Petition for Writ of Certiorari — WPIX, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

WPIX, INC.,

Petitioner,

VS.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Rocer T. Brice

Counsel of Record

RicHARD L. Marcus

Susan M. BENnTOoN-PowErRs

SONNENSCHEIN NaTH & ROSENTHAL

8000 Sears Tower

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 876-8000

Attorneys for Petitioner

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60611, (312) 321-0220

@OsE! “ti f OP ROL JR,

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

May an employer lawfully declare that an impasse has

been reached in collective bargaining after the collective

bargaining process has been stalled and prolonged through

the extensive use of dilatory tactics by the union?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

AND RULE 29.1 STATEMENT

In addition to the parties named in the caption, the

following entity was an intervenor in the court of appeals

on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board, peti-

tioner-cross respondent below and respondent here:

Newspaper Guild of New York, Local 3, AFL-CIO

Pursuant to Rule 29.1 of the Rules of this Court, peti-

tioner WPIX, Inc. furnishes the following information:

Parent companies of WPIX, Inc.:

Tribune Company

Tribune Broadcasting Company

Subsidiary of WPIX, Inc.:

CBC Broadcasting, Inc.

(formerly Connecticut Broadcasting Company)

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTION PRESENTED ................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

AND RULE 29.1 STATEMENT ............ ii

a iii

Tabu OF AUTHORITIES .............00.. iv

ccc ec nscccsesececs 1

EEE 2

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ...... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .. 7

THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO AD-

DRESS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FED-

ERAL LABOR LAW—THE EFFECT OF THE

GUILD’S DILATORY ACTIVITY ON THE

EXISTENCE OF BARGAINING IMPASSE IN

GS 7

Cee nn nn cae scesees 12

APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, June 25, 1990... App. 1

Decision and Order of National Labor Relations

meera, Feoruary 2a, 1060 ............... App. 13

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, August 8, 1990 ...... App. 53

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE

Continental Nut Co., 195 NLRB 841 (1972)... 9,10

N.L.R.B. v. Cable Vision, Inc., 660 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.

WEEE éandnscatdvedeconwhi debieteekbankwss< 9

N.L.R.B. v. Cambria Clay Products, Inc., 215 F.2d

Se ee eG ED 6A. dé Wacwab cbs ccceanksennes )

N.L.R.B. v. Milgo Industrial, Inc., 567 F.2d 540

Se NE ga oo a4 cau cc cue cckuuahuten 8, 9, 11

N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229

See. Ge I Ake cc Uenecd nwa ea ueeees < 9,10

N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d

131 (1st Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887

GE NEGA Kabah eR Sa deas bab sstheoenaeeeee 10

N.L.R.B. v. Remington-Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d

LAs NE SW AR RGWAR NS Sach h-cub a sItRbas cece 9

Statutes, Rules and Regulations

See CU SE 6 oo 0 0045 Chek as cae ones

ef a rrr

ep Seles * I obo G 4A 0% 04555 bcs dba ecwnen’s

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

~ OcTOBER TERM, 1990

WPIX, INC.,

Petitioner,

VS.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

WPIX, Inc. (“WPIX” or the “Company’’) petitions for

a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this

case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1-12)

is reported at 906 F.2d 898 (2nd Cir. 1990). The decision

and order of the National Labor Relations Board, cited

as WPIX, Inc., (App., infra, 13-52) is reported at 293

NLRB No. 2.

=

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

June 25, 1990. The court of appeals denied WPIX, Inc.’s

petition for rehearing on August 8, 1990 (App., infra,

53-54). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 8(aX5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29

U.S.C. §§ 158(aX5):

(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-

ployer:

. (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with

the representatives of his employees, subject to

the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In a purposeful strategy to avoid meaningful negotia-

tions and thus perpetuate the terms and conditions set

forth in an expired collective bargaining agreement, the

Newspaper Guild of New York, Local 3, AFL-CIO (the

“Union” or the ‘“Guild’’) repeatedly caused substantial

delays between meetings—resulting in only thirteen meet-

ings in nine months, delayed scheduled meetings—result-

ing in shorter sessions than planned, terminated scheduled

allie

meetings after abbreviated periods, and wasted precious

bargaining time by discussing extraneous matters and by

calling for repeated discussion of relativeiy minor issues.

After nine months of negotiation, the parties were no

closer to agreement on any critical management flexibility

or economic issue than they had been at the commence-

ment-of negotiations. Indeed, as of April 1, the parties

were further apart rather than closer together on these

issues. At that point, because of the Union’s continued

use of dilatory tactics and the total lack of progress, fur-

ther bargaining would have been futile and the Company

declared impasse.

The relevant facts are largely undisputed. (App., infra,

3) WPIX and the Union met thirteen times between July

6, 1986 and April 1, 1987 in an unsuccessful attempt to

negotiate a successor contract to the collective bargain-

ing agreement which expired on June 24, 1986. Through-

out the nine months of negotiation the Guild engaged in

numerous and repeated dilatory actions calculated to avoid

negotiation of a new contract and to perpetuate the terms

of the expired contract.

The dilatory tactics, as summarized below, essentially

fall into two categories, i.e., unavailability to meet or delay

of meeting and the superficial “talking technique’”’ of negoti-

ations:

a. Following the third negotiation session on Au-

gust 13, the spokesperson for the Company, Andrew

Hughes, sent a letter to the spokesperson for the

Guild, William Montes, urging him to set a date prior

to September 16 for continued negotiations. Not only

did the Union not agree to an earlier date but “a

long series of events” caused the September 16 date

to be rescheduled to October 1, resulting in a delay

of one and one-half months between sessions.

b. When Guild spokesperson, Sidney Kress (substi-

tuted for Montes), requested adjournment of the Oc-

tober 1 meeting, Company spokesperson, Richard

Marcrs (substituted fo: Hughes), indicated a desire

to meet as soon as possible. ss stated that he was

not available until October 17, more than two weeks

later.

c. The meeting of October 17 was cancelled on Oc-

tober 16 because of Kress’ alleged illness. The com-

mitment that Kress would contact Marcus the next

week was never honored.

d. When Marcus contacted Kress on Wednesday,

October 22 to inquire about the delay and urge prompt

rescheduling of the next meeting, Kress informed

Marcus that he no longer represented the Union and

that Leo DuCharme would take his place.

e. Although Kress promised Marcus that DuCharme

would call him the following week of October 27,

DuCharme made no attempt to contact Marcus that

next week or the following week.

f. Though the Union’s representatives were re-

peatediy unavailable for negotiations and repeatedly

neglected to honor commitments to contact Marcus

to arrange future meetings, “former representative’”’

Kress found time to prepare correspondence demand-

ing arbitration over one of the key issues (step in-

creases) which separated the parties in their negotia-

tions.

g. Ina letter to Marcus dated November 14, 1986,

received November 18, 1986, DuCharme finally sub-

mitted three dates for negotiations, the earliest being

November 26, the day before Thanksgiving and almost

two months after the previous October 1 session.

h. On November 24, 1986, James Madden, Union

business representative, contacted Marcus to cancel

the meeting on November 26 because, inter alia, of

DuCharme’s involvement in other business on that

=

date which DuCharme himself had previously offered.

As a result, the Union did not make itself available

to meet with the Company for the two and one-half

months between October 1 and December 12, 1986.

i. On December 12, DuCharme asked to devote a

substantial portion of the next meeting (scheduled for

December 16) to a discussion of grievance rather than

negotiation matters. On December 16, that discussion

was delayed due to William O’Meara’s (Guild steward)

exceedingly late arrival. Once the grievance discus-

sion commenced, it exhausted most of the time avail-

able for negotiations.

j. When the Union adjourned the December 16 meet-

ing, Marcus proposed to meet the next day. DuCharme

refused indicating that January 13, almost a full

month later, was his first available date.

k. On January 13, the Union insisted upon a lengthy

discussion of the Company-wide bereavement policy

(hardly a “major” issue), specifically the Union’s

proposal to include in-laws in the paid leave policy.

1. On January 20, DuCharme did not arrive for

negotiations until 3:00 p.m., allowing less than one

hour for negotiation. During this abbreviated negotia-

tion session, DuCharme insisted on again discussing

the in-law issue. In addition, he asked Marcus to re-

state the Company’s position on each of the griev-

ances discussed and answered at the December 16

meeting.

m. Upon the Union’s adjournment of the February

5 session, Marcus expressed his desire to continue

the negotiation as soon as possible. DuCharme in-

dicated that he was not available until February 26

and 27, almost three weeks later. When the mediator

indicated that he was not available on those dates,

DuCharme indicated an unwillingness to meet with-

out the mediator. DuCharme then changed his posi-

tion by stating that if he did negotiate on the 26th

he could not negotiate on the 27th.

a

n. The Union spent a substantial amount of time

at the meeting on February 26 discussing asbestos

contamination in a construction zone completely sepa-

rated from its members’ work area. They insisted

upon inspecting the area and engaging in long discus-

sions about asbestos removal and the assurances and

notices to be given to employees.

o. On April 1, 1987, the Union spent virtually the

entire session asking the Company to explain the rea-

sons for certain proposals, reasons which had already

been explained and reviewed in detail.

p. The Union consistently called for early adjourn-

ment of negotiation sessions.

q. When the Union announced adjournment on

April 1, 1987, Marcus expressed the Company’s strong

desire to meet the next day. DuCharme refused, indi-

cating that he was not available until late on April

21 or at the regular time on April 22, a full three

weeks later.

The Union learned of the Company’s difficult financial

condition as early as the first negotiation session on July

1, 1986. The Company’s specific cost proposals, including

the proposal to eliminate step increases, were communi-

cated to the Union orally on August 6 and, to some de-

gree, in writing on August 13. The Company’s final wage

proposal was submitied on October 1. The Union did not

submit any wage proposal until April 1, 1987 when it pro-

posed three annual 8% increases.

The Union filed a charge with the National Labor Rela-

tions Board (the “Board’’) claiming that the Company de-

clared a premature impasse. Sustaining that charge, the

Board applied to the court of appeals for enforcement of

its order, and WPIX cross-petitioned to set aside the

order, pursuant to Section 10(f) of the National Labor

Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seg.

on

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ADDRESS AN

IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LABOR LAW—

THE EFFECT OF THE GUILD’S DILATORY ACTIVITY

ON THE EXISTENCE OF BARGAINING IMPASSE IN

THIS CASE.

This case involves a question of exceptional importance

for federal labor law: At what point may an employer

properly declare an impasse when the bargaining process

is being flagrantly stalled and manipulated by a union

through the extensive use of dilatory tactics.

The Court of Appeals overlooked virtually all of the

critical facts regarding the Guild’s dilatory activities—its

delays between meetings resulting in only 13 sessions in

nine months, its delays of scheduled meetings resulting

in shorter sessions than planned, and its waste of precious

bargaining time by discussing extraneous matters and by

calling for repeated discussion of relatively minor issues.

Without discussion, the court of appeals concluded that

the Guild’s dilatory tactics were not dispositive with re-

gard to the existence of a lawful bargaining impasse.

(App., infra, 9-10). To the contrary, the prevailing law

throughout the circuits, including the Second Circuit, pro-

vides that such activity supports the existence of lawful

impasse in this case.

In response to WPIX’s argument that because the parties

were further apart on all critical economic and manage-

ment flexibility issues on April 1, the Company was justi-

fied in declaring impasse, the court of appeals queried:

“If—as the Company claims—all parties knew those key

economic issues could not be resolved, one might well

wonder why the parties would have bothered to discuss

walline

in the meantime what the Company now dismisses as in-

significant issues.” (App., infra, 8). The answer to the

court’s query lies in the Guild’s purposely dilatory activity.

While the Company was willing at all times to discuss

all bargaining issues, including economic issues, and con-

tinued meeting with the Union in the hope that some pro-

gress would be made, the Guild engaged in a purposeful

strategy to avoid such progress. Because of the Union’s

continuing dilatory strategy, it was apparent on April 1

that further bargaining would be futile.

The facts indicate that once the Union became aware

of the Company’s financial position and its concomitant

need to reduce costs and increase flexibility, it began to

engage in dilatory tactics. Following the August 13 meet-

ing, the Union avoided meeting with the Company with

the result that the parties met only once in the four

months between August 13 and December 12. Further,

due entirely to the Union’s dilatory tactics, the parties

met only 13 times in nine months. Many of those meetings

consisted of only very brief negotiation sessions with ex-

cessive delays and time spent on extraneous matters con-

cocted by the Union to delay negotiations.

The Second Circuit condemned similar behavior in

N.L.R.B. v. Milgo Industrial, Inc., 567 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.

1977). There the court of appeals held that such behavior

on the part of the company’s attorney-spokesperson, viz.

cancelling scheduled bargaining sessions, causing gaps of

one to three months, with the result that the parties met

only 17 times over the course of 15 months and then

usually only for a few hours, constituted “sham bargain-

ing’ and violated the statutory duty set forth in Section

&(d) to ‘“‘meet at reasonable times.” Jd. at 545, 546.

Additionally, the Guild spent an inordinate amount of

time discussing, questioning and considering the Com-

a

pany’s proposals, asking the same questions over and over

again to “buy time,” offering only one minor counter-

proposal which did not result in agreement. Use of such

“talking techniques” precludes a finding of premature im-

passe.

While the proviso to Section &d) allows that the obliga-

tion to bargain in good faith does not compel either party

to agree to a proposal or make a concession, “the prime

way for a party to avail itself of the proviso is to declare

an impasse after the failure of sincere efforts to resolve

the issue and to face the consequences—not to engage in

a play, or a ploy. Bad faith bargaining ... ‘is prohibited

though done with sophistication and finesse ... [T]o sit

at a bargaining table, or to sit almost forever, or to make

concessions here and there, could be the very means by

which to conceal a purposeful strategy to make bargain-

ing futile or fail.’ Jd. at 543, quoting N.L.R.B. v. Herman

Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1960). See also

N.L.R.B. v. Cambria Clay Producis, Inc., 215 F.2d 48,

55 (6th Cir. 1954), quoting N.L.R.B. v. Remington-Rand,

Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872 (2d Cir. 1938) (L. Hand, J.) (“ ‘A

union may at times seek to give the appearance of wishing

to treat, after it knows that all chance of agreement is

gone; in such conflicts each side generally wishes to place

the odium of rupture upon the other.’”’); N.L.R.B. v.

Cable Vision, Inc., 660 F.2d 1, 4 (ist Cir. 1981) (‘{T]he

mere statement that a party will ‘study’ and ‘consider’

proposals, repeated ad infinitum and combined with other

evidence of deliberate delay, gives the impression of a

party which is attempting to avoid rather than to induce

agreement.”’)

The Union’s dilatory activities are dispositive here; they

bar any challenge by the Union to the Company’s declara-

tion of an impasse. Continental Nut Co., 195 NLRB 841,

Ty

—10—

857-58 (1972). While the Union is entitled to certain rights

under the Act, it “may not use them as a cloak” to avoid

meaningful bargaining. N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co.,

275 F.2d at 232. The Union may not go “through the

motions of negotiations as an elaborate pretense with no

sincere desire to reach an agreement ...” N.L.R.B. v.

Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 1953),

cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1958).

Moreover, the Union is not in a position to argue that

it did not have enough time to bargain over critical issues

because the record makes it clear that the Union avoided

numerous opportunities to meet more often during the

nine months of negotiation. Because of these dilatory ac-

tivities, the parties were unable to reach agreement on

any issues in nine months—a more than ample period of

negotiation. Had the Company not declared impasse on

April 1, 1987, the Guild’s dilatory tactics would have con-

tinued indefinitely, and the Union would have achieved

its goal—perpetuation of the terms of the expired agree-

ment.

The Board, in its brief to the court of appeals, essen-

tially admitted to such dilatory tactics on the part of the

Guild, claiming that such tactics were justified to preserve

the status quo if that represented, in the Union’s view,

the best that it could achieve. The Guild’s delaying tactics,

the Board further argued, were lawful so long as the de-

lay did not interfere with the bargaining process. Such

interference certainly occurred in this case. By prevent-

ing more frequent meetings over the nine months and

by actively avoiding meaningful discussions, the Guild pre-

vented progress that otherwise could have been made

during the long period of negotiations. The Company, with )

no reason to believe that such dilatory -activity was at

wiliies

an end—or even on a decline—was therefore justified in

declaring an impasse. If the Company had not done so,

the Guild would have continued to meet sporadically and

indefinitely with no real intent to negotiate a new agree-

ment.

An employer should not be forced to sit at the bargain-

ing table ‘‘almost forever’ in the face of a “purposeful

strategy to make bargaining futile or fail”. N.L.R.B. v.

Milgo Industrial, Inc., 567 F.2d at 543. Such dilatory

strategy is dispositive; it clearly precludes a finding of

premature impasse in this case.

Review by this Court is essential. By failing to consider

the impact on the bargaining process of the extensive dila-

tory tactics demonstrated by the Union here, the court

of appeals has left employers powerless in the face of

blatant union attempts to avoid agreement. Such a result

tips the balance of labor-management relations in favor

of labor—a result contrary to the policies of the National

Labor Relations Act and federal labor law. The Court

should review this case and restore the fine balance neces-

sary to maintain the validity of the collective bargain-

ing process and thereby enhance vositive labor relations

throughout the country.

= =

CONCLUSION

soleil >

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Rocer T. Brice

Counsel of Record

Ricuarp L. Marcus

Susan M. Benton-Powers

SONNENSCHEIN NATH & ROSENTHAL

8000 Sears Tower

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 876-8000

Attorneys for Petitioner

Dated: September 13, 1990

- APPENDIX

App. 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Nos. 927, 928—August Term, 1989

(Argued March 2, 1990 Decided June 25, 1990)

Docket Nos. 89-4136, 4142

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Petitioner-Cross Respondent,

—-V.—

WPIX, INc.,

Respondent-Cross Petitioner,

NEWSPAPER GUILD OF NEW YORK,

Loca. 3, AFL-CIO,

Intervenor.

Before:

OakES, Chief Judge,

KEARSE and WALKER, Circuit Judges.

Petition by National Labor Relations Beard for enforce-

ment of order against employer, finding that employer had

4721

App. 2

violated sections &(aX1) and (5) of the National Labor

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(aX1), (5) (1988), and cross-

petition of employer to vacate order.

Petition granted and cross-petition denied.

JOSEPH H. BORNONG, Attorney, NLRB

(Howard E. Perlstein, Supervisory

Attorney; Jerry M. Hunter, General

Counsel; Robert E. Allen, Associate

General Counsel; Aileen A. Armstrong,

Deputy Associate General Counsel,

NLRB, Washington, D.C., of counsel),

for Petitioner-Cross Respondent.

RICHARD L. Marcus (Susan M. Benton-

Powers, Sonnenschein Carlin Nath &

Rosenthal, Chicago, IL., of counsel),

for Respondent-Cross Petitioner.

Irwin Bluestein, Stuart E. Bauchner, Vla-

deck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard,

P.C., New York, New York, of counsel,

submitted a brief for Intervenor.

WALKER, Circutt Judge:

On February 28, 1989, the National Labor Relations

Board (“the Board’’) found that WPIX, Inc. (‘the Com-

pany’’) had violated sections 8(aX1) and (5) of the Na-

tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(aX1), (5)

4722

App. 3

(“the Act”), by unilaterally implementing changes in terms

and conditions of employment without first bargaining

to an impasse with intervenor Newspaper Guild of New

York, Local 3, AFL-CIO (“the Union’’), and by refusing

to pay contractually required wage-step increases. Be-

cause we find that substantial evidence on the record as

a whole supports the Board’s findings, we enforce its

order.

BACKGROUND

The underlying facts are largely undisputed. They are

based on careful findings by the Administrative Law

Judge who explicitly evaluated the credibility of the wit-

nesses.

WPIX operates a television broadcasting station in New

York City. Since 1972, the Union has represented cer-

tain employees who write and edit news programs pro-

duced by the station. The most recent collective bar.

gaining agreement between the parties ran until June

24, 1986 (“the Agreement”’). It provided that its terms

would remain in effect until negotiations for a successor

agreement were lawfully terminated. Article XVII of the

Agreement required the Company to grant employees

periodic step increases in pay after specified periods of

service. On April 24, 1986, the Union informed WPIX

that it wished to negotiate changes in the Agreement.

Significantly, the Union requested, among other things,

a “substantial”—although unspecified—wage increase.

Over the course of the next nine months, the parties

held twelve meetings, which need only be summarized

here.

The parties’ first meeting occurred on July 1, 1986, and

addressed, among other issues, the Company’s decision

4723

App. 4

to lay off certain Union members shortly before the

negotiations began. The Company said it was “not thrilled

about” the Union’s written proposal, but the Company

had no written proposal of its own. At subsequent meet-

ings on July 22, again on August 8 and again on August

13, the parties addressed such matters as the step in-

creases and the employees’ dental plan, and the Union

explained that it considered the step increase an “integral

part”’ of the Agreement. Despite the Union’s request for

a wage increase, by the fourth meeting the Company still

had not offered even a preliminary wage proposal. Ac-

cording to the Company’s representative, the subject of

wages was~“‘always sort of deferred in [the] first three

meetings.” Although he thus recognized that a significant

outstanding issue had not even been addressed, the Com-

pany’s representative nonetheless volunteered at the

August 13 meeting that it appeared that the parties were

bargaining towards impasse—a conclusion the Union quick-

ly rejected.

At the next meeting on October 1, the Company pre-

sented its proposal, which envisioned twenty modifica-

tions to the Agreement and a slight increase in wages.

Also at that meeting, the Union broached the Company’s

failure to pay the contractually required step increases.

The Company admitted that those step increases had not

been made.

On October 27, the Union filed for arbitration on the

issue of the Company’s failure to pay the step increases.

On November 7, the Company rejected the arbitration

demand. The parties next met on December 12, and again

agreed to defer discussion of economic items to a later

date. At a meeting held on December 16, the parties

agreed to seek the aid of a mediator. Two more meet-

4724

App. 5

ings were held in January of 1987, during which the

parties addressed the possible change in health insurance

carriers and bereavement leave. On January 30, by pre-

arranged agreement, the parties met separately with a

mediator. The Company informed the mediator that an-

other “new” proposal was in the offing.

At a meeting held on February 6, the Company an--

nounced “a new proposal,” and a significant number of

items were indeed raised for the first time. On Febru-

ary 24, the Union agreed to a Company proposal to switch

insurance carriers. On February 26, the parties addressed

a wide variety of outstanding issues, including a pos-

sible withdrawal of a request for arbitration, dental plan

questions, the presence of loose asbestos on Company

premises and the proper composition of the bargaining

unit. The next meeting was scheduled for April 1. Be-

fore that meeting, the Company informed the Union that

it had dropped seven of the new proposals it had first

presented at the February 6 meeting. On April 1, the

Union dropped fourteen demands and modified three

others, and the parties addressed a variety of issues,

resolving a few. At the end of the April 1 session, the

Company appeared ready to meet the next day. The

Union’s lead representative said he would not be avail-

able until April 21 but expressed the Union’s desire to

continue the negotiations. The Company, however, an-

nounced that “given what has gone on here [we] believe

”

we’re at an impasse ....”.

On April 2—four days before the scheduled arbitration

hearing—the Company informed the Union that it would

institute retroactive step increases for the employees

named in the Union’s demand for arbitration. The Union

responded that, in addition to those employees, it sought

4725

App. 6

relief for employees not named in its original demand

for arbitration but who were nonetheless affected by

the Company’s action. The matter proceeded to arbitra-

tion, which the Company refused to attend. The arbitra-

tor ruled in favor of the Union and ordered the Company

to make all employees whole to the extent the Company

had not already done so.

The Company’s alleged violations of the Act were tried

before an Administrative Law Judge over four days in

the fall of 1987. On May 12, 1988, she found that the

Company had prematurely declared an impasse and im-

properly ceased paying contractually required step in-

creases. Nine months later, the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s

ruling, which it expanded to address the Company’s

failure to pay the required wage-step increases since

October 9, 1986. The NLRB, joined by the Union as in-

tervenor, now petitions this court for enforcement of

its order, and the Company cross-petitions to vacate the

Board’s order.

DISCUSSION

An employer bargains in bad faith, and thus violates

sections &aX1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations

Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(aX1), (5), if it unilaterally alters

terms and conditions of employment before first reach-

ing a true impasse in negotiations. See, e.g., NLRB v.

Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). Such unilateral action

“detracts from the legitimacy of the collective bargain-

ing process by impairing the union’s ability to function

effectively, and by giving the impression to members

that a union is powerless.”” Carpenter Sprinkler Corp. v.

NLEB, 605 F. 2d 60, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1979). A genuine im-

passe in negotiations exists when there is “ ‘no realis-

4726

Se ee ome mee

App. 7

tic prospect that continuation of discussion . . . would

[be] fruitful.’’”’ NLRB v. Independent Association of Steel

Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. de-

nied, 489 U.S. 1130 (1979) (citation omitted). A “funda-

mental tenet of the [AlJct [is] that even parties who seem

to be in implacable conflict may, by meeting and dis-

cussion, forge first small links and then strong bonds of

agreement.” AFTRA v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 628 (D.C.

Cir. 1968).

“(TyJhe issue of the existence of an impasse ‘is a ques-

tion of fact peculiarly suited to the Board’s expertise.’ ”

Carpenter Sprinkler Corp., 605 F.2d at 65 (quoting NLRB

v. J.H. Bonck Co., 424 F.2d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1970).

And the Board’s finding of no impasse can be overturned

only if it was not supported by “substantial evidence.”

29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) and (f). While this deferential stan-

dard does not permit an abdication of judicial review,

see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,

490 (1951), our review of the record as a whole persuades

us that substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclu-

sion that no impasse existed.

We cannot fault the determinations of the ALJ and

the Board that the Company prematurely declared an

impasse. Although the negotiations first began in July

of 1986, the Company waited five months after the Union

requested negotiations before presenting it first compre-

hensive written contract proposal on October 1. Four

months later, on February 6, the Company increased

its proposed changes in the Union’s requested contract

from twenty to forty. Relying on those proposals, the

ALJ concluded that bargaining “began anew” on those

dates. We agree, and note for instance that the Com-

pany’s representative repeatedly described the February

4727

App. 8

6 proposal as ‘“‘new,” rather than as essentially the same

proposal with some revisions and modifications. How-

ever, even accepting WPIX’s position that there was no

“new” bargaining but only a continuation of ordinary

“give and take,” the fact remains that the negotiations

were not static. When the Company declared an impasse

on April 1, 1987, changes were being made, revisions were

being offered and, as the ALJ reasonably concluded, the

Union needed more time to evaluate and respond to the

Company’s position.

Further, as of April 1, progress was discernable. The

Company admits, for instance, that on January 30 it told

the mediator that it would revise a few of its proposals,

and that, in a letter dated March 20, 1987, it ‘‘sent sub-

stantial modifications of the Company’s February 6 pro-

posals” to the Union, dropping no fewer than seven of

its demands and modifying others. Yet at the very first

meeting after making those “substantial modifications,”’

the Company declared an impasse.

In the main, WPIX argues that, progress in other areas

notwithstanding, “it is undisputed that, on April 1, the

parties were further apart on each and every critical

economic and flexibility issue than they were when they

commenced bargaining.”” What WPIX ignores, however,

is that significant economic issues, such as wages, were

deliberately deferred at meeting after meeting. If—as

the Company claims—all parties knew those key economic

issues could not be resolved, one might well wonder

why the parties would have bothered to discuss in the

meantime what the company now dismisses as insignifi-

cant issues. The Company itself explains that the Union

“for the first time [at the April 1 meeting] . . . quanti-

fied its initial proposal for a ‘substantial’ wage increase.”

4728

App. 9

Without the premature declaration of the impasse, we

cannot conclude on the record before us that progress

on this proposal would have been unlikely—even if, as

the Company repeatedly emphasizes, the parties’ wage

positions were far apart. An opening negotiating posi-

tion often bears little resemblance to the conditions ulti-

mately accepted after rounds of serious bargaining, and

while the Company places great weight on the distance

between the positions, no serious attempt was ever made

to lessen that distance. See Carpenter Sprinkler Corp.,

605 F.2d at 65 (recognition by both sides that their re-

spective positions are generally far apart is insufficient,

on its own, to support declaration of impasse). We agree

with the Company that there is no requirement that it

devote a full meeting to the discussion of core economic

issues, but where the Company relies on that very defi-

ciency in the negotiations to justify its declaration of

an impasse, it must point to at least some evidence of

negotiations on that subject in the record. In addition,

many mandatory subjects of bargaining, presented in the

February 6 company proposal, were similarly never dis-

cussed.

The Company also urges in support of its claim of im-

passe that the Union dismissed certain company proposals

as being “ridiculous” or a “slap in the face’ to the bar-

gaining unit. The Company, for instance, complains that

Union newsletters stated that the Union would never

accept certain Company proposals. What a party tells

its partisans during negotiations, perhaps to rally sup-

port, may well have little bearing on the terms of em-

ployment that party ultimately accepts. Beyond that,

there is no evidence in the record that WPIX was aware

of the Union newsletters during the negotiations and be-

fore it declared an impasse. A review of the record leaves

4729

App. 10

little doubt that both sides engaged in some exaggera-

tion, posturing and dilatory tactics, as might be expected

in labor negotiations, and none of which is dispositive on

this appeal.

In light of the foregoing, and upon review of the en-

tire record, we conclude that the NLRB’s finding of no

impasse was supported by substantial evidence.

Finally, the Board’s finding that WPIX violated the

Act by failing to pay contractually required step increases

is similarly supported by substantial evidence on the

record considered as a whole. A unilateral change in

an established working condition, such as a unilateral

decision to stop paying contractually required step in-

creases, violates the Act. See, e.g., Katz, 369 U.S. 742-

43. It remains undisputed that the Company stopped pay-

ing the step increases as of September 1986. The Com-

pany instead contends that it acted in good faith, that

it lacked the economic resources to make the increases,

that it made the affected employees whole before the

charges in this case were filed, and that its action at

most constitutes a “technical” violation of the Act. See

United States Postal Service, 253 NLRB 1203, 1206 (1981)

(Penello, concurring) (violation “technical” and needs no or-

dered remedy where “quantum of misconduct is so slight,

or its effect so substantially remedied by the wrongdoer’s

subsequent action’); Bellinger Shipyards, Inc., 227 NLRB

620 (1976) (“ ‘Respondent voluntarily put itself in com-

pliance with the Act. It is considered that such [volun-

tary] action should be encouraged.’ ’’) (citation omitted).

We are not persuaded by the Company’s arguments.

This was not a technical violation on a peripheral issue.

Rather, the step increases affected a principal item under

4730

App. 11

negotiation—the employees’ wages—and remained, as the

Union informed the Company as early as August of 1986,

an “integral part” of the Agreement. By failing to com-

ply with the Agreement on this score, the Company in

effect held hostage the step increases to the completion

of negotiations favorable to the Company. As the Com-

pany’s representative explained, after the Company had

suspended the step increases, “/Ejverything has a price

tag and it might be appropriate to defer those raises so

that the [Clompany would have funds to pay a raise to

the rest of the members of the unit.” (Emphasis added).

In such circumstances the Company cannot belatedly sup-

ply “good faith’ by making retroactive payments only

after it prematurely declared an impasse, and even then

only on the eve of an arbitration in which it refused to

participate, the outcome of which appeared clear. Cf.

Truck Drivers et al. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 425, 427 (D.C.

Cir. 1974) (timing of violator’s remedial action has bear-

ing on Board’s decision). Indeed, good faith alone would

not excuse a violation of the Act. See Katz, 369 U.S. at

742-43.

The Company has also fallen far short of establishing

an economic necessity for its unilateral action—not dis-

positive in any event—while at the same time diminish-

ing the effect of its action. “[R]Jetroactive compensation

eliminated any potential ‘adverse economic effect’ which

the denial of increases may have occasioned,” the Com-

pany contends. But by framing the issue so narrowly,

the Company ignores the fact that such unilateral action

on so important an issue not only undoubtedly affects

employee perceptions of the efficacy of the collective

bargaining process, but also has a real economic effect

few employees would deem “‘slight.”” We are presented

4731

App. 12

here with a deliberate violation of the Act that affected

a central aspect of the collective bargaining process and

denied certain employees part of the wages they were

due.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we find substantial

evidence on the record as a whole supports the Board’s

decision and thus grant the Board’s petition for enforce-

ment of its order and deny WPIX’s cross-petition to set

aside the order.

4732

App. 13

SJC

293 NLRB No. 2 D—9427

New York, NY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

WPIX, INC.

and Case 2—CA—22179

NEWSPAPER GUILD OF NEW YORK

LOCAL 3, THE NEWSPAPER GUILD,

AFL-CIO, CLC

DECISION AND ORDER

On May 12, 1988, Administrative Law Judge Eleanor

MacDonald issued the attached decision. The Respondent

filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Coun-

sel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, the Union

filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief and a reply

brief to the Respondent’s exceptions, and the Respondent

filed an answering brief to the General Counsel’s ard the

Union’s cross-exceptions.

The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its

authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has considered the decision and the rec-

ord in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-

cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,’ and conclu-

1 The co ng oe has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility

findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an ad-

(Footnote continued on following page)

App. 14

sions? and to adopt the recommended Order as modi-

fied.

1 continued

ministrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear pre-

ponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are

incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.

188 F.2d 362 (8d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record

and find no basis for reversing the findings.

We agree with the judge that the Respondent’s failure to pay

the wage-step increases required by the 1983-1986 contract, which

the parties had extended, violated Sec. &aX5) and (1) of the Act.

Because we also agree with the judge’s finding that the Respon-

dent had prematurely declared impasse in its negotiations for a

successor vs when it unilaterally implemented the terms

of its last offer, we find it unnecessary to pass on her further find-

ing that the failure to pay the wage-step increases under the old

contract would preclude reaching a lawful impasse in the negotia-

tions for the successor agreement.

2 The General Counsel and the Union contend that the Respon-

dent lacked overall good faith and engaged in surface bargaining

throughout the negotiations. We disagree. The record clear

shows that the Respondent was willing to meet and confer with

the Union, exchange proposals, and modify its positions in an at-

tempt to reach oe with the Union. See, e.g., G. Zaffino

& Sons, 275 NLRB 456 (1985); United Technologies Corp., 274

NLRB 1069, 1074 (1985), enfd. 789 F.2d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 1986).

The General Counsel and the Union also argue, inter alia, that

the Respondent’s proposal to conduct arbitration under the Federal

Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) in lieu of the American

Arbitration Association (AAA) was in retaliation for the Union’s

wage-step grievance. Even assuming that this matter was fully

litigated at the hearing, the General Counsel has failed to prove

an &a\X5) violation. The Respondent explained, without contradic-

tion, that it made the proposal because the AAA had mandated

the selection of an arbitrator previously rejected by the Respon-

dent to conduct the wage-step arbitration. The Respondent also

maintained that the services of the FMCS are less costly than

those offered by the AAA. Accordingly, we conclude that the Re-

spondent did not make the proposal in bad faith.

3 We shall issue amended conclusions of law, a modified Order,

and a new notice to employees that more closely conform to the

violations found.

App. 15

Amended Conclusions of Law

1. Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 3.

“3. By unilaterally failing to pay contractually required

wage-step increases since October 9, 1986, the Respon-

dent refused to bargain in violation of Section 8(aX5) and

(1) of the Act.”

2. Insert the following as Conclusion of Law 4 and re-

number the subsequent conclusion of law.

“4. By unilaterally implementing changes in terms and

conditions of employment from April 1, 1987, at which

time no bargaining impasse existed, the Respondent re-

fused to bargain in violation of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of

the Act.”

ORDER

The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recom-

mended Order of the administrative law judge as modi-

fied below and orders that the Respondent, WPIX, Inc.,

New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and

assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as

modified.

1. Insert the following paragraph l(a) and reletter the

subsequent paragraphs.

“(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union

by unilaterally failing to pay contractually required wage-

step increases since October 9, 1986.”

2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-

istrative law judge.

Dated, Washington, D.C. February 28, 1989

(SEAL)

App. 16

James M. Stephens, Chairman

Wilford W. Johansen, Member

Mary Miller Cracraft, Member

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

App. 17

APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we

violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered

us to post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize

To form, join, or assist any union

To bargain collectively through representatives of

their own choice

To act together for other mutual aid or protection

To choose not to engage in any of these protected

concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Newspaper Guild

of New York Local 3, The Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO,

CLC by unilaterally failing to pay contractually required

wage-step increases.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the Union by uni-

laterally changing wage rates and other terms and condi-

tions of employment in the absence of bargaining impasse.

The bargaining unit is:

INCLUDED: News editors, assignment editors, senior

writers, news writers, sports specialist, senior assign-

ment desk assistants, talent coordinators, graphic ar-

tists, assignment desk assistants, graphics assistants,

production assistants and telephone clerks in the

news department of WPIX-TV.

EXCLUDED: All other employees in the News De-

partment of WPIX-TV, including News Director, Ex-

ecutive Producer, Managing Editor, Producers, Metro-

politan Editor, Graphics Director, Business Manager,

administrative assistant (confidential secretary), all

App. 18

employees represented by other labor organizations,

guards, watchmen and supervisors as defined in the

Act.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere

with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights

guaranteed you by Section 7 of ine Act.

WE WILL make whole all bargaining unit employees for

any losses they may have suffered as a result of our un-

lawful unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of

employment, with interest.

WE WILL, on request from the Union, revoke any uni-

lateral changes in terms and conditions of employment and

reinstate the terms and conditions that existed before our

unlawful changes, although this does not mean that we

must rescind any wage or benefit increase granted-to unit

employees.

WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with the Union

with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and

other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an

understanding is reached, embody such understanding in

a signed agreement.

WPIX, INC.

(Employer)

(Representative) (Title)

This is an official notice and must not be defaced by

anyone.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days

from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,

or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-

ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be

Floren to the Then = Office, 26 Federal Plaza, New

York, New York 10278-0104, Telephone 212-264-0360.

App. 19

JD(N Y)—32—88

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

DIVISION OF JUDGES

NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE

WPIX, INC.

and Case No. 2—CA—22179

NEWSPAPER GUILD OF NEW YORK

LOCAL 3, THE NEWSPAPER GUILD,

AFL-CIO, CLC

ERRATUM

On 12 May 1988, the undersigned issued a Decision and

Recommended Order in the above-captioned case. Conclu-

sion of Law No. 4 found that “Respondent did not engage

in unfair labor practices other than those found herein.”

In the preparation of the Recommended Order, the foi-

lowing was inadvertently omitted and it is hereby added

after line 21 page 16:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and

it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleged violations of

the Act not specifically found herein.

Dated: Washington, D.C. May 24, 1988

/s/ ELEANOR MACDONALD

Eleanor MacDonald

Administrative Law Judge

App. 20

JD(N Y)—32—88

New York, NY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

DIVISION OF JUDGES

NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE

WPIX, INC.

and Case 2—CA—22179

NEWSPAPER GUILD OF NEW YORK

LOCAL 3, THE NEWSPAPER GUILD,

AFL-CIO, CLC

James Wasserman, Esq., for the

General Counsel

Richard L. Marcus, Esq. and

Susan M. Benton-Powers, Esq.

(Isham, Lincoln & Beale), of

Chicago, IL for Respondent.

Louis Pechman, ~~ | (Vladeck,

Waldman, Elias & Engelhardt),

of New York, NY for the Charging

Party

DECISION

Statement of the Case

ELEANOR MACDONALD, Administrative Law Judge:

This case was tried in New York, New York on 20, 21

and 22 October and 12 November 1987. The complaint al-

leges that Respondent, in violation of Sections &aX1) and

(5) and 8 (d) of the Act, failed to grant employees step

increases due under the collective bargaining agreement,

| asinine tiated ciel

App. 21

offered inconsistent and contradictory written proposals,

threatened to repudiate an agreement unless the Union

withdrew a pending grievance, refused to bargain about

employee evaluation criteria, declared a premature and

invalid impasse and unilaterally changed numerous terms

and conditions of employment. Respondent denies that it

failed to bargain in good faith, alleges that the Union

delayed the negotiations and engaged in surface bargain-

ing and alleges that the parties had negotiated to impasse

by 1 April 1987. In addition, Respondent raises the statute

of limitations as a bar to the allegations regarding cer-

tain of the step increases.

Upon the entire record, including my observation of the

demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration

of the briefs filed by General Counsel and Respondent,

I make the following:?

Findings of Fact

I. Jurisdiction

Respondent, a New York corporation with an office at

11 WPIX Plaza in New York, New York, operates radio

and television broadcasting stations. Respondent annual-

ly derives gross revenues in excess of $100,000, adver-

tises products sold nationally and subscribes to national!

wire services. The parties agree and I find that Respon-

dent is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-

ing of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act and that News-

paper Guild of New York Local 3, The Newspaper Guild,

1 After the initial exchange of briefs in January, 1988, both Gen-

eral Counsel and Respondent filed additional letters. I have con-

sidered these in reaching my decision.

App. 22

AFL-CIO, CLC is a labor organization within the mean-

ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.

II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices

A. The Negotiations Generally

The Union represents the following unit of employees

of Respondent:

INCLUDED: News editors, assignment editors, senior

writers, news writers, sports specialist, senior assign-

ment desk assistants, talent coordinators, graphic ar-

tists, assignment desk assistants, graphics assistants,

production assistants and telephone clerks in the

news department of WPIX-TV.

EXCLUDED: All other employees in the News De-

partment of WPIX-TV, including News Director, Ex-

ecutive Producer, Managing Editor, Producers, Metro-

politan Editor, Graphics Director, Business Manager,

administrative assistant (confidential secretary), all

employees represented by other labor organizations,

— watchmen and supervisors as defined in the

ct.

Respondent and the Union have been parties to a series

of three-year contracts. At the time relevant to the in-

stant case, WPIX and the Union were negotiating a suc-

cessor agreement to the one with a term from 25 June

1983 to 24 June 1986.

There were 12 negotiating sessions from 1 July 1986

through 1 April 1987, when WPIX declared that an im-

passe existed and unilaterally implemented its last offer.

B. Summary of the Negotiating Sessions

For the first four negotiating sessions, WPIX was repre-

sented by Andrew L. Hughes, Esq., who had represented

App. 23

it in prior negotiations. General Counsel does not allege

“that Hughes acted in bad faith either at or away from

the bargaining table.”

On 21 May 1986, the Union had submitted its proposals

for the new contract. The demands included changes re-

lating to union security, grievance and arbitration proce-

dure, probationary period, recall list, posting of schedules,

paid holidays, and leaves of absence. The Union said it

wanted to negotiate a “substantial” wage increase, but

no amounts were specified. The Union sought to eliminate

the factor of ability to perform the work from the layoff

and recall provisions of the contract, it sought greater job

security in the face of technological advances, it sought

improvements in severance pay and it sought to reduce

the work week and improve overtime, missed meal com-

pensation, vacations, and sick leave provisions.

The first negotiating session took place on 1 July 1986.

The Union expressed concern that after recent layoffs,

interns might be performing unit work. The Union had

previously sent its written proposal which Hughes was

“not thrilled about.’”” The Company had no written pro-

posal. Hughes said the Company was subject to a “severe

financial crunch” and could not add to the contract.

Hughes mentioned that he was concerned about large

severance pay amounts already due and the fact that em-

ployees were “banking” their vacations from year to year.

The second negotiating session took place on 22 July

1986. There was additional discussion of the use of interns.

2H was accompanied by Senior Vice President John Corporon

and other employees of WPIX. The Union was represented by busi-

ness representative William Montes, unit chairperson William

O’Meara and other unit employees. On some occasions, James

Madden, Esq., a business agent was present with the Union team.

App. 24

Hughes said he wanted to take seniority out of the con-

tract and put a cap on severance pay. Hughes complained

about the cost of the overtime payment for missed lunch

periods. No written Company proposal was presented.

The third negotiating session took place on 8 August

1986. The Company had no written proposal and Hughes

explained that he had to figure out a way to sell give-

backs to the Union. He said the Company could afford

very little and that it needed improvements but that it

was not seeking “wage cuts.” Perhaps more layoffs would

be needed to fund the next wage increase. Hughes men-

tioned a selective wage freeze and the Union said that

would present a problem. Hughes said the Company wanted

to eliminate the step increase method of granting wage

increases and Montes said it was an “integral part” of

the contract and that he opposed the suggestion. The

Company suggested either a new dental plan or a higher

deductible to hold down costs of the plan. The Union

asked to see a written proposal concerning the dental

plan. Hughes discussed the Union’s demand for two weeks’

notice of scheduling and stated that it did not give the

Company enough flexibility.

The fourth negotiating session took place on 13 August

1986. Hughes said he had no “good news.” The Company

had new cost cutting edicts. O’Meara testified that Hughes

said a time might come when the company would come

to the Union “with a more limited set of conditions that

[the Union] would have a limited time to accept other-

wise it would be imposed unilaterally.” I credit O’Meara’s

testimony. Hughes said the parties were bargaining to im-

passe. Montes replied, not yet but that the parties were

approaching the point of no return. He said the parties

had not even begun negotiating. Hughes handed out a

written proposal on behalf of WPIX. Hughes testified that

App. 25

on 13 August 1987 he did not have a complete wage pro-

posal despite his earlier promise to have one for that

meeting. Hughes had been told that the aim of WPIX

was to eliminate inefficiencies and cut costs. The Union

proposals would have increased costs. Hughes testified

that he did not discuss wages with the Union because the

subject was “deferred.” The Company also gave the Union

information about the new dental plan. After confirming

that no other changes would be made, the Union accepted

the new dental plan.? :

The next meeting had been scheduled for mid-Septem-

ber. In the event, the parties did not meet until October

1986.

Beginning 1 October 1986, the Chief Union spokesman

was Sidney Kress, Esq., staff attorney and business agent.

WPIX’s chief spokesman, Hughes, had been replaced by

Richard L. Marcus, Esq. The Union presented modifica-

tions to its proposal of May, 1986. The Company pre-

sented a complete written proposal which it explained was

a new proposal to replace the document prepared by

Hughes in August. The Company proposals contained 20

numbered items.

On 1 October 1986, WPIX proposed that employees

would no longer be paid for skipped meals. Employees

consistently worked a 40 hour week and did not take the

meal period allotted every working day. Instead, they

were paid % hour overtime for every working day, of 2%

hours per week. The evidence shows that this procedure

* The new dental plan insurance carrier was Aetna. Under the

new plan, effective 1 October 1986, the deductible was increased

and a change was made to increase preventive coverage. The plan

gt ne for two free teeth cleanings with a dentist to be chosen

y the individual employees.

App. 26

added a substantial sum to the employees’ weekly pay-

checks, estimated by Marcus to average 6% of wages for

the unit employees.

Kress questioned a memorandum issued by WPIX to

unit members which abolished the system of free dental

cleanings with Drs. Frankel and Marx as of 1 October

1986.4

Kress told Marcus that the Company had failed to grant

step wage increases under the contract.5 According to

O’Meara, Marcus replied that the step increases were not

being paid and that “everything has a price tag and it

might be appropriate to defer those raises so the Com-

pany would have funds to pay a raise to the rest of the

members in the unit.” The Union responded that it was

filing a grievance over the failure to grant the increases,

and the Company agreed to waive a formal grievance ses-

sion. The Union stated that it would file for arbitration.

The WPIX proposals of 1 October 1986 contained a pay

schedule different from that in effect, and conditioned

movement after one or two steps upon management’s judg-

ment of merit. Those not at the top of the scale would

receive up to a 2% wage increase. In the Union’s view,

the 2% wage increase for some employees taken together

with the Company’s proposal to eliminate the skipped

4 This system had provided each unit employee with two free clean-

ings per year with Drs. Frankel and Marx. WPIX eliminated the

system because the new Aetna dental coverage, effective on 1

October, provided two free cleanings with the employees’ own den-

tists.

5 It is undisputed that the 1983-1986 contract remained in effect

during the rae gp pase The step increases were based on an em-

ployee’s length of service in his or her job title.

App. 27

meal payment would effectuate a substantial wage de-

crease for unit employees.

A meeting was scheduled for November, but it was can-

celled due to the illness of Kress and his subsequent de-

parture from the Guild.

The next bargaining session took place on 12 December

1986. Kress was replaced as chief union spokesman by Leo

Ducharme, international representative. The parties went

through the Company proposals in detail. After they did

so, Ducharme said that the proposals were damaging to

unit members’ morale. Marcus replied that the Company

did not wish to destroy morale, but Ducharme said the

Company would not be able to convince the Union of its

need for the proposals. Ducharme asked if the Company

would agree to any of the Union demands. The parties

indicated which items were high priority and which were

less important. The parties discussed the Company pro-

posal to eliminate the paramount use of seniority in deter-

mining order of layoff.* Ducharme indicated that the par-

ties were at “opposite poles” but that there was a “mid-

dle ground.” Marcus said he would discuss the proposal

with the Company. The Union offered to drop its griev-

ance procedure proposal if the Company also dropped its

proposal. Marcus refused this offer.

The parties next met on 16 December. At the Union’s

suggestion they discussed a number of grievances includ-

ing the elimination of the free dental cleanings. They

agreed to contact a federal mediator.

® As of 12 December, the Union’s _—_ on layoffs removed

all reference to skill and ability and relied on seniority.

App. 28

The parties next met on 13 January 1987. They dis-

cussed various proposals including bereavement leave and

paternity leave. The company mentioned that it was possi-

ble to change the carrier for the medical insurance plan

and the Union agreed to meet with representatives of

Aetna, the proposed new carrier, on 20 January. O’Meara

testified that at Marcus’ instance, proposals and demands

that were economic in nature were deferred from discus-

sion and were agreed to be “part of the final package.”

On 20 January, the Union representatives met with Aetna

in the morning. The meeting ended with a promise from

Aetna to prepare a new proposal for coverage.

The parties met in the afternoon of 20 January for con-

tract negotiations. The inconclusive nature of the current

Aetna proposal was discussed. The parties discussed a

new written bereavement policy. The Union narrowed its

demand. Marcus had been trying to contact the mediator,

and he reported that he had finally been successful and

that the mediator was available on 30 January 1987.

On 30 January 1987, the parties each met separately

with the federal mediator.

The parties next met on 6 February 1987. Marcus an-

nounced that as a result of the negotiations so far and

his discussions of his proposals with the Company, he was

presenting a new proposal. The document contained 40

numbered items. Marcus then went through the new pro-

posal point by point and explained any questions the

Union posed about the proposal. Some of the proposals

were revisions of earlier proposals. According to Marcus,

a number of the proposals were entirely new and were

based on information Marcus had obtained in preparing

for negotiations with other units of WPIX unit employees.

App. 29

The arbitration provisions were to be changed substan-

tially so as to establish a new appointing agency and to

remove decisions as to procedural and substantive arbitra-

bility from the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.? Considera-

tion of seniority was entirely removed from the clause

relating to reduction in force and recall from layoff. Mar-

cus proposed deleting the clause that stated the Com-

pany’s and the Union’s recognition that technological

change could cause loss of jobs and the Company’s con-

tinued efforts to consider employees displaced by techno-

logical change for other positions. Marcus proposed chang-

ing the practice whereby severance pay was granted upon

layoff; the new proposal would make it payable only upon

expiration of the recall period. The new proposals would

remove the preference for unit employees in the filling

of vacancies and would give management the right to de-

mote employees even after completion of the probationary

period established in the old contract. Other changes in-

7 Senior Vice President Corporon testified that since 1972, arbitra-

tions between the parties had been conducted under the auspices

of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The Company had

not proposed any change in the contractual arbitration procedure.

However, by 6 February 1987, the Union had requested arbitra-

tion of its grievance over the Company’s failure te grant the con-

tractually mandated step up pay increases. Marcus objected to ar-

bitration on the ground that the Union was not bargaining fast

enough and he objected to continuation of the contract provisions

which WPIX sought to eliminate through negotiations. The AAA

ordered the arbitration to proceed over Marcus’ objections and the

hearing was scheduled for 6 April 1987. On 2 April, Marcus ad-

vised the Union that WPIX would retroactively pay the step up

increases due under the contract. He did not appear at the arbi-

tration hearing held on 6 April. The arbitrator upheld the griev-

ance. Marcus’ 6 February proposal replacing the AAA with the

Federal Mediation and Conciliation service and removing all ques-

tions of arbitrability from the jurisdiction of the arbitrator would

have the effect of forcing the Union into court litigation if the com-

pany objected to arbitrating a grievance under the new contract.

App. 30

volved payment of overtime, doubletime, posting of sched-

ules in a timely fashion, holiday pay and entitlement to

vacations. WPIX had previously proposed a change in the

banking of vacation time so that it would be paid at the

rate earned: Now, Marcus proposed eliminating the possi-

bility of banking vacation time altogether unless the Com-

pany requested an employee to defer a vacation. The

Company proposals would permit it to make more exten-

sive use of temporary employees. WPIX proposed to de-

lete news editors from the unit. On 6 February 1987, Mar-

cus for the first time proposed a 3 year contract. Before

that date, the Company had sought a 2 year contract.

Marcus recalled that after he presented the new set of

proposals to the Union, Ducharme expressed the opinion

that the Company was trying to avoid reaching a collec-

tive bargaining agreement.

The parties agreed effective 1 March 1987, to change

the medical insurance coverage to Aetna as proposed by

WPIX. The parties agreed on an interim basis to main-

tain a level of employee and employer contribution to the

cost until a new contract was reached between them.

The Union had recently requested arbitration of the

issue raised by the Company’s abolition of the free clean-

ings with Drs. Frankel and Marx. WPIX took the position

that the new dental coverage with Aetna was a replace-

ment for the Frankel-Marx benefit.

The parties next met on 26 February 1987. On that day,

they discussed the presence of asbestos in the workplace

in an area under construction and what safeguards would

be taken to protect employees.

The parties discussed the Company’s proposal of 6 Feb-

ruary 1987 to remove the news editor from the bargain-

ing unit. The Company rationale was that the position

App. 31

should be in management because under its proposed new

system of merit increases, the news editor would evaluate

employees’ performance. The Union asked what criteria

would be used in evaluating performance for merit in-

creases. WPIX replied that the criteria had not been

developed and that this would be done by management

after the Union agreed to the proposal. The Union said

it would not accept the proposal. The Union believed the

merit system of increases based on employer’s criteria is

unjust. However, the Union has two contracts in which

such merit increases are provided.

Marcus testified that Ducharme asked him about the

merit review and “what’s going to be involved?” He re-

plied that WPIX “had not formulated any specific system

for doing that as of this time... .”” According to Marcus,

this was the only time the Union raised the question of

merit reviews.

At the end of the meeting, Marcus said he could not

set up another date but that after consulting with manage-

ment he would get back to the Union. The parties subse-

quently agreed to meet on 1 April 1987. Marcus testified

that he told the Union no progress had been made and

that he had to confer with Corporon who was not then

present, before he could set another date.

On 20 March, Marcus sent a letter to Ducharme deleting

7 of the Company’s proposals and modifying the severance

pay and vacation pay proposals. WPIX abandoned its at-

tempt to remove news editors from the unit and to delete

from the agreement the provision for employees dislocated

by technological change and the provision relating to

schedule posting. The Company dropped its proposal per-

mitting demotions after the probationary period. WPIX

also revised its proposal relating to interns. In his letter

App. 32

of 20 March, Marcus expressed a sense of urgency about

the negotiations and the hope that they could be concluded

as quickly as possible.

The parties met on 1 April 1987. They discussed the

issue of performance of unit work by nonunit employees.

The Union questioned the meaning and intent of the lan-

guage proposed by the company and said it could accept

a provision within stated limits. No agreement was reached

on this topic. At the 1 April meeting, the Union dropped

a number of demands relating to coverage of the contract,

union security, job security, severance pay, probationary

periods and overtime. The Union proposed a wage in-

crease of 8% per year. The Union modified its demand

relating to vacation, sick leave and paternity leave. The

Union discussed the Company proposal to require griev-

ances to be filed within 30 days. It proposed 90 days; no

agreement was reached on this issue, but some language

on grievances was worked out. Thus, Marcus accepted the

Union proposal that the time for filing a grievance would

start to run when the employee knew or should have

known of the grievance. The Union accepted the Com-

pany’s proposal to add language prohibiting the arbitrator

from adding to, ignoring or modifying the provisions of

the agreement. The Union still refused to accept a change

in the agency appointing the arbitrator.

Ducharme asked if the Company had any position on

the Union modifications. Marcus repliec. that they could

not accept any of them under any circumstances.

At about 4:15pm, the Union representatives said they

had to leave and they asked to set up the next meeting.

Marcus said he was available the next day, but Ducharme

could not meet until 21 April. At that point Marcus said

the company believed the negotiations were at impasse,

App. 33

and that WPIX was terminating the contract and imple-

menting its proposal. Ducharme responded that the Union

position was that there was no impasse and that the

Union “was ready to continue discussing the proposals

and to move on our proposals.” Ducharme told Marcus

that the Union had expected the Company to declare im-

passe based on its 20 March 1987 letter. But Ducharme

reiterated that he was willing to negotiate and to make

additional modifications. Marcus replied that if the Union

had something else to propose it should write him a let-

ter. Then Marcus left. Corporon held a meeting in the

newsroom with unit employees about an hour later to in-

form the employees that an impasse had been declared

and the Respondent’s proposals implemented.

Marcus testified that elimination of the missed meal pay-

ment to unit employees would amount to about a 6% pay

cut per annum. The company was proposing a 2% pay in-

crease (but without taking into account the defacto 6%

decrease in the other part of its proposal). When on 1

April 1987 the Union proposed an 8% wage increase, Mar-

cus did not view this as a basis for negotiations. He stated

that the Company “proposal was not made as a means

of seeking middle ground. It was a proposal made to try

and reduce the costs that the Company was bearing.’’®

According to O’Meara, the parties to the negotiations

had mutually agreed that discussion of “economic” items

would be deferred until a final discussion of all economic

matters could resolve the cost of the overall agreement.

O’Meara recalled that Marcus introduced the concept that

all matters of financial impact would be deferred until a

later stage of the negotiations.

8 Marcus stated that at no point in the negotiations from 1 Oc-

tober 1986 through 1 April 1987 did he consider accepting a union

demand as a trade off for a Company proposal.

App. 34

C. Specific Violations Alleged in the Complaint

1. Failure to Grant Step Up Increases

It is undisputed that the 1983-1986 contract between the

parties remained in effect during the negotiations. Article

XVII of the contract provided minimum wages for each

job title classification of the unit employees and provided

for so-called step up increases after specified time periods

such as 6 months, 1 year, 2 years or more. On 1 October

1986, the Union informed Company negotiators that the

step increases were not being granted as required by the

contract. Marcus acknowledged that the increases were

not being paid. The Union announced that it was filing

a grievance over the failure to grant step wage increases,

the Company agreed to waive the formal grievance ses-

sion, and the Union stated that it would file for arbitra-

tion. The Company resisted arbitration on the ground that

the Union should not have been seeking to enforce the

wage provisions of the contract while the Company wanted

to modify those provisions through collective bargaining.

The American Arbitration Association scheduled the mat-

ter for an arbitration hearing to be held on 3 April 1987.

On 2 April 1987, the Company advised the Union that

it had “decided to institute retroactive wage adjustments”

for certain employees. The arbitration hearing was held

without the appearance of the Company, and by award

dated 13 May 1987, the arbitrator upheld the grievance

and ordered WPIX to make the employees whole. At the

trial herein, the parties stipulated that the employees

named in the instant complaint, as amended by General

Counsel, had received retroactive wage increases “‘short-

ly” after 2 April 1987.

The conclusion is inescapable that each individual failure

to pay the wage required by the contract, including the

mandated step up increases, is unlawful and in violation

App. 35

of Section &aX1) and (5) of the Act. Abbey Medical/Abbey

Rents, Inc., 264 NLRB 969, 975 (1982). The defense based

on the statute of limitations is without merit as to each

failure to pay the proper wage from 9 October 1986, a

date 6 months before the filing of the instant charge. Fur-

ther, Respondent’s contention that the violation is ‘tech-

nical” and does not warrant a remedial order is not sup-

ported by the cases cited in Respondent’s brief. Bellinger

Shipyards, Inc., 227 NLRB 620 (1976); Deringer Com-

pany, 201 NLRB 622 (1973). In those cases, the Board

found that the unlawful conduct was “minimal” and that

“there was no showing that the employees were adversely

affected.” In the instant case, employees were denied

wages due to them under the contract, an adverse eco-

nomic effect which no employee views as minimal.

2. Threat to Repudiate an Agreement

General Counsel asserts that the Company threatened

to repudiate the agreement reached about new medical

and dental insurance unless the Union withdrew a pend-

ing grievance relating to the two annual free dental clean-

ings provided by Drs. Frankel and Marx. The testimony

of all the witnesses shows that for some time the Com-

pany paid for the free cleanings and that under the new

dental insurance plan agreed to by the parties effective

1 October 1986 two free cleanings were provided for by

the dentist of the employee’s choice.® The issue centers

® The c s in health insurance were made in two stages. In

August oe the parties agreed on a change in dental coverage

effective 1 October 1986. Begi in January, 1987, the parties

discussed other aspects of medical insurance. A final agreement

on all dental and medical coverage was reached effective 1 March

1987.

App. 36

on the discontinuance of the Drs. Frankel and Marx clean-

ings in October, 1986, and the Union’s filing of a griev-

ance over the loss of the benefit. On 26 February 1987,

O’Meara understood Marcus to say that unless the Union

withdrew its pending grievance, the Company would with-

draw from the agreement to participate in the new Aetna

dental and medical insurance plan, which was to be ef-

fective on 1 March 1987. Marcus testified that he told the

Union that the new plan provided for free dental clean-

ings, and he wished the agreement about medical and den-

tal insurance to resolve all open issues prospectively from

1 March 1987. Marcus testified that at no point did he

press the Union to withdraw the grievance in return for

continued Company adherence to the agreement for new

dental and medical insurance. In fact, the arbitration was

held in July, 1987, and the grievance was denied. I find

that O’Meara misunderstood Marcus’ comments at the

bargaining table. I find that Marcus did not threaten to

withdraw from the insurance agreement unless the Union

dropped its grievance. Instead, I find that Marcus said

the Company would not proceed with the insurance plan

unless it resolved all issues from the date of 1 March 1987.

Thus, I do not find that Respondent violated the Act.

3. Inconsistent and Contradictory Proposals and

Refusal to Discuss Evaluation Criteria

General Counsel cites as examples of inconsistent pro-

posals made by the Company the following: Hughes stated

he was not asking for a wage reduction but Marcus later

proposed such a reduction; Hughes had apparently worked

on a proposal which retained a system of step up increases

while Marcus’ proposal eliminated the step increases and

gave a 2% or lower across the Board increase to em-

ployees, depending on their current rate.

1

App. 37

The testimony shows that Hughes had announced that

he was under instructions to cut costs, that he had to find

a way to sell give backs to the Union and that he wanted

to eliminate the missed meal payments to employees.

Hughes did not say he would ask for a wage cut, but he

did mention the possibility of a freeze or future layoffs

to cut costs. Hughes never actually made a wage proposal

to the Union. Marcus did make a wage proposal entail-

ing a 2% or lower wage increase, which when coupled

with the loss of missed meal payments, would have meant

a net wage loss to the employees. Further, although in-

ternal Company documents suggest Hughes worked on

a proposal to keep the step increases, he never presented

it, nor any other wage scale, to the Union.

Based on these facts, I cannot find any inconsistency.

Both Hughes and Marcus gave fair notice that the Com-

pany wished to cut costs and that draconian measures

would be proposed to the Union. Both targeted specifically

the missed meal payments which amounted to at least 6%

of employee wages. Although Marcus’ proposal to elim-

inate the step increases angered the Union, it was not

inconsistent with Hughes’ proposals since Hughes had not

given the Union a wage proposal.

Another example of an inconsistent Company proposal

cited by General Counsel is the exchange of 1 April 1987 .

concerning performance of unit work.

In its proposal of 1 October 1986, as modified on 6 Feb-

ruary 1987, the Company had proposed language permitting

non-bargaining unit employees occasionally to perform bar-

gaining unit work. In response to Ducharme’s question

on 1 April about the meaning and implementation of the

language, Marcus replied that it would permit Corporon

or his secretary to answer the telephone in the newsroom

iii

App. 38

or book a guest for the show. O’Meara testified that he

stated that this interpretation was in accord with current

practice. Ducharme said the Union could accept the pro-

posal providing it would not change present practice. Mar-

cus replied that the examples he had just given were not

exhaustive and that the clause might be applied different-

ly. The Union then stated that it would not accept the

proposal.

General counsel argues that Marcus’ actions amount to

“a sudden shift to increased demands that were incon-

sistent with [Marcus’] prior explanation” in order to avoid

reaching an agreement with the Union. I do not find that

the facts are consistent with General Counsel’s theory.

In this case, Marcus and the Union engaged in a brief

exchange about the meaning of a Company proposal. In

response to the Union’s statement that if the meaning were

limited it would accept the proposal, Marcus hastened to

explain that the language could be read in a more expan-

sive way. This is not a situation where the Company had

been adamantly insisting on a provision and had explained

it at length only to change its proposal once the Union

seemed willing to agree. Cf. NLRB v Herman Sausage

Co., 275 F.2d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 1960). Instead, Marcus’

explanation of his initial explanation came during the ex-

change concerning the meaning and intent of the proposed

language. It would hardly serve the cause of collective

bargaining to limit a party’s permissible explanation of

its proposals to one or two sentences; the give and take

of negotiations requires the ability to explore a proposal

at length.

General Counsel supports the allegation that WPIX re-

fused to discuss the evaluation criteria to be employed

by the Company under the wage proposal by the follow-

ing: On 1 October 1986, Marcus proposed that future

App. 39

movement to the top wage rates for a job title classi-

fication would be ‘‘at the Company’s discretion.” This was

part of the proposal to eliminate the automatic step in-

creases and substitute merit evaluations. On 6 February

1987, Marcus also proposed elimination of the news editor

from the bargaining unit since that employee would hence-

forth be involved in conducting the merit evaluation for

unit employees.

On 26 February, when the Union asked what criteria

would be used in merit evaluations, Marcus replied that

these had not yet been formulated. He said the criteria

would be formulated by the Company after the Union ac-

cepted the proposal to remove the news editor from the

unit. Even after Marcus deleted the proposal to drop news

editors from the unit on 20 March 1987, he still proposed

that raises to the top wage rates would be determined

by the Company, but he still did not provide any criteria

for the Company’s exercise of its “discretion.”

General Counsel urges that by proposing raises at the

Company’s unilateral discretion without discussing the ap-

plicable criteria, WPIX removed the highly significant sub-

ject of wages from the bargaining table.

The evidence shows that on 26 February 1987, the

Union asked what the criteria for wage increases would

be under the Company’s proposal, and Marcus said these

had not yet been developed. I can find no indication that

the Union asked about the criteria again. Marcus’ state-

ment that the Company would develop the criteria was

thus the last word on the subject before he declared im-

passe on 1 April 1987.

I do not find that the Union ever requested WPIX to

bargain about the criteria for granting pay raises, thus

I do not find that Respondent refused to bargain on this

issue.

App. 40

4. Declaration of Impasse and Unilateral Changes

The conclusion seems clear that there was no true im-

passe between the parties on 1 April 1987 when the Com-

pany declared impasse.

The parties began negotiations in July, 1986. After four

meetings, during which no wage proposal was submitted

by the Company, a new Company bargaining representa-

tive came on the scene with a new set of proposals to re-

place the incomplete Company proposals presented earlier.

Thus, on 1 October 1986, the bargaining in essence began

anew. The parties met six times from 1 October 1986 to

30 January 1987. During these sessions the Company pre-

sented its new proposals on 1 October. On 12 December,

the parties discussed the Company proposal in detail and

the Union offered to compromise on the grievance pro-

cedure and sought a middle ground on the seniority issue.

On 16 December, the parties discussed pending griev-

ances. On 13 January bargaining took place on certain

leave issues. On 20 January the parties dealt with medi-

cal insurance and the Union narrowed its demand on be-

reavement leave. On 30 January the mediator was brought

in and met with the parties separately. Nothing in this

brief summary indicates that there was a failure of the

bargaining process. Instead, there was exploration of the

parties’ aims and proposals, offers of compromise by the

Union and a resort to the assistance of a mediator.

Then on 6 February 1987, the Company presented a

new set of proposals containing 40 items. Some of these

were changes to the 20 proposals presented by Marcus

on 10 October 1986, but many of these were new de-

mands. For the most part, the new proposals did not rep-

resent an attempt to compromise with the Union by tak-

ing into account Union concerns or demands. Many of the

0

Ab octet sa sv oie ca

App. 41

proposals of 6 February were -unfavorable to the Union

and involved more retrogression in employee rights under

the contract than did the proposals of 1 October 1987. In-

deed, Marcus candidly testified that he prepared the

WPIX proposals of 6 February based on new information

he had acquired concerning the Company’s needs. In a

sense, the bargaining again began anew on 6 February.

The Union had new demands and new language to con-

sider.

The parties met 3 times to consider the 6 February pro-

posals. On 6 February the new proposals were given to

the Union and were discussed. On 26 February, the par-

ties met; they discussed removal of the news editor from

the unit, criteria for merit increases and an asbestos prob-

lem. The new medical insurance plan was finally agreed

to. By letter of 20 March, WPIX dropped some of its pro-

posals and moved close to the Union position on others.

On 1 April, the Union dropped some of its proposals and

modified others; it also proposed some compromise on the

subject of grievances. Thus, some progress was indeed

made by the parties in bringing their positions closer to-

gether; each side dropped demands deemed unfavorable

by the other. This movement indicates that bargaining

was not exhausted and that it would not have been futile

to continue collective bargaining negotiations. The Union

wanted to negotiate further. The fact that the parties

were not close on many issues does not indicate that the

negotiations were deadlocked; it shows that the parties

still had many hours of bargaining before them in order

to resolve their differences. The parties had met only 3

times since the new proposals of 6 February 1987. By the

nature of the issues still to be resolved, it was to be ex-

pected that the negotiations would be lengthy and dif-

ficult. Moreover, the evidence shows that parties had

App. 42

never bargained extensively about wages. WPIX had pro-

posed to change the automatic step increase system to

a merit system based on employer evaluations. The Union

had expressed its opposition to this new system. In ad-

dition, the employer’s 2% wage increase offer was too low,

in the view of the Union. But no extended discussion of

wages had ever taken place. The uncontradicted testimony

shows that wage discussions had been deferred by mutual

agreement. In fact, it was not until 1 April 1987 that the

Union asked for an 8% annual increase. Even on 1 April,

no bargaining took place on economic items. Thus, it is

clear that no impasse could have been reached on the sub-

ject of wages. And without an intensive discussion of wages,

it would be difficult to find that any bargaining impasse

had been reached. Although, as Respondent points out,

the Union was opposed to a system of merit increases,

it did have such provisions in other of its contracts. Fur-

ther, there is no evidence that the Union had refused to

discuss the Company’s proposal for such a system.

Although Respondent’s brief faults the Union for not

having accepted Company proposals during the course of

bargaining, it is clear that the Union could not be required

to compromise its own demands where the employer felt

free to keep adding new proposals to the table. The Union

would then be withdrawing or modifying its demands only

to be faced with the later addition of more Company pro-

posals. In such an instance, the give and take of collec-

tive bargaining would be meaningless because it would

involve no mutual give and take; only the Union would

be giving. And the Union would have no way of gauging

what the Company’s basic needs were in order to offer

a compromise in these areas because, faced with an in-

complete and ever-changing set of demands, the Union

could never be sure what Company proposals were of

paramount importance in reaching a contract.

App. 43

At the end of the i April bargaining session, the par-

ties discussed when to negotiate further. Marcus wanted

to meet the next day, but when it was clear that Du-

charme could not meet until 21 April, Marcus declared

impasse and said WPIX would implement its last offer.

Apparently Marcus was willing to negotiate further with

the Union but unwilling to wait 3 weeks to do so, and

for that reason he declared an impasse. This was in the

face of Ducharme’s statement that the Union was pre-

pared to meet and to “move” on its demands. Respon-

dent’s brief intimates that the Union was not willing to

meet as often as the Company wished and that this un-

willingness was the cause of an impasse being reached.

It is true that the negotiations were protracted. Some

delays in meeting were due to the fact that both the Com-

pany and the Respondent changed their chief spokesmen

in the negotiations. One delay was due to a Union’s

spokesman’s illness. Some delay was caused by the un-

availability of the mediator. It would be useless and

wasteful to recite all the facts in detail. The Union has

not been charged with refusing to bargain in the instant

case. The Union did not refuse to meet with WPIX and

it did not refuse to schedule new dates for negotiations

nor did it abruptly cancel meetings with no apparent jus-

tification. Marcus was piqued that on 1 April Ducharme

stated that his next available date was 21 April. A delay

of 3 weeks is not unreasonable. See Gulf States Manufac-

turers, Inc., 287 NLRB No. 4, sl op pp. 19-20 (1987).

I conclude that no impasse existed in the collective bar-

gaining negotiations between Respondent and the Union

when Respondent declared impasse on 1 April 1987. See

Powell Electrical Mfg., 2837 NLRB No. 100 (1987), (“The

parties had yet to bargain exhaustively over core eco-

nomic issues. The relatively limited discussions engaged

App. 44

in do not provide a basis for Respondent’s alleged belief

that further bargaining would have been futile.’’); Towne

Plaza Hotel, 258 NLRB 69, 78 (1981), (recent union con-

cession and expression of willingness by union to consider

employer’s proposals show no impasse existed); Henry

Miller Spring & Manufacturing Co. inc., 273 NLRB 472

(1984), (no impasse based on continuous negotiations in-

volving concessions and agreements and a final lengthy

session during which some items were settled); SGS Con-

trol Services, Inc., 275 NLRB 989 (1985), (recent conces-

sions and statement that differences could be worked out

show no impasse was reached).

In addition to my conclusion that the parties had not

bargained to impasse on 1 April 1987, I note that I have

found above that beginning 1 October 1986, and continu-

ing until after 1 April 1987, the Company admittedly was

not paying required wage step up increases to employees.

This unilateral change was an unfair labor practice and

an absence of good faith by WPIX, and thus no lawful

impasse could be reached while it persisted. NLRB v

Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962). Respondent, citing EHagle

Express Co., 273 NLRB 501 (1984), argues that its failure

to abide by the contract did not contribute to a deadlock

between the parties. Respondent seems to argue that the

Union did not care about the failure to pay step up in-

creases. I note that the Union pressed its claim to the

increases immediately and fully: it asked Marcus about

them on 1 October 1986, and then it secured the Com-

pany’s waiver of the intermediate grievance step and filed

for arbitration. Eagle Express is not applicable to the case

at bar. In Eagle Express, the ALJ found that an almost

bankrupt employer which reduced wages unilaterally in

the face of the Union’s technique of discussing the wage

issue interminably rather than engaging in negotiations de-

ee

PAAR ER BRE AEN

Son haan inthe

App. 45

signed to reach agreement was privileged later to declare

impasse despite the earlier unlawful unilateral action. In

adopting the judge’s finding in Eagle Express, the Board

panel noted that the unilaterally reduced wages were dis-

cussed in the negotiations between the parties. In the in-

stant case, Respondent unilaterally failed to pay the step

increases before it presented its wage proposal to the

Union and Respondent did not engage in extensive bar-

gaining on its wage proposal or other economic items:

these were deferred by mutual consent to some later

stage of the negotiations. No finding can here be made

that the Union’s dilatory tactics prevented the parties

from reaching agreement on wages. In Eagle Express, the

Board distinguished Bedford Farmers Cooperative, 259

NLRB 1226 (1982), where the unilateral action was taken

before bargaining began and where additional unilateral

action was taken contrary to a tentatively settled mat-

ter. In the instant case, Respondent did not take emer-

gency action in the face of an intransigent Union. Here,

Respondent took action without prior negotiation and with-

out subsequent discussion of the subject. The Union was

faced with a fait accompli, and the Company did not per-

mit the bargaining to go on long enough for an impasse

on wages to take place.

Thus I find that the unilateral changes put into effect

on 1 April 1987 were unlawful and in violation of Sec-

tions 8(aX1) and (5) of the Act.

Conclusions of Law

1. The following employees of Respondent constitute

a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargain-

ing within the meaning of Section 9b) of the Act:

App. 46

INCLUDED: News editors, assignment editors, senior

writers, news writers, sports specialist, senior assign-

ment desk assistants, talent coordinators, graphic ar-

tists, assignment desk assistants, graphics assistants,

production assistants and telephone clerks in the

news department of WPIX-TV.

EXCLUDED: All other employees in the News De-

partment of WPIX-TV, including News Director, Ex-

ecutive Producer, Managing Editor, Producers, Metro-

politan Editor, Graphics Director, Business Manager,

administrative assistant (confidential secretary), all

employees represented by other labor o izations,

guards, watchmen and supervisors as defined in the

Act.

2. At all times material herein, the Union has been the

exclusive representative of all employees within the ap-

propriate unit described above for purposes of collective

bargaining within the meaning of Section 9a) of the Act.

3. By unilaterally implementing changes in terms and

conditions of employment from 9 October 1986 and again

from 1 April 1987, at which time no bargaining impasse

existed, Respondént refused to bargain in violation of Sec-

tion 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act.

4. Respondent did not engage in unfair labor practices

other than those found herein.

The Remedy

Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair

labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(aX5) and

(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be required to

cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirm-

ative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.

Respondent having unilaterally implemented its last

offer when it unlawfully declared impasse, it must make

App. 47

the employees whole for loss of earnings and other bene-

fits from 1 April 1987. Backpay shall be compiled in a

manner consistent with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB

682 (1970), enf’d 44 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest

as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, Inc., 283

NLRB No. 181 (1987). No backpay remedy is required

for the failure to pay step up increases from October,

1986, as the parties have stipulated that these were paid

shortly after 2 April 1987.

Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of

law, upon the entire record and pursuant to Sectiun 10(c)

of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:

ORDER *°

Respondent WPIX, its officers, agents, successors and

assigns, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Refusing to bargain with the Union, by unilateral-

ly implementing changes in terms and conditions of em-

ployment, in the absence of a bargaining impasse, of its

employees in the appropriate unit described above.

(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,

restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights

guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to

effectuate the policies of the Act.

10 In the event no exceptions are filed as — by Section

102.46 of the Rules and Reaktions of the National r Rela-

tions Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order

herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and -

lations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings. conclu-

sions and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived.

App. 48

(a) Make all employees whole for any losses they may

have suffered as a result of Respondent’s unlawful uni-

lateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment

as of | April 1987 in the manner set forth in the Remedy

section of the decision.

(b) Upon request from the Union, revoke any uni-

lateral changes in wages or other conditions of employ-

ment and reinstate the terms and conditions of employ-

ment that obtained before the unilateral changes of 1

April 1987, provided that nothing herein shall be con-

strued as requiring rescission of any wage or benefit in-

crease heretofore granted to unit employees.

(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the

Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-

roll records, social security payment records, timecards,

personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-

sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the

terms of this Order.

(d) On request, bargain collectively with the Union

as the exclusive representative of all employees in the

appropriate unit described above with respect to rates of

pay, wages, hours and other terms and conditions of em-

ployment, and if an understanding is reached, embody

such understanding in a signed agreement.

(e) Post at its facility copies of the attached notice

marked “‘Appendix.’”’"! Copies of the notice, on forms pro-

11 In the event that the Board’s Order is enforced by a Judg-

ment of a United States Court of A , the words in the notice

reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD” shall be changed to read “POSTED PUR-

SUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”

ee ne

App. 49

vided by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being

duly signed by Respondent’s authorized representative,

shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt

thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days

thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places

where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-

sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any

other material.

(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in

writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what

steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.

Dated: Washington, D.C. May 12, 1988

/s/ ELEANOR MACDONALD

Eleanor MacDonald

Administrative Law Judge

App. 50

APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

AN AGENCY OF

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

AFTER A HEARING AT WHICH ALL SIDES HAD AN

OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND STATE

THEIR POSITIONS, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD FOUND THAT WE HAVE VIOLATED THE NA-

TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, AS AMENDED, AND

HAS ORDERED US TO POST THIS NOTICE.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees the following

rights:

To engage in self-organization;

To form, join or assist any union;

To bargain collectively through representatives

of their own choice;

To engage in concerted activities for the purpose

of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or

protection;

To refrain from the exercise of any or all such

activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with NEWSPAPER

GUILD OF NEW YORK, LOCAL 3, THE NEWSPAPER

GUILD, AFL-CIO, CLC, by unilaterally changing wage

rates and other terms and conditions of employment. The

bargaining unit is:

INCLUDED: News editors, assignment editors, senior

writers, news writers, sport: specialist, senior assign-

ment desk assistants, talent coordinators, graphic ar-

tists, assignment desk assistarts, graphics assistants,

production assistants and telephone clerks in the

news department of WPIX-TV.

ee

App. 51

EXCLUDED: All other employees in the News De-

partment of WPIX-TV, including News Director, Ex-

ecutive Producer, Managing Editor, Producers, Metro-

politan Editor, Graphics Director, Business Manager,

administrative assistant (confidential secretary), all

employees represented by other labor organizations,

guards, watchmen and supervisors as defined in the

Act.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere

with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the

rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL make whole all bargaining employees for any

losses they may have suffered as a result of our unlawful

unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employ-

ment, with interest.

WE WILL, upon request from the Union, revoke any uni-

lateral changes in terms and conditions of employment and

reinstate the terms and conditions that obtained before

our unlawful changes, although this does not mean that

we must rescind any wage or benefit increase granted to

unit employees.

WE WILL on request bargain collectively with the Union

with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment and

other terms and conditions of employment, and if an un-

derstanding is reached, embody such understanding in a

signed agreement.

WPIX, INC.

(Representative) (Title)

App. 52

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE

DEFACED BY ANYONE.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days

from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,

or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-

ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be

directed to the Board’s office. Jacob K. Javits Federal

Building, Room 3614, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New

York 10278, Telephone (212) 264-0360.

App. 53

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

DOCKET NUMBER 89-4136, 89-4142

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court-

house, in the City of New York, on the 8 day of August,

one thousand nine hundred and ninety

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Petitioner-Cross-Respondent,

Vv

WPIX, INC.,

Respondent-Cross-Petitioner,

NEWSPAPER GUILD OF NEW YORK,

LOCAL 3 AFL-CIO,

Intervenor.

A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the

action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by

counsel for respondent-cross-petitioner, WPIX, INC.

Upon consideration by the panel that heard the appeal,

it is

Ordered that said petition for rehearing is DENIED.

It is further noted that the suggestion for rehearing in

bane has been transmitted to the judges of the court in

App. 54

regular active service and to any other judge that heard

the appeal and that no such judge has requested that a

vote be taken thereon.

ELAINE B. GOLDSMITH

Clerk

by /s/

Chief Deputy Clerk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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