Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Acmat Corp. v. School District of Philadelphia
Supreme Court brief1991
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Text
No.
In The
Supreme Court Of The United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
ACMAT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
RAY GODDARD
675 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 949-0555
Counsel of Record and
Attorney for Petitioner
Joseph P. Dineen
Edward A. Stein
Goddard & Blum
Of Counsel
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether due process is violated when a federal court sitting in
diversity ignores controlling precedent and holds that a political
subdivision, as party to a publicly bid construction contract, can
unilaterally adjudicate a contractor’s clainis without any hearing and
without any availability for judicial review.
2. Whether a federal court sitting in diversity may reject the
controlling precedent set forth in Teodori v. Penn Hills School
District Authority, 413 Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964), and hold that
a coniract approved by the School Board with a differing site
condition clause requires additional School Board approval foreach
and every item of additional work performed on account of differing
site conditions.
3. Whether a contractual site inspection clause may abrogate a
provision mandating an equitable adjustment for differing site
conditions.
4. Whether the Court’s construction of ambiguous contractual
language on a motion for summary judgment is reversible error.
5. Whether triable issues of material fact precluded entry of
summary judgment in favor of the School District.
6. Whether a federal court sitting in diversity may ignore
controlling precedent and determine on a motion for summary
judgment that qualified exculpatory language in a contract deprives
a contractor of damages for delay.
*Petitioner’s corporate parent, subsidiary and affiliates are:
Amins, Inc., Geremia Electric Co., Acmat of Texas, Inc., Acstar
Holdings, Inc., United Coasts Corp., Acstar Insurance Co. and
United Coastal Insurance Co.
ii
PARTIES
The names of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose
judgment is sought to be reviewed here appear in the caption of the
case. Although Hughes Urethane Construction, Inc., is listed as a
third-party defendant in the caption of the Court of Appeals’
Judgment Order, it had been dismissed from the action. Hughes
Urethane Construction, Inc. has no interest in the outcome of the
petition and is not considered a party to this proceeding. There is no
other party with an interest in the outcome of the petition.
PU
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................... i
vie ae a ii
enge> nt lon pag pe J iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................. viii
tra cos 1
JURISDICTION ..... pee PSIMOMIGA TORK. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISION Ss
hk oss whan c ence. 2
A. Constitutional Provisions................ 2
B. StatutoryProvisions .................. 4
STATEMENT OFTHECASE................. 6
A. StatementofFacts ................... 7
ee 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......... 9
I. THIS CASE INVOLVES IMPORTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF DUE PROCESS
AND THE DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS . . 9
iv
A. The district court ignored binding state court precedent
set forth in John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of
Philadelphia and made the School District’s determination
of Acmat’s claims final and binding without a hearing and
I THE DETERMINATION THAT ACMAT’S CLAIMS
FOR DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS ARE BARRED IS
CONTRARY TO THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT
AND THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT'S
HOLDING IN TEODORI V. PENN HILLS SCHOOL
yl ey ee Pres 17
A. Article 14 was misinterpreted by the lower courts. . 17
B. The holding that the contract site inspection clause
subsumes the differing site conditions clause is contrary
to United States v. Spearin and prevailinglaw. ... 20
Iii. DISMISSAL OF ACMAT’S BREACH OF CONTRACT
CLAIMS IS CONTRARY TOLAW .......... 23
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DECIDED
DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON A
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ...... 24
V. THE DETERMINATION THAT THE CONTRACTOR IS
BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES FOR
DELAY IS CONTRARY TO COATESVILLE
CONTRACTORS & ENGINEERS, INC. V. BOROUGH
GP CREME Bs Bocce cc rcesseseses 26
VI. ACMAT WAS DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING
ON THE CLAIM FOR CONTRACT RETAINAGES . 28
v
A. The alleged failure to furnish dump tickets was an
immaterial breach of the Contract............ 28
VII. DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT
RECOVERY WAS IMPROPER AND CONTRARY TO
DERRY TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT V. SUBURBAN
eee 28
TORU RAL CEE TAME 31
vi
APPENDIX
Appendix A—Per Curiam Judgment Order of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
affirming the judgment of the districtcourt. ......... la
Appendix B—Order of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, denying the Petition
= revery etl LETT Tr 3a
Appendix D—Transcript and decision issued from
the bench by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on petitioner's
Appendix F—Amended Final Judgment of the United
Appendix G—Transcript of argument before the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
Appendix H—Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-
Appellee submitted to the United States Court
of Appeals forthe Third Circuit... .. .
ieee ee
vii
Appendix I—Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee submitted to the United States
ew. a & €& S
Appeal for the Third Circuit.
26 6.8 © © 6 6.6 66
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Acmat Corporation v. School Disirict of Philadelphia,
904 F.2d. 693 (3rd Cir. 1990) 2... eee ee ee eee 1
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1936) ....... Lf
Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d.
GE BAGS CCHS Re EEE eee ecerece 16
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.
Ct. 780, 28 LEG 2d 113 (1971) .......220-- 14, 15
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548,
Ol LBA DADES (ISS 2. ww cc cre c cs cscccce 24
Coatesviile Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v.
Borough of Ridley Park, S09 Pa. 553,
CE 26
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S. Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 2301
(1968), rehearing denied, 393 U.S.1112.......... 16
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. General Asphalt
Paving Co., 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 114, 405
Pe) Ty Pee ee 27
Derry Township School District v. Suburban
Roofing Co., Inc., 102 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 54, 517 A.2d 225 (1986) .. 2... ee ee eee 29, 30
Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1976). .... 16
Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.
Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) .........222ee, 12
ix
Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. v. U.S., 346
F.2d 577, 171 Cx. C1. 30(1965) .. 2...
Formigli Corp. v. Fox, 348 F.Supp. 629 (E.D-Pa. 1972) . . . . 28
Gray v. Weiss, 519 A.2d 716 (Me. 1986) .....
John F . Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of
Philadelphia, 313 Pa. Super. Ct. 425,
460 A.2d 260 (1983)... 2... eee ee
Logan v. Zimmerman, 4S5 U.S. 422, 102 S.
Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1982) ........
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Cr. 1348,
89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986) ..... eG eneces
Nether Providence Township School Aushority v.
Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, inc., 505 Pa. 42,
ere
Teodori v. Penn Hills School District Authority,
413 Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964)... .....
Town of Longboat Key v. Carl E. Widell & Son,
362 So. 2d 719 (Fia. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) . . . .
Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Cr.
GUS UUMUEPENEEE Sc wccccecc cs
United Contractors v. U.S., 368 F. 2d 585,
SUG EEE we Sic cesecccce
U.S. v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 39 S. Ct. 59,
SE PPUED 6 & 66 Kin wee acces
Statutes
Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949, 24
PORE ee ee OTe ee
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§1. . .
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§6. . .
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§9. . .
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§11 ....
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 5,§9. . .
PBUBC. GIZA . ccc ccvcvevevevece
PBUBC.GISSZ 0. ccc crv ccccecccrccce
Other Authorities
P.LE. Constitutional Law §135.........++-.
es
In The
Supreme Court Of The United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No.
ACMAT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,
Respondent.
=Ooooo_=_=_=_=_LLLSS
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
———————
OPINIONS BELOW
The per curiam judgment order of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the amended final judgment
of the district court is officially reported as Acmat Corporation v.
School District of Philadelphia, 904 F.2d. 693 (3rd Cir. 1990) and
appears in Appendix A hereto at 1a-2a. The decision of the United
2
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, denying Acmat
Corporation’s (“Acmat”) Petition for Rehearing, not officially
reported, is printed in Appendix B hereto at 3a-4a. The opinion and
order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, deciding the summary judgment motion by the
School District of Philadelphia (“School District’), not officially
reported, is printed in Appendix C hereto at 5a-24a. The district
court’s decision on Acmat’s motion for reargument of the summary
judgment motion was issued in open court, not officially reported,
is printed in Appendix D hereto at 51a-53a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment order of the United States Court of Appeals is dated
May 23, 1990. Acmat’s petition for rehearing was denied by order
dated June 22, 1990. In accordance with Rule 13.1 and Rule 13.4,
this petition is filed within 90 days of the date of the denial of the
petition for rehearing. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
A. Constitutional Provisions
The “Due Process Clause” of the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, $1, provides:
Section 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which rhall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens for the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
3
property, without due process of law; nor Jeny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Article 1, Sections 1, 6,9 and 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
P.S. Const. Art. 1, §§1, 6, 9, 11 provide:
Section 1. Inherent rights of mankind
All men are bom equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property and reputation, and of pursuing their own
happiness.
Sec. 6. Trial by jury
Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right
thereof remain inviolate. The General Assembly may
provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be
rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any
civil case.
Section 9. Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to
be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet
the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in
prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he
cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself,
nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property,
unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the
land. The use of a suppressed voluntary admission or
voluntary confession to impeach the credibility of a
4
person may be permitted and shall not be construed as
compelling a person to give evidence against
themself.
Sec. 11. Courts to be open; suits against the
Commonwea!th
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation
shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in
such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the
Legislature may by law direct.
Article 5, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const.
Art. 5, $9, provides:
§9. Right of appeal
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court
of record from a court not of record; and there shall
also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from
an administrative agency to a court of record or to an
appellate court, the selection of such court to be as
provided by law; and there shall be such other rights
of appeal as may be provided by law.
B. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 5-508 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949,
24 P.S. §5-508, provides:
§5-508. Majority vote required; recording
The affirmative vote of a majority of all the members
of the board of school directors in every school
district, duly recorded, showing how each member
voted, shall be required in order to take action on the
eet BOGEN OP AI La OP TE etal n° ts = Oe St ert Ne pee Rte
following subjects:—
Fixing length of school term.
Adopting textbooks.
Appointing or dismissing district superintendents,
assistant district superintendents, associate
superintendents, principals, and teachers.
Appointing tax collectors and other appointees.
Adopting the annual budget
Levying and assessing taxes
Purchasing, selling or condemning land.
Locating new buildings or changing the locations of
old ones.
Dismissing a teacher after a hearing.
Creating or increasing any indebtedness.
Adopting courses of study.
Establishing additional schools or departments.
Designating depositories for school funds.
Entering into contracts of any kind, including
contracts for the purchase of fuel or any supplies,
where the amount involved exceeds one hundred
dollars ($100).
Fixing salaries or compensation of officers, teachers,
or other appointees of the board of school directors.
Entering into contracts with and making
appropriations to the intermediate unit for the
district’s proportionate share of the cost of services
provided orto be provided for by the intermediate unit.
Failure to comply with the provisions of this section
shall render such acts of the board of school directors
void and unenforcible.
6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An important issue raised by this case is whether the district
court’s interpretation of a construction contract, that makes the
School District the sole judge and jury over a contractor’s claims,
violates due process of law. The lower courts’ holdings sanctioned
a procedure whereby the Government in a public contract deprived
acontractor of any hearing of its contract claims and further deprived
the contractor of judicial review. The decisions make the School
District judge of its own cause. Significantly, the lower courts’
holdings sharply conflict with controlling Pennsylvania precedent
and decisions issued by other federal courts. In addition, the district
court, in contravention of the rules governing summary judgment,
lumped many of Acmat’s claims together, labelled them “extra
work” items and summarily dismissed those claims without regard
to the fact that many of the items had their genesis in breach of
contract, differing site conditions and delays caused by the School
District. As a consequence, the lower courts imbued the School
District with contractual immunity, a principle that the Pennsylvania
legislature has declined to enact into law.
This is an issue of great practical significance because the
decision deviates from well settled Pennsylvania precedent that
permits a contractor to sue a political subdivision for breach of
contract and also to recover for differing site conditions when its
contract so provides. If the lower courts’ holdings are allowed to
stand, they will impact on the entire construction industry in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and will undoubtedly result in
skyrocketing construction costs to the Commonwealth. Moreover,
the decisions represent a major leap backward in the evolution of
‘construction contract law in the United States and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
coer stam.
A. Statement of Facts
In or about April and June 1984, Acmat and the School District
entered into separate contracts for asbestos abatement in three
school buildings in the City of Philadelphia. The significant
provisions are identically worded in each of the contracts. The
pertinent portion of the Rush School contract is annexed in
Appendix (“App.”) E at 82a-96a. Almost from the start, Acmat
encountered conditions that differed materially from those shown
on the plans and specifications for the projects and differed from
those it observed in pre-bid inspections. Moreover, the School
District breached the contracts in many respects. The School
District unreasonably interfered with construction by permitting the
premises to flood, conducting improper and late inspections, issuing
defective plans and specifications and ordering work that caused
disruptions. Other breaches involved a dispute over the scope of
work required by the contracts. The foregoing resulted in enormous
delays and the loss of millions of dollars by the contractor.
B. Prior Proceedings
The action was commenced in 1985 with the filing of a complaint
in the United States District Court for the Easter District of
Pennsylvania. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
28 U.S.C. §1332.
The District Court (Giles, J.) by order dated December 21, 1988,
granted partial summary judgment to the School District (App. C at
5a-24a). The District Court dismissed the claims for differing site
conditions because of its erroneous determination that additional
School Board approval was required for each such claim despite the
School Board's initial approval of the contracts with a differing site
condition clause by the School Board. Similarly, the claims for
breach of contract were summarily dismissed because of the absence
of School Board approval for the additional labor and concomitant
costs for work made more difficult and expensive by School District
breaches.
Other claims asserted by Acmat were allowed by the district
court, but only because of School District acknowledgment of their
legitimacy. However, the district court, relying on certain contract
language, restricted compensation for these claims to that amount
unilaterally determined by the School District, and further held that
“..., the claims for time and material costs are not subject to judicial
review.” (App. C at 9a).
The claims for delay damages were dismissed by the district court
based upon certain purported exculpatory contract language.
Accordingly, the district court’s order was based primarily on its
misinterpretation of applicable Pennsylvania state law and the
erroneous construction of an agreement that was patently ambiguous
and required interpretation by the jury. The district court made
factual determinations of disputed material issues of fact and ruled
that Acmat’s claims were subject to summary dismissal.
The district court ignored the state court precedents cited, infra,
which allow Acmat recovery of its damages. A motion to reconsider
was also denied. (App D at 51a-53a).
The School District’s counterclaims and A.cmat’s sole remaining claim
for contract retainages was tried to a jury and culminated in a
Amended Final Judgment dated October 24, 1989. (App. F at 97a-98a).
However, after trial, but before the Amended Final Judgment was
entered, the district court entertained argument and thereafter
reduced the amount previously awarded Acmat because the School District’s
expert re-evaluated the amounts it would have allowed Acmat for
work it acknowledged was compensable. (App.G at 99a-128a).
LAO at C0 A i Rao Gh Matas
So NA ALOE AL 0th
9
Acmat’s appeal and the School District’s cross-appeal were
argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. A Per Curiam Judgment Order, without any discussion of
the case, affirming the judgment of the District Court is dated May
23, 1990. Acmat Corporation v. School District of Philadelphia,
904 F.2d 693 (3rd Cir. 1990). (App. A at la-2a). Acmat’s Petition
for Rehearing was denied by decision dated June 22, 1990. (App.
B at 3a-4a).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
L THIS CASE INVOLVES IMPORTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF DUE PROCESS
AND THE DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. The district court ignored binding state court precedent set
forth in John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of
Philadelphia and made the School District’s determination of
Acmat’s claims final and binding without a hearing and
without the availability of judicial review.
Although the great majority of Acmat’s claims were summarily
dismissed in the district court’s order of December 21, 1988, the
court did find entitlement for a group of claims that the School
District acknowledged in writing. Having made that determination,
the district court adopted the sum unilaterally and arbitrarily
designated by the School District as being due. There was no
hearing conducted or evidence received since the court concluded
that it was without jurisdiction to rule on the question.
Net ot a on ak
Pt ee
11
language, to the School District’s final determination
as to net costs of labor and material. Thus, the claims
for time and material costs are not subject to judicial
review. The School District’s contractual right of
final determination necessarily includes the form and
extent of proof and actual expenditures by the
contractor. However, the court can decide whether
there was written authorization from the School
District to ACMAT to undertake work on a time and
material basis. App. C at 9a.
The district court then proceeded to list each of Acmat's claims
and to accept the meager amount allocated by the School District on
a minority of the c.aims and nothing on the remaining claims.
This approach was totally contrary to the holding of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court which expressly rejected the idea that
the subject language could make the School District's determination
final and binding.
In John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of Philadelphia,
313 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 460 A.2d 260 (1983), the Court wrote:
In the first place, the school district was to be the final
arbiter of the contractor’s net cost. Pursuant to the
provisions of the contract, it made a determination of
appellee's net increase in the cost of labor and made
payment accordingly. The burden of proving by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that additional
damages had been incurred was on the contractor.
(d) Verbal instruction given by any of the officers, agents, or employees of the
Board which depart frm the contract documents shall not be binding upon the
Board.
12
John F. Harkins, supra at page 265. Emphasis
supplied.
The Court in Harkins, consistent with principles of due process,
construed the subject language as simply requiring an intermediate
step in the process of having a dispute with the School District
resolved in court. The contractor was permitted to try its claims,
even though the agreement contained contractual terms that are very
similar to those under review herein. Regrettably, neither the district
court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the Harkins case although
they had the obligation to apply state precedent in this diversity
action. Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82
L.Ed. 1188 (1938). It is clear that Acmat never waived its
constitutional right to a hearing or to have its claims heard in a court
of law. Such a waiver, if it could be effective, would surely have to
be explicit and unequivocal. That standard was not been met by the
contracts and certainly was not met by Article 14.
Consequently, the application given the contractual provisions by
the district court clearly violated the guarantee of due process as
required by the constitutions of the United States and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Clearly one party to a contract
has too great a pecuniary and other interests in the outcome of its
own dispute to allow it to sit as judge and jury without a hearing and
without judicial review. The lower courts’ holdings put the
proverbial “fox in charge of the chicken coop”.
In Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.
2d 265 (1982), this Court held that it would be a demial of due process
to permit the state to deprive litigants from using established
' adjudicatory procedures.
The Court wrote:
ee ee tts
13
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause has been interpreted as preventing the States
from denying potential litigants use of established
adjudicatory procedures, when such an action would
be “the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to
be heard upon their claimed right[s].” Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,380 (1971).
Each of our due process cases has recognized, either
explicitly or implicitly, that because “minimum
[procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal
law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State
may have specified its own procedures that it may
deem adequate for determining the preconditions to
adverse official action.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480,491(1980). See Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at
166-167 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); id., at 211
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, any other
conclusion would allow the State to destroy at will
virtually any state-created property interest. The
Court has considered and rejected such an approach:
“*While the legislature may elect not to confer a
property interest,...it may not constitutionally
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once
conferred, without appropriate procedural
safeguards...[Tjhe adequacy of statutory procedures
for deprivation of a statutorily created property
interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms."”
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S., at 490-491, n. 6, quoting
Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 167 (opinion
concurring in part).
14
ees
As our decisions have emphasized time and again, the
Due Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the
opportunity to present his case and have its merits
fairly judged. Thus it has become a truism that “some
form of hearing” is required before the owner is finally
deprived of a protected property interest. Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 570-571, n. 8 (emphasis
in original). And that is why the Court has stressed
that, when a “statutory scheme makes liability an
important factor in the State’s determination..., the
State may not, consistent with due process, eliminate
consideration of that factor in its prior hearing.” Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S., at 541. To put it as plainly as
possible, the State may not finally destroy a property
interest without first giving the putative owner an
opportunity to present his claim of entitlement. See
id., at 542 Logan v. Zimmerman, supra at pages 429,
430, 432, 433 and 434.
In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.
2d 113 (1971), this Court interpreted access to the Courts as an
element of due process and wrote:
It is to courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies,
that we ultimately look for the implemeniation of a
regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.
Within this framework, those who wrote our original
Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those
who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized
the centrality of the concept of due process in the
operation of this system. Without this guarantee that
one may not be deprived of his rights, neither liberty
~ wetew
15
nor property, without due process of law, the State’s
monopoly over techniques for binding conflict
resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable under
our scheme of things. Only by providing that the
social enforcement mechanism must function strictly
within these bounds can we hope to maintain an
ordered society that is also just. It is upon this premise
- that this Court has through years of adjudication put
flesh upon the due process principle.
The State’s obligations under the Fourteenth
Amendment are not simply generalized ones, rather,
the State owes to each individual that process which,
in light of the values of a free society, can be
characterized as due. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
at 375, 380.
In Tuney v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed.
749 (1927), tie Court held that due process was violated when an
officer acting in a judicial capacity had an interest in the controversy.
The mayor in Tumey, supra, as the School District in the case at bar,
was charged with fiscal responsibilities and could not be expected
to adjudicate a dispute that impacted on those obligations. Acmat,
like the accused in Tuwmey, supra, has a right to an impartial judge.
Unlike the accused in Twney, supra, Acmat did not have a hearing
of any kind on those items where the district court simply adopted
the position of the School District.
It is submitted that the provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution set forth above lend additional support to this argument.
See also, P.L.E. Constitutional law §135.
16
Similarly, it is well established that due process is violated when
a third-party acting as judge of acontroversy has some bias or where
there is a commingling of judicial and prosecutorial functions.
Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152,351 A.2d 667 (1976).
In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
393 US. 145, 150, 89 S. Ct. 337, 340 (1968), rehearing denied, 393
U.S. 1112, the Court held:
This rule of arbitration and this canon of judicial ethics
rest on the premise that any tribunal permitted by law
to try cases and controversies not only must be
unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of
bias. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of
Congress to authorize litigants to submit their cases
and controversies to arbitration boards that might
reasonably be thought biased against one litigant and
favorable to another.
In Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d. 612(1938), the
Court held that a party aggrieved in proceedings before a nonjudicial
body is entitled to the opportunity for a judicial hearing The instant
case is even more compelling than those immediately cited above
since there wasn’t even the pretense of a hearing.
It is apparent that the construction given Article 14 of the
contracts by the lower courts is contrary to due process. The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Harkins, supra, clearly stated that
the subject language was to be construed as only requiring an
intermediate step in the adjudicatory process.
There was no waiver of Acmat’s constitutional right to access to
the courts. The Court of Appeals unfortunately sanctioned the
district court’s departure from these fundamental principles of law.
net taelaneaitereacaa emanates
17
ILTHE DETERMINATION THAT ACMAT’S CLAIMS
FOR DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS ARE BARRED IS
CONTRARY TO THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT
AND THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT’S
HOLDING IN TEODORI V. PENN HILLS
SCHOOL DISTRICT AUTHORITY
A. Article 14 was misinterpreted by the lower courts.
Fundamentally, the lower courts failed to understand that each of
; Acmat’s claims was precipitated by a different event. Some of the
Claims were caused by breaches of contract. Other claims resulted
from differing site conditions or delays caused by the owner. The
common law and provisions of the contracts provided a mechanism
for compensating the cortractor. A review of Article 14 of the
contracts shows that the lower courts misconstrued its provisions
and ignored the precedent set forth in Teodori v. Penn Hills School
District Authority, 413 Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964), which made
crucial distinctions among the provisions of the School District
contracts. Article 14(a) is intended to cover those situations where
the School District unilaterally orders changes to the contract.”
Article 14(c) is intended to cover those situations where differing
site conditions cause more work to be performed. Work that results
from causes governed by either Article 14(a) or Article 14(c) is to
be compensated in accordance with the provisions of Article 14(b).
In all other respects, Articles 14(a) and 14(c) are separate and distinct
from each other. The unit prices referred to in Article 14(b) were not
OA ATA Ab OR eA ee Se 2 eee
2 Acmat’s claim arising under Article 14(a) is for work that received School Board
approval before it was performed because the School District initiated changes
which all parties recognized were not within the parameters of the initial contract.
However, Acmat did not agree to a lump sum change in its contract price and
: Acmat alleged that it was entitled to an equitable adjustment. It is a clear denial
of due process to permit the School District to unilaterally order changes in work
and also to unilaterally determine the amount that Acmat should be paid therefor.
a
18
applicable and the parties could not agree on a lump sum settlement
for any of the claims. Accordingly, actual net cost was to form the
basis for compensation of the differing site condition claims arising
under Article 14(c).
The foregoing categorization and distinctions were examined and
adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Teodori v. Penn
Hills School District Authority, supra.> The Teodori decision clearly
3 Authority next argues that the contract between the parties provided no agreement
to pay for extra work in the amount claimed by Teodori. This contention is based
upon the “Changes and Alterations” section of the contract, which clearly
provides that such “changes and alterations” be made by written order. This
atgument completely ignores the section of the contract dealing with “Conditions
Differing From Those Shown on Plans or Indicated In Specifications”, set forth
in full above. The parties obviously contemplated the possibility of the exact
type of contingency which arose, and provided for it in the contract.
We agree with the conclusion of the Court below, that Teodori’s right to extra
compensation, if any, is governed by the “differing conditions” clause, and not
by the “changes and alterations” clause, the extra compensation not being ©
sought for “changes” and/or “alterations” as those texms were used in the contract.
Nor are we moved by Authority's argument that the award of extra compensation
is contrary to the provisions of the School Code or Municipality Authorities Act... .
The contract in the instant case was entered into under circumstances which fully
complied with the above statute. The extra work which the plaintiff was required
to do and upon which his claim is based was a natural extension of the quantum
of the work contemplated by the original contract and was clearly covered by an
express provision thereof. No work not encompassed in the original contract
was presented by discovery of the gasoline line, and thus no physical changes
or alterations in the contract documents were necessitated thereby. The end
product of the site preparation remained exactly es originally planned; only the
manner of accomplishing it was affected. The contract unequivocally provided
for this contingency, and the plaintiff hed a clear contractual right to adjust his
method of operation and tw recover his additional costs within the contract
framework.
a
8 ner cht Ae RENE ce 6a TR OR
19
shows that provisions in the changes section of Article 14(a) have
no bearing on claims made under the differing site conditions clause
of Article 14(c).
The lower courts ignored’ the controlling precedent of Teodori
and improperly merged the terms of Articles 14(a) and 14(c) so as
to require School Board approval of differing site condition claims.
Contrary to the statements made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the District
Court’s order (App. C at 7a), School Board approval is not a
requirement in Article 14(c). (App. E at 91a). Nor were changes in
plans required or a necessary condition to compensation for
differing site conditions. Article 14(c) refers only to changes in
drawings by the School District, “as it may find necessary”. In this
instance the differing site conditions did not require changes in
drawings. The fact that notice was given by Acmat of the differing
site conditions and that written direction to proceed was issued by
the School District is fully documented and was part of the record
before the lower courts. School Board approval of the differing site
provision was received prior to the execution of the contracts. The
contracts do not indicate that further School Board approval is
required in order to recover for claims necessitated by differing site
conditions. At the very least, the district court’s order does reflect,
what may be ambiguities in Article 14 that create a jury question
and which should have resulted in denial of summary judgment.
Here, the contract foresaw the possibility of what actually occurred, and Teodori
complied with the governing provisions of the contract . . . Teodori v. Penn Hills
School District Authority, 196 A. 2d at 309. Emphasis supplied.
4 Indeed, the lower courts did not even discuss the application of Teodori, although
it was cited and extensively briefed by Acmat.
20
B. The holding that the contract site inspection clause subsumes
the differing site conditions clause is contrary to United States
y. Spearin and prevailing law.
Another reason given by the district court for denying claims
made under the differing site conditions clause was its conclusion
that Acmat did not make a reasonable site inspection.” (App. C at
8a, 9a). The fact that a site inspection was conducted was established
by affidavit. Further affidavits were fumished on the motion for
reargument, but were apparently ignored by the lower courts. The
record Clearly showed that a site inspection was made and that the
question of how reasonable it was under the circumstances was a
matter for the jury. Moreover, the pre-bid site inspection clauses
do not mandate a comprehensive investigation that would require
dismantling of permanent structures. Rather, the contract required
5 This was a disputed issue of material fact improperly decided by the judge on
motion for summary judgment.
© ‘The first inspection Clause is contained in paragraph 7 of the General Conditions
and states the following:
7. CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE WORK
(a) The Contractor shall be responsible for ascertaining the nature and location
of the work and the general and local conditions which can affect the work or
the cost thereof. Any failure by the Contractor to do so will not relieve him from
responsibility for successfully performing the work without additional expense
to the School District. The School District assumes no responsibility for any
understanding or representations concerning conditions made by any of its
officers or agents prior to the receipt and opening of bids other than by a bulletin
or addendum that is duly issued. App. E at 88a.
The second site inspection clause is contained in Article SC-07 of the Special
Conditions and reads as follows:
SC-07 EXAMINATION OF THE SITE
The contractor bidding on this work must inspect the sites before submitting the
proposal and will be responsible for informing himself fully on all determinable,
existing conditions and limitations of the sites and will assume responsibility for
all charges and costs resulting from his failure to verify same. (Emphasis
supplied). App. E at 95a.
21
Se ee ae enn Ge CUTER OF Sp
work.
In U.S. v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L.Ed 166
(1918), this Court held:
But the insertion of the articles prescribing the
character, dimensions and location of the sewer
imported a warranty that, if the specifications were
: complied with, the sewer would be adequate. This
implied warranty is not overcome by the general
Clauses requiring the contractor, to examine the site,
to check up the plans, and to assume the responsibility
for the work until completion and acceptance. The
obligation to examine the site did not impose upon him
the duty of making a diligent enquiry into the history
of the locality with a view to determining, at his peril,
whether the sewer specifically prescribed by the
Government would prove adequate. The duty to
check plans did not impose the obligation to pass upon
their adequacy to accomplish the purpose in view.
And the provision concerning contractor’s
responsibility cannot be construed as abridging rights
arising under specific provisions of the contract.
Ce ce ee we
7 A differing site condition is not a condition that either party knows about in
advance of bidding. It is not a condition that a mere site inspection would
: disclose. If it were, since the owner and its representatives are even more
familiar with the site than are prospective bidders, such work would be included
in the base contract. The differing site conditions clause is included w
compensate a contractor for those conditions that neither party knows about, that
may be encountered, and are not readily ascertainable at the time of bidding.
Certainly, it is not included, with its concomitant promise to pay, only to be later
snatched back with spurious arguments to the effect that the bidder should have
somehow “discovered” the condition prior to bidding.
22
In United Contractors v. U.S., 368 F. 2d 585, 598, 177 Ct.CL. 151
(1966), the Court wrote the following:
But we have held, in comparable circumstances, that
broad exculpatory clauses (identical in effect with this
one) cannot be given their full literal reach, and “do
not relieve the defendant of liability for changed
conditions as the broad language thereof would seem
to indicate.” Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 151 F.
Supp. 817, 825, 138 Ct. Cl. 571, 584 (1957), cert.
denied 355 U.S. 877,78 S. Ct. 141, 2 L.Ed.2d 108. As
Fehlhaber said, general portions of the specification
should not lightly be read to override the Changed
Conditions clause. Ibid. It takes clear and
unambiguous language to do that, for “the provision
sought to be eliminated, or subordinated, is a standard
mandatory clause of broad application * * *.”
Thompson Ramo Woodridge Inc. v. United States, 361
F, 2d 222, 238,175Ct.ClL =, Ss (1966).
See also, Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. v. U.S., 346 F.2d
577, 171 Ct. CL. 30 (1965) and Town of Longboat Key v. Cari E.
Widell & Son, 362 So. 2d 719 (Fila. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Reliance
by the district court on Nether Providence Township School
Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 505 Pa. 42, 476 A.2d
904 (1984), was misplaced. The site investigation clause in Nether,
supra, was far more comprehensive than the one in the School
District contracts and there was no differing site condition clause to
consider in Nether.
Sl nadate wh ae
t ~ AO A kA et we
23
IIL. DISMISSAL OF ACMAT’S BREACH OF CONTRACT
CLAIMS IS CONTRARY TO LAW
The School District breached the contracts in several respects.
Acmat was ordered to perform work out of sequence and was
compelled to clean and re-clean areas to a point that exceeded
contractual requirements. Moreover, the School District permitted
elevators that were used to move materials to stop functioning and
permitted pipes to break and flood one building. These breaches by
the School District caused Acmat to remain on the project far longer
than it would have otherwise and to expend additional sums of
money for labor and materials. Despite these serious allegations the
district court in paragraph 1 of its order (App. C at Sa) dismissed the
breach of contract claims because of its perception that the breach
Claims constituted “extra work” and were barred by Section 5-508
of the Pennsylvania School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. §5-508 (requiring
prior School Board approval) and Nether Providence Township
School Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 505 Pa. 42,476
A.2d 904 (1984). In short, the district court’s holding was that a
contractor cannot recover for breach of contract unless the School
Board approves the School District’s breach, a clear denial of due
process.
As aconsequence, the district court and the Court of Appeals have
imbued the School District with an immunity from claims for breach
of contract that the legislature has declined to enact into law. Indeed,
the Pennsylvania Constitution permits such suits to be brought. P.S.
Const. Art. 1, §11. Although more work and a concomitant increase
in costs were the result of the School District's breaches, the breach
Claims are not transformed into a claim for “extra work” which
involves a change in scope to the original contract. The claims at
issue herein involve contract work which was made more difficult
and expensive by virtue of the School District’s breaches. In Nether
Providence Township School Authority, supra, the claims involved
24
the clearing of an area not included in the scope of work and was
extra to the contract. It did not concem breaches that impacted on
work that was within the original scope of work. The district court’s
order and the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of that order show a
failure to understand these well recognized distinctions. For these
reasons, the district court’s reference to the School Code is
inapposite. Moreover, the district court's categorization of claims
as extra work was incongruous, and at the very least, an issue for
the jury. Dismissal of the breach of contract claims was aclear denial
of due process.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DECIDED
DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON A MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Even a cursory review of the district court’s order shows that it
made impermissible findings of fact in a motion for summary
judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986),
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265
(1986) and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Lid. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
In the instant case, the district court addressed each of Acmat’s
claims, made findings of fact, including whether or not conditions
were concealed, and fully adjudicated Acmat's claims, except the
claim for contract retainages. Most unusual was the district court’s
categorization of claims as “extra work” when the evidence showed
that the claims derived, for the most part, from breaches of contract
and differing site conditions. Thus, the district court's factual
determination, in the context of summary judgment, that work was
“extra” to the contract was improper and should have been left to
the jury.
|
25
Another critical issue of fact decided by the district court on
summary judgment, was that Acmat did not conduct a reasonable
pre-bid site inspection. (App. C at 7a-9a). Moreover, the District
Court eschewed the idea that a differing site condition clause could
allow a contractor to receive compensation beyond its contract price.
To permit a contractor to claim belatedly that it could
not discover the scope of the work through pre-bid
inspection, and without more, to collect for work not
approved as an “extra”, would nullify the contract
provisions controlling bidding and performance and
undermine the fiscal authority and responsibility of
the public contracting body. (App. C at 8a).
The district court’s apparent concern about fiscal responsibility
was entirely inappropriate, but does support the principle that the
School District cannot sit in judgment of its own cause.
Significantly, the School District could have let the contract without
a differing site condition clause, if it wished to entertain large bids
in anticipation of contingencies that could arise. However,
Government entities, including the United States Government and
the Commonwealth, have discovered that their overall expenditures
for construction are lower when their contracts contain a differing
site condition clause.
There was more than enough evidence to show that a reasonable
site inspection was performed. Of course, the question of the
“reasonableness” of the inspection was a matter for the jury.
Moreover, it is submitted that the ambiguity of the contract
language required interpretation by the trier of fact.
26
V. THE DETERMINATION THAT THE CONTRACTOR
IS BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES FOR
DELAY IS CONTRARY TO COATESVILLE
CONTRACTORS & ENGINEERS, INC.
V. BOROUGH OF RIDLEY PARK
The District Court simply denied Acmat’s claims for delay
damages because of “specific language ot the written contracts”.®
(App. C at 9a). It made no inquiry into the factual basis of Acmat's
claims and ignored the Pennsylvania precedent that permits
damages for delay despite exculpatory contractual language.
In Coatesville Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v. Borough of
Ridley Park, 509 Pa. 553, 506 A.2d 862, 865, 866 (1986), the Court
held:
The rule in Pennsylvania is that exculpatory
provisions in a contract cannot be raised as a defense
where (1) there is an affirmative or positive
interference by the owner with the contractor's work,
or (2) there is a failure on the part of the owner to act
in some essential matter necessary in the prosecution
of the work. Gasparini Excavating Co. v.
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 409 Pa. 465, 187
A.2d 157 (1963); . . . “[WJhere an owner by an
8 Article 15(c) of the contract provides:
If any contractor shall be delayed in the completion of his work by reason of
unforeseeable causes beyond his control and without his fault or negligence,
including but not restricted to, acts of God, acts or neglect of the School District,
acts or neglect of any other contractor, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine
restrictions, strikes, or freight embargoes, the period herein-above specified for
completion of his work may be extended by such time as shall be fixed by the
School District, but the contractor shall not be entitled to any damages or
compensation from the School District on account of any delay or delays
resulting from any of the aforesaid causes. (App. E at 92a).
27
unwarranted positive act interferes with the execution
of a contract, or where the owner unreasonably
neglects to perform an essential element of the work
in furtherance thereof, to the detriment of the
contractor, [the owner] will be liable for damages
resulting therefrom.” Henry Shenk Company v. Erie
County, 319 Pa. 100, 178 A. 662 (1935)
See also, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. General Asphalt
Paving Co., 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 114, 405 A.2d 1138 (1979).
Thocnsegdieuncuementet in Comtesvills ware Geageecian events
that occurred in the instant case. Clearly a factual determination was
required prior to a ruling by the Court as to the nature of the School
District’s conduct in causing delays to the Project. The record
before the district court was more than sufficient to permit the issue
of delays to go to the jury. The School District, in numerous
instances, actively interfered with the work or failed to act in some
essential manner.
Delays caused by unanticipated changes at the job site are
certainly compensable. In addition, the School District’s breaches,
including unreasonable inspection requirements and delays in
inspection, all impacted on the progress of the job and constituted
active interference.
Acmat was denied the opportunity of showing that the
exculpatory language did not apply to it under the circumstances of
this case.
28
VL. ACMAT WAS DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING
ON THE CLAIM FOR CONTRACT RETAINAGES
A. The alleged failure to furnish dump tickets was an immaterial
breach of the Contract.
The only claim of Acmat to survive summary judgment was for
contract retainges in the sum of $150,909.14. The district court
ruled, however, that Acmat must furnish all of the asbestos dump
tickets to recover its contract retainages. The Court refused to allow
the jury to find that the dump tickets were an immaterial breach and
did not instruct them on this issue. Parenthetically, dump tickets are
the documentary receipt given at the dump sites upon delivery of
debris. Significantly, there was no claim of injury or damages on
account of the School District’s not having the dump tickets. Nor
was there any allegation that the debris was not properly removed.
In spite of this fact, the district court ruled that the dump tickets were
an absolute condition precedent to recovery of the retainage. This
was Clear error. See Gray v. Weiss, 519 A.2d 716 (Me. 1986) and
Formigli Corp. v. Fox, 348 F.Supp. 629(E.D.Pa. 1972).
VIL DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT
RECOVERY WAS IMPROPER AND CONTRARY TO
DERRY TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT V.
SUBURBAN ROOFING CO., INC.
The district court’s order dismissing Acmat’s alternative count
for quantum meruit recovery was based on the absence of School
Board approval.” It is axiomatic that no claim for quantum meruit
recovery will have School Board approval. It is the lack of formal
9 Plaintiff's other contract claims, based upon theories of quantum meruit, unjust
enrichment, equitable adjustment, promissory estoppel, and modified contract,
also fail because of the absence of formal approval of the claimed extra work by
& majority of the members of the School Board as is required by state statute.
(App. C at 6a).
29
prerequisites that give rise to quantum meruit recovery.
Accordingly, the district court’s decision dismissing the quantum
meruit count in the amended complaint on the grounds that there
was no School Board approval is paradoxical and contrary to law.
The issue is whether the factual basis of Acmat’s fifty-eight or so
claims can give rise to quantum meruit recovery, if not otherwise
recoverable on a contractual theory. Of course, this requires a
factual determination based on oral and documentary evidence.
In Derry Township School District v. Suburban Roofing Co., Inc.,
102 Pa. Commw. Ct. 54, 517 A.2d 225, 229 (1986), the Court
allowed quantum meruit recovery and wrote:
The District misrepresents the Contractor’s claim
which is not for compensation for extra work
performed under changes to the contract, rather, the
Contractor is asserting a claim for its reasonable costs
incurred in reliance upon the District’s interpretation
of the Contractor’s performance under the terms of the
contract, which interpretation the District later altered
to the Contractor’s detriment. This is a proper case
for equitable estoppel. In Department of
Environmental Resources v. Dixon Contracting Co.,
Inc., 80 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 438, 471 A.2d 934
(1984), we held that equitable estoppel can be applied
to a governmental agency to preclude that agency
from depriving a person of a reasonable expectation
when such agency knew or should have known that
such person would rely upon the representation of the
agency. Id. at 443, 471 A.2d at 936-937; see also, De
Frank v. County of Greene, 50 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
30,412 A.2d 663 (1980).
30
As was the case in Derry, supra, Acmat was severely damaged
by the School District’s interpretation of the contract and was
compelled to expend substantial additional sums to perform the
work. If not otherwise recoverable under one of the other theories
discussed previously, these claims should be redressed on a
quasi-contractual basis. A claim that stands out as a prime example
is the work in the faculty cafeteria at the Lincoln School. Acmat
was ordered to perform asbestos abatement in the area and did all
the work preparatory to the actual abatement. The School District
then halted the work and refused to compensate Acmat for the
additional work claiming it was within the scope of the original
contract.
Another example was the orderto clean instructional material that
was later rescinded after causing much havoc and disruption to
Acmat’s performance.
The issue is factual in nature and not, as the district court stated,
whether the School Board ever approved the work. It was reversible
error to summarily dismiss the quantum meruit count.
31
CONCLUSION |
For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should be issued to review
the judgment order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
Ray Goddard
675 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 949-0555
Counsel of Record and
Attorney for Petitioner
Acmat Corporation
Joseph P. Dineen
Edward A. Stein
Goddard & Blum
Of Counsel
September 17, 1990
la
APPENDIX A—PER CURIAM JUDGMENT ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT, AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE DISTRICT COURT
United States Court Of Appeals For
The Third Circuit
NOS. 89.1930 and 89-1953
ACMAT CORPORATION,
Appellant in No. 89-1930
Vv.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,
Plaintiff on a Counterclaim,
Appellant in No. 89-1953
Vv.
ACMAT CORPORATION,
Defendant on a Counterclaim
Vv.
HUGHES URETHANE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant on a Counterclaim
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastem District of Pennsylvania
2a
Appendix A
(D.C. Civil No. 85-7067)
Argued May 21, 1990
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, and ALDISERT,
Circuit Judges
JUDGMENT ORDER
After consideration of all contentions raised by appellants, it is
ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the judgment of the district
court be and is hereby affirmed.
Each party to bear its own costs.
By the Court,
signature
Circuit Judge
Attest:
signature
Sally Mrvos, Clerk
3a
APPENDIX B—ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
DENYING THE PETITION FOR REHEARING
United States Court Of Appeals Hor
Che Third Cirrnit
Nos. 89-1930 and 89-1953
ACMAT CORPORATION,
Appellant-Cross- Appellee
Vv.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Present: HIGGINBOTHAM, Chief Judge, SLOVITER,
BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG,
HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD and
ALDISERT®, Circuit Judges
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant-Cross-Appellee
Acmat Corporation in the above-entitled case having been submitted
to the judges who participated in the decision of this court and to all
the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active
service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked
for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in
regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the court in
banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.
OM
Dated: June 22 1990
* Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge, as to panel
rehearing only.
5a
APPENDIX C—ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA DATED DECEMBER 21, 1988
| IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
/Stamp/
ACMAT CORPORATION
CIVIL ACTION
Oh EN NI AI ti se ti
NO. 85-7067
Rh elie
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 1988, upon consideration
) of the motion for partial summary judgement of defendant, School
District of Philadelphia and the response in opposition of plaintiff,
ACMAT Corporation, is it hereby ORDERED that the School
District’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, for the
following reasons and to the following extent:
1. The claims for breach of express contract are barred, as a matter
of law, except where noted below, due to the absence of Philadelphia
School Board approval of the claimed extra through formal
. resolution by a majority of its members. Such written approval is
required by statute, Section 5-508 of the Pennsylvania Public School
Code of 1949, 24 Pa. Stat, Ann. § 5-508, and the specific provisions
of the underlying contracts. Waiver of public contract provisions
regulating change orders can be accomplished only by the public
ee)
ne
6a
Appendix C
body authorized to enter into the contract. Nether Providence
Township School Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 505
Pa. 42,476 A.2d 904, 907 (1984). Anything less falls short of School
Board approval.
2. Plaintiff's other contract claims, based upon theories of
quantum meriut, unjust enrichment, equitable adjustment,
promissory estoppel, and modified contract, also fail because of the
absence of formal approval of the claimed extra work by a majority
of the members of the School Board as is required by state statute.
3. The claim of fraud is dismissed for failure to state a claim. By
reason of express provisions of the School Board approved
contracts, ACMAT knew that any work that it undertook which it
believed to be beyond the scope of an original contract, and for
which it would seek to be paid extra, required formal approval by a
majority of the members of the School Board. Where it did not have
such approval before commencing the extra work, and had no
contract addendum, ACMAT could not have selied justifiably upon
the advices or representations of the employees of the School
District as binding upon the members of the School Board. Any
reliance upon such advice had to have been done knowingly at
defendant's own peril, that is to say, with the hope that the extra
work, and documentation of it, would prove satisfactory to the
School District and win School Board ratification. Therefore, as a
matter of law, the fraud claim fails both against the School Board
and the School District.
. 4. The RICO claim fails to state a claim because, inter alia, there
was no fraud. Moreover, the School District cannot be both the
“person” charged with the RICO violation and the enterprise under
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
OAD Am A i en the ed fel
RAO or: hae .
Ao ae
_°
Appendix C
5. The negligence claims are barred as matter of law because the
School District is immune from liability for negligent behavior
under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §
8541, et seq. Any basis for recovery on the plaintiff's contracts must
be based on contract law, not tort law.
6. Section 14(c) of the contracts does not permit payment forextra
work without School Board approval even if the School District
made changes in drawings and/or specifications. The contracts
require Board approval of all changes in scope and price, and all
changes to be in writing. The phrase “an equitable adjustment shali
be made” is modified by a preceeding sentence which advises that
any change in drawings or specifications requires Board approval.
In short, Section 14(c) gives notice that the Board has the right not
to fund a project unless and until it is satisfied both as to the change
in scope of work and the price and approval is formalized.
7. Section 16(c) of the contracts does not relieve the defendant of
obtaining School Board approval of extra work orders. The contract
requires that if the contractor incurs conditions at the site materially
different than anticipated, the School District must be notified to
investigate the conditions and to determine if any change in the
contract is necessary, whether there exists an emergency or not.
Newly discovered materially different conditions are required to be
left undisturbed pending School District investigation and
evaluation. If a change is proposed as to scope of work or price
because of materially different conditions, any change must be
accomplished in accordance with Section 14(c) of the contracts
which requires written School Board approval.
8. The School District is entitled generally to summary judgment
on the Rush School “overspray” claims because there was failure on
8a
Appendix C
defendant’s part to comply with the procedures of Section 16(c) of
the contract requiring School Board approval of any change in scope
of work or contract price occasioned by discovery of conditions not
allegedly reasonably anticipated. Fundamentally, however, the
contract documents specify that ACMAT assumed responsibility for
“ascertaining the nature and location of the work and the general and
local conditions which can affect the work or costs thereof”, and
further, that defendant’s failure to ascertain what was entailed in
performing the contracted work could not be visited upon the School
District but would be the contractor’s “responsibility for
successfully performing...without additional expense to the School
District.” To the same effect, see Nether Providence Township
School Authority, supra. Prior to bidding, ACMAT had the
Opportunity to remove the ceiling tiles and make whatever
inspection it deemed necessary. Alternatively, ACMAT could have
attempted to negotiate a reservation of rights clause for conditions
which are not observable. The contractor also had the option of not
performing the work and thereby causing the dispute to be limited
to one of contract interpretation. To permit a contractor to claim
belatedly that it could not discover the scope of the work through
pre-bid inspection, and without more, to collect for work not
approved as an “extra”, would nullify the contract provisions
controlling bidding and performance and undermine the fiscal
authority and responsibility of the public contracting body.
9. The Henry A. Nozko Affidavit pertaining to the Rush School
has no probative value for opposition to the summary judgment
motion. It is not based upon personal knowledge that a reasonable
investigation of the site could not have. been made. Moreover, there
is no evidence that ACMAT was prevented by any action of the
School District in making its own inspection. On the contrary, there
——
9a
Appendix C
is undisputed evidence that ACMAT was not impeded by School
District action. According to ACMAT, it was advised, prebid, that
there was asbestos above the ceilings of the second floor of the
school. It was also advised that, prior to bidding, it could inform
itself of the nature of the job by an earnest inspection, that is, by
looking beyond the ceiling tiles, or accept the risk of a lesser
examination. It chose the latter course.
10. Work directed to be undertaken by ACMAT on a time and
material basis was subject, by contract language, to the School
District’s final determination as to net costs of labor and material.
Thus, the claims for time and material costs are not subject to judicial
review. The School District’s contractual right of final
determination necessarily includes the form and extent of proof and
actual expenditures by the contractor. However, the court can decide
whether there was written authorization from the School District to
ACMAT to undertake work on a time and material basis.
11. ACMAT’s claim for delay damages is barred by the specific
language of the written contracts.
12. Derry Township School District v. Suburban Roofing, 102 Pa.
Commw. 54, 517 A.2d 255 (1986) is not applicable. It is not an
“extra work order” case.
13. ACMAT understood and agreed that with regard to any claims
for extra work in the performance of the contract, it had to propose
why the work should be considered outside the scope of the
agreement, specify alump sum amount if no unit price was specified,
provide detailed support for the proposal for School District review
and await approval or disapproval before doing the work.
10a
Appendix C
14. Where it was agreed that the work was extra to the contact,
but the School District and ACMAT could not agree on a lump sum
price, ACMAT was to perform the work on a time and material basis
plus 15% with the School District determining the net cost of time
and material under the contact.
15. With these criteria, the court now proceeds to consider
separately each aspect of ACMAT’s claim under the summary
judgment standard of review.
16. The Rush School
(a) Item 1. Decontamination of Building Contents. The School
District directed ACMAT to perform certain work on a time and
material basis. A change order issued. ACMAT claimed
$148,398.22. The School Board approved $63,282.89 of the claim
as the reasonable value for the work based upon its review of
invoices submitted. ACMAT continues to claim $85,115.33, yet it
executed the change orderon May 10, 1985, acknowledging that the
School District would be obligated to pay $63,282.89 for the work.
It cannot now claim more.
(b) Item 2. Teachers’ Closets and Boxed Rail for Folding
Partition. ACMAT hung two layers of polyethylene on the walls
which sealed off built-in lockers, cabinets, shelves, and closets. It
then removed asbestos containing fireproofing from structural steel
beams in the classrooms on the second floor. Then, it proceeded to
Clean up the second floor area. After <“tis work was done, but before
the School District approved the work site as having been
completed, the School District notified ACMAT that it was
necessary to remove asbestos from a steel beam that ran through the
area above the closets and between the wall and the flush sheet metal
panels over the doors on the closets’ face. Removal of this asbestcs
A iy et
St Ot eee
Se cathe et et
A TT i Ao Mew a
lla
Appendix C
was part of the original contract for removal of asbestos containing
spray-on fireproofing from structural steel beams. Removal of this
asbestos was not approved by the School Board as an “extra”.
Although ACMAT had to cover over the cabinets to do the
required work and had twice to clean up the second floor area, the
work was occasioned by its owr. contractual undertaking, which
included correcting its own omissions and mistakes. ACMAT’s
claim of $291,711.36 fails as a matter of law.
The School District did advise that removal of the bottom shelf
of the metal closets to clean out original construction asbestos
material would be considered extra work. ACMAT was asked to
submit a quote for this work, but it never did.
ACMAT has not broken out this part of the claim. Although the
School Board is not obligated to pay ACMAT unless the contractor
had obtained approval of a price for the extra work, it stands ready
to pay $388.52 as calculated from field reports. Since there is no
dispute that this work was done, I will allow the claim to the extent
of $388.52.
(c) Item 3. Work Regarding Light Fixtures. ACMAT claims
$51,297.23 for the removal and disposal o' some light fixtures and
the dismantling, cleaning and reassembling of other light fixtures.
These fixtures had been covered with asbestos spray-on
fireproofing. ACMAT was required by contract to wrap and seal all
light fixtures prior to asbestos removal. Certain of these fixtures
were determined unable to be cleaned and were designated for
disposal. Those discarded did not have to be wrapped. ACMAT was
authorized to replace fixtures on a time and material basis. However,
ACMAT does not claim that it furnished or installed new fixtures
and the School District contends it did not. Therefore, there is no
12a
Appendix C
material dispute. ACMAT did, in this regard, only that which was
required by its contract. Accordingly, this claim is denied.
(d) Item 4. Work Regarding Access in Platform Area. The School
District agreed that gaining access to a beam in the area of the leading
dock was extra work because it had to be accessed from outside the
building. This work was agreed to be paid on a time and material
basis. However, it was made clear that removal of the asbestos was
part of the contract. ACMAT claims $4,843.05 for this work. The
School District claims the reasonable value is $4,583.92. Although
the School Board now claims that ACMAT should have discovered
this condition in its inspection, the acknowledgement of the work as
an “extra” by the School District caused ACMAT to rely upon that
assessment and to forego any contest as to whether it was within or
without the contract. Finding that the School District is the final
arbiter of the value of this work which it authorized, I find no
material dispute that the work was done and, accordingly, ACMAT
is due $4,583.92 on this claim.
(ec) Item 5. Removal of Enclosures for Access to Beams and
Removal of Encapsulated Asbestos. ACMAT claims for the costs of
removing enclosures for access to beams and removal of
encapsulated as opposed to unencapsulated asbestos behind those
enclosures on the first floor. ACMAT claims for moving furniture
and removing and disposing of steel stud frame work and gypsum
board enclosures that completely encased the steel beams. The
School District advised that removal of encapsulated asbestos in
various rooms on the first floor would involve an extra to the
contract. However, ACMAT never submitted a proposal for the
work as was required. Therefore, the actual work and price were
never agreed to or approved by the School District or School Board
and there was no obligation to pay. However, since work was done,
13a
Appendix C
and the Board would have authorized some amount, the court is
required to accept the School Board’s determination of the net cost
of time and material and awards that amount to ACMAT, that is,
$22,576.00. The balance of the claim of $41,538.65 is denied
because it was not approved as a contractual sum to be paid.
(f) Item 6. Perimeter Soffit Removal and Replacement. ACMAT
removed and disposed of insulation board around the perimeter of
soffit on the second floor and supplied an installed new insulation
board. This was authorized by the School District on a time and
material basis. Although it contends that ACMAT never obtained
. proper School Board approval, I find that ACMAT was authorized
to proceed on a time and material basis under the contract with the
School Board having the right to determine the fair value for the
work. On that basis ACMAT is owed $7,419.99 of its claim of
$14,853.25.
(g) Item 7. Work Above Metal Ceiling in Room 130. ACMAT
claims $2,524.53 for working above and around the metal ceilings
in this room. Although the School District recognized the possibility
that there would be an unanticipated degree of difficulty in gaining
access to the asbestos covered ceiling beam, ACMAT was not
authorized to proceed on a time ard material basis and it did not
submit a proposa! that the work was an “extra” and propose a price.
Therefore, the School Board was not obligated to pay. However, the
work was done. ACMAT’s contention that there was unanticipated
difficulty is undisputed. Therefore, this claim proceeded on a time
and material basis. The School District’s calculation of $1,839.31
as reasonable is awarded.
(h) Item 8. Removal and Replacement of Drywall Ceilings in
Locker Rooms. This was work approved by the School District to
i
14a
Appendix C
be done on a time and material basis. ACMAT failed to observe that
there was a drywall ceiling on the first floor. It bid the work based
upon its erroneous belief that there was a lay-in grid ceiling on the
first floor and here. The School District calculated the reasonable
costs for installation of the drywall ceiling to be $25,517.28. Since
ACMAT’s bid anticipated a cost of $6,700, per School District
calculations, for a lay-in ceiling, assuming School Board approval
had been obtained, $18,817.28 would be allowed. Since ACMAT
actually installed a drywall ceiling on the first floor and since that
replacement was authorized, the sum calculated by the School
District will be ordered paid. The balance of the claim of $58,531.71
is disallowed because ACMAT never obtained approval of this
amount as a contractual sum and agreed by working on a time and
material basis that the School Board would determine the sum to be
paid.
(i) Item 9. Removal and Disposal of Carpeting. This work was
approved as an extra. However, work that was to be done was deleted
from the original contract and it is not disputed that ACMAT has
not given a credit for not protecting and shampooing this carpet as
was the understanding between the parties. According to the School
Board’s time and material calculations, ACMAT is entitled to no
payment because of the agreed set-off and may be obligated to pay
back $12,140.50.
(j) Item 10. Removal and Disposal of Transite Panels. ACMAT
claims for removal of these panels in the gymnasium and shop areas
as work not referenced in the specifications for the job. The complete
removal of the transite soffit closure and the replacement with 1/2
inch sheetrock were approved by the School District. Of the
$4,772.80 claimed, the School District would allow $3,335.20 and
_ that amount is awarded.
15a
Appendix C
(k) Item 11. Labor Working Above Plaster Ceiling. ACMAT
claims as extra work the labor cost of working above plaster ceilings
in the locker rooms, auditorium, cafeteria and first floor corridor.
The School District agreed to pay for this work as an extra if it was
the contractor’s proposal or the cwner’s counterproposal, or some
modification of either was approved. In any event, the contractor
was apprised of the method for submitting the proposal to claim for
extra work. That method was not followed. However, since certain
work was performed which would have been approved by the
School District, it will be treated here as performed on a time and
material basis. The School District’s calculations of the value is
$6,293.94. That amount is awarded as opposed to ACMAT’s claim
of $54,960.89.
(1) Item 12. Removal of Overspray. This claim has been addressed
in paragraphs 8 and 9. The claim for $605,501.07 is rejected.
(m) Item 13. Extra Work Date to More Area on First Floor.
ACMAT bid work on the first floor using the second floor as a model
in negotiations with the School District. It was agreed between the
parties that “[t]o the extent that there [was] a substantial difference
in the quantity of asbestos to be removed or in the nature of the
asbestos to be removed, an extra or credit would be given depending
upon whether the quantity of the work was greater or lesser or the
nature of the asbestos differed.” Brazil Letter dated November 21,
1984, p.2. ACMAT has made no showing that a significantly greater
quantity of asbestos was removed. There is no essential relationship
between floor area and labor costs. The claim for $20,778.57 is
denied.
(n) Item 14. Masonry Block and Sealing Work. ACMAT makes
claims for the work of hammering, chiseling, removing and
ell
16a
Appendix C
disposing of cement block, and the purchasing of block, caulking
materials and masonry items. It also makes claims for replacing or
completing block walls, patching masonry and various caulking
activities which it attributes to the masonry trade. This was not work
approved as an extra. It was, however, work required to be done by
ACMAT’s contractual undertaking to proceed on an “alternate
method of control which shall not exceed the base bid.” The claim
of $34,206.08 is denied.
(0) Item 15. Labor Costs of Working Above and Around Shop
Machines. ACMAT claims for the labor costs of working around,
protecting and cleaning large equipment in the shop rooms on the
first floor. It claims $178,767.05. The School Board disclaims
because the equipment was obvious and the contractor was not
relieved of the obligation to inspect and to include in his bid the cost
of dealing with that which was seen or knowable. The School
District is correct. It never agreed to treat this work as an extra and
it is not disputed that these machines were visible and the duty of
inspection was incorporated into the contract for work on the first
floor. Accordingly, this claim is denied.
(p) Item 16. Cost of Staging in Music Area. ACMAT sues for the
cost of furnishing, erecting, dismantling and disposing of timber
scaffolding in the music room which embraced several floor levels.
This claim for $9,489.35 is rejected because it represents an obvious
condition which was known to ACMAT when it bid the work.
Moreover, there is no essential relationship between area and
quantity or nature of asbestos removed.
(q) Item 17. Cost for Working in Elevator Shaft. The School
District regarded part of this work as within the scope of the contract
and part as an extra. No agreement was reached as to the cost.
17a
Appendix C
Therefore, the removal work was approved and undertaken on atime
and material basis. The School District has determined that
$4,063.50 of the $10,532.51 sought is reasonable and would have
been approved. Therefore, that amount is awarded to ACMAT.
(r) Item 18. Labor Due to Lack of Heat. ACMAT claims for loss
of productivity due to lack of heat during the winter months. The
School District disclaims on the basis that these were conditions of
the contractor’s own making by failing to complete the contract by
the agreed deadline, which would have been in the Fall, and by
failing to enclose and heat the property so as to protect it. This claim
is barred by paragraph 15(c) of the original contact, General
Conditions. The claim for $85,651.15 is denied.
(s) Item 19. Freeze, Damage and Contamination. This claim for
$36,195.11 follows upon that asserted in Item 18. The same ruling
applies. The claim is denied.
(t) Item 20. Additional Contamination After Encapsulation. This
| is a claim for discontaminating leaming materials in the Science
Area. The materials included microscopes. ACMAT claims
$40,809.41. There was School District direction to perform this
work on a time and material basis. The reasonabie value for the work
has been determined by the School District to be $3,333.72. That
which is claimed as costs of re-cleaning an area is denied. There was
no approval of this item as an extra or to be performed on a time and
material basis. Accordingly, $3,333.72 is awarded.
(u) Item 21. Additional Barriers. This claim is for $12,358.18
attributed to an alleged requirement to have three, not two, layers of
plastic sheeting on the walls. There is no evidence that ACMAT was
required to install a third layer as an owner-approved “extra.”
Therefore, this claim is denied.
ial
18a
Appendix C
(v) Item 22. Cleaning Inside Univents. This was work required
under the contract. Further, there was no approval that it be
performed as an extra. The claim for $17,199.50 is denied.
(w) Item 23. Removing and Replacing Ceiling Grid. This claim
of $180,432.21 is denied because it was not work that was authorized
as an “extra” by any School District representation whether on a
lump sum or time and materials basis.
(x) Item 24. Removal of Metal Pan Ceiling. This ceiling work
occurred in the dishwashing, faculty dining and serving areas. The
undisputed evidence shows that ACMAT’s contract included this
work and it is not entitled to $11,303.60. The School District claims
a credit of $4,915.00 because allegedly ACMAT did not install the
ceiling in the kitchen areas.
(y) Item 25. Removal and Disposal of Cafeteria Items. This work
was approved as an “extra.” It was done on a time and material basis.
The fair value as determined by the School District’s $2,214.30 and
that amount is awarded.
(z) Item 26. Removal of Furniture from Chair and Office Storage
Area. There is no evidence to support this claim of $4,522.44 as an
owner approved “extra.” It is denied.
(aa) Item 27. Claim for Recleaning and Over Inspection. There
is no evidence that this $26,896.26 claim was an owner-approved
“extra,” or lump sum or approved on a time and material basis. It is
denied.
(bb) Item 28. Labor of Working Above Lockers in Locker Room.
ACMAT claims for the cost of covering and protecting lockers on
the first floor and for working around these obstructions since there
were no lockers on the second floor. This claim for $26,476.14 must
19a
Appendix C
be denied because a general inspection disclosed this as within the
scope of the bid and there was no side agreement to compensate as
“extra” for every difference between the first and second floor;
rather, only if there was proof of a substantially different quantity
of asbestos to be removed.
(cc) Item 29. Removal of Plaster Wall, Room 133. This involved
the sealing of a plaster partition. ACMAT purchased and installed
gypsum board and taped the joints. This work was approved as an
“extra” on atime and material basis. Of the $609.03, $533.12 would
be approved. Accordingly, that amount is awarded.
(dd) Item 30. Extra Cost of Decadex. This was approved by the
School District. The claim of $13,851.95 is substantiated and
awarded.
(ee) Item 31. Electricity. This claim of $10,040.30is substantiated
by the language of the contract and $10,040.30 is awarded.
(ff) Item 32. Extended Duration Expenses. This claim of
$1,060,800.00 is not substantiated as an approved “extra.” It is
barred, in any event, by paragraph 15(c) of the contract.
17. The Fairhill School
(a) Item 1. Encapsulation of Sealer at Soffits. This claim is denied
because there is no evidence that this was agreed to be “extra” work
or that ACMAT could bill for it as an approved “extra.” It appears
that it was work that was part of an $18,000 change order.
(b) Item 2. Furnishing and Installing Ceiling Grid for Acoustical
Tile. The contact required ACMAT to replace damaged or missing
sections of the grid as part of the contract price. The claim for
$68,000 must be rejected.
20a
Appendix C
(c) Item 3. Removing, Cutting Up and Disposing of Old Ceiling
Grid. This claim for $85,000 is denied because there is no evidence
that this was an agreed “extra.” Rather, there is undisputed evidence
that the operation (choice of clean or replace) was within the
contractual commitments of ACMAT.
(d) Item 4. Removing Carpeting and Scraping Carpet Glue.
Specifically, ACMAT claims for the cost of having to cut up the
removed carpet in pieces that would fit into the asbestos disposal
bags. However, the documentation shows that this was work
undertakeni as part of the $18,000 Change Order. The proferred
ACMAT documentation on the score pertains to the Rush School,
not Fairhill. The ACMAT claim for $185,000 is, therefore, denied.
The School District claims a credit of $19,990.89 because
ACMAT did not have to protect and shampoo the carpet already
removed. This credit claim is denied because the Change Order was
incorporated into the primary contract and must be read as an agreed
add-on to the original price and, simultaneously, a nullification of
any conflicting requirements therein.
(e) Item 5. Electricity. ACMAT claims that the School District
failed to provide the electricity required to operate the microtraps,
even though the contract provided that the owner would supply ail
electricity for construction under the contract. It claims $10,000. The
School District offers no evidence that modifies the contractual
undertaking or quarrels with the charge for supplying alternate
sources of electricity. ACMAT is awarded $10,000.
(f) Item 6. Adjustments Concerning Overtime, Disruptions,
Delays and Acceleration. ACMAT claims $203,440 for delays
occasioned by late test reports. This claim is denied because it
amounts to a claim for delay and negligence.
21a
Appendix C
(g) Item 7. Inability to Use Elevators. This claim is denied
because there was no agreement that this was an “extra.” There is
an exclusion for School Board liability in the underlying agreement
for unforeseen causes for delay and there is no contention that this
item was foreseeable. The claim for $36,400 is denied.
(h) Item 8. Claims Attributed to Defective Specifications, Over
Inspection and Recleaning. This claim for $500,000 is denied.
ACMAT was required to perform according to the Work Practices
Supplemen: which it accepted. There is no evidence of this being
agreed-upon extra work.
(i) Item 9. Application of Second Coat of Wax. This claim for
$2,400 is denied because there is no evidence that this was
authorized as “extra” work. Furthermore, it was required to be done
under the contract provisions.
(j) Item 10. Troughs Above Closets. ACMAT claims $16,800 for
covering 23 troughs above closets with polyethylene. This claim is
denied because it was work within the scope of the agreed work.
There is no evidence that this was agreed upon as “extra work.”
ACMAT’s Exhibit B-10 refers to the Rush School, not Fairhill.
(k) Item: 11. Full-Face Powered Air Respirators, Type B, Worn
by ACMAT Workers. This claim for $184,559 is denied. ACMAT
had the responsibility of providing whatever minimum equipment
was required by prevailing circumstances or contract to protect iis
own workers. There is no evidence that the School District agreed
to this expense as an “extra.”
(1) Item 12. Additional Air Monitoring. ACMAT claims $34,500
which it had to pay to its independent air monitoring contractor for
22a
Appendix C
being at Fairhill longer than originally scheduled. This is a claim for
delay which is contractually barred.
(m) Item 13. Extended Duration Expenses. This claim of
$110,086 also amounts to a claim for delay and is barred.
18. The Lincoln School
(a) Item 1. Asbestos Removal in Back Rooms, Toilets and
Cafeteria. This work was authorized by the School District to be
done as an extra on a time and material basis per the handwritten
ACMAT proposal, except for the work in the faculty lunchroom.
ACMAT B-37. ACMAT had attributed $4,800 of its proposed lump
sum of $78,100 to do that work. The School District’s response is
that the $78,100 was excessive for the work done. Certainly, the
claim of $257,962.00 should be regarded as excessive. I find that
$78,100 less $4,800 is an appropriate award, that is, $73,300.
(b) Item 2. Relocation of Decontamination Chamber. ACMAT
claims $17,838. Relocation of the chamber was necessary to allow
students access and to comply with fire and safety codes. This cost
was not an agreed “extra” and is denied.
(c) Item 3. Removal of Asbestos at Ceiling Level and at Steel
Around Motor Equipment and at Ceiling Line at Bi-Fold Door. The
claim is for $6,086.00. There is no written approval for this work as
an “extra.” Therefore, the School Board had no authority to pay.
However, since the School District acknowledges that certain of the
work done would have qualified as an approved “extra,” $1,132.74
is awarded as a time and material undertaking.
(d) Item 4. Lost Production. This $12,000 claim is a delay claim
which is contractually barred.
23a
Appendix C
(e) Item 5. Work Stoppage. This claim for $15,000 is
contractually barred.
(f) Item 6. Full Face Powered Air Respirators. This claim for
$78,012 cannot be asserted. See { 14(i), above. This is a delay claim,
in essence, and is barred.
(g) Item 7. Installation of Extra Covering. This claim for $660 is
denied because there is no written authorization for this to be
considered an extra expense. Contractually, ACMAT was required
to enclose totally and adequately the work areas.
(h) Item 8. Overtime, Disruptions, Delays and Acceleration. This
claim for $94,045 is barred as a delay claim. The School District
contractually is not bound by oral directions by its employees which
would obligate it financially and ACMAT cannot here proceed on
a theory of negligence.
(i) Item 9. Electricity. This claim for electricity is founded on the
contract and $10,000 is awarded.
(j) Item 10. Cleaning and Recleaning. This claim for $400,000
cannot be asserted as there is no evidence that the School District
authorized this as “extra” work or expense.
(k) Item 11. Extended Duration. This claim of $59,916 is a delay
claim that must be denied.
19. In accordance with the foregoing, ACMAT is entitled to
credits against the School District’s counterclaim amounts, if any
are proven, of $99,291.05 from the Rush School, $10,000.00 from
the Fairhill School, and $94,432.74 from the Lincoln School, for a
total of $203,723.79.
12-23-88
cc: R.A. Kom
S.J. O’Brien
P.S. Miller
JJ. Hatzell
S. Akan
A.L. Dennis
J.M. Heley
24a
Appendix C
BY THE COURT:
Signature
James T. Giles/J.
25a
APPENDIX D—TRANSCRIPT AND DECISION ISSUED
FROM THE BENCH BY THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA ON PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR REARGUMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
. EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ACMAT CORP.
v.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILA.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 85-7067
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
June 30, 1989
HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES T. GILES, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff: JOSEPH DINEEN, ESQUIRE
EDWARD A. STEIN, ESQUIRE
Goddard & Blum
675 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017 .
and
JAY M. LEVIN, ESQUIRE
1737 Chestnut Street, Suite 1200
Philadelphia, PA 19103
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For the Defendant: ANDRE L. DENNIS, ESQUIRE
PAULA D. SHAFFNER, ESQUIRE
Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young
2600 One Commerce Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7098
Audio Operator: Andrew Schwab
Transcribed By: Grace Williams
(Proceedings recorded by Electronic Sound Recording;
transcript produced by transcription service.)
(Whereupon the following occurred in open court:)
THE COURT: Good Moming.
ALL COUNSEL: Good Moming, your Honor.
THE COURT: Please be seated. State your appearances for the
record, please.
MR. DINEEN: Joseph Dineen for the plaintiff, Acmat
MR. STEIN: Edward Stein for Acmat Corporation.
MR. LEVIN: Jay Levin also for Acmat, your Honor.
MR. DENNIS: Andre Dennis for the School District of
MS. SHAFFNER: And Paula Shaffner for the School District of
Philadelphia
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THE COURT: _I promised to hear you with respect to your
contention, Acmat’s contention, that I should reconsider the prior
ruling granting in part each of the parties’ cross-motions for partial
summary judgment.
I will consider Acmat’s motion for reconsideration as essentially
a motion for leave to contend at this point that there should be
reconsideration. That is, is there something major that’s new raised
which, as a matter of faimess, should require the opening of the
record or a recasting of the order? Is there anything to be added to
Acmat’s written submissions?
MR. STEIN: Your Honor, may I address the Court on that
question?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STEIN: Well, as your Honor knows, the present firm
representing Acmat substituted for the Korn, Kline & Kutner firm
after your initial order was entered. At that time, we reviewed the
files, reviewed the case and decided that a motion for re-argument
was in order.
At that time we were able to find Fred Dalton whose affidavit is
now before you and who is no longer an employee of Acmat
Corporation. It was Mr. Dalton who conducted or who was present
at the prebid meeting and was also part of the group who went on
prebid inspections. This is, I think, a rather — I think he brought
quite a bit to bear on the issues factually.
Mr. Nosco’s (ph.) affidavit, while he presented one before you
initially, he now explained those matters of which he had personal
knowledge and I think that that certainly is worthy of consideration
by the Court.
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I'd just like to elaborate a little bit on the papers which are already
before you and, in particular, Article 14 of the Rush contract, which
appears in identical form in the Fairhill and the Lincoln contracts,
although its number might change.
And, your Honor, for the convenience of the Court and all
concemed I brought some copies of Article 14 on one, on a single
page, and with your permission I'd like to hand it up to the bench at
this time and to my adversaries.
(Pause.)
MR. STEIN: In reading Article 14 I think it’s important to
point out some of the subtle distinctions that exist there and the use
of language employed by the School District who was the draftsman
of this agreement.
In particular, I think it’s important to understand the distinction
between the word “cost” under equitable adjustment and the use of
the phrase “contract price”, because there’s really three things they
talk about here: contract price, equitable adjustments and then we
see afi increase or decrease in compensation talked about in
Paragraph B. I think it’s significant that they didn’t use the same
phrases or the same words throughout Article 14.
Well, first of all, 14-A, it is Acmat’s contention, deals with those
situations where the School District may order unilateral changes
that are within the scope of the contract. This is alittle different from
most contracts that we face, that usually a modification requires a
sentence. But because this is a construction contract, because large
sums of money are committed to it and because people realize that
you can’t plan for all contingencies, an owner such as the School
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District reserves itself the right to make unilateral changes to the
contract. And that is what 14-A is intended for.
And if the School District which — now, if I may just proceed
on another tack — there are two claims that Acmat asserts that arise
under 14-A, both of which had School Board approval. The first one
was the change order to the Rush School contract which added
personal property. That had School Board approval, the School
District sem out what they call a change order, trying to get Acmat
to agree to a lump sum adjustment in the price.
Acmat sent it back with words reserving its right to seek
additional compensation. The School District crossed it out and said
look, this is what you're getting, we have that right under the
contract. Ill explore that issue concerning the School District’s right
in just a moment.
THE COURT: Did Acmat then sign it?
MR. STEIN: Acmat signed it, your Honor, with the words of
reservation and sent it back to the School District who unilaterally
crossed out the wording and signed it themselves. I don’t see how
there could be a meeting of minds with respect to the amount.
THE COURT: Well, was the work then performed by Acmat
under the conditions of the document as it was revised?
MR. STEIN: Acmat performed the work in accordance with
14-A. It had no choice but to do the work that the School District
unilaterally ordered it to do and it reserved its right to seek an
equitable adjustment and not a change in contract price.
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Now, that’s the first item for which we seek damages under 14-A.
The second one has to do with the Fairhill work practices
supplement.
THE COURT: Now, just a minute. All right, go ahead.
MR. STEIN: Thank you. Apparently after the contract was
entered into the School District decided they wanted Acmat to
perform their work in accordance with what has been called this
work practices supplement and the issue was put to the School
Board. The School Board approved it, Acmat was sent a copy of the
work practices supplement with a cover letter, saying that the School
Board has approved it. And there are other documents in the file
which also indicate the same.
Well, Acmat went ahead and performed that work, but there was
no documentation showing that it ever agreed to a lump sum price
of $18,000 or any other amount. What the documentation shows is
that Acmat gave an estimate to the School District to put some
encapsulating sealer, I think it was, up at the soffits. But it wasn’t
for that work practices supplement which goes on page after page
of additional work that has to be done under that agreement.
But that had School Board approval, Acmat was directed to do it
under 14-A, but there was no agreement as to contract price.
So those are the two claims that come unde 14-A. Acmat had no
choice, it had to do the work.
We now come to the question of what does Acmat get paid for
that work. And 14-A begins to talk about it and then it’s explained
in Paragraph 14-B. First of all, 14-A says if there is an increase or
decrease in the contractor’s costs, and those are important words,
they will receive an equitable adjustment. And then it goes on to say
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Appendix D
that a change in contract price shall be subject to approval by the
Board.
What are we talking about here? Why are we using different
phrases? It’s because an equitable adjustment, while it could result
in an increase in compensation, is not a change in contract price.
Contract price, just as was the case when they initially entered into
the contract, is a lump sum, is a lump sum agreement.
THE COURT: Well, how do you overlook the phrase “Any
such change in contract price?”.
MR. STEIN: That does not refer back —
THE COURT: It refers to —
MR. STEIN: — to equitable adjustment, your Honor. And in
fact, indeed, they talk about approval by the Board and they talk
about lump sum mutually agreed upon.
THE COURT: Well, what does such change in contract price
refer to? It has to refer to something that has gone before.
MR. STEIN: It—
THE COURT: And that which has gone before is equitable
adjustment.
MR. STEIN: Well, I can’t say, I don’t understand. Maybe we
could have the draftsman here, but I certainly don’t think it’s clear
and I don’t understand why they changed the phrases here from
equitable adjustment, which is a term of art in construction, to
contract price.
And when you look at B, which is —
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THE COURT: Well, this particularcontract and as I read it, any
such change refers back to equitable adjustment. And equitable
adjustment is contractor’s cost.
MR. STEIN: Weill, if we go on to B, I think it helps to clarify
the issue.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. STEIN: Now, B begins by talking about increases and
decreases in compensation and that’s going to be done one of three
ways: Number one, unit prices, if they’re available and applicable.
Well, none of the claims involve unit prices, so that’s gone. When
es oe re
agreement with the Board.
THE COURT: Well, there were certain unit prices.
MR. STEIN: I don’t believe that they were —
THE COURT: The unit prices with respect to labor, for
example.
MR.STEIN: _ I don’t think that those unit prices apply to the
particular claims in this case, your Honor. I certainly don’t think that
the School District referred to unit prices in the contract.
THE COURT: Well, all right. But looking at the way in which
claims were submitted, there were certain claims for labor.
MR. STEIN: Your Honor —
THE COURT: _ But part of the problem was that Acmat failed
to submit documentation satisfactory to the School Board with
respect to its costs
MR. STEIN But —
THE COURT: — for which it sought equitable adjustments.
MR. STEIN: Well, you know, Judge, I have a feeling that
there is no documentation that would have been satisfactory to the
School Board on this case.
THE COURT: Well—
MR. STEIN: And furthermore, the contract, which I think
would govern an issue like this —
THE COURT: Allright, so—
MR. STEIN: — is silent on that question.
THE COURT: — what are you saying? You're saying that the
contractor would not have to submit a detail of the time and materials
which it actually expended in order to justify its claim for an
equitable adjustment? They could just pick a lump sum out of the
air end say this is what we think is fair and just?
MR. STEIN: You know, Judge —
THE COURT: Let's go to the court?
MR. STEIN: You know, Judge, Acmat did everything they
could. There are three volumes entitled “Equitable Adjustment,”
which were submitted to the School Board, I think it was 1985 or
1986, detailing everything.
THE COURT: Okay, let’s go ahead.
MR. STEIN: Thank you.
THE COURT: You Say unit price is not applicable —
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Appendix D
MR. STEIN: If they're not applicable —
THE COURT: —and that then we deal with an attempt to get
a lump sum agreement?
MR. STEIN: Exactly, Judge, we try to make a deal. And that
is precisely what happened with the change order on the Rush
contract that I spoke about earlier.
The School Board — School District tried to make a deal, with
School Board approval, for $63,000.
THE COURT: Now, if the parties can’t reach a lump sum
agreement, then what?
MR. STEIN: Okay, Judge, that’s where we are. We increase
the compensation by way of an equitable adjustment. Equitable
adjustment is not contract price, although it may result in an increase
in compensation.
THE COURT: It says by the actual net cost in labor and
materiais plus 15 percent for profit and overhead.
MR. STEIN: That’s right, Judge, actual net cost plus 15
percent as markup or, as it says here, profit and overhead. Now, the
rub seems to be the last sentence here, which now the School Board
is Out of it altogether when you price it this way, it says the School
District makes the final determination.
Now, Judge, we cite in our papers the Supreme Court case of
Teodori — I'm sorry — John F . Harkins Co. v. The School District
of Philadelphia, 1983, and this comes out of the appellate — the
Superior Court, your Honor.
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THE COURT: _ I've read that case. That case does not say that
this kind of phrase is unconstitutional. In fact, either that case or
another case you cited, the references that a contract did provide, the
School District would be the final arbiter of net cost.
MR. STEIN: Judge, let's take a look at that paragraph as it's
written. I think you'll find —
THE COURT: Which paragraph? In the case or here?
MR. STEIN: I think you'll find that doesn't say that. Judge,
my papers cite it in full, I think, or most of it, and I have the case in
front of me right now. It will just take a minute, I'm not going to
read the whole thing.
THE COURT: Just take a minute.
MR. STEIN: Okay. It’s the operative parts I think we ought
to talk about. Okay, in the first place, it says, the School District was
to be the final arbiter of a contractor’s net cost. Well, if you stop
right there, I guess we lose.
THE COURT: —_ Just go on and read it. I've read it.
MR. STEIN: Okay, and by the way, in the first place means —
THE COURT: —_ Just read it.
MR. STEIN: Okay. Pursuant to the provisions of the contract,
it made a determination of appellee's net increase in the cost of labor
and made payment accordingly. The burden of proving by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that additional damages had been
incurred was on the contractor. And a trial was held in which the
contractor tried to prove that it had suffered additional damages.
They were not barred from being ab*e to prove damages. They failed
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to carry their burden of proof. They went on a theory of law that the
Court wouldn’t accept.
Had they presented the evidence differently, they might have won
the day. But that contract language did not preclude that contractor
for the School District of Philadelphia from going forward and our
State Appellate Court —
THE COURT: Was the issue raised?
MR. STEIN: Your Honor, this is an interpretation.
THE COURT: _I know, but was the issue raised? Either in that
case or another case, the Superior Court expressed a bit of chagrin
with the fact that somehow the case got to the Court of Common
Pleas and an arbitration provision that was applicable had not been
raised as a defense by the School District. That was that particular
contract, I’m not sure of this Harkins case or some other case that
you cited.
But the point is that the Superior Court gets the case in the posture
procedurally in which it comes up from the Court of Common Pleas.
I have the issue raised squarely before me and it’s not evident to me
that the School District raised that issue, that is that it was the final
arbiter of this matter in that case. The case was in the Court of
Common Pleas and the Court of Common Pleas assumed it had
jurisdiction because jurisdiction was not contested and it applied an
interpretation to the matter as it was pending before it, that is to try
to determine if the contractor’s theory of claim made sense, and it
rejected it. Or at least it gave the contractor an award on a theory
that the Superior Court or the Supreme Court of Philadelphia
declared as not right and proper.
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But I have not found a case that says that where the school district
is the final arbiter of the net costs of labor and material, that that is
unconstitutional.
MR. STEIN: Well, Judge, I think the Abromovich case that I
also referred to —
THE COURT: Which one is that?
MR. STEIN: Abromovich 1 think was the first party in the
case. It involved the Liquor Board. And it was also a situation there
where a party to the contract sat as judge and jury. I think it was the
appellate courts said no, they sent it back.
You see, Judge, I don’t see how really under our system of
jurisprudence while one party may try and take advantage of the
other party by trying to have their will, that you can allow one party
to adjudicate these claims. How can it be done, Judge? It would put
us Out of business.
THE COURT: You signed the agreement. Your client was not
a destitute helpless individual. He wanted this contract, to be sure,
but he didn’t have to agree to these terms. It knew what it was signing
at the time that it signed it.
MR. STEIN: Well, surely you realize, your Honor, in these
municipal contracts the contractor signs these things in the form that
it’s presented to them.
U
THE COURT: I don’t know that at all. The law presumes just
the opposite.
MR. STEIN: But in any event, you know, thank goodness for
the courts, don’t allow people to take advantage of our citizens.
When we see something like this, judges step in to correct a wrong.
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One party to an agreement should not be able to have their way in
the manner in which the School District has tried to do so here.
And I might add, your Honor, you know, just look what happened
here, or take abstract case. Somebody makes an agreement —
THE COURT: __Let’s not take an abstract case.
MR. STEIN: Let’s talk about a small sum of money, let’s talk
about a couple of hundred thousand dollars. One party to the contract
reserves itself the right to make unilateral changes in that agreement
and then to also determine the final costs.
THE COURT: Of labor and materials?
MR. STEIN: Sure, Judge. Well, what do you have in an
asbestos-removal contract? It’s all labor and materials, mostly labor.
THE COURT: Now, are you saying that it’s just and proper to
charge up a jury every time there is some dispute over labor and
materials?
MR. STEIN: You know, Judge, we did everything we could
to avoid coming here to spend these —
THE COURT: _I mean under your theoretical case.
MR. STEIN: Sure, Judge.
THE COURT: _ Well, let’s suppose in amunicipal contract there
is a good faith dispute, the parties are $15 apart. Are you saying that
the Federal Court of a State Court would have to get involved in a
jury trial every time the parties have such a dispute, that that would
be just and proper and a good way to expend judicial resources?
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MR. STEIN: Well, I don’t have to answer that question. The
Legislature —
THE COURT: __ Ifthe partiescan’t agree, then the School Board
is — it says here — the final determiner of the net cost of labor and
material. Why, I find that very practical. First of all, there should be
a record of the labor and the materials. It should be observable. And
it can be resolved because it is observable right there on the spot.
And it cautions the contractor to make sure that it documents what
it’s doing and that it can justify through observance that which was
done.
In my review of the documentation there were many instances
where I observed that Acmat was diligent or dilatory relative to its
documentation of labor. And the School Board, therefore, had to
estimate what was a fair amount of time to allocate in the absence
of Acmat’s submissions of actual labor costs.
MR.STEIN: May I respond to that, Judge?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STEIN: First of all, you raised a question as to whether
a contractor should be able to come into court, although even small
sums of money like $15. Well, luckily for me, I don’t have to answer
that because the Legislature already has. They have eliminated
sovereign immunity from Governmental subdivisions such as the
School Board from suits of this type.
Acmat, like any other citizen, is entitled to come to court and to
press its claim for contract against the School District. So any
concem that —
THE COURT: Does that apply to torts?
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MR. STEIN: Torts, we’re — this is a contract case, Judge.
THE COURT: Yes, but does that apply to contract cases?
MR. STEIN: I think your order, Judge, indicates —
THE COURT: I thought you were talking about, you know, the
waiver of sovereign immunity, the subdivision, political subdivision
act, I thought, that applied to —
MR. STEIN: I’m talking about contract case, Judge.
THE COURT: Under that act?
MR. STEIN: I believe, I don’t think there’s any question that
Acmat is entitled to press its claims for breach of contract.
THE COURT: Where? Under what act? You say the waiver of
sovereign immunity relative to contract actions.
MR. STEIN: I don’t think there is even a defense by the
School District that they’re not allowed to press that claim.
THE COURT: The contract is the source of your rights.
MR. STEIN: Is your Honor saying that sovereign immunity
continues over claims such as this?
THE COURT: Where is the tort? You don’t have a claim of
tort. You have a claim that Acmat has contractual rights flowing
from the agreement that were not observed by the School Board, and
hence there is liability. I think you had some other claims, but they're
not in the case —
MR. STEIN: Okay, I'd like to make some other points.
Judge, and I promise to be brief.
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I'd like to take a look at Paragraph C. Now, Paragraph C is what
we call a different site condition clause. This is where additional
work is caused not by unilateral decisions by the School District, but
by physical conditions at the site that make it more difficult to
perform one’s work.
I think the overspray condition at Rush is really a good example
of that, but if I may, I just want to go down towards the end of the
paragraph.
It says there any increase or decrease of cost.
Well, before you get there, you have to read the last prior to the.
preceding sentence.
MR.STEIN: _Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: __ It, being the School District, shall make such
changes in the drawings and/or specifications as it may find
necessary.
MR. STEIN: And if it’s not necessary to change drawings
and specifications, you Honor, does that mean that there is no
compensation for different site conditions? I think not.
When Acmat encountered the overspray, how were we going to
change specifications and drawings? They had to continue with their
work and do more of it, go feet and feet. How would one change a
drawing to help them accomplish the overspray situation? So, your
Honor —
THE COURT: Well—
MR. STEIN: —W¥ really don’t think it’s fair to read that.
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Appendix D
THE COURT: _Inthecase youcited there was specific architect
approval of a change in manner of operation which, under that
agreement, triggered the contractor’s right to additional sums of
money. So it is here, under C, that the School District has to
determine, for C to be applicable, that the investigated conditions
are materially different from those shown on the drawings or
indicated in the specifications.
MR. STEIN: It’s not the School District’s decision, I don’t
think, to decide whether there are materially different site
conditions. What happens is, and it happens in this case, Judge, they
bring, they call the attention of the School District to this situation.
They come out. And you know what the School District did in this
Acmat case? They said, you know, go do the work, go do it. Now,
it just didn’t require, quite frankly, Judge, it just didn’t require a
change in plans and specifications, but they were brought there, their
attention was drawn to it and they said: Go do it, Acmat.
And you know in Paragraph D — and this is something which
was within the scope of the contract because it’s provided for right
there — it says they can give these verbal ins*ructions.
THE COURT: “Shall not be binding upon ie Board.”
MR. STEIN: We didn’t depart from the contract documents,
Judge, we did what we were supposed to do.
THE COURT: _ It says “Verbal instructions given by any of the
officers, agents or employees of the Board which depart from the
contract documents shall not be binding upon the Board.”
MIR.STEIN: And if they don’t depart from the contract
documents, Judge, verbal instructions referring to different site
conditions was contemplated. They thought they might encounter
Poe. aera
Sol i ie we
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different site conditions, they provided for it in the contract and I
submit to you that verbal instructions under that situation is
permitted.
But, you know, we got letters that say: “Go do the work, Acmat,”
and Acmat memorialized it in writing. Now, what do we do about
the costs of these different site conditions?
THE COURT: Well, first of all, are there different site
conditions under the agreement?
MR. STEIN: I’m sorry, Judge? I didn’t hear your last
statement.
4
THE COURT: First, are there different site conditions which
are cognizable under 14-C?
MR. STEIN: Well —
THE COURT: I mean, where in my order did I fail to treat that
which was recognized by the School Board as being a different site
condition?
MR. STEIN: But, see, the different site condition
determination is for the Court and in this case, the trier of fact, which
is ajury. The question as to whether there is a different site condition
is something for — is a decision to be made by the citizens of the
Commonwealth, it’s for the trier of fact. It’s not for the School
District.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. STEIN: If I may just finish up on this, Judge, with
respect to the last sentence, it refers to increase or decrease of cost,
and I think that’s the operative language, and that takes us back into
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B, in which it says if you can’t agree on a lump sam, then it’s to be
determined by the actual net cost in labor. I think that’s a clear
reference to the third tier set forth in Paragraph B.
THE COURT: Well, it’s labor and material, plus 15 percent.
MR. STEIN: Right, Judge, labor and material, plus 15
percent.
THE COURT: Yes, with the School District being the final
determiner.
MR. STEIN: Which it is our contention, Judge, is null and
void, and I think that the Harkness case, other cases, have so held.
I certainly have not seen any cases cited to the contrary.
Now, there’s two other categories of claims. Now, 14-A deals
with unilateral decisions, 14-C deals with different site condition
claims. Another category of claims are simple breach of contract
claims. It’s really not unusual in a construction project for the owner
and the contractor to disagree over an item as to whether it’s in the
scope of the contract.
They disagree, the contractor alleges a breach of the contract, you
proceed under common law principles. We have that, we have that
right here. Some of the claims that come within that are, forexample,
the over inspection claims. It’s Acmat’s contention they didn’t
employ the spec properly, they didn’t enforce the specs properly. It
has a right to do that and a reasonable — the question is, was it
reasonable? That’s for the trier of fact.
And finally, the )ast category of claims is delays. I know what the
contract says about it, but even though that’s what it says, the Courts
have interpreted for me that that’s not what was intended. It says it,
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that’s not what it means. I’ve cited some cases for your consideration
and I hope you'll look at it, and thank you very much.
THE COURT: Well, did you raise in your pleadings that any
of the clauses of this contract were null and void as against public
policy?
MR. STEIN: Well, I don’t know, Judge.
THE COURT: Wouldn't you have to do that?
MR. STEIN: Sorry, Judge?
THE COURT: Wouldn't you have to plead that?
MR. STEIN: I’m not sure, I’m not sure if it’s there or not.
THE COURT: Well, you may have to plead it.
MR. STEIN: Do I have to plead it?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STEIN: I think the law has already shown, these cases
were decided a number of years ago.
THE COURT: Wouldn’t you have to plead that certain
provisions were null and void as against public policy as an
affirmative defense?
MR.STEIN: _Judge, plaintiff pleads facts —
THE COURT: Can you answer the question?
MR. STEIN: Yes, Judge. Plaintiff pleads the facts, it does not
plead law, and that is what a complaint is intended to do. The
argument that I’ve presented to you on this issue is one of law.
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THE COURT: _ So the answer is you don’t know? The answer
to my question is you don’t know?
MR. STEIN: Judge, I don’t know if the pleading says it, but
I don’t believe we have to state it.
THE COURT: _ All right, that’s what I understood you to say,
that you don’t know.
MR. STEIN: Well, have I clarified that, Judge?
THE COURT: Yes, you don’t know.
MR. STEIN: Well, Judge, maybe I didn't get it across.
THE COURT: You did, you don’t know.
MR. STEIN: What I’m saying is whether —
THE COURT: _ All right, do you have anything to say on this
issue?
MR. DENNIS: Jast a few things, your Honor. First, with
respect to whether the final arbiter clause is void as against public
policy, I agree with the Court's observation of Harkins. It does not
stand for that proposition. It indeed recognizes the validity of the
final arbiter clause in a contract, indeed a contract quite similar to
the contract before the Court.
Counsel makes the argument that another reason why the final
arbiter clause should not be enforceable is because of the harsh
nature of its result. However, this Court is well aware that the parties
to contracts can waive certain rights. That is, one party may waive
a right through a contractual relationship. And I submit to the Court
that a waiver of right is certainly no more harsh and, indeed, perhaps,
then I should say a waiver of a right could be construed as harsher
H " eee
47a
Appendix D
than allowing the School District to be the final arbiter as is provided
in this contract, and that is well recognized.
We don’t have a situation here where one party is arguing a
difference in economic status whereby the other — one party is
overbearing as to the other party. We have two corporations — we
have a corporation here, we have a public body in the School District
and duress has not been raised in the pleadings and, indeed, it doesn’t
exist. And we believe that the final arbiter clause is enforceable and
applies with respect to Paragraph 14.
But if I can go back one step further, you Honor, we also believe,
as your Honor has noted in the briefs that we filed and in my most
recent letter to the Court that I sent this week, that we believe the
Court doesn’t even have to reach this issue in terms of
reconsideration, that the whole matter should have been resolved by
the entry of summary judgment against Acmat on all of its claims
and the Court did not have to reach the Paragraph 14 or final arbiter
clause.
With respect to — oe
THE COURT: What do you say about the breach cf contract
contentions? That is, I don’t have all my file here before me, but I
believe these were raised before, breach of contract claims?
MR. DENNIS: _ There was a breach of contract claim stated in
the Complaint. My position on the breach of contract claim, you
Honor, is that the claim, since the amount it seeks does not have
Board approval, would be barred because it doesn’t have Board
approval.
THE COURT: No, no, I’m talking about counsel referenced
disputes about the scope of work.
48a
Appendix D
MR. DENNIS: Oh, different conditions?
THE COURT: No, scope of work, interpretation of the scope
of work clause.
Let’s suppose Acmat says Item A is not covered by the scope of
work provision. The School District disagrees and says it is. Who is
the final arbiter of that dispute, the Court or the contract?
MR. DENNIS: Well, in that dispute, you Honor, it seems to me
that if Acmat says it isn’t, then Acmat proceeds at its peril to do the
work if the School Board says it is, because it doesn’t have approval
and Acmat always has the right to refuse to perform work that is not
within the scope of the contract.
However, if Acmat proceeds to do the work in a situation where
the School Board insists that it is, then I think Acmat proceeds at its
peril and should not be compensated for that work.
THE COURT: Well, does Acmat have any realistic alternative
but to proceed with the work?
MR. DENNIS: If it is correct in its position the realistic
alternative is not to proceed until the matter is resolved either by
approval from the School Board or to Acmat’s satisfaction.
One illustration, for example, let’s focus on the change order for
Rush. We have a situation where a change order was actually
executed by the Board. Acmat gets is — Acmat disagrees with the
amount and instead of insisting that the matter be resolved at that
point, proceeds to do the work and now seeks to hold the School
Board responsible for an amount far in excess of the amount stated
in the change order.
49a
Appendix D
Now, that is an example of a situation where if there is no meeting
of the minds, Acmat didn’t have to proceed. It cannot proceed and
now come into court and try to hold the School District liable for
more that it agreed to in the change order.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. DENNIS: With respect to the differing conditions clause,
counsel submits that the jury determines whether there are different
conditions and the contract specifically states that the School District
shall investigate and make that determination.
Further, Acmat has failed to point to any notice to the School
District or any contemporaneous notice that there was a differing
condition, that the Schoo! District went in and investigated and either
made or did not make a change. There are conditions that Acmat is
to satisfy in order to take advantage of that clause or to try to take
advantage of, that Acmat has not satisfied.
It may now not come in and bootstrap its claim for equitable
adjustment, breach of contract, negligence, et cetera, by simply
stating that there were differing conditions.
Also, as your Honor pointed out in the order, there was and there
certainly is a provision in the contract which obligates Acmat to
investigate.
One other item, your Honor. As I’ve pointed out again in my
letter, in terms of the computation of the potential credits to Acmiat,
we believe there's a mathematical error.
THE COURT: _ | adopted those in an order.
MR. DINEEN: Okay, your Honor, if I may just for a moment,
I understand your opening remarks prior to argument to be that you
5
50a
Appendix D
were treating this particular argument this moming as basically a
prelude to a decision on your part whether you would consider
granting leave for reconsideration. And it was my understanding,
certainly, following the conference earlier this week which resulted
in our coming down here to Philadelphia today, that it was your
decision that you would entertain reconsideration and would,
perhaps, take argument today if you felt that there were reasons to.
And that was my understanding based on our conversation earlier
this week. I just wanted to clarify that.
MR. STEIN: If I may, your Honor, I also remember being in
chambers on April the 10th in which this issue came up. I have a
very specific and vivid recollection and your Honor at that time
indicated and granted our oral application for reargument and
reconsideration.
THE COURT: That conference was held when?
MR. STEIN: April the 10th, your Honor. As a matter of fact,
Judge, I specifically remember Mr. Dennis asking you if —
THE COURT: Whendid you get involved in this case?
MR. STEIN: It was shortly before then, your Honor.
THE COURT: What's shortly?
MR. STEIN: Pardon me, Judge?
THE COURT: Whatis shortly?
MR. STEIN: I think — counsel advises me that we were
admitted pro hac vice shortly before that. I really don‘t remember,
but —
1 Nl PREIIE 0 sts TA a eats BRB
re eb inal
Sla
Appendix D
THE COURT: Whenwere you involved with the investigation
of this case on behalf of your client, not when you became admitted
to speak her?
MR. STEIN: It was not long before that time, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. STEIN: It certainly —
THE COURT: My determination is as follows: Nothing new
has been raised in this motion for reconsideration that prompts me
to consider it under any equitable provision waiving the timeliness
requirements for the filing of such a motion for reconsideration.
Nothing has been advanced which could not have been pressed
before, assuming there was something that, indeed, was not pressed
before by Mr. Korn.
Secondly, I find that everything that has been advanced here was,
in fact, advanced by Mr. Kom, prior counsel. Existing counsel has
said it in his own way, but Mr. Korn raised the same points. And
each of the points was addressed by the Court previously.
No new light has been shed and there has been no demonstration
of unfaimess in the approach taken by the Court relative to its
consideration of the Acmat claims. On the merits alternatively I
reiterate my prior ruling. Nothing has been advanced here which
shakes the logic of those matters ruled upon as they raised matters
for legal determinations by this Court.
In a letter to me, the School District suggested that if I
reconsidered the matter that I reconsider my rulings to the extent
they were made in favor of Acmat where there was not specific
School Board approval of certain items. For the reasons which I
52a
Appendix D
Stated in the memorandum and order, I continue in my position that
where the Schoo! District put in writing that certain additional costs
were to be incurred by the contractor, that those writings were
binding upon the Board because the School District was an agent of
the Board and Paragraph 14-D is construed as a matter of law to say
that written instructions which are in accordance with contract
documents shall be binding upon the Board.
And as a matter of equity, where the School District in writing
requires the contractor to proceed, to incur costs approved by the
School District, that it cannot be said that the co: actor is
proceeding at its own peril.
With respect to the time and material provision, that is plain to
me. It’s actual net cost in labor and materials, those things which are
observable, and the School District is the final determiner of that net
cost. And that time and material provision comes into play where
there is work that is done for which an equitable adjustment is to be
made up or down. That is the way in which work that is outside of
the scope of the contract is to be compensated.
I observed in my earlier ruling that where the contractor
appreciates that School Board approval must be in writing for work
beyond the scope of the contract, if it proceeds to do such work, it
does so at its own peril, taking the risk that is will not be paid through
recognition in writing by the School Board that that work is indeed
an altered site work or that it requires an alteration in the drawings
and specifications. Its altemative is not to do the work or to seek
some judicial intervention at that point before it does the work.
Otherwise, if it does the work which the School District claims
should not be done outside the scope of the contract clause, it is
essentially seeking to ask a jury to engage in a legislative act of
tale vin TAB eS, os
53a
Appendix D
appropriating money. Or it could hold the School District hostage,
so to speak, by doing the work always contending that something is
beyond the scope of the work, as any contractor who might have a
dispute or would be inclined to have a dispute would so do, which
would take away from the School District its essential authority of
being the authorizer of work and would undermine completely its
duty to be the fiscal controller.
Now, that’s old ground. Left to try are the School District’s
counterclaims for liquidated damages. Whether the liquidated
damage clause is enforceable is a matter for a Court, not a jury. As
to whether or not, assuming the liquidated damage clause is
enforceable, there should be credit given to Acmat for delays caused
by the School District. That may be an issue for a jury.
So let’ discuss these two issues. Does anyone take issue with my
observation that the Court, not a jury, is the determiner of the
enforceability of the liquidated damages clause?
MR. DINEEN: YourHonor, ifI may, the plaintiff does not take
issue with the Court in the first instance, determining whether in fact
the liquidated damage provision on its face is an enforceable
provision. Whether it is allowed to be applied in any given situation
is really a factual question which must go to a jury, but in the first
instance whether the contract provision permitting liquidated
damages is enforceable in light of what the law requires for
liquidating liquidated damage provisions to be enforceable, that is
really a question for the Court.
And in the briefs cited — in the briefs filed by Acmat, a number
of considerations were presented to the Court upon which it should
determine whether in fact these provisions in the Acmat contracts
are indeed enforceable or not as a matter of law.
54a
Appendix D
THE COURT: Did you cite Laughlin v. Baltedene (ph.)?
MR. DINEEN: _ I don’t recall, your Honor, quite frankly.
THE COURT: 191 PA Superior 611.
That case stands for the proposition that the enforceability of the
clause is a question for the Court. Enforceability should be
determined by comparing actual damages with liquidated damages
and ensuring that the two measures are reasonably commensurate.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, the —
THE COURT: _ Did you cite that case?
MR. DINEEN: _ Ican’t find it in the original papers, your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you read it?
MR. DINEEN: I don’t recall reading that, your Honor.
THE COURT: _ It looks good to me, as stating the law of
Pennsylvania.
MR. DINEEN: Well, your Honor, Acmat is not contesting that
that is in fact the law.
THE COURT: Okay. So I have to look at, on this case, the
actual damages and compare them with the stated liquidated
damages to see if they are reasonably commensurate.
MR. DENNIS: _ If I may, your Honor, my only reservation at
this point is as to whether Acmat actually raised in its answer to our
counterclaim the question of the enforceability of the liquidated
damages provision; I don’t believe it did. In the motion that was filed
with your Honor, Acmat’s position was that the School District
55a
Appendix D
could not recover actual damages — rather actual delay damages
and liquidated damages, and I’m now going back to previous
counsel.
THE COURT: Well, have your dropped the actual damages?
MR. DENNIS: We've dropped the actual delay damages, yes.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, if I may, there was one item
remaining — well, there are actually several items remaining in the
counterclaim which are actual delay damages and one of them is an
$87,000 counterclaim for the additional cost of air monitoring
during the delay period, and that is a claim that is still in the case as_
far as I understand from Mr. Dennis, and that is a clear overlap of
In addition, there are claims for custodial overtime wages which
take place during the deiay periods which overlap again with the
liquidated damage periods being asserted by the Schooi District.
MR. DENNIS: _ If I may, your Honor, the custodial overtime
wages are being asserted pursuant to an express contractual
provision that obliges the contractor to pay for those overtime
wages. They are not a part of delay damages from our perspective,
as well as the air monitors cost, those costs were incurred in order
for the work to be completed, not as a consequence of the delay.
_MR.DINEEN: Your Honor, if I may, the reason that the air
monitors are on the job in January through June of 1985 at the Rush
School is because there is a delay to the project. At that point the
School District has an option. It either seeks the cost of the air
monitors and drops the liquidated damage claim, or it opts for the
liquidated damages which it has done in this case.
56a
Appendix D
THE COURT: Were the air monitors there because of delay in
the completion of the contract?
MR. DENNIS: _ Ihave to concede, your Honor, if the work had
been done earlier, the air monitors would not have been there and
therefore that amount would not have been incurred. However, the
amount was incurred because the prosecution of the work to
complete the job was necessary. In other words, in order to complete
the job and do that work which was necessary, the air monitors had
to be there.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, Mr. Dennis has just conceded that
but for the delay there would have been no additional air monitoring
cost. So clearly the direct cause of the additional air monitoring cost
is the delay. And in the contracts they have an option. They can take
actual delay damages or liquidated damages, but certainly not both.
THE COURT: The cost of completion is what Mr. Dennis is
talking about. He’s saying that that was a cost that should have been
bome by Acmat in the prosecution of its work that the School
District had to pick up. And that’s what the School District is
talent
MR. DINEEN: _ But, your Honor, that is no different from the
other actual delay damage claims which have been asserted earlier
by the School District and which have subsequently been dropped.
For instance, the cost of —
THE COURT: As I recall, there was a specific understanding
as to this matter between Mr. Dennis and Mr. Korn, cleaning up the
apparent confusion between liquidated and actual delay claims.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, the question is —
a ee£E§&E rr
57a
Appendix D
THE COURT: And what stayed in represents the meeting of
their minds and the parties’ minds with respect to what was actual
delay claims. And the actual delay claims were taken out as they
were understood by the parties.
MR. DENNIS: Weill, your Honor, you've put me in an
impossible position because I can’t speak for Mr. Kom as t0 what —
THE COURT: I—
MR. DENNIS: — he may have agreed to with Mr. Dennis.
THE COURT: _ Everything was on the record. Whatever was
done, it was on the record, so you're not at a great disadvantage. You
can read the record as well as I could.
MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, in all candor, I don’t recall — I
must say I don’t recall a specific agreement with Mr. Kom. I want
to be honest with the Court and opposing counsel on this issue. I do
recall Mr. Korn filed a motion and that motion was denied by the
Court. That motion was calculated to make the School District elect
and in response to that motion we withdrew certain damages from
the case. That was in our response, the Court ruled and denied Mr.
Kom’s motion and nothing more was done by Mr. Kom about that
after the Court’s ruling.
THE COURT: __ I understand. I am not saying that there is some
binding agreement enforceable by the Court on this. I am saying
only that I have not had to, at this point, make a decision as to these
— whether these two particular claims are actual delay damage
claims or not. But up to this point there appeared to be, once Mr.
Dennis made an action to delete actual delay damage claims, an
understanding that what remained were not actual delay damage
claims. If I have to make a decision, I’ll make a decision.
58a
Appendix D
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, am I to understand —
THE COURT: I mean, but if it appears to me that this was, that
this air monitoring was acost that was already paid for in the contract
price that the School District had to incur additionally, that is not a
delay claim.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor—
THE COURT: That's not a delay claim, that’s just a
reimbursement of the contract price.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor has to look at the cause of the cost.
For instance, Mr. Frank Richmond who is the School Inspector at
the Rush School while Acmat was performing its work was paid
some additional moneys to monitor what was happening on that job.
Now, there was no claim being made for the additional money that
had to be paid to Mr. Richmond for performing his duties attendant
to the Acmat work.
THE COURT: Well, youdidn’thave tw pay Mr. Richmond, did
you? Acmat didn’t.
MR. DINEEN: Well, Acmat didn’t have to pay the air monitor
either. This was a consultant retained by the School District to
monitor what was happening on the various school projects. As Mr.
Dennis conceded, he would not have been paid any additional
moneys if the work had been completed on time.
THE COURT: All right, is that what you're saying?
That's not what I've heard you say, but if that is the case then that
would be an actual delay cost.
59a
Appendix D
MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, what I'm saying is that the air
monitoring costs were a cost of completion. We had to have the air
monitors there to complete the work. Now, if the work had been
completed on time, we would not have incurred that expense, but it
is a cost of completion. We couldn't complete the work without
having air monitors. I don't know whether this is a —
THE COURT: But it seems tw me that that’s actual delay
damage, and that may justify liquidated damages.
MR. DENNIS: _ But, your Honor, except unlike the cost of bus,
the bus to bus students, I mean this was a cost incurred directly in
connection with the work. The work could not proceed unless we
had the air monitors there, so I believe it is a construction, a
completion damage. Now, I understand counsel's argument, but
that’s what we contend.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, if! may, in presumably one of the
considerations behind the liquidated damage provision and your
determination whether it's enforceabie or not in the first instance is
a question as to whether in fact the School District would incur any
additional cost by virtue of delay and if such cost would be incurred,
what types of costs would be incurred? And certainly the School
District had to understand in preparing these liquidated damage
provisions that cost of air monitors on an asbestos removal project
would be an additional cost that would be incurred in the event of a
delay. And they —
THE COURT: _ It sounds to me, sirs and madam, that this air
monitoring is in the category of actual delay damage. That's not a
cost that would have been incurred. It's over and above the cost that
would have been incurred had the contractor been on time. What are
the actual delay damages, which would include this amount?
60a
Appendix D
MR. DENNIS: With the Court's indulgence for a few
moments.
THE COURT: __ I have to compare the liquidated damages, the
total liquidated damages versus the actual damages.
MR. DINEEN: In that regard, your Honor, while the School
District has asserted initially in the case certain actual delay damages
which it did incur, there was no indication as to what moneys were
saved by the School District in not having the school open at that
time, and that certainly has to play a major factor in determining
whethes the liquidated damage provision is enforceable in the first
instance, and that may be information that you do not have before
you now.
THE COURT: _ I don't know if that's’ something I have to take
into consideration. There are some actual damages which were
withdrawn, so I have to consider all of those as well as the costs of
monitoring and even the custodial costs.
MR. DINEEN: __ If your Honor is going to rule that the custodial
costs are delay costs, then yes, they should be included.
THE COURT: Well, I may not have to do that. The contract
may entitle them to that separate recovery, even though these were
delay costs.
MR. DINEEN: Well, if they are delay costs, they certainly fall
under the number of the liquidated damage provision.
THE COURT: Do you want to take some time to figure those
out?
MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, we don't have our statement of
claim which has all of the items enumerated.
‘
6la
Appendix D
(Pause.)
MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, as I was saying a minute ago,
unfortunately we don’t have all co four pretrial with us which includes
that amount or the other document which does, but I do have a part
of that document with respect to the Rush School and the general
items apply with respect to other schools.
There's security necessary to keep the persons out of
contaminated areas. And the amount in Rush for that particular item
is $31,554. There is inspector's wages — and this is all, by the way,
from January 1, 1985, to June 28, 1985 — $30,000.
Contract costs for air monitors during the same period, $87,000,
and the costs of busing Rush students to other schools, $446,716.
THE COURT: What's the amount of liquidated damages you
seek relative to Rush?
MR. DENNIS: _ I'm sorry, your Honor?
THE COURT: What's the amount of liquidated damages you
seek as to the Rush School?
MR. DENNIS: $128.500.
MR. DINEEN: I would just note, your Honor, these are
amounts being claimed by the School District. These amounts
necessarily actual expenditures as a result of any delays to the Rush
School, but right now these are claimed amounts.
MR. DENNIS: I don’t quite know what —
THE COURT: These are amounts that they are prepared to
prove they have.
62a
Appendix D
MR. DINEEN: Correct.
MR. DENNIS: We paid $87,000 for air monitors.
MR. DINEEN: [understand that's what you're claiming.
MR. DENNIS: Weil, that’s what the Court asked for, ourclaim.
THE COURT: Well, any argument that the actual damages,
delay damages, are commensurate with the liquidated damage
costs?
MR. DINEEN: _ I have no reason —
THE COURT: Certainly if you factor in $87,000 for air
monitoring.
MR. DINEEN: _ I heve no reason one way or the other to doubt
the accuracy of the costs. I think there are other considerations here,
other than just the purported actual costs which were expensed in
connection with the delay at the Rush School. You have to also look
at what savings there were by virtue of not having the Rush School
opened.
THE COURT: What savings could there be?
MR. DINEEN: Weill, for instance, a large saving had to be not
having to heat the building for one year. That had to be a substantial
amount of money that the School District saved in not having to heat
the building.
‘THE COURT: So they had to heat the building for additional
students somepiace else.
MR. DINEEN: Well, presumably they were in a building that's
already being heated.
63a
Appendix D
THE COURT: How many students had to be moved?
MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, we don’t have that information at
this time.
THE COURT: Have you developed that information? ht seems
to me that the burden is on the School District t© show the
reasonableness of its actual delay costs and on Acmat to show the
unreasonableness of it.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, we don't have any specific
information one way or the other on what the savings were.
THE COURT: Okay, well, I'll make my judgment based upon
the information I have. Discovery is closed.
MR. DINEEN: Weil, discovery was closed before we came into
the case, unfortunately.
THE COURT: All right. Well, make such a list for each of the
schools.
MR. DENNIS: = Yes, sif.
THE COURT: And bring it Wednesday.
Ali right. So you should offer to me evidence of actual
expenditures for each of these schools. My understanding of the law
is that where the contract is silent as to the means for extension of
the contract, that the contractor will be allowed to show that the
amount of liquidated damages should be reduced by the School
District's delay.
So what does Acmat intend to present, for example, as to the Rush
School?
64a
Appendix D
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, Acmat is going to testify as to the
difficulties encountered in attempting to complete the Rush School,
the overinspection, the amount of additional work which was
required to be performed by reason of different site conditions, by
reason of directives from the School District to perform additional
work.
THE COURT: Now, be careful. I will rule, as a matter of law
as I already have, that certain work that was undertaken by Acmat
without School Board approval was done at its own peril and
therefore is not chargeable as delay to the School District.
Similarly, with respect to what Acmat contends to be differing
site work, that that, too, without School Board approval, was work
done within the scope of the agreement and therefore is not
chargeable to School Board delay.
So what do you have chargeable to the School District that is
beyond the scope of my ruling?
MF.. DINEEN: Well, your Honor certainly granted to Acmat
certain claims in certain amounts which did, in your view, represent
additional work that was performed, and those items certainly will
be testified to.
There are certain other items which occurred on the various jobs,
Rush included, that being overinspection by the consultants for the
School District, and this was a recurring problem through all the
jobs; that will be testified to and that held up the work considerably.
In addition, you Honor, the fact that many of the claims were
dismissed by your Honor on the basis that there was not School
Board approval does not negate the fact that in fact they were extra
‘ a vepees
65a
Appendix D
work. And certainly if it’s extra work, it entitles the contractor to an
extension of time.
The fact may be that he can’t get paid for the work, but it certainly
extends the schedule. And certainly in defense of a liquidated
damage claim, the contractor ought to be able to prove that there was
additional work performed — whether or not he has been paid for
it or not is irrelevant — that did extend the schedule.
THE COURT: Well, I agree with you that if there was work
that was compensable, that is that it had School Board approval or
as I have construed School Board approval, School District written
approval, you’d be able to argue that a reasonable period of time
extension to do that should be allowed. What’s reasonable?
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, in connection with the time
extension provisions of the contract, they talk about unforeseen
conditions or items that occurred that are not the fault of the
contractor. And if the contractor performs extra work, whether or
not he’s entitled to be compensated for it by reason of School Board
approval or lack thereof, the fact is that this is work which was not
part of the original scope of the job. It was something that was
unforeseen and it did extent the schedule. And even under the
agreement itself, the contractor would be entitled to an extension of
time.
THE COURT: No, no. Because a contractor may have failed
to size a job up right does not mean that the contract completion date
has to be extended because of the contractor’s oversiglit or
undersight; that doesn’t make sense.
MR. DINEEN: Well, your Honor, in the first instance, I think
that would be a question to be presented to a jury.
66a
Appendix D
THE COURT: it’s a matter of law, it’s a matter of logic.
Unreasonableness , and the jury will not be required to do that which
is silly, and you’ve just made a silly argument.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, we would never intend to present
anything to the jury that’s silly.
THE COURT: _ I know, but sometimes you say things that you
don’t even contend, and what you’ve just said is silly. That is, that
a contractor should be excused at the completion end for a mistake
it made at the beginning.
MR. DINEEN: YourHonor,! never said that. I said acontractor
is entitled to an extension of time where he performs additional
work. Obviously Acmat would have to establish that the work it
performed was additional, not that it missed it or that it made a
mistake in its bid, but that the work it performed was not
contemplated. And that is what | said.
THE COURT: By whom?
MR. DINEEN: By Acmat or by any reasonable, prudent
contractor doing the work.
THE COURT: I disagree with that. I mean, you’re making the
same argument you said you weren’t making, and that is that the
contractor should be relieved of the mistake that it may have made
at the beginning. You have a difference of — you claim that the
overspraying was something unanticipated and dealing with that
took them a lot of time you hadn’t anticipated.
The School District says that overspraying was within the scope
of the work, for example, and it told you that. I have made a ruling
that is was noncompensable, for example. That means, my ruling
67a
Appendix D
means that you can’t contend you should be given an extension of
the contract because you did that which was required to be done
under the contract.
MR. DINEEN: _Is your Honor saying that if overspraying is
encountered which is, in fact, beyond the scope of the contract, that
that particular problem cannot be presented to a jury in justification
of a time extension?
THE COURT: Yes, where it was within the scope of the work.
MR. DINEEN: _ So Acmat is then free to testify that there was
overspray at the Rush School or at the other schools which was, in
fact, beyond the scope of the contract?
THE COURT: Only to the extent that I’ve ruled that it was
beyond the scope of the contract and therefore was compensable.
MR. DINEEN: Well, your Honor has already ruled that it was
not compensable because there was no School Board approval.
THE COURT: Yes, my nuling is saying it’s not compensable.
If it’s not compensable, there is no entitlement to consideration of
extension of the completion date. That would alter the contract.
MR. DINEEN: But your Honor is saying that because there
wasn’t a technicality followed in getting School Board approval, that
means that whatever work was done by definition then is not extra
work, and that’s simply not the case.
THE COURT: _ That’s the contract.
MR. DINEEN: _ That only — the lack of School Board approval
relates only to whether Acmat’s entitled to be compensated for the
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work or not. It has nothing to do with whether there is an extension
of the schedule by virtue of having to do that work.
THE COURT: _ But you contracted to do the work, all the work
that was within the scope of the agreement, by a certain completion
date, that this agreement was, whether it was within the scope of the
agreement, this, quote, “additional work.” If it was not additional
work, then you had already agreed to do that work before the end of
the contract period.
MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, there are several bases which
Acmat will seek an extension of time for. One is, for instance, the
overinspection, a misapplication, a lawful implementation of the
specification requiring that areas be cleaned and cleaned and cleaned
over and over again which was not necessary. That held up the work.
THE COURT: Allright.
MR. DINEEN: That wast.
THE COURT: But now you're talking about School Board
delay.
MR. DINEEN: _ That’s correct, that’s a breach by the School
District and in fact the contract talks about breaches by the School
District being a basis for a time extension. Then there are the items
of additional work. Now, your Honor has ruled as to the issue of
compensation on those items, but using a Neeva (ph.) case, if that is
going to be the standard upon which an item is determined to be
extra or not, that is not what Neeva stood for. Neeva said basically
that without School Board approval, you can’t get paid for extra
work, and that is basically the position that has been proffered by
the School District and your Honor has, in essence, followed that.
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However, that doesn’t change the nature of the work. It still can
be extra work for purposes of getting a time extension, but under
your Honor’s ruling, you can’t get additional compensation for it.
MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, I believe that the Court’s ruling
should govem this situation. Now, if the Court ruled that it wasn’t
authorized extra work, then the work was unauthorized and there
should be no basis for an extension of time. The contract speaks in
terms of the School District may grant an extension under certain
circumstances; it’s not obligatory.
Furthermore, I would submit that the overinspection item which .
has been repeated often by counsel falls within this category. That
was ruled on by the Court under the Rush School as being an item
not subject to compensation, unauthorized and therefore should not
be the basis of any extension of time. :
THE COURT: Well, cannot this for inspections that had to be
paid for by Acmat?
MR. DENNIS: No, no, these were inspections by the air
monitors to determine whether the asbestos was in fact removed to
the levels that were dictated in the specification. And Acmat’s
position is that is was overinspection, a too rigid application of those
specifications which caused it to incur delays for which it sought
extra compensation.
THE COURT: Well, I don’t see any reason why Acmat can’t
present evidence that it was unable to get to do its contract work
because the School District required it to slow down, basically. I
mean, that’s what this proceeding would be. Acmat would have to
show that it was going along at a certain pace and the School District
required it to do things that weren't reasonable and therefore,
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necessarily, extended the time that would have taken a reasonably
prudent contractor to do the work.
That’s a different argument than one where Acmat basically is
saying it should be excused for making a mistake as to what was
contemplated by the scope of the agreement.
Are there any categories of claim where the School District —
the School District, not the School Board — the School District
acknowledged that certain work was beyond the scope of the
agreement, but there was no writing by the School District directing
the work for which Acmat seeks payment but the School District
has said that payment is not required because there was no School
Board approval?
As to any such category as that, testimony would be permitted as
to time extension —
MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, may I—
THE COURT: — because that is an instance where there has
been verbal direction by the School District representative to do
something, Acmat has undertaken to do it and
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