unless the agency determines

that there is a medically reliable method of determining the

risk of sudden incapacitation and other pertinent risks. See

Pet. App. 67a-69a.

Up until the present date, the FAA has not been satisfied

that the medical tests or other procedures suggested by in-

terested parties, or independently investigated by the agen-

cy, can adequately assess the risks of sudden impairment.

And without such a determination, the agency has “simply

chosen what it considers the safer” approach —/.e., to con-

tinue to adhere to the age sixty rule. See Starr v. FAA, 589

F.2d at 312. See also Pet. App. 67a-69a; Aman v. FAA,

856 F.2d at 954; Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611, 613 (9th

Cir. 1979).

In light of these factors, it is hardly surprising that every

court to rule on the reasonableness of the FAA’s exercise

of its administrative discretion in this context has upheld

the policy, as well as the individual exemption denials. See,

e.g., Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d at 613 (“the medical tests

proposed by Keating are not sufficiently reliable to compel

his employment in a position of great stress and respon-

sibility where sudden incapacitation could jeopardize many

lives”); Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d at 899 (the

“psychological and physiological changes due to age can-

not be tested with sufficient reliability to justify the safety

risks involved”); Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793, 795 (10th Cir.

1979) (“At some point, the state of the medical art may

become so compellingly supportive of a capacity to deter-

mine functional age equivalents in individual cases that it

would be an abuse of discretion not to grant an exemption.

It is apparent to us, however, that present medical opinion

is far from unanimous on the question.”); Starr v. FAA,

589 F.2d at 314 (“The FAA has the discretionary power to

establish a policy that there will be no exemptions granted

9

until it is satisfied that medical standards can demonstrate

an absence of risk factors in an individual sufficient to war-

rant a more liberal application of the Age 60 Rule.”).

3. Petitioners contend that the agency’s refusal to issue

any exemption to the age sixty rule conflicts with the Act’s

exemption provision. See Pet. 9-12. However, 49 U.S.C.

1421(c) only empowers the Administrator to grant exemp-

tions. It states that the FAA “may grant” exemptions to its

general rules if it “finds that such action would be in the

public interest.” There is no statutory entitlement to an ex-

emption and no statutory mandate to issue one. See S/arr

v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 312 (the statutory language “does not

mean that the administrator must grant exemptions from

the challenged regulation”). Moreover, whether to issue an

excepuion clearly involves an exercise of policy-making and

discretion by the agency vested by Congress to ensure the

public safety. See 29 U.S.C. 1421(b).

Petitioners cite the Seventh Circuit’s Starr decision as

authority that the agency must issue some exemptions. Sec

Pet. 9. However, that opinion expressly holds that it can

be reasonable for the FAA to refuse to grant exemptions

to some rules. See Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 311-312. Fur-

ther, the court explained the virtue of adopting a no-

exemption policy in certain circumstances. Jd. at 312. In-

deed, the Sarr court held that the issue was whether the

FAA’s no-exemption policy to the age sixty rule was an

abuse of discretion, and the court correctly concluded that

it was not. /d. at 312-314.

4. Petitioners further assert that the FAA’s refusal to

grant exemptions is impermissible in light of the medical

evidence, studies and anecdotal evidence they have sub-

mitted. Pet. 18-22. However. as explained above, the courts

have uniformly upheld the FAA’s policy of denying exemp-

tions until it determines that medical science can adequate-

ly assess the age related risks on an individual pilot basis.

10

See pp. 6-7, supra. In petitioners’ initial challenge, the

Seventh Circuit similarly upheld the agency’s general poiicy

and, more specifically, held that petitioners’ medical pro-

tocol did not sufficiently eliminate the risks associated with

sudden incapacitation and undetected deterioration, and

thus did not show the FAA’s continued adherence to its

policy to be unreasonable. See Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d at

953-954. See also Pet. App. 2a.

Petitioners are in reality asking this Court to second guess

the agency’s evaluation of the medical evidence. That is en-

tirely contrary to the ordinary rules of deference, but is

especially inappropriate here, where the issues pertain to

scientific, medical and safety related issues, and where the

degree of proof required to merit an exemption is itself in-

herently a policy decision. See Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d

at 899-900; Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 314.

The focus of the remand in this case was to address

whether pilot experience offsets the health related risks. The

FAA considered the numerous comments and evidence sub-

mitted, but was not convinced that experience compensated

for the risks associated with sudden incapacitation and

undetected deterioration. See Pet. App. 66a. Indeed, the

agency found that when the youngest pilots were excluded

from the analysis, and experienced “young” pilots were com-

pared with experienced older pilots, the data demonstrated

that the older pilots were more prone to accidents. See id.

at 66a-67a.

[In addition, petitioners submitted anecdotal evidence

regarding the heroic deeds performed by experienced pilots

near or over the age of sixty. See Pet. App. 46a-50a. The

FAA properly concluded that several isolated acts do not

create a pattern from which any general conclusions or

assumptions could be drawn. /d. at 47a. The agency agreed

that experience can be helpful in emergencies, but concluded

that petitioners’ anecdotal reports and other evidence simply

did not demonstrate that experience offsets the danger of

11

sudden incapacitation and other decrements which the FAA

concluded are greater once a pilot reaches the age of sixty.

Id. at 47a, 67a.

The court of appeals correctly upheld the FAA’s decision

that the evidence did not demonstrate the invalidity of the

FAA’s determination that experience does not offset the

health risks associated with age. See Pet. App. 7a-9a. Even

the dissenter in the court of appeals recognized that it is

highly unlikely that the incremental value of experience

could offset the problems associated with “sudden in-

capacitation.” Jd. at 14a. Accordingly, the decision below

was correct and no further review is warranted.

5. Petitioners also contend that the decision below is

in conflict with Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 758 F.2d 685 (D.C.

Cir. 1985). Pet. 14-15. Airmark simply holds that the FAA

must apply consistent criteria in granting or denying peti-

tions for exemptions in like cases. 758 F.2d. at 691-692.

However, the FAA is applying consistent criteria to exemp-

tions from the age sixty rule: there will be no exemption

uniess and until the FAA determines that medical science

can assess the individual pilots’ risks of sudden incapacita-

tion and other pertinent risks. Petitioners’ claim of a con-

flict is thus incorrect.?

With regard to exemptions, petitioners .also assert that

the agency’s willingness to grant special issuances to some

airline pilots under the age of sixty with known medical

conditions is at odds with the agency’s failure to grant ex-

emptions to pilots over the age of sixty, and that this in-

consistency conflicts with Airmark. Pet. 16-17. This con-

tention is incorrect.

Petitioners’ premise that pilots with known medical con-

ditions are indistinguishable from pilots over 60 is un-

4 For the same reason, petitioners’ reliance on decisions in accord

with Airmark (see Pet. 14-15 & n.3) is also misplaced.

founded. Pilots can only obtain a special issuance of medical

certificate if the agency has determined that a known

medical disease or deficiency can be clearly identified and

monitored, and then only if the agency has approved ade-

quate means for assessment and surveillance of the condi-

tion for any adverse change. Pet. App. 68a. On the other

hand, after examining and reexamining the medical evidence

available, the Administrator has determined that medical

technology does not yet allow reliable predictions regarding

the physical consequences of the aging process (including

the risk of sudden incapacitation) as to one particular in-

dividual pilot. /d. at 69a. Thus, there is clear distinction

between these two contexts.

In any event, the Seventh Circuit is the only court that

has directly addressed the issue of whether the FAA’s denials

of petitions for exemptions to the age sixty rule is inconsis-

tent with the grant of exceptions of medical applications.

In Starr v. FAA, the court held that the FAA’s granting

of exemption to younger pilots suffering from specific

medical problems did not make the failure to issue exemp-

tion to those over sixty unreasonable. The court explained:

The rationale for exemptions is to allow an ad-

ministrator flexibility. Ruling that a liberal exemption

policy for one set of circumstances requires such a

policy in other circumstances deemed by the agency to

be less suitable to safe exemption processes would result

in an all-or-nothing policy of exemptions, with the

possible effect of denying exemptions in all cases, and

limiting the administrator’s ability to provide optimum

air safety in the public interest.

589 F.2d at 313.

In the case at bar, the Seventh Circuit has again upheld

the FAA’s distinction (Pet. App. 7a), and petitioners’ claim

does not warrant review.

EEO

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

STUART M. GERSON

Assistant Attorney General

LEONARD SCHAITMAN

ROBERT M. LOEB

Attorneys

MARCH 199]

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1991-282 061

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