Opposition Brief — Nevada v. Watkins
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cas Supreme Court, U.>
FILE b
FEB 12 199
OFFICE OF THE Cic.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
DISTRIBUTED
FEB Le 1991 No. 90-992
STATE OF NEVADA ET AL., PETITIONERS
JAMES D. WATKINS, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OPPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
TO MOTION TO DEFER CONSIDERATION
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of
Energy and the Department of Energy, hereby opposes the Motion to
Defer Consideration filed by the petitioners in this case.
Petitioners, the State of Nevada and various officials and
representatives of the State, seek review of a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that rejected
their constitutional and statutory challenges to the implementation
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 43 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. Pet. App.
1-37. In that statute, congress has directed the Department of
Energy to characterize a site in Nevada known as Yucca Mountain as
a potential location for a permanent underground nuclear waste
-2-
repository. 43 U.S.C. 10133{(a). Petitioners seek to defer
consideration of their petition for a writ of certiorari in this
case until disposition of another petition, not yet filed, in a
separate case brought by the State against the Bureau of Land
Management, an agency of the Department of the Interior. That
agency granted a right-of-way pursuant to the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. 1761, which permits the Department
of Energy to use public lands in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain for
the site characterization program. The district court dismissed
the State's complaint challenging the right-of-way for lack of
standing, and the court of appeals affirmed. 918 F.2d 854 (1990)
(copy attached). The Department of Energy is not a party to the
latter case.
Although in each case the State is attempting to prevent
the carrying out of site characterization activities, in this Court
each case presents distinctly different issues. In the present
case, No. 90-992, the State presents several direct challenges to
the constitutionality of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as well as
to the Department of Energy's implementation of the statute, all
of which the court of appeals rejected on their merits. Pet. App.
13-37. In its complaint against the Bureau of Land Management, the
State included some of these same claims, but the court of appeals
decided only that the complaint had failed to allege any basis for
satisfying the standing requirements of Article III. 918 F.2d at
855-858. There are no common questions, and thus nothing about the
- 3-
relationship petween the two cases that would warrant deferring
disposition of the petition in No. 90-992.
Moreover, delay in the consideration of No. 90-992 will
result in continued frustration of the Congressional mandate to
characterize the Yucca Mountain site. In order to carry out this
program, the Department of Energy must obtain permits from State
agencies exercising delegated authority under the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.
300f et seg., as well as a permit to appropriate water for the
project. The State's motion fails to mention the fact that the
State has rejected the Department of Energy's permit applications
solely because of the effect of three state legislative enactments
purporting to make site characterization activities illegal under
state law. Pet. App. 9-11. As a result, the United States filed
suit more than a year ago in the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada seeking an injunction requiring the State
to process the applications. United States v. State of Nevada, No.
CV-S-90-065~-HDM. The United States argues that these state laws
have been preempted by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. This
contention was subsequently sustained in the court of appeals
decision under review in No. 90-992, which originated in the court
of appeals as a separate proceeding.
In response to the repeated request of the State, the
district court in United States v. State of Nevada, supra, first
stayed proceedings pending the court of appeals decision, and now
has stayed disposition of the United States' motion for summary
—
judgment pending the disposition of the petition for a writ of
certiorari filed in No. 90-992 (Orders dated May 23, 1990, and
December 14, 1990, copies attached). Any further delay in the
disposition of the petition is significantly prejudicial to the
ability of the Department of Energy to carry out the will of
Congress.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the motion to defer
consideration should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
FEBRUARY 1991
854
the crime.” Runco, 873 F.2d at 1232.
Thus, there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port Hadley’s conviction on count eight.
Vv
{12} Finally, Hadley contends that the
district court erred by imposing a sentence
not in accordance with the Sentencing
Guidelines for his conviction on count sev-
en. The district court did not apply the
Sentencing Guidelines in imposing a 30-
year sentence on that conviction. The
court did follow the Sentencing Guidelines
when it sentenced Hadley to nine years in
prison on counts eight and nine.
Hadley’s contention is without merit.
We have held that the Sentencing Guide-
lines do not apply to conduct that occurred
before November 1, 1987. United States
v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir.1989),
cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 110 S.Ct. 2168,
109 L.Ed.2d 497 (1990). There is no dis-
pute that the conduct underlying the count
seven conviction occurred in October 1987,
prior to the effective date of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. Thus, the district court did
not err when it declined to apply the guide
lines to count seven.
AFFIRMED. ——
STATE OF NEVADA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Robert F. BURFORD, Director of Bureau
of Land Management, Department of
Interior; Edw F. Spang, Nevada
State Director, Bureau of Land
Management, D ment of Interior,
Defendants—Appéllees.
No. 89-15272.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Aug. 16, 1990.
Decided Nov. 14, 1990.
State of Nevada brought action chal-
lenging Bureau of Land Management's
-
918 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 SERIES
grant of right-of-way to Department of En-
ergy to conduct site characterization study
of proposed nuclear waste repository. The
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nevada, Philip M. Pro, J., dismissed
action, 708 F.Supp. 289, and State ppealed.
The Court of Appeals, Wallace, Circuit
Judge, held that Nevada failed to show
that it would suffer concrete and immedi-
ate injury as result of grant of right-of-
way, and did not have standing to chal-
lenge grant.
" Affirmed.
1. Federal Courts €557
Where district court has inadvertently
neglected to dismiss action but it is clear it
intended its order to terminate action,
Court of Appeals - treats action as dis-
missed.
2. Federal Courts 4-555
Order which dismissed complaint but
which did not dismiss underlying action
was appealable, where it was clear that
ruling by district court was meant to be
dispositive of action. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291,
1331 .
3. Federal Civil Procedure 103.1
Federal Courts €-12 - -
“Case or controversy” limitation in ar-
ticle III of the Constitution requires that
federal courts visit threshold question of
standing in every federal case; in order to
clear this jurisdictional] hurdle, complaining
party must demonstrate injury in fact.
U.S.C.A. Cons} Art. 3, § 1 et seq.
4. Health and Environment ¢25.15(4)
State of Nevada failed to show that it
would suffer concrete and immediate injury
as result of Bureau of Land Management's
grant of right-of-way to Department of En-
ergy to conduct site characterization study
of proposed nuclear waste repository, and
did not have standing to challenge grant;
land was owned by federal government,
and State did not allege that it used site for
STATE OF NEV. v. BURFORD
eae a Cte an 918 F.2d 854 (9h Cir. 1990)
any purpose. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of,
1982, § 2 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 10101 et seq.; Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, § 102 et seq., 48
U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq.; National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, § 2 et seq., 42
US.C.A. § 4821 et seq.; U.S.C.A. Const.”
Art. 3, § 1 et seq.
855
JI
In February of 1983, Nevada was noti-
fied that certain public lands near Yucca
Mountain were under consideration as a
national repository for the disposal of nu-
clear waste. Four years later, Congress
decided to concentrate waste repository de-
velopment efforts on:the Yucca Mountain
— _ site. Accordingly, Congress amended the
3
Harry W. Swainston, Deputy Atty. Gen.,
Carson City, Nev., for plaintiff-appellant.
George W. Vancleve, US. Dept. of Jus-
tice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-ap-
pellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada.
Before WALLACE, ALARCON and
WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.
WALLACE, Circuit Judge: .
{1,2} Nevada appeals from the dismis-
sal of its complaint against the Bureau of
Land Management (Bureau), in which Ne-
vada alleges that the Bureau improperly
granted a right-of-way to the Department
of Energy (Department) to conduct site
characterization studies at Yucca Moun-
tain, Nevada. The district court concluded
that Nevada lacked standing to pursue this
action, and dismissed the complaint. The
district court exercised jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our court has no
jurisdiction to review a dismissed com-
plaint; a judgment is not final until the
underlying action is dismissed. Where the
district court has inadvertently neglected
to dismiss the action but it is clear it in-
tended its order to terminate the action, we
treat the action as dismissed. Kilkenny v.
Arco Marine: Inc., 800 F.2d 853, 855-56
(9thn Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934,
107 S.Ct. 1575, 94 L.Ed.2d 766 (1987).
Here it is clear that the ruling by the
district court was meant to be dispositive
of the action. Therefore, we have jurisdic-
tion over this timely appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We affirm.
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (Waste Act), 42
US.C. §§ 19101-10270, to require that site
characterization activities proceed solely at
Yucca Mountain. Jd § 10133(a). Site
characterization consists of extensive test-
ing conducted by the Department in order
to evaluate the suitability of a site for the
location of a repository. Jd § 10101(21).
‘In order to aid the Department in its site
characterization activities, the Waste Act
provides, :
{t}o the extent that the taking of any
action related to the site characterization
of a site ... requires a certificate, right-
of-way, permit, lease, or other authoriza-
tion from a Federal agency or officer,
such agency or officer shall issue or
grant any such authorization at the earli-
est practicable date, to the extent permit-
ted by the applicable provisions of law
administered by such agency or officer.
42 U.S.C. § 101401) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to this section, the Department
applied to the Bureau in November 1987
for a right-of-way over public land near
Yucca Mountain. This land is administered
by the Bureau under the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (Land
Act), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 which directs
the Bureau to manage the land in a way
“that will best meet the present and future
needs’ of the American people.” Jd
§ 1702(c). On January 6, 1988, the Bureau
granted to the Department a 13 year right-
of-way over 51,632 public acres near Yucca
Mountain, and authorized the Department
to undertake necessary site character-
ization activities on that land in accordance
with the Department’s Plan of Develop-
ment.
Under this plan, the Department intends
to excavate several exploratory shafts and
conduct a variety of scientific tests. The
856
Department has stated that site character
ization activities should not interfere with
any current or planned activities on the
lands within the right-of-way. It promises”
“to return lands disturbed by site charac-
terization to a stable ecological state with a
form and productivity similar to the predis-
turbance state.” Moreover, the -rightof-
way granted by the Bureau prohibits the:
disposal] of any hazardous materials on the
land, and states that it “does not convey
any rights for the construction or initial
operation of a nuclear waste repository.”
Nevada filed an action in the district
court challenging the grant of this right-of-
way. Nevada alleged that the grant violat-
ed requirements in both the Land Act and
the National Environmental Policy Act (En-
vironmental Act). In addition, it claimed
that the Bureau’s actions violated Nevada’s
constitutional right, including that © ‘the
right-of-way rendered meaningless Neva-
da’s political right to object to its selectiqn
as a waste repository site. The district
court determined that Nevada lacked
standing to pursue the action, and conclud-
ed that the constitutional claims were with-
out merit.
4
II
We review de novo the district court’s
legal conclusion that Nevada lacks stand-
ing. Bruce v. United States, 159 F.2d 755,
758 (9th Cir.1985). Moreover, for purposes
of this review, we must construe the com-
plaint in favor of Nevada, and accept as
true all of Nevada’s material allegations.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 DS. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct.
2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
{3] .The “case or cqntroversy” limitation
in article III of the Constitution requires
that federal courts visit the “threshold
question” of standing in every federal case.
Id. at 498, 95 S.Ct. at 2205. In order to
clear this jurisdictional hurdle, a complain-
ing party must demonstrate an injury in
fact. Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans ‘"vited for Separation of.
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473,
102 S.Ct. 752, 759, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)
(Valley Forge). The Supreme Court has
held that this constitutional injury require-
918 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d. SERIES
ment “embraces three related elements: ay"
an actual or threatened injury, (2) which is*
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly’ 3
unlawful conduct, and (8) which is likely ta
be redressed.by the relief requested. | See, P
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 787, 751, 104!
S.Ct. 8815, $324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), (ai
len); Valley Forge, 454 US: ‘at 472, 102?
S.Ct. at 758; Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed\4
eration v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 988, 987 (9th -*
Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988, 108 /
S.Ct. 1290, 99,.L.Ed.2d 501_.(1988), ae: i
[4] To satisfy the first of these require ‘
ments, Nevada must show that it “has <
been or will-in fact be perceptibly harmed)? -
by” the decision of the Bureau to grant the} *
rightof-way. United States v. Students ‘
Challenging Regulatory ‘Agency ‘Prose:
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688, 98 S.Ct?
2405, 2416, 87 LEd.2d 254 (1973). Thus, 4
Nevada must demonstrate that it has suf-
fered or will in fact suffer “concrete and: |
immediate” injury on account of the right- 7
of-way grant. Rapid Transit Advocates, |
Inc. v. Southern California Rapid Tran. | ;
sit District, 152 F.2d 373, 878 (9th Cir. *
1985). This it has failed to do. oe %
Nevada's complaint contains allegations’
that the Bureau’s decision to issue the ¥
right-of-way violated several constitutional 4@
and statutory provisions. - For example,’ 4
Nevada contends that the Bureau violated’
requirements of the Land Act by issuing’ ’
the right-of-way because in order to permit’ 4
the Department to-occupy the land sur* |
rounding Yucca Mountain, the Bureau was'
required to use ‘the withdrawal preoaaie’ 3
specified in 43 U.S.C. § 1714. - Nevada fur’ §
ther argues that{the environmental assess-! «
ment accepted by the Bureau in connection’ ,
with the right-of-way grant is insufficient #
to satisfy the requirements imposed by the’ %
Environmental Act. In addition, Nevada' §
contends that issuance of the right-of-way’ *
violates many constitutional provisions, in-. 3
cluding the tenth amendment. rg
However, the complaint is silent as to.
how these alleged violations have resulted
in.jnjury to Nevada. “[A]n asserted right’
to have the Government’ act in accordance
with law is not suffi icient, standing alone,
A= wat SI Ae KR
+ oe
STATE OF NEV. v. BURFORD
857
Cite as 918 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1990)
to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.”
Allen, 468 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. at 3326;
see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 US. 54,
62, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1703, 90 L.Ed.2d 48
(1986) (“The presence of a disagreement,
however sharp and acrimonious it may be,
is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III's
requirements.”). The federal government,
not Nevada, owns the land in question.
Moreover, Nevada did not allege in its com-
plaint that it uses the land surrounding
Yucca Mountain for any purpose. Even
assuming that the right-of-way grant vio-
lates the Land Act, the Environmental Act,
and the Constitution, Nevada fails to show
how those violations result in injury to
Nevada. We agree with the district court
that Nevada’s claims merely “constitute a
generalized grievance that the [Bureau] is
not acting in a way in which [Nevada]
maintains is in accordance” with federal
laws. Nevada v. Burford, 708 F.Supp.
289, 295 (D.Nev.1989) (Burford). This is
insufficient to demonstrate standing. See
Allen, 468 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. at 3326;
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482-83, 102 S.Ct.
at 763-64; Schlesinger v. Reservists Com-
mittee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223
n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2933 n. 13, 41 L.Ed.2d
706 (1974). ,
In addition to contending that the right-
of-way grant violated several federal stat-
utes and the Constitution, Nevada asserts
that its political right to object to its selec-
tion as the host for a nuclear waste reposi-
tory has been rendered meaningless by the
Bureau’s action. It is clear that a state
may demonstrate standing by asserting an
injury to a sovereign interest. See Alfred
L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458
U.S. 592, 601, 102 S.Ct 3260, 3265, 73
L.Ed.2d 995 (1982) (Snapp). What consti-
tutes a state’s sovereign interest is not free
from doubt. /d But in this appeal, we
need not analyze its nature or parameters.
Nevada argues that one of its sovereign
interests—the right to object in the political
arena to the selection of Yucca Mountain
_ as a waste repository—has been infringed.
‘Assuming such an identifiable sovereign
interest, Nevada’s argument ignores the
fact that the decision of whether to con-
struct the repository at Yucca Mountain is
many years and numerous procedural hur’
dles away. For example, if the Depart:
ment determines that Yucca Mountain is an.
appropriate site after site characterization
is completed, the Department must hold
public hearings near the site to receive
comments regarding its suitability. 42
U.S.C. § 10134(a). Following this, the De-
partment must make a recommendation to
the President whether to construct the re-
pository, who in turn must decide whether
to recommend the site to Congress. /d
Within 60 days of the President’s recom-
mendation to Congress, the state in which
the recommended site is located may file a
notice of disapproval with Congress. /d.
§ 10136(bX2). If such a notice is filed, the
site selection is disapproved unless Con-
gress passes a resolution as required by
the Waste Act within 90 days. /d
§ 10135(c). We deal here only with the
decision by the Bureau to grant a right-of-
way, the only “direct consequence [of
which] is that the site characterization pro-
cess will proceed to the next step in accord-
ance with the [Waste Act].” Burford, 708
F.Supp. at 297. Any claim by Nevada that
site characterization will inevitably lead to
the designation of Yucca Mountain as a
repository site is mere speculation, and
“unadorned speculation will not suffice to
invoke the federal judicial power.” Simon
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization, 426 U.S. 26, 44, 96 S.Ct. 1917,
1927, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Clearly, the
right-of-way decision has not stripped Ne.
vada of its right to participate in the site
characterization process or of its right to
object to the selection of Yucca Mountain
as a repository. Thus, because Nevada has
failed to show how it has been injured in
this respect, its claim of standing based on
its asserted sovereign interest fails.
In its complaint, Nevada also alleges that
the site characterization process will dis-
turb the surface and subsurface of the land
in the affected area, and will interfere with
other possible uses of the land. A state
may, of course, have standing to redress
injuries to its proprietary interests, such as
the interests arising from property owner-
ship. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602-03, 102 S.Ct.
858 918 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES
at 3266-67. As we have discussed above,
however, Nevada does not own the affect-
ed property, nor has it alleged that it uses
the property for any purpose. Thus, even
assuming that the site characterization pro-
cess will disturb the land, Nevada has
failed to show that it will suffer on account
of that disturbance. Proprietary standing
is therefore not available to Nevada.
Finally, Nevada alleges that it has stand-
ing in its parens patriae capacity to ad-
vance the interests of its citizens. The
Supreme Court has held that a state has a
“quasi-sovereign interest in the health and
well-being—both physical and economic—
of its residents in general,” and can there-
fore sue to protect these interests through
a parens patriae action. /d. at 607, 102
S.Ct. at 3268. In this case, Nevada alleges
that the selection of Yucca Mountain as the
site for a national waste repository will
have a devastating effect on the state’s
vital tourist industry. Although the Su-
preme Court has endorsed parens patriae
suits in general, it has also stated that “{a]
State does not have standing as parens
patriae to bring an action against the Fed-
eral Government.” /d at 610 n. 16, 102
S.Ct. at 3270 n. 16 (stating that with re-
spect to the citizens’ rights in relation to
the federal government, “it is the United
States, and not the State, which represents
them as parens patriae”). Our earlier
case of Washington Utilities & Transpor-
tation Commission v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142,
1153 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836,
96 S.Ct. 62, 46 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), must, of
course, give way to the Supreme Court’s
clear statement in Snapp.
Because Nevada has Pailed to allege suf-
ficient facts to demonstrate standing, we
affirm the district court’s dismissal. of the
action. We therefore do not reach the
question of whether the district court was
correct in dismissing Nevada's claims on
the merits.
AFFIRMED.
Edward Lee CLEMMONS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
¥,
Dale BOHANNON, Robert Tansy, Herb
Maschner, and Robert Mills,
Defendanto~Appetions.
No. 88-2730.
United States Court of Appeals, BY:
Tenth Circuit. 3 q
Oct. 9, 1990, .
Rehearing and Rehearing, En, Banc
Granted Nov. 14, 1990.
tes 3 ing
State prisoner brought civil sania’ ell 2?
tion alleging, inter alia, violations of his
constitutional rights arising out of potas
tary subjection to environmental tobaces’
smoke. Summary judgment for sc
dants was granted by the United States
District Court for the. District of Kar
Dale E. Saffels, J., and prisoner thers |
The Court of Appeals, Seymour, Cireuit '
Judge, held that: (1) exposing prisoner. to
unreasonable risk of debilitating or
nal disease offends “evolving standards of.
decency” protected by the Eighth Amend-
ment; (2) relevant inquiry is whether long-
term exposure to environmental tobacco’
smoke poses unreasonable risk of harm to’
an inmate’s health; and (3) inmate’s indefi- .
nite, involuntary exposure to environmen?
tal tobacco smoke in an eight-foot cell, by} 3
reason of involuntary double-elling with:
smokers, raised triable issue of fact as to"
whether such exposure created urireaso
able risk to health. ay
Reversed and remanded in part A
affirmed in part 7 ae
Tacha, Circuit oes filed a cn
opinion.
a Oe nk ee meme
1. Constitutional Law €=272(2)
Criminal Law € 1213.13)
Prisons ¢17(2) ‘§
State prison policy of permitting indefi; §
nite double-<elling of smokers with not
¥
woe SM ef ew se
cana ~ @ me,
; UNITED STATES DISTRICT Co’ 7 QE SS |
DISTRICT OF NEVADA ,
RENO, NEVADA
UNITED STATES OF ANERICA,
i Plaintiff, AE
vs. MAY
<> :
—
2 8
STATE OF NEVADA, ET AL., U.S. ATTORNEY, LAS VEGAS, ee
nn MINUTES OF THE COURT
DATE: May 23, 1990
PRESENT: _ HOWARD D. McKIBBEN U.S. District Judge
Deputy Clerk: Cliff Chamblee Reporter: Lesley Clarkson
Counsel for Plaintiff(s) Karen Eabert
Counsel for Defendant(s) Brian McKay and Harry Swainston
COURT CONVENES AT 11:30 A.M. & CONCLUDES AT 12:10 P.M.
MMSIXRE XORRERXENXRNAMRERRX
PROCEEDINGS: HEARING MOTION OF DEFENDANTS FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS (#6):
Hearing is held on the motion of dGefendants for stay of proceedings,
or in the alternative, to dismiss.
Arguments made.
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for stay of proceedings filed on behalf
of defendents (#8) is GRANTED, and this action is stayed pending final
resolution of the action presently pending in the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, case number 90-70004.
Court directs counsel in this action to file pleadings regarding any
action taken by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
A formal order from this Court will subsequently be filed.
CAROL C. sa CLERK
SOG
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SUNETED STATES OP> AMERICA, | é
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plaintifé, ‘ve
vs. . et L_ Aken
STATE OF NEVADA, ET AL.»
) CIVIL-S=_90-65-HDM (RJJ)
Defendants. )
) MINUTES OF THE COURT
)
) DATE: December 14, 1990
PRESENT: HOWARD D. MCKIBBEN 0,8. District Judge
Deputy Clerk: Cliff Chamblee Reporter: Oma Rose-Recordec
Counsel for Plaintiff (s) Karen L. Egbect
Counsel for Defendant (8) Haccy Swainston, Deputy Attorney General
couRT CONVENES AT 10: 6 A.A. 7a.
MEAT ORD DROP NCOCRANEERS TELEPHONE CON
FILED ON BEHALF OF
PENDING U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION,
PROCEEDINGS: HEARING MOTION
Heacing held and acg
IT IS ORDERED
plaintiff to
congideced filed
be filed no latec
filed by Januacy 25, 1991.
aftec all oppositions
foc summacy judgment,
The stay in this
than the issues
ce Fa bunt, Garemen
that the stay in thi
file a meticn for sum
as of this date;
than Januacy 15,
and ceplies ace
1991,
action shall cemain in effect foc all puc
foc summacy judgment.
FERENCE CALL
s action is lit
macy judgment,
any opposition
DEFENDANT TO MAINTAIN STAY
ETC. (#22)
uments made telephonically.
ted only for the
which will be
by defendants shall
and any final ceply shall be
filed with cespect to the motion
this mattec shall stand submitted.
poses othec
CAROL C. FITZGERALD, CLERK
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