Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart

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90 783 iii FILED

NOV 16 1999

JOBERA F. AWOL, JR

No. OLaeK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS' DE

ALBUQUERQUE and RIO GRANDE

VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,

Petitioners,

V.

R.H.BARNHART, Administrator of the

Federal Highway Administration, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM G. WALKER

Counsel for Petitioners

150 Louisiana NE

Albuquerque, NM 87108

505/268-4551

Il.

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Is a state highway project always

exempt, as a matter of law, from

federal environmental requirements,

despite extensive federal involvement

in the project, including federal

development funds, location approval

from the Federal Highway

Administration and eligibility for

further federal funding, if it has not

actually received federal construction

funds?

Is the Montano Bridge Project to cross

the Rio Grande a "major federal

action" or "federal or federally

assisted undertaking" within the

purview of federal environmental and

historic preservation laws as a result

of the "exhaustive" involvement and

control of the project by the National

Highway Administration and the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers?

ii

PARTIES

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE, RIO

GRANDE VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,

Petitioners,

and

ELBERT KING, JOAN MCGINNIS, VELMA WHIPPLE,

TOMAS MONTOYA, PRICILLA MONTOYA, JOHN

TROTTER AND KIT SARGEANT,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

R.H.BARNHART, Administrator of the Federal

Highway Administration, ELIZABETH DOLE,

Secretary of the Department of

Transportation, PETER A. LOMBARD,

Environmental Protection Specialist for the

Federal Highway Administration, DANIEL

DAKE, Director, Office of Planning and

Programming Development of the Federal

Highway Administration and DEWEY LONSBERRY,

Federal Highway Division, Administrator,

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, and THE COUNTY OF

BERNALILLO,

Respondents.

ow ih chat stn mae tt

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED......eeeeeeeecevces

LIST OF PARTIES....-eeeeeeeees eoccccces

OPINIONS BELOW... cece ecceccrennccesees

JURISDICTION... cc eeccceenereeeccceseves

RELATED CASES... cceeceeeseerccesecccees

STATUTES INVOLVED. ...--eeeeeevcerrecs

STATEMENT OF THE CASE....-eeeeeeecevees

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.......---

~-

oo, U& Nee

LS

I. The Tenth Circuit's decision that a

highway project which is eligible for

Federal construction funds and has

received "exhaustive" Federal

assistance, planning funds, and

locaticn approval is, nevertheless,

not a “major federal action" nor a

“federal or federally assisted

undertaking" if federal funds for

actual construction have not been used

or approved a) conflicts with

decisions of other Circuits and b)

unreasonably restricts the reach of 42

USC §4321 ef Seq. (NEPA), 16 USC §470 ef

seq. (NHPA), 23 USC §138 (FAHWA), and 49

usc §303 et Seq. (DOTA)... eee eeeces 20

II. Despite the confluence of the FHWA

location approval and the assertion of

jurisdiction and “major federal

action" status by the Corps of

Engineers, the Tenth Circuit's

aecision that the Montafio Bridge

Project is not a "major federal

action" raises important and

unresolved problemsS.......+esese+e++- 34

CONCLUSION. ccccccccecccccccccccececccce 44

APPENDIX eeeeeee70ee*eeneeeeeweeneeeeeeneeeeeeee 14

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v.

Volpe, 376 FSupp 806 (D.Conn.),

aff'd percuriam, 503 F2d 601 (2nd

Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870

caervees «+ « «ss s. OB) 83, 38, M6,

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401

ae eee: Caen. 6 6 Se eo a ee Ee fe

City of Boston v.Volpe, 464 F2d 254 (1st

ee I a

Historic Preservation Guild of Bay View v.

Burnley, 896 F2d 985 (6th Cir.

Ee te | oe ae a ee el a

Indiana Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F2a

Se eee, SOURS ss cee

La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 FSupp 221

(N.D.Cal. 1971), cert. denied 409 US

890 (1972) (prematurely filed),

supplemented by 57 FRD 94 (atty'‘s

fees), affd 488 F2d 559 (9th Cir.

1973), cert. denied, 417 US 964

a ee A eh es Ge tf

Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F2da 1053 (D.c.

DT 6-4, 0S « «6 & & @ 6 ¢

Maryland Conservation Council v. Gilchrist,

808 F2d 1039 (4th Cir.1987) ...

39,40

29

26

22-25

29

PP cei 9 tates oe oto snseeiiionnl

Vv

Named Individual Members of San Antonio

Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dept.,

446 F2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) . . 26, 30

NRDC v. Calloway, 389 FSupp. 1263 (D.

Conn. 1974), rev’d on other grounds,

524 F2d 79 (2d Cir.1975) ... 40, 41

Quince Orchard Valley Citizens Ass'n v. Hodel,

872 F2d 75 (4th Cir. 1989). .... . 28

River v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority ,

359 FSupp 611 (E.D.Va.

Richmond Div. 1973) . ...+. +... 25

Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Witherspoon,

638 FSupp 1158 (E.D.La. 1986) .. . .37

Scottsdale Mall v. State of Indiana, 549 F2da

484 (7th Cir. 1977), cer.denied,

434 US 1008 (1978) .... 26, 28

Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F2d 1068

(10th Cir.1988). . « « «© «© « « 17, 43

Village of Los Ranchos v. Hatch,

No. CIV 88-1032JC (D.N.M.),

Nos. 90-2012, 90-2026, 90-2052

(10th Cir.) (pending). . . .3, 5, 6, 14, 34

Statutes:

16 USC §470 ef Seq., National

Historic Preservation Act

(NHPA). . « «© « « 7, 10, 14, 18-21,

eee 8 6 6 8 «8 0 oe eee Gee eee ae

vi

a oe ee. “es « sé ee 6 ete 68 6 6 ss SS

2: 5C §138, Federal-Aid Highways

At (FAHWA) . .7, 10, 19-21, 25-26, 107a

TE. Sa cg we ee ke 4

28 USC §1291 eo oO es * — o .* _ eo * . 7 . 4

28 usc §1331 e e - e oa . o J] e . * * . 4

ee

33 USC §1344, Clean Water Act

(§404) . .6, 10, 14, 18, 19, 22, 29, 34,

oe e . @ oe s o eo J . oO oe 36-39, 41, 110a

42 USC §4321, 4332 ef seq.,

National Environmental Policy

Act (NEPA) .. 6, 7, 10, 14, 16, 19-21,

°o © « « 25, 28, 33, 34, 38-40, 42, 119a

49 usc §303, Department of

Transportation Act (DOTA)

§4(f) .. 7, 10, 14, 19-21, 25,

oO e * . oe a o e . o o 26, 28, 126a

Rules and Regulations:

ee |

36 CFR §800.2(c)(1986) ....... 31

36 CFR §800.2(0) (1989) . .... 31, 138a

40 CFR Part 1500, efseg. (1986) . . 42, 139a

40 CFR §1508.18 . .....e. 43, 163a

vii

40 CFR §1501.6, CEQ Regs... . 4l, 144a

40 CFR §1501.7, CEQ Regs. .. . 41, 146a

46 Fed.Reg. 18026 (1981), Forty

Most Asked Questions Concerning

CEQ's NEPA Regulations . . .41, 42, 173a

Executive Order 11990, Protection

of Wetlands ...+«+«e«e«e.-s. 10, 19

Deer Autasistes:

FAHWA Policy and Procedures

Memorandum 20-8 .... +. +++. -«-+ 25

S.Rep.No. 91-296, 91 Cong., 1st

Sess. 5 (1969) . o . . . ca . . . 7 . 41

1

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS' DE

ALBUQUERQUE and RIO GRANDE

VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,

Petitioners,

Vv.

R.H.BARNHART, Administrator of the

Federal Highway Administration, ef al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

The petitioners, Village of Los

Ranchos de Albuquerque, efail., respectfully

pray that a writ of certiorari issue to

review the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the

2

Tenth Circuit, entered in the above-

entitled proceeding on June 2, 1990, with

petitioners' rehearing petition denied on

August 22, 1990.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit is reported at 906

F2d 1477, and is reprinted in the appendix,

p. la, infra. The denial of rehearing in the

Tenth Circuit is reprinted in the appendix

at p. 34a, infra.

The memorandum decision of the United

States District Court for the District of

New Mexico (Burciaga, D.J.) has not been

reported. It is reprinted in the appendix,

p. 36a, infra.

The memorandum decision of May 8,

1989, of the United States District Court

3

for the District of New Mexico (Conway,

D.J.) in a related case, Village of Los Ranchos

v. Hatch, No. CIV 88-10327C (D.N.M.), See p.

5, infra, has not been reported. a

reprinted in the appendix hereto, p. 70a,

infra.

4

JURISDICTION

The decision, order and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit affirming the decision of the

trial court was entered on July 2, 1990 and

is reported at 906 F2d 1477 (10th Cir.

1990). The Court's order denying rehearing

was entered on August 22, 1990.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this

Court to review the order by writ of

certiorari to the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals by 28 USC §1254(1).

The jurisdiction of the United States

District Court for the District of New

Mexico was invoked pursuant to 28 USC §1331

(federal question) and 28 USC §§2201-2202

(declaratory judgment). The jurisdiction

of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was

invoked pursuant to 28 USC §1291.

3

;

:

Pe A ae ae ee

5

RELATED CASES

1. Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, et al., v.

Lt. Gen. Hatch, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, et al., No. CIV 88-10323C (the "Hatch"

case), United States District Court for the

District of New Mexico, currently on appeal

to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Tenth Circuit, Nos. 90-2012, 90-2026

and 90-2052 (unconsolidated appeals).

Summary judgment in favor of the federal

defendants was granted on June 9, 1987 by

the District Court. Briefing is complete

and oral argument has not yet been set in

the Tenth Circuit. One of thre. memorandum

decisions rendered in the Hatch case is set

out in the appendix at p. 70a, infra.'

’ In the Hatch case the Village of

Los Ranchos de Albuquerque and other

plaintiffs have sued the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers following its issuance of a

6

2. State of New Mexico, ex rel., Village of Los

Ranchos de Albuquerque, et al., v. City of Albuquerque, No.

CV-89-02766, New Mexico District Court for

the Second Judicial District. AK

preliminary injunction halting work on the

Montano Bridge Project was issued by the

District Court on June 16, 1989 and the

City of Albuquerque took an interlocutory

appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals

(No. 11688). The case has been briefed and

argued. A decision is pending. The

memorandum decision in the state case is

not included in the appendix.?

permit pursuant to §404 of the Clean Water

Act, 33 USC §1344, to the City of

Albuquerque to dredge and fill the Rio

Grande for the Montano Bridge Project. The

basic allegation is that in failing to

prepare an EIS or supplement the one

prepared by the FHWA the Corps has violated

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC

§4332 (NEPA).

: The basis of the Preliminary

Injunction is that the bridge will be a

public nuisance because of noise, injury to

7

STATUTES INVOLVED

16 USC §470 ef Seq., National Historic

Preservation Act (NHPA). Reprinted at

Appendix, pp. 105a-106a.

23 USC §138, Federal-Aid Highways Act

(FAHWA) . Reprinted at Appendix pp.

107a-109a.

33 USC §1344, Clean Water Act. Reprinted

at pp. 110a-118a.

42 USC §4321 ef Seq., National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA). Reprinted at

Appendix, pp. 119a-125a.

49 USC §303, Department of Transportation

Act (DOTA) §4(f). Reprinted at

Appendix pp. 126a-127a.

historic sites and injury to wildlife

habitat in the bosque.

8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns a controversy over

the Montano Bridge Project of the City of

Albuquerque ("City"). The Project involves

construction of a bridge across the Rio

Grande in north-central New Mexico which

will necessarily destroy many acres of rich

riparian wildlife habitat and wetland and

fracture an unbroken six mile segment of

riparian bosque (forest and wetland). The

bridge and its approach road will pass

through Los Poblanos National Historic

District. It will also bifurcate the

Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, an

incorporated village located north of the

City of Albuquerque.

Petitioners are the Village of Los

Ranchos de Albuquerque and the Rio Grande

Valley Preservation Society (collectively

with certain individual residents of the

vere See a ee eee

9

North Valley of Albuquerque, who were

plaintiffs below but are not petitioners,

referred to herein as the "Village").

The Village brought suit in the United

States District Court for the District of

New Mexico on August 30, 1984. It sought

declaratory and injunctive relief following

decisions of the Federal Highway

Administration ("FHWA") : 1) to approve an

Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") by

the New Mexico State Highway Department

("NMSHD"), 2) to give location approval to

the river-crossing sites recommended by the

location study and 3) not to prepare a

site-specific EIS for the approved river-

crossings of the Rio Grande in the North

Valley of Albuquerque.

The Complaint sought to enjoin the

federal defendants from proceeding with the

North Valley River Crossings until such

time as they complied with the National

10

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),

42 USC §4321, et seq.; the National Historic

Preservation Act ("NHPA"), 16 USC §§470-

470W-6; §4(f) of the Department of

Transportation Act ("DOTA"), 49 USC §303;

the Federal-Aid Highways Act ("FAHWA"), 23

USC §138°; and Executive Order 11990

(1977) (Protection of Wetlands).

In 1979 the NMSHD requested FHWA

financial and technical assistance in

preparing a location study for additional

river-crossings in the North Valley. The

state requested the assistance from the

FHWA, in part, because

Factors which led the UTPPB to

make the decision to conduct a

location-environmental study were: ...

4) Section 404 permits would be

required from the U.S. Army Corps of

’ Both 49 USC §303 and 23 USC §138

are usually referred to as "§4(f)," the

former section number by which the parkland

and historic property protection provision

became well known.

BP esa ght ge

11

Engineers before construction of the

bridges could commence, thus federal

National Environmental Policy Act

compliance relating to the Section 404

permit applications would be required

in any event.

Dist.Ct.Mem., p. 42a-43a, n.2, infra. By a

federal-aid project agreement and Letter of

Approval and/or Authorization, FHWA agreed

to provide nearly $59,000 of the $75,000

cost of the location study and associated

EIS. In addition to funding the location

study and the option evaluating EIS,

"it is safe to say that the actual

preparation of the EIS required fairly

exhaustive’ federal assistance from

approving agencies and individual FHWA

personnel. The process is lengthy

and, ... the actual sufficiency of the

EIS itself is not at this time before

the Court...."

906 F2d at 1479, p. 5a, infra (quoting

Burciaga, D.J., p. 44a, infra).

‘ The Tenth Circuit substituted the

word "exhaustive" for the word "extensive,"

which was the word used by the District

Court.

12

The location study determined that six

additional river-crossing lanes were needed

and selected two new bridge locations in

the North Valley at El Pueblo and Montano

to provide the lanes. FHWA then reviewed

and approved the location study. See Record

below, Doc. 100, Defendants' Summary

Judgment Memorandum, Ex. 1, 44. Doc. 111,

Plaintiffs' Response, Ex. 1, p. 10.

In 1983, FHWA entered into a formal

Memorandum of Agreement with NMSHD, which

committed FHWA to continued monitoring of

and involvement in the Montano bridge

project. See Record below, Doc. 100,

Defendants' Memorandum, Ex. 1A, Vol. 2, p.

1-T; Ex. 8B, p. 9. Moreover, although

construction of the project is currently

funded solely by City monies, the City

retains the option of seeking reimbursement

via the federal-aid highway system. See

owe ee

13

Record below, Doc. 111, Plaintiffs'

Response, Ex. 4. In fact, the federal

defendants have specifically and formally

granted the City and/or State permission to

proceed to the next stage for requesting

federal funding. See Record below, Doc.

100, Ex. 8B, Ex. 9, pp. 39-43.

The part of the lawsuit relating to El

Pueblo (now Paseo del Norte) bridge was

settled on October 11, 1985. Only the

Montano bridge project is at issue in this

Petition. The District Court granted the

federal defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment on June 9, 1987. P. 66a, infra.

The City of Albuquerque and County of

Bernalillo's Motion to Dismiss® was granted

on October 7, 1987. p. 68a, infra. Appeal

5 The claims against the City and

County Defendants were dismissed on the

same basis as the District Court's grant of

summary judgment in favor of the Federal

Defendants.

14

to the Tenth Circuit was timely taken.

In the lawsuit the Village sought 1)

review of the adequacy of the EIS and 2)

restriction on federal approval of the

location study and further federal action

until the federal agencies comply with

NEPA, NHPA and §4(f).° Several aspects of

the Opinions of the District Court and the

Tenth Circuit require emphasis:

1. Both courts held that "federal

involvement with the bridge project[] was

minimal, and, as a matter of law, did not

. Both the Draft EIS and Final EIS

prepared by the NMSHD and FHWA in

cooperation with, inter alia, the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, were relied upon by the

Corps in preparing its Environmental

Assessment ("EA") of the Montano project

and granting a dredge and fill permit to

the City §404(b) of the Clean Water Act.

The DEIS and FEIS are incorporated into the

EA and supporting Administrative Record.

The Village was not permitted to challenge

the EIS in either the case against the

preparing agency, the FHWA, or the case

against the Corps (the Hatch case).

15

rise to the level of 'major federal action'

so as to bring the project within the

purview of federal environmental laws."

Pp. 18a and 38a, infra. In doing so both

courts restricted their analysis to two

factors:

a. A state highway project that

may, but has not yet, received federal

highway construction funds, can never

be a “major federal action." See pp.

13a-15a, infra.

b. Federal funding for and

"exhaustive" involvement in the

decision-waking process of selecting

and approving river-crossing locations

is insignificant to an analysis of

whether a project is a "major federal

action" or a "federal or federally

assisted undertaking." See pp. i15a-

20a, infra.

16

2. Both courts used EIS preparation

and "location approval" interchangeably.

The Tenth Circuit equated the location

study, EIS and location approval. At

footnote 2, 906 F2d 1477, 1481, p. 15a,

infra, the Tenth Circuit struggles with the

distinction and cites the following from

the Village's Reply Brief:

it is the funding and preparation

assistance by the FHWA of the location

study that preceded the EIS that

triggers NEPA. (emphasis added)

The Court says a location study is somehow

"lesser" than a "greater" preparation of

the EIS. Therefore, since a lesser cannot

control a greater, the Court says:

[W]e construe plair* ffs' argument as

stating that the «IS, which in this

case includes the location study, is

the major federal action.

The Court then goes on to say that since an

EIS can never be a "major federal action,"

there was no major federal action here. See

4

17

906 F2d at 1481-82, pp. 15a-17a, infra.

Neither Court considered nor analyzed

the location study with its federal funding

and "exhaustive" federal assistance as the

major federal action triggering the

evaluative document called an EIS. If a

proper and comprehensive EIS had been

prepared it would have provided the FHWA

with a useful tool to use in deciding

whether to grant location approval. The

Village is prepared to prove that the EIS

utilized by the FHWA was inadequate.

3. The Court cited Sierra Club v. Hodel,

848 F2d 1068, 1089 (10th Cir.1988) at pp.

18a-20a, for the proposition that

"(Tjhe distinguishing feature of

'federal' involvement is the ability

to influence or control the outcome in

material respects. The EIS process is

supposed to inform the decision-maker.

This presupposes he has judgment to

exercise."

906 F2d at 1482, p. 19a, infra. Having made

18

this distinction, the Tenth Circuit

nevertheless then stated that the "federal

government had [no] actual power to control

this project. At most, it gave advice as

to the location of the bridge. Thus, we do

not here have any ‘major federal action.'"

906 F2d at 1482, p. 20a, _ infra. Neither

court analyzed their conclusions that a)

location approval authority is not the real

"ability to influence or control" the

location of a highway project, or b) that

location study and approval and EIS

funding, production and approval are not a

very real ability to control the outcome

and eventually control and influence the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") '

§404 permit decision as well.

4. Both courts address the issues

raised by the Village regarding the

National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),

19

16 USC §470 ef seq. and §4(f) of the

Department of Transportation Act, 49 USC

§303 and 23 USC §138, and Executive Order

11990, as subsets of the analysis of "major

federal action." Insofar as each act

required that a covered project be a

"Federal or federally assisted

undertaking," the courts held that the

project was not "federal" based upon the

analysis of the EIS and therefore not

subject to federal law.

5. The Tenth Circuit ignored and the

District Court did not discuss, except to

mention inn. 2, Memorandum Opinion, p.42a-

43a, infra, that a principal reason for the

state's request for federal involvement was

the known requirement that a §404 permit

from the Corps and NEPA compliance would be

required "before construction of the

bridges could commence."

20

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Tenth Circuit's decision that a

highway project which is eligible for

Federal construction funds and has

received "exhaustive" Federal

assistance, planning funds, and

location approval is, nevertheless,

not a “major federal action" nor a

"federal or federally assisted

undertaking" if federal funds for

actual construction have not been used

or approved a) conflicts with

decisions of other Circuits and b)

unreasonably restricts the reach of 42

USC §4321 ef Seg. (NEPA), 16 USC §470 ef

seq. (NHPA), 23 USC §138 (FAHWA), and 49

USC §303 ef Seq.(DOTA).

Without statutory authorization, the

Tenth Circuit has restricted the scope and

sweep of the National Environmental Policy

Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 USC §4321, efsSeq., the

National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),

16 USC §470, efseqg., the Federal-Aid Highway

Act (FAHWA) , 23 usc §138, and the

Department of Transportation Act (DOTA), 49

USC §303. The Court arbitrarily removed

from the scope of these statutes every

$

7

2

“a

4

.

q

i

eer

21

state highway project which had not, at the

time it is challenged, received federal

funds for post-planning and_ location

approval construction or had such funding

approved. Pp. 12a-15a, infra.

The Court excluded from the scope of

NEPA, NHPA, FAHWA and “DOTA, federal

involvement which logically falls within

the intent of Congress. Both courts below,

for example, erroneously assumed that the

state "did not initially need any type of

federal approval" and that the basis of

federal status was the approval of the EIS.

Pp. 16a, 54a-55a.

The actual basis of the federal status

remains a combination of federal funding of

the location studies and the EIS, the

location approval, eligibility and

preliminary application for and preliminary

approval of federal funding, and the

22

requirement that a §404 dredge and fill

permit from the Corps be obtained for every

possible bridge location. Moreover, the

granting of such a permit was always a

"major federal action" and was a known

requirement from the beginnings of the

project. See p.42a-43a, n.2(4).

The Tenth Circuit's restrictions on

these federal acts are similar to, and go

far beyond, the restrictions set out in

Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe,

376 FSupp 806, 812-813 (D.Conn.), affd per

curiam, 503 F2d 601 (2nd Cir.1974), cert.

denied, 423 US 870 (1975). Both the Second

and Tenth Circuits sharply criticized and

rejected the analysis adopted by the Ninth

Circuit in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 FSupp 221

(N.D.Cal. 1971), cert. denied 409 US 890 (1972)

(prematurely filed), supplemented by 57 FRD 94

23

(attorney's fees), affd 488 F2dad 559 (9th

Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 US 964 (1974).

See pp. 10a-15a, infra. The Tenth Circuit

adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit

which focused on, disagreed with and

disparaged the La Raza court's determination

that a state option to use federal funds

brings it within the purview of the federal

acts. Compare La Raza, 488 F2d at 561-62 (9th

Cir.) and 337 FSupp at 226-27 (N.D.Cal.);

with Citizens, 503 F2d at 602 (2nd Cir.) and

376 FSupp at 812-813 (D.Conn.) and 906 F2d

at 1481-82 (10th Cir.), pp.12a-14a, infra.

The Circuit Courts disagreed again in

their analyses of other relevant factors.

While the Tenth Circuit determined that

"([jsignificant" federal funding was a

necessary prerequisite to "major federal

action" status, the La Raza court found and

24

held precisely the opposite. The Ninth

Circuit specifically rejected the argument

that federal environmental laws do not

apply until construction funds are

provided.

We do not agree with the Commission's

interpretation of these provisions.

The general purpose of these statutes

and regulations is to assure that

projects for which federai funding

might become available are carried out

in a way that will afford the

protection to those displaced ... and

to the environment, including public

parks,....

We believe Judge Peckham

correctly interpreted the applicable

statutes and regulations to require

compliance by the Commission with

those provisions ... protecting the

environment "before location approval,

(and) prior to federal funding of a

project." La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337

FSupp 221, 231 (N.D.Cal.1971).

La Raza, 488 F2d at 562. The District Court

in La Raza discussed location approval in

some detail, noting that "the state and

federal defendants concede that a project

becomes part of the federal-aid highway

we Se T

25

system upon location approval...." 337

FSupp at 227.’

The Tenth Circuit's new requirement of

"([jsignificant" amounts of federal funding

(p.17a-18a, (infra) to trigger NEPA, NHPA,

FAHWA and DOTA, is in conflict with other

Circuits as well. See, e.g., River v. Richmond

Metropolitan Authority, 359 FSupp 611, 628

(E.D.Va. Richmond Div.1973). In that case

the Court stated, albeit in dicta,

Courts have recognized situations in

"Location approval" is a specific

step in the process of obtaining federal

construction funds. It is step two

following “systems approval" and preceding

"design approval" in the process’ for

obtaining federal funds pursuant to 23 USC

§103 and FAHWA Policy and Procedures

Memorandum 20-8. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337

FSupp 221, 223-24 (N.D.Cal.1971). The EIS

was an evaluative tool focusing on

generalized impacts to the broad reach of

the North Valley and not specific to the

locations of the preferred alternatives.

The location approval is a step which

involves the exercise of judgment by the

FHWA.

26

which no federal funds have been

authorized for a particular highway,

yet the highway has, through various

circumstances, taken on such a federal

character that the purposes behind the

federal laws would be defeated unless

their requirements are met.

359 FSupp at 628; Scottsdale Mall v. State of Indiana,

549 F2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.denied, 434

US 1008 (1978); Indiana Lookout Alliance v. Volpe,

484 F2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973); City of Boston v.

Volpe, 464 F2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972). Seealso,

Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation

Society v. Texas Highway Dept., 446 F2d 1013, 1027

(5th Cir. 1971).

The Court emphasized the sweep of its

restriction by then apparently defining the

DOTA, 49 USC §303, and the FAHWA, 23 USC

§138, language "use of federal funds to

finance construction" to exclude projects

receiving federal planning funds. The

Tenth Circuit cites three cases as

sel ath

27

supporting this definition. As it happens

none of the cited cases involved or

discussed federal planning funds as part of

their holdings nor was any distinction made

in any of those cases between the funds

used to plan and those used to bulldoze.

In the first cited case, MHistoric

Preservation Guild of Bay View v. Burnley, 896 F2da 985

(6th Cir.1989), the project at issue had

received no federal funds for planning or

any other purpose. Location studies were

entirely state funded® and the federal

government had specifically rejected all

federal funding for the project. Id. at 989.

At no time did the state request federal

8 As noted above, the funds

utilized by the NHWA and NMSHD were

supplied as part of the federal-aid highway

progran. Pp.10-11, supra; federal-aid

project agreement and Letter of Approval

and/or Authorization, both dated February

5, 1979. See Record below, Doc. 100, Ex. 8A.

28

funding. id. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit

|

distinguished the Michigan fact situation

from one like Montano in describing the

difference between its facts and those in

Scottsdale Mall v. State of Indiana, 549 F2d 484 (7th

Cir. 1977), cert.denied, 434 US 1008 (1978):

This absence of federal funding is

not necessarily dispositive in

determining whether a highway project

is imbued with a federal character....

Since the entire project [ Scottsdale

Mall } had been planned in accordance

with federal programming and

procedural requirements, ana had

received design approval from the

Department of Transportation in

addition to some federal funds for

preliminary engineering studies, the

court concluded that the project was a

federal project, and was therefore

subject to the requirements of the

National Environmental Policy Act.

549 F2d at 489."

896 F2d at 985. The Tenth Circuit admits

that Quince Orchard Valley Citizens Ass’n v. Hodel, 872

F2ad 75 (4th Cir.1989), did not decide

whether §4(f) applied when only federal

29

planning funds were present. In the

opinion the Fourth Circuit describes its

earlier opinion? in which it utilized

numerous grounds to reverse the District

Court and remand for compliance with §404

of the Clean Water Act and §6(f) of the

Conservation Act. In dicta it noted it

might also have to comply with §4(f). Its

citation to Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,

401 US 402, 411 (1971), says nothing more

than that the expenditure of "federal

funds" virtually always requires compliance

with federai environmental laws. Neither

Congress nor this Court has ever qualified

the words "federal funds" with the addendum

"except those used for planning."

In addition to its lack of support for

its analysis, the Tenth Circuit opinion is

° Maryland Conservation Council v. Gilchrist,

808 F2d 1039 (4th Cir.1987).

30

in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit's

opinion in Named Individual Members of San Antonio

Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dept., 446 F2d

1013, 1027-28 (5th Cir. 1971). In that

case the State of Texas informed the Fifth

Circuit that if federal law interfered with

construction, it would proceed with "100%

state money." The Fifth Circuit stated

that once federal involvement begins,

federal law applies regardless of any

change in funding method.

The Tenth Circuit similarly defines

the words "proposed Federal or federally

assisted undertaking" in the NHPA, 16 USC

§470f, p. 105a-106a, infra, to mean

"([]significant" amounts of federal funds.

Pp. 26a-28a, infra. This definition is not

found in the statute. The regulations

cited by the Village and discussed in

footnote 6 to 906 F2d at 1484, p. 27a-28a,

:

;

i

31

infra, state the opposite.

The Tenth Circuit appears to

invalidate 36 CFR §800.2(c) (1986)

(definition of "undertaking") as exceeding

its statutory authorization." Fortunately,

the statute’ does not contain the

restrictive language suggested by the Tenth

Circuit and therefore the regulation, as

modified, 36 CFR §800.2(0) (1989), should

be upheld as a proper administrative

ba The "definitions" section of the

regulations of the Advisory Council on

Historic Preservation has been revised and

renumbered. The definition referred to by

the Tenth Circuit is now 36 #=CFR

§800.2(0) (1989), p. 138a, infra, and has not

changed in any material way. It now reads,

in pertinent part,

"Undertaking" means any _. project,

activity, or program that can result

in changes in the character or use of

historic properties....The project...

must be under the direct or indirect

jurisdiction of a Federal agency or

licensed or assisted by a Federal

agency.

Id. (emphasis added).

32

interpretation of the statute. The only

case cited by the Tenth Circuit, Lee v.

Thornburgh, 877 F2da 1053 (D.C.Cir.1989)

involved a project using exclusively

District of Columbia funds’ directly

appropriated by Congress. Both the

District and Congress are specifically

exempted from the NHPA. /d. at 1056.

Nevertheless, the interpretation of the

NHPA by the District of Columbia Circuit

Court supports the inclusion, not

—_exclusion, within the ambit of the NHPA of

projects receiving federal funds of any

sort. id. at 1057.

The majority of federal courts have

held that providing planning’ § funds,

location approval, authorization of future

federal participation or a combination of

these and other factors are each sufficient

to confer "major federal action" status

eRe a? 2

Jo

under NEPA. The Montano Bridge Project,

which has received both federal location

approval and authorization of continuing

federal participation, should be treated as

a major federal action.

The confusion engendered by the ever

more disparate positions of the Circuit

Courts on these issues deserves this

Court's attention. Moreover, the clear

error of the courts below warrants review

and reversal by this Court. Plenary

consideration of this matter by this Court

is essential. The Village urges this Court

to issue its Writ of Certiorari to the

Tenth Circuit.

34

II. Despite the confluence of the FHWA

location approval and the assertion of

jurisdiction and "major federal

action" status by the Corps of

Engineers, the Tenth Circuit's

decision that the Montano’ Bridge

Project is not a “major federal

action" raises important and

unresolved problems.

As described above, the Montano Bridge

Project had received federal location and

environmental study funds and location

approval from the FHWA and, at all times,

required a permit from the Corps pursuant

to §404 of the Clean Water Act to dredge

and fill the river before any construction

could occur. In the Hatch case, the Corps,

a federal agency, and the U. S. District

Court have determined the Montano bridge

project to be a "major federal action" for

NEPA purposes. This determination is

setevent to the decision in this case. See

p.70a, infra, Memorandum Opinion, Hatch, at

p.98a ("it is true that the [§404] permit

b

forms the indispensable basis for any

construction of the bridge").

In adopting the analysis of Judge

Newman in Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc.

v. Volpe, 376 F.Supp. 806, 812-813 (D.

Conn.), affd per curiam, 503 F2d 601 (2nd

Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975),

the Tenth Circuit has ignored the final

point of analysis by Judge Newman:

Though not specifically urged by

plaintiffs, it might be

appropriate in some cases to

reach a conclusion of "Federal

action" based on the cumulative

effect of the various factors

considered in this opinion. The

federal dollars to build the spur

that will connect new Route 7 to

I-84 and the small amount of

highway planning and research

funds, the "route revision"

approval by the FHWA and the

state's continued eligibility for

federal funding for later

projects north of Danbury, and

the relationship between the

Danbury-New Milford portion and

the Norwalk-Danbury portion may

well be considered to have a

greater total effect than any

36

factor alone.

376 F.Supp. at 814.

He concluded that although "the

question on these facts is close, it does

not appear that the federal government has

played a sufficient role..." to make the

project a major federal action. Id.

Included within the list above are past and

future actions relating to the project at

issue, but conspicuously absent is a

location approval, a §404 dredge and fill

permit or other conclusively "major federal

action."

The facts in Citizens did not include any

factor which was indubitably "a major

federal action." Nor was it clear that the

Connecticut project itself would

necessarily become a major federal action.

This is significantly different from the

Montano Bridge Project.

i

- ” hy is let a ry,

37

From the beginning of the Montano

project, through all phases of federal or

state consideration, it was known and

recognized that the Montano Bridge Project

required a permit to dredge and fill the

Rio Grande from the Corps pursuant to

§404(b) of the Clean Water Act, and that

the granting of such permits is a "major

federal action." 33 CFR §320, ef seg.; Save

Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 638 F.Supp. 1158,

1161 (E.D.La. 1986).

In its funding and coordination of the

project the FHWA was acting at all times as

the first federal actor in the §404

permitting process. Other evidence of the

continuous, cumulative process can be found

in a variety of sources. See e.g.:

Le The District Court Memorandun,

p.42a-43a, infra. An affidavit by a City of

Albuquerque officer identifies factors

38

leading to preparation of Rio Grande river-

crossing location-environmertal study:

4) Section 404 permits would be

required from the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers before construction of the

bridges could commence, thus federal

National Environmental Policy Act

compliance relating to the Section 404

permit applications would be required

in any event.

2. The EIS was produced by the FHWA

and the NMSHD with the knowledge that the

project would require a federal permit. The

FEIS is Exhibit 1A in the _ Federal

Defendants' Addendum to their Answer Brief

below. At p. 66 of the FEIS the FHWA and

NMSHD state that the Corps aided the FEIS

preparation and is "the agency which issues

the required 404 Permit for the crossings

of the Rio Grande."

Neither the preparation of the EIS nor

the provision of federal planning funds

serve as a litmus test for the

determination of major federal action under

Pe ee ee ae ere ee ee Fe ee Oe ye me ey

39

NEPA. Having adopted the test set forth in

Citizens, 376 F.Supp. 806 (further citation

supra), the Tenth Circuit added confusion to

the matter by its failure to consider all

of the known and relevant factors

influencing the cumalative portion of the

analysis. Here the preparation and funding

of the EIS and the location study led to

location approval. This was merely one step

in a continuous, cumulative process of

federal iavelvanent ending in the

unquestioned major federal action of

considering and granting a §404 permit.

The initial (planning and study funding)

and intermediate (location and further

funding approval) steps are part of the

same stairway leading to the §404 permit.

They cannot be compartmentalized or

divorced from this certain final step.

When evaluating whether there is a

40

major federal action, a court must look to

the totality of the project: all federal

parts of the project should be "summed-up"

to decide whether there is a major federal

action. Citizens, 376 FSupp at 814. In NRDC

v. Calloway, 389 FSupp. 1263 (D.Conn.1974),

rev'd on other grounds, 524 F2d 79 (2d Cir.1975),

the District Court stated at p. 1272, n.

31, that regardless of the time sequence or

"lead" agency,

"all the federal parts of a

project should be summed in order

to determine whether the project

is 'major' and thus whether NEPA

should apply. Concomitantly, if

NEPA does appiy to a project as a

whole it must apply to each of

its parts."

Indeed it violates the clearly stated

intent of Congress to treat one part of a

project as an "isolated '‘'single-shot'

venture," NRDC v. Calloway, 524 F2d at 88,

without coordination and consideration of

—s YY eee? eee ere eS eee ee

41

related federal actions and projects and

the further actions contemplated. Id.; CEQ

Regulations, 40 CFR §§ 1501.6 and 1501.7

(pp. 144a-146a, infra); See also S.Rep.No.91-

296, 91 Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).

The EIS was primarily prepared with

federal funds, under at least the partial

control of and subject to the eventual

approval of the FHWA. The process received

"exhaustive" federal assistance with input

from the Corps, and with the knowledge that

every possible location for a bridge

required a §404 permit.

Since the granting of such a permit

was also necessarily a major federal

action, the federal preparers of the

location studies for the Montafio bridge

project should have designated the project

a major federal action at the earliest

preparation stage. — Forty Most Asked Questions

42

Concerning CEQ’s NEPA Regulations, 46 Fed.Reg.

18026 (1981) (Questions and Answers: No.9,

pp. 176a-179a, infra, agencies must integrate

the NEPA process into other planning at the

earliest possible time, including "scoping"

the possible involvement of other agencies

and whether an applicant will eventually

seek federal approval; No.14b, pp. i85a-

187a, infra, & No.21, pp. 190a-194a, infra,

every effort should be made to prepare

joint federal review documents and avoid

duplication of efforts). Accord, 40 CFR

Part 1500, ef seg. (1986), pp.139a-141 (early

NEPA application), 146a-150a (Scoping),

158a-159a (Tiering), 163a-167a (Major

Federal Action & Scope), 167a-171la

(Significantly) and 171la-172a (Tiering),

infra. io

The Tenth Circuit itself has

recognized that when determining whether

ae ey

43

there is a major federal action the CEQ

regulations mandate that the court should

consider non-federal actions which are

potentially subject to Federal control and

responsibility. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d

1068, 1089 (10th Cir. 1988), Citing, CEQ

regulations, 40 CFR §1508.18. Although

this case may incorporate a local project,

it has at all times presented an imminent

and unavoidable federal action and the

actions of the FHWA should be classified as

major federal action. Lower courts will

obviously need guidance as our nation looks

to rebuild its highway infrastructure in an

era of more parsimonious federal funding.

©

44

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this

petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted. The Village urges the Court to

find the existence of a major federal

action in this case and to consider the

need for clarification and guidance to the

lower courts.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM G. WALKER

Counsel for Petitioners

150 Louisiana NE

Albuquerque, NM 87108

505/268-4551

ia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OF THE APPENDIX

Tenth Circuit Decision

O06 POR 2477 Goeke SB. BDOR) occ cccccee sD

Order, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

Robert L. Hoecker (August 2,1990)....34a

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Juan G. Burciaga (June 9, 1987)......36a

Judgment

Juan C. Burciaga (June 9, 1987)......66a

Order

Juan C. Burciaga (October 6, 1987)...68a

Memorandum Opinion and Order

John E. Conway (May 8, 1989).........70a

16 USC §470f National Historic

PEGS IE BGicctcccsvitsieoovectvs --105a

23 USC §138 Federal-Aid Highways Act..107a

33 USC §1344 Clean Water Act (§404)...110a

42 USC §4321 National Environmental

Policy 0 ee ee ee ee >

42 USC §4332 National Environmental

Policy re ee

49 USC §303 Department of

TEAMSPOECACION AGE. cccccccccccccccec tse

23 CFR Part 771 Federal Highway

REMERADETECIOR, BER ccccccsvcccscscckaee

sms ec, re eee % oe.

iia

36 CFR Ch. VIII (1989) Advisory on

Historic Preservation.....ccccccccceel138a

40 CFR §1501 ef Seq. Council on

Environmental Quality Regulations...139a

46 Fed Reg 18026 (1981) Council on

Environmental Quality...............173a

la

906 F2d 1477 (July 2, 1990)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE; and

RIO GRANDE VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

ELBERT KING; JOAN MCGINNIS; VELMA WHIPPLE;

THOMAS MONTOYA; PRISCILLA MONTOYA;

JOHN TROTTER; KIT SARGENT,

Plaintiffs,

Vv. No. 87-2657

R.H. BARNHART, Administrator of the Federal

Highway Administration; ELIZABETH DOLE,

Secretary of the Department of

Transportation; PETER A. LOMBARD,

Environmental Protection Specialist for the

Federal Highway Administration; DANIEL

DAKE, Director, Office of Planning and

Programming Development of the Federal

Highway Administration; DEWEY LONSBERRY,

Federal Highway Division, Administrator,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

THE CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; and THE COUNTY

OF BERNALILLO,

Defendants-iIntervenors-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of New Mexico

2a

(D.C. No. CV-84-1273-JB)

Alice G. Hector of Hector & Associates,

P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Vicki L. Plaut (Roger J. Marzula, Acting

Assistant Attorney General, William L.

Lutz, United States Attorney, Albuquerque,

New Mexico, Herbert A. Becker, Assistant

United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New

Mexico, Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney,

Department of Justice, Land and Natural

Resources Division, and Jean G. Rogers, of

Counsel, Federal Highway Administration,

with her on the brief) for

Defendants~-Appellees.

James H. Foley, City Attorney, and Edward

R. Pearson, Assistant City Attorney, for

City of Albuquerque, and Joe Cc. Diaz,

County Attorney, and MaryAnn Lunderman,

Deputy County Attorney, for County of

Bernalillo, on the brief for

Defendants-Intervenors- Appellees.

Before LOGAN, MOORE and EBEL, Circuit

Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs (The Village of Los Ranchos

de Albuquerque, the Rio Grande Valley

Preservation Society, and certain named

residents in Albuquerque's North Valley)

appeal from a decision of the United States

3a

District Court for the District of New

Mexico granting summary judgment in favor

of defendants (certain officials in the

Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA"),

the City of Albuquerque, and the County of

Bernalillo). We affirm.

FACTS

The district court summarized the

relevant facts as follows:

The North Valley’ river

crossings project is a proposal

for construction of two bridges

across the Rio Grande River, one

at Paseo del Norte just south of

an existing crossing at Corrales

Road, and another further south

at Montafio Road. Construction on

the Paseo del Norte has begun as

of this writing, while the

Montaho Bridge is still in the

planning stage. Both bridges

involve substantial right-of-way

acquisitions within the Villasce

[of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque],

a rural community northwest of

Albuquerque. Further, the project

involves widening of Village

roads and addition of new roads

to handle the increased bridge

traffic, with resulting effects

of increased noise, etc., on

neighboring Village landowners.

4a

The bridge at Paseo del Norte

will be a four-lane crossing with

an option for later expansion to

six lanes, while the Montano

crossing is proposed to be two

lanes.

While few residential

homeowners would react favorably

to the prospect of having a major

arterial traffic route built

practically in their backyards,

the citizens of the Village are

particularly concerned about the

impact of the new bridges on the

rural quality of their

neighborhood, various sites of

historical interest in that area,

and the effects of the project on

the river bosque wetlands. The

Village has thus brought suit

under various federal

environmental protection

statutes, arguing that, in

approving the bridge projects,

the federal government is taking

action which will adversely

affect the environment, without

adequate study and planning as

required by law.

The central issue in this

motion {for summary judgment) is

whether or not the _ federal

government's involvement in the

river crossings project is

sufficiently major to trigger the

applicable statutes. Therefore,

the extent of that involvement

must here be set forth in some

detail.

Federal involvement in the

river crossings project was

eae NS ee Pee

“—

initiated by a January 1979

decision of the Urban

Transportation Planning Policy

Board ("UTPPB") of the Middle Rio

Grande Council of Governments to

seek a location-environmental

study of the project. This

request was presented to the

Federal Highway Administration

("FHWA"), where, on February 5,

1979, the Division office in

Santa Fe, New Mexico, authorized

preliminary engineering work in

preparation of the environmental

study for the river crossings

project. The authorization form

for the project, Defendants’

Exhibit 8A, estimated the cost of

the location environmental study

at $75,000.00, and authorized

federal financial assistance for

part of these costs, in the

amount of $58,972.50.

In addition to provision of

funding, the federal government

took an active role in the

preparation of the EIS. Without

going into exhaustive detail as

the process is set forth in

Defendants' Answers to

Interrogatories, submitted as

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, it is safe

to say that the actual

preparation of the EIS required

fairly exhaustive federal

assistance from approving

agencies and individual FHWA

personnel. The process is lengthy

and, as the actual sufficiency of

the EIS itself is not at this

time before the Court, the Court

6a

will not here reiterate those

procedures. A Final Environmental

Impact Statement ("FEISS") for the

river crossings project was

approved by Peter Lombard,

Director of the Office of

Planning and Program Development

in the Region 6 Office of the

FHWA, on September 16, 1983.

After approval of the FEIS,

the City of Albuquerque

programmed $4.2 million of 1983

general obligation bond money for

the Montano crossing, and an

additional $6.1 million was

appropriated for the project from

the 1985 bond election.

According to the

affidavit/testimony of Joseph

Martin, Director of New Mexico

Department of Transportation,

Harry E. Kinney, former Mayor of

Albuquerque, and Kenneth E.

Bower, Jr., Director of Technical

Support for the New Mexico State

Highway Department, federal

funding has not been and will not

be requested for any part of the

Montano or the Paseo del Norte

river crossings. Thus, as of the

date of FEIS approval by the

FHWA, federal involvement in the

river crossing came to an end, as

far as any financial assistance

was concerned.

(Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3-5, June

9, 1987) (footnote omitted).

Plaintiffs sought a declaration that

7a

the federal environmental laws were

violated and an injunction against all

further federal participation in the

project. After considering the evidence

submitted by both sides, the district court

granted summary judgment in favor of the

federal defendants on the ground that the

FHWA's participation in the bridge projects

was not sufficient to trigger the federal

laws. The district court subsequently

granted summary judgment in favor of the

local defendants "on the same grounds as

stated by the Court for dismissal of

Plaintiff's complaint against the Federal

Defendants." (Order at 1, October 7, 1989.)

Plaintiffs appeal.

ISSUES

Plaintiffs raise four issues on appeal:

(1) whether construction, of the Montano

bridge is a "major federal action" subject

to the requirements of the National

8a

- Environmental Policy Act; (2) if

construction of the bridge is not a major

federal action, whether the bridge project

was properly segmented from the federally

funded I-25/Los Angeles project, which is a

major federal action; (3) whether

construction of the bridge requires

compliance with section 106 of the National

Historic Preservation Act; and (4) whether

construction of the bridge requires

compliance with section 4(E) of the

Department of Transportation Act or

Executive Order 11990.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

Plaintiffs argue that the federal

defendants' improper approval of the EIS

for the Montano bridge violated the

National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),

42 USC §4332 ef seq. NEPA provides in

pertinent part:

9a

The Congress authorizes and

directs that, to the fullest

extent possible: (1) the

policies, regulations, and public

laws of the United States shall

be interpreted and administered

in accordance with the policies

set forth in this chapter, and

(2) all agencies of the Federal

Government shall --

(Cc) include in every

recommendation or report’ on

proposals for legislation and

other major Federal actions

significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment,

a detailed statement by the

responsible official on --

(i) the environmental impact

of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse

environmental effects which

cannot be avoided should the

proposal be implemented,

(iii)alternatives to the

proposed action,

(iv) the relationship

between local short-term uses of

man's environment and the

maintenance and enhancement of

long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and

irretrievable commitments of

resources which would be involved

in the proposed action should it

be implemented.

Section 4332 (emphasis added).

10a

The requirements of NEPA apply only

when the federal government's involvement

in a project is sufficient to constitute

"major federal action." Plaintiffs contend

that the bridge project is a major federal

action because of (1) the local defendants'

eligibility for federal funding or (2) the

FHWA's participation in and approval of the

EIS. We disagree.

i. Eligibility for Federal Funding

Federal courts have not agreed on the

amount of federal involvement necessary to

trigger the applicability of NEPA. In La Raza

Unida v. Volpe, 337 FSupp. 221 (N.D. Cal.

1971), cert. denied 409 US~ 890 (1972)

(prematurely filed), supplemented by 57 FRD 94

(attorney's fees), aff'd 488 F2da 559 (9th

Cir. 1973), cern. denied, 417 US 964 (1974),

the Federal District Court for the Northern

lla

District of California addressed the issue

ef whether "the federal regulations and

statutes apply to a highway project upon

location approval, construction approval,

or some intermediate point when federal

participation is assured[.]" Jd. at 226. The

court analyzed the problem by dividing

highways into three categories: (1)

"highways for whicl; federal funds have been

approved or are immediately sought"; (2)

"state highways constructed without federal

funds, and for which federal participation

has never been sought"; and (3) "those

projects that may eventually receive

federal funds." Jd. at 226-27. The court

said that there is no question that

highways in the first category are major

federal actions, and highways in the second

category clearly are not; the troublesome

category is the third. The court concluded

12a

that highways in the third category are

major federal actions and require

compliance with federal rules because

"[a)jny project that seeks even the possible

protection and assistance of the

federal-government must fall within the

statutes and regulations." Id. at 227.'

The United States District Court for

the District of Connecticut recognized the

. In the case before us, the

district court distinguished La Raza by

noting that in La Raza the local government

still had the option to receive federal

funds, whereas here, the district court

concluded that the local defendants have

foreclosed that possibility and thus fall

into La Raza’s second category. We agree with

the district court that an official

foreclosure of all possibility of federal

assistance will undoubtedly work to exempt

a federal agency from NEPA requirements.

However, here we find no concrete evidence

that the local government was’ ever

officially precluded from seeking federal

assistance even though it expressed its

intention not to seek federal funds. Thus,

we analyze this case on the premise that

the local government still had the

possibility of receiving federal funds.

a re

EE eee EEE

AE SA

i3a

flaws in the approach taken in La Raza, and,

instead of requiring all highways in La

Raza’s third category (state highways that

may eventually receive federal funds) to

submit to federal requirements, rejected La

Raza and held that no highways in that

category should be subject to federal

requirements:

Though recognizing the force of

the argument developed in La Raza

Unida, this Court concludes that

while Congress no doubt has power

to require NEPA compliance in

such circumstances, the existing

legislation simply does not do

sO.

The contentions in [La Raza] are

all sound, but with deference I

do not understand how they

establish that such an option [to

apply for federal funding] on the

part of a state constitutes the

highway a "Federal action" within

the meaning of NEPA. Solicitude

for the environment cannot

substitute for legislation.

Congress has not applied NEPA to

all highways that the states are

eligible to fund with federal

dollars.

14a

The State's option to use federal

dollars, though open virtually

until the concrete is poured, is

nonetheless an option, and the

State's choice should not be

restricted simply because one

alternative of the option (using

state dollars) might result in

less adequate assessment of

environmental considerations. If

the highway is not a federal

action, then a state's decision

to avoid federal involvement

cannot have the paradoxical

effect of establishing federal

involvement.

Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe,

376 FSupp 806, 812-13 (D. Conn.), affd, 503

F2d 601 (1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870 (1975)

(emphasis in original).

We are persuaded by the analysis of

Citizens and adopt its conclusions. Therefore,

because the State of New Mexico, the City

of Albuquerque, and the County of

Bernalillo here (hereinafter collectively

referred to as "the state") are only

eligible for federal assistance, that

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15a

eligibility in itself is not sufficient to

establish a major federal action requiring

the FHWA to comply with the requirements of

NEPA.

2. Approval of the EIS

Plaintiffs also argue that FHWA's

assistance in and approval of the EIS is

sufficient to make the bridge project a

major federal action.* The district court

In their reply brief, plaintiffs

state that "an EIS itself is not a 'major

federal action,'" and that they "are not

making such an absurd claim." See

Appellant's Reply Brief at 2. Rather,

plaintiffs argue that "it is the funding

and preparation assistance by the FHWA of

the location study that preceded the EIS

that triggers NEPA." Id. However, at oral

argument plaintiffs argued that the

location study is a component of the EIS.

We cannot accept plaintiffs' implicit

argument that the lesser (the location

study) can impose higher standards (such as

compliance with NEPA) than the greater

(preparation of the EIS). Therefore, we

construe plaintiffs' argument as stating

that the EIS, which in this case includes

the location study, is the major federal

action.

16a

rejected this argument on the following

grounds:

Clearly, the state in the

instant case did not initially

need any type of federal

approval, assuming that they

chose not to seek federal money,

in order to proceed with the

river crossings project. The fact

that the state did voluntarily

request a federal EIS, though

they were not legally bound to do

so, should not, without more,

constrain the state to make the

entire project federal. Unless

the state is actually receiving

or is planning to receive federal

funding for a project, mere

preparation and approval of an

EIS is not “major federal

action."

(Memorandum Opinion and Order at 9, June 9,

1987.) We agree with the district court and

would only add that an EIS is what is

required once a project is deemed to be a

major federal action. See 42 42.USC

§4332(C) (i). It would be anomalous indeed

to say that in a case such as this, where

there is no showing that the _ local

Gefendants were involved in a sham

17a

transaction to evade federal environmental

requirements, that the preparation and

approval of an EIS is a major federal

action for which an EIS must be prepared

and approved.

Plaintiffs also point to the fact that

the federal government contributed nearly

$59,000 of the $75,000 cost of the location

study. Although $59,000 is indeed a large

portion of that cost, it was incurred in

connection with the preparation of the EIS

and it is minuscule in comparison with the

cost of the total bridge project.* Cf Citizens

for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 376

FSupp 806, 810 (D. Conn.) ("The only other

federal funding indicated is a sum less

than $50,000 of federal highway planning

and research funds that were used in

*

5 The City of Albuquerque floated

$10.3 million in bonds in 1983 and 1984 to

finance the bridge project.

-18a

connection with the planning of the

proposed road. The size of this expenditure

and the totally preliminary purposes of the

funds are too insignificant to render the

proposed multi-million dollar highway a

federal action.") (footnote omitted), affd,

503 F2d 301 (1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870

(1975).

For the foregoing reasons, we agree

with the district court "that federal

involvement with the bridge project[] was

minimal, and, as a matter of law, did not

rise to the level of ‘major federal action'

so as to bring the project within the

purview of federal environmental laws."

Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, (June 39,

1987).

We draw guidance from Sierra Club v. Hodel,

848 F2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988), as to the

meaning of the phrase "major federal

19a

action." In that case we analyzed whether

and to what extent the Bureau of Land

Management (the "BLM") could exercise

control over a county's major- road

improvement seotect, and then we addressed

whether such input or control by the BLM

constituted "major federal action." First,

we observed that the Council on

Environmental Quality's regulations have

defined major federal action to encompass

not only actions by the federal government

but also nonfederal actions "'with effects

that may be major and which are potentially

subject to Federal control and

responsibility. 40 CFR 5 1508.18.'" Id. at

1089. However, we went on to state that:

"(‘Tlhe distinguishing feature of

‘federal' involvement is’ the

ability to influence or control

the outcome in material respects.

The EIS process is supposed to

inform the decision-maker. This

presupposes he has judgment to

exercise."

20a

The touchstone of major federal

action, in the context of the

case before us, is an agency's

authority to influence

significant nonfederal activity.

This influence must be more than

the power to give nonbinding

advice to the nonfederal actor. .

- + Rather, the federal agency

must possess actual power to

control the nonfederal activity.

Id. at 1089 (quoting W. Rodgers, Environmental

Law 763 (1977) (citation omitted).

Given the decision of the state to

proceed with the bridge project without

federal assistance beyond the initial

location study and EIS preparation, we

conclude that there is no evidence that the

federal government had the actual power to

control this project. At most, it gave

advice as to the location of the bridge.

Thus, we do not here have any "major

federal action."

SEGMENTATION

Plaintiffs argue that even if the

21a

participation in, and approval of, the EIS

alone is not enough to make the project

federal, the bridge project was improperly

"segmented" from the I-25/Los’ Angeles

Interchange project, which is a -major

federal project subject to the requirements

of NEPA. The district court rejected that

argument, holding that "the evidence is

undisputed that the projects are, at best,

only peripherally related, and have not

been improperly segmented from one

another." (Memorandum Opinion and Order at

10, June 9, 1987.) We agree.

"As a general rule under’ NEPA,

segmentation of highway projects. is

improper for purposes of preparing

environmental impact statements." Piedmont

Heights Civic Club, Inc., v. Moreland, 637 F2a 430,

439 (5th Cir. 1981). However, a local

project closely related physically to a

22a

federal project may be deemed independent

for NEPA purposes after consideration of

whether the proposed segment:

(1) has logical termini, (2) has

substantial independent utility,

(3) does not foreclose the

opportunity to consider

alternatives, and (4) does not

irretrievably commit federal

funds for closely related

projects.

2.*

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the

district court erred in determining that

they had failed to present any issues of

material fact.*? Specifically, they argue

. The district court considered

only the first three factors enumerated in

Piedmont Heights. (Memorandum Opinion and order

at 10-11, June 9, 1987, citing 23 CFR

§771.111(f); Daly v. Volpe, 514 F2d 1106 (9th

Cir. 1975)). The appellants, however, do

not argue that the district court failed to

consider all relevant factors. Instead,

they argue the district court erroneously

found no issue of material fact with

regards to the factors it did consider.

. The district court's findings are

as follow:

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23a

that an affidavit submitted by one of their

transportation consultants demonstrates

that the eastern terminus of the bridge

project, Edith Avenue, is not logical:

8. The . . . Wilson & Company

[traffic] report addresses a Montafo

Corridor with termini at Coors Road

and Edith Boulevard. Figure 2 in that

report indicates that 30% of the

estimated year 2005 bridge traffic (or

5,070 vehicles per day) will use the

section of Montano between Edith

Boulevard and I-25.

9. Since nearly a third of all

bridge traffic will use montano Bridge

east of Edith Boulevard, this strongly

suggests that the logical eastern

terminus for consideration of bridge

The Court finds that there is no

material issue of fact as to whether

such segmentation was proper, as

[plaintiffs have } presented no

evidence to the Court that the [I-25]

project is in any way related to the

Montano bridge crossing, other than

the inevitable relationship caused by

the fact that some of the new frontage

road traffic will undoubtedly use that

route as a means of access to Montano

Road, and hence to the new bridge

crossing.

Memorandum Opinion and Order at 11, (June

9, 1987).

24a

traffic impacts and related

improvements would be I-25, which is

the next major intersecting, regional

route east of Edith Boulevard.

10. An I-25 terminus for Montano

Corridor improvements also has basis

according to the Environmental

Assessment (EA) for the I-25 Frontacge

Road improvements. Section "0" of the

EA notes that among the assumptions

behind the traffic forecasts used in

the I-25 Frontage Road analysis was

the following:

++. a new Montano corridor bridge and

roadway (two-lane limited access

facility) from Coors Road to

Interstate 25 via Montano

Road/Montgomery Boulevard.

Affidavit of Harvey R. Joyner, Doc. 111 at

G 8-10) (emphasis added).

We do not read that evidence to say

that Edith Boulevard is not a logical

terminus. Rather, the affidavit, at most,

merely asserts that the I-25 terminus would

be more logical. That a terminus is the

most logical is not mandated by the

segmentation analysis -- that analysis

requires only that a terminus be "logical."

—

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Ceiba ana tts CE MESS NT tl ics tii BAERS rh

25a

Because plaintiffs point us to no evidence

in the record indicating the Edith

Boulevard is not a logical terminus, we

agree with the district court that there is

no question of material fact on that issue.

Even if a local project terminates at

a point of juncture with a federally funded

project, that would not preclude

segmentation. "Congress has not purported

to apply NEPA requirements to _ ([e)very

highway that connects with a federally-

funded highway, and the fact that the

connection here involves a_e three-mile

overlap makes no difference." Citizens for

BalancedEnviron. & Transp.,Inc. v. Volpe, 376 FSupp

806, 810 (D.Conn.), affd, 503 F2d 301

(1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870 (1975).

Because all local projects must start and

end somewhere, under plaintiffs' theory the

entire highway network across the country

26a

could be considered one project. Such an

implication is obviously indefensible.

Because the criteria advanced in

Piedmont Heights are satisfied here, and

because plaintiffs have not demonstiated

any issues of material fact or raised any

other arguments that would demonstrate that

the district court erroneously granted

summary judgment in favor of defendants, we

affirm the district court's holding that

defendants did not improperly segment the

bridge project from the I-25 project.

NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT

Plaintiffs argue that the construction

of the bridge requires compliance with

section 106 of the National Historic

Preservation Act ("NHPA"), 16 USC §470 ef

seq. The NHPA provides in pertinent part:

The head of any Federal

agency having direct or indirect

jurisdiction over a proposed

Federal or federally assisted

gr Tn ited eel re ners Lane

27a

undertaking in any State...

shall, prior to the approval of

expenditure of any Federal funds

on the undertaking or prior to

the issuance of any license, as

the case may be, take into

account the effect of the

undertaking on any district,

site, building, structure or

object that is included in the

National Register.

16 USC §470f (emphasis added).

As we held above, the participation in

and approval of the EIS in this case did

not render the bridge project federal in

nature. Moreover, the bridge project is not

under the "direct or indirect jurisdiction"

of the FHWA. Therefore’, we cannot say that

it is "a proposed Federal or federally

assisted undertaking" requiring the

FHWA's-compliance with the requirements of

the NHPA.*® See Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F2da 1053,

6 Plaintiffs refer to the 1986

version of the regulation promulgated to

implement the NHPA, which defines

"undertaking" as |

any Federal, federally assisted

28a

1056 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACT

and EXECUTIVE ORDER 11990

Plaintiffs argue that the construction

of the bridge requires compliance with

§4(f) of the Department of Transportation

Act ("DTA"), 49 USC App §303 and 23 USC

§138, and Executive Order 11990. We

or federally licensed action,

activity, or program or the

approval, sanction, assistance,

or support of any non-Federal

action, activity or program.

Undertakings include new and

continuing projects and program

activities ... that are

(3) carried out pursuant to a

Federal lease, permit, license,

certificate, approval, or other

form of entitlement or

permission.

36 CFR §800.2(c) (1986) (emphasis added in

Appellants' Brief). Assuming, without

deciding, that this quoted version of the

regulation is the relevant and appropriate

version controlling the present dispute, it

cannot broaden the reach of the statute.

Because the project is neither "federally

assisted" nor under the "direct or indirect

jurisdiction" of any "head of any Federal

Agency," we need not address the definition

of "undertaking" in this regulation.

29a

disagree.

i. Section 4(f)

Section 4(f) provides that it is the

national policy "that special effort should

be made to preserve the natural beauty of

the countryside and public park and

recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl

refuges, and historic sites." To that end,

Section 4(f) permits the Secretary of

Transportation to approve a transportation

project only if

(1) there is no prudent and feasible

alternative to using that land; and

(2) the program or project includes

all possible planning to minimize harm

to the park, recreation area, wildlife

or waterfowl refuge, or historic site

resulting from such use.

49 USC App §303; see 23 USC §138. Plaintiffs

argue that the Secretary's actions in this

case constituted "approval" of the project

such that compliance with §4(f)'s

requirements is necessary.

30a

We hold that, like the NEPA and the

NHPA, §4(f) is only applicable to federal

projects. See Historic Preservation Guild of Bay View v.

Burnley, 896 F2ad 985, 988 (6th Cir.

1989) (Section 4(f) is applicable only to

federal projects, and not state projects);

see also Quince Orchard Valley Citizens Ass’n v. Hodel,

872 F2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1989) (assuming,

but not deciding, that Section 4(f) does

not apply to a project that has received

only federal planning funds); cf, Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 US 402, 411

(1971) (The language of §4(f) “is a plain

and explicit bar to the use of federal

funds for construction of highways through

parks--only the most unusual situations are

exempted."). Here, the district court

properly explained that §4(f) does not

apply because it "bars the use of federal

funds to finance construction of highways

—

31a

through parks, without all possible

planning to minimize harm to the park."

Memorandum opinion and Order at 13, June 9,

1987 (emphasis in original).

a. Executive Order 11990

Plaintiffs also argue that defendants

have failed to comply with’ the requirements

of Executive Order 11990. Specifically,

appellants maintain that the defendants’

action fall within the coverage of §1(a) (3)

of Executive Order 11990. That section

provides as follows:

(a) Each agency shall provide

leadership and shall take action to

minimize the destruction, loss or

degradation of wetlands, and, to

preserve and enhance the natural and

beneficial values of wetlands in

carrying out the agency's

responsibilities for . . . (3)

conducting Federal activities and

programs affecting land use, including

but not limited to water and related

land resource planning, regulating,

and licensing activities.

Executive Order 11990, 42 Fed Reg 26961

32a

(May 24, 1977) (emphasis added). The

district court held that the order was

inapplicable to the challenged actions

because there had not been "any significant

federal participation in the river

crossings project." Memorandum Opinion and

Order at 12, (June 9, 1987).

We agree with the district court that

§l(a)(3) of Executive Order 11990 does not

apply in this case. Plaintiffs argue, that

the preparation of the EIS constituted

"land resource planning." While that may be

true, Executive Order 11990 only imposes

obligations upon an executive agency in

carrying out its responsibilities for land

use planning. Giving that term its normel

usage,’ the federal defendants were not

A "responsibility" is defined as

"che state or fact of being...answerable or

accountable, as for something within one's

power or control." Random House College

Dictionary, 1125 (1980).

33a

"responsible" for the land use planning

here at issue because they did not have any

ability to exercise control over the

project unless the state elected to seek

federal funding for the project. Because

the state declined to seek such funding, it

was free to reject whatever federal

location advice was offered in connection

with the preparation of the EIS. Thus, the |

district court correctly concluded that the

defendants' limited involvement in this

project is insufficient federal action to

trigger the requirements of Executive Order

11990.

CONCLUSIONS

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM

the decision of the district court in all

respects.

34a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE;

RIO GRANDE VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

ELBERT KING; JOAN MCGINNIS; VELMA WHIPPLE;

THOMAS MONTOYA; PRISCILLA MONTOYA; JOHN

TROTTER; KIT SARGENT,

Plaintiffs,

Vv. No. 87-

2657

R.H. BARNHART, Administrator of the Federal

Highway Administration; ELIZABETH DOLE,

Secretary of the Department of

Transportation; PETER A. LOMBARD,

Environmental Protection Specialist for the

Federal Uighway Administration; DANIEL

DAKE, Director, Office of Planning and

Programming Development of the Federal

Highway Administration; DEWEY LONSBERRY,

Federal Highway Division, Administrator,

Defendants-Appellees,

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; THE COUNTY OF

BERNALILLO,

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees.

35a

ORDER

Filed August 22, 1990

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and

EBEL, Circuit Judges.

This matter comes on for consideration

of appellant's petition for rehearing in

the captioned case.

Upon consideration whereof, the

petition for rehearing is denied.

Entered for the Court.

_s/

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk

36a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE _

ALBUQUERQUE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv. Civil No. 84-1273-JB

R.A. BARNHART, Administrator

of the Federal Highway

Administration, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on

the federal Defendants' motion for summary

judgment. Having reviewed the pleadings,

the evidence of record and the relevant

law, the Court finds that the motion is

well taken and will be granted.

This action involves a long-standing

dispute over construction of two bridges in

the North Valley area of Albuquerque, New

Mexico, one north of El Pueblo Road ["Paseo

del Norte"} and another further south, at

37a

Montano Road. Plaintiff Village of Los

Ranchos de Albuquerque ["the Village')

opposes the construction of these bridges,

charging that the increased traffic will

harm the rural character of the Village,

threaten historical landmarks, and damage

the river bosque wetlands. The Village

alleges that the federal Defendants failed

adequately to consider all environmental

and other factors before approving and

Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for

the project, in violation of federal

environmental statutes.' Thus, Plaintiffs

contend that they are entitled to

declaratory and injunctive relief with

respect to any further federal involvement

, The Village claims violations of

the National Environmental Policy Act

("“NEPA"], 42 USC §4332 ef Sseq., the National

Historic Preservation Act ["NHPA"], 16 USC

§§470-470W-6, the Department of

Transportation Act of 1966, 49 USC §303,

and Executive Order (°E.0.%) 11990

regarding the preservation of the wetlands.

a

—_-- es

a sll

38a

in the North Valley river crossings

project. However, the Court finds that

federal involvement with the bridge

projects was minimal, and, as a matter of

law, did not rise to the level of "major

federal action" so as to bring the project

within the purview of federal environmental

laws. Thus, Plaintiffs' claims must fail

and summary judgment in favor of the

federal Defendants is warranted.

Facts

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in

this action on August 30, 1984, seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief from the

federal Defendants, in the form of (1) a

Court order declaring that federal approval

of an EIS for the river crossings project

violated federal environmental laws; and

(2) an injunction against all further

federal participation in the river

39a

crossings project. The New Mexico State

Highway Commission and Department, and

Bernalillo County, filed motions’ to

intervene as Defendants which subsequently

were granted. On October 11, 1985, the

Village entered into a settlement agreement

with the state Defendants, whereby the

Village agreed to bring no further legal

actions against any Defendant, federal or

state, with respect to the proposed Paseo

del Norte crossing, and further agreed to

dismissal of all of its river-crossing

project claims against the state

Defendants. Thus, the only remaining

Claims in this lawsuit are against the

federal Defendants, with respect to the

proposed Montano crossing.

The North Valley river crossings

project is a proposal for construction of

two bridges across the Rio Grande River,

one at Paseo del Norte just south of an

40a

existing crossing at Corrales Road, and

another further south at Montano Road.

Construction on the Paseo del Norte has

begun as of this writing, while the Montano

Bridge is still in the planning stage.

Both bridges involve substantial right-of-

way acquisitions within the Village, a

rural community northwest of Albuquerque.

Further, the project involves widening of

Village roads and addition of new roods to

handle the increased bridge traffic, with

resulting effects of increased noise, etc.,

on neighboring Village landowners. The

bridge at Paseo del Norte will be a four-

lane crossing with an option for later

expansion to six lanes, while the Montano

crossing is proposed to be two lanes.

While few residential homeowners would

react favorably to the prospect of having a

major arterial traffic route built

practically in their’ backyards, the

4la

citizens of the Village are particularly

concerned about the impact of the new

bridges on the rural quality of their

neighborhood, various sites of historical

interest in that area, and the effects of

the project on the river bosque wetlands.

The Village has thus brought suit under

various federal environmental protection

statutes, arguing that, in approving the

bridge projects, the federal government is

taking action which will adversely affect

the environment, without adequate study and

planning as required by law.

The central issue in this motion is

whether or not the federal government's

involvement in the river crossings project

is sufficiently major to trigger the

applicable statutes. Therefore, the extent

of that involvement must here be set forth

in some detail.

Federal involvement in the river

42a

crossings project was initiated by a

January 1979 decision of the Urban

Transportation Planning Policy Board

("UTPPB"] of the Middle Rio Grande Council

of Governments to seek a location-

environmental study of the project.* This

e According to the A*fidavit of

Thomas B. Hoover, Defendants' Exhibit 10, 4

8, in support of this motion:

Factors which led the UTPPB

to make the decision to conduct a

location-environmental study

were: 1) The State Action Plan

mandates preparation of an EIS

(Environmental Impact Statement)

for all major State Highway

Department projects, whether or

not the project will be federally

funded; any extra work required

to meet federal requirements

would be minimal; 2) desire to

preserve project eligibility for

any additional funding if it

became available under new

federal highway legislation and

if the State and local agencies

elected to apply for it; 3)

public concern for the need to

address the social, economic, and

environmental effects of new

river crossings; 4) Section 404

permits would be required from

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

43a

request was presented to the Federal

Highway Administration ["FHWA"], where, on

February 5, 1979, the Division office in

Santa Fe, New Mexico, authorized

preliminary engineering work in preparation

of the environmental study for the river

crossings project. The authorization form

for the project, Defendants' Exhibit 8A,

estimated the cost of the _ location-

environmental study at $75,000.00, and

authorized federal financial assistance for

part of these costs, in the amount of

$58,972.50

In addition to provision of funding,

the federal government took an active role

in the preparation of the EIS. Without

before construction of the

bridges could commence, thus

federal National Environmental

Policy Act compliance relating to

the Section 404 permit

applications would be required in

any event.

PO RO ee ET

Oe mL, ee Ne a Se eee eee

te a

44a

going in to exhaustive detail as_ the

process is set forth in Defendants' Answers

to Interrogatories, submitted as

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, it is safe to say

that the actual preparation of the EIS

required fairly extensive federal

assistance form approving agencies and

individual FHWA personnel. The process is

lengthy and, as the actual sufficiency of

the EIS itself is not at this time before

the Court, the Court will not here

reiterate those procedures. A Final

Environmental Impact Statement ["FEIS"] for

the river crossings project was approved by

Peter Lombard, Director of the Office of

Planning and Program Development in the

Region 6 Office of the FHWA, on September

16, 1983.

After approval of the FEIS, the city

of Albuquerque programmed $4.2 million of

1983 general obligation bond money for the

45a

Montano crossing, and an additional $6.1

million was appropriated for the project

from the 1985 bond election.

According to the affidavit/deposition

testimony of Joseph Martin, Director of New

Mexico Department of Transportation, Harry

E. Kinney, former Mayor of Albuquerque, and

Kenneth E. Bower, Jr., Director of

Technical Support for the New Mexico State

Highway Department, federal funding has not

been and will not be requested for any part

of the Montano or the Paseo del Norte river

crossings. Thus, as of the date of FEIS

approval by the FHWA, federal involvement

in the river crossings project came to an

end, as far as any financial assistance was

concerned.

Plaintiff's Standing to Sue and Ripeness

The Court must first consider the

jurisdictional issues raised by the federal

}

46a

Defendants, namely that the Village lacks

standing to sue the FHWA, and that this

case is not yet ripe for review. The Court

rejects both of these contentions.

First, with respect to the standing

issue, the Village must allege (1) "a

distinct and palpable injury to itself," or

in the case of an organization, to its

members, and (2) that "the asserted injury

was the consequence of the Defendants’

actions, or that prospective relief will

remove the harm." Warth v. Seldin, 422 US 490,

501, 505 (1975); Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186

(1962); Glover River Organization v. United States

Department of the Interior, 675 F2dad 251 (10th Cir.

1982). The Village meets each of these

criteria. First, the Village and its

members have presented evidence from which

the Court may reasonably conclude that they

will suffer "distinct and palpable injury"

47a

if the Montanc bridge is built as planned.

Such injury would take the form of

increased traffic, noise, and a possible

decrease int he value of the Village

residents' land, as well as, in some cases,

condemnation of all or portions of such

land. Second, if the Court were to grant

all relief requested by the Village, i.e.,

(1) to declare that federal involvement in

the project is "major," and (2) to enjoin

further federal involvement in the project

pending compliance with federal

environmental iaws, such relief would

redress the injury claimed. Work on the

bridge could not then proceed absent

compliance with federal law, should the

Court find such law to be applicable.

Second, with respect to the issue of

ripeness, Defendants ague that the actions

of the FHWA in respect to the bridge

48a

crossings project are not final agency

actions, or even if they are such final

actions, they are not ripe for review. The

real thrust of Defendants' argument is that

the federal Defendants retain no power to

affect the crossing project in any way,

since the EIS was not required by law, and

no further federal assistance was requested

by the state. The Court finds, however, as

a threshoid matter, that it has

jurisdiction to determine whether the

federal Defendants' actions were of

sufficient magnitude to subject them to the

federal environmental laws alleged here,

and thus to the relief requested by the

Village. An already-accomplished action

such as allegedly improper preparation and

approval of an EIS is clearly ripe for

review, in accordance with applicable

standards; See Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association v.

49a

Watt, 696 F2d 734, 741 (10th Cir. 1982).

"Major Federal Action"

The Village claims that the federal

Defendants' allegedly improper approval of

the EIS for the bridge project violated the

National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA],

42 USC §4332 ef seg. Section 4332 provides,

in part:

The Congress authorizes and

directs that, to the fullest extent

possible: (1) the policies,

regulations, and public laws of the

United States shall be interpreted and

administered in accordance with the

policies set forth in this chapter,

and (2) all agencies of the Federal

Government shall -

zx*kee*ee

(C) include in every recommendation or

report on proposals for legislation

and other major Federal actions

significantly affecting the quality of

the human environment, a detailed

statement by the responsible official

on-

(i) the environmental impact of

the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse

tiie

50a

environmental effects which

cannot be avoided should the

proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the

proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between

local short-term uses of man's

environment and the maintenance and

enhancement of long-term productivity,

and

(v) any irreversible and

irretrievable commitments of resources

which would be involved in the

proposed action should it be

implemented.

Whether this statute even applies to

the bridge project hinges, in this case, on

the question of whether the federal

government's involvement in this project

was sufficient to constitute "major federal

action."

The question of what constitutes

"major federal action" has received varying

interpretations by the courts, but few

cases have found such action to exist

without the presence of at least some

5la

federal funding of the project in question.

In the instant case, Defendants have

presented evidence, as previously set forth

in the factual portion of this opinion,

that no feceral funds have been sought, nor

will any such funding be sought, for the

river crossings project. The Village's

mere argument that the state has not

“officially" shut the door on federal

funding, and thus theoretically retains

that option, is not sufficient to overcome

the federal Defendants' evidence to the

contrary. A motion for summary judgment

properly may be granted only in cases where

there is no genuine issue of material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The

movant bears the burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 54 USLW 4775,

52a

4777 (June 25, 1986); Mustang Fuel Corp. v.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F2d 33, 36 (10th

Cir. 1975). In ruling upon a motion for

summary judgment the Court must view the

record in the light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion and must consider

factual inferences in the light most

favorable to the existence of triable

issues. Exnicious v. United States, 563 F2d 418

(10th Cir. 1977). The burden on a

defendant moving for summary judgment may

be discharged by offering evidence that

negates an element of the plaintiff's claim

or by showing hat there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's

case. Celotex, 54 USLW at 4777-78. Should

the Plaintiff then fail to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of

53a

proof at trial, summary judgment in favor

of the moving party is mandated. id. at

4777.

Thus, since the Court finds that no

issue of material fact remains as to future

federal funding, the only issue to be

decided on this motion for summary judgment

is a question of law: whether the federal

government's financial and technical

participation in ok eapewte) of the EIS

for the river crossings project amounted to

"major federal action."

In support of its argument’ that

approval of an EIS can amount to "major

federal action," the Village directs this

Court's attention to several Tenth Circuit

cases dealing with similar issues: Scenic

Rivers Association of Oklahoma v. Lynn, 520 F2d 240

(10th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 US

54a

776 (1976), and Davis v. Morton, 469 F2da 593

(10th Cir. 1972). Davis held that the

federal government's granting of a lease on

Indian land was major federal action

requiring subsequent preparations of an EIS

for proposed projects on the land. The

Scenic Rivers case held that federal approval

of a developer's filing under_ the

Interstate Land Sales Act constituted major

federal action, requiring that an EIS be

prepared.

Both of the above-cited cases dealt

with the issue of when a project was

sufficiently federal to require preparation

of an EIS, but those courts did not address

the question of whether approval of the EIS

itself, regardless of whether or not

preparation of an EIS was initially

required by law, constitutes major federal

action. Clearly, the state in the instant

55a

case did not initially need any type of

federal approval, assuming that they chose

not to seek federal money, in order to

proceed with the river crossings project.

The fact that the state did voluntarily

request a federal EIS, though they were not

legally bound to do so, should not, without

more, constrain the state to make the

entire project federal. Unless the state

is actually receiving or is planning to

receive federal funding for a project, mere

preparation and approval of an EIS is not

"major federal action." See Citizens for Balanced

Environment & Transportation, Inc. v., Volpe, 376 FSupp

806 (D. Conn.,), affd, 503 F2d 601 (2d Cir.

1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870 (1975). The

Village cites a number of cases contra, see La

Raza Unida of Southern Alameda County v. Volpe, 337

FSupp 221, 226, 227 affd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th

56a

cir. 1973), cert. denied, 409 US 890 (1972); San

Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department ,

446 F2d 1013, 1027 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 406 US 933 (1972); Scottsdale Mall v. State

of Indiana, 549 F2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.

denied, 434 US 1008 (1978) (and cases cited

therein at 488); City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F2d

254, 258-59 (list Cir. 1972).

The cases which hold that mere

preparation of an EIS is a major federal

action reason generally that the option to

receive federal funds is still available to

the state, through preparation of the EIS,

and the state should not therefore be

allowed to "duck" further federal

environmental regulation merely by

asserting that they are not actually

receiving federal funds. However, where,

as here, uncontradicted evidence shows that

57a

a state will not later seek federal funding

for a project,* it seems inconsistent with

basic princip[les] of federalism to

nevertheless require the state to label the

project as federal. It is evident from the

statutory language, "major federal action,"

that Congress did not intend for purely

locally-funded, locally-built projects to

come within the purview of federal

environmental laws. Courts have recognized

that purely local projects, no matter how

great their potential impact on the

environment, do not fall within the purview

of federal law. See Civic Improvement Committee v.

Volpe, 459 F2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972); Bradford

: The Village argues that the state

has not "officially" foreclosed the option

for federal funding, and thus theoretically

may still seek federal money for the

project. However, for purposes of this

motion, the Court relies on evidence

voluntarily presented by Defendants, and

uncontradicted by Plaintiffs, that such

funds will not be sought.

i alt ae 8 ta en

58a

Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 463 F2da

537, 540 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US 1047

(1972). It is reasonable to conclude that

purely locally~funded and operated

projects, such as the North Valley river

crossings project, do not become "major

federal action" by reason of federal

involvement limited to preparing and

approving an EIS for the project.

Segmentation

The Village further argues that, even

if the preparation of the EIS alone, as the

Court has held, is not enough to make the

entire project federal, the river crossings

project was nevertheless improperly

"segmented" from the I-25/Los Angeles

Interchange project, which is a federal

funded project. Thus, the Village argues

that each project comprises one whole,

"major federal action." The Court rejects

59a

this argument, as the evidence is

undisputed that the projects are, at best,

only peripherally related, and have not

been improperly segmented from one another.

Case law, incorporated in FHWA

regulations at 23 CFR §771.111(f), has

developed the following factors’ for

determining the proper "scope" of a

project:

(1) connects logical termini and is

of sufficient length to address

environmental matters on a broad

scope;

(2) has independent utility oor

independent significance; and

(3) does not restrict consideration

of alternatives for other

reasonably foreseeable

transportation improvements.

See, e.g., Bennett v. Taylor, 505 F Supp 800, 808

(M.D. La. 1980); Daly v. Volpe, 514 F2da 1106

(9th Cir., 1975).

Under the regulations, a project which

60a

meets these criteria is suitable in scope

for a separate evaluation. Such a separate

EIS has been prepared for the Los

Angeles/I-25 project. The Court finds that

there is no material issue of fact as to

whether such segmentation was proper, as

the Village has presented no evidence to

this Court that the project is in any way

related to the Montano bridge crossing,

other than the inevitable relationship

caused by the fact that some of the new

frontage road traffic will undoubtedly use

that route as a means of access to Montano

Road, and hence to the new bridge crossing.

But this factor alone does not mean that

the projects were improperly "segmented" by

the preparation of a separate EIS for each

one. The Los Angeles/I-25 project meets

the criteria for being suitable in scope

6la

for a separate EIS.‘ The Village has

presented no evidence contrary to this

analysis, and the Court finds that he

federal-aid frontage road project is not

impermissibly segmented from the locally-

: Concerning the frontage roads

project as a whole, the first criterion is

not an issue, inasmuch as only safety and

operational improvements to an existing

facility are involved. The Los Angeles and

Montgomery/Montano Interchanges tie into

presently existing facilities. They thus

have logical termini. The length of the

project, from Menaul north some 7.5 miles

to Tramway, also complies with the first

criterion as it is sufficient to address

environmental matter on a broad scope. The

project likewise complies with the second

criterion; the safety and operational

improvements to I-25 have independent

utility in that they are justifiable

without reference to any other project.

Finally, the I-25 project meets the third

criterion of the regulations. The sixteen

alternatives considered in the EIS for the

river crossings indicate that the frontage

roads project did not restrict

consideration of alternatives for the river

crossings. Furthermore, federal approval

of the I-25 project was given before FHWA

approved the EIS on the river crossings,

which suggests that the river crossing

projects did not limit federal

consideration of alternatives to the I-25

improvements.

62a

funded North valley river crossing

projects.

The National Historic Preservation Act

The Village further alleges that

Defendants have not complied with the

National Historic Preservation Act, 16 USC

§§420-470W-6 [NHPA], and that, regardless

of this Court's decision regarding

Plaintiffs' claims under the NEPA, the NHPA

still applies to this case as it requires a

lower threshold of federal participation

than does the NEPA. The Court does not

agree.

The NHPA, 16 USC §470t, provides in

pertinent part:

The head of any Federal Agency having

direct or indirect jurisdiction over'a

proposed Federal or federally

undertaking in any State and the head

of any Federal department or

independent agency having authority to

license any undertaking shall, prior

to the approval of the expenditure of

any Federal funds on the undertaking

or prior to the issuance of any

63a

license ... take into account the

effect of the undertaking on any

district, site, building, structure or

object that is included in the

National Register. (Emphasis added.)

This Court has already held that the

river crossings project is not federally

assisted, nor is the project rendered

"federal" in character by the federal

government's mere participation in and

approval of an EIS for the project. Thus,

as no "Federal" or "federally assisted"

undertaking is involved in this action, the

NHPA does not apply.

Section 4f of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966,

and E.O. 11990

The Village's argument that §4(f), 49

USC §303, and Executive Order 11990 apply

to this action fails for the same reason:

lack of any significant federal

participation in the river crossings

project. Section 4(f) bars the use of

64a

federal funds to finance construction of

highways through parks, without = all

possible planning to minimize harm to the

park. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,

401 US 402, 406 (1971). Similarly, E.O.

11990 applies to federal agencies

“undertaking or providing assistance for

new construction in wetlands ..." (Emphasis

added.) As this Court has already stated,

the river crossings project is not a

federal undertaking nor is it federally

assisted. Therefore, §4(f) and E.O. 11990

have no application to this case.

As the Court finds no significant

federal participation in this action which

would require compliance with the federal

environmental laws asserted by the Village

as grounds for this lawsuit, it follows

that summary judgment in favor of the

federal Defendants is proper.

65a

Wherefore,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that the federal Defendants' motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby

is, granted.

DATED this _9th_ day of June, 1987.

—_s/ Juan G. Burciaga_

United States District Judge

66a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

VILLAGE OF IOS RANCHOS DE

ALBUQUERQUE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv. Civil No. 84-1273-JB

R.A. BARNHART, Administrator

of the Federal Highway

Administration, et al.,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on

the federal Defendants' motion for summary

judgment, and the Court having entered its

Memorandum Opinion and Order herewith

granting the motion;

Wherefore,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that Plaintiffs VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE

ALBUQUERQUE, RIO GRANDE VALLEY PRESERVATION

SOCIETY, ELBERT KING, JOAN MCGINNIS, VELMA

WHIPPLE, THOMAS MONTOYA, PRISCILLA MONTOYA,

67a

JOHN TROTTER and KIT SARGENT take nothing

by their Complaint § against federal

Defendants R.H. BARNHART, ELIZABETH DOLE,

PETER A. LOMBARD, DANIEL DAKE and DEWEY

LONSBERRY.

DATED this 9th _ day of June, 1987.

_S/Juan G. Burciaga

United States District Judge

68a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE

ALBUQUERQUE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv. Civil No. 84-1273-JB

R.A. BARNHART, Administrator

of the Federal Highway

Administration, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Because of the Court's decision

granting the Federal Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment herein, there are no

Claims remaining against the Defendant

Intervenor, City of Albuquerque = and

Defendant Intervenor, County of Bernalillo,

and the Court being fully advised in the

premises,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant

Intervenor City of Albuquerque and

Defendant Intervenor County of Bernalillo

69a

are hereby dismissed as Defendants in the

above entitled action on the same grounds

as stated by the Court for dismissal of

Plaintiff's complaint against the Federal

Defendants.

DATED this _6th day of _October ,

1987.

—__s/Juan G. Burciaga

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Approved:

_s/

Edward R. Pearson

Assistant City Attorney

Attorney for Defendant

Intervenor, City of

Albuquerque

_8/

Alice G. Hector

Attorney for Plaintiffs

eS

J. Edward Hollington

Attorney for Defendant

Intervenor, County of

Bernalillo

70a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

Village of Los Ranchos de

Albuquerque, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs. NO. CIV 88-1032JC

Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is now before the Court on

the defendant City of Albuquerque's Motion

to Dismiss for Failure to State a Clain,

filed March 13, 1989; the defendant City's

Motion for Protective Order, filed March

13, 1989; the federal defendants' Motion

for Protective Order, filed March 17, 1989;

and the defendant City's Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Standing and Estoppel, filed

March 23, 1989. Having reviewed the

memoranda of the parties and the applicable

case law, and being otherwise fully advised

_”

71a

in the premises, the Court finds that the

first Motion to Dismiss is not well-taken

and will be denied. The second Motion to

Dismiss is well-taken and will be granted.

The City's Motion for Protective Order is

moot, and the federal defendants' Motion

for Protective Order is well-taken in part

and will be granted in part. The Court's

reasoning is set forth below.

PART I - MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM

On August 29, 1988 the plaintiffs

commenced this action alleging that the

Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service and the City of

Albuquerque violated the National

Environmental Policy At (NEPA), 42 USC

§4321 ef seq., §404 of the Clean Water Act, 33

USC §1341 and the Fish and Wildlife

Coordination Act, 16 USC §662, in granting

Army Permit No. NM-OYT-0458 to the City of

72a

Albuquerque for construction of one aspect

of the Montafo Bridge and Corridor (Montano

Project).

The sole basis for the City

defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure

to State a Claim is that the plaintiffs'

reliance on 28 USC §1331 and §1361 as

jurisdictional basis is misplaced. The

City suggests that the current action can

be sustained only by a petition for

judicial review under the Administrative

Procedures Act (APA), 5 USC §706(2) (A).

A review of the applicable case law

suggests that the defendant's position is

not well-taken, and that the plaintiffs

have properly pled jurisdiction under 28

USC §1331 and 5 USC §706. In Califano v.

Sanders, 430 US 99 (1977), the Supreme Court

indicated that the 1976 modifications to

§1331 jurisdiction conferred "jurisdiction

73a

on the federal courts to review agency

action, regardless of whether the APA of

its own force served as a jurisdictional

predicate." This Court is guided by Califano

and further finds that the APA specifically

contemplated U.S. District Court review of

agency actions. Title 5 USC §702, entitled

"Right to Review" specifically states that

A person suffering legal wrong

because of agency action, or

adversely affected or aggrieved

by agency action within the

meaning of a relevant statu[tje,

is entitled to judicial review

thereof.

This jurisdictional axiom was also

recognized in Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F2d

822 (9th Cir. 1986), a case presented to

this Court by the defendants. There the

circuit court found that the plaintiff's

suit seeking judicial review of an Army

Corps of Engineers issuance of a permit

under §404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 USC

74a

§1344, was properly based on 28 USC §1331

as well as 33 USC §1365. Id. at 827.

The Court finds that paragraph 2 of

the Complaint properly alleges §1331

jurisdiction, and that paragraph 3 of the

Complaint properly alleges review under the

APA at §706. Both paragraphs are

incorporated by reference into each of the

Claims for relief; therefore, jurisdiction

is properly based.

The allegation of §1361 jurisdiction

as it appears in the Complaint is

redundant. In the plaintiffs' Response to

Motion to Dismiss, filed April 5, 1989,

plaintiffs explain that they are seeking

mandamus relief under 28 USC §1361 based on

the duty of the Fish and Wildlife Service -

to recommend adequate mitigation.

Plaintiffs seek an order compelling the

Fish and Wildlife Service to recommend

75a

adequate mitigation as pertains to the

Montafio Project. However, a review of §706

indicates that the relief requested may

properly be granted within the framework of

the APA. Section 706(1) provides that the

reviewing court shall "compel agency action

unlawfully witkrheld or unreasonably

delayed." Plaintiffs' claim of

jurisdiction pursuant to §1361 will

therefore be relegated to the dust bin of

legal excess.

PART II - DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR

LACK OF STANDING AND ESTOPPEL

In their motion dated March 23, 1989

the City defendants have moved to dismiss

on grounds that the plaintiffs lack

standing to assert the claims alleged in

the Complaint against the City. The basis

for the defendants' claim is that the

action in question is the federal agency's

76a

granting of the §404 permit and that the

plaintiffs' Claim is against the

sufficiency of the permit as opposed to any

City action. The City asserts that there

is no right of action created by any

federal statute which would allow the

plaintiff to proceed against it. Finally,

the City urges that even if proof of a

federal permitting violation occurred, such

a violation would not form a basis for an

injunction against a wholly non-federal

project which is in fact the City's

exercise of its police power. The City

concedes that it has relied on the validity

of the permit, but it also states that its

actions to date, specifically those related

to the widening of Montano Road, would have

occurred regardless of the issuance of the

permit, and are at any rate within the

legal scope of the City's authority.

On the other hand, the plaintiffs

77a

argue that NEPA covers all proposed actions

and impacts of a project whether those

actions are taken by federal or non-federal

actors. The plaintiffs urge that all

impacts of a project, past, present and

reasonably foreseeable are covered by the

NEPA umbrella under 40 CFR §1508.7. Thus,

plaintiffs argue, the City is properly

named as a defendant since its actions are

a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the

issuance of the §404 permit. The

plaintiffs further allege that the §404

permit enabled the City to pursue the

construction of the Montafo Corridor and

Bridge, and as such the non-federal action

is completely linked to and dependent on

the Corps' §404 permit. On that basis, the

plaintiffs argue that an injunction against

the City would be properly and correctly

granted by this Court. This reasoning is

explained below.

78a

As the defendants correctly point out,

standing to sue has traditionally been

accorded those “injured in fact" or

"adversely affected" or "aggrieved" by

actions of the defendants. U.S. v. SCRAP, 412

US 669 (1973). In Allen v. Wright, 468 US 737

(1984), the Supreme Court stated that the

“injury" must be fairly traceable to the

challenged action, and relief from the

injury must be "likely" to follow from a

favorable decision. An association has

standing to sue if individual members of

the association have a cognizable personal

interest at stake and if individual members

have been “injured in fact." Sierra Club v.

Morton, 405 US 727 (1972). The Tenth

Circuit has held that associations seeking

review only need allege facts showing that

individual members are adversely affected

as individuals. Citizens Concerned for Separation of

79a

Church and State v. City and County of Denver, 628 F2a

1289 (10th Cir. 1980); Mountain States Legal

Foundation v. Costle, 630 F2d 754 (10th Cir.

1980). Finally, in Save the Bay v. United States

Corps of Engineers, 610 F2d 322 (5th Cir. 1980),

the court ruled that aesthetic and

environmental injury to members of an

association who reside in the geographic

area of concern is sufficient to grant

standing.

This Court now finds that plaintiffs

have properly alleged facts in their

Complaint sufficient to grant standing to

the Village, the Rio Grande Valley

Preservation Society, and the individual

plaintiffs to bring this cause against the

federal defendants. The plaintiffs will be

adversely affected by the Montafio project

and thus all have a personal stake fairly

traceable to and causally connected tc the

80a

challenged conduct of the federal

defendants.

The Village of Los Ranchos meets the

standing test because residents of the

Village live in or near the Montafo

Corridor and use the Bosque and thus will

be affected by the numerous impacts of the

Montano Bridge and Corridor. Individual

plaintiffs have standing because they live

in or near the proposed Montafio Corridor

and use the Bosque and thus will be

affected by the environmental impacts. The

Rio Grande Valley Preservation Society has

standing because many individual members of

the organization live in or near the

proposed Montafho Corridor and use the

Bosque and thus will be affected by the

environmental impacts associated with the

project. Mr. Arnold Sargeant, a resident

of the Bosque area, testified without

objection at the temporary restraining

8la

order hearing before this Court on March

30, 1989 that individual members of the Rio

Grande Valley Preservation Society use and

enjoy the Bosque on a regular basis. He

also testified that one of the purposes of

the organization is to protect the Bosque.

These interests give the Rio Grande Valley

Preservation Society organization standing

in this case.

Having clearly established that the

plaintiffs have standing to sue, the

question before the Court is whether that

standing extends to the claims against the

City. It is this Court's opinion that it

does not. In reaching this decision, the

Court has relied heavily on two separate

themes. First, the actor which has caused

or will cause the alleged injury is the

federal agency through the granting of the

§404 permit. The City has in no manner

been involved in the permitting process but

82a

for its initial request of the permit.

Thus, it cannot fairly be said that the

City is an actor whose conduct is causally

related to the injury claimed by the

plaintiff.

Secondly, however, the Court

specifically notes that in the event that

an injunction should prove warranted, the

Court's grant of said injunction would have

the same effect on the City as a non-party

as it would on the City and federal

defendants as parties. This reasoning is

explained below.

In urging that standing in fact

exists, the plaintiffs rely in considerable

part on the case of Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772

F2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1985). There the

plaintiffs sued a private developer, along

with federal officials, to prevent

construction of a waterfront housing

83a

development before preparation of a proper

environmental impact statement. The Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals upheld = an

injunction against the developer when it

found that the Corps had _ improperly

declined to study related cumulative

impacts of the development. (The Fifth

Circuit only affirmed the district court's

injunction insofar as it prohibited the

private developer from performing

additional work on the land in question

which was within the jurisdiction of the

Corps. [(]The court did not enjoin

development outside of the permit area).

Though somewhat unclear, it appears that

the plaintiffs rely on the _ implicit

assumption in Fritiofson that the court would

not have enjoined the defendant developer

if the plaintiff lacked standing to sue

that party.

84a

This Court deduces from Fritiofson that in

a NEPA claim where a private developer

proposes development on land under the

jurisdiction of a federal agency for

permitting purposes, the developer may

properly be enjoined if there is a finding

that the EIS or EA relied upon as a basis

for the permit is legally deficient.

It is also well established that a

court order granting injunction "is binding

upon parties to an action...and upon those

persons in active concert or participation

with them who receive actual notice of the

order." U.S. v. Hall, 42 F2d 261 (emphasis

added). Furthermore, a court may bind non-

parties to terms of an injunction to

preserve its ability to render a judgment

in a case over which it has jurisdiction.

Vuition et Fils S.A. v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F2d 126

(2nd Cir. 1979). Having considered the

85a

rulings in Fritiofson, Hall and Carousel Handbags,

the Court now determines that dismissal of

the City of Albuquerque’ will not

substantially prejudice the plaintiffs'

rights under the NEPA. While it is

admittedly true that the plaintiffs will

not be able to raise a claim against the

City directly, it is also true that to date

they have not established a basis for doing

so. On the other hand, while the City

defendants will ~ excused from formal

pleading, their actions in regard to the

project will still be significantly

dependent upon the validity of the permit.

It is this Court's belief that this

approach to the litigation focuses the

considerable light shed by the adversary

process on the core issue: Is the §404

permit valid?

Having reached this conclusion, the

86a

Court will grant the City's Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Standing. The issue of

estoppel need not be reached. The Court

will also deny the City's Motion for

Protective Order as moot and order that the

City defendants need not respond to

plaintiffs' propounded interrogatories.

PART III ~- FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

PROTECTIVE ORDER

The federal defendants base their

motion on the assumption that any action

seeking judicial review of the Corps of

Engineers issuance of the §404 permit must

be determined solely on the complete

administrative record. Therefore, any

additional discovery would not and could

not lead to competent admissible evidence.

The general rule is that judicial

review of agency action is limited to a

review of the administrative record. Florida

Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 US 729 (1985),

87a

Camp v. Pitts, 411 US 138 (1973). In addition,

the courts have clearly indicated that in

actions brought requesting relief under APA

§706(2) (A) - which seek to set aside agency

findings as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion or otherwise not in

accordance with the law - the record

available to the court is limited to the

record of proceedings available to the

administrative agency. Citizens to Protect Overton

Park vy. Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971), Friends of the

Earth v. Hintz, 800 F2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986),

Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F2da

897 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the

judicial review of agency determinations

conducted under §706(2)(B) and (C) is also

limited to the administrative agency

record).

The courts have clearly indicated that

§706(2)(E) review is also limited to the

administrative agency record. Roberts v.

Morton, 549 F2d 158 (10th Cir. 1977) and

Fishback v. U.S., £519 FSupp 190 (D.N.M. 1981).

Plaintiffs' acknowledge that of their

five claims for relief, the third and

fourth claims, which challenge the actions

and decision of the Corps in regard to the

§404 permitting process, are clearly within

the scope of APA §706(2)(A) review. Thus,

there can be no dispute that this Court

should only review those claims based on

the complete administrative agency record.

Given this scenario, the Court will only

supplement the administrative agency record

if it appears that "there is such a failure

to explain administrative action as to

frustrate effective judicial review." C.F.].

Steel Corp. v. Economic Development Administration, 624

F2d 136 (10th Cir. 1980).

Plaintiffs urge that there exist

89a

several exceptions to the general rule

limiting the reviewing court to the

administrative record, and that’ those

exceptions apply to the first, second and

fifth claims for relief. One such

exception encompasses claims brought

pursuant to the procedural requirements of

NEPA. On that basis, the plaintiffs urge

that additional discovery is appropriate on

its first and second claims for relief

which are premised on NEPA, 42 USC §4321, ef

seq. The Tenth Circuit has had occasion to

Clarify this issue in a context

substantially similar to the current cause.

In National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F2d 995

(10th Cir. 1973), the court was presented

with a challenge to the sufficiency of an

EIS which the Secretary of the Interior had

used as a basis for the decision to

terminate certain helium purchase

90a

contracts. This appeal’ was based on the

district court's ruling that the department

had failed to comply with the mandate of

NEPA because the EIS was’ essentially

lacking in depth.

For the purposes of this case, the

relevant portion of the Tenth Circuit's

opinion is found in Part II beginning at

page 1001. There, the court illustrates

and explains that the record available to

the reviewing district court is dependent

on the type of action being reviewed. When

called upon to assess the adequacy of an

' The Tenth Circuit had ruled on

three previous appeals in the same cause of

action. In the first appeal, 455 F2d 650

(10th Cir. 1971), the court upheld the

district court's ruling that contracts

entered into pursuant to the Helium Act

could not be terminated without the filing

by the Interior Department of an

Environmental Impact Statement in =

accordance with 42 USC §4321, ef seg. The

court held specifically that the Interior

Department was required to comply with the

provisions of the NEPA.

9la

impact statement, the Tenth Circuit held

that a court was not reviewing agency

action within the meaning of the APA. The

court acknowledged that a review of agency

action per se would be forbidden by the

Supreme Court‘s ruling in Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971), but

found that a review of the adequacy of the

EIS was in the realm of a review of a NEPA

procedural requirement which was a

prerequisite for agency action, and not a

review of agency action itself. Rejecting

the notion that the arbitrary and

capricious standard found at §706(2) (A) was

the appropriate benchmark, the court

indicated that in assessing ‘alleged

violations of NEPA, the rule of reason and

objective good faith compliance were the

proper standards.

This Court is guided by the

92a

distinction drawn in National Helium. Since

the APA §706(2)(A) guideline is not

applicable in determining the adequacy of

an EIS under NEPA, it would be unwise for

this Court to uphold a protective order on

the basis of an inapplicable standard of

review. Having come to this conclusion,

the question now before the Court is

whether new evidence, or evidence outside

the administrative record, may be

introduced for the purposes of determining

whether NEPA procedural guidelines have

been followed.

The judicial response to this question

has been a uniform acceptance and

recognition of the need for evidence beyond

the administrative record, in cases where

the plaintiff has alleged that an EIS

neglects to mention a serious environmental

consequence, failed to adequately discuss

’

;

q

93a

some reasonable alternative, or otherwise

swept "stubborn problems oor serious

criticism under the rug." County of Suffolk v.

Secretary of Interior, 526 F2d 1368 (2nd Cir.

1977). Accord, A.T.S.&F. R.R. Co. v. Callaway, 459

F Supp 188 (D.D.C. 1978); Como-Falcon Coalition

v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 465 F Supp 850 (D.Minn.

1978) ; American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 456 F

Supp 889 (D.Cal. 1978), National Indian Youth |

Council vy. Andrus, 501 F ont 649 (D.N.M. 1980).

In addition the Court has been advised

of the numerable cases where testimony

outside the administrative record has been

admitted or presented at an evidentiary

hearing. See, Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F2d 788

(10th Cir. 1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating

Council v. Butz, 484 F2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973)

Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F2d 295 (9th

Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F2d 43 (5th

94a

Cir. 1974).

The plaintiffs seek to supplement the

administrative agency record as regards

their claims for relief under NEPA with

evidence related to four separate issues:

1.

2.

The analysis and impact of the

fracturing of the bosque;

The impact to lecal residents of

the widening of Montafio Road

between Fourth Street and Rio

Grande Boulevard;

The failure of the Corps to do a

study or require the City to

undertake a study of the actual

noise, air quality and water

depletion impact which would

result from the Montano Project;

and

The failure of the Corps to

analyze the alternative of

widening the Alameda Bridge and

compare that impact with that of

the Montafio Project.

This Court must now determine whether

the requested supplementation is both

necessary and in conformance with the scope

and nature of the NEPA claims.

It is clear that evidence which

95a

indicates that the impact of the fracturing

of the Bosque was not adequately studied is

of the type specifically contemplated by

the court in County of Suffolk, since the

plaintiff has alleged that an EIS "neglects

to mention a serious environmental

consequence." 562 F2d at 1385. The

federal defendants object to additional

evidence on this topic on two grounds.

First, defendants assert that they have not

proffered evidence that suggests that a

study of the impact of fracturing of the

Bosque was not adequately done. Second,

the fedora? defendants assert that a

sufficient study was indeed undertaken, and

that the results of the study appear in the

agency record, at pgs. 25-27 of the

Environmental Assessment.

The defendants['] first contention,

while accurate, does not take into

96a

consideration the fact that plaintiffs have

not been allowed discovery to this point

and therefore their failure to proffer

evidence pertaining to the importance of a

thorough study of the fracturing of the

Bosque is excusable. Defendants' second

contention is somewhat more troublesome to

the Court. While this Court acknowledged

that it has no right to substitute its own

judgment for the decision-making process

of the agency, it is also the law that a 3

NEPA claim "raises issues sufficiently

important to permit the introduction of new

evidence in the district court, including

expert testimony with respect to technical

matters...." County of Suffolk, 562 F2d at

1385. This Court will be guided by the

wisdom of those courts which have allowed

additional testimony to be presented at an

evidentiary hearing. Supra. Having heard

97a

the proferred testimony, the Court will

then rule on the admissibility of the

additional evidence. The Court will

therefore schedule an evidentiary hearing

prior to, or in conjunction with, the

motion for preliminary injunction hearing

already set. For reasons outlined below,

the sole purpose of the evidentiary hearing

will be to hear proffered testimony on the

issue of the Corps of Engineers' analysis

of the impacts of fracturing on the Bosque.

Having temporarily placed the cart

before the horse, the Court now returns to

the plaintiffs' request for additional

discovery on the issues of widening Montafio

Road, the Corps[{'] lack of a noise, air

quality and water depletion impact analysis

and lack of analysis on the Alameda

alternative.

As the federal defendants have noted

in their Reply in Support of Motion for

98a

Protective Order, this case is brought to

remedy federal action in connection with

the issuance of the §4C4 permit. While it

is true that the permit forms’ the

indispensable basis for any construction of

the bridge, it does not follow that the

federal agency should be required to

analyze the effects of non-federal action

in connection with completion of the

Montano Project. Federal action, ‘though

major, does not encompass the City's avowed

intention to widen Montafio Road regardless

of construction of a new bridge. This is

wholly a City managed and _ supervised

project which might easily be accomplished

without a §404 permit. Likewise, the

decision to grant a §404 permit does not

and need not concern itself with the noise,

air quality and water depletion effects of

the City's aspect of the project. It

appears from the record that the Corps of

99a

Engineers' chief task was to determine the

effects of the dredge and fill aspects of

the construction phase of the project.

Additional analysis is simply beyond the

scope of the requested permitting process.

Turning then to the issue of the

alleged lack of due consideration given the

Alameda alternative, the Court has

difficulty in imagining what additional

evidence might be introduced to shed light

on the Corps' decision-making process. The

record indicates that the Corps did not

consider the Alameda alternative due to the

fact that the Alameda site lies outside the

jurisdiction of the City of Albuquerque.

This Court sees no basis for additional

testimony on this issue as the basis for

the Corps' decision is clear, and

additional testimony will not make it

Clearer. While it may be that the extra-

territoriality of the Alameda site is of

100a

itself an insufficient basis to reject

consideration of the site, that is an issue

which is not currently before the Court.

The defendants will therefore not be

required to respond to discovery requests

on the Alameda alternative site issue.

The fifth claim for relief challenges

the alleged failure of the Fish and

Wildlife Service to recommend adequate

mitigation for the alleged negative impacts

to fish and wildlife caused by the

completion of the Montafio Project. As the

Court noted in Part I above, such relief is

specifically contemplated in the APA;

therefore, the appropriate scope of review

on this issue is found within the APA.

The problem presented to the Court

then is whether additional evidence may be

used to supplement the administrative

agency record in APA §706(1) cases. The

Court has previously noted the general rule

101a

requiring that judicial review be limited

to the administrative agency record. Infra

at p. 10. The Court has not been presented

with, nor has it discovered on its own, any

basis for not applying the general rule.

The plaintiffs have listed no exception to

the rule applicable to §706(1) cases.

Therefore, the Court will follow the

general rule and restrict the parties to

the administrative agency record. The

Court will not allow additional discovery

or testimony on the issues related to the

plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief.

Wherefore,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that the defendant City of Albuquerque's

Motion to Cismiss for Failure to State a

Claim, filed March 13, 1989 is denied. The

defendant City of Albuquerque's Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Standing, filed March

i.

102a

23, 1989 is granted. The defendant City of

Albuquerque's Motion for Protective Order

is moot, and is therefore denied. The

federal defendants' Motion for Protective

Order is granted pursuant to the following

restrictions:

1. The federal defendants are not

required to respond to interrogatories or

other discovery requests concerning the

impact to local residents of the widening

of Montano Road between Fourth Street and

Rio Grande Boulevard;

2. The federal defendants are not

required to respond to interrogatories or

other discovery requests concerning their

decision not to, or the alleged failure to,

undertake a study, or require the City to

undertake a study of the actual noise, air

quality and water depletion impact which

would result from the Montano Project.

36 The federal defendants are not

103a

required to respond to interrogatories or

other discovery requests concerning their

alleged failure to study the Alameda

alternative bridge site.

4. The federal defendants are not

required to respond to interrogatories or

other discovery requests concerning the

alleged failure of the Fish and Wildlife

Service to recommend adequate mitigation.

S. The federal defendants are hereby

directed to comply with the plaintiffs'

discovery requests immediately regarding

its study of the impact of the fracturing

of the Bosque.

With respect to the issue presented in

restriction #5 above, the federal

defendants' Motion for Protective Order is

denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that _= an

evidentiary hearing will be held at 8:30

a.m. on Monday, May 15, 1989 for

ee naale aia < 4

_—

104a

presentation of testimony regarding the

impacts of fracturing on the Bosque. The

parties will be notified by subsequent

order of that setting.

DATED this 8th day of May, 1989.

John E. Conway

United States District Judge

105a

NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT

16 USC §470f

Effect of Federal undertakings upon

property listed in National Register;

comment by Advisory Council on Historic

Preservation

The head of any Federal agency having

direct or indirect jurisdiction over a

proposed Federal or federally assisted

undertaking in any State and the head of

any Federal department or independent

agency having authority to license any

undertaking shall, prior to the approval of

the expenditure of any Federal funds on the

undertaking or prior to the issuance of any

license, as the case may be, take into

account the effect of the undertaking on

any district, site, building, structure, or

object that is included in or eligible for

inclusion in the National Register. The

head of any such Federal agency shall

afford the Advisory Council on Historic

106a

Preservation established under title II of

this Act [16 USCS §§470i efseg.] a reasonable

opportunity to comment with regard to such

undertaking.

107a

FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAYS ACT 23 USC §138

§138. Preservation of parklands.

It is hereby declared to be the national

policy that special effort should be made

to preserve the natural beauty of the

countryside and public park and recreation

lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and

historic sites. The Secretary of

Transportation shall cooperate and consult

with the Secretaries of the Interior,

Housing and Urban Developments, and

Agriculture, and with the States in

developing transportation plans and

programs that include measures to maintain

or enhance the natural beauty of the lands

traversed. After the effective date of the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the

Secretary shall not approve any program or

project (other than any project for a park

road or parkway under section 204 of this

title) which requires the use of any

108a

publicly owned land from a public park,

recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl

refuge of national, State, or local

significance as determined by the Federal,

State, or local officials having

jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an

historic site of national, State,or local

significance as so determined by such

officials unless (1) there is no feasible

and prudent alternative to the use of such

land, and 2) such program includes all

possible planning to minimize harm to such

park, recreational area, wildlife and

waterfowl refuge, or historic site

resulting from such use. In carrying out

the national policy declared in. this

section the Secretary, in cooperation with

the Secretary of the Interior and

appropriate State and local officials, is

authorized to conduct studies as to the

most feasible Federal-aid routes for the

109a

movement of motor vehicular traffic through

or around national parks so as to best

serve the needs of the traveling public

while preserving the national beauty of

these areas.

110a

CLEAN WATER ACT (§404)

33 UBC §1344

Permits for dredged and fill material

(a) Discharge into navigable waters at

specified disposal sites. The Secretary

may issue permits, after notice and

opportunity for public hearings for the

discharge of dredged or fill material into

the navigable waters at specified disposal

sites. Not later than the fifteenth day

after the date an applicant submits all the

information required to complete an

application for a permit under this

subsection, the Secretary shall publish the

notice required by this subsection.

(b) Specification for disposal sites.

Subject to subsection (c) of this section,

each such disposal site shall be specified

for each such permit by the Secretary (1)

through the application of guidelines

developed by the Administrator, in

llla

conjunction with the Secretary, which

guidelines shall be based upon criteria

comparable to the criteria applicable to

the territorial seas, the contiguous zone,

and the ocean under section 403(c) [33 USC

§1343(c)], and (2) in any case where such

guidelines under clause (1) alone would

prohibit the specification of a site,

through the application additionally of the

economic impact of the site on navigation

and anchorage.

(a) "“Becretary" defined. The term

"Secretary" as used in this section means

the Secretary of the Army, acting through

the Chief of Engineers.

(m) Comments on permit applications or

proposed general permits by Secretary of

the Interior acting through Director of

United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

112a

Not later than the ninetieth day after the

date on which the Secretary notifies the

Secretary of the Interior, acting through

the Director of the United States Fish and

Wildlife Service that (1) an application

for a permit under subsection (a) of this

section has been received by the Secretary,

or (2) the Secretary proposes to issue a

general permit under subsection (e) of this

section, the Secretary of the Interior,

acting through the Director of the United

States Fish and Wildlife Service, shall

submit any comments with respect to such

application or such proposed general permit

in writing to the Secretary.

(n) Enforcement authority not limited.

Nothing in this section shall be construed

to limit the authority of the Administrator

to take action pursuant to section 309 of

this Act [33 USC §1319]}.

(0) Public availability of permits aad

—

113a

permit applications. A copy of each permit

application and each permit issued under

this section shall be available to the

public. Such permit application or portion

thereof, shall further be available on

request for the purpose of reproduction.

(p) Compliance. Compliance with a perait

issued pursuant to this section, including

any activity carried out pursuant to a

general permit issued under this section,

shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of

sections 309 and 505 [33 USC §§1319, 1365},

with sections 301, 307 and 403 [33 USC

§§1311, 1317, 1343].

(q) Minimisation of duplication, needless

paperwork, and delays in issuance;

agreements. Not later than the

one-hundred-eightieth day after the date of

enactment of this subsection [enacted Dec.

27, 1977), the Secretary shall enter into

agreements with the Administrator, the

114a

Secretaries of the Departments of

Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and

Transportation, and the heads of other

appropriate Federal agencies to minimize,

to the maximum extent practicable,

duplication, needless paperwork, and delays

in the issuance of permits under this

section. Such agreements shall be developed

to assure that, to the maximum extent

practicable, a decision with respect to an

application for a permit under subsection

(a) of this section will be made not later

than the ninetieth day after the date the

notice for such application is published

under subsection (a) of this section.

(s) Violation of permits. (1) Whenever on

the basis of any information available to

him the Secretary finds that any person is

in violation of any condition or limitation

set forth in a permit issued by the

115a

Secretary under this section, the Secretary

shall issue an order requiring such person

to comply with such condition or

limitation, or the Secretary shall bring a

civil action in accordance with paragraph

(3) of this subsection.

(2) A copy of any order issued under this

subsection shall be sent immediately by the

Secretary to the State in which the

violation occurs and other affected States.

Any order issued under this subsection

shall be by personal service and shall

state with reasonable specificity the

nature of the violation, specify a time for

compliance, not to exceed thirty days,

which the Secretary determines is

reasonable, taking into account’- the

seriousness of the violation and any good

faith efforts to comply with applicable

requirements. In any case in which an order

under this subsection is issued to a

1164

corporation, a copy of such order shall be

served on any appropriate corporate

officers.

(3) The Secretary is authorized to commence

a civil action for appropriate relief,

including a permanent or temporary

injunction for any violation for which he

is authorized to issue a compliance order

under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Any

action under this paragraph may be brought

in the district court of the United States

for the district in which the defendant is

located or resides or is doing business,

and such court shall have jurisdiction to

restrain such violation and to require

compliance. Notice of the commencement of

such acton j[action) shall be _ given

immediately to the appropriate State.

(4) (A) Any person who willfully or

negligently violates any

condition or limitation in a

117a

permit issued by the Secretary

under this section shall be

punished by a fine of not less

than $2,500 nor more than $25,000

per day of violation, or by

imprisonment for not more than

one year, or by both. If the

sonviction is for a violation

committed after a first

conviction of such person under

this paragraph, punishment shall

be by a fine of not more than

$50,000 per day of violation, or

by imprisonment for not more than

two years, or by both.

(B) For the purposes of this

paragraph, the term "person"

shall mean, in addition to the

definition contained in section

502(5) of this Act [33 USC

§1362(5)], any responsible

aia

118a

corporate officer.

(5) Any person who violates any condition

or limitation in a permit issued by the

Secretary under this section, and any

person who violates any order issued by the

Secretary under paragraph (1) of this

subsection, shall be subject to a civil

penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day of

such violation.

119a

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

42 USC §4321

Congressional Declaration of Purpose

The purposes of this Act [42 USCS §§4321 ef

Seq.) are: To declare a national policy

which will encourage productive and

enjoyable harmony between man and his

environment; to promote efforts which will

prevent or eliminate damage to the

environment and biosphere and stimulate the

health and welfare of man; to enrich the

understanding of the ecological systems and

natural resources important to the Nation;

and to establish a Council on Environmental

Quality.

EE — > —

‘a

oy

53

120a

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA)

42 USC § 4332

Cooperation of agencies; reports;

availability of information;

recommendations; international and national

coordination of efforts

The Congress authorizes and directs that,

to the fullest extent possible: (1) the

policies, regulations, and public laws of —

the United States shall be interpreted and

administered in accordance with the

policies set forth in this Act [42 USCS §§

4321 ef seq.}, and (2) all agencies of the

Federal Government shall-

(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary

approach which will insure the integrated

use of the natural and social sciences and

the environmental design arts in planning

and in decision-making which may have an

impact on man's environment;

(B) identify and develop methods and

procedures, in consultation with the

i2ia

Council on Environmental Quality

established by title II of this Act [42

USCS §§ 4341 efseq.], which will insure that

presently unquantified environmental

amenities and values may be given

appropriate consideration in

decision-making along with economic and

technical considerations;

(C) include in every recommendation or

report on proposals for legislation and

other major Federal actions significantly

affecting the quality of the human

environment, a detailed statement by the

responsible official on-

(i) the environmental impact of the

proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects

which cannot be avoided should the proposal

be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed

action,

(iv) the relationship between local

short-term uses of man's environment and

i22a

the maintenance and enhancement of

long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable

commitments of resources which would be

involved in the proposed action should it

be implemented.

Prior to making any detailed statement, the

responsible Federal official shall consult

with and obtain the comments of any Federal

agency which has jurisdiction by law or

“special expertise with respect to any

environmental impact involved. Copies of

such statement and the comments and views

of the appropriate Federal, State, and

local agencies, which are authorized to

develop and enforce environmental

standards, shall be made available to the

President, the Council on Environmental

Quality and to the public as provided by

section 552 of title 5, United States Code,

and shall accompany the proposal through

the existing agency review processes;

(D) Any detailed statement required under

i23a

subparagraph (C) after January 1, 1970, for

any major Federal action funded under a

program of grants to States shall not be

deemed to be legally insufficient solely by

reason of having been prepared by a State

agency or official, if:

(i) the State agency or official has

statewide jurisdiction and has_~ the

responsibility for such action,

(ii) the responsible Federal official

furnishes guidance and participates in such

preparation,

(iii) the responsible Federal official

independently evaluates such statement

prior to its approval and adoption, and

(iv) after January 1, 1976, the

responsible Federal official provides early

notification to, and solicits the views of,

any other State or any Federal land

management entity of any action or any

alternative thereto which may have

significant impacts upon such State or

affected Federal land management entity

and, if there is any disagreement on such

impacts, prepares a written assessment of

such impacts and views for incorporation

into such detailed statement.

The procedures in this subparagraph shall

not relieve the Federal official of his

i24a

responsibilities for the scope,

objectivity, and content of the entire

statement or of any other responsibility

under this Act; and further, this

subparagraph does not affect the legal

sufficiency of ececenete prepared by State

agencies with less than statewide

jurisdiction. [;]

(E) study, develop, and describe

appropriate alternatives to recommended

courses of action in any proposal which

involves unresolved conflicts concerning

alternative uses of available resources;

(F) recognize the worldwide and long range

character of environmental problems and,

where consistent with the foreign policy of

the United States, lend appropriate support

to initiatives, resolutions, and programs

designed to maximize international

cooperation in anticipating and preventing

a decline in the quality of mankind's world

125a

environment;

(G) make available to States, counties,

municipalities, institutions, and

individuals, advice and information useful

in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing

the quality of the environment;

(H) initiate and utilize ecological

information in the planning and development

of resource-oriented projects; and

(I) assist the Council on Environmental

Quality established by title II of this

Act.

126a

Department of Transportation Act

49 USC §303

Policy on lands, wildlife and waterfowl

refuges, and historic sites

(a) It is the policy of the United

States Government that special effort

should be made to preserve the natural

heauty of the countryside and public park

and recreation lands, wildlife and

waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.

(b) The Secretary of Transportation

shall cooperate and consult with the

Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and

Urban Development, and Agriculture, and

with the States, in developing

transportation plans and programs that

include measures to maintain or enhance the

natural beauty oof lands crossed by

transportation activities or facilities.

(c) The Secretary may approve a

transportation program or project requiring

the use of publicly owned land of a public

127a

park, recreation area, or wildlife and

waterfowl refuge of national, State, or

local significance, or land of an historic

site of national, State, or local

significance (as determined by the Federal,

State, or local officials having

jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge,

or site) only if -

(1) there is no prudent and feasible

alternative to using that land; and

(2) the program or project includes

all possible planning to minimize harm to

the park, recreation area, wildlife and

waterfowl refuge, or historic site

resulting from the use.

i26e

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, DOT

23 CFR Part 771

Environmental Impact

§771.105 Policy.

It is the policy of the Administration

that:

(a) To the fullest extent possible,

all environmental investigations, reviews,

and consultations be coordinated as a

single process, and compliance with all

applicable environmental requirements be

reflected in the environmental document

required by this regulation.

§771.107 Definitions.

The definitions contained in the CEQ

regulation and in Titles 23 and 49 of the

United States Code are applicable. In

addition, the following definitions apply.

(a) Environmental studies. The

investigations of potential environmental

impacts to determine the environmental

129a@

process to be followed and to assist in the

preparation of the environmental document.

(b) Action. A highway or transit

project proposed for FHWA or UMTA funding.

It also includes activities such as joint

and multiple use permits, changes in access

control, etc., which may or may not involve

a commitment of Federal funds.

(c) Administration action. The

approval by FHWA or UMTA of the applicant's

request for Federal funds for constructicn.

It also includes approval of activities

such as joint and multiple use permits,

changes in access control, etc., which may

or may not involve a commitment of Federal

funds.

(e) Formerly § 4(f) refers to 49 USC

§303 and 23 USC §138.

§771.109 Applic ab ility and

responsibilities.

ae

130a

(a) (1) The provisions of this

regulation and the CEQ regulation apply to

actions where the Administration exercises

sufficient control to condition the permit

or project approval. Actions taken by the

applicant which do not require Federal

approvals, such as preparation of a

regional transportation plan are not

subject to this regulation.

§771.111 Early coordination, public

involvement, and project development.

(f) In order to ensure meaningful

evaluation of alternatives and to avoid

commitments to transportation isprovenents

before they are fully evaluated, the action

evaluated in each EIS or finding of no

significant impact (FONSI) shall:

(1) Connect logical termini and be of

sufficient length to address

environmental matters on a broad

scope;

i3ia

(2) Have independent utility or

independent significance, i.e., be

usable and be a reasonable

expenditure even if no additional

transportation improvements in the

area are made; and

(3) Not restrict consideration of

alternatives for other reasonably

foreseeable transportation

improvements.

(g) For major transportation actions,

the tiering of EISs as discussed in the CEQ

regulation (40 CFR 1502.20) may . ~be

appropriate. The first tier EIS would

focus on broad issues such as general

location, mode choice, and area wide air

quality and land use implications of the

major alternatives. The second tier would

address site-specific details on project

impacts, costs, and mitigation measures.

§771.113 Timing of Administration

activities.

(a) The Administration in cooperation

with the applicant will perform the work

Sa at at

ra paca iy

132a

necessary to complete a FONSI or an EIS and

comply with other related environmental

laws and regulations to the maximum extent

possible during the NEPA process. This

work includes environmental studies,

related engineering studies, agency

coordination and public involvement.

However, final design activities, property |

acquisition (with the exception of hardship

and protective buying, as defined in

§771.117(d), purchase of construction

materials or rolling stock, or project

construction shall not proceed unt{l the

following have been completed:

(1)...

(iii) A final EIS has been approved

and available for the prescribed period of

time and a record of decision has been

signed;

(b) For FHWA, the completion of the

133a

requirements set forth in paragraph (a) (1)

and (a)(2) of this section is considered

acceptance of the general project location

and concepts described in the environmental

document unless otherwise specified by the

approving official. However, such approval

does not commit the Administration to

approve any future grant request to fund

the preferred alternative.

§771.115 Classes of actions.

There are three classes of actions

which prescribe a level of documentation

required in the NEPA process.

(a) Class I (EI8s). Actions that

significantly affect the environment

require an EIS (40 CFR 1508.27). The

following are examples of actions that

normally require an EIS:

(4) A new controlled access freeway.

(2) A highway project of four or more

lanes on a new location.

134a

§771.117 Categorical exclusions.

(b) Any action which normally would

be classified as a CE but could involve

unusual circumstances will require the

Administration, in cooperation with the

applicant, to conduct appropriate

environmental studies to determine if the

CE classification is proper. Such unusual

circumstances include:

(1) Significant environmental

impacts;

(2) Substantial controversy on

environmental grounds;

(3) Significant impact on properties

protected by section 4(f) of the DOT Act or

section 106 of the National Historic

Preservation Act; or

(4) Inconsistencies with any Federal,

State, or local law, requirement’. or

administrative determination relating to

the environmental aspects of the action.

§771.135 Section 4(f) (¢<9 USC 303).

135a

(a) (1) The Administration may not

approve the use of land from a significant

publicly owned public park, recreation

area, or wildlife and water ®owl refuge, or

any significant historic site unless a

determination is made that:

(i) There is no feasible and prudent

alternative to the use of land from the

property; and

(ii) The action includes all possible

planning to minimize harm to the property

resulting from such use.

~ 8 Supporting information must

demonstrate that there are unique problems

or unusual factors involved in the use of

alternatives that avoid these properties or

that the cost, social, economic, and

environmental impacts, or community

disruption resulting from such alternatives

reach extraordinary magnitudes.

(b) The Administration will determine

the application of section 4(f). Any use

of lands from a section 4(f) property shall

136a

be evaluated early in the development of

the action when alternatives to the

proposed action are under study.

(c) Consideration under section 4(f)

is not required when the Federal, State, or

local officials having jurisdiction over a

park, recreation area or refuge determine

that the entire site is not significant.

In the absence of such a determination, the

section 4(f) land will be presumed to be

significant. The Administration will

review the significance determination to

assure its reasonableness.

(e) In determining the application of

section 4(f) to historic sites, the

Administration, in cooperation with the

applicant, will consult with the State

Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and

appropriate local officials to identify all

properties on or eligible for the National

Register of Historic Places (National

137a

Register). The section 4(f) is otherwise

appropriate.

138a

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION

36 CPR Ch. VIII (1989)

§800.2 Definitions

(A) “Act™ means the National Historic

Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, 16

USC 470-470w-6.

oo (o) "Undertaking" means any project,

activity, or program that can result in

changes in the character or use of historic

properties, if any such historic properties

are located in the area of potential

effects. The project, activity, or program

must be under the direct or indirect

jurisdiction of a Federal agency or

licensed or assisted by a Federal agency.

Undertakings include new and continuing

projects, activities, or programs and any

of their elements not previously considered

under section 106.

139a

Council on Environmental Q u ality

Regulations

40 CFR §1501 ef seq.

Part 1561 NEPA and Agency Planning

§1501.2 Apply NEPA early in the process.

Agencies shall integrate the NEPA

process with other planning at the earliest

possible time to insure that planning and

decisions reflect environmental values to

avoid delays later in the process and to

head off potential conflicts. Each agency

shall:

(a) Comply with the mandate of

section 102(2) (A) to “utilize a systematic

interdisciplinary approach which will

insure the integrated use of the natural

and social sciences and the environmental

design arts in planning and in decision-

making which may have an impact on man's

environment," as specified by §1507.2.

(b) Identify environmental effects

. eo Say Sete oN te es jew

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart · 498 U.S. 1109 | Frix