Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brower's Moving & Storage, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

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WOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No.

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

Petitioner,

-against-

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND

LOCAL 814, AFFILIATED WITH THE

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,

WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS

OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ROBERT S. NAYBERG |

Law Offices of

MARTIN H. SCHER

Attorneys for Petitioner

1 Old Country Road, Suite 385

Carle Place, N.Y. 11514

(516) 746-5040

*)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Notwithstanding, that for more than twenty years the Union

had no contact with the Employer or its employees, and never

demanded bargaining nor serviced the shop, the National

Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) found that, in effect,

through the actions of the Union’s ERISA/LMRA-governed*

funds, the Union established its representation of the

Employer’s employees. The Employer’s argument that there

was no collective bargaining relationship and that therefore it

did not violate §8(a) (5) & (1) of the National Labor Relations

Act (“Act”), 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (5) & (1), was rejected by the

NLRB.

The questions presented are:

1) Did the NLRB err in crediting the Funds’ conduct in

pursuing alleged delinquent contributions as evidence of the

Union’s conduct in enforcing the alleged contracts with the

Employer?

2) Whether the Act requires that the Union demand bar-

gaining as a condition precedent for sustaining a “refusal to

bargain” charge under §8(a) (5)?

3) Whether the NLRB misapplied its precedents concerning

the rebuttable presumption of the Union’s majority status dur-

ing the term of the allegedly unexpired collective bargaining

agreement?

*Employee Retirement Income Security Act §§403-06, 29 U.S.C. §§1103-06,

Labor Management Relations Act §302, 29 U.S.C. §186.

=

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties to the proceedings below were the petitioner

Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc.**. the respondent National

Labor Relations Board and the Intervenor Local 814, affili-

ated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-

feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO.

** Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc, filing this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

in this case, states that its full name is Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc. and that it

has no parent companies, or subsidiaries to list pursuant to U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 29.1.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLES OF AUTERORITIES ..n........cc.cccscccssccstescossaceccesccooees iv

RIN MEI WT Ss casasadiessocecodsovasctsesnsineoesessecessescostssnanesesee l

SS RAAT RRR GE” DEAE, CASE ono sccinciccscesscisescoscorenscesecsscseeescee 3

POINT I: BECAUSE THE RECORD IS BEREFT

OF ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE UNION ACTED

TO ENFORCE ITS ALLEGED CONTRACT, THE

SECOND CIRCUIT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED

THE NLRB TO RELY UPON THE ACTIONS OF

ERISA/LMRA GOVERNED FUNDS AS

EVIDENCE OF THE UNION’S

EENIRC BIEN E ACTIVITY, ..0....0.cccccrsescescoreccersesessossececeeees 9

POINT Il: THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIED AN

IMPROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW TO THE

NLRB’S FINDING THAT THE UNION, THROUGH

THE ACTIONS OF ITS FUNDS, AFFIRMATIVELY

SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE

POINT II: THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERRED BY

PERMITTING THE NLRB TO RELY UPON THE

ACTIONS OF THE FUNDS AS EVIDENCE OF

THE UNION’S ENFORCEMENT OF THE

CONTRACT, BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF

LAW THE FUNDS CANNOT SERVE

AS THE AGENT OF THE UNION ..............cccesecsesseseees 13

A. The Funds Cannot Serve as the “Agent”

B. In Only Limited Circumstances May

the Funds Serve as the Agent for Both

the Union and Employer ..................sssssssssseeseeesseees 16

POINT IV: WHERE THE UNION ABANDONED THE

RESPONSIBILITY TO INITIATE BARGAINING,

IT CANNOT THEREAFTER ACCUSE

THE EMPLOYER OF VIOLATING THE

EMPLOYER’ STATUTORY DUTY TO BARGAIN.

A. The §8(a) (5) charge cannot be sustained in

the absence of any evidence that the Union

B. Both the NLRB and the Second Circuit

Ignored Their Precedents Requiring the Union

to Demand Bargaining Before a Refusal to

Bargain Charge May be Sustained......................s000 21

POINT V: THE NLRB MISAPPLIED ITS

PRECEDENTS TO CONCLUDE THAT BROWER’S

AND THE UNION INTENDED TO HAVE A

, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP .......... 23

a cd hie tasctniscievercuiaseresesneepsonseietessbsetivenesbeecsabasin 29

APPENDIX A: SUMMARY ORDER OF THE U.S.

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT.

APPENDIX B: DECISION AND ORDER OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

APPENDIX C: RESPONDENT’S EXCEPTIONS TO

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

A.merican Buslines, Inc., 164 NLRB (No. 136) 1055,

65 LRRM 1265 (1967).............cssccssescessesesssssesssrensesessseess 21, 22

Ace-Doran Hauling & Rigging Co., 171 NLRB (No. 88)

645, 68 LRRM 1298 (1968).............cccccccesssessessessseseesees .23, 24

Altchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.

Witchita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 93 S.Ct. 2367

(ROTD) iccccsbiacseenis ids covert en editaecntncections 12, 24, 28

Bender Ship Repair Co., Inc., 188 NLRR (No. 86) 615,

TT LIRRM 1007 (1971)..........ssssesssessessessesnssnssrsnsenesnsnssees 23, 24

Benson v. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc.,

726 F.Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 907 F.2d 310

(2d Cir. 1990), cert. petition pending, Docket #90-527.......6,7

Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., 297 NLRB No. 28,

E5e Ee Ce COED insiicbtsessipiteresennccntnnesivinssvwcececees passim

Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488,

a cewpunmuesbsonsouneesee 12

Grove Press, Inc. v. Angelton, 649 F.2d 121

Ce BE atic aceite dae deai hb dininstniebintnssnvvsecedenseerececsene 18

Gllenlynn, Inc. d/b/a, McDonald’s Drive-In Restaurant,

204 NLRB (No. 45) 299, 83 LRRM 1356 (1973) ....23, 24, 25

In Re Shulman Transport Enterprises, Inc.,

FG Fe ee a FD aati ga chictntncindinnrccterenscvesereesenceenes 18

Insulating Fabricators, inc., 144 NLRB (No. 125) 1325,

54 LRRM 1246 (1963)............sescsersserscsensesensenenseneseensenensenss .20

International Offset Corp., 210 NLRB (No. 140) 854,

86 LRRM 1305 (1974).............c.sesserssseesesenseseesensnseneensssesensees 22

Island Typographers, Inc., 252 NLRB (No. 3) 9, 105

LRRM 1455 (1980), enf. den., NLRB v. Island

Typographers, Inc., 70S F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983)................0+ 22

Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 80 S.Ct. 489

(1960) ia dtiintinieiivadpNiasinishcsenavenaseccensis 15

Local 777, Democratic Union, Etc. v. NLRB,

Faia vcccssnececesnsensesccesecsosececerecncoeee ll

Mr. Clean of Nevada, Inc., 288 NLRB No. 101,

DS Te BIAS CFG Ba vcinsen cs sscecevesecsvesecesevscecscseseee 25, 27, 28

NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Etc., 453 U.S. 322,

NE Fathi ccenicdicnsesvvvcemncorereccccceenccccees 14, 16

NLRB vy. Better Building Supply Corp., 837 F.2d 377

ESET ESSENSE SSSR Oe ll

NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 85 S.Ct. 980

NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc.,

306 U.S. 292, 59. S.Cr. SOL (1939).....c..cccrccccrsescsscees 20, 21, 22

NLRB vy. Cone Mills Corp., 373 F.2d 595

(4th Cir. 1967)......... bine SEE RE A eRe Ene CO ee 19

. vi

NLRB vy. Clerks and Checkers Local No. 1593,

Int | Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO,

644 F.2d 408 (th Cir. 1981), enforcing, 243

NLRB (No. 3) 8, 101 LRRM 1348 (1979) ......cccscsesseens 16

NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int’! Union, AFL-CIO,

361 U.S. 477, 80 S.Ct. 419 (1960) ..ccccccccccscscssssesesnssennns 11, 12

NLRB v. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d 379

I lias aanescheedhanites seatinab vic ddnainvianracrenrreninrsrerrensne 22

NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters &

Joiners of America, Local #1913, AFL-CIO,

SOT Fee a Sa ae BP aac lasihiccnnssckcscivecesseseavessessssens 17

NLRB vy. West Sand & Gravel Co., 612 F.2d 1326

CR ER Fae tia scons ihc ean athe cant ibsdiclln attain evwinserentecervees 25

Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union Etc. v.

NLRB, 842 F.2d 1141 (Qth Cir. 1988) .......sesccscecscsveesenesenenes 28

Pioneer Inn Assoc., 228 NLRB (No. 160) 1263,

SS Eee Be CTT icicnccaecinssasauibiigesntcbatreccnsrscsvsenccceens 25, 26

Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 NLRB (No. 63) 494,

Se ee Ne Ce iditiiincthscaclictihscninttackcnbererieininanssnreserinss 25

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB. 340 U.S. 474,

Tk ee IE Dhan eidiittiicia tice ienctdaiewigueldinrneiinencarsensnees 12

Waggoner v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981),

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064,

ae re I ciaiatitihni caneeninectninsainnanerscnrsvecnies 13, 15, 17

EE ee MS ee I LN ne NN Re LSE Se a EN PANO at eA ee hy a ee

vii

Weber's Bakery, 711 NLRB (No. 3) 1, 86 LRRM

Be iieediues eibstnetninsensntatngnsensntenninar~ .ororararstorverrenee 23, 25

White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 154 NLRB

(No. 127) 1593, 60 LRRM 1147 (1965) ..cccccccccuscnnns 20

W.W. —— Inc. v. NLRB, 860 F.24 244

STATUTES

National Labor Relations Act

SN Tie TE COD sacntcancnsecerevasesaseresevernvereveccecesecnens 24

§8(a) (1) & (S), 29 U.S.C. $158(a) (1) & (5) ncn passim

Pe tee RI TRD iccccerscevevscsvesnsvvnssvevnsnresenecesesecnns 2,3

ts can aranenativabennvevererveareersnernens 1,8

Labor Management Relations Act

cash ansnensrscacniicarcesensannet passim

Employee Retirement Macome Security Act

$2(7) & (8), 29 U.S.C. $1002 (2. & (B) rcscscsssrserrvenne 15

+ I UD its coca cccncccerecseecsenseversesesenners 13, 14, 16

I IE vcs cexcncscscscscerssscnceccccecsesanssnsecene 14, 16

I Me SU I ease ccsacecccnsnsnereveccccececscsencavsevesesanencons 14

$406, 29 U.S.C. $1106 ...ccccccn isecsrnearnsecrersavencencaranses 14

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No.

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

Petitioner,

-against-

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND

LOCAL 814, AFFILIATED WITH THE

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,

WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS

OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

| Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

8) ge ee en See ee gt SA ee

fies

The Petitioner, Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc.,

(“Brower’s”) prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

summary order and opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit entered in this case on August

29, 1990.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unpublished opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit is reported at 914 F.2d 239

and is reprinted in Appendix A. The Decision and Order of

the National Labor Relations Board is reported at 297 NLRB

No. 28 and is reprinted in Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

Pursuant to §10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act

(“Act”), 29 U.S.C. §150(b), the National Labor Relations

Board (“NLRB” or “Board’’) caused to be issued a complaint

alleging that Brower’s violated sections 8(a) (5) and (1) of the

Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (5) and (1). After reviewing the record

established in a hearing before its designated agent, the NLRB

held that Brower’s violated the Act, 29 U.S.C. $158(a) (5) and

(1). Pursuant to §10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. $160(e), the

NLRB petitioned the Second Circuit for enforcement of its

Order. The Order was enforced on August 29, 1990.

The jurisdiction of this Court to review the order and

decree of the Second Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1).

|

STATUTE INVOLVED

National Labor Relations Act §§8(a) (1) & (5), and (9)(a),

29 U.S.C. $§158(a) (1) & (5) and 159(a) (in relevant part):

§8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the

exercise of the right guaranteed in section 7;

a + * *

(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives

of his employees, subject to this provisions of section

(a);

§9(a) Representatives designated or selected for the pur-

poses of collective bargaining by a majority of the employees

in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive

representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-

poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay wages,

hours of employment, or other condition of employment. ...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc.’s (“Brower’s”) introduc-

tion to Local 814 affiliated with the International Brotherhood

of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of

America, AFL-CIO (“Union”) occurred in or about 1951

when the Union’s agents forced a Brower’s truck off the road

and demanded that the company become a Union barn. (A:

236, 299.)! A Union representative subsequently came to

Brower’s’ place of business and signed up a number of it’s

employees, including principals and officers, but he never

gave Brower’s a contract to execute. (A: 236-37.) There was

never an election or other means pursuant to §9(a) of the Act

(ie: NLRB certification or the presentation of executed union

cards) establishing that the Union represented the interests of

a majority of the Brower’s employees. (A: 237.)

In addition, the Union never requested nor negotiated an

independent collective bargaining agreement with Brower’s

(A: 238, 256, 299, 301). And, because Brower’s never

belonged to any association of employers with whom the

Union negotiated its collective bargaining agreements (A:

292-93) there is no bargaining history. Brower’s simply

signed printed contracts or stipulations sent to it by the Union.

The Union never administered the agreements Brower’s

signed. It never appointed a Brower’s employee as the shop

steward (A: 75 17 (L), 237-38 and 302), nor a replacement

delegate after its original representative to Brower’s died in

the mid to late 1950’s. (A: 72 44, 238.) Other than a monthly

‘Numbers in parentheses preceded by the letter “A:” refer to the references in

the Joint Appendix filed with the Second Circuit, which included the complete

transcript of the administrative hearing.

visit in the early years by its agent to collect dues directly

from an unknown number of individuals presumably main-

taining their Union membership (A: 236-38), the Union did

nothing to enforce the successive agreements.? (A: 252-56,

Appendix B at 24-26.)

Brower’s’ noncompliance was no secret to the Union. For

example, in or about October 1967, Brower’s directed its

counsel to explore with the Union placing one of its long-time

employees in the Union so he could receive a pension and

hospitalization. (A: 238.) Thus, the Union learned that

Brower’s ernployed someone for approximately ten years

without his ever becoming a member of the Union, but did not

even ask whether there were any other employees who should

also be members of the Union or whether other provisions of

the collective bargaining agreement were being ignored by

Brower’s. (A: 239-40 & Appendix C at 26.) Brower’s’ blatant

noncompliance with the underpinnings of the alleged collec-

tive bargaining relationship (that employees be members of

the Union) was simply ignored by the Union. Even after the

Union and Brower’s agreed that Brower’s would pay one

individual’s back dues and benefit fund contributions to make

him eligible for full benefits, the Union did not ask whether

there were any other Brower’s employees failing to maintain

Union membership. (A: 170, 238-40.)

Another example is that in 1981 the Union’s benefit funds,

Local 814 Pension, Annuity and Welfare Funds (“Funds”),

commenced a state court action against Browe.’s for allegedly

2One exception concerns Wesley Brower, who testified that he was informed by

the Union in 1956 that as an owner he could no longer drive a Brower’s truck with

a Union man sitting next to him. (A:300 & Appendix B at 20.) Mr. Brower rejected

the Union's demand, continued to drive the Brower’s vehicle, and the Union never

raised the issue again. (A: 305.)

delinquent contributions. (Appendix B at 18.) The trustees of

the Funds, who included representatives of the Union, negoti-

ated a settlement based upon an estimation of the delinquen-

cies because no audit was performed. (A: 181 7.) While the

Funds were litigating the issue of delinquent contributions,

Brower’s continued contributing only for the two Brower

family members. (A: 245.) Yet the Union again failed to con-

tact or even ask whether the terms of its agreements were

being complied with, let alone to enforce them. (A: 245-47.)

The Union next demonstrated its abandonment of the con-

tract after the Funds’ December 1987 audit performed by

Peter Furtado. Mr. Furtado, who was fully aware of Brower’s’

noncompliance with the collective bargaining agreement, sub-

sequently became the interim Secretary Treasurer of the

Union on September 9, 1988. (A: 289-90.) Notwithstanding

that Mr. Furtado’s responsibilities as the Secretary Treasurer

included the initiation of Union actions against employers for

their noncompliance with the collective bargaining agreement

(A:290), he did nothing more than advise the Union’s Presi-

dent of Brower’s’ noncompliance. (A: 292.) Thus, even

though the Union, through Mr. Furtado, was aware of

Brower’s’ noncompliance the Union again did nothing.3

*In the hearing below, Brower's served the Union with a subpoena duces tecum

for the production of documents concerning its negotiations with Brower’s, its rep-

resentation of Brower’s’ employees, its designation of Union shop stewards and

delegates and its general administration of the collective bargaining agreements.

(A:157-166.) The Union’s response consisted of the Notice of Delinquency from

the Funds (A: 167), a single form letter sent to all employers asking for a seniority

list and the Union's confirmation of receipt of a list from Brower’s consisting of

the two Brower’s family members. (A: 168-69.) Thus, the Union’s own records

reveal that it was not conducting any business with Brower’s associated with its

alleged representation of the Brower’s’ employees, at least from 1983 to the date

of the hearing.

Significantly, the Union had numerous opportunities to

demonstrate that it did not abandon its representation of

Brower’s’ employees. As early as April 18, 1988 Brower’s

served its Answer on the Funds’ (and Union’s) attorneys in

the federal action brought by the Funds (A: 147-156), Benson

v. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., 726 F.Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y.

1989), aff’ d, 907 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. petition pend-

ing, Docket No. 90-527, which apprised the Union’s counsel

of Brower’s’ noncompliance. Yet the Union did nothing to

enforce any of its alleged rights under the alleged collective

bargaining agreement, including, but not limited to, demand-

ing bargaining over the litany of provisions that were admit-

tedly not being followed by Brower’s.4

Even after Brower’s filed its election petition with the

NLRB on September 29, 1988 acknowledging noncompliance

with the 1986-89 Agreement (A:71), the Union did not con-

tact Brower’s to discuss, let alone demand, compliance with

any provision of its alleged contract (A: 243-247). Instead, on

October 11, 1988 the Union filed a charge (A:1) alleging that

Brower’s violated §§8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.

§158(a) (1) and (5), by failing and refusing to apply the

alleged contract as if it had inquired into and then demanded

compliance. The NLRB’s General Counsel thereafter issued a

complaint alleging that from April 11, 1988 Brower’s

“refused to bargain collectively and is refusing to bargain col-

lectively with the representative of its employees...” (A: 5,

411.) Brower’s’ Answer denied the allegations. (A: 8).

In the hearing before the NLRB’s Administrative Law

* The ALJ in numerous places erroneously identified the Union as the actor

instead of the Funds. (Appendix B at 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26.) Brower’s excepted to

these findings of the ALJ. (See Appendix C.)

Judge (“ALJ”), Brower’s contended that the alleged collective

bargaining agreement and bargaining relationship had long

been abandoned by the Union, that the Union by its conduct

waived any right to enforce the terms of the agreement and

that the General Counsel failed to establish the factual predi-

cate to sustain the substantive allegation of the complaint,

namely, that Brower’s refused to bargain with a union repre-

senting the majority of its employees.

After hearing all of the evidence, the ALJ recommended

the dismissal of the complaint because the Union did not rep-

resent a majority of Brower’s employees and alternatively that

the Union abandoned its representation of the Brower’s

employees (Appendix B at 26 & n.3). The ALJ neither

addressed nor ruled on Brower’s’ third argument that the

Union never demanded bargaining as specifically outlined in

its charge and the General Counsel’s complaint. (A: 1 & 2-7).

Both Brower’s and the Counsel for the General Counsel

filed Exceptions to the ALJ’s conclusions with the NLRB.°

On November 8, 1989, the NLRB issued its Decision and

Order rejecting the recommended order of the ALJ and

finding that Brower’s violated §§8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act by

repudiating and refusing to abide by the terms of the alleged

collective bargaining agreement. (Appendix B at 9.) The

NLRB cited to the Union’s request to Wesley Brower (in

1956!) not to drive a truck, the single request for a seniority

* Five of Brower’s’ six Exceptions (see Appendix C) concerned the ALJ's iden-

tifying the Union or its agents as taking specific actions when in fact the actions

were those of the Funds. For Example, the ALJ erroneously identified the Union as

the plaintiff in Benson v. Brower's Moving & Storage, Inc., 426 F.Supp. 31

(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. petition pending Docket

#90-527. In its Decision and Order the NLRB did not address any of Brower's

Exceptions.

list in 1983 and the activities of the Funds as evidence of a

collective bargaining relationship and the Union’s enforce-

ment of the agreements for over thirty years. (Appendix B at

7.)

Brower’s refused to comply with the NLRB’s order to

obtain judicial review pursuant to §10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.

§160(e). The NLRB then filed a petition for enforcement with

the Second Circuit. Brower’s answered the petition denying

the NLRB’s allegations and further contending that “the find-

ings of fact and conclusions of law of the NLRB were erro-

neous, and were not supported by substantial evidence on the

record considered as a whole.” (A:341.)

Before the Second Circuit Brower’s argued that a) the

NLRB’s order was unsupported by substantial evidence®, b)

the NLRB erroneously created a new, arbitrary and capricious

rule excusing the Union’s twenty year absence on the grounds

that the Union had not received formal notice of any contract

violations by the Employer; c) the NLRB erroneously sus-

tained a refusal to bargain charge based upon the Union’s sin- .

gle act of filing a charge within the applicable statute of

limitations (§10[b] of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §160[b]), d) the

NLRB erred by not requiring its General Counsel to establish

that the Union demanded bargaining as a condition precedent

to sustaining the §8(a) (5) charge, e) the NLRB erred by hold-

ing that the ERISA/LMRA-governed Funds’ actions were evi-

dence of the Union’s intention to maintain a collective

bargaining relationship as weli as to enforce the alleged con-

tracts, and f) the NLRB improperly applied its precedents

concerning the rebuttable presumption of majority status.

* Brower’s pointed out that in key instances the NLRB cited specific actions as

those of the Union when in fact they were those of the Funds.

By a summary Order, dated August 29, 1990, the Second

Circuit granted the NLRB’s petition finding that substantial

evidence on the record as a whole supported the NLRB’s find-

ings. (Appendix A at 4.)

POINT I

BECAUSE THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF

ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE UNION ACTED TO

ENFORCE ITS ALLEGED CONTRACT, THE SEC-

OND CIRCUIT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED

THE NLRB TO RELY UPON THE ACTIONS OF

ERISA/LMRA GOVERNED FUNDS AS EVI-

DENCE OF THE UNION’S ENFORCEMENT

ACTIVITY.

In the absence of evidence that the Union took any action

in the past twenty years to enforce the terms of the alleged

contracts, the Second Circuit erroneously found that:

The Board made a number of findings con-

firming the parties’ intent to form a valid, ongoing

collective bargaining relationship, including the

Company’s assent to successive agreements over a

period of years, its payment of dues and contribu-

tions for several employees over a substantial

period of time and the Union’s efforts on behalf of

employees in a number of instances to secure affir-

mative compliance with the contract.

(Appendix at A-4),?

’ The execution of agreements is not dispositive. (See Point V below.) Brower's

paid dues for only one employee as part of an effort to put him in the Union.

(A:238-39.) The Brower family members, nonemployees under the Act, paid their

dues independently. (A:75 411.)

10

There is simply no factual (or legal) foundation in the

record to support the Second Circuit’s conclusion that the

Union in a number of instances made any effort “to secure

affirmative compliance with the contract.” Since it is undis-

puted that the Union has not had any contact with Brower’s

since in or about 1967, and certainly during the term of the

1986-89 contract at issue before the NLRB, the only means

available to the NLRB and the Second Circuit to reach their

stated conclusion of Union enforcement activity is to hold that

the Funds’ actions were in behalf of the Union—the creation

of an agency relationship between the Union and the

ERISA/LMRA-governed Funds. In the Second Circuit the

NLRB denied that it was relying upon any agency principle.

But in the absence of any evidence in the record that the

Union did anything in the last twenty years other than file the

charge on October 11, 1988, the NLRB’s denial is disingenu-

ous to the extent that it explicitly relied upon the activities of

the Funds as evidence of an enforceable agreement. (Appen-

dix B at 7.)

Furthermore, the NLRB was well-aware that only the

Funds were taking actions against Brower’s because

Brower’s’ Exceptions identify several instances where the

ALJ erroneously labelled actions taken by the Funds pursuant

to their fiduciary responsibilities as the actions of the Union.

(See Appendix C.) Yet the NLRB ignored Brower’s’ Excep-

tions by failing to distinguish the actions of the Funds in car-

rying out their statutory duties from the actions of the Union.

On the record in this case, the NLRB exceeded its mandate

and established the Union’s intent to maintain a collective

bargaining relationship by relying upon the ERISA/LMRA-

governed Funds’ exercise of their fiduciary duties.

ll

POINT I

THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIED AN

IMPROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW TO

THE NLRB’S FINDING THAT THE UNION,

THROUGH THE ACTIONS OF ITS FUNDS,

AFFIRMATIVELY SOUGHT TO ENFORCE

THE ALLEGED CONTRACTS.

The NLRB’s interpretation of legal issues outside its man-

date and expertise is entitled to no particular deference from

the reviewing courts. Local 777, Democratic Union, Etc. v.

NL2B, 603 F.2d 862, 869 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Bet-

ter Building Supply Corp., 837 F.2d 377, 378 (9th Cir. 1988)

(Case turned on NLRB’s interpretation of the federal

bankruptcy code which was entitled to no deference from the

reviewing court.) Here, the NLRB exceeded its mandate by

relying upon the actions of the Funds, which Congress

intended to be independent of the parochial concerns of both

the Union and employers, as evidence of the Union’s intention

to enforce the contracts. The NRLB’s involvement of the

Funds in behalf of the Union is contrary to Congress’ intent

and constitutes the NLRB’s unauthorized “movement into a

new area of regulation which Congress had not committed to

it.” NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 361

U.S. 477, 490, 80 S.Ct. 419, 433 (1960).

The NLRB further errs by failing to articulate a rationale

for its holding that the Union itself made any effort to secure

compliance with the alleged contract where the record is

devoid of any supporting evidence. The NLRB cites only one

incident, in over twenty years, of action taken by the Union,

the 1983 seniority list request. (Appendix B at 7.) Therefore,

12

the only logical deduction is that the NLRB found that the

actions of the third-party beneficiary Funds were evidence of

the Union’s intentions.

The NLRB’s failure to articulate its rule and rationale, a

“ “simple but fundamental rule of administrative law,’ [cite

omitted], that the agency must set forth clearly the grounds on

which it acted” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.

Witchita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807, 93 S.Ct. 2367,

2374 (1973), alone warranted the Second Circuit’s denial of

the NLRB’s petition. But the Second Circuit, deferring to the

NLRB’s findings, lock, stock and barrel, shirked its responsi-

bilities under this Court’s holding in NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.

278, 291-92, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988 (1965) (Reviewing courts obli-

gated to set aside decisions inconsistent with the Act and

which contain erroneous conclusions) and granted the

NLRB’s petition. See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,

340 U.S. 474, 490, 71 S.Ct. 456, 466 (1951) (NLRB orders

must be set aside when the record does not justify the NLRB’s

conclusions.)

The NLRB’s reliance upon the Funds’ actions is a matter

beyond its recognized area of special competence and its

statutory mandate. NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int'l Union,

AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. at 499, 80 S.Ct. at 433. The actions of

independent LMRA/ERISA funds may not be relied upon by

the NLRB to establish the Union’s intent to enforce the

alleged collective bargaining agreements. Such a rule is fun-

damentally inconsistent with the Act because it permits the

NLRB to usurp Congress’ policy decision establishing the

Funds’ independence. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S.

488, 497, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 1849 (1979). Note, had the Funds

been delinquent in meeting their fiduciary obligations ar? not

13

sued Brower’s, no court would hold that it was evidence of

the Union’s intention not to enforce the contracts. Waggoner

v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1981) (Trust author-

ities have no authority to direct the Union.), cert. denied, 475

U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 1374 (1986). Thus no court should hold

that the Funds’ actions are evidence of the Union’s enforce-

ment. The Second Circuit’s failure to address this issue by

applying an improper and deferential standard of review to

the NLRB’s order renders its decision in this case in conflict

with ERISA, the LMRA and the precedents of this Court.

U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 10.1(c). The writ of certiorari should be

granted.

POINT III

THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERRED BY PER-

MITTING THE NLRB TO RELY UPON THE

ACTIONS OF THE FUNDS AS EVIDENCE OF

THE UNION’S ENFORCEMENT OF THE CON-

TRACT, BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF LAW THE

FUNDS CANNOT SERVE AS THE AGENT OF

THE UNION.

A. The Funds Cannot Serve as the “Agent” for the Union.

Before the NB and the Second Circuit, Brower’s con-

tended that t- _, the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act (“ERISA”) §40-4(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. §1104(a) (1), and the

Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) §302(c) (5), 29

U.S.C. §186(c) (5) preclude the NLRB from finding that the

action of the Funds is evidence of the Union’s active enforce-

ment of the alleged contract. The Second Circuit’s Order does

not even address the issue, but simply accepts the NLRB’s

unsupported assertion that the Union enforced the alleged

14

contracts over the past twenty years. (Appendix B at 7.)

The Funds in this case are multi-employer benefit trusts

established “for the sole and exclusive benefit ... of the

employees of ...” the employers who contribute to the Funds.

LMRA §302(c) (5). The Funds, as well as their trustees, must

be completely independent from the Union and employers to

ensure that they function for the sole benefit of the trust bene-

ficiaries. Id; NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Etc., 453 U.S. 322,

329-31, 101 S.Ct. 2789, 2794-95 (1981). (“[NJothing in the

language of §302(c) (5) reveals any congressional intent that a

trustee should or may administer a trust fund in the interest of

the party that appointed him. ...”)

According to this Court, the same rule of independence is

forced on the trustees and their funds by ERISA:

Section 404(a) (1) of ERISA requires a trustee to

“discharge his duties ... solely in the interest of the

participants and beneficiaries. ...” 29 U.S.C.

$1104(a) (1).'5 Section 406(b) (2) declares that a

trustee may not “act in any transaction involving the

plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party)

whose interests are adverse to the interests of the

plan or the interests of its participants or beneficia-

ries.” 29 U.S.C. §1106(b) (2). Section 405(a)

imposes on each trustee an affirmative duty to pre-

vent every other trustee of the same fund from

breaching fiduciary duties, including the duty to act

solely on behalf of the beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C.

§$1105(a).

Id. at 332-33, 2796.8

* Footnote 15 referred to the ERISA definitions of beneficiaries and participants

which excludes any reference to the smion or employer. §2(7) and (8) of ERISA,

29 U.S.C. §1002(7) & (8).

ja “- = . Cl i Me eS Ot il el gi Ni de ee Se

: -

15

The same fiduciary principles apply to the fund as an entity.

Thus, the NLRB’s reliance upon the Funds’ activities as evi-

dence of the Union's enforcement of the contract is in e:ror as

a matter of law because the Funds cannot act as the “agent”

for the Union and at the same time comply with both the

LMRA and ERISA. "{U]nions are involved with the trust

authorities only to the extent of selecting half of the trustees.”

Waggoner v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d at 1368.

The court in Waggoner reversed the district court’s holding

that the union’s business agent’s observation of contract viola-

tions was effective notice to the funds:

As a matter of federal law, a union and its represen-

tatives are not agents of a trust fund created by a

collective bargaining agreement. Trust authorities

set up pursuant to section 302 of the LMRA have

long been held to constitute a distinct and indepen-

dent entity separate from the union that negotiates

the collective bargaining agreement establishing a

trust. See Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S.

459, 465-71, 80 S.Ct. 489, 493-496, 4 L.Ed.2d 442

(1960). These trust authorities by law have no

authority to direct union activities, and unions are

involved with the trust authorities only to the extent

of selecting half of the trustees. Section 302(c) (5)

of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §186(c) (5).

Id. at 1368.

The LMRA and ERISA ensure that the trust and its trustees

remain independent of the parties who create (union and

employer) and contribute (employer) to the trust in order to

ensure that the parochial concerns of the parties are separated

16

from the parties’ mutual agreement that the trust benefit the

designated beneficiaries. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Etc., 453

U.S. at 329-34, 101 S.Ct. at 2794-96. (Discussion of legisla-

tive history of LMRA §302 and ERISA.) In the instant case,

however, the NLRB is relying upon the fiduciary responsibili-

ties of the trustees (ERISA §403-04, 29 U.S.C. §1103-04) to

establish that the Unio, a separate and distinct legal entity

from the Funds, was actively enforcing the terms of the

alleged contract.

The NLRB and Second Circuit decisions raise an important

_ issue of federal law “which has not been, but should be settled

by this Court. ...” U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 10.1(c): May the NLRB

rely upon the actions of LMRA/ERISA-governed Funds for

its resolution of a labor law dispute concerning the existence

of a contract between an employer and a union? In addition to

raising a question of federal law to be settled by this Court,

the Second Circuit’s enforcement order, while not a prece-

dent, conflicts with the decisions of other courts of appeals.

Id. Rule 10.1(a).

B.In Only Limited Circumstances May the Funds’ Serve as

the Agent for Both the Union and Employer.

Benefit funds may be the agent for the limited purpose of

receiving contributions. For example, in NLRB v. Clerks and

Checkers Local No. 1593, Int’! Longshoremen’s Association,

AFL-CIO, 644 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1981), enforcing, 243

NLRB (No. 3) 8, 101 LRRM 1348 (1979), the court stated:

“This limited agency of the Fund to receive contributions

does not conflict with common law principles relating to fidu-

Ciaries or with ERISA provisions requiring that trustees of

such a fund not be subject to the control of any other person

Calbine

17

or organization”. This is a strictly limited “agency” that can-

not serve to establish the existence of the collective bargain-

ing agreement.

The courts have rejected the NLRB’s attempts to extend the

agency to other matters:

It is generally agreed that both agents and

trustees are fiduciaries, but there are significant dif-

ferences between the two. An agent acts for and on

behalf of his principal and subject to his control. A

trustee acts for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the

trust; he is an agent only if he agrees to hold title for

the benefit and subject to the control of another.

Restatement 2d, Agency §14B; Restatement 2d,

Trusts §8. Unless the Union can be said to have

control of the operations of the Trust, the Trust

should not be treated as the Union’s agent.

NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of

America, Local #1913, AFL-CIO, 531 F.2d 424, 426-27 & n.1

(9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original) (Multiemployer benefit

fund subject to LMRA §302(c) (5) and ERISA.)

Were the union “to have control of the operations of the

Trust”, id., the trust would violate LMRA §302(c) (5) and

ERISA §403. Thus the NLRB’s attempts to find and apply a

common law “agency” relationship between benefit funds and

unions has been rejected. See also Waggoner v. Dallaire,

supra.

The record in this case does not support even a limited

agency because where, as here, the principals (Brower’s and

the Union) disagree over the agent’s (the Funds) conduct (the

18

enforcement of the alleged contract) there can be no agency.

In Re Shulman Transport Enterprises, Inc., 744 F.2d 293, 295

(2d Cir. 1984) (“An essential characteristic of an agency rela-

tionship is that the agent is eae to the principal’s direction

and control.”’)

As a matter of law, the activities of the Funds in pursuit of

their statutory and fiduciary obligations cannot be usurped by

the delinquent Union and relied upon by the NLRB as evi-

dence of the Union’s enforcing its alleged contracts with

Brower’s. The Funds, which could only have been an agent

for both Brower’s and the Union must be shown to act “for

the benefit of, with the knowledge and consent of, and under

some control by” the principals. E.g. Grove Press, Inc. v.

Angelton, 649 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1981). No such showing

has been made, and it is ludicrous to even consider that it

could exist on the record in this case because of the conflict-

ing interests of the potential principals. Therefore, the NLRB

exceeded its mandate by relying on the actions of the Funds to

find that the Union sought to enforce the alleged contract.

19

POINT IV

WHERE THE UNION ABANDONED THE

RESPONSIBILITY TO INITIATE BARGAIN-

ING, IT CANNOT THEREAFTER ACCUSE

THE EMPLOYER OF VIOLATING THE

EMPLOYER’S STATUTORY DUTY TO BAR-

GAIN.

Both the NLRB and the Second Circuit failed to address

Brower’s’ contention that the Union’s failure to demand bar-

gaining or even contact Brower’s to discuss the alleged

breaches warranted the dismissal of the complaint (Appendix

C at 4).

A. The §8(a) (5) charge cannot be sustained in the absence

of any evidence that the Union demanded bargaining.

The record in this case is bereft of any evidence that the

Union in the past twenty years demanded that Brower’s bar-

gain over or comply with any of the provisions of any alleged

agreement. (Appendix B at 19, 26.) In fact, just the opposite is

in evidence. In the past twenty years the Union never collec-

tively negotiated a bargaining agreement with Brower’s or its

agent nor demanded bargaining or compliance with any spe-

cific provision of any agreement. (A: 78, 227, 239-40, 252-57,

291-93, 298-301). In the absence of the General Counsel

introducing any evidence that the Union demand negotiations

or that Brower’s refused a request from the Union to bargain,

the Union’s charge cannot be sustained.?

9 That Brower’s’ actions were unilateral is rot per se a refusal to bargain.

NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 373 F.2d 595, 599 (4th Cir. 1967). Only where the

record establishes that any demand would have been futile, may a refusal to

(footnote continued)

20

It is well settled that in the absence of a demand, a refusal

to bargain charge cannot be sustained. NLRB v. Columbian

Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc., 306 U.S. 292, 59 S.Ct. 501

(1939). (The union never requested negotiations or even

expressed its willingness and desire to the employer to meet

and negotiate.) This case presents a more compelling set of

facts than those of Columbian Enameling simply because the

historical record, not just the operative period of the NLRB’s

Complaint (A:5, 19(a)), is bereft of any evidence that the

Union even communicated with Brower’s.!° In the absence of

this prima facie showing, the complaint should have been dis-

missed.

The NLRB has unsuccessfully attempted to restrict

Columbian Enameling to instances where the employer is

closing down its facility. See e.g. White Consolidated Indus-

tries, Inc., 154 NLRB (No. 127) 1593, 60 LRRM 1147 (1965)

(No §8(a) (5) violation because union never requested bar-

gaining over the decision to terminate the employer’s opera-

tion.) But as discussed below, the courts, and even the NLRB

on occasion, have not settled on such a narrow application of

Columbian Enameling.

(footnote continued)

bargain be inferred. /nsulating Fabricators, Inc., 144 NLRB (No. 125) 1325,

1332, 54 LRRM 1246, 1248 (1963). The NLRB made no such finding and since

there is no history of bargaining, any such inference is inappropriate. There is sim-

ply nothing in the record to indicate that a demand by the Union would have been

futile.

10 Indeed, the ALJ held that the fact that the Union made no attempts to

enforce the collective bargaining agreements established that the Union aban-

doned the contract. (Appendix B at 26 n.3)

21

B. Both the NLRB and the Second Circuit Ignored Their

Precedents Requiring the Union to Demand Bargaining

Before a Refusal to Bargain Charge May be Sustained.

The principle of failing to demand bargaining stands apart

from the particular issue over which bargaining is allegedly

refused. In American Buslines, Inc., 164 NLRB (No. 136)

1055, 65 LRRM 1265 (1967), the NLRB dismissed the com-

plaint (citing to Columbian Enameling) holding that the

union’s contenting itself with a mere protest over promotions

and the filing of an unfair labor practice charge did not meet

the union’s obligation to demand bargaining. /d. at 1267. The

essential point was that the union “failed to prosecute its

right” to demand negotiations and as a result the employer

could not be charged with a violation of $8(a) (5) of the Act.

The instant case was even more compelling for dismissal of

the complaint because Brower’s not only concealed nothing

from the Union (Appendix B at 26) or its employees with

Union backgrounds (A:307), but the Union was well aware of

Brower’s noncompliance over the years and did nothing about

it. The Union did not even attempt a half-hearted protest as in

American Buslines. If anything, the Union concealed itself

from Brower’s and misled it by never appointing a shop stew-

ard or even sending a delegate to the premises over the past

thirty years. A union cannot charge an employer with a failure

to observe its rights when by its conduct and practice over a

thirty year period the union claims no rights nor demands that

any be observed. The employer is justified in believing that

some arrangement exists between itself and the union, but that

it certainly is not a collective bargaining relationship in which

the employees’ interests are represented.

22

Moreover, the Second Circuit itself has refused to enforce

an NLRB order where the union failed to demand bargaining

over unilateral technological changes. /sland Typographers,

Inc., 252 NLRB (No. 3) 9, 105 LRRM 1455 (1980). enf. den.,

NLRB vy. Island Typographers, Inc., 705 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.

1983). Citing to Columbian Enameling, American Buslines,

Inc., International Offset Corp., 210 NLRB (No. 140) 854, 86

LRRM 1305 (1974) and NLRB vy. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d

379, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1967) (failure to request bargaining is

waiver of rights), the Second Circuit stated: “Both the Board

and this Court have recognized that a union cannot simply

ignore its responsibility to initiate bargaining over subjects of

concern and thereafter accuse the employer of violating its

statutory duty to bargain.” 705 F.2d at 51. See also W.W.

Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 860 F.2d 244, 249 (7th Cir. 1988)

(“We agree with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that, ‘a

union cannot simply ignore its responsibility to initiate bar-

gaining over subjects of concern and thereafter accuse the

employer of violating its statutory duty to bargain.’ /sland

Typographers, 705 F.2d at 51.”) Thus, the decision of the Sec-

ond Circuit in this case is inconsistent with its own precedent.

The writ of certiorari should be granted because both the

NLRB and the Second Circuit ignored their precedents as

well as those of this Court which required the Union to

demand bargaining. U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 10.1(c).

23

POINT V

THE NLRB MISAPPLIED ITS PRECEDENTS

TO CONCLUDE THAT BROWER’S AND THE

UNION INTENDED TO HAVE A COLLEC-

TIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP.

The NLRB attempts to distinguish the cases relied upon by

its ALJ, Ace-Doran Hauling & Rigging Co., 171 NLRB (No.

88) 645, 68 LRRM 1298 (1968), Glenlynn, Inc. d/b/a,

McDonald's Drive-In Restaurant, 204 NLRB (No. 45) 299,

83 LRRM 1356 (1973), Weber’s Bakery, 211 NLRB (No. 3) 1,

86 LRRM 1421 (1974), and Bender Ship Repair Co., Inc.,

188 NLRB (No. 86) 615, 77 LRRM 1007 (1971), by contend-

ing that the contract in the instant case was unambiguous and

that the Union enforced it. (Appendix B at 5-7.) The attempt

to distinguish the cases in which agreements were similarly

signed over the years is really an attempt to redecide them or

to depart from existing NLRB rules.

For example in Ace-Doran Hauling the dispositive factor,

ignored by. the NLRB in the instant case, was that the prac-

tices of the employer and union established that there was no

intention by either party to enter into or maintain a collective

bargaining relationship:

The evidence relating to the practice under the

agreements further makes it clear that the parties did

not intend them to be effective collective-bargaining

contracts, but instead merely regarded them as

arrangements under which Respondent agreed to

check off dues, health and welfare, and pension

payments for Union members only. The acquies-

cence of the Unions in Respondent’s failure both to

Pe ee en Pe ew ee

24

enforce the union-security provisions of the agree-

ments and to pay health and welfare contributions

for all employees, (as ostensibly provided in the

‘Contracts’) makes it clear that the parties did not

believe they were in true collective-bargaining rela-

tionships.

171 NLRB at 646, 68 LRRM at 1299.

Similarly, in this case the parties over the years signed con-

tracts, never bargained, failed to comply with key contract

terms, but continued an “arrangement” covering on occasion a

couple of employees and the Brower family. (The Brower

family members are not “employees” within the meaning of

§2[3] of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §152[3]). Since Brower’s’ intro-

duction to the Union in 1951, there is no evidence that the

parties ever intended to have a collective bargaining relation-

ship.

Bender Ship Repair presents a more compelling case for

dismissal of the complaint to the extent that the NLRB recog-

nized that the units were defined and it was able to state that

“(t]he record lacks evidence of majority status by the Union in

any appropriate unit at any critical date. ...” 188 NLRB at

615, 77 LRRM at 1008 n.2. The NLRB then held that “it is

evident from the practice under this and earlier contracts that

the parties had no intention of entering into a real collective-

bargaining relationship.” /d. at 616, 1009. See also Glenlynn,

Inc., 204 NLRB at 309 (“the record is devoid of independent

evidence of the Union’s majority status in [the] unit. ...”) Yet

the NLRB simply ignores its precedents without regard to its

obligation as an administrative agency to provide a reviewing

court with a basis to “judge the consistency of that act with

the agency’s mandate.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway

25

Co. v. Witchita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808, 93 S.Ct.

2367, 2375 (1973).

The NLRB’s attempt to distinguish Weber’s Bakery is

absurd because in that case it found that the unit was not ill-

defined and instead relied upon the fact that “the parties’ prac-

tice under the agreement showed they did not intend a real

collective bargaining agreement” to reject the union’s major-

ity status. (Appendix B at 6 n.10.) Thus, the NLRB should be

following Weber's Bakery in the instant case because for thirty

plus years the Union knew of Brower’s’ noncompliance and

yet never sought to enforce the terms of the successive con-

tracts. The contracts were a “sham.” (See also Glenlynn, Inc.,

204 NLRB at 308-09; NLRB v. West Sand & Gravel Co., 612

F.2d 1325 (1st Cir. 1979) (Application of decisions to case

identical to Brower’s.)

The NLRB further attempts to distinguish and depart from

the application of its Ace-Doran line of decisions by holding

that the presumption of majority status is irrebuttable by cit-

ing to Mr. Clean of Nevada, Inc., 288 NLRB No. 101, 130

LRRM 1345 (1988) and Pioneer Inn Assoc., 288 NLRB No.

(160) 1263, 95 LRRM 1225 (1977)."! Again, the distinctions

fail.

Pioneer Inn concerned the issue of union defunctness

11 The NLRB’s decision is inconsistent on this point. It states that an “incum-

bent union generally enjoys a presumption of continued majority status”

(Appendix B at 5)}—a rebuttable presumption—but then declares the presumption

irrebuttable. /d. at 8. Furthermore, in Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 NLRB (No. 63)

494, 44 LRRM 1407, 1408 (1959) the NLRB stated there was no evidence to

rebut the presumption. Why would the NLRB refer to a lack of rebutting evidence

if the presumption was irrebuttable? Either Shamrock should be overruled or the

presumption is rebuttable.

26

which was noi an issue in the instant case. Here, with the

exception of the charge it filed, the Union has not performed a

single act demonstrating any interest in representing Brower’s

employees. Pioneer is therefore both factually and conceptu-

ally inapposite because the dispositive factors in Pioneer were

that after a five year period of inertia from the Union, the

Union “resumed its role” representing the employees by pro-

cessing a grievance, by protesting unilateral changes in the

medical plan and by demanding negotiations to “amend and

modify” its contract. These facts are critical because they

establish that the union administered its contract and that the

employer appears to have been otherwise in compliance—evi-

dence of a collective bargaining relationship. The NLRB hung

its hat in Pioneer on the ALJ’s findings that the Union was

active in the critical period:

[T]he ... conduct alleged by the General Counsei to

be violative of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act

took place subsequent to June 1974, and, in fact,

subsequent to January 1975, the time specified by

the Administrative Law Judge when the Union

“commenced to represent the unit employees and to

admiuister the collective-bargaining agreement.”

228 NLRB at 1263, 95 LRRM at 1226.

While in Brower’s the contract also was signed, the latter

two critical elements—negotiations and processing grievances

—are absent. The only activity in the instant case by the

Union is the filing of the charge that: “During the past six

months, the Employer has failed and refused to apply its col-

lective bargaining [sic] with the Union.” (A: 1.) The irony of

the charge is that it implies that the Union checked whether

there was compliance and then asked (hence “refusal”)

27

Brower’s to comply. There is no evidence in the record that

the Union lifted its finger to do even these Acts. Pioneer Inn,

a defunctness case, was simply misapplied by the NLRB. The

Second Circuit failed to address the NLRB’s error in enforc-

ing the order.

The decision in Mr. Clean is also both factually and legally

inapposite because the union in Mr. Clean met with Mr.

Clean’s officer and discussed both the initial and renewal con-

tracts with him. (ALJ Decision pp. 15-19 describes the dis-

puted circumstances concerning the execution of both

contracts.) Additional critical distinctions between Brower’s

and Mr. Clean, ignored by the NLRB, are that the union in Mr.

Clean grieved discharges and signed up new employees. (ALJ

Decision at 3, 19.) There is no conduct more consistent with a

union’s desire to represent the employees of an employer than

signing-up new members. In Brower’s, there is no evidence of

contact between Brower’s and the Union for over twenty

years.

Moreover, and in sharp contrast with Brower’s, Mr. Clean

repudiated its contract while the union demanded bargaining,

signed up new members and grieved discharges which is evi-

dence that the union was affirmatively exercising its contrac-

tual rights in behalf of the employees it represented. None of

these facts essential to the outcome in Mr. Clean are present in

Brower’s. Except for the filing of the unfair labor practice

charge there has been only silence from the Union for the past

twenty years.!2 The facts in this case do not permit the appli-

12 The NLRB cited the single instance of the Union requesting én. updated

seniority list in 1983 (A;169, 211-13) as evidence of the Union's enforcement.

(Appendix B at 7.) The letter, however, was a form mass mailed to all employers.

i i let i

28

cation of the NLRB’s Pioneer Inn and Mr. Clean pre-

cedents.!3

Nevertheless, the NLRB is attempting to have it both ways

—retaining its precedents but rejecting the outcome they

require. The facts in the NLRB “precedents” and the instant

case are indistinguishable on the central question whether the

parties evinced any intention to maintain a collective bargain-

ing relationship. The NLRB erroneously failed to follow those

precedents.

If the NLRB is to be supported in its departure from prece-

dents, then it must at the very least establish that it is being

consistent with the mandate of the Act. Cf. Atchison & Topeka

Etc. v. Witchita Board of Trade, supra. Here, the NLRB does

not assert such a departure. Therefore, its actual departure is

an abuse of discretion which the Second Circuit erroneously

reviewed under a deferential standard. See Oil, Chemical &

Atomic Workers Int'l Union Etc. v. NLRB, 842 F.2d 1141,

1143 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988).

The actions of the NLRB and Second Circuit warrant

review by this Court to the extent that they are inconsistent

with the precedents of this Court requiring an administrative

agency to follow its precedents, explain any departures there-

from and remain consistent with the mandate of its enabling

act. The result in this case, thus far, is that the NLRB, with the

acquiescence of the Second Circuit, is arbitrarily forcing a

13 An additional distinction is that in Brower's there was no deception

(Appendix B at 26). Contr. Mr. Clean, Decision and Order at 2, n.4. Moreover,

ary inference of deception here is unsupportable because deception requires con-

tact, communication or avoidance, none of which took place between Brower's

and the Union even though certain Brower’s employees were Union members at

one time. (A:307-08.)

ie te diets ae a?) tine a stein le i a da J a ae

29

union on an employer’s employees without any evidence that

the union ever established having their support, has it now, or

has a valid legal basis for an inference being drawn that such

support exists.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. The

Second Circuit erroneously applied a deferential standard of

review permitting the NLRB to ignore its precedents as well

as exceed the parameters of its Congressional mandate.

In addition, both the NLRB and the Second Circuit erred by

relying upon the activities of LMRA/ERISA-governed Funds

as evidence of the Union’s intent and actual enforcement of its

contracts. Not only is this a question of federal law that

should be settled by this Court, but the Second Circuit’s order

conflicts with the precedents of other courts of appeals and

this Court. U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 101.(a), (c).

Dated: Carle Place, New York

November 23, 1990

Respectfully submitted,

Robert S. Nayberg

Law Offices of MARTIN H. SCHER

One Old Country Road, Suite 385

Carle Place, New York 11514

(516) 746-5040

~~.

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the

SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse in

the City of New York, on the 29th day of August, one thou-

sand nine hundred and ninety.

PRESENT:

HONORABLE WILFRED FEINBERG

HONORABLE RICHARD J. CARDAMONE

Circuit Judges

HONORABLE JOSE A. CABRANES*

District Judge

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED AUG 29 1990

ELAINE B. GOLDSMITH, CLERK

SECOND CIRCUIT

90-403 1

*Honorable Jose A. Cabranes, United States District Judge for the District of

C icut, siting by designat

A-2

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Petitioner,

and

LOCAL 814, AFITILIATED WITH THE

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN

AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

Intervenor,

against

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

Respondent,

X

Petition for enforcement of an order of the National Labor

Relations Board.

This cause came on to be heard on the application of the

National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its Deci-

sion and Order, dated November 8, 1989, and was briefed and

argued by counsel.

UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered,

adjudged and decreed that the order of the Board be and it

hereby is ENFORCED.

1. The National Labor Relations Board seeks to enforce its

order, dated November 8, 1989, against Brower’s Moving and

A-3

Storage, Inc., a Port Washington, New York business, which,

among other things, directed Brower’s to comply with the

terms and conditions of its 1986-89 collective bargaining

agreement with Local 814, International Brotherhood of

Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-

ica, AFL-CIO. The Board decided, in disagreement with the

ruling of the Administrative Law Judge, that Brower’s vio-

lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations

Act by repudiating the terms of its collective bargaining

agreement with the Union and by failing to make the contrac-

tually required contributions to employee Welfare, Pension

and Annuity Funds since April 11, 1988. It should be noted

that this Court recently affirmed the grant by the Unitea States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York of sum-

mary judgment against Brower’s in an action by the Trustees

of the Funds, ordering Brower’s to make unpaid pension con-

tributions to the Funds. Benson, Corbett, Eisenberg, Morgan

& O’Connor v. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., No. 90-

7001 (2d Cir. June 18, 1990).

2. Citing such cases as NLRB v. Marine Optical Associates,

671 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1982), Pioneer Inn Associates v.

NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1978) and NLRB v.

Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1969),

the Board argues that Brower’s was not legally justified in

challenging the incumbent Union’s majority status and

dishonoring its agreement because, during the term of a col-

lective bargaining agreement of three years or less, the incum-

bent union is entitled to a presumption of majority status. The

Company apparently does not dispute this proposition;

instead, relying principally on Ace-Doran Hauling & Rigging

Co., 171 NLRB 645, 646 (1968), it claims that his presump-

tion does not apply here because the conduct and practice of

A-4

the parties shows that they did not intend their agreement to

function as an effective collective bargaining contract.

Brower’s alleges that the Union’s actions subsequent to its

initial agreement in 1951 indicate that the Union either aban-

doned the contract or acquiesced in the Company’s repudia-

tion of it. The Board, however, found on the record before it

that the parzies’ conduct over a period of years did not negate

the intent to form a valid collective bargaining agreement or

establish that the Union abandoned the contract or acquiesced

in repudiation of it.

3. We find that the Board’s findings of fact are supported

by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and therefore

must be affirmed. The Board made a number of findings con-

fixming the parties’ intent to form a valid, ongoing collective

bargaining relationship, including the Company’s assent to

successive agreements over a period of many years, its pay-

ment of dues and contributions for several employees over a

substantial period of time and the Union’s efforts on behalf of

employees in a number of instances to secure affirmative

compliance with the contract.

4. We have considered all of the Company’s arguments and

find them without merit. We grant the Board’s application to

enforce its order.

’ WILFRED FEINBERG

RICHARD J. CARDAMONE

Circuit Judges

ewe Bee Met a ts OP eel aes. .e ae 8 eae 2

Parr = ; aid eae rere oF os eee

*

A-5

JOSE A. CABRANES,

District Judge

N.B. This summary order will not be published in the Federal

Reporter and should not be cited or otherwise relied upon in

unrelated cases before this or any other court.

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APPENDIX B

297 NLRB No. 28

SCH

D—1027

Port Washington, NY

Case 29—-CA—13733

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

and

LOCAL 814, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN

AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO

DECISION AND ORDER

On April 11, 1989, Administrative Law Judge Joel P.

Biblowitz issued the attached decision. The Respondent and

the Acting General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting

briefs, and the Respondent filed an answering brief.

The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-

thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

B-2

The Board has considered the decision and the record in

light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the

judge’s rulings, findings,’ and conclusions only to the extent

consistent with the Decision and Order.

The complaint alleged that the Respondent violated Section

8(a)(5) and (1) by repudiating and failing to honor the terms

of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union and by

failing to make the required contributions to the Teamsters

Local 814 Welfare, Pension and Annuity Funds (the Funds),

covering the employees in the following appropriate unit:

All chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low

operators, checkers and helpers employed at the Re-

spondent’s warehouse, excluding guards and super-

visors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.

The judge dismissed the complaint. Relying primarily on Ace-

Doran Hauling & Rigging Co.* and McDonald's Drive-In

Restaurant,’ the judge found that the collective-bargaining

agreement between the parties did not give rise to a presump-

' We shall set forth the facts that the judge failed to mention, which support as-

serting jurisdiction over the Respondent. The Respondent, a New York corporation

with an office and place of business at its warehouse located at 18 Avenue A, Port

Washington, New York, is engaged in the warehousing, moving, and storage of

household and commercial furniture and other items. The Respondent, during the

12-month period ending November 30, 1988, which is a representative period, in

the course and conduct of its business had gross revenues in excess of $500,000.

During the same 12-month period, the Respondent purchased and received at its

warehouse goods and material valued in excess of $50,000 directly from sources

located outside the State of New York. We find that the Respondent is an employer

engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that

the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act.

7171 NLRB 645 (1968).

> 204 NLRB 299 (1973). The judge also cited Weber's Bakery, 211 NLRB 1

(1974), and Pender Ship Repair Co., 188 NLRB 615 (1971).

297 NLRB No. 28

B-3

tion of majority status. He concluded that the agreement was

invalid because the parties’ practice under the agreement

demonstrated that they did not intent to established a valid

collective-bargaining relationship. We disagree with the

judge’s failure to find a violation for the following reasons.

The Respondent recognized the Union in 1951 after it de-

manded recognition. The Respondent admits signing succes-

sive collective-bargaining agreements over the years, although

there were never any individual negotiations. Most recently,

the Respondent agreed to be bound by the 1986 to 1989 col-

lective-bargaining agreement between the Union and an em-

ployer association of which the Responuent is not a member.

The agreement states that it covers employees classified as

chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low operators, check-

ers, and helpers. Although the Respondent has never estab-

lished the specific job classifications described in the contract,

it has employees who perform many of the functions included

in those classifications.

It is undisputed that over the years the Respondent failed to

honor and abide by the wage, holiday, vacation, union secu-

rity, and other provisions of the successive agreements. There

is no affirmative evidence that the Union was aware of these

lapses other than failure to pay into the Funds until the instant

unfair labor practice charge was filed. From 1951 to 1954 a

union representative visited the Respondent’s facility on a

monthly basis to collect dues. No grievances were ever filed

and no steward was appointed, and after 1954 no union repre-

sentative visited the Respondent’s facility.

Over the years the Union’s Funds sent the Respondent

monthly contribution remiftamee reports. Until 1968 the Re-

B-4

spondent made Fund contributions only on behalf of a few

family members employed by the Respondent, despite the fact

that the Respondent employed other individuals in the unit de-

scribed in the contract. The Respondent had contributed to the

Funds on behalf of Wesley Brower until 1956 when the Union

informed him that, because he was an owner of the Respon-

dent, he could not work on trucks with members of the bar-

gaining unit.

In 1968, the Respondent contacted the Union about getting

an employee “set up” with hospitalization coverage and other

benefits. In March 1982 the Respondent paid the back dues

and Fund contributions that the Union required in order for

the employee to be eligible. The parties settled a 1981 suit

brought by the trustees of the Funds for delinquent contribu-

tions for the period July 1975 to January 1981. In September

1987, the Respondent ceased making any Fund contributions.

In December 1987, the Funds conducted an audit of the Re-

spondent’s payroll records and found a sizeable delinquency

in contributions due from April 1983 through September

1987. The Funds regularly sent past due notices to the Re-

spondent on a monthly basis showing delinquencies dating

back to 1981. The Respondent did not respond to bills for the

delinquency, and the Funds filed suit.

By letter dated October 14, 1983, the Union requested all

employers with collective-bargaining agreements, including

the Respondent, to submit an updated seniority list. This re-

quest was made pursuant to a provision of the collective-bar-

gaining agreement. The Respondent replied by sending the

Union a letter listing some family members who worked for

it. At that time the Respondent also requested that the Union

provide it with the dates of entry and years of credit for the

B-5

few family members that the Respondent had listed in its re-

sponse. The Union responded by submitting this information

to the Respondent. It appears that the Respondent, in actuality,

employed more unit employees than those listed in its re-

sponse and never informed the Union of the existence of these

additional employees. On October 11, 1988, the Union filed

the charge herein.

We find that since 1951, the Union has been the designated

exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-

ployees in the unit described in the complaint, which we find

appropriate for collective bargaining, and that the Union has

been recognized as such by the Respondent. Since 1951 such

recognition has been embodied in successive collective-bar-

gaining agreements between the Respondent and the Union,

the most recent of which is effective by its terms for the pe-

riod April 1, 1986, to March 31, 1989. The Respondent has

repudiated and, by its own admission, failed to honor and

abide by the wage, vacation, holiday, union security, and other

provisions of its agreement with the Union. We find that,

since April 11, 1988, by this conduct, the Respondent has vio-

lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. We further find that

the Respondent has since April 11, 1988, violated Section

8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to make the contractually required

contributions to the Union’s Funds.‘

We reject the Respondent’s contention and the judge’s find-

ing that there is no valid collective-bargaining agreement and

that the Union was not supported by a majority of the employ-

ees in an appropriate unit. We find that the cases relied on by

the judge are distinguishable. As the judge noted, it is well-

established in Board Law that an incumbent union generally

‘Mr. Clean of Nevada, 288 NLRB No. 101 (May 11, 1988).

enjoys a presumption of continued majority status during the

term of a collective-bargaining agreement. In Ace-Doran

Hauling & Rigging Co., supra, the Board found a narrow ex-

ception to that general rule when two factors undermined the

validity of the contract and the presumption of majority status.

First, the Board found that the unit was not defined with suffi-

cient clarity “to warrant a finding that the contracts are ones

to which a presumption of majority status can attach.” Sec-

ond, the Board found that both parties’ practice under the

agreements showed that the parties did not intend them to be

effective collective-bargaining agreements, but merely ar-

rangements to check off dues and to procure benefits for

union members only.* Similarly, in Bender Ship Repair Co.,

supra, the Board found a “patent ambiguity” in the contrac-

tual unit definition and that the union acquiesced in the appli-

cation of the contract to only a few favored employees.* In

McDonald's Drive-In Restaurani, supra,’ the Board adopted

the judge’s finding that the unit purported to be covered by

the contract was ambiguous and that the union never bothered

to enforce its contract.”

The aforementioned cases are distinguishable because the

collective-bargaining agreement in this case suffers from no

*171 NLRB at 645.

* Id. at 646.

’ 188 NLRB at 615.

* Id. at 616.

* 204 NLRB 299, 309 (1973).

* The judge also cited Weber's Bakery, supra. In that case the board adopted the

judge’s finding that, although the unit definition in the contract was adequate to

support the contract's validity, the parties’ practice under the agreement showed

presumption of majority status did not attach. The judge in Weber's Bakery found

that the contract was a sham and that the Union acquiesced in, at most, token com-

pliance with the contract.

211 NLRB at 12.

— Te ee a eee eee ee 1: Alasiae

B-7

such infirmities. It clearly specifies the unit, and the judge

specifically found it was not a “members only” contract. In

addition, the Union has clearly taken affirmative steps to en-

force its contract over the years. When the contract was first

signed, a union representative went to the facility to sign up

employees and thereafter visited monthly for 3 years to col-

lect dues. In 1956 the Union sought to stop the Respondent’s

owner, Wesley Brower, from performing unit work. In 1968

the Union responded to the Respondent’s request to sign up

one of its employees and required that the Respondent comply

with the contract by paying back dues and benefit contribu-

tions to the employee’s date of hire. In 1983, the Union re-

quested that the Respondent submit an updated seniority list.

Moreover, the activity of the Funds in filing suit in 1981 and

in auditing the Respondent’s books and records in 1987 and

instituting another suit for the delinquencies discovered is

consistent with a finding that there was in existence a valid

enforceable collective-bargaining agreement between the par-

ties.

While no steward was appointed and no grievances filed,

the Respondent admitted it never told its unit employees they

were represented by the Union or that there was an applicable

contract. Therefore, the employees were denied the knowl-

edge necessary to seek assistance from the Union. And, as

discussed earlier, the Union was also denied knowledge con-

cerning the unit employees when it asked for it. The Umion

filed the charge herein in October 1988 and has actively pur-

sued it.

Thus, we find that there is no evidence that the Union ever

acquiesced in a repudiation of substantial portions of the con-

tract or that the Union and the Respondent ever had an ar-

rangement or understanding that would negate an intent to

enter into a valid collective-bargaining relationship."

Accordingly, we find that the 1986-1989 contract is valid

and gives rise to an irrebutable presumption of majority status

and that the Union has not abandoned its administration of the

contract. We further find that the Respondent has violated

Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by repudiating and failing

to comply with the contract’s terms and by failing to make the

required Fund contributions.”

" KBMS, Inc., 278 NLRB 826, 846 (1986).

We note that the Respondent itself has engaged in conduct that is inconsistent

with its position that there is no valid contract. It has signed successive agreements

over a period of 36 years and paid dues and made benefit contributions pursuant to

those collective-bargaining agreements for several employees over a substantial

part of that time. In 1968 the Respondent called on the Union to sign up an em-

ployee so he could receive union benefits, and it complied with the Union’s re-

quirement to pay back dues and benefits for that employee so that employee would

be ligible.

We also reject the Respondent’s contention that the contract is not valid be-

cause the Union lacked majority status at the time of the initial recognition in

1951. The Board has held:

[A]n employer may not defend against a refusal-to-bargain allegation

on the basis that the original recognition, occurring more than 6

months before charges had been filed in the proceeding raising the

issue, was unlawful. Any such defense is barred by Section 10(b) of

the Act.

Morse Shoe, Inc., 227 NLRB 391, 394 (1976), and the cases cited therein. Mr.

Clean of Nevada, supra. Even if the initial recognition in 1951 were flawed, it is

outside the 10(b) period, and the Resondent is precluded from attacking the current

contract on that basis.

® Mr. Clean of Nevada, supra, KBMS, Inc., supra; Pioneer Inn & Pioneer Inn

Casino, 228 NLRB 1263 (1977), enfd. 578 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1978).

We reject the Respondent’s contention and the jucye’s finding that the Union

has abandoned the contract and the unit. As the Board stated in Pioneer Inn, supra

at 1264:

[T]he lack of any basis for finding the contract to be invalid calls irito

effect the long-established Board presumption of the Union's major-

ity status during the term of the contract, irrespective of the degree to

which the Union may or may not have been deficient in the adminis-

(Footnote continued)

B-9

Conclusions of Law

‘

1. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc. is an employer en-

gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and

(7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of

Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. The Union is the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-

sentative of the employees in the following appropriate unit:

All chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low op-

erators, checkers and helpers employed by Brower’s

Moving & Storage, Inc., at its Port Washington,

New York facility, excluding guards and supervisors

as defined in the Act.

4. Since April 11, 1988, the Respondent has violated Sec-

tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by repudiating and failing to

honor or abide by the terms of its collective-bargaining agree-

ment with the Union, and by failing to make the required

Fund contributions.

5. The above-described violations of the Act constitute un-

fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of

Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

tration of that agreement.

To preserve the validity of a contract for contract bar purposes, a recognized union

need only show that it is willing and able to represent the covered employees at the

time its status is called into question. Loree Footwear Corp., 197 NLRB 360

(1972); Road Materials, 193 NLRB 990, 991 (1971). There is no evidence that the

Union is either unwilling or unable to represent the Respondent’s employees cov-

ered by the contract.

B-10

The Remedy

Having found that the Respondent has violated Section

8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we shall order that it cease and de-

sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to

effectuate the policies of the Act.

Specifically, we shall order the Respondent to honor and

abide by the terms of its collective-bargaining agreement with

the Union, to make the unit employees whole for any losses

they may have suffered because of the Respondent’s failure to

abide by the terms of the agreement, for the period beginning

April 11, 1988, to be computed in the manner set forth in

Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), plus interest

to be computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for

the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), and to remit the contri-

butions required by the agreement for the period beginning

April 11, 1988, to the Union’s Funds, with interest to be com-

puted according to the practice set forth in Merryweather Op-

tical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 126 fn. 7 (1979). The Respondent

shall also reimburse its employees for any expenses ensuing

from its failure to make contributions to the Funds, as set

forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2

(1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981).

ORDER

The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Re-

spondent, Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., Port Washing-

ton, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,

shall

1. Cease and desist from

B-11

(a) Repudiating and failing to honor and abide by the terms

of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union cover-

ing the employees in the following unit:

All chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low op-

erators, checkers and helpers employed by Brower’s

Moving & Storage, Inc., at its Port Washington,

New York facility, excluding guards and supervisors

as defined in the Act.

(b) Failing to make pension, welfare, and annuity Fund

contributions as required by its collective-bargaining agree-

ment with the Union for the unit employees described above.

(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-

ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-

anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-

tuate the policies of the Act. |

(a) Honor and abide by the terms of its collective-bargain-

ing agreement with the Union.

(b) Make whole all unit employees for any losses they may

have suffered as a result of the Respondent’s refusal to honor

the terms of its collective-bargaining agreement for the period

beginning April 11, 1988, in the manner described in the rem-

edy section of this decision.

(c) Make whole tne Union’s Funds for any payments the

Respondent failed to make for the period beginning April 11,

1988, in the manner described in the remedy section of this

Decision.

B-12

(d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or

its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,

social security payment records, timecards, personnel records

and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the

amount of reimbursements due.

(e) Post at its Port Washington, New York facility copies of

the attached notice marked “Appendix.””® Copies of the no-

tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region

29, after being signed by the Respondent’s representative,

shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt

and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places

including all places where notices to employees are custom<r-

ily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent

to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered

by any other material.

(f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days

from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has

taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C. November 8, 1989

James M. Stephens, Chairman

Mary Miller Cracraft, Member

John E. Higgins, Jr. Member

(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

" If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals,

the words in the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS BOARD” shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDG-

MENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN

ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”

B-13

APP.NDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-

lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to

post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT repudiate or fail to honor and abide by the

terms of our collective-bargaining agreement with Local 814,

International Brotherhood Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-

housemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO covering the

employees in the following unit:

All chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low op-

erators, checkers and helpers employed by Brower’s

Moving & Storage, Inc., at its Port Washington,

New York facility, excluding guards and supervisors

as defined in the Act.

WE WILL NOT fail to make pension, welfare, and annuity

Fund contributions as required by our collective-bargaining

agreement with che Union for the employees described above.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,

restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed

you by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL honor and abide by the terms of our coilective-bar-

gaining agreement with the Union.

B-14

WE WILL make whole all unit employees for any losses they

may have suffered as a result of our refusal to honor the terms

of our collective-bargaining agreement from April 11, 1988,

with interest.

WE WILL make whole the Union’s Funds for any payments

we failed to make from April 11, 1988, with interest.

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

(Employer)

Dated By

(Representative) (Title)

This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-

one.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days

from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or

covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this

notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to

the Board’s Office, 75 Clinton Street, Eighth Floor, Brooklyn,

New York 11201-0001, Telephone 718-330-2862.

B-15

JD(NY)-30—89

Port Washington, NY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

DIVISION OF JUDGES

NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE

Case No. 29-CA—13733

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

.

and

LOCAL 814, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN

AND HELPERS OF AMERICA

Carol L. O’Rourke, Esq. and James J. Paulsen, Esq.

for the General Counsel

Michael Barrett, Esq., Friedman, Levy, Warren & Moss,

for the Charging Party

Robert S. Nayberg, Esq. and Richard A. Ivers, &sq.

Law Offices of Martin H. Scher, for the Respondent

B-16

DECISION

Statement of the Case

JOEL P. BIBLOWITZ, Administrative Law Judge:

This case was heard by me on February 9, 1989 in Brooklyn,

New York. The Complaint and Notice of Hearing herein,

which issued on November 30, 1988,’ and was based upon an

unfair labor practice charge filed on October 11 by Local 814,

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-

housemen and Helpers of America, herein called the Union,

alleges that Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., herein called

Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(1)(5) of the Act by repudi-

ating and failing to abide by its contract with the Union by,

inter alia, failing to make pension fund, welfare fund and an-

nuity fund contributions, as required by the contract, and by

failing to comply with the contract’s terms regarding wages,

holidays, vacations and union security.

Upon the entire record, I make the following:

Findings of Fact

L. Jurisdiction and Labor Organization Status

Therein being no dispute, I find that Respondent is an em-

ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section

2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act, and the Union is a labor organiza-

tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

Unless indicated otherwise, all dates referred to herein relate to the year 1988.

B-17

II. Facts and Analysis

Respondent is engaged in the warehousing and moving and

storage business and has maintained a collective bargaining

relationship (of sorts) with the Union since 1951. At that time,

Respondent recognized the Union and the Union delegate

came to Respondent’s facility and had a number of employees

(principally members of the Brower family) join the Union.

From that time until his death in 1954, the Union delegate

came to the facility regularly to collect Union dues from these

individuals. From 1954 until the visit of Peter Furtado (as dis-

cussed, infra) nobody from the Union ever visited the shop.

Respondent never formally negotiated a contract with the

Union, but, apparently, every few years executed a Memoran-

dum of Agreement agreeing to be bound by an agreement en-

tered into by the Union with one of the employer associations

with which it negotiates, and to execute the printed contract as

soon as it was available. The last such Memorandum of

Agreement is effective April 1, 1986 through March 31, 1989.

During 1988, Respondent had a complement of from ten to

twenty employees; this number does not include Dorothy

Golden, bookkeeper and sister-in-law of the owners. It does

include Clifford Brower, Secretary-treasurer of Respondent

(“I take care of the books in the office and work around the

warehouse just like everybody else”), Wesley Brower, Presi-

dent of Respondent and another owner with Clifford Brower,

Gary Brower (“He drives a truck, he works around the ware-

house, anything that has to be done”), Wesley Brower’s son

and John Brower, a truck driver and also Wesley Brower’s

son. Gary and John Brower each owns some stock in Respon-

dent. Gary and John Brower are two of Respondent’s four

regular drivers; Respondent also employs people who do

B-18

packing and warehousing.

At least since 1967, the only two employees for whom Re-

spondent has transmitted dues and contributions to the Union

are Clifford and John Brower. Until about 1956, Respondent,

contributed, as well, for Wesley Brower; at that time, a repre-

sentative of the Union told him that he could not work along-

side the other employees, and Respondent ceased transmitting

dues and contributions to the Union on his behalf. In about

1967, Respondent contacted the Union and informed them

that it had a driver in its employ for about nine years and that

it had not been deducting or transmitting dues or contributions

on his behalf; at that time, Respondent and the Union entered

into an agreement for the Respondent to pay about $20,000 to

the Union over eighteen months so that the employee would

be eligible for benefits upon his retirement. Respondent made

the final payment pursuant to this agreement in 1969. Prior to

1982, Respondent also made the required contributions for

employee George Finley and, possibly, others.

In 1981, the trustees of the Union’s Welfare, Pension and

Annuity Trust Fund, herein called the Funds, sued Respon-

dent in Supreme Court, Queens County for failing to pay to

the funds the sum of $14,105 for the period July 1975 through

January, 1981;? the lawsuit added an additional $7,500 as in-

terest and attorney’s fees. By a Stipulation entered into in

March 1982, Respondent agreed to pay $19,000 to the funds

over a period of about two years and said payments were

made.

By letter dated October 14, 1983 “to All Employers” (in-

2 It is not clear whether this lawsuit covered payments only for John and Clif-

ford Browers, or whether it included payments for others, as weil.

B-19

cluding Respondent) the Union, by Charles Martelli, its Sec-

retary treasurer, wrote: ;

In accordance with the requirements of Section

21(A) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, it is

expected that each Employer shall mail, to the

Union’s office, no later than November 15, 1983, an

up-to-date seniority list, showing the date of origi-

nal hire and the classification seniority date for all

employees.

The above requirement must be complied with

without exception.

On the bottom of this letter, Clifford Brower wrote: “Char-

lie—Please check and see what year we got in the Union and

how many years we have .o our credit.” Underneath, he listed

his name together with John Brower. By letter dated Nover-

ber 28, 1983, Martelli stated: “Please be informed that we are

in receipt of your seniority list and wish to inform you of the

following information.” The letter gave October 16, 1967 as

date of initiation for both, Clifford and John Brower, together

their pension credits.

Other than the above recited situations, and the Complaint

filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-

trict of New York on February 11 (as more fully described,

infra) the Union has never filed a grievance or court action

against Respondent, nor did any Union representative ever ap-

pear at Respondent’s facility to question Respondent’s com-

pliance with the contract even though the uncontradicted testi-

mony establishes that Respondent did not comply with a vast

majority of the contractual terms, including the following:

B-20

Article 1 (Wages)

Article 3 (Birthday Holidays)

Article 4 (Vacations)

Articles 5, 6 and 7 (Job Classifications)

Article 9 E (Pay for Meals and Lodging for

Overnight Hauls)

Articles 11 and 12 (Conditions and Rates Paid

Employees)

Article 13 (Union Security Clause)

Article 16 (Check-Off of Dues)

Article 17 (Shop Steward)

Article 21 (Seniority)

Article 23 (Death in Family)

Articles 29, 30 and 31 (Pension, Welfare and

Annuity Fund)

Article 32 (Cost of Living Allowance)

More particularly (as regards the more important of these pro-

visions) Respondent did not pay the wages as set forth in the

contract or make the contributions to the Union’s funds for

any of Respondent’s employees except for Clifford and John

Brower. In addition, Respondent did not maintain a seniority

list, did not notify the Union upon the hiring of new em-

ployees or after their thirty first day of employment, and

never had any employee designated as a shop steward. As

stated, supra, in about 1956 Wesiey Brower was informed

that, as an owner of Respondent, he could not work on the

trucks with members of the Union. At that time, Respondent

ceased making payments to the Union and the funds on his

behalf, but he “...still worked on the truck next to whoever

was there with me”, without any complaints from the Union.

Beginning in January, the Union has sent Past Due Notices

B-21

(“This will inform you that your monthly payment to the

Teamsters Local 814 Pension, Welfare and Annuity Trust

Funds as set forth below has not been received. This matter

needs your immediate attention”.) to Respondent stating that

the delinquency period was 1981 through 1987; apparently,

Respondent never responded to these notices. Rather, Respon-

dent continued to make the required contributions to the

Funds for Clifford and John Brower, at least, through the end

of 1987.

On December 21, 1987, Peter Furtado, who, at the time,

was an auditor for the Funds, audited Respondent’s books

pursuant to the Funds normal procedures. On January 14, the

Funds sent Respondent a Notice of Audit Delinquency stating

that Respondent had underpaid the Funds in the amount of

$239,000 for the period April 1983 through September 1987;

that amount, together with interest and “liquidated damages”

of twenty percent brought the amount Respondent owed to

$377,000. Payment was demanded within fifteen days; Re-

spondent was informed that if payment was not made the mat-

ter would be turned over to the Funds’ attorneys. On February

11, 1988, the Funds sued Respondent in Federal District Court

in Brooklyn for $239,000 plus interest, liquidated damages

and costs. Apparently, this matter has not yet reached the trial

stage. Respondent has not paid this amount to the Union.

Respondent defends on three grounds: there is no contract,

even if there were a contract, it has long since been aban-

doned by the Union, and, even if it has not been abandoned,

after so many years of not enforcing the agreements, the

Union is estopped from attempting to do so now.

The Board has long held that an incumbent union generally

B-22

enjoys a presumption of continued majority status (a prerequi-

site, of course, to a Section 8(a)(5) violation) during the dura-

tion of a collective bargaining agreement. Pioneer Inn Associ-

ates, d/B/A Pioneer Inn and Pioneer Inn Casino, 228 NLRB

1263; Colson Equipment, Inc., 257 NLRB 78. An exception

to this rule was set forth in Ace-Doran Hauling & Rigging

Co., 171 NLRB 645 where the Board found that the contracts

between the parties did not raise a presumption of regularity

or that the union was the majority representative of the em-

ployer’s employees.

The evidence relating to the practice under the

agreements further makes it clear that the parties did

not intend them to be effective collective-bargaining

contracts, but instead merely regarded them as ar-

rangements under which Respondent agreed to

check off dues, health and welfare, and pension

payments for union members only. The acquies-

cence of the Unions in Respondent’s failure both to

enforce the union-security provisions of the agree-

ments and to pay health and welfare contributions

for all employees (as ostensibly provided by the

“contracts”), makes it clear that the parties did not

believe that they were in true collective-bargaining

relationships.

Since the alleged agreements are not such as

would give rise to a presumption of majority status,

we find that the General Counsel has failed to sus-

tain his burden of proof and therefore that the com-

plaint should be dismissed.

See also Bender Ship Repair Company, Inc., 188 NLRB

615, Weber’s Bakery, 211 NLRB 1; and Glenlynn, Inc., 204

NLRB 299, which stated at 309:

B-23

However, the Board has held that this presump-

tion may not attach following the termination of the

contract where the contract does not define the bar-

gaining unit with sufficient clarity or where the

practices thereunder demonstrate that the parties

never intended to establish a real bargaining rela-

tionship.

Apart from the ambiguity thus surrounding the

scope of the bargaining unit, the evidence leaves

one highly skeptical that a real collective-bargaining

relationship emanated from the execution of the

Alton contract. As previously discussed, it is undis-

puted that the Union neither administered the con-

tract nor serviced the employees. As a result, not

only were the employees deprived of contractual

benefits pertaining to such matters as wage rates,

health and welfare contributions, meals, uniforms,

job duties, and holidays, but they were subjected to

working conditions unilaterally imposed by the Re-

spondent without any protest from the Union. More-

over, whatever grievances or complaints they had

they personally presented to, and discussed with,

management and it was not until the closing days of

the contract that the Union undertook to submit sev-

eral employee grievances to the Company. In addi-

tion to the Union’s indifference to employee inter-

ests, it did not bother to enforce them. Apparently,

the Union was not content with the few employees

the Respondent periodically signed up for the Union

and with the initiation fees and dues the Respondent

deducted from the wages of these employees. It was

only near the end of the contract term that the Union

took more affirmative steps to enlist the Respon-

dent’s assistance to force the employees to join.

B-24

In sum, I find that the parties never entered into a

true collective-bargaining relationship out of which

a presumption of the Union’s majority status may

arise. At best, the relationship was a token one

where “the Union was willing to exact little in the

way of contract enforcement and ... [the Respon-

dent was] never satisfied to reap the financial bene-

fits of lower costs.” In these circumstances, and in

view of equivocal nature of the bargaining unit, I

find the evidence insufficient to support a presump-

tion that the Union was the majority representative

of the employees in the alleged Alton store unit.

I cannot imagine a better example of the situation referred

to in Glenlynn and Ace Doran, supra, as the instant matter.

Respondent initially recognized the Union in about 1951 and

about every three years the Union sent Respondent a Memo-

randum of Agreement to execute; by signing each of these,

Respondent agreed to be bound by the contract the Union was

to negotiate with an association. After Respondent agreed to

recognize the Union in 1951 (without any majority support

from Respondent’s employees) the Union’s subsequent activ-

ity (up until the December 1987 audit of Respondent’s books

and the subsequent filing of the Federal Court action in

February) was as follows:

After Respondent recognized the Union, a representative of

the Union came to the Respondent’s facility and signed Clif-

ford and Wesley Brower as Union members; it is not clear

whether any other employee joined the Union at that time.

In 1967, Respondent contacted the Union and informed them

that it wanted Merriweather, a driver in its employ for nine

years, to be a member of the Union and covered by the Funds

B-25

so that he could receive a pension from the Union upon retire-

ment. The Union determined the amount due it since Merri-

weather began his employment, with Respondent in 1959—

almost $20,000—and Respondent paid this amount to Re-

spondent.

In 1981, the Union funds sued Respondent for $14,000 delin-

quency in payments to the funds from 1975; a year later, this

matter was settled when Respondent agreed to pay this

amount in installments. This lawsuit involved only the annu-

ity, welfare and pension funds not any other payments Re-

spondent failed to make under the contracts.

In 1983 the Union requested all employers under contract to

supply them with a seniority list; Respondent asked the Union

for the seniority dates of the only two individuals who were

members—Clifford and John Brower—and the following

month the Union supplied them with their date of initiation

into the Union—1967.

On a monthly basis (beginning in, at least, April 1986) trans-

mitted to Respondent a combined Monthly Welfare, Pension

and Annuity Contribution Report with only John and Clif-

ford’s name filled in; Respondent then listed forty hours for

each, together with the amount due and a check to cover this

amount. Between the 1981 lawsuit and the December 1987

audit, Respondent never questioned these reports.

The record clearly establishes that aside from the dues and

fund payments for Clifford, and John Brower (and for a pe-

riod, Merriweather and Wesley Brower) the contracts between

the parties were totally disregarded; employees were not

members of the Union as required by the union security

B-26

clause of the agreement nor did they receive the terms and

conditions of employment as specified in the contracts.

Rather, it appears that (with the exception of the 1981 lawsuit)

between 1951 and December 1987, the Union did nothing to

enforce its contract with Respondent. General Counsel, in her

brief, cites Mr. Clean of Nevada, Inc., 288 NLRB No. 101.

However, that case is distinguishable from the instant matter

because that bargaining relationship lasted only two years and

four months and involved deception by the employer. In the

instant matter, the parties had a collective bargaining relation-

ship for thirty six years before the Union took any action to

enforce the contract, and Respondent never engaged in any

positive deceptions; it simply made believe that the contract

did not exist.

The 1986 through 1989 contract therefore does not give

rise to a presumption of majority status, Ace-Doran, supra, |

therefore find that the General Counsel has failed to sustain

her burden of proof and accordingly recommend that the

Complaint be dismissed.’

? Although I have recommended that the Complaint be dismissed on this

ground, two other theories—members only and abandonment—should be men-

tioned. In Don Mendenhall, Inc., 194 NLRB 1109 the Board refused to find a Sec-

‘ tion 8(aX5) violation because the agreement between the company and the union

was appiied to members only. Members only is not applicable to the instant sitta-

tion because the contract did not even cover the terms and conditions of employ-

ment of the only two members—John and Clifford Brower, it only covered them

for the annuity, pension and welfare funds. On the other hand, I cannot imagine a

clearer case of abandonment by a union; in the situation herein, the Union (as dif-

ferentiated from the trustees of the Funds) made no attempt to enforce the provi-

sions of its agreements with Respondent for approximately thirty six years. To me,

this indicates an “unwillingness to represent the employees in the unit.” Road Ma-

terials, Inc., 193 NLRB 990 at 991. See also Industrial Paper Stock Company, 66

NLRB 1185.1 would therefore recommend the dismissal of this Complaint for that

reason, as well.

B-27

Conclusions of Law

1. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., is an employer en-

gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),

and (7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of

Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1)(5) of the Act

as alleged in the Complaint. 2

Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,

and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Na-

tional Labor Pelations Act, as amended, I hereby issue the

following recommended:

ORDER‘

It having been found and conciuded that Respondent,

Brower Moving & Storage, Inc., has not engaged in unfair

labor practices as alleged, the Complaint is hereby dismissed

in its entirety.

}

Dated: April 11, 1989

Joel P. Biblowitz

Administrative Law Judge

* If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules

and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recommended Order shall, as pro-

vided in Section 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to

them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.

APPENDIX C

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.,

Respondent/Employer,

and

LOCAL 814, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD

OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN

AND HELPERS OF AMERICA,

Union.

RESPONDENT’S EXCEPTIONS TO

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION

C-2

The Respondent, BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE,

INC., excepts to the Decision of Administrative Law Judge

Joel P. Biblowitz (“ALJ”) dated 11 April 1989.

Pursuant to section 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of

the National Labor Relations Board, the Respondent sets forth

the following exceptions to the ALJ’s Decision:

Exception #1: To the finding that: “From 1954 until

the visit of Peter Furtado ... nobody from the Union

ever visited the shop.” (ALJD 2 lines 15-16).*

Grounds: The ALJ erroneously found that Mr.

Peter Furtado was a representative of the Union

when he audited Respondent’s books in or about

December, 1987. In fact, Mr. Furtado was a field

auditor employed by the benefit Funds and was not

at the time employed by the Union. (Tr. 85-86 &

91.)

Exception #2: To the finding that “Other than the

above-recited situations and the Complaint filed in

the United States District Court of the Eastern Dis-

trict of New York on February 11 (as more fully

described, infra) the Union has never filed a

grievance or court action against Respondent. ...”

(ALJD 3 lines 40-44)

*“G.C. Ex.” refers to the exhibits of the General Counsel. “Tr. refers to the

transcript of the hearing. “ALJD” refers to the Decision and recommended Order

of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 11, 1990.

C-3

Grounds: The ALJ erroneously concluded that the

Union initiated the action against Brower’s and is a

party to that action. In fact, the Funds commenced

the action. The Funds are an independent and a dis-

tinct entity, separate and apart from the Union and

the Union is not a party to that action. (G.C. Ex. 9

Complaint #4)

Exception #3: To the finding that “Beginning in

January, the Union has sent Past Due Notices. ...

(ALJD 4 line 38.)

Grounds: The ALJ erred in concluding that the

Past Due Notices (which were admitted into evi-

dence as G.C. Exhibit #6) were sent by the Union

since Mr. Anthony Mandile, the Funds’s Office

Manager (Tr. 71) testified that the G.C. Exhibit #6

was sent by the Fund (not the Union). (Tr. 74.)

Exception #4: To the finding that “The Respondent

has not paid this amount to the Union.” (ALJD 5

line 12), in referring to the Federal District Court

action.

Grounds: The ALJ’s conclusion is in error since

the Union is not a party to the Federal District Court

action, has never demanded payment of the alleged

delinquency and is not entitled to such payment.

The word “Funds” should be replaced for the word

“Union.”

Exception #5: To the finding that “After Respon-

dent agreed to recognize the Union in 1951 (without

C-4

any showing of majority support from Respondent’s

employees) the Union’s subsequent activity (up

until the December 1987 audit of Respondent’s

books and the subsequent filing of the Federal Court

action in February) was. ...” (ALJD 7 lines 21-25.)

Grounds: The ALJ erroneously concluded that the

1987 audit was the Union’s activity. The audit was

the sole action of the Funds.

Exception #6: To the failed review and ruling on

the Respondent’s argument that the Union’s failure

to demand bargaining at any time rendered the

charge invalid.

Grounds: The Union’s failure to demand bargain-

ing over the alleged contract violations at any time

establishes a) an alternative ground for dismissal of ,

the charge and b) supports the ALJ’s conclusion that

the Union did not have the support of the majority

of the Respondent’s employees (ALJD 8) and aban-

doned the collective bargaining relationship (ALJD

8 n. 3).

. Dated: Carle Place, New York

May 25, 1989

C-5

Respectfully submitted,

Law Offices of MARTIN H. SCHER

Attorneys for Respondent

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

S/

By: Robert S. Nayberg

One Old Country Road, Suite 385

Carle Place, New York 11514

(516) 746-5040

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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