Opposition Brief — Stiles v. Blunt

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No.90-811 —{, FEB 20 Wer

GEFE OF THE CLERK

ee

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Writed States

OcToBER TERM, 1990

JOHN A. STILEs,

Petitioner,

VS.

Roy BLUNT,

Secretary of State of the State of Missouri,

and

WILLIAM WEBSTER,

Attorney General of the State of Missouri,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM L. WEBSTER

Attorney General

DEBORAH GROUND BUCKNER

Assistant Attomey General

P. O. Box 899

Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

(314) 751-3321

Counsel for Respondents

St. Louis Law Printing,Inc. 13307ManchesterRd. St.Louis, MO 63131 314-231-4477

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is the rational relationship test the appropriate standard of

review for an age requirement for a candidate for public office where

neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved?

2. Is the State of Missouri’s legitimate interest in having mature

lawmakers rationally related to aminimum age requirement for public

office?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986)..........00...000...

Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977)...

Blassman v. Markworth, 358 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1973).....

Bowman v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Va.

Crane v. Schneider, 635 F. Supp. 1430 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) .....

Felix v. Milliken, 463 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1978)......

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1990) ..............

Hankins v. State of Hawaii, 639 F. Supp. 1552 (D. Hawaii

Human Rights Party of Ann Arbor v. Secretary of State for

Michigan, 370 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Mich. 1973) ...........

Manson v. Edwards, 482 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1973) .............

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307

EIEN TEN uciccaplaraagon ucunataniakaueharcaagusbinangartbedadwembaen cuca sinned

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) ....... ee

Price v. Cohen, 715 F.20 87 (Sd Cir. 1963) ..........................

Raza Unida Party v. Bullock, 349 F. Supp. 1262 (W.D. Texas

Page

San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. ___

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Seoewr v.. Bowes, SUS US. TG CIPO vssnineccvnnnnccsisvnisnensacencess

United States v. Olsen, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1973)...........

Zielasko v. Ohio, 873 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1989) ......... eee

Constitutions

U.S. Const., Art. 1 §2¢.3..

U.S. Const., Art. 1 §3.¢.3..

U.S. Const., Art.2 §1c.5..

Ariz., Const., Art. 4, Part 2..

Colo., Const., Art. 5, § 4 .....

Del., Const., Art. 2, § 3 .......

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Mo., Const., Art. III, § 4......

S. Dak., Const., Art. 3, § 3...

Utah, Const., Art. 6, § 5 ......

Statutes

Section 1.205, RSMo 1986 .

Section 21.080, RSMo 1986

Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314

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No. 90-811

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1990

JOHN A. STILEs,

Petitioner,

VS.

Roy BLUNT,

Secretary of State of the State of Missouri,

and

WILLIAM WEBSTER,

Attorney General of the State of Missouri,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Article III, § 4 of the Missouri Constitution and § 21.080, RSMo

[Revised Statutes of Missouri] 1986, require amember of the Missouri

House of Representatives be twenty-four years of age. On January 9,

1990, petitioner sought to be certified as a candidate on the Democratic

Party ticket forthe office of State Representative for the 1 19th District

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of the Missouri General Assembly. Petitioner, because of his birth on

Apnil 11, 1967, would not be twenty-four years old when the Missoun

General Assembly next convened. Thus, when petitiorer attempted to

file his declaration of candidacy, the Secretary of State informed

petitioner that he was without authority to certify petitioner as a

qualified primary candidate, because petitioner, then twenty-two

years of age, would not have attained the age of twenty-four years at

the time he would be swom in as a State Representative.

On February 12, 1990, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaratory

Judgment and Injunctive Relief alleging that the age requirement for

candidates for House of Representatives violated the First, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In the

alternative, petitioner asserted that § 1.205, RSMo 1986 should be

interpreted in such a way as to add nine months to petitioner’s age.

The District Court held a hearing in the matter on March 21, 1990,

considering the evidence presented on both the preliminary and

permanent injunction requests. The District Court dismissed petitioner’s

cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. The District Court found that Missouri’s requirement for the

office of State Representative did not violate petitioner’s constitutional

rights and denied petitioner’s request for injunctive relief.

Petitioner appealed the District Court Order to the United States

Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On August 24, 1990,

after oral argument, the court affirmed the order of the District Coun.

The court’s opinion, which is set forth in Petitioner’s Appendix, recites

the facts underlying its decision.

The primary election and general election have since been held.

Petitioner’s name did not appear on the ballot as a candidate for State

Representative of the 119th District of Missouri. Moreover, on April

11, 1991, petitioner will attain the age of twenty-four years. Although

numerous cases have held a claim for ballot access is not rendered

moot by the occurrence of an election, see, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415

U.S. 724, 737, n.8 (1974); Rasario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756,

n.5 (1973), those cases involved controversies that were capable of

a. en

repetition, and yet evaded review. Petitioner, the sole plaintiff in this

litigation, will never again be deemed unqualified as a candidate for

the Missouri House of Representatives for failure to meet the age

requirement. Therefore, the underlying controversy in this case is

moot.

a ae

ARGUMENT

1.

Article III, § 4, of the Missouri Constitution provides:

Each representative shall be twenty-four years of age, and next

before the day of his election shall have been a qualified voter for

two years and a resident of the county or district which he is

chosen to represent for one year, if such county or district shall

have been so long established, and if not, then of the county or

district from which the same shall have been taken.

Section 21.080, RSMo 1986, contains similar language. The age

requirement of twenty-four years for members of the Missouri House

of Representatives has existed since its inclusion in Article III, § 3 of

the Missouri Constitution of 1820, adopted shortly before Missouri’s

admission te the Union. ;

Petitioner asserts that the lower courts erred when they used the

rational basis test to dismiss his claim that these provisions of Missouri

law violated petitioner’s right to the equal protection of the laws. In

making this claim, petitioner overlooks every relevant decision ever

made in a federal court.

In determining the level of scrutiny to be applied io an equal

protection challenge, courts have recognized that “strict scrutiny is

only appropriate when persons are classified according to ‘suspect’

Criteria or a ‘fundamental interest’ is involved or affected by the

classifications scheme.” Felix v. Milliken, 463 F. Supp. 1360, 1371

(E.D. Mich. 1978). In the present litigation, the District Court and the

Court of Appeals correctly concluded that no fundamental iriterest was

at stake, and that the age requirement did not impinge upon any suspect

Classification. (Petitioner’s Appendix at 11).

There is no fundamental right to run for elective office, an important

distinction from the right of suffrage. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,

142-143 (1972). See also Hatten v. Rains, 854 F.2d 687, 693 (Sth Cir.

1988); Zielasko v. Ohio, 873 F.2d 957, 961 (6th Cir. 1989); Hankins

v. State of Hawaii, 639 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (D. Hawaii 1986). In

Bullock v. Carter, supra, this Court observed such “fundamental

ca ee

status” had not previously been attached to candidacy as to the right of

suffrage. /d., 504 U.S. at 142. This Court recognized that “the rights

of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat

separation,” and concluded that because a filing fee requirement

impacted upon the financial resources of voters wanting to support

candidates, a standard of strict scrutiny was required. /d., 405 U.S. at

143-144. However, this Court cautioned that “not every limitation or

incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a

stringent standard of review.” /d., 405 U.S. at 143.

Despite petitioner’s assertions to the contrary, this is not a ballot

access case, but rather, a case involving candidate qualifications.

Unlike the filing fee in Bullock, an age requirement is a qualification

states have traditionally imposed upon voters as well as upon candi-

dates for public office. Prior to ratification of the Twenty-Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, the states determined

the minimum age for voters in state and national elections. In Oregon

v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), a plurality opinion of this Court ruled

on a challenge by the states to the Voting Rights Act Amendments of

1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, because states believed it took away

powers reserved to the states in the Constitution to control their own

elections. /d., 50 U.S. at 117. Justice Black, writing for the Court,

opined that while Congress could set a minimum voting age for

national elections, those portions of the Act pertaining to state and

local elections were unconstitutional and unenforceable. /d.,400 U.S.

at 117-118.

Justice Stewart, in a separate opinion joined by the Chief Justice and

Justice Blackmun, discussed the standard for reviewing a State’s

minimum age requirement for voting after observing that the states

have a “constitutionally unimpeachable interest in establishiug some

age qualifications as such.” /d., 400 U.S. at 294. He concluded:

Yet to test the power to establish an age qualification by the “‘com-

pelling interest” standard is really to deny a State any choice at all,

because no State could demonstrate a “compelling interest” in

drawing the line with respect to age at one point rather than another.

Id.

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Federal courts presented with the question of the constitutionality

of a state’s requirement of a minimum age for candidates for public

office have applied a rational basis test, following the analysis of

Oregon v. Mitchell, supra. See, e.g.,Raza Unida Party v. Bullock, 349

F. Supp. 1262 (W.D. Texas 1972); Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F. Supp.

1(N.D. Ill. 1973); Manson v. Edwards, 482 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1973);

Human Rights Party of Ann Arbor v. Secreiary of State of Michigan,

370 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Mich. 1973). These cases distinguished a

minimum age requirement from ballot access issues such as the filing

fee in Bullock v. Carter, supra. An age qualification falls with equal

weight on all voters. Blassman v. Markworth, supra, 350 F. Supp. at

7. “The age minimum does not permanently exclude any candidate,

nor more importantly, has it been shown to preclude or substantially

narrow the field of candidates who espouse any given political ideo- °

logical, and/or socio-economic views.” /d.

Not only does an age requirement for elective office fail to impact

on fundamental rights, it also fails to create any suspect classification

for equal protection purposes. In addition to an age requirement as a

qualification for public office, numerous courts have examined leg-

islative line drawing on the basis of age in the context of mandatory

retirement provisions and representations on juries. In Massachusetts

Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), this Court made

it clear that age classifications do not trigger heightened scrutiny. /d.,

427 U.S. at 312-314. See also Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 92 (3d Cir.

1983). “A class denoted only by age does not constitute a ‘discrete and

insular minority,’ such as race, sex or national origin. Persons subject

to age-based classifications are not ‘saddled with such disabilities, or

subjected to such ahistory of purposeful unequal treatment, orrelegated

to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraor-

dinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’ “ Arritt v.

Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1977), quoting San Antonio

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).

Particularly, age requirements affecting young people, such as

petitioner, are the least suspect, since they bring about no absolute

prohibition, but merely a postponement of the opportunity to engage

in the conduct atissue. Felix y. Milliken, supra, 463 F. Supp. at 1373-

ae

1374. Thus, this case does not warrant the same interest demonstrated

in the grant of certiorari in the case of Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d

598 (8th Cir. 1990). Young adults ages 18 to 24 are not a distinct class,

Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986), and there has been no

showing they possess attitudes that cannot be adequately represented

by older individuals. United States v. Olsen, 473 F.2d 686, 688 (8th

Cir. 1973).

Il.

The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the District Court’s finding

that a rational relationship exists between the minimum age require-

ment of twenty-four years for a State Representative and a legitimate

State interest. The ‘rationality’ standard is a ‘relatively relaxed’ one

which reflects judicial awareness that the drawing of lines that create

distinctions is an unavoidable task for which the legislative and admin-

istrative branches of government are more suited than the courts and

that such formation of categories should be viewed as presumptively

valid.” Crane v. Schneider, 635 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).

Because of the pressures confronting a legislator, it is not unreason-

able for the citizens of Missouri to demand their State Representatives

bring maturity and some life experience to the office. ‘““The State has

a Clear interest in the maturity of its office holders, just as it has an

interest in the maturity of its voters.” Human Rights Party of Ann

Arbor v. Secretary of State for Michigan, 370 F. Supp. 921, 924 (E.D.

Mich. 1973).

The second question of a rational basis analysis is whether the

means chosen by the state are rationally related to its legitimate goal.

An established minimum age for elected officials is “sanctioned by

time-honored precedent. The Constitution of the United States fixes

a minimum age of thirty-five for the President (Art. 2, § 1, c. 5), thirty

for United States Senators (Art. 1, § 3, c. 3), and twenty-five for

Representatives (Art. 1,§ 2,c.2).”” Manson v. Edwards, 482 F.2d 1076,

1078 (6th Cir. 1973). The vast majority of states impose some

minimum age requirement upon candidates for the house of repre-

sentatives. For example, four states require a candidate for house of

representatives to be twenty-five years of age: Arizona, Const., Art.

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4, Part 2; Colorado, Const., Art. 5, § 4; South Dakota, Const., Art. 3,

§ 3; Utah, Const., Art. 6, § 5. In addition to Missouri, Delaware, Const.,

Art. 2, § 3 and Kentucky, Const., § 32, set the minimum age at 24. The

majority of the remaining states set the minimum age at 21.

Federal courts that have examined ihe issue of minimum age

requirements for public office have declined to enter this particular

ring of the legislative circus. As the courts stated in Blassman v.

Markworth, 359 F. Supp. 1, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1973), “were we to strike down

the age minimum requirement here, we would be accomplishing

nothing more than substituting our judgment for that of the ILlinois

legislature. This we decline to do.”

It is not the State’s obligation to come forward with empirical

evidence to support twenty-four as the perfect minimum age require-

ment. The chosen requirement need not be the best or even the least

burdensome. It is sufficient that the state can demonstrate that the

requirement ‘“‘may rationally be thought to advance the asserted

purposes.” Bowman v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 1183, 1185(E.D.Va.

1981). Should the citizens of Missouri determine another minimum

age would best serve their needs, the democratic process allows an

amendment to the Missouri Constitution to be set in motion either by

the legislature or by an initiative petition. Since 1820, Missouri has

declined to take such action.”

Missouri’s minimum age requirement is rationally related to a

legitimate state interest. Because this legitimate state interest does not

‘In the present case, of course, it is not the judgment of the Missouri

legislative body, but rather that of the voters who adopted the Missouri

Constitution, in 1820, 1875 and again in 1945.

?Two resolutions to change the age requirement for state representatives

are pending in the Missouri General Assembly this session. House Joint

Resolution No. 10, 86th General Assembly, First Regular Session (1991)

would submit to the voters of Missouri an amendment to Article III, § 3 of the

Missouri Constitution to change the age requirement to twenty-one years.

House Joint Resolution No. 14, 86th General Assembly, First Regular

Session (1991) would require only that a representative be a “qualified voter”.

~—

impinge upon an overriding federal right, the petition for writ of

certiorari should be denied.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, the respondent submits that petitioner’s

petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM L. WEBSTER

Attorney General

DEBORAH GROUND BUCKNER

Assistant Attomey General

P. O. Box 899

Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

(314) 751-3321

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS