Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Acmat Corp. v. School District of Philadelphia

Supreme Court brief1991

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No.

In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

ACMAT CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

RAY GODDARD

675 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10017

(212) 949-0555

Counsel of Record and

Attorney for Petitioner

Joseph P. Dineen

Edward A. Stein

Goddard & Blum

Of Counsel

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether due process is violated when a federal court sitting in

diversity ignores controlling precedent and holds that a political

subdivision, as party to a publicly bid construction contract, can

unilaterally adjudicate a contractor’s clainis without any hearing and

without any availability for judicial review.

2. Whether a federal court sitting in diversity may reject the

controlling precedent set forth in Teodori v. Penn Hills School

District Authority, 413 Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964), and hold that

a coniract approved by the School Board with a differing site

condition clause requires additional School Board approval foreach

and every item of additional work performed on account of differing

site conditions.

3. Whether a contractual site inspection clause may abrogate a

provision mandating an equitable adjustment for differing site

conditions.

4. Whether the Court’s construction of ambiguous contractual

language on a motion for summary judgment is reversible error.

5. Whether triable issues of material fact precluded entry of

summary judgment in favor of the School District.

6. Whether a federal court sitting in diversity may ignore

controlling precedent and determine on a motion for summary

judgment that qualified exculpatory language in a contract deprives

a contractor of damages for delay.

*Petitioner’s corporate parent, subsidiary and affiliates are:

Amins, Inc., Geremia Electric Co., Acmat of Texas, Inc., Acstar

Holdings, Inc., United Coasts Corp., Acstar Insurance Co. and

United Coastal Insurance Co.

ii

PARTIES

The names of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose

judgment is sought to be reviewed here appear in the caption of the

case. Although Hughes Urethane Construction, Inc., is listed as a

third-party defendant in the caption of the Court of Appeals’

Judgment Order, it had been dismissed from the action. Hughes

Urethane Construction, Inc. has no interest in the outcome of the

petition and is not considered a party to this proceeding. There is no

other party with an interest in the outcome of the petition.

PU

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................... i

vie ae a ii

enge> nt lon pag pe J iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................. viii

tra cos 1

JURISDICTION ..... pee PSIMOMIGA TORK. 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISION Ss

hk oss whan c ence. 2

A. Constitutional Provisions................ 2

B. StatutoryProvisions .................. 4

STATEMENT OFTHECASE................. 6

A. StatementofFacts ................... 7

ee 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......... 9

I. THIS CASE INVOLVES IMPORTANT

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF DUE PROCESS

AND THE DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND

USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS . . 9

iv

A. The district court ignored binding state court precedent

set forth in John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of

Philadelphia and made the School District’s determination

of Acmat’s claims final and binding without a hearing and

I THE DETERMINATION THAT ACMAT’S CLAIMS

FOR DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS ARE BARRED IS

CONTRARY TO THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT

AND THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT'S

HOLDING IN TEODORI V. PENN HILLS SCHOOL

yl ey ee Pres 17

A. Article 14 was misinterpreted by the lower courts. . 17

B. The holding that the contract site inspection clause

subsumes the differing site conditions clause is contrary

to United States v. Spearin and prevailinglaw. ... 20

Iii. DISMISSAL OF ACMAT’S BREACH OF CONTRACT

CLAIMS IS CONTRARY TOLAW .......... 23

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DECIDED

DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON A

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ...... 24

V. THE DETERMINATION THAT THE CONTRACTOR IS

BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES FOR

DELAY IS CONTRARY TO COATESVILLE

CONTRACTORS & ENGINEERS, INC. V. BOROUGH

GP CREME Bs Bocce cc rcesseseses 26

VI. ACMAT WAS DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING

ON THE CLAIM FOR CONTRACT RETAINAGES . 28

v

A. The alleged failure to furnish dump tickets was an

immaterial breach of the Contract............ 28

VII. DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT

RECOVERY WAS IMPROPER AND CONTRARY TO

DERRY TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT V. SUBURBAN

eee 28

TORU RAL CEE TAME 31

vi

APPENDIX

Appendix A—Per Curiam Judgment Order of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

affirming the judgment of the districtcourt. ......... la

Appendix B—Order of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit, denying the Petition

= revery etl LETT Tr 3a

Appendix D—Transcript and decision issued from

the bench by the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on petitioner's

Appendix F—Amended Final Judgment of the United

Appendix G—Transcript of argument before the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of

Appendix H—Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-

Appellee submitted to the United States Court

of Appeals forthe Third Circuit... .. .

ieee ee

vii

Appendix I—Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of

Cross-Appellee submitted to the United States

ew. a & €& S

Appeal for the Third Circuit.

26 6.8 © © 6 6.6 66

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Acmat Corporation v. School Disirict of Philadelphia,

904 F.2d. 693 (3rd Cir. 1990) 2... eee ee ee eee 1

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1936) ....... Lf

Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d.

GE BAGS CCHS Re EEE eee ecerece 16

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.

Ct. 780, 28 LEG 2d 113 (1971) .......220-- 14, 15

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548,

Ol LBA DADES (ISS 2. ww cc cre c cs cscccce 24

Coatesviile Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v.

Borough of Ridley Park, S09 Pa. 553,

CE 26

Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty

Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S. Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 2301

(1968), rehearing denied, 393 U.S.1112.......... 16

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. General Asphalt

Paving Co., 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 114, 405

Pe) Ty Pee ee 27

Derry Township School District v. Suburban

Roofing Co., Inc., 102 Pa. Commw.

Ct. 54, 517 A.2d 225 (1986) .. 2... ee ee eee 29, 30

Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1976). .... 16

Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.

Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) .........222ee, 12

ix

Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. v. U.S., 346

F.2d 577, 171 Cx. C1. 30(1965) .. 2...

Formigli Corp. v. Fox, 348 F.Supp. 629 (E.D-Pa. 1972) . . . . 28

Gray v. Weiss, 519 A.2d 716 (Me. 1986) .....

John F . Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of

Philadelphia, 313 Pa. Super. Ct. 425,

460 A.2d 260 (1983)... 2... eee ee

Logan v. Zimmerman, 4S5 U.S. 422, 102 S.

Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1982) ........

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Cr. 1348,

89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986) ..... eG eneces

Nether Providence Township School Aushority v.

Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, inc., 505 Pa. 42,

ere

Teodori v. Penn Hills School District Authority,

413 Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964)... .....

Town of Longboat Key v. Carl E. Widell & Son,

362 So. 2d 719 (Fia. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) . . . .

Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Cr.

GUS UUMUEPENEEE Sc wccccecc cs

United Contractors v. U.S., 368 F. 2d 585,

SUG EEE we Sic cesecccce

U.S. v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 39 S. Ct. 59,

SE PPUED 6 & 66 Kin wee acces

Statutes

Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949, 24

PORE ee ee OTe ee

Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§1. . .

Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§6. . .

Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§9. . .

Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§11 ....

Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 5,§9. . .

PBUBC. GIZA . ccc ccvcvevevevece

PBUBC.GISSZ 0. ccc crv ccccecccrccce

Other Authorities

P.LE. Constitutional Law §135.........++-.

es

In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No.

ACMAT CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,

Respondent.

=Ooooo_=_=_=_=_LLLSS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

———————

OPINIONS BELOW

The per curiam judgment order of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the amended final judgment

of the district court is officially reported as Acmat Corporation v.

School District of Philadelphia, 904 F.2d. 693 (3rd Cir. 1990) and

appears in Appendix A hereto at 1a-2a. The decision of the United

2

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, denying Acmat

Corporation’s (“Acmat”) Petition for Rehearing, not officially

reported, is printed in Appendix B hereto at 3a-4a. The opinion and

order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, deciding the summary judgment motion by the

School District of Philadelphia (“School District’), not officially

reported, is printed in Appendix C hereto at 5a-24a. The district

court’s decision on Acmat’s motion for reargument of the summary

judgment motion was issued in open court, not officially reported,

is printed in Appendix D hereto at 51a-53a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment order of the United States Court of Appeals is dated

May 23, 1990. Acmat’s petition for rehearing was denied by order

dated June 22, 1990. In accordance with Rule 13.1 and Rule 13.4,

this petition is filed within 90 days of the date of the denial of the

petition for rehearing. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

A. Constitutional Provisions

The “Due Process Clause” of the 14th Amendment of the United

States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, $1, provides:

Section 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the

United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce

any law which rhall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens for the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

3

property, without due process of law; nor Jeny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.

Article 1, Sections 1, 6,9 and 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,

P.S. Const. Art. 1, §§1, 6, 9, 11 provide:

Section 1. Inherent rights of mankind

All men are bom equally free and independent, and

have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among

which are those of enjoying and defending life and

liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting

property and reputation, and of pursuing their own

happiness.

Sec. 6. Trial by jury

Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right

thereof remain inviolate. The General Assembly may

provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be

rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any

civil case.

Section 9. Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions

In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to

be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the

nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet

the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process

for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in

prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy

public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he

cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself,

nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property,

unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the

land. The use of a suppressed voluntary admission or

voluntary confession to impeach the credibility of a

4

person may be permitted and shall not be construed as

compelling a person to give evidence against

themself.

Sec. 11. Courts to be open; suits against the

Commonwea!th

All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury

done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation

shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and

justice administered without sale, denial or delay.

Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in

such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the

Legislature may by law direct.

Article 5, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const.

Art. 5, $9, provides:

§9. Right of appeal

There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court

of record from a court not of record; and there shall

also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from

an administrative agency to a court of record or to an

appellate court, the selection of such court to be as

provided by law; and there shall be such other rights

of appeal as may be provided by law.

B. STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Section 5-508 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949,

24 P.S. §5-508, provides:

§5-508. Majority vote required; recording

The affirmative vote of a majority of all the members

of the board of school directors in every school

district, duly recorded, showing how each member

voted, shall be required in order to take action on the

eet BOGEN OP AI La OP TE etal n° ts = Oe St ert Ne pee Rte

following subjects:—

Fixing length of school term.

Adopting textbooks.

Appointing or dismissing district superintendents,

assistant district superintendents, associate

superintendents, principals, and teachers.

Appointing tax collectors and other appointees.

Adopting the annual budget

Levying and assessing taxes

Purchasing, selling or condemning land.

Locating new buildings or changing the locations of

old ones.

Dismissing a teacher after a hearing.

Creating or increasing any indebtedness.

Adopting courses of study.

Establishing additional schools or departments.

Designating depositories for school funds.

Entering into contracts of any kind, including

contracts for the purchase of fuel or any supplies,

where the amount involved exceeds one hundred

dollars ($100).

Fixing salaries or compensation of officers, teachers,

or other appointees of the board of school directors.

Entering into contracts with and making

appropriations to the intermediate unit for the

district’s proportionate share of the cost of services

provided orto be provided for by the intermediate unit.

Failure to comply with the provisions of this section

shall render such acts of the board of school directors

void and unenforcible.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

An important issue raised by this case is whether the district

court’s interpretation of a construction contract, that makes the

School District the sole judge and jury over a contractor’s claims,

violates due process of law. The lower courts’ holdings sanctioned

a procedure whereby the Government in a public contract deprived

acontractor of any hearing of its contract claims and further deprived

the contractor of judicial review. The decisions make the School

District judge of its own cause. Significantly, the lower courts’

holdings sharply conflict with controlling Pennsylvania precedent

and decisions issued by other federal courts. In addition, the district

court, in contravention of the rules governing summary judgment,

lumped many of Acmat’s claims together, labelled them “extra

work” items and summarily dismissed those claims without regard

to the fact that many of the items had their genesis in breach of

contract, differing site conditions and delays caused by the School

District. As a consequence, the lower courts imbued the School

District with contractual immunity, a principle that the Pennsylvania

legislature has declined to enact into law.

This is an issue of great practical significance because the

decision deviates from well settled Pennsylvania precedent that

permits a contractor to sue a political subdivision for breach of

contract and also to recover for differing site conditions when its

contract so provides. If the lower courts’ holdings are allowed to

stand, they will impact on the entire construction industry in the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and will undoubtedly result in

skyrocketing construction costs to the Commonwealth. Moreover,

the decisions represent a major leap backward in the evolution of

‘construction contract law in the United States and the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

coer stam.

A. Statement of Facts

In or about April and June 1984, Acmat and the School District

entered into separate contracts for asbestos abatement in three

school buildings in the City of Philadelphia. The significant

provisions are identically worded in each of the contracts. The

pertinent portion of the Rush School contract is annexed in

Appendix (“App.”) E at 82a-96a. Almost from the start, Acmat

encountered conditions that differed materially from those shown

on the plans and specifications for the projects and differed from

those it observed in pre-bid inspections. Moreover, the School

District breached the contracts in many respects. The School

District unreasonably interfered with construction by permitting the

premises to flood, conducting improper and late inspections, issuing

defective plans and specifications and ordering work that caused

disruptions. Other breaches involved a dispute over the scope of

work required by the contracts. The foregoing resulted in enormous

delays and the loss of millions of dollars by the contractor.

B. Prior Proceedings

The action was commenced in 1985 with the filing of a complaint

in the United States District Court for the Easter District of

Pennsylvania. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.

28 U.S.C. §1332.

The District Court (Giles, J.) by order dated December 21, 1988,

granted partial summary judgment to the School District (App. C at

5a-24a). The District Court dismissed the claims for differing site

conditions because of its erroneous determination that additional

School Board approval was required for each such claim despite the

School Board's initial approval of the contracts with a differing site

condition clause by the School Board. Similarly, the claims for

breach of contract were summarily dismissed because of the absence

of School Board approval for the additional labor and concomitant

costs for work made more difficult and expensive by School District

breaches.

Other claims asserted by Acmat were allowed by the district

court, but only because of School District acknowledgment of their

legitimacy. However, the district court, relying on certain contract

language, restricted compensation for these claims to that amount

unilaterally determined by the School District, and further held that

“..., the claims for time and material costs are not subject to judicial

review.” (App. C at 9a).

The claims for delay damages were dismissed by the district court

based upon certain purported exculpatory contract language.

Accordingly, the district court’s order was based primarily on its

misinterpretation of applicable Pennsylvania state law and the

erroneous construction of an agreement that was patently ambiguous

and required interpretation by the jury. The district court made

factual determinations of disputed material issues of fact and ruled

that Acmat’s claims were subject to summary dismissal.

The district court ignored the state court precedents cited, infra,

which allow Acmat recovery of its damages. A motion to reconsider

was also denied. (App D at 51a-53a).

The School District’s counterclaims and A.cmat’s sole remaining claim

for contract retainages was tried to a jury and culminated in a

Amended Final Judgment dated October 24, 1989. (App. F at 97a-98a).

However, after trial, but before the Amended Final Judgment was

entered, the district court entertained argument and thereafter

reduced the amount previously awarded Acmat because the School District’s

expert re-evaluated the amounts it would have allowed Acmat for

work it acknowledged was compensable. (App.G at 99a-128a).

LAO at C0 A i Rao Gh Matas

So NA ALOE AL 0th

9

Acmat’s appeal and the School District’s cross-appeal were

argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit. A Per Curiam Judgment Order, without any discussion of

the case, affirming the judgment of the District Court is dated May

23, 1990. Acmat Corporation v. School District of Philadelphia,

904 F.2d 693 (3rd Cir. 1990). (App. A at la-2a). Acmat’s Petition

for Rehearing was denied by decision dated June 22, 1990. (App.

B at 3a-4a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

L THIS CASE INVOLVES IMPORTANT

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF DUE PROCESS

AND THE DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND USUAL

COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. The district court ignored binding state court precedent set

forth in John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of

Philadelphia and made the School District’s determination of

Acmat’s claims final and binding without a hearing and

without the availability of judicial review.

Although the great majority of Acmat’s claims were summarily

dismissed in the district court’s order of December 21, 1988, the

court did find entitlement for a group of claims that the School

District acknowledged in writing. Having made that determination,

the district court adopted the sum unilaterally and arbitrarily

designated by the School District as being due. There was no

hearing conducted or evidence received since the court concluded

that it was without jurisdiction to rule on the question.

Net ot a on ak

Pt ee

11

language, to the School District’s final determination

as to net costs of labor and material. Thus, the claims

for time and material costs are not subject to judicial

review. The School District’s contractual right of

final determination necessarily includes the form and

extent of proof and actual expenditures by the

contractor. However, the court can decide whether

there was written authorization from the School

District to ACMAT to undertake work on a time and

material basis. App. C at 9a.

The district court then proceeded to list each of Acmat's claims

and to accept the meager amount allocated by the School District on

a minority of the c.aims and nothing on the remaining claims.

This approach was totally contrary to the holding of the

Pennsylvania Superior Court which expressly rejected the idea that

the subject language could make the School District's determination

final and binding.

In John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of Philadelphia,

313 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 460 A.2d 260 (1983), the Court wrote:

In the first place, the school district was to be the final

arbiter of the contractor’s net cost. Pursuant to the

provisions of the contract, it made a determination of

appellee's net increase in the cost of labor and made

payment accordingly. The burden of proving by a fair

preponderance of the evidence that additional

damages had been incurred was on the contractor.

(d) Verbal instruction given by any of the officers, agents, or employees of the

Board which depart frm the contract documents shall not be binding upon the

Board.

12

John F. Harkins, supra at page 265. Emphasis

supplied.

The Court in Harkins, consistent with principles of due process,

construed the subject language as simply requiring an intermediate

step in the process of having a dispute with the School District

resolved in court. The contractor was permitted to try its claims,

even though the agreement contained contractual terms that are very

similar to those under review herein. Regrettably, neither the district

court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the Harkins case although

they had the obligation to apply state precedent in this diversity

action. Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82

L.Ed. 1188 (1938). It is clear that Acmat never waived its

constitutional right to a hearing or to have its claims heard in a court

of law. Such a waiver, if it could be effective, would surely have to

be explicit and unequivocal. That standard was not been met by the

contracts and certainly was not met by Article 14.

Consequently, the application given the contractual provisions by

the district court clearly violated the guarantee of due process as

required by the constitutions of the United States and the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Clearly one party to a contract

has too great a pecuniary and other interests in the outcome of its

own dispute to allow it to sit as judge and jury without a hearing and

without judicial review. The lower courts’ holdings put the

proverbial “fox in charge of the chicken coop”.

In Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.

2d 265 (1982), this Court held that it would be a demial of due process

to permit the state to deprive litigants from using established

' adjudicatory procedures.

The Court wrote:

ee ee tts

13

Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

Clause has been interpreted as preventing the States

from denying potential litigants use of established

adjudicatory procedures, when such an action would

be “the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to

be heard upon their claimed right[s].” Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,380 (1971).

Each of our due process cases has recognized, either

explicitly or implicitly, that because “minimum

[procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal

law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State

may have specified its own procedures that it may

deem adequate for determining the preconditions to

adverse official action.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.

480,491(1980). See Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at

166-167 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); id., at 211

(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, any other

conclusion would allow the State to destroy at will

virtually any state-created property interest. The

Court has considered and rejected such an approach:

“*While the legislature may elect not to confer a

property interest,...it may not constitutionally

authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once

conferred, without appropriate procedural

safeguards...[Tjhe adequacy of statutory procedures

for deprivation of a statutorily created property

interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms."”

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S., at 490-491, n. 6, quoting

Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 167 (opinion

concurring in part).

14

ees

As our decisions have emphasized time and again, the

Due Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the

opportunity to present his case and have its merits

fairly judged. Thus it has become a truism that “some

form of hearing” is required before the owner is finally

deprived of a protected property interest. Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 570-571, n. 8 (emphasis

in original). And that is why the Court has stressed

that, when a “statutory scheme makes liability an

important factor in the State’s determination..., the

State may not, consistent with due process, eliminate

consideration of that factor in its prior hearing.” Bell

v. Burson, 402 U.S., at 541. To put it as plainly as

possible, the State may not finally destroy a property

interest without first giving the putative owner an

opportunity to present his claim of entitlement. See

id., at 542 Logan v. Zimmerman, supra at pages 429,

430, 432, 433 and 434.

In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.

2d 113 (1971), this Court interpreted access to the Courts as an

element of due process and wrote:

It is to courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies,

that we ultimately look for the implemeniation of a

regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.

Within this framework, those who wrote our original

Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those

who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized

the centrality of the concept of due process in the

operation of this system. Without this guarantee that

one may not be deprived of his rights, neither liberty

~ wetew

15

nor property, without due process of law, the State’s

monopoly over techniques for binding conflict

resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable under

our scheme of things. Only by providing that the

social enforcement mechanism must function strictly

within these bounds can we hope to maintain an

ordered society that is also just. It is upon this premise

- that this Court has through years of adjudication put

flesh upon the due process principle.

The State’s obligations under the Fourteenth

Amendment are not simply generalized ones, rather,

the State owes to each individual that process which,

in light of the values of a free society, can be

characterized as due. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.

at 375, 380.

In Tuney v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed.

749 (1927), tie Court held that due process was violated when an

officer acting in a judicial capacity had an interest in the controversy.

The mayor in Tumey, supra, as the School District in the case at bar,

was charged with fiscal responsibilities and could not be expected

to adjudicate a dispute that impacted on those obligations. Acmat,

like the accused in Tuwmey, supra, has a right to an impartial judge.

Unlike the accused in Twney, supra, Acmat did not have a hearing

of any kind on those items where the district court simply adopted

the position of the School District.

It is submitted that the provisions of the Pennsylvania

Constitution set forth above lend additional support to this argument.

See also, P.L.E. Constitutional law §135.

16

Similarly, it is well established that due process is violated when

a third-party acting as judge of acontroversy has some bias or where

there is a commingling of judicial and prosecutorial functions.

Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152,351 A.2d 667 (1976).

In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,

393 US. 145, 150, 89 S. Ct. 337, 340 (1968), rehearing denied, 393

U.S. 1112, the Court held:

This rule of arbitration and this canon of judicial ethics

rest on the premise that any tribunal permitted by law

to try cases and controversies not only must be

unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of

bias. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of

Congress to authorize litigants to submit their cases

and controversies to arbitration boards that might

reasonably be thought biased against one litigant and

favorable to another.

In Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d. 612(1938), the

Court held that a party aggrieved in proceedings before a nonjudicial

body is entitled to the opportunity for a judicial hearing The instant

case is even more compelling than those immediately cited above

since there wasn’t even the pretense of a hearing.

It is apparent that the construction given Article 14 of the

contracts by the lower courts is contrary to due process. The

Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Harkins, supra, clearly stated that

the subject language was to be construed as only requiring an

intermediate step in the adjudicatory process.

There was no waiver of Acmat’s constitutional right to access to

the courts. The Court of Appeals unfortunately sanctioned the

district court’s departure from these fundamental principles of law.

net taelaneaitereacaa emanates

17

ILTHE DETERMINATION THAT ACMAT’S CLAIMS

FOR DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS ARE BARRED IS

CONTRARY TO THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT

AND THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT’S

HOLDING IN TEODORI V. PENN HILLS

SCHOOL DISTRICT AUTHORITY

A. Article 14 was misinterpreted by the lower courts.

Fundamentally, the lower courts failed to understand that each of

; Acmat’s claims was precipitated by a different event. Some of the

Claims were caused by breaches of contract. Other claims resulted

from differing site conditions or delays caused by the owner. The

common law and provisions of the contracts provided a mechanism

for compensating the cortractor. A review of Article 14 of the

contracts shows that the lower courts misconstrued its provisions

and ignored the precedent set forth in Teodori v. Penn Hills School

District Authority, 413 Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964), which made

crucial distinctions among the provisions of the School District

contracts. Article 14(a) is intended to cover those situations where

the School District unilaterally orders changes to the contract.”

Article 14(c) is intended to cover those situations where differing

site conditions cause more work to be performed. Work that results

from causes governed by either Article 14(a) or Article 14(c) is to

be compensated in accordance with the provisions of Article 14(b).

In all other respects, Articles 14(a) and 14(c) are separate and distinct

from each other. The unit prices referred to in Article 14(b) were not

OA ATA Ab OR eA ee Se 2 eee

2 Acmat’s claim arising under Article 14(a) is for work that received School Board

approval before it was performed because the School District initiated changes

which all parties recognized were not within the parameters of the initial contract.

However, Acmat did not agree to a lump sum change in its contract price and

: Acmat alleged that it was entitled to an equitable adjustment. It is a clear denial

of due process to permit the School District to unilaterally order changes in work

and also to unilaterally determine the amount that Acmat should be paid therefor.

a

18

applicable and the parties could not agree on a lump sum settlement

for any of the claims. Accordingly, actual net cost was to form the

basis for compensation of the differing site condition claims arising

under Article 14(c).

The foregoing categorization and distinctions were examined and

adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Teodori v. Penn

Hills School District Authority, supra.> The Teodori decision clearly

3 Authority next argues that the contract between the parties provided no agreement

to pay for extra work in the amount claimed by Teodori. This contention is based

upon the “Changes and Alterations” section of the contract, which clearly

provides that such “changes and alterations” be made by written order. This

atgument completely ignores the section of the contract dealing with “Conditions

Differing From Those Shown on Plans or Indicated In Specifications”, set forth

in full above. The parties obviously contemplated the possibility of the exact

type of contingency which arose, and provided for it in the contract.

We agree with the conclusion of the Court below, that Teodori’s right to extra

compensation, if any, is governed by the “differing conditions” clause, and not

by the “changes and alterations” clause, the extra compensation not being ©

sought for “changes” and/or “alterations” as those texms were used in the contract.

Nor are we moved by Authority's argument that the award of extra compensation

is contrary to the provisions of the School Code or Municipality Authorities Act... .

The contract in the instant case was entered into under circumstances which fully

complied with the above statute. The extra work which the plaintiff was required

to do and upon which his claim is based was a natural extension of the quantum

of the work contemplated by the original contract and was clearly covered by an

express provision thereof. No work not encompassed in the original contract

was presented by discovery of the gasoline line, and thus no physical changes

or alterations in the contract documents were necessitated thereby. The end

product of the site preparation remained exactly es originally planned; only the

manner of accomplishing it was affected. The contract unequivocally provided

for this contingency, and the plaintiff hed a clear contractual right to adjust his

method of operation and tw recover his additional costs within the contract

framework.

a

8 ner cht Ae RENE ce 6a TR OR

19

shows that provisions in the changes section of Article 14(a) have

no bearing on claims made under the differing site conditions clause

of Article 14(c).

The lower courts ignored’ the controlling precedent of Teodori

and improperly merged the terms of Articles 14(a) and 14(c) so as

to require School Board approval of differing site condition claims.

Contrary to the statements made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the District

Court’s order (App. C at 7a), School Board approval is not a

requirement in Article 14(c). (App. E at 91a). Nor were changes in

plans required or a necessary condition to compensation for

differing site conditions. Article 14(c) refers only to changes in

drawings by the School District, “as it may find necessary”. In this

instance the differing site conditions did not require changes in

drawings. The fact that notice was given by Acmat of the differing

site conditions and that written direction to proceed was issued by

the School District is fully documented and was part of the record

before the lower courts. School Board approval of the differing site

provision was received prior to the execution of the contracts. The

contracts do not indicate that further School Board approval is

required in order to recover for claims necessitated by differing site

conditions. At the very least, the district court’s order does reflect,

what may be ambiguities in Article 14 that create a jury question

and which should have resulted in denial of summary judgment.

Here, the contract foresaw the possibility of what actually occurred, and Teodori

complied with the governing provisions of the contract . . . Teodori v. Penn Hills

School District Authority, 196 A. 2d at 309. Emphasis supplied.

4 Indeed, the lower courts did not even discuss the application of Teodori, although

it was cited and extensively briefed by Acmat.

20

B. The holding that the contract site inspection clause subsumes

the differing site conditions clause is contrary to United States

y. Spearin and prevailing law.

Another reason given by the district court for denying claims

made under the differing site conditions clause was its conclusion

that Acmat did not make a reasonable site inspection.” (App. C at

8a, 9a). The fact that a site inspection was conducted was established

by affidavit. Further affidavits were fumished on the motion for

reargument, but were apparently ignored by the lower courts. The

record Clearly showed that a site inspection was made and that the

question of how reasonable it was under the circumstances was a

matter for the jury. Moreover, the pre-bid site inspection clauses

do not mandate a comprehensive investigation that would require

dismantling of permanent structures. Rather, the contract required

5 This was a disputed issue of material fact improperly decided by the judge on

motion for summary judgment.

© ‘The first inspection Clause is contained in paragraph 7 of the General Conditions

and states the following:

7. CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE WORK

(a) The Contractor shall be responsible for ascertaining the nature and location

of the work and the general and local conditions which can affect the work or

the cost thereof. Any failure by the Contractor to do so will not relieve him from

responsibility for successfully performing the work without additional expense

to the School District. The School District assumes no responsibility for any

understanding or representations concerning conditions made by any of its

officers or agents prior to the receipt and opening of bids other than by a bulletin

or addendum that is duly issued. App. E at 88a.

The second site inspection clause is contained in Article SC-07 of the Special

Conditions and reads as follows:

SC-07 EXAMINATION OF THE SITE

The contractor bidding on this work must inspect the sites before submitting the

proposal and will be responsible for informing himself fully on all determinable,

existing conditions and limitations of the sites and will assume responsibility for

all charges and costs resulting from his failure to verify same. (Emphasis

supplied). App. E at 95a.

21

Se ee ae enn Ge CUTER OF Sp

work.

In U.S. v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L.Ed 166

(1918), this Court held:

But the insertion of the articles prescribing the

character, dimensions and location of the sewer

imported a warranty that, if the specifications were

: complied with, the sewer would be adequate. This

implied warranty is not overcome by the general

Clauses requiring the contractor, to examine the site,

to check up the plans, and to assume the responsibility

for the work until completion and acceptance. The

obligation to examine the site did not impose upon him

the duty of making a diligent enquiry into the history

of the locality with a view to determining, at his peril,

whether the sewer specifically prescribed by the

Government would prove adequate. The duty to

check plans did not impose the obligation to pass upon

their adequacy to accomplish the purpose in view.

And the provision concerning contractor’s

responsibility cannot be construed as abridging rights

arising under specific provisions of the contract.

Ce ce ee we

7 A differing site condition is not a condition that either party knows about in

advance of bidding. It is not a condition that a mere site inspection would

: disclose. If it were, since the owner and its representatives are even more

familiar with the site than are prospective bidders, such work would be included

in the base contract. The differing site conditions clause is included w

compensate a contractor for those conditions that neither party knows about, that

may be encountered, and are not readily ascertainable at the time of bidding.

Certainly, it is not included, with its concomitant promise to pay, only to be later

snatched back with spurious arguments to the effect that the bidder should have

somehow “discovered” the condition prior to bidding.

22

In United Contractors v. U.S., 368 F. 2d 585, 598, 177 Ct.CL. 151

(1966), the Court wrote the following:

But we have held, in comparable circumstances, that

broad exculpatory clauses (identical in effect with this

one) cannot be given their full literal reach, and “do

not relieve the defendant of liability for changed

conditions as the broad language thereof would seem

to indicate.” Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 151 F.

Supp. 817, 825, 138 Ct. Cl. 571, 584 (1957), cert.

denied 355 U.S. 877,78 S. Ct. 141, 2 L.Ed.2d 108. As

Fehlhaber said, general portions of the specification

should not lightly be read to override the Changed

Conditions clause. Ibid. It takes clear and

unambiguous language to do that, for “the provision

sought to be eliminated, or subordinated, is a standard

mandatory clause of broad application * * *.”

Thompson Ramo Woodridge Inc. v. United States, 361

F, 2d 222, 238,175Ct.ClL =, Ss (1966).

See also, Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. v. U.S., 346 F.2d

577, 171 Ct. CL. 30 (1965) and Town of Longboat Key v. Cari E.

Widell & Son, 362 So. 2d 719 (Fila. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Reliance

by the district court on Nether Providence Township School

Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 505 Pa. 42, 476 A.2d

904 (1984), was misplaced. The site investigation clause in Nether,

supra, was far more comprehensive than the one in the School

District contracts and there was no differing site condition clause to

consider in Nether.

Sl nadate wh ae

t ~ AO A kA et we

23

IIL. DISMISSAL OF ACMAT’S BREACH OF CONTRACT

CLAIMS IS CONTRARY TO LAW

The School District breached the contracts in several respects.

Acmat was ordered to perform work out of sequence and was

compelled to clean and re-clean areas to a point that exceeded

contractual requirements. Moreover, the School District permitted

elevators that were used to move materials to stop functioning and

permitted pipes to break and flood one building. These breaches by

the School District caused Acmat to remain on the project far longer

than it would have otherwise and to expend additional sums of

money for labor and materials. Despite these serious allegations the

district court in paragraph 1 of its order (App. C at Sa) dismissed the

breach of contract claims because of its perception that the breach

Claims constituted “extra work” and were barred by Section 5-508

of the Pennsylvania School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. §5-508 (requiring

prior School Board approval) and Nether Providence Township

School Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 505 Pa. 42,476

A.2d 904 (1984). In short, the district court’s holding was that a

contractor cannot recover for breach of contract unless the School

Board approves the School District’s breach, a clear denial of due

process.

As aconsequence, the district court and the Court of Appeals have

imbued the School District with an immunity from claims for breach

of contract that the legislature has declined to enact into law. Indeed,

the Pennsylvania Constitution permits such suits to be brought. P.S.

Const. Art. 1, §11. Although more work and a concomitant increase

in costs were the result of the School District's breaches, the breach

Claims are not transformed into a claim for “extra work” which

involves a change in scope to the original contract. The claims at

issue herein involve contract work which was made more difficult

and expensive by virtue of the School District’s breaches. In Nether

Providence Township School Authority, supra, the claims involved

24

the clearing of an area not included in the scope of work and was

extra to the contract. It did not concem breaches that impacted on

work that was within the original scope of work. The district court’s

order and the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of that order show a

failure to understand these well recognized distinctions. For these

reasons, the district court’s reference to the School Code is

inapposite. Moreover, the district court's categorization of claims

as extra work was incongruous, and at the very least, an issue for

the jury. Dismissal of the breach of contract claims was aclear denial

of due process.

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DECIDED

DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON A MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Even a cursory review of the district court’s order shows that it

made impermissible findings of fact in a motion for summary

judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986),

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265

(1986) and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Lid. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986).

In the instant case, the district court addressed each of Acmat’s

claims, made findings of fact, including whether or not conditions

were concealed, and fully adjudicated Acmat's claims, except the

claim for contract retainages. Most unusual was the district court’s

categorization of claims as “extra work” when the evidence showed

that the claims derived, for the most part, from breaches of contract

and differing site conditions. Thus, the district court's factual

determination, in the context of summary judgment, that work was

“extra” to the contract was improper and should have been left to

the jury.

|

25

Another critical issue of fact decided by the district court on

summary judgment, was that Acmat did not conduct a reasonable

pre-bid site inspection. (App. C at 7a-9a). Moreover, the District

Court eschewed the idea that a differing site condition clause could

allow a contractor to receive compensation beyond its contract price.

To permit a contractor to claim belatedly that it could

not discover the scope of the work through pre-bid

inspection, and without more, to collect for work not

approved as an “extra”, would nullify the contract

provisions controlling bidding and performance and

undermine the fiscal authority and responsibility of

the public contracting body. (App. C at 8a).

The district court’s apparent concern about fiscal responsibility

was entirely inappropriate, but does support the principle that the

School District cannot sit in judgment of its own cause.

Significantly, the School District could have let the contract without

a differing site condition clause, if it wished to entertain large bids

in anticipation of contingencies that could arise. However,

Government entities, including the United States Government and

the Commonwealth, have discovered that their overall expenditures

for construction are lower when their contracts contain a differing

site condition clause.

There was more than enough evidence to show that a reasonable

site inspection was performed. Of course, the question of the

“reasonableness” of the inspection was a matter for the jury.

Moreover, it is submitted that the ambiguity of the contract

language required interpretation by the trier of fact.

26

V. THE DETERMINATION THAT THE CONTRACTOR

IS BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES FOR

DELAY IS CONTRARY TO COATESVILLE

CONTRACTORS & ENGINEERS, INC.

V. BOROUGH OF RIDLEY PARK

The District Court simply denied Acmat’s claims for delay

damages because of “specific language ot the written contracts”.®

(App. C at 9a). It made no inquiry into the factual basis of Acmat's

claims and ignored the Pennsylvania precedent that permits

damages for delay despite exculpatory contractual language.

In Coatesville Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v. Borough of

Ridley Park, 509 Pa. 553, 506 A.2d 862, 865, 866 (1986), the Court

held:

The rule in Pennsylvania is that exculpatory

provisions in a contract cannot be raised as a defense

where (1) there is an affirmative or positive

interference by the owner with the contractor's work,

or (2) there is a failure on the part of the owner to act

in some essential matter necessary in the prosecution

of the work. Gasparini Excavating Co. v.

Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 409 Pa. 465, 187

A.2d 157 (1963); . . . “[WJhere an owner by an

8 Article 15(c) of the contract provides:

If any contractor shall be delayed in the completion of his work by reason of

unforeseeable causes beyond his control and without his fault or negligence,

including but not restricted to, acts of God, acts or neglect of the School District,

acts or neglect of any other contractor, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine

restrictions, strikes, or freight embargoes, the period herein-above specified for

completion of his work may be extended by such time as shall be fixed by the

School District, but the contractor shall not be entitled to any damages or

compensation from the School District on account of any delay or delays

resulting from any of the aforesaid causes. (App. E at 92a).

27

unwarranted positive act interferes with the execution

of a contract, or where the owner unreasonably

neglects to perform an essential element of the work

in furtherance thereof, to the detriment of the

contractor, [the owner] will be liable for damages

resulting therefrom.” Henry Shenk Company v. Erie

County, 319 Pa. 100, 178 A. 662 (1935)

See also, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. General Asphalt

Paving Co., 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 114, 405 A.2d 1138 (1979).

Thocnsegdieuncuementet in Comtesvills ware Geageecian events

that occurred in the instant case. Clearly a factual determination was

required prior to a ruling by the Court as to the nature of the School

District’s conduct in causing delays to the Project. The record

before the district court was more than sufficient to permit the issue

of delays to go to the jury. The School District, in numerous

instances, actively interfered with the work or failed to act in some

essential manner.

Delays caused by unanticipated changes at the job site are

certainly compensable. In addition, the School District’s breaches,

including unreasonable inspection requirements and delays in

inspection, all impacted on the progress of the job and constituted

active interference.

Acmat was denied the opportunity of showing that the

exculpatory language did not apply to it under the circumstances of

this case.

28

VL. ACMAT WAS DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING

ON THE CLAIM FOR CONTRACT RETAINAGES

A. The alleged failure to furnish dump tickets was an immaterial

breach of the Contract.

The only claim of Acmat to survive summary judgment was for

contract retainges in the sum of $150,909.14. The district court

ruled, however, that Acmat must furnish all of the asbestos dump

tickets to recover its contract retainages. The Court refused to allow

the jury to find that the dump tickets were an immaterial breach and

did not instruct them on this issue. Parenthetically, dump tickets are

the documentary receipt given at the dump sites upon delivery of

debris. Significantly, there was no claim of injury or damages on

account of the School District’s not having the dump tickets. Nor

was there any allegation that the debris was not properly removed.

In spite of this fact, the district court ruled that the dump tickets were

an absolute condition precedent to recovery of the retainage. This

was Clear error. See Gray v. Weiss, 519 A.2d 716 (Me. 1986) and

Formigli Corp. v. Fox, 348 F.Supp. 629(E.D.Pa. 1972).

VIL DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT

RECOVERY WAS IMPROPER AND CONTRARY TO

DERRY TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT V.

SUBURBAN ROOFING CO., INC.

The district court’s order dismissing Acmat’s alternative count

for quantum meruit recovery was based on the absence of School

Board approval.” It is axiomatic that no claim for quantum meruit

recovery will have School Board approval. It is the lack of formal

9 Plaintiff's other contract claims, based upon theories of quantum meruit, unjust

enrichment, equitable adjustment, promissory estoppel, and modified contract,

also fail because of the absence of formal approval of the claimed extra work by

& majority of the members of the School Board as is required by state statute.

(App. C at 6a).

29

prerequisites that give rise to quantum meruit recovery.

Accordingly, the district court’s decision dismissing the quantum

meruit count in the amended complaint on the grounds that there

was no School Board approval is paradoxical and contrary to law.

The issue is whether the factual basis of Acmat’s fifty-eight or so

claims can give rise to quantum meruit recovery, if not otherwise

recoverable on a contractual theory. Of course, this requires a

factual determination based on oral and documentary evidence.

In Derry Township School District v. Suburban Roofing Co., Inc.,

102 Pa. Commw. Ct. 54, 517 A.2d 225, 229 (1986), the Court

allowed quantum meruit recovery and wrote:

The District misrepresents the Contractor’s claim

which is not for compensation for extra work

performed under changes to the contract, rather, the

Contractor is asserting a claim for its reasonable costs

incurred in reliance upon the District’s interpretation

of the Contractor’s performance under the terms of the

contract, which interpretation the District later altered

to the Contractor’s detriment. This is a proper case

for equitable estoppel. In Department of

Environmental Resources v. Dixon Contracting Co.,

Inc., 80 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 438, 471 A.2d 934

(1984), we held that equitable estoppel can be applied

to a governmental agency to preclude that agency

from depriving a person of a reasonable expectation

when such agency knew or should have known that

such person would rely upon the representation of the

agency. Id. at 443, 471 A.2d at 936-937; see also, De

Frank v. County of Greene, 50 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.

30,412 A.2d 663 (1980).

30

As was the case in Derry, supra, Acmat was severely damaged

by the School District’s interpretation of the contract and was

compelled to expend substantial additional sums to perform the

work. If not otherwise recoverable under one of the other theories

discussed previously, these claims should be redressed on a

quasi-contractual basis. A claim that stands out as a prime example

is the work in the faculty cafeteria at the Lincoln School. Acmat

was ordered to perform asbestos abatement in the area and did all

the work preparatory to the actual abatement. The School District

then halted the work and refused to compensate Acmat for the

additional work claiming it was within the scope of the original

contract.

Another example was the orderto clean instructional material that

was later rescinded after causing much havoc and disruption to

Acmat’s performance.

The issue is factual in nature and not, as the district court stated,

whether the School Board ever approved the work. It was reversible

error to summarily dismiss the quantum meruit count.

31

CONCLUSION |

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should be issued to review

the judgment order of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Ray Goddard

675 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10017

(212) 949-0555

Counsel of Record and

Attorney for Petitioner

Acmat Corporation

Joseph P. Dineen

Edward A. Stein

Goddard & Blum

Of Counsel

September 17, 1990

la

APPENDIX A—PER CURIAM JUDGMENT ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT, AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT

OF THE DISTRICT COURT

United States Court Of Appeals For

The Third Circuit

NOS. 89.1930 and 89-1953

ACMAT CORPORATION,

Appellant in No. 89-1930

Vv.

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,

Plaintiff on a Counterclaim,

Appellant in No. 89-1953

Vv.

ACMAT CORPORATION,

Defendant on a Counterclaim

Vv.

HUGHES URETHANE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

Third-Party Defendant on a Counterclaim

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastem District of Pennsylvania

2a

Appendix A

(D.C. Civil No. 85-7067)

Argued May 21, 1990

Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, and ALDISERT,

Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT ORDER

After consideration of all contentions raised by appellants, it is

ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the judgment of the district

court be and is hereby affirmed.

Each party to bear its own costs.

By the Court,

signature

Circuit Judge

Attest:

signature

Sally Mrvos, Clerk

3a

APPENDIX B—ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,

DENYING THE PETITION FOR REHEARING

United States Court Of Appeals Hor

Che Third Cirrnit

Nos. 89-1930 and 89-1953

ACMAT CORPORATION,

Appellant-Cross- Appellee

Vv.

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: HIGGINBOTHAM, Chief Judge, SLOVITER,

BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG,

HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD and

ALDISERT®, Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant-Cross-Appellee

Acmat Corporation in the above-entitled case having been submitted

to the judges who participated in the decision of this court and to all

the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active

service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked

for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in

regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the court in

banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.

OM

Dated: June 22 1990

* Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge, as to panel

rehearing only.

5a

APPENDIX C—ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF

PENNSYLVANIA DATED DECEMBER 21, 1988

| IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

/Stamp/

ACMAT CORPORATION

CIVIL ACTION

Oh EN NI AI ti se ti

NO. 85-7067

Rh elie

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 1988, upon consideration

) of the motion for partial summary judgement of defendant, School

District of Philadelphia and the response in opposition of plaintiff,

ACMAT Corporation, is it hereby ORDERED that the School

District’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, for the

following reasons and to the following extent:

1. The claims for breach of express contract are barred, as a matter

of law, except where noted below, due to the absence of Philadelphia

School Board approval of the claimed extra through formal

. resolution by a majority of its members. Such written approval is

required by statute, Section 5-508 of the Pennsylvania Public School

Code of 1949, 24 Pa. Stat, Ann. § 5-508, and the specific provisions

of the underlying contracts. Waiver of public contract provisions

regulating change orders can be accomplished only by the public

ee)

ne

6a

Appendix C

body authorized to enter into the contract. Nether Providence

Township School Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 505

Pa. 42,476 A.2d 904, 907 (1984). Anything less falls short of School

Board approval.

2. Plaintiff's other contract claims, based upon theories of

quantum meriut, unjust enrichment, equitable adjustment,

promissory estoppel, and modified contract, also fail because of the

absence of formal approval of the claimed extra work by a majority

of the members of the School Board as is required by state statute.

3. The claim of fraud is dismissed for failure to state a claim. By

reason of express provisions of the School Board approved

contracts, ACMAT knew that any work that it undertook which it

believed to be beyond the scope of an original contract, and for

which it would seek to be paid extra, required formal approval by a

majority of the members of the School Board. Where it did not have

such approval before commencing the extra work, and had no

contract addendum, ACMAT could not have selied justifiably upon

the advices or representations of the employees of the School

District as binding upon the members of the School Board. Any

reliance upon such advice had to have been done knowingly at

defendant's own peril, that is to say, with the hope that the extra

work, and documentation of it, would prove satisfactory to the

School District and win School Board ratification. Therefore, as a

matter of law, the fraud claim fails both against the School Board

and the School District.

. 4. The RICO claim fails to state a claim because, inter alia, there

was no fraud. Moreover, the School District cannot be both the

“person” charged with the RICO violation and the enterprise under

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

OAD Am A i en the ed fel

RAO or: hae .

Ao ae

_°

Appendix C

5. The negligence claims are barred as matter of law because the

School District is immune from liability for negligent behavior

under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §

8541, et seq. Any basis for recovery on the plaintiff's contracts must

be based on contract law, not tort law.

6. Section 14(c) of the contracts does not permit payment forextra

work without School Board approval even if the School District

made changes in drawings and/or specifications. The contracts

require Board approval of all changes in scope and price, and all

changes to be in writing. The phrase “an equitable adjustment shali

be made” is modified by a preceeding sentence which advises that

any change in drawings or specifications requires Board approval.

In short, Section 14(c) gives notice that the Board has the right not

to fund a project unless and until it is satisfied both as to the change

in scope of work and the price and approval is formalized.

7. Section 16(c) of the contracts does not relieve the defendant of

obtaining School Board approval of extra work orders. The contract

requires that if the contractor incurs conditions at the site materially

different than anticipated, the School District must be notified to

investigate the conditions and to determine if any change in the

contract is necessary, whether there exists an emergency or not.

Newly discovered materially different conditions are required to be

left undisturbed pending School District investigation and

evaluation. If a change is proposed as to scope of work or price

because of materially different conditions, any change must be

accomplished in accordance with Section 14(c) of the contracts

which requires written School Board approval.

8. The School District is entitled generally to summary judgment

on the Rush School “overspray” claims because there was failure on

8a

Appendix C

defendant’s part to comply with the procedures of Section 16(c) of

the contract requiring School Board approval of any change in scope

of work or contract price occasioned by discovery of conditions not

allegedly reasonably anticipated. Fundamentally, however, the

contract documents specify that ACMAT assumed responsibility for

“ascertaining the nature and location of the work and the general and

local conditions which can affect the work or costs thereof”, and

further, that defendant’s failure to ascertain what was entailed in

performing the contracted work could not be visited upon the School

District but would be the contractor’s “responsibility for

successfully performing...without additional expense to the School

District.” To the same effect, see Nether Providence Township

School Authority, supra. Prior to bidding, ACMAT had the

Opportunity to remove the ceiling tiles and make whatever

inspection it deemed necessary. Alternatively, ACMAT could have

attempted to negotiate a reservation of rights clause for conditions

which are not observable. The contractor also had the option of not

performing the work and thereby causing the dispute to be limited

to one of contract interpretation. To permit a contractor to claim

belatedly that it could not discover the scope of the work through

pre-bid inspection, and without more, to collect for work not

approved as an “extra”, would nullify the contract provisions

controlling bidding and performance and undermine the fiscal

authority and responsibility of the public contracting body.

9. The Henry A. Nozko Affidavit pertaining to the Rush School

has no probative value for opposition to the summary judgment

motion. It is not based upon personal knowledge that a reasonable

investigation of the site could not have. been made. Moreover, there

is no evidence that ACMAT was prevented by any action of the

School District in making its own inspection. On the contrary, there

——

9a

Appendix C

is undisputed evidence that ACMAT was not impeded by School

District action. According to ACMAT, it was advised, prebid, that

there was asbestos above the ceilings of the second floor of the

school. It was also advised that, prior to bidding, it could inform

itself of the nature of the job by an earnest inspection, that is, by

looking beyond the ceiling tiles, or accept the risk of a lesser

examination. It chose the latter course.

10. Work directed to be undertaken by ACMAT on a time and

material basis was subject, by contract language, to the School

District’s final determination as to net costs of labor and material.

Thus, the claims for time and material costs are not subject to judicial

review. The School District’s contractual right of final

determination necessarily includes the form and extent of proof and

actual expenditures by the contractor. However, the court can decide

whether there was written authorization from the School District to

ACMAT to undertake work on a time and material basis.

11. ACMAT’s claim for delay damages is barred by the specific

language of the written contracts.

12. Derry Township School District v. Suburban Roofing, 102 Pa.

Commw. 54, 517 A.2d 255 (1986) is not applicable. It is not an

“extra work order” case.

13. ACMAT understood and agreed that with regard to any claims

for extra work in the performance of the contract, it had to propose

why the work should be considered outside the scope of the

agreement, specify alump sum amount if no unit price was specified,

provide detailed support for the proposal for School District review

and await approval or disapproval before doing the work.

10a

Appendix C

14. Where it was agreed that the work was extra to the contact,

but the School District and ACMAT could not agree on a lump sum

price, ACMAT was to perform the work on a time and material basis

plus 15% with the School District determining the net cost of time

and material under the contact.

15. With these criteria, the court now proceeds to consider

separately each aspect of ACMAT’s claim under the summary

judgment standard of review.

16. The Rush School

(a) Item 1. Decontamination of Building Contents. The School

District directed ACMAT to perform certain work on a time and

material basis. A change order issued. ACMAT claimed

$148,398.22. The School Board approved $63,282.89 of the claim

as the reasonable value for the work based upon its review of

invoices submitted. ACMAT continues to claim $85,115.33, yet it

executed the change orderon May 10, 1985, acknowledging that the

School District would be obligated to pay $63,282.89 for the work.

It cannot now claim more.

(b) Item 2. Teachers’ Closets and Boxed Rail for Folding

Partition. ACMAT hung two layers of polyethylene on the walls

which sealed off built-in lockers, cabinets, shelves, and closets. It

then removed asbestos containing fireproofing from structural steel

beams in the classrooms on the second floor. Then, it proceeded to

Clean up the second floor area. After <“tis work was done, but before

the School District approved the work site as having been

completed, the School District notified ACMAT that it was

necessary to remove asbestos from a steel beam that ran through the

area above the closets and between the wall and the flush sheet metal

panels over the doors on the closets’ face. Removal of this asbestcs

A iy et

St Ot eee

Se cathe et et

A TT i Ao Mew a

lla

Appendix C

was part of the original contract for removal of asbestos containing

spray-on fireproofing from structural steel beams. Removal of this

asbestos was not approved by the School Board as an “extra”.

Although ACMAT had to cover over the cabinets to do the

required work and had twice to clean up the second floor area, the

work was occasioned by its owr. contractual undertaking, which

included correcting its own omissions and mistakes. ACMAT’s

claim of $291,711.36 fails as a matter of law.

The School District did advise that removal of the bottom shelf

of the metal closets to clean out original construction asbestos

material would be considered extra work. ACMAT was asked to

submit a quote for this work, but it never did.

ACMAT has not broken out this part of the claim. Although the

School Board is not obligated to pay ACMAT unless the contractor

had obtained approval of a price for the extra work, it stands ready

to pay $388.52 as calculated from field reports. Since there is no

dispute that this work was done, I will allow the claim to the extent

of $388.52.

(c) Item 3. Work Regarding Light Fixtures. ACMAT claims

$51,297.23 for the removal and disposal o' some light fixtures and

the dismantling, cleaning and reassembling of other light fixtures.

These fixtures had been covered with asbestos spray-on

fireproofing. ACMAT was required by contract to wrap and seal all

light fixtures prior to asbestos removal. Certain of these fixtures

were determined unable to be cleaned and were designated for

disposal. Those discarded did not have to be wrapped. ACMAT was

authorized to replace fixtures on a time and material basis. However,

ACMAT does not claim that it furnished or installed new fixtures

and the School District contends it did not. Therefore, there is no

12a

Appendix C

material dispute. ACMAT did, in this regard, only that which was

required by its contract. Accordingly, this claim is denied.

(d) Item 4. Work Regarding Access in Platform Area. The School

District agreed that gaining access to a beam in the area of the leading

dock was extra work because it had to be accessed from outside the

building. This work was agreed to be paid on a time and material

basis. However, it was made clear that removal of the asbestos was

part of the contract. ACMAT claims $4,843.05 for this work. The

School District claims the reasonable value is $4,583.92. Although

the School Board now claims that ACMAT should have discovered

this condition in its inspection, the acknowledgement of the work as

an “extra” by the School District caused ACMAT to rely upon that

assessment and to forego any contest as to whether it was within or

without the contract. Finding that the School District is the final

arbiter of the value of this work which it authorized, I find no

material dispute that the work was done and, accordingly, ACMAT

is due $4,583.92 on this claim.

(ec) Item 5. Removal of Enclosures for Access to Beams and

Removal of Encapsulated Asbestos. ACMAT claims for the costs of

removing enclosures for access to beams and removal of

encapsulated as opposed to unencapsulated asbestos behind those

enclosures on the first floor. ACMAT claims for moving furniture

and removing and disposing of steel stud frame work and gypsum

board enclosures that completely encased the steel beams. The

School District advised that removal of encapsulated asbestos in

various rooms on the first floor would involve an extra to the

contract. However, ACMAT never submitted a proposal for the

work as was required. Therefore, the actual work and price were

never agreed to or approved by the School District or School Board

and there was no obligation to pay. However, since work was done,

13a

Appendix C

and the Board would have authorized some amount, the court is

required to accept the School Board’s determination of the net cost

of time and material and awards that amount to ACMAT, that is,

$22,576.00. The balance of the claim of $41,538.65 is denied

because it was not approved as a contractual sum to be paid.

(f) Item 6. Perimeter Soffit Removal and Replacement. ACMAT

removed and disposed of insulation board around the perimeter of

soffit on the second floor and supplied an installed new insulation

board. This was authorized by the School District on a time and

material basis. Although it contends that ACMAT never obtained

. proper School Board approval, I find that ACMAT was authorized

to proceed on a time and material basis under the contract with the

School Board having the right to determine the fair value for the

work. On that basis ACMAT is owed $7,419.99 of its claim of

$14,853.25.

(g) Item 7. Work Above Metal Ceiling in Room 130. ACMAT

claims $2,524.53 for working above and around the metal ceilings

in this room. Although the School District recognized the possibility

that there would be an unanticipated degree of difficulty in gaining

access to the asbestos covered ceiling beam, ACMAT was not

authorized to proceed on a time ard material basis and it did not

submit a proposa! that the work was an “extra” and propose a price.

Therefore, the School Board was not obligated to pay. However, the

work was done. ACMAT’s contention that there was unanticipated

difficulty is undisputed. Therefore, this claim proceeded on a time

and material basis. The School District’s calculation of $1,839.31

as reasonable is awarded.

(h) Item 8. Removal and Replacement of Drywall Ceilings in

Locker Rooms. This was work approved by the School District to

i

14a

Appendix C

be done on a time and material basis. ACMAT failed to observe that

there was a drywall ceiling on the first floor. It bid the work based

upon its erroneous belief that there was a lay-in grid ceiling on the

first floor and here. The School District calculated the reasonable

costs for installation of the drywall ceiling to be $25,517.28. Since

ACMAT’s bid anticipated a cost of $6,700, per School District

calculations, for a lay-in ceiling, assuming School Board approval

had been obtained, $18,817.28 would be allowed. Since ACMAT

actually installed a drywall ceiling on the first floor and since that

replacement was authorized, the sum calculated by the School

District will be ordered paid. The balance of the claim of $58,531.71

is disallowed because ACMAT never obtained approval of this

amount as a contractual sum and agreed by working on a time and

material basis that the School Board would determine the sum to be

paid.

(i) Item 9. Removal and Disposal of Carpeting. This work was

approved as an extra. However, work that was to be done was deleted

from the original contract and it is not disputed that ACMAT has

not given a credit for not protecting and shampooing this carpet as

was the understanding between the parties. According to the School

Board’s time and material calculations, ACMAT is entitled to no

payment because of the agreed set-off and may be obligated to pay

back $12,140.50.

(j) Item 10. Removal and Disposal of Transite Panels. ACMAT

claims for removal of these panels in the gymnasium and shop areas

as work not referenced in the specifications for the job. The complete

removal of the transite soffit closure and the replacement with 1/2

inch sheetrock were approved by the School District. Of the

$4,772.80 claimed, the School District would allow $3,335.20 and

_ that amount is awarded.

15a

Appendix C

(k) Item 11. Labor Working Above Plaster Ceiling. ACMAT

claims as extra work the labor cost of working above plaster ceilings

in the locker rooms, auditorium, cafeteria and first floor corridor.

The School District agreed to pay for this work as an extra if it was

the contractor’s proposal or the cwner’s counterproposal, or some

modification of either was approved. In any event, the contractor

was apprised of the method for submitting the proposal to claim for

extra work. That method was not followed. However, since certain

work was performed which would have been approved by the

School District, it will be treated here as performed on a time and

material basis. The School District’s calculations of the value is

$6,293.94. That amount is awarded as opposed to ACMAT’s claim

of $54,960.89.

(1) Item 12. Removal of Overspray. This claim has been addressed

in paragraphs 8 and 9. The claim for $605,501.07 is rejected.

(m) Item 13. Extra Work Date to More Area on First Floor.

ACMAT bid work on the first floor using the second floor as a model

in negotiations with the School District. It was agreed between the

parties that “[t]o the extent that there [was] a substantial difference

in the quantity of asbestos to be removed or in the nature of the

asbestos to be removed, an extra or credit would be given depending

upon whether the quantity of the work was greater or lesser or the

nature of the asbestos differed.” Brazil Letter dated November 21,

1984, p.2. ACMAT has made no showing that a significantly greater

quantity of asbestos was removed. There is no essential relationship

between floor area and labor costs. The claim for $20,778.57 is

denied.

(n) Item 14. Masonry Block and Sealing Work. ACMAT makes

claims for the work of hammering, chiseling, removing and

ell

16a

Appendix C

disposing of cement block, and the purchasing of block, caulking

materials and masonry items. It also makes claims for replacing or

completing block walls, patching masonry and various caulking

activities which it attributes to the masonry trade. This was not work

approved as an extra. It was, however, work required to be done by

ACMAT’s contractual undertaking to proceed on an “alternate

method of control which shall not exceed the base bid.” The claim

of $34,206.08 is denied.

(0) Item 15. Labor Costs of Working Above and Around Shop

Machines. ACMAT claims for the labor costs of working around,

protecting and cleaning large equipment in the shop rooms on the

first floor. It claims $178,767.05. The School Board disclaims

because the equipment was obvious and the contractor was not

relieved of the obligation to inspect and to include in his bid the cost

of dealing with that which was seen or knowable. The School

District is correct. It never agreed to treat this work as an extra and

it is not disputed that these machines were visible and the duty of

inspection was incorporated into the contract for work on the first

floor. Accordingly, this claim is denied.

(p) Item 16. Cost of Staging in Music Area. ACMAT sues for the

cost of furnishing, erecting, dismantling and disposing of timber

scaffolding in the music room which embraced several floor levels.

This claim for $9,489.35 is rejected because it represents an obvious

condition which was known to ACMAT when it bid the work.

Moreover, there is no essential relationship between area and

quantity or nature of asbestos removed.

(q) Item 17. Cost for Working in Elevator Shaft. The School

District regarded part of this work as within the scope of the contract

and part as an extra. No agreement was reached as to the cost.

17a

Appendix C

Therefore, the removal work was approved and undertaken on atime

and material basis. The School District has determined that

$4,063.50 of the $10,532.51 sought is reasonable and would have

been approved. Therefore, that amount is awarded to ACMAT.

(r) Item 18. Labor Due to Lack of Heat. ACMAT claims for loss

of productivity due to lack of heat during the winter months. The

School District disclaims on the basis that these were conditions of

the contractor’s own making by failing to complete the contract by

the agreed deadline, which would have been in the Fall, and by

failing to enclose and heat the property so as to protect it. This claim

is barred by paragraph 15(c) of the original contact, General

Conditions. The claim for $85,651.15 is denied.

(s) Item 19. Freeze, Damage and Contamination. This claim for

$36,195.11 follows upon that asserted in Item 18. The same ruling

applies. The claim is denied.

(t) Item 20. Additional Contamination After Encapsulation. This

| is a claim for discontaminating leaming materials in the Science

Area. The materials included microscopes. ACMAT claims

$40,809.41. There was School District direction to perform this

work on a time and material basis. The reasonabie value for the work

has been determined by the School District to be $3,333.72. That

which is claimed as costs of re-cleaning an area is denied. There was

no approval of this item as an extra or to be performed on a time and

material basis. Accordingly, $3,333.72 is awarded.

(u) Item 21. Additional Barriers. This claim is for $12,358.18

attributed to an alleged requirement to have three, not two, layers of

plastic sheeting on the walls. There is no evidence that ACMAT was

required to install a third layer as an owner-approved “extra.”

Therefore, this claim is denied.

ial

18a

Appendix C

(v) Item 22. Cleaning Inside Univents. This was work required

under the contract. Further, there was no approval that it be

performed as an extra. The claim for $17,199.50 is denied.

(w) Item 23. Removing and Replacing Ceiling Grid. This claim

of $180,432.21 is denied because it was not work that was authorized

as an “extra” by any School District representation whether on a

lump sum or time and materials basis.

(x) Item 24. Removal of Metal Pan Ceiling. This ceiling work

occurred in the dishwashing, faculty dining and serving areas. The

undisputed evidence shows that ACMAT’s contract included this

work and it is not entitled to $11,303.60. The School District claims

a credit of $4,915.00 because allegedly ACMAT did not install the

ceiling in the kitchen areas.

(y) Item 25. Removal and Disposal of Cafeteria Items. This work

was approved as an “extra.” It was done on a time and material basis.

The fair value as determined by the School District’s $2,214.30 and

that amount is awarded.

(z) Item 26. Removal of Furniture from Chair and Office Storage

Area. There is no evidence to support this claim of $4,522.44 as an

owner approved “extra.” It is denied.

(aa) Item 27. Claim for Recleaning and Over Inspection. There

is no evidence that this $26,896.26 claim was an owner-approved

“extra,” or lump sum or approved on a time and material basis. It is

denied.

(bb) Item 28. Labor of Working Above Lockers in Locker Room.

ACMAT claims for the cost of covering and protecting lockers on

the first floor and for working around these obstructions since there

were no lockers on the second floor. This claim for $26,476.14 must

19a

Appendix C

be denied because a general inspection disclosed this as within the

scope of the bid and there was no side agreement to compensate as

“extra” for every difference between the first and second floor;

rather, only if there was proof of a substantially different quantity

of asbestos to be removed.

(cc) Item 29. Removal of Plaster Wall, Room 133. This involved

the sealing of a plaster partition. ACMAT purchased and installed

gypsum board and taped the joints. This work was approved as an

“extra” on atime and material basis. Of the $609.03, $533.12 would

be approved. Accordingly, that amount is awarded.

(dd) Item 30. Extra Cost of Decadex. This was approved by the

School District. The claim of $13,851.95 is substantiated and

awarded.

(ee) Item 31. Electricity. This claim of $10,040.30is substantiated

by the language of the contract and $10,040.30 is awarded.

(ff) Item 32. Extended Duration Expenses. This claim of

$1,060,800.00 is not substantiated as an approved “extra.” It is

barred, in any event, by paragraph 15(c) of the contract.

17. The Fairhill School

(a) Item 1. Encapsulation of Sealer at Soffits. This claim is denied

because there is no evidence that this was agreed to be “extra” work

or that ACMAT could bill for it as an approved “extra.” It appears

that it was work that was part of an $18,000 change order.

(b) Item 2. Furnishing and Installing Ceiling Grid for Acoustical

Tile. The contact required ACMAT to replace damaged or missing

sections of the grid as part of the contract price. The claim for

$68,000 must be rejected.

20a

Appendix C

(c) Item 3. Removing, Cutting Up and Disposing of Old Ceiling

Grid. This claim for $85,000 is denied because there is no evidence

that this was an agreed “extra.” Rather, there is undisputed evidence

that the operation (choice of clean or replace) was within the

contractual commitments of ACMAT.

(d) Item 4. Removing Carpeting and Scraping Carpet Glue.

Specifically, ACMAT claims for the cost of having to cut up the

removed carpet in pieces that would fit into the asbestos disposal

bags. However, the documentation shows that this was work

undertakeni as part of the $18,000 Change Order. The proferred

ACMAT documentation on the score pertains to the Rush School,

not Fairhill. The ACMAT claim for $185,000 is, therefore, denied.

The School District claims a credit of $19,990.89 because

ACMAT did not have to protect and shampoo the carpet already

removed. This credit claim is denied because the Change Order was

incorporated into the primary contract and must be read as an agreed

add-on to the original price and, simultaneously, a nullification of

any conflicting requirements therein.

(e) Item 5. Electricity. ACMAT claims that the School District

failed to provide the electricity required to operate the microtraps,

even though the contract provided that the owner would supply ail

electricity for construction under the contract. It claims $10,000. The

School District offers no evidence that modifies the contractual

undertaking or quarrels with the charge for supplying alternate

sources of electricity. ACMAT is awarded $10,000.

(f) Item 6. Adjustments Concerning Overtime, Disruptions,

Delays and Acceleration. ACMAT claims $203,440 for delays

occasioned by late test reports. This claim is denied because it

amounts to a claim for delay and negligence.

21a

Appendix C

(g) Item 7. Inability to Use Elevators. This claim is denied

because there was no agreement that this was an “extra.” There is

an exclusion for School Board liability in the underlying agreement

for unforeseen causes for delay and there is no contention that this

item was foreseeable. The claim for $36,400 is denied.

(h) Item 8. Claims Attributed to Defective Specifications, Over

Inspection and Recleaning. This claim for $500,000 is denied.

ACMAT was required to perform according to the Work Practices

Supplemen: which it accepted. There is no evidence of this being

agreed-upon extra work.

(i) Item 9. Application of Second Coat of Wax. This claim for

$2,400 is denied because there is no evidence that this was

authorized as “extra” work. Furthermore, it was required to be done

under the contract provisions.

(j) Item 10. Troughs Above Closets. ACMAT claims $16,800 for

covering 23 troughs above closets with polyethylene. This claim is

denied because it was work within the scope of the agreed work.

There is no evidence that this was agreed upon as “extra work.”

ACMAT’s Exhibit B-10 refers to the Rush School, not Fairhill.

(k) Item: 11. Full-Face Powered Air Respirators, Type B, Worn

by ACMAT Workers. This claim for $184,559 is denied. ACMAT

had the responsibility of providing whatever minimum equipment

was required by prevailing circumstances or contract to protect iis

own workers. There is no evidence that the School District agreed

to this expense as an “extra.”

(1) Item 12. Additional Air Monitoring. ACMAT claims $34,500

which it had to pay to its independent air monitoring contractor for

22a

Appendix C

being at Fairhill longer than originally scheduled. This is a claim for

delay which is contractually barred.

(m) Item 13. Extended Duration Expenses. This claim of

$110,086 also amounts to a claim for delay and is barred.

18. The Lincoln School

(a) Item 1. Asbestos Removal in Back Rooms, Toilets and

Cafeteria. This work was authorized by the School District to be

done as an extra on a time and material basis per the handwritten

ACMAT proposal, except for the work in the faculty lunchroom.

ACMAT B-37. ACMAT had attributed $4,800 of its proposed lump

sum of $78,100 to do that work. The School District’s response is

that the $78,100 was excessive for the work done. Certainly, the

claim of $257,962.00 should be regarded as excessive. I find that

$78,100 less $4,800 is an appropriate award, that is, $73,300.

(b) Item 2. Relocation of Decontamination Chamber. ACMAT

claims $17,838. Relocation of the chamber was necessary to allow

students access and to comply with fire and safety codes. This cost

was not an agreed “extra” and is denied.

(c) Item 3. Removal of Asbestos at Ceiling Level and at Steel

Around Motor Equipment and at Ceiling Line at Bi-Fold Door. The

claim is for $6,086.00. There is no written approval for this work as

an “extra.” Therefore, the School Board had no authority to pay.

However, since the School District acknowledges that certain of the

work done would have qualified as an approved “extra,” $1,132.74

is awarded as a time and material undertaking.

(d) Item 4. Lost Production. This $12,000 claim is a delay claim

which is contractually barred.

23a

Appendix C

(e) Item 5. Work Stoppage. This claim for $15,000 is

contractually barred.

(f) Item 6. Full Face Powered Air Respirators. This claim for

$78,012 cannot be asserted. See { 14(i), above. This is a delay claim,

in essence, and is barred.

(g) Item 7. Installation of Extra Covering. This claim for $660 is

denied because there is no written authorization for this to be

considered an extra expense. Contractually, ACMAT was required

to enclose totally and adequately the work areas.

(h) Item 8. Overtime, Disruptions, Delays and Acceleration. This

claim for $94,045 is barred as a delay claim. The School District

contractually is not bound by oral directions by its employees which

would obligate it financially and ACMAT cannot here proceed on

a theory of negligence.

(i) Item 9. Electricity. This claim for electricity is founded on the

contract and $10,000 is awarded.

(j) Item 10. Cleaning and Recleaning. This claim for $400,000

cannot be asserted as there is no evidence that the School District

authorized this as “extra” work or expense.

(k) Item 11. Extended Duration. This claim of $59,916 is a delay

claim that must be denied.

19. In accordance with the foregoing, ACMAT is entitled to

credits against the School District’s counterclaim amounts, if any

are proven, of $99,291.05 from the Rush School, $10,000.00 from

the Fairhill School, and $94,432.74 from the Lincoln School, for a

total of $203,723.79.

12-23-88

cc: R.A. Kom

S.J. O’Brien

P.S. Miller

JJ. Hatzell

S. Akan

A.L. Dennis

J.M. Heley

24a

Appendix C

BY THE COURT:

Signature

James T. Giles/J.

25a

APPENDIX D—TRANSCRIPT AND DECISION ISSUED

FROM THE BENCH BY THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA ON PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR REARGUMENT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

. EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ACMAT CORP.

v.

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILA.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 85-7067

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

June 30, 1989

HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES T. GILES, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: JOSEPH DINEEN, ESQUIRE

EDWARD A. STEIN, ESQUIRE

Goddard & Blum

675 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10017 .

and

JAY M. LEVIN, ESQUIRE

1737 Chestnut Street, Suite 1200

Philadelphia, PA 19103

26a

Appendix D

For the Defendant: ANDRE L. DENNIS, ESQUIRE

PAULA D. SHAFFNER, ESQUIRE

Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young

2600 One Commerce Square

Philadelphia, PA 19103-7098

Audio Operator: Andrew Schwab

Transcribed By: Grace Williams

(Proceedings recorded by Electronic Sound Recording;

transcript produced by transcription service.)

(Whereupon the following occurred in open court:)

THE COURT: Good Moming.

ALL COUNSEL: Good Moming, your Honor.

THE COURT: Please be seated. State your appearances for the

record, please.

MR. DINEEN: Joseph Dineen for the plaintiff, Acmat

MR. STEIN: Edward Stein for Acmat Corporation.

MR. LEVIN: Jay Levin also for Acmat, your Honor.

MR. DENNIS: Andre Dennis for the School District of

MS. SHAFFNER: And Paula Shaffner for the School District of

Philadelphia

27a

Appendix D

THE COURT: _I promised to hear you with respect to your

contention, Acmat’s contention, that I should reconsider the prior

ruling granting in part each of the parties’ cross-motions for partial

summary judgment.

I will consider Acmat’s motion for reconsideration as essentially

a motion for leave to contend at this point that there should be

reconsideration. That is, is there something major that’s new raised

which, as a matter of faimess, should require the opening of the

record or a recasting of the order? Is there anything to be added to

Acmat’s written submissions?

MR. STEIN: Your Honor, may I address the Court on that

question?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STEIN: Well, as your Honor knows, the present firm

representing Acmat substituted for the Korn, Kline & Kutner firm

after your initial order was entered. At that time, we reviewed the

files, reviewed the case and decided that a motion for re-argument

was in order.

At that time we were able to find Fred Dalton whose affidavit is

now before you and who is no longer an employee of Acmat

Corporation. It was Mr. Dalton who conducted or who was present

at the prebid meeting and was also part of the group who went on

prebid inspections. This is, I think, a rather — I think he brought

quite a bit to bear on the issues factually.

Mr. Nosco’s (ph.) affidavit, while he presented one before you

initially, he now explained those matters of which he had personal

knowledge and I think that that certainly is worthy of consideration

by the Court.

:

:

:

|

28a

Appendix D

I'd just like to elaborate a little bit on the papers which are already

before you and, in particular, Article 14 of the Rush contract, which

appears in identical form in the Fairhill and the Lincoln contracts,

although its number might change.

And, your Honor, for the convenience of the Court and all

concemed I brought some copies of Article 14 on one, on a single

page, and with your permission I'd like to hand it up to the bench at

this time and to my adversaries.

(Pause.)

MR. STEIN: In reading Article 14 I think it’s important to

point out some of the subtle distinctions that exist there and the use

of language employed by the School District who was the draftsman

of this agreement.

In particular, I think it’s important to understand the distinction

between the word “cost” under equitable adjustment and the use of

the phrase “contract price”, because there’s really three things they

talk about here: contract price, equitable adjustments and then we

see afi increase or decrease in compensation talked about in

Paragraph B. I think it’s significant that they didn’t use the same

phrases or the same words throughout Article 14.

Well, first of all, 14-A, it is Acmat’s contention, deals with those

situations where the School District may order unilateral changes

that are within the scope of the contract. This is alittle different from

most contracts that we face, that usually a modification requires a

sentence. But because this is a construction contract, because large

sums of money are committed to it and because people realize that

you can’t plan for all contingencies, an owner such as the School

29a

Appendix D

District reserves itself the right to make unilateral changes to the

contract. And that is what 14-A is intended for.

And if the School District which — now, if I may just proceed

on another tack — there are two claims that Acmat asserts that arise

under 14-A, both of which had School Board approval. The first one

was the change order to the Rush School contract which added

personal property. That had School Board approval, the School

District sem out what they call a change order, trying to get Acmat

to agree to a lump sum adjustment in the price.

Acmat sent it back with words reserving its right to seek

additional compensation. The School District crossed it out and said

look, this is what you're getting, we have that right under the

contract. Ill explore that issue concerning the School District’s right

in just a moment.

THE COURT: Did Acmat then sign it?

MR. STEIN: Acmat signed it, your Honor, with the words of

reservation and sent it back to the School District who unilaterally

crossed out the wording and signed it themselves. I don’t see how

there could be a meeting of minds with respect to the amount.

THE COURT: Well, was the work then performed by Acmat

under the conditions of the document as it was revised?

MR. STEIN: Acmat performed the work in accordance with

14-A. It had no choice but to do the work that the School District

unilaterally ordered it to do and it reserved its right to seek an

equitable adjustment and not a change in contract price.

30a

Appendix D

Now, that’s the first item for which we seek damages under 14-A.

The second one has to do with the Fairhill work practices

supplement.

THE COURT: Now, just a minute. All right, go ahead.

MR. STEIN: Thank you. Apparently after the contract was

entered into the School District decided they wanted Acmat to

perform their work in accordance with what has been called this

work practices supplement and the issue was put to the School

Board. The School Board approved it, Acmat was sent a copy of the

work practices supplement with a cover letter, saying that the School

Board has approved it. And there are other documents in the file

which also indicate the same.

Well, Acmat went ahead and performed that work, but there was

no documentation showing that it ever agreed to a lump sum price

of $18,000 or any other amount. What the documentation shows is

that Acmat gave an estimate to the School District to put some

encapsulating sealer, I think it was, up at the soffits. But it wasn’t

for that work practices supplement which goes on page after page

of additional work that has to be done under that agreement.

But that had School Board approval, Acmat was directed to do it

under 14-A, but there was no agreement as to contract price.

So those are the two claims that come unde 14-A. Acmat had no

choice, it had to do the work.

We now come to the question of what does Acmat get paid for

that work. And 14-A begins to talk about it and then it’s explained

in Paragraph 14-B. First of all, 14-A says if there is an increase or

decrease in the contractor’s costs, and those are important words,

they will receive an equitable adjustment. And then it goes on to say

3la

Appendix D

that a change in contract price shall be subject to approval by the

Board.

What are we talking about here? Why are we using different

phrases? It’s because an equitable adjustment, while it could result

in an increase in compensation, is not a change in contract price.

Contract price, just as was the case when they initially entered into

the contract, is a lump sum, is a lump sum agreement.

THE COURT: Well, how do you overlook the phrase “Any

such change in contract price?”.

MR. STEIN: That does not refer back —

THE COURT: It refers to —

MR. STEIN: — to equitable adjustment, your Honor. And in

fact, indeed, they talk about approval by the Board and they talk

about lump sum mutually agreed upon.

THE COURT: Well, what does such change in contract price

refer to? It has to refer to something that has gone before.

MR. STEIN: It—

THE COURT: And that which has gone before is equitable

adjustment.

MR. STEIN: Well, I can’t say, I don’t understand. Maybe we

could have the draftsman here, but I certainly don’t think it’s clear

and I don’t understand why they changed the phrases here from

equitable adjustment, which is a term of art in construction, to

contract price.

And when you look at B, which is —

32a

Appendix D

THE COURT: Well, this particularcontract and as I read it, any

such change refers back to equitable adjustment. And equitable

adjustment is contractor’s cost.

MR. STEIN: Weill, if we go on to B, I think it helps to clarify

the issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEIN: Now, B begins by talking about increases and

decreases in compensation and that’s going to be done one of three

ways: Number one, unit prices, if they’re available and applicable.

Well, none of the claims involve unit prices, so that’s gone. When

es oe re

agreement with the Board.

THE COURT: Well, there were certain unit prices.

MR. STEIN: I don’t believe that they were —

THE COURT: The unit prices with respect to labor, for

example.

MR.STEIN: _ I don’t think that those unit prices apply to the

particular claims in this case, your Honor. I certainly don’t think that

the School District referred to unit prices in the contract.

THE COURT: Well, all right. But looking at the way in which

claims were submitted, there were certain claims for labor.

MR. STEIN: Your Honor —

THE COURT: _ But part of the problem was that Acmat failed

to submit documentation satisfactory to the School Board with

respect to its costs

MR. STEIN But —

THE COURT: — for which it sought equitable adjustments.

MR. STEIN: Well, you know, Judge, I have a feeling that

there is no documentation that would have been satisfactory to the

School Board on this case.

THE COURT: Well—

MR. STEIN: And furthermore, the contract, which I think

would govern an issue like this —

THE COURT: Allright, so—

MR. STEIN: — is silent on that question.

THE COURT: — what are you saying? You're saying that the

contractor would not have to submit a detail of the time and materials

which it actually expended in order to justify its claim for an

equitable adjustment? They could just pick a lump sum out of the

air end say this is what we think is fair and just?

MR. STEIN: You know, Judge —

THE COURT: Let's go to the court?

MR. STEIN: You know, Judge, Acmat did everything they

could. There are three volumes entitled “Equitable Adjustment,”

which were submitted to the School Board, I think it was 1985 or

1986, detailing everything.

THE COURT: Okay, let’s go ahead.

MR. STEIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: You Say unit price is not applicable —

34a

Appendix D

MR. STEIN: If they're not applicable —

THE COURT: —and that then we deal with an attempt to get

a lump sum agreement?

MR. STEIN: Exactly, Judge, we try to make a deal. And that

is precisely what happened with the change order on the Rush

contract that I spoke about earlier.

The School Board — School District tried to make a deal, with

School Board approval, for $63,000.

THE COURT: Now, if the parties can’t reach a lump sum

agreement, then what?

MR. STEIN: Okay, Judge, that’s where we are. We increase

the compensation by way of an equitable adjustment. Equitable

adjustment is not contract price, although it may result in an increase

in compensation.

THE COURT: It says by the actual net cost in labor and

materiais plus 15 percent for profit and overhead.

MR. STEIN: That’s right, Judge, actual net cost plus 15

percent as markup or, as it says here, profit and overhead. Now, the

rub seems to be the last sentence here, which now the School Board

is Out of it altogether when you price it this way, it says the School

District makes the final determination.

Now, Judge, we cite in our papers the Supreme Court case of

Teodori — I'm sorry — John F . Harkins Co. v. The School District

of Philadelphia, 1983, and this comes out of the appellate — the

Superior Court, your Honor.

3Sa

Appendix D

THE COURT: _ I've read that case. That case does not say that

this kind of phrase is unconstitutional. In fact, either that case or

another case you cited, the references that a contract did provide, the

School District would be the final arbiter of net cost.

MR. STEIN: Judge, let's take a look at that paragraph as it's

written. I think you'll find —

THE COURT: Which paragraph? In the case or here?

MR. STEIN: I think you'll find that doesn't say that. Judge,

my papers cite it in full, I think, or most of it, and I have the case in

front of me right now. It will just take a minute, I'm not going to

read the whole thing.

THE COURT: Just take a minute.

MR. STEIN: Okay. It’s the operative parts I think we ought

to talk about. Okay, in the first place, it says, the School District was

to be the final arbiter of a contractor’s net cost. Well, if you stop

right there, I guess we lose.

THE COURT: —_ Just go on and read it. I've read it.

MR. STEIN: Okay, and by the way, in the first place means —

THE COURT: —_ Just read it.

MR. STEIN: Okay. Pursuant to the provisions of the contract,

it made a determination of appellee's net increase in the cost of labor

and made payment accordingly. The burden of proving by a fair

preponderance of the evidence that additional damages had been

incurred was on the contractor. And a trial was held in which the

contractor tried to prove that it had suffered additional damages.

They were not barred from being ab*e to prove damages. They failed

36a

Appendix D

to carry their burden of proof. They went on a theory of law that the

Court wouldn’t accept.

Had they presented the evidence differently, they might have won

the day. But that contract language did not preclude that contractor

for the School District of Philadelphia from going forward and our

State Appellate Court —

THE COURT: Was the issue raised?

MR. STEIN: Your Honor, this is an interpretation.

THE COURT: _I know, but was the issue raised? Either in that

case or another case, the Superior Court expressed a bit of chagrin

with the fact that somehow the case got to the Court of Common

Pleas and an arbitration provision that was applicable had not been

raised as a defense by the School District. That was that particular

contract, I’m not sure of this Harkins case or some other case that

you cited.

But the point is that the Superior Court gets the case in the posture

procedurally in which it comes up from the Court of Common Pleas.

I have the issue raised squarely before me and it’s not evident to me

that the School District raised that issue, that is that it was the final

arbiter of this matter in that case. The case was in the Court of

Common Pleas and the Court of Common Pleas assumed it had

jurisdiction because jurisdiction was not contested and it applied an

interpretation to the matter as it was pending before it, that is to try

to determine if the contractor’s theory of claim made sense, and it

rejected it. Or at least it gave the contractor an award on a theory

that the Superior Court or the Supreme Court of Philadelphia

declared as not right and proper.

37a

Appendix D

But I have not found a case that says that where the school district

is the final arbiter of the net costs of labor and material, that that is

unconstitutional.

MR. STEIN: Well, Judge, I think the Abromovich case that I

also referred to —

THE COURT: Which one is that?

MR. STEIN: Abromovich 1 think was the first party in the

case. It involved the Liquor Board. And it was also a situation there

where a party to the contract sat as judge and jury. I think it was the

appellate courts said no, they sent it back.

You see, Judge, I don’t see how really under our system of

jurisprudence while one party may try and take advantage of the

other party by trying to have their will, that you can allow one party

to adjudicate these claims. How can it be done, Judge? It would put

us Out of business.

THE COURT: You signed the agreement. Your client was not

a destitute helpless individual. He wanted this contract, to be sure,

but he didn’t have to agree to these terms. It knew what it was signing

at the time that it signed it.

MR. STEIN: Well, surely you realize, your Honor, in these

municipal contracts the contractor signs these things in the form that

it’s presented to them.

U

THE COURT: I don’t know that at all. The law presumes just

the opposite.

MR. STEIN: But in any event, you know, thank goodness for

the courts, don’t allow people to take advantage of our citizens.

When we see something like this, judges step in to correct a wrong.

38a

Appendix D

One party to an agreement should not be able to have their way in

the manner in which the School District has tried to do so here.

And I might add, your Honor, you know, just look what happened

here, or take abstract case. Somebody makes an agreement —

THE COURT: __Let’s not take an abstract case.

MR. STEIN: Let’s talk about a small sum of money, let’s talk

about a couple of hundred thousand dollars. One party to the contract

reserves itself the right to make unilateral changes in that agreement

and then to also determine the final costs.

THE COURT: Of labor and materials?

MR. STEIN: Sure, Judge. Well, what do you have in an

asbestos-removal contract? It’s all labor and materials, mostly labor.

THE COURT: Now, are you saying that it’s just and proper to

charge up a jury every time there is some dispute over labor and

materials?

MR. STEIN: You know, Judge, we did everything we could

to avoid coming here to spend these —

THE COURT: _I mean under your theoretical case.

MR. STEIN: Sure, Judge.

THE COURT: _ Well, let’s suppose in amunicipal contract there

is a good faith dispute, the parties are $15 apart. Are you saying that

the Federal Court of a State Court would have to get involved in a

jury trial every time the parties have such a dispute, that that would

be just and proper and a good way to expend judicial resources?

39a

Appendix D

MR. STEIN: Well, I don’t have to answer that question. The

Legislature —

THE COURT: __ Ifthe partiescan’t agree, then the School Board

is — it says here — the final determiner of the net cost of labor and

material. Why, I find that very practical. First of all, there should be

a record of the labor and the materials. It should be observable. And

it can be resolved because it is observable right there on the spot.

And it cautions the contractor to make sure that it documents what

it’s doing and that it can justify through observance that which was

done.

In my review of the documentation there were many instances

where I observed that Acmat was diligent or dilatory relative to its

documentation of labor. And the School Board, therefore, had to

estimate what was a fair amount of time to allocate in the absence

of Acmat’s submissions of actual labor costs.

MR.STEIN: May I respond to that, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STEIN: First of all, you raised a question as to whether

a contractor should be able to come into court, although even small

sums of money like $15. Well, luckily for me, I don’t have to answer

that because the Legislature already has. They have eliminated

sovereign immunity from Governmental subdivisions such as the

School Board from suits of this type.

Acmat, like any other citizen, is entitled to come to court and to

press its claim for contract against the School District. So any

concem that —

THE COURT: Does that apply to torts?

40a

Appendix D

MR. STEIN: Torts, we’re — this is a contract case, Judge.

THE COURT: Yes, but does that apply to contract cases?

MR. STEIN: I think your order, Judge, indicates —

THE COURT: I thought you were talking about, you know, the

waiver of sovereign immunity, the subdivision, political subdivision

act, I thought, that applied to —

MR. STEIN: I’m talking about contract case, Judge.

THE COURT: Under that act?

MR. STEIN: I believe, I don’t think there’s any question that

Acmat is entitled to press its claims for breach of contract.

THE COURT: Where? Under what act? You say the waiver of

sovereign immunity relative to contract actions.

MR. STEIN: I don’t think there is even a defense by the

School District that they’re not allowed to press that claim.

THE COURT: The contract is the source of your rights.

MR. STEIN: Is your Honor saying that sovereign immunity

continues over claims such as this?

THE COURT: Where is the tort? You don’t have a claim of

tort. You have a claim that Acmat has contractual rights flowing

from the agreement that were not observed by the School Board, and

hence there is liability. I think you had some other claims, but they're

not in the case —

MR. STEIN: Okay, I'd like to make some other points.

Judge, and I promise to be brief.

4la

Appendix D

I'd like to take a look at Paragraph C. Now, Paragraph C is what

we call a different site condition clause. This is where additional

work is caused not by unilateral decisions by the School District, but

by physical conditions at the site that make it more difficult to

perform one’s work.

I think the overspray condition at Rush is really a good example

of that, but if I may, I just want to go down towards the end of the

paragraph.

It says there any increase or decrease of cost.

Well, before you get there, you have to read the last prior to the.

preceding sentence.

MR.STEIN: _Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: __ It, being the School District, shall make such

changes in the drawings and/or specifications as it may find

necessary.

MR. STEIN: And if it’s not necessary to change drawings

and specifications, you Honor, does that mean that there is no

compensation for different site conditions? I think not.

When Acmat encountered the overspray, how were we going to

change specifications and drawings? They had to continue with their

work and do more of it, go feet and feet. How would one change a

drawing to help them accomplish the overspray situation? So, your

Honor —

THE COURT: Well—

MR. STEIN: —W¥ really don’t think it’s fair to read that.

ea

Appendix D

THE COURT: _Inthecase youcited there was specific architect

approval of a change in manner of operation which, under that

agreement, triggered the contractor’s right to additional sums of

money. So it is here, under C, that the School District has to

determine, for C to be applicable, that the investigated conditions

are materially different from those shown on the drawings or

indicated in the specifications.

MR. STEIN: It’s not the School District’s decision, I don’t

think, to decide whether there are materially different site

conditions. What happens is, and it happens in this case, Judge, they

bring, they call the attention of the School District to this situation.

They come out. And you know what the School District did in this

Acmat case? They said, you know, go do the work, go do it. Now,

it just didn’t require, quite frankly, Judge, it just didn’t require a

change in plans and specifications, but they were brought there, their

attention was drawn to it and they said: Go do it, Acmat.

And you know in Paragraph D — and this is something which

was within the scope of the contract because it’s provided for right

there — it says they can give these verbal ins*ructions.

THE COURT: “Shall not be binding upon ie Board.”

MR. STEIN: We didn’t depart from the contract documents,

Judge, we did what we were supposed to do.

THE COURT: _ It says “Verbal instructions given by any of the

officers, agents or employees of the Board which depart from the

contract documents shall not be binding upon the Board.”

MIR.STEIN: And if they don’t depart from the contract

documents, Judge, verbal instructions referring to different site

conditions was contemplated. They thought they might encounter

Poe. aera

Sol i ie we

43a

Appendix D

different site conditions, they provided for it in the contract and I

submit to you that verbal instructions under that situation is

permitted.

But, you know, we got letters that say: “Go do the work, Acmat,”

and Acmat memorialized it in writing. Now, what do we do about

the costs of these different site conditions?

THE COURT: Well, first of all, are there different site

conditions under the agreement?

MR. STEIN: I’m sorry, Judge? I didn’t hear your last

statement.

4

THE COURT: First, are there different site conditions which

are cognizable under 14-C?

MR. STEIN: Well —

THE COURT: I mean, where in my order did I fail to treat that

which was recognized by the School Board as being a different site

condition?

MR. STEIN: But, see, the different site condition

determination is for the Court and in this case, the trier of fact, which

is ajury. The question as to whether there is a different site condition

is something for — is a decision to be made by the citizens of the

Commonwealth, it’s for the trier of fact. It’s not for the School

District.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEIN: If I may just finish up on this, Judge, with

respect to the last sentence, it refers to increase or decrease of cost,

and I think that’s the operative language, and that takes us back into

a

Appendix D

B, in which it says if you can’t agree on a lump sam, then it’s to be

determined by the actual net cost in labor. I think that’s a clear

reference to the third tier set forth in Paragraph B.

THE COURT: Well, it’s labor and material, plus 15 percent.

MR. STEIN: Right, Judge, labor and material, plus 15

percent.

THE COURT: Yes, with the School District being the final

determiner.

MR. STEIN: Which it is our contention, Judge, is null and

void, and I think that the Harkness case, other cases, have so held.

I certainly have not seen any cases cited to the contrary.

Now, there’s two other categories of claims. Now, 14-A deals

with unilateral decisions, 14-C deals with different site condition

claims. Another category of claims are simple breach of contract

claims. It’s really not unusual in a construction project for the owner

and the contractor to disagree over an item as to whether it’s in the

scope of the contract.

They disagree, the contractor alleges a breach of the contract, you

proceed under common law principles. We have that, we have that

right here. Some of the claims that come within that are, forexample,

the over inspection claims. It’s Acmat’s contention they didn’t

employ the spec properly, they didn’t enforce the specs properly. It

has a right to do that and a reasonable — the question is, was it

reasonable? That’s for the trier of fact.

And finally, the )ast category of claims is delays. I know what the

contract says about it, but even though that’s what it says, the Courts

have interpreted for me that that’s not what was intended. It says it,

45a

Appendix D

that’s not what it means. I’ve cited some cases for your consideration

and I hope you'll look at it, and thank you very much.

THE COURT: Well, did you raise in your pleadings that any

of the clauses of this contract were null and void as against public

policy?

MR. STEIN: Well, I don’t know, Judge.

THE COURT: Wouldn't you have to do that?

MR. STEIN: Sorry, Judge?

THE COURT: Wouldn't you have to plead that?

MR. STEIN: I’m not sure, I’m not sure if it’s there or not.

THE COURT: Well, you may have to plead it.

MR. STEIN: Do I have to plead it?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STEIN: I think the law has already shown, these cases

were decided a number of years ago.

THE COURT: Wouldn’t you have to plead that certain

provisions were null and void as against public policy as an

affirmative defense?

MR.STEIN: _Judge, plaintiff pleads facts —

THE COURT: Can you answer the question?

MR. STEIN: Yes, Judge. Plaintiff pleads the facts, it does not

plead law, and that is what a complaint is intended to do. The

argument that I’ve presented to you on this issue is one of law.

46a

Appendix D

THE COURT: _ So the answer is you don’t know? The answer

to my question is you don’t know?

MR. STEIN: Judge, I don’t know if the pleading says it, but

I don’t believe we have to state it.

THE COURT: _ All right, that’s what I understood you to say,

that you don’t know.

MR. STEIN: Well, have I clarified that, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes, you don’t know.

MR. STEIN: Well, Judge, maybe I didn't get it across.

THE COURT: You did, you don’t know.

MR. STEIN: What I’m saying is whether —

THE COURT: _ All right, do you have anything to say on this

issue?

MR. DENNIS: Jast a few things, your Honor. First, with

respect to whether the final arbiter clause is void as against public

policy, I agree with the Court's observation of Harkins. It does not

stand for that proposition. It indeed recognizes the validity of the

final arbiter clause in a contract, indeed a contract quite similar to

the contract before the Court.

Counsel makes the argument that another reason why the final

arbiter clause should not be enforceable is because of the harsh

nature of its result. However, this Court is well aware that the parties

to contracts can waive certain rights. That is, one party may waive

a right through a contractual relationship. And I submit to the Court

that a waiver of right is certainly no more harsh and, indeed, perhaps,

then I should say a waiver of a right could be construed as harsher

H " eee

47a

Appendix D

than allowing the School District to be the final arbiter as is provided

in this contract, and that is well recognized.

We don’t have a situation here where one party is arguing a

difference in economic status whereby the other — one party is

overbearing as to the other party. We have two corporations — we

have a corporation here, we have a public body in the School District

and duress has not been raised in the pleadings and, indeed, it doesn’t

exist. And we believe that the final arbiter clause is enforceable and

applies with respect to Paragraph 14.

But if I can go back one step further, you Honor, we also believe,

as your Honor has noted in the briefs that we filed and in my most

recent letter to the Court that I sent this week, that we believe the

Court doesn’t even have to reach this issue in terms of

reconsideration, that the whole matter should have been resolved by

the entry of summary judgment against Acmat on all of its claims

and the Court did not have to reach the Paragraph 14 or final arbiter

clause.

With respect to — oe

THE COURT: What do you say about the breach cf contract

contentions? That is, I don’t have all my file here before me, but I

believe these were raised before, breach of contract claims?

MR. DENNIS: _ There was a breach of contract claim stated in

the Complaint. My position on the breach of contract claim, you

Honor, is that the claim, since the amount it seeks does not have

Board approval, would be barred because it doesn’t have Board

approval.

THE COURT: No, no, I’m talking about counsel referenced

disputes about the scope of work.

48a

Appendix D

MR. DENNIS: Oh, different conditions?

THE COURT: No, scope of work, interpretation of the scope

of work clause.

Let’s suppose Acmat says Item A is not covered by the scope of

work provision. The School District disagrees and says it is. Who is

the final arbiter of that dispute, the Court or the contract?

MR. DENNIS: Well, in that dispute, you Honor, it seems to me

that if Acmat says it isn’t, then Acmat proceeds at its peril to do the

work if the School Board says it is, because it doesn’t have approval

and Acmat always has the right to refuse to perform work that is not

within the scope of the contract.

However, if Acmat proceeds to do the work in a situation where

the School Board insists that it is, then I think Acmat proceeds at its

peril and should not be compensated for that work.

THE COURT: Well, does Acmat have any realistic alternative

but to proceed with the work?

MR. DENNIS: If it is correct in its position the realistic

alternative is not to proceed until the matter is resolved either by

approval from the School Board or to Acmat’s satisfaction.

One illustration, for example, let’s focus on the change order for

Rush. We have a situation where a change order was actually

executed by the Board. Acmat gets is — Acmat disagrees with the

amount and instead of insisting that the matter be resolved at that

point, proceeds to do the work and now seeks to hold the School

Board responsible for an amount far in excess of the amount stated

in the change order.

49a

Appendix D

Now, that is an example of a situation where if there is no meeting

of the minds, Acmat didn’t have to proceed. It cannot proceed and

now come into court and try to hold the School District liable for

more that it agreed to in the change order.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DENNIS: With respect to the differing conditions clause,

counsel submits that the jury determines whether there are different

conditions and the contract specifically states that the School District

shall investigate and make that determination.

Further, Acmat has failed to point to any notice to the School

District or any contemporaneous notice that there was a differing

condition, that the Schoo! District went in and investigated and either

made or did not make a change. There are conditions that Acmat is

to satisfy in order to take advantage of that clause or to try to take

advantage of, that Acmat has not satisfied.

It may now not come in and bootstrap its claim for equitable

adjustment, breach of contract, negligence, et cetera, by simply

stating that there were differing conditions.

Also, as your Honor pointed out in the order, there was and there

certainly is a provision in the contract which obligates Acmat to

investigate.

One other item, your Honor. As I’ve pointed out again in my

letter, in terms of the computation of the potential credits to Acmiat,

we believe there's a mathematical error.

THE COURT: _ | adopted those in an order.

MR. DINEEN: Okay, your Honor, if I may just for a moment,

I understand your opening remarks prior to argument to be that you

5

50a

Appendix D

were treating this particular argument this moming as basically a

prelude to a decision on your part whether you would consider

granting leave for reconsideration. And it was my understanding,

certainly, following the conference earlier this week which resulted

in our coming down here to Philadelphia today, that it was your

decision that you would entertain reconsideration and would,

perhaps, take argument today if you felt that there were reasons to.

And that was my understanding based on our conversation earlier

this week. I just wanted to clarify that.

MR. STEIN: If I may, your Honor, I also remember being in

chambers on April the 10th in which this issue came up. I have a

very specific and vivid recollection and your Honor at that time

indicated and granted our oral application for reargument and

reconsideration.

THE COURT: That conference was held when?

MR. STEIN: April the 10th, your Honor. As a matter of fact,

Judge, I specifically remember Mr. Dennis asking you if —

THE COURT: Whendid you get involved in this case?

MR. STEIN: It was shortly before then, your Honor.

THE COURT: What's shortly?

MR. STEIN: Pardon me, Judge?

THE COURT: Whatis shortly?

MR. STEIN: I think — counsel advises me that we were

admitted pro hac vice shortly before that. I really don‘t remember,

but —

1 Nl PREIIE 0 sts TA a eats BRB

re eb inal

Sla

Appendix D

THE COURT: Whenwere you involved with the investigation

of this case on behalf of your client, not when you became admitted

to speak her?

MR. STEIN: It was not long before that time, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEIN: It certainly —

THE COURT: My determination is as follows: Nothing new

has been raised in this motion for reconsideration that prompts me

to consider it under any equitable provision waiving the timeliness

requirements for the filing of such a motion for reconsideration.

Nothing has been advanced which could not have been pressed

before, assuming there was something that, indeed, was not pressed

before by Mr. Korn.

Secondly, I find that everything that has been advanced here was,

in fact, advanced by Mr. Kom, prior counsel. Existing counsel has

said it in his own way, but Mr. Korn raised the same points. And

each of the points was addressed by the Court previously.

No new light has been shed and there has been no demonstration

of unfaimess in the approach taken by the Court relative to its

consideration of the Acmat claims. On the merits alternatively I

reiterate my prior ruling. Nothing has been advanced here which

shakes the logic of those matters ruled upon as they raised matters

for legal determinations by this Court.

In a letter to me, the School District suggested that if I

reconsidered the matter that I reconsider my rulings to the extent

they were made in favor of Acmat where there was not specific

School Board approval of certain items. For the reasons which I

52a

Appendix D

Stated in the memorandum and order, I continue in my position that

where the Schoo! District put in writing that certain additional costs

were to be incurred by the contractor, that those writings were

binding upon the Board because the School District was an agent of

the Board and Paragraph 14-D is construed as a matter of law to say

that written instructions which are in accordance with contract

documents shall be binding upon the Board.

And as a matter of equity, where the School District in writing

requires the contractor to proceed, to incur costs approved by the

School District, that it cannot be said that the co: actor is

proceeding at its own peril.

With respect to the time and material provision, that is plain to

me. It’s actual net cost in labor and materials, those things which are

observable, and the School District is the final determiner of that net

cost. And that time and material provision comes into play where

there is work that is done for which an equitable adjustment is to be

made up or down. That is the way in which work that is outside of

the scope of the contract is to be compensated.

I observed in my earlier ruling that where the contractor

appreciates that School Board approval must be in writing for work

beyond the scope of the contract, if it proceeds to do such work, it

does so at its own peril, taking the risk that is will not be paid through

recognition in writing by the School Board that that work is indeed

an altered site work or that it requires an alteration in the drawings

and specifications. Its altemative is not to do the work or to seek

some judicial intervention at that point before it does the work.

Otherwise, if it does the work which the School District claims

should not be done outside the scope of the contract clause, it is

essentially seeking to ask a jury to engage in a legislative act of

tale vin TAB eS, os

53a

Appendix D

appropriating money. Or it could hold the School District hostage,

so to speak, by doing the work always contending that something is

beyond the scope of the work, as any contractor who might have a

dispute or would be inclined to have a dispute would so do, which

would take away from the School District its essential authority of

being the authorizer of work and would undermine completely its

duty to be the fiscal controller.

Now, that’s old ground. Left to try are the School District’s

counterclaims for liquidated damages. Whether the liquidated

damage clause is enforceable is a matter for a Court, not a jury. As

to whether or not, assuming the liquidated damage clause is

enforceable, there should be credit given to Acmat for delays caused

by the School District. That may be an issue for a jury.

So let’ discuss these two issues. Does anyone take issue with my

observation that the Court, not a jury, is the determiner of the

enforceability of the liquidated damages clause?

MR. DINEEN: YourHonor, ifI may, the plaintiff does not take

issue with the Court in the first instance, determining whether in fact

the liquidated damage provision on its face is an enforceable

provision. Whether it is allowed to be applied in any given situation

is really a factual question which must go to a jury, but in the first

instance whether the contract provision permitting liquidated

damages is enforceable in light of what the law requires for

liquidating liquidated damage provisions to be enforceable, that is

really a question for the Court.

And in the briefs cited — in the briefs filed by Acmat, a number

of considerations were presented to the Court upon which it should

determine whether in fact these provisions in the Acmat contracts

are indeed enforceable or not as a matter of law.

54a

Appendix D

THE COURT: Did you cite Laughlin v. Baltedene (ph.)?

MR. DINEEN: _ I don’t recall, your Honor, quite frankly.

THE COURT: 191 PA Superior 611.

That case stands for the proposition that the enforceability of the

clause is a question for the Court. Enforceability should be

determined by comparing actual damages with liquidated damages

and ensuring that the two measures are reasonably commensurate.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, the —

THE COURT: _ Did you cite that case?

MR. DINEEN: _ Ican’t find it in the original papers, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you read it?

MR. DINEEN: I don’t recall reading that, your Honor.

THE COURT: _ It looks good to me, as stating the law of

Pennsylvania.

MR. DINEEN: Well, your Honor, Acmat is not contesting that

that is in fact the law.

THE COURT: Okay. So I have to look at, on this case, the

actual damages and compare them with the stated liquidated

damages to see if they are reasonably commensurate.

MR. DENNIS: _ If I may, your Honor, my only reservation at

this point is as to whether Acmat actually raised in its answer to our

counterclaim the question of the enforceability of the liquidated

damages provision; I don’t believe it did. In the motion that was filed

with your Honor, Acmat’s position was that the School District

55a

Appendix D

could not recover actual damages — rather actual delay damages

and liquidated damages, and I’m now going back to previous

counsel.

THE COURT: Well, have your dropped the actual damages?

MR. DENNIS: We've dropped the actual delay damages, yes.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, if I may, there was one item

remaining — well, there are actually several items remaining in the

counterclaim which are actual delay damages and one of them is an

$87,000 counterclaim for the additional cost of air monitoring

during the delay period, and that is a claim that is still in the case as_

far as I understand from Mr. Dennis, and that is a clear overlap of

In addition, there are claims for custodial overtime wages which

take place during the deiay periods which overlap again with the

liquidated damage periods being asserted by the Schooi District.

MR. DENNIS: _ If I may, your Honor, the custodial overtime

wages are being asserted pursuant to an express contractual

provision that obliges the contractor to pay for those overtime

wages. They are not a part of delay damages from our perspective,

as well as the air monitors cost, those costs were incurred in order

for the work to be completed, not as a consequence of the delay.

_MR.DINEEN: Your Honor, if I may, the reason that the air

monitors are on the job in January through June of 1985 at the Rush

School is because there is a delay to the project. At that point the

School District has an option. It either seeks the cost of the air

monitors and drops the liquidated damage claim, or it opts for the

liquidated damages which it has done in this case.

56a

Appendix D

THE COURT: Were the air monitors there because of delay in

the completion of the contract?

MR. DENNIS: _ Ihave to concede, your Honor, if the work had

been done earlier, the air monitors would not have been there and

therefore that amount would not have been incurred. However, the

amount was incurred because the prosecution of the work to

complete the job was necessary. In other words, in order to complete

the job and do that work which was necessary, the air monitors had

to be there.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, Mr. Dennis has just conceded that

but for the delay there would have been no additional air monitoring

cost. So clearly the direct cause of the additional air monitoring cost

is the delay. And in the contracts they have an option. They can take

actual delay damages or liquidated damages, but certainly not both.

THE COURT: The cost of completion is what Mr. Dennis is

talking about. He’s saying that that was a cost that should have been

bome by Acmat in the prosecution of its work that the School

District had to pick up. And that’s what the School District is

talent

MR. DINEEN: _ But, your Honor, that is no different from the

other actual delay damage claims which have been asserted earlier

by the School District and which have subsequently been dropped.

For instance, the cost of —

THE COURT: As I recall, there was a specific understanding

as to this matter between Mr. Dennis and Mr. Korn, cleaning up the

apparent confusion between liquidated and actual delay claims.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, the question is —

a ee£E§&E rr

57a

Appendix D

THE COURT: And what stayed in represents the meeting of

their minds and the parties’ minds with respect to what was actual

delay claims. And the actual delay claims were taken out as they

were understood by the parties.

MR. DENNIS: Weill, your Honor, you've put me in an

impossible position because I can’t speak for Mr. Kom as t0 what —

THE COURT: I—

MR. DENNIS: — he may have agreed to with Mr. Dennis.

THE COURT: _ Everything was on the record. Whatever was

done, it was on the record, so you're not at a great disadvantage. You

can read the record as well as I could.

MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, in all candor, I don’t recall — I

must say I don’t recall a specific agreement with Mr. Kom. I want

to be honest with the Court and opposing counsel on this issue. I do

recall Mr. Korn filed a motion and that motion was denied by the

Court. That motion was calculated to make the School District elect

and in response to that motion we withdrew certain damages from

the case. That was in our response, the Court ruled and denied Mr.

Kom’s motion and nothing more was done by Mr. Kom about that

after the Court’s ruling.

THE COURT: __ I understand. I am not saying that there is some

binding agreement enforceable by the Court on this. I am saying

only that I have not had to, at this point, make a decision as to these

— whether these two particular claims are actual delay damage

claims or not. But up to this point there appeared to be, once Mr.

Dennis made an action to delete actual delay damage claims, an

understanding that what remained were not actual delay damage

claims. If I have to make a decision, I’ll make a decision.

58a

Appendix D

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, am I to understand —

THE COURT: I mean, but if it appears to me that this was, that

this air monitoring was acost that was already paid for in the contract

price that the School District had to incur additionally, that is not a

delay claim.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor—

THE COURT: That's not a delay claim, that’s just a

reimbursement of the contract price.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor has to look at the cause of the cost.

For instance, Mr. Frank Richmond who is the School Inspector at

the Rush School while Acmat was performing its work was paid

some additional moneys to monitor what was happening on that job.

Now, there was no claim being made for the additional money that

had to be paid to Mr. Richmond for performing his duties attendant

to the Acmat work.

THE COURT: Well, youdidn’thave tw pay Mr. Richmond, did

you? Acmat didn’t.

MR. DINEEN: Well, Acmat didn’t have to pay the air monitor

either. This was a consultant retained by the School District to

monitor what was happening on the various school projects. As Mr.

Dennis conceded, he would not have been paid any additional

moneys if the work had been completed on time.

THE COURT: All right, is that what you're saying?

That's not what I've heard you say, but if that is the case then that

would be an actual delay cost.

59a

Appendix D

MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, what I'm saying is that the air

monitoring costs were a cost of completion. We had to have the air

monitors there to complete the work. Now, if the work had been

completed on time, we would not have incurred that expense, but it

is a cost of completion. We couldn't complete the work without

having air monitors. I don't know whether this is a —

THE COURT: But it seems tw me that that’s actual delay

damage, and that may justify liquidated damages.

MR. DENNIS: _ But, your Honor, except unlike the cost of bus,

the bus to bus students, I mean this was a cost incurred directly in

connection with the work. The work could not proceed unless we

had the air monitors there, so I believe it is a construction, a

completion damage. Now, I understand counsel's argument, but

that’s what we contend.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, if! may, in presumably one of the

considerations behind the liquidated damage provision and your

determination whether it's enforceabie or not in the first instance is

a question as to whether in fact the School District would incur any

additional cost by virtue of delay and if such cost would be incurred,

what types of costs would be incurred? And certainly the School

District had to understand in preparing these liquidated damage

provisions that cost of air monitors on an asbestos removal project

would be an additional cost that would be incurred in the event of a

delay. And they —

THE COURT: _ It sounds to me, sirs and madam, that this air

monitoring is in the category of actual delay damage. That's not a

cost that would have been incurred. It's over and above the cost that

would have been incurred had the contractor been on time. What are

the actual delay damages, which would include this amount?

60a

Appendix D

MR. DENNIS: With the Court's indulgence for a few

moments.

THE COURT: __ I have to compare the liquidated damages, the

total liquidated damages versus the actual damages.

MR. DINEEN: In that regard, your Honor, while the School

District has asserted initially in the case certain actual delay damages

which it did incur, there was no indication as to what moneys were

saved by the School District in not having the school open at that

time, and that certainly has to play a major factor in determining

whethes the liquidated damage provision is enforceable in the first

instance, and that may be information that you do not have before

you now.

THE COURT: _ I don't know if that's’ something I have to take

into consideration. There are some actual damages which were

withdrawn, so I have to consider all of those as well as the costs of

monitoring and even the custodial costs.

MR. DINEEN: __ If your Honor is going to rule that the custodial

costs are delay costs, then yes, they should be included.

THE COURT: Well, I may not have to do that. The contract

may entitle them to that separate recovery, even though these were

delay costs.

MR. DINEEN: Well, if they are delay costs, they certainly fall

under the number of the liquidated damage provision.

THE COURT: Do you want to take some time to figure those

out?

MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, we don't have our statement of

claim which has all of the items enumerated.

‘

6la

Appendix D

(Pause.)

MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, as I was saying a minute ago,

unfortunately we don’t have all co four pretrial with us which includes

that amount or the other document which does, but I do have a part

of that document with respect to the Rush School and the general

items apply with respect to other schools.

There's security necessary to keep the persons out of

contaminated areas. And the amount in Rush for that particular item

is $31,554. There is inspector's wages — and this is all, by the way,

from January 1, 1985, to June 28, 1985 — $30,000.

Contract costs for air monitors during the same period, $87,000,

and the costs of busing Rush students to other schools, $446,716.

THE COURT: What's the amount of liquidated damages you

seek relative to Rush?

MR. DENNIS: _ I'm sorry, your Honor?

THE COURT: What's the amount of liquidated damages you

seek as to the Rush School?

MR. DENNIS: $128.500.

MR. DINEEN: I would just note, your Honor, these are

amounts being claimed by the School District. These amounts

necessarily actual expenditures as a result of any delays to the Rush

School, but right now these are claimed amounts.

MR. DENNIS: I don’t quite know what —

THE COURT: These are amounts that they are prepared to

prove they have.

62a

Appendix D

MR. DINEEN: Correct.

MR. DENNIS: We paid $87,000 for air monitors.

MR. DINEEN: [understand that's what you're claiming.

MR. DENNIS: Weil, that’s what the Court asked for, ourclaim.

THE COURT: Well, any argument that the actual damages,

delay damages, are commensurate with the liquidated damage

costs?

MR. DINEEN: _ I have no reason —

THE COURT: Certainly if you factor in $87,000 for air

monitoring.

MR. DINEEN: _ I heve no reason one way or the other to doubt

the accuracy of the costs. I think there are other considerations here,

other than just the purported actual costs which were expensed in

connection with the delay at the Rush School. You have to also look

at what savings there were by virtue of not having the Rush School

opened.

THE COURT: What savings could there be?

MR. DINEEN: Weill, for instance, a large saving had to be not

having to heat the building for one year. That had to be a substantial

amount of money that the School District saved in not having to heat

the building.

‘THE COURT: So they had to heat the building for additional

students somepiace else.

MR. DINEEN: Well, presumably they were in a building that's

already being heated.

63a

Appendix D

THE COURT: How many students had to be moved?

MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, we don’t have that information at

this time.

THE COURT: Have you developed that information? ht seems

to me that the burden is on the School District t© show the

reasonableness of its actual delay costs and on Acmat to show the

unreasonableness of it.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, we don't have any specific

information one way or the other on what the savings were.

THE COURT: Okay, well, I'll make my judgment based upon

the information I have. Discovery is closed.

MR. DINEEN: Weil, discovery was closed before we came into

the case, unfortunately.

THE COURT: All right. Well, make such a list for each of the

schools.

MR. DENNIS: = Yes, sif.

THE COURT: And bring it Wednesday.

Ali right. So you should offer to me evidence of actual

expenditures for each of these schools. My understanding of the law

is that where the contract is silent as to the means for extension of

the contract, that the contractor will be allowed to show that the

amount of liquidated damages should be reduced by the School

District's delay.

So what does Acmat intend to present, for example, as to the Rush

School?

64a

Appendix D

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, Acmat is going to testify as to the

difficulties encountered in attempting to complete the Rush School,

the overinspection, the amount of additional work which was

required to be performed by reason of different site conditions, by

reason of directives from the School District to perform additional

work.

THE COURT: Now, be careful. I will rule, as a matter of law

as I already have, that certain work that was undertaken by Acmat

without School Board approval was done at its own peril and

therefore is not chargeable as delay to the School District.

Similarly, with respect to what Acmat contends to be differing

site work, that that, too, without School Board approval, was work

done within the scope of the agreement and therefore is not

chargeable to School Board delay.

So what do you have chargeable to the School District that is

beyond the scope of my ruling?

MF.. DINEEN: Well, your Honor certainly granted to Acmat

certain claims in certain amounts which did, in your view, represent

additional work that was performed, and those items certainly will

be testified to.

There are certain other items which occurred on the various jobs,

Rush included, that being overinspection by the consultants for the

School District, and this was a recurring problem through all the

jobs; that will be testified to and that held up the work considerably.

In addition, you Honor, the fact that many of the claims were

dismissed by your Honor on the basis that there was not School

Board approval does not negate the fact that in fact they were extra

‘ a vepees

65a

Appendix D

work. And certainly if it’s extra work, it entitles the contractor to an

extension of time.

The fact may be that he can’t get paid for the work, but it certainly

extends the schedule. And certainly in defense of a liquidated

damage claim, the contractor ought to be able to prove that there was

additional work performed — whether or not he has been paid for

it or not is irrelevant — that did extend the schedule.

THE COURT: Well, I agree with you that if there was work

that was compensable, that is that it had School Board approval or

as I have construed School Board approval, School District written

approval, you’d be able to argue that a reasonable period of time

extension to do that should be allowed. What’s reasonable?

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, in connection with the time

extension provisions of the contract, they talk about unforeseen

conditions or items that occurred that are not the fault of the

contractor. And if the contractor performs extra work, whether or

not he’s entitled to be compensated for it by reason of School Board

approval or lack thereof, the fact is that this is work which was not

part of the original scope of the job. It was something that was

unforeseen and it did extent the schedule. And even under the

agreement itself, the contractor would be entitled to an extension of

time.

THE COURT: No, no. Because a contractor may have failed

to size a job up right does not mean that the contract completion date

has to be extended because of the contractor’s oversiglit or

undersight; that doesn’t make sense.

MR. DINEEN: Well, your Honor, in the first instance, I think

that would be a question to be presented to a jury.

66a

Appendix D

THE COURT: it’s a matter of law, it’s a matter of logic.

Unreasonableness , and the jury will not be required to do that which

is silly, and you’ve just made a silly argument.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, we would never intend to present

anything to the jury that’s silly.

THE COURT: _ I know, but sometimes you say things that you

don’t even contend, and what you’ve just said is silly. That is, that

a contractor should be excused at the completion end for a mistake

it made at the beginning.

MR. DINEEN: YourHonor,! never said that. I said acontractor

is entitled to an extension of time where he performs additional

work. Obviously Acmat would have to establish that the work it

performed was additional, not that it missed it or that it made a

mistake in its bid, but that the work it performed was not

contemplated. And that is what | said.

THE COURT: By whom?

MR. DINEEN: By Acmat or by any reasonable, prudent

contractor doing the work.

THE COURT: I disagree with that. I mean, you’re making the

same argument you said you weren’t making, and that is that the

contractor should be relieved of the mistake that it may have made

at the beginning. You have a difference of — you claim that the

overspraying was something unanticipated and dealing with that

took them a lot of time you hadn’t anticipated.

The School District says that overspraying was within the scope

of the work, for example, and it told you that. I have made a ruling

that is was noncompensable, for example. That means, my ruling

67a

Appendix D

means that you can’t contend you should be given an extension of

the contract because you did that which was required to be done

under the contract.

MR. DINEEN: _Is your Honor saying that if overspraying is

encountered which is, in fact, beyond the scope of the contract, that

that particular problem cannot be presented to a jury in justification

of a time extension?

THE COURT: Yes, where it was within the scope of the work.

MR. DINEEN: _ So Acmat is then free to testify that there was

overspray at the Rush School or at the other schools which was, in

fact, beyond the scope of the contract?

THE COURT: Only to the extent that I’ve ruled that it was

beyond the scope of the contract and therefore was compensable.

MR. DINEEN: Well, your Honor has already ruled that it was

not compensable because there was no School Board approval.

THE COURT: Yes, my nuling is saying it’s not compensable.

If it’s not compensable, there is no entitlement to consideration of

extension of the completion date. That would alter the contract.

MR. DINEEN: But your Honor is saying that because there

wasn’t a technicality followed in getting School Board approval, that

means that whatever work was done by definition then is not extra

work, and that’s simply not the case.

THE COURT: _ That’s the contract.

MR. DINEEN: _ That only — the lack of School Board approval

relates only to whether Acmat’s entitled to be compensated for the

68a

Appendix D

work or not. It has nothing to do with whether there is an extension

of the schedule by virtue of having to do that work.

THE COURT: _ But you contracted to do the work, all the work

that was within the scope of the agreement, by a certain completion

date, that this agreement was, whether it was within the scope of the

agreement, this, quote, “additional work.” If it was not additional

work, then you had already agreed to do that work before the end of

the contract period.

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, there are several bases which

Acmat will seek an extension of time for. One is, for instance, the

overinspection, a misapplication, a lawful implementation of the

specification requiring that areas be cleaned and cleaned and cleaned

over and over again which was not necessary. That held up the work.

THE COURT: Allright.

MR. DINEEN: That wast.

THE COURT: But now you're talking about School Board

delay.

MR. DINEEN: _ That’s correct, that’s a breach by the School

District and in fact the contract talks about breaches by the School

District being a basis for a time extension. Then there are the items

of additional work. Now, your Honor has ruled as to the issue of

compensation on those items, but using a Neeva (ph.) case, if that is

going to be the standard upon which an item is determined to be

extra or not, that is not what Neeva stood for. Neeva said basically

that without School Board approval, you can’t get paid for extra

work, and that is basically the position that has been proffered by

the School District and your Honor has, in essence, followed that.

69a

Appendix D

However, that doesn’t change the nature of the work. It still can

be extra work for purposes of getting a time extension, but under

your Honor’s ruling, you can’t get additional compensation for it.

MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, I believe that the Court’s ruling

should govem this situation. Now, if the Court ruled that it wasn’t

authorized extra work, then the work was unauthorized and there

should be no basis for an extension of time. The contract speaks in

terms of the School District may grant an extension under certain

circumstances; it’s not obligatory.

Furthermore, I would submit that the overinspection item which .

has been repeated often by counsel falls within this category. That

was ruled on by the Court under the Rush School as being an item

not subject to compensation, unauthorized and therefore should not

be the basis of any extension of time. :

THE COURT: Well, cannot this for inspections that had to be

paid for by Acmat?

MR. DENNIS: No, no, these were inspections by the air

monitors to determine whether the asbestos was in fact removed to

the levels that were dictated in the specification. And Acmat’s

position is that is was overinspection, a too rigid application of those

specifications which caused it to incur delays for which it sought

extra compensation.

THE COURT: Well, I don’t see any reason why Acmat can’t

present evidence that it was unable to get to do its contract work

because the School District required it to slow down, basically. I

mean, that’s what this proceeding would be. Acmat would have to

show that it was going along at a certain pace and the School District

required it to do things that weren't reasonable and therefore,

70a

Appendix D

necessarily, extended the time that would have taken a reasonably

prudent contractor to do the work.

That’s a different argument than one where Acmat basically is

saying it should be excused for making a mistake as to what was

contemplated by the scope of the agreement.

Are there any categories of claim where the School District —

the School District, not the School Board — the School District

acknowledged that certain work was beyond the scope of the

agreement, but there was no writing by the School District directing

the work for which Acmat seeks payment but the School District

has said that payment is not required because there was no School

Board approval?

As to any such category as that, testimony would be permitted as

to time extension —

MR. DENNIS: Your Honor, may I—

THE COURT: — because that is an instance where there has

been verbal direction by the School District representative to do

something, Acmat has undertaken to do it and

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.