Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Frey v. Reilly

Supreme Court brief1990

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1990

SARAH ELIZABETH FREY and

PEOPLE AGAINST THE INCINERATOR (PATI),

An Unincorporated Association

Petitioners,

v.

WILLIAM K. REILLY, Administrator,

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Respondent,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

LOUIS CLARK

Government Accountability Project

25 E Street N.W. Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 347-0460

Counsel of Record

RICHARD E. CONDIT

Government Accountability Project

Date: August 28, 1990

a Ee

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did Congress intend that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) be

interpreted and applied to preclude only pre-enforcement

review, and not post-enforcement and post-consent decree

review of citizen claims that EPA acted ultra vires and in

violation of its Superfund and NEPA statutory mandates in

selecting a remedial response for a National Priorities List

hazardous waste site without conducting feasibility and

environmental impact studies of alternatives and providing

for public review and comment?

2. If 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) on its face precluded post-

enforcement pre-implementation review, would the federal

courts nonetheless have jurisdiction, under the "statutory

authority" exception, to review a blatantly lawless EPA

Superfund remedial decision process?

3. Does the District Court maintain post-enforcement pre-

implementation jurisdiction over denial of due process

claims despite the limiting language of 42 U.S.C. §9613(h)

where withholding judicial review will result in irreparable

harm to plaintiffs’ health and environment and deny them

an opportunity to seek review of EPA’s failure to provide

for notice and opportunity to be heard on EPA’s proposed

Superfund remedy decision and supporting analysis?

4. Does application of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) so as to

provide an industrial toxic waste polluter post-enforcement

review of EPA’s decision process and selected remedial

action before remedy implementation while denying this

same access to the courts to citizen plaintiffs constitute a

violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection

of the laws, thereby voiding any jurisdictional limitation on

post-enforcement review by citizens?

iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

1. Petitioners:

Sarah Elizabeth Frey,

People Against the Incinerator (PATI)*

an unincorporated association

- Respondent:

William K. Reilly, in his capacity as Administrator

of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

* As required by Rule 28.1 of this Court, Petitioner PATI

states that it has no parent companies, subsidiaries, or

affiliates.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............. ae

LIST OF PARTIES ...................... ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................. vii

OPINIONS BELOW ...................--. 2

JURIMNCTION ..... =... 2. ee ceca eee 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ 7

Pie I on cet ewe 7

ES ea ee eee 9

I eee 12

REASONS FOR ISSUING THE WRIT

I. The 7th Circuit’s Decision that Judicial

Review of EPA’s Failure to Comply with

Provisions of CERCLA and NEPA that

Require Written Analyses of Hazardous Site

Cleanup Options and Meaningful

Opportunities for Public Comment and

Participation is Wrong, and is in Direct

Conflict with the 2nd, 5th, and 11th Circuits... 13

‘

;

:

'

i

:

neem or

II.

The 7th Circuit Fundamentally

Misinterpreted the Plain Meaning of the

Timing of review Provision in CERCLA §

oe he ee oe ee ee als ae

As a Result of the 7th Circuit’s Flawed

Statutory Interpretation, Its decision Directly

Conflicts with Other Circuits ..........

Resolution of the Issue of Proper

Interpretation of Citizen Enforcement Rights

is Important in Order to Ensure that

Citizen’s CERCLA §§ 9613, 9616, 9617

and NEPA Rights are Preserved .........

Constitutional Issues

The Due Process Guarantee of the Fifth

Amendment, in the Context of Non-

Emergency Hazardous Waste Cleanups

under CERCLA Requires More Than After

the Fact Public Comment and After the Fact

Review by Citizen Sut ............6..

Provision of Post-Enforcement Judicial

Review for the Corporate Wrong-Doer

While Denying Review to Citizen’s Acting

as Private Attorneys General Under

CERCLA Offends Fifth Amendment

Principles of Equal Protection ...........

vi

III. Assuming Arguendo, that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) On Its

Face Limits Jurisdiction of Post-

Enforcement Claims, the 7th Circuit’s

Failure to Recognize the “Statutory

Authority" Exception to Statutory

Jurisdictional Limitations is in Direct

Conflict with Decisions of this Court ....... 28

NED 04! 0"s aa wo dae Ws Od 8 Ow es 34

PNG Wo 6:8 «6 0 week ae 2 eee ne eae la

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

State of Alabama v. U.S. E.P.A., 871 F.2d 1548

co ee ee ee ee 19,20,21

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ....... 26

Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480-481 (19643

Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) .......... 28

wen v. Michi A f Family Physicians,

EN ee ee eee 21

rvi cal N

396 U.S. 460, 90 §.Ct. 661, 24 L.Ed.2d 653 (1970) ee

hip Clerks v for

ho. Senill of Mon otieact Emoloutes. 380 U.S. 650,

I 33

Browning-Ferris Industries of South Jersey, Inc. v,

Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151 (2nd Cir. 1990) ..... 19,21,24

Cabot Corp. v. U.S.E.P.A., 677 F.Supp.

823 (E.D.Pa. (1988) ............... una vat 29

Combustion Equipment Assoc. v. U.S.E.P.A., 838 F.2d 35

MI ie as rg ais naraals aw baal 19,22

Dickerson v. Administrator, E.P.A., 834 F.2d 934 (11th

OR eS eT a ee POOR reer eS eee ee 19,20

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) .......... 26

Viii

Frey v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) ... passim

Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933) ....... 25

Leedom vy, Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180,

PE ee 31-34

Logan v, Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (198225 ,26

Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) ....... 25

Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963) ............. 33

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339

I eg a dea be be 8 25

O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 807, 811

i Ss ee a ek be ane 30

a a a PT ee eT

393 U.S. 233, 89 St.Ct. 414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968) . 33

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens —

i 5 ag RSE aie ae eee 21

Rucker v. Willis, 358 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd

0 Pr eer errr ers re er ere ee 25

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) 26

South Macomb Disposal Authority v. U.S.E.P.A., 681

Pa RPE, EOD 8 cc ceca scceees 27,28

Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336

ix

SE Ah ee Pd ere kB ei eae Drang 33

U.S. v, M, Genzale Plating, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 877, 883

PE et as os, 5 aa oo 6a eee ke eo’ 30

U.S. v. Rohm and Haas Co., Inc., 669 F.Supp. 672,

oo LE UL US. aaa eee eee 30

Versatile Metals v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1582

Ce ae 6 beds Oe 30

Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d

DT nd so oe ok oes re ae cab ee 19,22

Statutes: Page:

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,

("CERCLA" or "Superfund") as amended by the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

of 1986, ("SARA" Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.

1613 et seq. (1986))

CERCLA provisions

ke rr passim

I nao ns 4 30 «ob ed ee 6 eee passim

re passim

GED kv cece esses eencseear 29

UU Svcs eee eaceeudews 20,29

rr O 16

I ia nn 6 6 taco hee ee 15,25,28

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")

NEPA provisions

43 U.S.C. 4BBBGNME) ow ccc ccc c cr ecceccen 29

Regulations:

40 C.F.R. $300.68 (1982)... 0... 2 ee ee eee 25,30

40 C.F.R. §300.68 (1985)... 2... ee ee eee 25,30

Legislative Hi

H.R. Rep. No. 253(III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 22

ree eee er ee ee ee Pe 19

H.R. Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1986) . 18

H.R. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1986) 17,18

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. :

Fed .R.Civ.Proc. GO)... ww wcrc cc ccc ccccces 16

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1990

No. _90-

SARAH ELIZABETH FREY and

PEOPLE AGAINST THE INCINERATOR (PATI),

An Unincorporated Association

Petitioners,

Ve

WILLIAM K. REILLY, Administrator,

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Respondent,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Sarah E. Frey and People Against the Incinerator (PATI),

petition this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit entered in this proceeding on April 24,1990 and May 30

and 31, 1990.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit, upholding the decision to dismiss for want

of jurisdiction by the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana (Case No. IP-88-948-C) is reported

at 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990). The decision of the Court of

Appeals is printed in the Appendix hereto, infra, page 3a. The

opinion of the District Court is reported at 28 E.R.C.1655 (S.D.

Ind.). The decision of the District Court is printed in the

Appendix hereto, infra, page 18a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals (Appendix, infra,

page 3a) was entered on April 24, 1990. A timely petition for

rehearing was denied on May 30, 1990 with an Amended Order

issued on May 31, 1990. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. art. V. No person. . . shall be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),

42 U.S.C § 4332(2)(C).

(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall--

(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals

for legislation and other major federal actions significantly

affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed

statement by the responsible official on--

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be

avoided should the proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s

environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-

term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of

resources which would be involved in the proposed action

should it be implemented.

—

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act of 1980, ("CERCLA" or "Superfund") as

amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization

Act of 1986, (“SARA” Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 et

seq. (1986)) provisions:

42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). (a) (1) Whenever any hazardous

substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a

release into the environment ...the President is authorized to

act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove

...and provide for remedial action ... or take any other

response measure consistent with the national contingency

plan which the President deems necessary to protect the

public health or welfare or the environment.

42 U.S.C § 9606(a). when the President determines that

there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the

public health or welfare or the environment because of an

actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance...., he

may require the Attorney General ...to secure such relief as

may be necessary to abate such danger ... and the district

court ...shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the

public interest and the equities of the case may require.

42 U.S.C. §9613(h). No Federal court shall have jurisdiction

under Federal law . . . to review any challenges to removal

or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or

to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title,

in any action except one of the following:

(4) An action under section 9659 of

this title (relating to citizens suits) alleging

that the removal or remedial action taken

under section 9604 of this title or secured

under section 9606 of this title was in

violation of any requirement of this chapter

undertaken at the site. (Emphasis added.)

(5) An action under section 9606 of

this title in which the United States has moved

to compel a remedial action.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2)(B). Remedial action. The President

shall provide for the participation of interested persons ... in

the development of the administrative record on which the

President will base the selection of the remedial actions and

on which judicial review of remedial actions will be based.

The procedures developed under this subparagraph shall

include, at a minimum, each of the following:

(i) Notice to potentially affected persons and the

public, which shall be accompanied by a brief analysis of the

plan and alternative plans that were considered

(ii) A reasonable opportunity to comment and provide

information regarding the plan.

(iii) An opportunity for a public meeting ...

42 U.S.C. §9616(d). The President shall assure that remedial

investigations and feasibility studies (RI/FS) are commenced

for facilities listed on the National Priorities List, in addition

to those commenced prior to the date of enactment of

Superfund Amendments ... in accordance. with the following

schedule: ...

42 U.S.C. 9617. (a) Proposed plan. Before adoption of any

plan for remedial action to be undertaken by ...or by any

other person, under section 104, 106, 120, or 122..., the

President or State, as appropriate, shall take both of the

following actions:

(1) Publish a notice and brief analysis of the proposed

plan and make such plan available to the public.

(2) Provide a reasonable opportunity for submission

of ...comments and an opportunity for a public meeting ...

regarding the proposed plan ....

The notice and analysis published under paragraph (1) shall

include sufficient information as may be necessary to provide

a reasonable explanation of the proposed plan and alternative

proposals considered.

42 U.S.C. § 9622(m). In the case of consent decrees and

other settlements under this section (including covenants not

to sue), no provision of this Act shall be construed to

preclude or otherwise affect the applicability of general

principles of law regarding the setting aside or modification

of consent decrees or other settlements.

42 U.S.C. § 9659. Except as provided in ...section 113(h)

... (relating to timing of judicial review), any person may

commence a civil action on his own behalf--

(1) against any person (including the United

States and any other ... or agency ...) who is

alleged to be in violation of any standard,

regulation, condition, requirement, or order

which has become effective pursuant to this

Act ...; or

(2) against the President or any other officer

of the United States (including the

Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency ... where there is alleged a failure of

the President or such other officer to perform

any act or duty under this Act ... which is not

discretionary ....

40 C.F.R. 300.61(c) (1982). In determining the need for and

in planning or undertaking fund-financed action, response

personnel should, to the extent practicable, consider the

following:

w * =

(3) Be sensitive to local community concerns (in

accordance with applicable guidance).

40 C.F.R. 300.67 (d) (1985). In remedial actions at NPL

sites, including Fund-financed and enforcement actions,

feasibility studies that outline alternative remedial measures

must be provided to the public for review and comment for a

period of not less than 21 calendar days. Such review and

comment shall precede selection of the remedial response.

40 C.F.R. 300.68(f)-(j) (1982).

(f) A remedial investigation should be undertaken by

the lead agency ...to determine the nature and extent of the

problem presented by the release.

(g) A limited number of alternatives should be

developed .... One alternative may be a no-action alternative

... for example, when response action may cause a greater

environmental or health danger than no action.

(h) The alternatives developed ... will be subjected to

an initial screening ....

(1) For each alternative, the cost of installing

or implementing the remedial action must be considered, ...

(2) The effects of each alternative should be

evaluated .... If an alternative has significant adverse effects,

it should be excluded from further consideration. ....

(i)(1) A more detailed evaluation will be conducted ...

(2) The detailed analysis of each alternative should

include: ...(D) An assessment of each alternative in terms of

the extent to which it is expected to effectively mitigate and

minimize damage to ... public health, welfare and the

environment, ...(E) An analysis of any adverse environmental

impacts ...

(j) The appropriate extent of remedy shall be

determined by ... selection of lowest cost alternative that is

... feasible and reliable and ... minimizes damage to ...

public health ...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case raises fundamental statutory and

constitutional issues affecting the health, safety and

environmental quality of millions of Americans and the

expenditure of literally billions of dollars in hazardous waste

response costs. It poses the question of whether and how

Congress may limit the timing of judicial review of blatantly

lawless agency action which is clearly harmful to public

health and the environment. This case involves consideration

of a 7th Circuit opinion which requires affected citizens and

groups to stand aside and watch illegal agency action proceed

for years causing serious harm to their families and

community, and then, after the harm has been done and the

issues of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)

violation of fundamental constitutional and statutory

requirements have become moot, be allowed only to bring a

symbolic judicial action with no hope of effective remedy.

A. Statutory Background

Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental

Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or

Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seg., in 1980 to address the

serious environmental and public health threats posed by

abandoned hazardous waste sites created through years of

reckless waste disposal by industry and government neglect.

Congress amended the Superfund Statute in 1986 by passage

of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

(SARA), Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 et seq. (1986).'

The Congress, in the Superfund statute, and EPA, in

' See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.

the regulations promulgated to enforce the Act, require

specific safeguards and procedures to be followed in

addressing contaminated sites.? The first step in this required

procedure is for EPA to conduct a preliminary assessment/site

investigation (PA/SI) after discovery of a site, and issue a

PA/SI report. Once this assessment and investigation is

complete, the site is evaluated on the basis of the PA/SI and

ranked on a point scale under the Hazard Ranking System

(HRS) to determine if the site scores high enough (if it poses

such a serious threat) to qualify for placement on the National

Priorities List (NPL), and thereby qualify for federal cleanup

funds (from the Superfund).

If the site ranks high enough for placement on the

NPL, a second set of procedural safeguards are required.

These safeguards include the requirement that a remedial

investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) be conducted to define

the nature of the contamination problem and assess the

feasibility of alternative cleanup plans (remedies) and the

environmental impacts of each. 42 U.S.C. § 9616(d); 40

C.F.R. 300.68 (1982 and 1985). This requirement is

acknowledged by the 7th Circuit in its opinion. Frey v,

Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1093. If EPA fails to conduct an

RI/FS or conducts an RI/FS that fails to adequately address

the environmental impacts of the chosen remedy and all

reasonable alternatives (fails to perform the functional

equivalent of an EIS), then EPA must prepare a full

Environmental Impact Statement. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

Once the RI/FS or EIS is drafted, public comment

must be taken on the study and the alternatives described

therein, prior to finalizing the RI/FS or EIS and prior to

selecting a remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §

1503.1 (1987); 40 C.F.R. § 300.61 (1982) (and incorporated

guidance); 40 C.F.R. § 300.67 (1985); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k);

42 U.S.C. § 9617. The 7th Circuit also acknowledged this

requirement. Frey, 900 F.2d at 1093. The EPA selects a

2 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. and 40 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.

remedy based on the RI/FS and public comment thereon and

formalizes the decision in a Record of Decision (ROD) (or

Enforcement Decision Document (EDD)). EPA then

proceeds to implement that remedy either directly under 42

U.S.C. § 9604 using EPA funds or, after an enforcement

order or suit under 42 U.S.C. § 9606, through oversight of

actions of the party responsible for the pollution. If the

remedy selection was part of an enforcement litigation

settlement-as here, the ROD is incorporated into a federal

court consent decree. 42 U.S.C. § 9622. The decree itself is

subjected to (post-ROD pre-court approval) public review

during another comment period pursuant to Department of

Justice regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 50.7, not to be confused

with the public comment and participation required under

NEPA and Superfund which comes prior to selection of the

Both the studies done at the pre-remedial and remedial

Stages, as well as the site cleanup (remediation) itself are

expensive. RI/FS studies can cost $500,000 or more. Site

cleanups often cost millions of dollars, and sometimes

hundreds of millions of dollars. More importantly, if the

hazardous waste is handled improperly, serious harm can

occur to the environment and public health. The timely and

accurate assessment and reporting of such hazardous waste

sites is thus a critical step which will determine both whether

the responsible industry (or government) polluter will have to

pay millions of dollars in cleanup costs and whether public

health and environment will be harmed.

B. Facts

In January of 1983, eight years after EPA became

aware of the Bloomington Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB)

contamination problem, the EPA sued Westinghouse Electric

Corporation ("Westinghouse") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§

9604, 9606, and 9607, and 42 U.S.C. § 6973, seeking the

cleanup of two (of several) toxic waste dumps near

10

Bloomington, Indiana.’ The State of Indiana intervened, and

Westinghouse joined the Monsanto Company as a third-party

defendant. Later, the case was consolidated with an earlier

tort suit filed by the City of Bloomington regarding two other

toxic waste dump sites containing Westinghouse waste.‘

In early 1984, the parties to the Westinghouse actions

began protracted consolidated settlement negotiations which

were conducted well out of public view. A proposed consent

decree resulted from these secret negotiations which inter alia

provided that the City of Bloomington and Monroe County

would pay Westinghouse, the polluter, to burn local garbage

as the primary fuel for a proposed Westinghouse designed and

operated experimental incinerator to be used to “treat” the

toxic PCB waste which Westinghouse had recklessly disposed

of in the community. The tipping fee paid to Westinghouse

together with fees from the sale of steam and electricity to be

generated from the proposed incinerator, and the profit from

sale of similar incinerators Westinghouse hoped to market,

was intended by Westinghouse to offset their cleanup costs.

The proposal covered only a few of the known contaminated

sites leaving others, notably the Westinghouse plant property

itself, unaddressed.

The first public meeting to take comment on the

proposed decree which emerged from the secret negotiations

was held December 5, 1984, one day after EPA had already

signed a record of decision (ROD) called an enforcement

decision document (EDD) selecting the remedy described.

This meeting and the successive public meetings revealed

wide-spread public opposition to and fear about the public

health dangers apparent in the experimental and limited-scope

cleanup plan.

* See United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. IP 83-9-C

(S.D. Ind. Jan. 4, 1983).

* See City of Bloomington, v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. IP

81-448-C (S.D. Ind. 1981).

11

The signing of the ROD/EDD document constituted

EPA’s final remedy selection decision, and the EPA filing of

the Superfund enforcement suit under 42 U.S.C. § 9606 to

compel Westinghouse to cleanup the sites in question

categorizes all subsequent EPA and citizen action as "post-

enforcement".

EPA selected the remedial plan (remedy) without

complying with the requirements of the National

Environmental Policy Act.* NEPA mandates preparation of a _

formal environmental impact statement ("EIS") before any

Federal agency undertakes any “major Federal actions

affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(C). The ROD/EDD was signed without prior (or

post) performance or a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility

Study ("RI/FS"), an environmental assessment procedure

required by EPA Superfund regulations at 40 C.F.R. §300.68

to be performed before remedial decisions can be made and

implemented.

The eventual consent decree incorporating EPA’s

record(s) of decision provided for remedial action at (only)

six (of a large number) of contaminated sites, four of which

were Superfund National Priorities List sites. The EPA

performed limited studies of two of these sites in 1983 that

addressed remedial alternatives. However, these studies did

not address the feasibility or environmental impacts of the

remedy actually selected by EPA.

More specifically, these studies did not address the

feasibility of the experimental plan to use garbage as fuel for

an incinerator to be used to attempt to destroy toxic and

hazardous waste in soil and sludge. The studies did not

~ address the environmental impacts of such incineration in

Monroe County (or anywhere). Nor did the studies address

the full scope of known contamination from Westinghouse

waste disposal nor the impacts of addressing only part of such

contamination in the remedy selected. The other four sites,

* NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370a.

i2

each environmentally different and different in terms of the

nature of the contamination problem, were not addressed in

any study of feasibility, impacts, or alternatives.

No study, including the two inadequate ones that were

done, were submitted for public review prior to EPA’s final

action of signing the record of decision on December 4,

1984. These studies would not have been available at all

except for a freedom of information request by Indiana Public

Interest Research Group (InPIRG). The ROD/EDD itself

would never have been revealed to the public except for a

second freedom of information request by InPIRG which

finally, after some assistance from Indiana elected officials,

forced disclosure two and a half years later in August, 1987.

Following a series of public meetings to take public

comment on the proposed consent decree, in the absence of

the administrative record including the ROD and any

feasibility or impact studies of the selected remedy or

alternatives, during which over ninety percent of citizens

testifying explicitly condemned the proposal and decision

process, EPA moved the federal court to approve the

proposal. The District Court approved the proposal and

issued the consent decree in August, 1985 without holding a

hearing and without the benefit of the EPA ROD and any

supporting analysis, while denying as untimely citizen

intervention motions made in September, 1984.

C, PROCEEDINGS BELOW

After EPA made public disclosure of its ROD/EDD in

August of 1987, and after Petitioners analyzed the disclosed

materials, it became clear that no equivalent of an EIS was

ever performed by EPA. Consequently, Petitioners on

February 10, 1988 filed an action in the district court of the

District of Columbia claiming the decision constituted an

unlawful agency action in violation of NEPA due to failure to

prepare an EIS and provide for meaningful public

participation in the remedy selection process leading to the

EDD (ROD); and failure to prepare an RI/FS as required by

13

Superfund prior to selection of a remedy. Petitioners asked

for declaratory relief but no injunction. On July 25, 1988,

the Court granted the government’s motion to transfer the

action to the Southern District of Indiana.

On December 6, 1988, the Court granted

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-

pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).

Petitioners’ appeal of the district court’s dismissal was

consolidated with that of David Schalk® and Ronald T.

Smith.’

On April 24, 1990, the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit upheld the District Court’s dismissal.

The Appellate Court’s decision merely upheld the district

court’s interpretation of the preclusive affect of 42 U.S.C. §

9613(h)(4), and dismissed Plaintiff's and Amicus Curiae

InPIRG’s Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection

concerns as ". . . novel theories [that] rest on undesirable

expansions of the meaning of the Fifth Amendment" and

failed to respond to them, discuss them, or to distinguish case

law cited to support them. On May 30, 1990, the Court

denied Petitioners’ Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for

Rehearing In Banc, and issued an amended order to this effect

on May 31, 1990.

* Until 1984 David Schalk was the Bloomington City Chemist.

Upon EPA’s disclosure of the ROD/EDD, Schalk, like Petitioner, filed

an equitable action against the decision in the D.C. district court in

December, 1987. The suit was transferred to the Southern District of

Indiana and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

9613(h)4. His appeal was consolidated with Petitioners’.

” Ronald T. Smith succeeded David Schalk as Bloomington City

Chemist, and was a co-plaintiff in Schalk’s suit.

14

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The 7th Circuit’s Decision Denying Judicial Review

of EPA’s Failure to Comply with Provisions of

CERCLA and NEPA that Require Written

Analyses of Hazardous Site Cleanup Options and

Meaningful Opportunities for Public Comment and

Participation is Wrong, and is in Direct Conflict

with the 2nd, Sth, and 11th Circuits

A. The 7th Circuit Fundamentally Misinterpreted

the Plain Meaning of the Timing of review

Provision in CERCLA § 9613(h)

The 7th Circuit opinion is obviously and fatally

flawed because Judge Daniel A. Manion, writing for the 7th

Circuit, failed to acknowledge the legal significance of the

clear fact that EPA had already filed suit against

Westinghouse to enforce the Superfund statute and compel a

cleanup remedy, as evidenced by the 1985 consent decree of

the district court. Judge Manion acknowledges the EPA

enforcement suit and resulting consent decree in the 7th

Circuit opinion. Frey vy. Reilly, 900 F.2d at 1093. Thus

there is no dispute that Plaintiffs are in the posture of

bringing a post-enforcement review claim, not a pre-

enforcement review action, although Judge Manion does not

express this clearly in the 7th Circuit opinion.

It is clear, however, that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) limits

only pre-enforcement review, not post-enforcement review.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) states:

No Federal court shall have

jurisdiction under Federal law . . . to review

any challenges to removal or remedial action

selected under section 9604 of this title, or to

review any order issued under section 9606(a)

of this title, in any action except one of the

following:

15

(4) An action under section 9659 of

this title (relating to citizens suits) alleging

that the removal or remedial action taken

under section 9604 of this title or secured

under section 9606 of this title was in

violation of any requirement of this chapter

such an action may not be brought with regard

i wt ie) action ‘a to |

undertaken at the site. (Emphasis added.)

(5) An action under section 9606 of

this title in which the United States has moved

to compel a remedial action.

The plain meaning of § 9613, when read in its entirety and in

conjunction with the other referenced sections of CERCLA,

makes clear that Petitioners’ suit is not barred.

The introductory paragraph of the 42 U.S.C. §

9613(h) timing of review provision states exactly the types of

EPA action for which review is precluded as a general rule,

namely a 42 U.S.C. § 9604 EPA funded action (which is not

the case here) and a 42 U.S.C. § 9606 administrative order

(which is also not the case here). These categories of EPA

actions represent situations known as pre-enforcement since

EPA has not yet invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts

itself by filing a suit to inter alia compel a remedy, enforce an

administrative order, or establish liability and seek

reimbursement.

The opinions from other circuits and the legislative

history discussed infra show beyond doubt that the 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(h) language “or to review any order issued under

section 9606(a) of this title" means agency orders issued by

EPA, not court orders such as consent decrees. Therefore,

an EPA enforcement suit under 42 U.S.C. § 9606 does not

fall within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The opinions

from other circuits and the legislative history show explicitly

that only pre-enforcement review is limited. It is in holding

that post-enforcement review is limited by 42 U.S.C. §

9613(h) that the 7th Circuit opinion conflicts directly with

other circuits, meriting the attention of this Court and

justifying the issuance of the Writ of Certiorari.

The error in the reasoning of the 7th Circuit which

placed it at odds with the other circuits becomes clear upon a

close reading. Following the introductory paragraph in §

9613(h) five items are listed which identify exceptions to the

general rule. The 7th Circuit errs by addressing the

exceptions to § 9613(h) as if they apply to post-enforcement

cases. The court fails to recognize that EPA enforcement

suits under 42 U.S.C.§ 9606, such as the one here, do not

fall within the parameters of the introductory language of §

9613(h), and thus are not cases where review is limited at all.

Consequently, there is no need to look at the list of

exceptions.*

* There are obvious reasons why review would not be limited where

a § 9606 suit had been filed. Once the court had assumed jurisdiction of

the EPA § 9606 enforcement complaint, it would necessarily have

jurisdiction to hear defenses from the responsible party defendants, as well

as any citizen plaintiffs with standing and a cause of action (such as a

citizen enforcement suit), under general principles of law and the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The Superfund statute recognizes this explicitly

in 42 U.S.C. § 9622(m) (“In the case of consent decrees and other

settlements under this section (including covenants not to sue), no provision

of this Act shall be construed to preclude or otherwise affect the

applicability of general principles of law regarding the setting aside or

modification of consent decrees or other settlements"). Because Plaintiff

Frey in the instant case brought a complaint alleging that the EPA decision

process that resulted in an ROD, which was then incorporated into a

consent decree following litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 9606, violated both

NEPA and Superfund, her complaint is either a challenge to a decree as

void due to illegality, a ground for relief from judgment under

Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 60(b) which is therefore allowed under 42 U.S.C. §

9622(m), or her complaint is not a “challenge” at all and therefore

17

It is significant that the 7th Circuit opinion in quoting

the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) omits the key

language which limits application of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) to

only 42 U.S.C. § 9604 actions and 42 U.S.C. § 9606

(administrative) orders, and not 42 U.S.C. § 9606 suits.

Erey, 900 F.2d at 1095. The failure of the 7th Circuit to

consider the 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) language in its entirety

results in an out of context reading of portions of the

provision which lead the 7th Circuit to the inevitable

conclusion (under the circumstances of the misreading) that

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) limits al] challenges to remedial actions

including post-enforcement challenges such as the case at bar.

See, Frey, 900 F.2d at 1098 ("Federal courts lack subject

matter jurisdiction to consider challenges to remedial actions

that have not been ‘taken’ or ‘secured.’"). The legislative

history cited in the Court's opinion is in itself sufficient,

however, to make clear the error in the 7th Circuit’s

reasoning, and that pre-enforcement review is all Congress

intended to limit.

The 7th Circuit cites the Conference Committee

Report, the Report from the House Committee on Energy and

Commerce, and the Report from the House Judiciary

Committee all for the proposition that federal courts lack

jurisdiction over citizen suits where a remedial action has not

been completed (regardless of the enforcement status of the

case). Frey, 900 F.2d at 1096. However, each of these

reports clearly shows that Congress intended to limit only

pre-enforcement review. The 7th Circuit failed to note that

the Conference Report section laying out the § 9613(h) timing

of review provision was entitled "Pre-enforcement review".

H.R. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1986). The

7th Circuit opinion quotes the word “completed” out of this

pre-enforcement context and fails to note that the conference

substitute provision (now 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)) adopted the

first three “exceptions” of the Senate and House Amendments

jurisdiction of it is not removed by § 9613(h).

18

which allow for review of a response inter alia when EPA

brings a suit for abatement under 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a), which

is exactly the circumstance of the present case. H.R. Rep.

No.962 at 221, 223.

Judge Manion also quotes the House Committee on

Energy and Commerce Report to the effect that there is no

right of judicial review until completion of a response action.

However, the quote states that this is true for "the

Administrator’s selection and implementation of response

actions" [emphasis added]. Frey, 900 F.2d at 1096. This

makes clear that the Committee was speaking only of pre-

enforcement situations since the entire goal of enforcement is

to compel the responsible party to implement the response. If

any doubt remained, the section in the Committee on Energy

and Commerce Report from which Judge Manion quoted is,

as with the previous cite, entitled "pre-enforcement." H.R.

Rep. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1986).

To dispose of doubt on the matter entirely, this same

section states "Response actions or consent orders under

section 104 [42 U.S.C. § 9604] and orders under section 106

[42 U.S.C. § 9606] may be subject to judicial review at the

time the government seeks cost recovery or acts to enforce an

order or otherwise obtain injunctive relief." Id, The 7th

Circuit quoted the Committee cleariy out of context in that the

omitted part of the sentence from which the quote was taken

read "The section is intended to codify the current position of

the Administrator and Department of Justice with respect to

pre-enforcement review: ..."[emphasis added].

Finally, the 7th Circuit cited the House Judiciary

Report to the same effect that review of a response could not

be had until it was completed. Frey, 900 F.2d at 1096.

Suffice it to say that the relevant section of this report is also

entitled "pre-enforcement review", that the report

acknowledges review can be had when there is an action for

an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (as here), and states

"that, in the absence of a government enforcement action,

judicial review of the selection of a response action should

19

generally be postponed ....". H.R. Rep. No. 253(III), 99th

Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 22 (1986).

B. As a Result of the 7th Circuit’s Flawed Statutory

Interpretation, Its Decision Directly Conflicts with

Other Circuits

The 7th Circuit’s decision below is therefore in direct

conflict with the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 11th Circuits (as well as

with district court decisions in other circuits) which have

clearly found that Congress intended 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) to

limit pre-enforcement, not post-enforcement, review.

Browning Ferris Industries of South Jersey, Inc, v.

Muszynski, 891 F.2d 161 (2nd Cir 1990); State of Alabama

v. US, EP.A., 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.

denied, 110 S.Ct. 538 (1989); Combustion Equipment

Assoc., Inc v. U.S.E.P.A., 838 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir. 1988);

Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380

(Sth Cir. 1989); Dickerson y.Administrator, E.P.A., 834

F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1987).

The 7th Circuit cites to Alabama as its primary

authority to support the erroneous conclusion that post-

enforcement review is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).

Frey, 900 F.2d at 1095-1097. Therefore, the direct conflict

between the 7th Circuit decision below and the 11th Circuit

decision in Alabama is considered first. It should be made

clear that Alabama considered several different types of

claims and found jurisdiction was not available for some, but

was for others. This distinction the 7th Circuit failed to

make.

Alabama directly conflicts with the 7th Circuit opinion

in several ways. The most blatant and most fundamentally

important conflict is that in the Alabama opinion, contrary to

the out-of-context discussion of this decision in the 7th Circuit

opinion, the 11th Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review

plaintiffs claims that EPA had violated the Superfund statute

and had illegally denied notice and rights to participate in the

development of the record of decision, just as Petitioners

claim here. Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1559. “To the extent

plaintiffs’ complaint may in part be read as not challenging

the remedial action plan and therefore not removed from

federal jurisdiction by section 113(h), we address the merits

of plaintiffs’ claims ...." Id.

Further, the Alabama court stated "[t]o the extent

plaintiffs challenge the EPA’s cleanup under section 117(a)

and (b), it is clear that EPA has complied ...." Id.

"Consequently, we reverse ...." Id, Clearly, the 11th

Circuit held that it had jurisdiction and gave plaintiffs a

hearing on the merits of their claims that EPA violated the

decision process required by Superfund, including the

requirements for public participation. This is precisely

opposite the holding of the 7th Circuit.

The Alabama court also considered plaintiffs’

constitutional challenges to an EPA response action and

rejected them on standing grounds (rather than lack of

jurisdiction). Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1555-56. The Alabama

court further considered plaintiffs’ other statutory challenges

on the basis of which plaintiffs had requested an injunction

halting implementation of the remedial action and reopening

of the record of decision. Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1557-59.

In finding that such challenges were precluded by 42

U.S.C. § 9613(h) the Alabama court emphasized two

important points which place it in conflict with the 7th

Circuit. First, citing to the legislative history, the Aiabama

court repeatedly acknowledged that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)

limited “pre-enforcement review." Alabama, 871 F.2d at

1557-58; also see Dickerson v, Administrator, E.P.A., 834

F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1987). The Alabama court found it

lacked jurisdiction for plaintiffs’ claims on which injunctions

were requested to halt implementation of the remedy because

on the facts of Alabama there had been no EPA enforcement

action, unlike here. Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1559-60.

Further, in analyzing plaintiffs’ arguments that they

were not really “challenging” the response action but the

21

selection of an off-site remc Jial plan generally, the Alabama

court emphasized that plaintiffs’ argument failed because

plaintiffs sought to enjoin implementation, unlike here where

no injunction to halt implementation was sought. Alabama,

871 F.2d at 1558-59. The Alabama court’s reasoning makes

clear that judicial review of the decision process is not

prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Alabama, 871 F.2d at

1558-59.°

The 7th Circuit opinion is also in conflict with the

2nd Circuit. Browning Ferris Industries of South Jersey, Inc.

Vv. Muszynski, 891 F.2d 161 (2nd Cir 1990). The 2nd

Circuit in Browning Ferris, as the 11th Circuit in Alabama,

found that § 9613(h) limits pre-enforcement review.

Browning Ferris 891 F.2d at 154 ("While not dispositive, the

express congressional prohibition on pre-enforcement judicial

° The distinction between a challenge to a decision process and a

challenge to the merits of a decision was addressed by this Court in Bowen

y. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). In

Bowen this Court held that despite statutory preclusion of federal

jurisdiction for challenges to the merits of a particular agency decision, if

the challenge is really to the illegality of the decision process itself, the

courts retain jurisdiction. The 7th Circuit opinion wholly fails to make the

distinction or fails to apply the rule. In either case, the 7th Circuit is in

conflict with this Court’s holding in Bowen. The 7th Circuit attempts to

equate Petitioners’ claims that EPA violated NEPA in failing to perform

an EIS and take public comment prior to selecting a remedy with a claim

that the particular remedy chosen is inadequate. By erroneously equating

Petitioners’ procedural NEPA claim with a claim that the remedy chosen

is wrong, the 7th Circuit concludes that Frey is challenging the remedy and

therefore § 9613(h) removes jurisdiction. This is pure folly. Petitioners

have not altered their NEPA procedural claim nor have they amended their

complaint to seek an injunction. They may not be thrilled with the

experimental remedy selected. But seldom is an illegal decision process

that improperly shuts out public participation one that produces a satisfying

result. nonetheless, the process remains illegal, and nonetheless still a

process. The procedural nature of a NEPA claim was made clear recently

by this Court. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens, 490 U.S. _,

109 S.Ct. 1835 (1989).

review of CERCLA orders, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), suggests

."). See also Combustion Equipment Assoc., Inc v.

USEPA. 838 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir. 1988) ("In fact Congress

amended CERCLA in 1986 to make clear that the statute

precluded preenforcement judicial review. See 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 9613(h)....").

The Sth Circuit has likewise acknowledged that the

limitation on review expressed in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) is a

pre-enforcement limit. “[C]Jourts have consistently held that

where judicial review will delay remedial ... activities, they

are barred from reviewing response actions prior to an

attempt by the EPA to enforce > orders or allegations of

liability” [emphasis added].

Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, Cr (Sth Cir. 1989).

"Section 113(h) of SARA, [footnote omitted] enacted in 1986,

codified earlier case law limitations on ‘pre-enforcement’

review of remedial and removal actions". Id, at 1387-88.

C. Resolution of the Issue of Proper Interpretation of

Citizen Enforcement Rights is Important in Order

to Ensure that Citizens’ CERCLA §§ 9613, 9616,

9617 and NEPA Rights are Preserved

The hazardous waste cleanup involved in

Bloomington, Indiana is, without any doubt, a truly major

agency action affecting the human environment. It is one of

the most extensive operations undertaken in the troubled

history of the Superfund program.

All of the parade of horrible chemical poisons, with

the possible exception of nuclear radiation, are present here.

The specter of poisonous chemical fallout from a recklessly

selected experimental hazardous waste incineration facility

randomly spreading toxic byproducts across the land is

present here. Petitioners represent a genuine community fear

and anxiety which, in normal circumstances, would be

reflected in the decision record in a major agency action. But

not here.

The voices of those willing to express the

community’s understandable fear and doubt have been

ignored and rejected. Instead of making affirmative efforts to

insure a good record of public participation in the selection of

remedies, here the EPA has gone to great lengths to deny and

oppose this participation.

Instead, the record speaks of secret negotiations

between major pollution generators to settle lawsuits in which

vitally interested citizen groups were denied intervention. It

speaks of secret and blatant agency lawlessness which

compromised both Petitioners’ faith in good government, and

in the ability of the federal judiciary to protect the statutory,

due process and property rights of Petitioners and other

concerned citizens.

When Petitioners turned to the Federal Courts for

justice, they were told that the Courts have no jurisdiction to

judge and right wrongs if the wrongdoing led to the taking of

a Superfund removal or remedial decision despite that the

polluter is given full access to the courts, being a party to

EPA’s longstanding Superfund enforcement suit. Does 42 _

U.S.C § 9613(h) really mark a boundary across which official

lawlessness and denial of due process becomes immune from

judicial review?

Surely not. The decision below completely undercuts

the citizen enforcement strategy envisioned by Congress as a

necessary complement to EPA enforcement, which can best

be described historically as too little too late. Under the rule

established by the 7th Circuit, all courts in the 7th Circuit

will be forced to postpone citizen suits brought to enforce

against EPA or industry violations of even the most

fundamental requirements of Superfund, as here, until after

the illegal action ani remedy of which it is part are complete.

Violation of any and all of the safeguards painstakingly

crafted into the Superfund statutory scheme by Congress are

insulated from citizen enforcement under the holding of the

7th Circuit, as well as all the safeguards of NEPA the Clean

Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the entire panoply of

24

environmental laws.

This cannot be what Congress intended. The potential

harm to public health and environment and potential waste of

billions of tax and industry dollars resulting from such

unchecked misguided or blatantly lawless agency action is so

great that it is unthinkable that Congress intended to place

EPA so high above the law.

The 7th Circuit failed to acknowledge that postponing

citizen enforcement against EPA’s statutory violations and

postponing citizen mandamus actions against the agency’s

refusal to perform its statutory duties until such actions are

moot, which is the clear consequence of the district court’s

ruling, effectively insulates the agency from enforcement of

the very law Congress has charged EPA with upholding.

This unwarranted preclusion of review encourages the very

agency misconduct which Congress intended to combat by

writing in the citizen suit provisions in the 1986 amendments

to the Superfund statute.

The 2nd Circuit in Browning Ferris also

acknowledged the importance of the jurisdictional issue

surrounding interpretation of § 9613(h), and because of the

sweeping impact interpretation of the section would have and

the difficulty of the issue, declined to resolve the question.

Instead, the 2nd Circuit decided the case on the merits after

assuming jurisdiction arguendo. 891 F.2d at 154-155. "A

comprehensive ruling on the jurisdictional issues would

necessarily have a broad impact on future EPA pollution

remediation efforts." Id, at 154. “Their resolution would

necessarily have a broad impact on an important legislative

scheme involving the expenditure of billions of dollars of tax

and private money ...." Id, at 160. Such considerations add

additional weight to the justification for issuance of a Writ by

this Court.

II. Constitutional Issues

A. The Due Process Guarantee of the Fifth

Amendment, in the Context of Non-Emergency

Hazardous Waste Cleanups under CERCLA

Requires More Than After the Fact Public

Comment and After the Fact Review

by Citizen Suit

In this case Petitioners have been denied their rights

to participate in or comment on EPA’s development of a

cleanup plan, and to bring suit under CERCLA and NEPA to

challenge EPA’s actions. These rights are vested by statute

or regulation." Yet, EPA and the courts below have

unjustly prevented Petitioners from exercising their rights.

This Court has recognized that a cause of action, like

those provided to Petitioners under NEPA and CERCLA, is a

species of property protected by the Due Process Clause."

While citizens do not have a right to a particular form of

remedy, there is a guarantee, under the due process clause,

that a citizen’s substantial right to redress by some effective

procedure will be preserved. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290

U.S. 326, 332 (1933). Other courts have similarly held that

'° Citizen enforcement of CERCLA is provid xd in 42 U.S.C. § 9659.

Public participation and comment rights are granted under 42 U.S.C. §§

9613, 9616, 9617 and the NCP (40 C.F.R. § 300.68). Prior to the

CERCLA amendments in 1986, public participation rights were granted

through the NCP. See, 40 C.F.R. § 300.61 (1982) and the applicable

guidelines; 40 C.F.R. § 300.67 (1985). The right for citizens to sue under

NEPA is governed by the Admihistrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. § 702)

and judicial decisions holding that citizens could act as private attorneys

general. Rucker v. Willis, 358 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd 484

F.2d 158.

'' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313

(1950); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-282 (1980); Logan v.

Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-430 (1982).

a right to a judicial hearing must be made at a meaningful

time. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971);

Armstrong v, Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Sniadach v.

Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v.

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Logan, 455 U.S. at 437.

Like the situations in Boddie, Logan, Fuentes, and

others, Petitioners are being denied any timely and

meaningful opportunity to protect their rights in the courts.

Their health, property, and environment are threatened by

EPA proceeding with a hazardous waste response action in

their community without having first assessed the feasibility

and environmental impacts of alternative remedial plans,

including the plan being implemented. In order for Frey and

PATI to protect these important interests, they must have

timely access to the courts. Congress’ acknowledgement of

this fact is shown in the inclusion of citizen suit provisions in

almost all recent environmental legislation.

It is true that Congress intended, and the government

has an interest, which the public shares, in not delaying

urgently needed cleanups. However, EPA has been provided

means for dealing with emergencies through its powers to

conduct removal actions, to issue administrative orders (42

U.S.C. §9606), or through its power to conduct a fund

financed cleanup without delay (42 U.S.C. § 9604). EPA has

chosen none of these routes in the instant case and has

decided instead to pursue a lengthy litigation (since 1983) on

sites known to be contaminated since 1976.

In any case, Congress specifically mandated the RI/FS

procedure and public comment to be done to protect public

health and environment. The intent of Congress is to have

EPA conduct cleanups as quickly as possible in accordance

with law, so that proper care is taken. There is no

compelling government interest in recklessly rushing to

conduct a cleanup in a careless and illegal fashion. The 7th

Circuit’s decision deprives Petitioners of their entitlement to

sue to enforce CERCLA and NEPA and their fundamental

right to access to the courts, and is not supported by any

27

compelling government interest. The 7th Circuit’s decision

represents a fundamental violation of Due Process and

directly conflicts with the above cited decisions of this Court

in removing from Petitioners any forum in which they can

seek an effective remedy.

B. Provision of Post-Enforcement Judicial Review for

the Corporate Wrong-Doer While Denying Review

to Citizen’s Acting as Private Attorneys General

Under CERCLA Offends Fifth Amendment

Principles of Equal Protection

Under the 7th Circuit’s construction of CERCLA’s

review provision, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), citizens would be

denied the right to seek review of the EPA response action

both before EPA enforcement and after enforcement but

before response implementation. The interests which citizens

would seek review to protect after enforcement but before

implementation would be their vested right to enforce the

requirements of the Act itself, their due process right to

comment and an opportunity to be heard on the RI/FS and

proposed ROD prior to EPA’s final decision on the remedy,

their constitutional right to petition for redress, their interest

in the value of their property that might be harmed, their

interest in their health and that of their families, and their

interest in the quality of the environment. Surely these rights

and interests of citizen plaintiffs are as worthy of protection

as the PRP’s mere financial interest?

The CERCLA statute provides for PRPs to challenge

an EPA response action through post-enforcement review

before implementation, once the EPA has sought injunctive

relief, as in the present case. South Macomb Disposal

Authority, 681 F.Supp. at 1250; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Thus

28

pre-implementation review is available to PRPs in these

circumstances. To allow PRPs, as a class, access to pre-

implementation review while denying the same access to the

courts to citizen plaintiffs constitutes a violation of the

constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). No compelling or

even rational basis can be offered to explain this inequitable

classification of interests.

Since the CERCLA citizen suit provision (42 U.S.C.

§ 9659) and the §9613(h) timing of judicial review provision

were added by the 1986 Amendments, PRPs often have been

denied judicial review prior to completion of EPA response

actions unless EPA had brought suit under 42 U.S.C § 9606.

However, the statute has generally not been interpreted to

deny citizens the right to sue under §9659. In denying PRPs

the right to pre-implementation review, the courts have

explicitly stated that such a denial is not a violation of due

process only because the PRPs, unlike citizen plaintiffs under

§9659, have special opportunities to protect ‘heir financial

interests and seek review later. South Macomb Disposal

Authority, 681 F.Supp. at 1251, 1252;

E.P.A,, 677 F.Supp. 823, 829 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1988). The 7th

Circuit's discriminatory classification of citizen plaintiffs into

a class that is denied post-enforcement judicial review while

responsible parties are placed in a class where such review is

available represents a conflict with decisions of this Court

upholding citizens’ rights to equal protection. Moreover, the

7th Circuit opinion results in the wrong-doer having greater

rights than citizens acting as private attorneys general, which

is a gross miscarriage of justice.

Ill. Assuming Arguendo, that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) On

Its Face Limits Jurisdiction of Post-Enforcement

Claims, the 7th Circuit’s Failure to Recognize the

"Statutory Authority" Exception to Statutory

Jurisdictional Limitations is in Direct Conflict with

Decisions of this Court

Even assuming that the 7th Circuit's interpretation of

CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)) is correct, its refusal to

accept jurisdiction over this case for the sole purpose of

striking down the outrageous and illegal actions of EPA,

directly conflicts with prior well established Supreme Court

precedent. A brief discussion of EPA’s lawless conduct will

set the stage for the analyses of the Court's precedents that

follows.

EPA cannot credibly contest the fact that it failed to

obey mandatory statutory requirements to : 1) prepare an

environmental impact statement (EIS) or a functional

equivalent of an EIS as required by the National

Environmental Policy Act before choosing a remedy to clean

up 700,000 tons of soils and sludges contaminated by

PCBs", and conduct a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility

Study (RI/FS) prior to selecting a clean up remedy as

required by CERCLA.” In failing to meet these important

" NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) requires the preparation uf an EIS

for any “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment." The EIS is supposed to discuss environmental

impacts and effects, alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship

between short term and long term environmental goals, and any irreversible

or irretrievable commitments of resources. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C\i-v).

42 U.S.C. §§ 9616(d), 9617 (as amended in 1986). In

section 9616 of CERCLA Congress delineated mandatory

requirements for the preparation of an RI/FS prior to selecting

a clean up remedy for a National Priorities List (NPL) site.

(continued...)

statutory requirements, EPA also intentionally prevented

masninatd public participation end scrutiny of tho CERCLA

clean up remedy selection process. This covert and illegal

SPA masteetailin of Goo qatetse tagt diieesn ont of 0

decision that will effect the health and property of over

100,000 persons in the communities surrounding these

horribly contaminated sites and the planned location of the

Westinghouse incinerator.

The “public comment", “intensive public scrutiny”,

“ample opportunity for public comment and involvement” and

“numerous opportunities for input into the process"

referred to in the erroneous 7th Circuit decision were

permitted after the remedy selection was completed, and

absent an RI/FS, EIS, or equivalent written analyses. In fact,

to this day EPA has refused to designate the information it

allegedly relied upon in making its illegal decision. EPA's

"(.. continued)

Prior to the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, the same RI/FS

was articulated in the National Contingency Plan

(40 C.F.R. § 300.68 (1982, 1985)). This regulation remains in

effect today. Cases that have considered the RI/FS requirement

agree that it is a mandatory component of the NPL site clean up

process. U.S. v. M. Genzale Plating, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 877,

883 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“once a site is listed on the NPL,

CERCLA mandates that an RI/FS be commenced in accordance

with a designated schedule."); U.S. v. Rohm & Haas Co,, 669

F. Supp. 672, 674-675 (D.N.J. 1987); Versatile Metals v.

Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1582 (E.D.Pa. 1988).

See, also, O" Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc,, 677 F. Supp.

807, 811 (E.D.Pa. 1988) for a discussion of the proper

procedure for EPA to utilize in selecting a clean up remedy

for a site prior to the 1986 SARA amendments.

~ = =e

See, 7th Circuit opinion in appendix at pages 5(a), 7 (a),

14(a), 17(a).

31

arrogant disrespect for the law and the rights of persons who

will be directly and irreparably effected by its decisions in

this matter must not be viewed complacently as the

stereotypical tension between an over-zealous citizenry and

struggling agency that is trying its best to manage its many

responsibilities. All Petitioners seek is compliance with the

law. Ata minimum, EPA must be required to meet this

obligation.

In failing to act to correct the blatantly lawless acts of

the EPA, the 7th Circuit positioned itself directly in conflict

with the decisions of this Court which dictate that the courts

have jurisdiction over cases where agencies have exceeded

their authority or ignored a specific statutory prohibition.

Such oversight is one of the most important roles of the

judiciary. In Leedom vy. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) this

Court had cause to exercise its oversight responsibility over

the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In Leedom, a

233 member professional employees association had petitioned

the NLRB for certification as a collective bargaining unit.

The NLRB added 9 non-professional employees to the

bargaining unit and convened an election. The professional

employees objected to the addition of the 9 non-professional

employees and asked to exercise their statutory right to vote

on the issue. The NLRB refused to grant the professional

* their opportunity to vote as provided in the

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(b)).

Consequently, the professional employees challenged

the NLRB’s decision in district court. The district court

voided the NLRB’s decision as violative of the NLRA. The

NLRB appealed, and challenged the district court’s

jurisdiction to review the NLRB’s decision under a provision

in the NLRA which limited the ability of the courts to review

NLRB bargaining unit certification decisions. The appeals

court affirmed the judgement of the district court and decided

that it had jurisdiction.

In reviewing the decisions of the lower courts, this

Court held that the courts had general jurisdiction to “strike

32

down an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated

powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act."

Leedom, 358 U.S. at 188. The Court reasoned that Congress

had provided the professional employees with a specific right

to vote on whether or not to accept non-professional

employees in their bargaining unit. The NLRB deliberately

violated the employees’ statutory rights when it refused to

allow them to vote on the issue. The Court determined that

when Congress limited judicial review of NLRB decisions, it

could not have intended to eliminate "judicial protection of

rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of

delegated powers." Leedom, 358 U.S. at 190. Where

Congress has given a right it must intend for that right to be

enforced.

The parallels between Leedom and Petitioners’ case

are striking. Like the NLRB in Leedom, EPA has attempted

to hide behind statutory protections limiting judicial review,

and has trampled specific rights provided by Congress for

citizens affected by NPL site clean ups. The loss of the

rights at stake for Petitioners are far greater in this case than

the bargaining rights of professional employees defended in

Leedom.

Interestingly, another parallel emerges between

Petitioners’ case and Leedom when the decision of the 7th

Circuit is compared with the dissenting opinion in Leedom.

In Leedom Justices Frankfurter and Brennan dissented

arguing that the limitations upon judicial review were a

purposeful effort by Congress to limit "time-consuming court

procedures [that] would seriously threaten to frustrate the

basic national policy of preventing industrial strife..."

Leedom, 358 U.S. at 191. The 7th Circuit used a similar

argument to support its position.

...challenges to the procedure employed in

selecting a [clean up] remedy nevertheless

impact the implementation of the remedy and

result in the same delays Congress sought to

avoid by passage of the statute; the statute

33

necessarily bars these challenges. The judicial

review itself slows the process down. [citation

omitted]

Whether the important statutory objective involves preventing

industrial strife or cleaning up NPL sites, agency actions that

contradict unambiguous statutory mandates cannot be tolerated

by the courts.'*

Beyond Leedom this Court has used similar rationale

to strike down agency actions when they have been beyond

the scope of statutory authority. In at least 2 cases this Court

acknowledged jurisdiction to overturn the illegal actions of

selective service boards despite statutory restrictions on

judicial review. Qestereich v. Selective Service Board No.

11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Breen v, Selective Service Local

Board No, 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970). In both cases this Court

found that the respective Selective Service Boards had acted

unlawfully, and concluded that statutory restraints on judicial

review did not apply.

Similarly, in a case involving review of a district

court remand order, this Court held that the district court had

exceeded its statutory authority and that the prohibition

against reviewing remand orders did not apply. Thermtron

Products, Inc, v, Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976).

Petitioners do not agree with the 7th Circuit’s

interpretation of their rights under CERCLA or EPA’s

obligations. However, if the 7th Circuit's statutory analysis

'S Frey, 900 F.2d at 1097.

'© This Court has subsequently interpreted Leedom

consistently. See, Boire v. Greyhound Corp,, 376 U.S. 473,

480-481 (1964); Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v.

380 U.S.

Assoc. for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees,

650, 659-660 (1965); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de

Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963).

is somehow correct, and judicial review of EPA’s post-

enforcement actions under CERCLA is properly limited, then

the court’s authority under the Leedom line of cases should

have been invoked to strike down EPA’s remedy selection

process for failure to complete an EIS, and/or RI/FS, and

permit meaningful public participation. By failing to utilize

the Leedom exception the 7th Circuit abdicated an important

judicial responsibility to hold EPA accountable for actions

taken beyond the scope of its delegated powers. Therefore,

the 7th Circuit’s decision directly conflicts with this Court’s

precedents and must be subjected to thorough review.

CONCLUSION

For these various reasons, this petition for certiorari

should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Louis Clark

Government Accountability Project

25 E Street N.W. Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 347-0460

Attorney for Petitioners

RICHARD E. CONDIT

Government Accountability Project

25 E Street N.W. Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 347-0460

Of Counsel

wreck,

ae

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Amended: May 31, 1990

May 30, 1990

Before

Hon. Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judge

Hon. Kenneth F. Ripple, Circuit Judge

Hon. Daniel A. Manion, Circuit Judge

DAVID SCHALK and

RONALD T. SMITH,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 89-1141 v.

WILLIAM K. REILLY, Administrator,

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

SARAH E. FREY and PEOPLE

AGAINST THE INCINERATOR

(PATI), an Unincorporated Association,

Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

No. 89-1276 Vv.

WILLIAM K. REILLY, in his official

Capacity as administrator of the

United States Environmental

Protection Agency,

Defendant--Appellee.

AMENDED ORDER

Appeals from

the United

States District

Court for the

Southern

District of

Indiana,

Indiapolis

Division

Nos. 88-C-344

and 88-C-948

S.Hugh Dillin,

Judge.

2(a)

Nos. 89-1141 & 89-1276 Page 2

On consideration of the petitions for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing in banc filed in the above-entitled

cause by Appellants, no judge in active service has

requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the

original panel have voted to deny a rehearing.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that thé aforesaid petition for

rehearing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

3(a)

David SCHALK and Ronald T. SMITH,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

William K. REILLY, Administrator, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, Defendant-Appellee.

Sarah E. FREY and People Against the Incinerator (PATI),

an Unincorporated Association, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

William K. REILLY, in his official capacity as

administrator of the United States Environmental Protection

Agency, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 89-1141, 89-1276.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 28, 1989.

Decided April 24, 1990.

Citizens brought action to challenge consent decree entered

into by corporation and Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) concerning clean up of hazardous waste sites. The

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, S. Hugh Dillin, J., dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, and citizens appealed. The Court of

Appeals, Manion, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) under the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act (CERCLA), the federal court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to consider challenges to remedial actions

which had not yet been completed, and (2) federal court

lacked jurisdiction to consider EPA’s failure to perform an

environmental impact study under the National Environmental

Policy Act.

Affirmed.

4(a)

David Schalk, Bloomington, Ind., pro se.

Ronald T. Smith, Bloomington, Ind. pro se.

Deborah J. Daniels, U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., Martin

W. Matzen, M. Alice Thurston, Dept. of Justice, Land &

Natural Resources Div., Washington, D.C., for defendant-

appellee.

Edward L. Rogers, Washington, D.C., Rudolph W.

Savich, Bloomington, Ind., for plaintiffs-appellants.

John Blair, Indianapolis, Ind., Richard E. Condit,

Washington, D.C., amicus curiae, for Hoosier Environmental

Council and Indiana Public Interest Research Group.

Before WOOD, Jr., RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit

Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

David Schalk and Sara Frey brought separate citizens suit

challenges to a consent decree entered into by Westinghouse

and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to clean up

hazardous waste sites in and around Bloomington, Indiana.

The district court separately dismissed both cases for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Schalk and Frey appealed, and

their cases were consolidated. We affirm.

—

I. Statutory Background

The Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as

amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization

Act of 1986 (SARA), provides a statutory scheme for cleaning

up hazardous substances. These laws allow the EPA to

undertake direct removal or remedial action to protect the

5(a)

public health or welfare or the environment when it

determines that release of a hazardous substance poses an

imminent and substantial danger. The EPA may also

determine that the party responsible for the release will take

appropriate removal or remedial action.'

Before remedial action is taken, the site is studied and

various cleanup alternatives are considered. The National Oil

and Hazardous Subsiances Pollution Contingency Plan(NCP),

40 C.F.R. Pt. 300 (1988), sets out the criteria and procedures

to be followed in comparing remedial alternatives and

choosing a response. The NCP in effect when the consent

decree in this case was signed required the EPA to prepare a

Remedial Alternatives Assessment by signing an Enforcement

Decision Document. The Remedial Alternatives Assessment

served essentially the same purposes as the present-day

Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study -- determining the

nature and extent of contamination, then studying the merits

of proposed alternatives. After a period of public comment,

the EPA was required to select a remedy and memorialize it

in an Enforcement Decision Document (now called a Record

of Decision).

The statutory authority for citizens suits pursuant to

CERCLA was added by the 1986 SARA amendments, section

310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659. the amendments allow a citizen to

maintain a civil action against any person or the government

: Removal refers to short-term action taken to halt

the immediate risks posed by hazardous wastes. See 42

U.S.C. § 9601(23). Remedial action refers to permanent

remedies taken instead of or in addition to removal, and

includes destruction of hazardous wastes. See 42 U.S.C. §

9601(24). See also State of Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548,

1551 n. 1 (11th Cir.1989). This case involves a proposed

remedial action.

6(a)

for violating any provision of CERCLA. Section 310(a)(2)

provides for suits against the President or any other officer of

the United States, including the administrator of the EPA,

"where there is alleged a failure . . to perform any act or

duty under [CERCLA]. . . which is not d

42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2). However, this section is qualified by

the phrase "Except as provided in . . . section 9613(h) of this

title (relating to timing of judicial review). cae

Section 9613(h)(4) provides:

(h) Timing of review

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law

other than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity

of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is

applicable or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of

this title (relating to cleanup standards) to review any

challenges to removal or remedial action selected under

section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under

section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except one of the

following:

(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to

citizens suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action

taken under section 9604 of this title or secured under section

9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of this

chapter. Such an action may not be brought with regard to a

removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the

site.

Il. Proceedings

In 1983 the United States sued Westinghouse to force

— =

7(a)

cleanup of two landfills where Westinghouse had disposed of

polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs) and other hazardous

substances. See United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,

No. IP 83-9-C (S.D.Ind.1981) Two more sites were brought

into settlement negotiations in late 1983.

The parties agreed to a consent decree in December 1984

and immediately released its terms to the public. The decree

involved all six sites, and required that comprehensive

remedial measures be undertaken at each site. The agreement

required the measures to be undertaken in two steps: first, a

removal action involving surface excavation and capping of

abandoned dump sites; and second, the burning of hazardous

wastes in a trash-fired incinerator.

The proposed consent decree was subjected to intensive

public scrutiny, including 14 public meetings, media

interviews and votes before various city, county and state

governmental bodies. None of those meetings was required

by federal law. The proposed consent decree was approved

and signed by each governmental entity that was a party to the

litigation. The consent decree was lodged with the district

court on May 20, 1985, pending conclusion of a 30-day

public comment period required by Department of Justice

regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.7. This comment period

was extended by two weeks at the request of the Bloomington

Common Council and area residents. :

During this period a number of citizens, including

plaintiffs David Schalk and Ronald Smith, commented on the

consent decree, raising criticisms similar to those put forward

in this lawsuit. Among other things, the comments suggested

that the consent decree’s proposed remedial measures were

inadequate, that there was a lack of opportunity for

meaningful public comment and review, that other remedial

alternatives were not considered, that incineration is not a safe

8(a)

method for disposing of PCBs,’ and that no adequate written

assessment of the potential environmental effects of the

remedy had been prepared.

The United States responded to the criticisms in its request

that the district court approve the final version of the consent

decree. The government noted that other methods of

treatment and disposal of PCBs were considered and rejected

as unsatisfactory. Further, more opportunities for public

comment had already been provided than were legally

necessary, although further public participation was planned

in connection with the processing of permits required by the

consent decree. The government further argued that the

incinerator would be required to meet regulatory standards to

ensure it did not release significant harmful emissions.

Finally, the government pointed our that the application

process for an incinerator permit required that a risk

assessment, along with the results of a test burn, be submitted

and evaluated.

The district court approved the consent decree in August

1985, holding that there were numerous public meetings prior

to its acceptance, and that the decree was “fair, adequate,

reasonable and appropriate.”

. David Schalk is the former Bloomington City

Chemist, and Ronald Smith succeeded Schalk in that post in

1984. The substantive component of their claim and Frey's

claim, which the district court did not reach, is the charge that

PCBs -- a type of man-made chemical compound that may

harm living organisms -- cannot properly be disposed of by an

incinerator. These plaintiffs believe that heating and burning

PCBs may even exacerbate damage to the environment and

risk poisoning many citizens.

Wa)

In December of 1987, Schalk filed a pro se complaint in

the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging

an “illegal plan to clean up hazardous wastes in and near

Bloomington, Indiana” pursuant to the Westinghouse consent

decree. Schalk’s complaint state that the administrator of the

EPA violated federal law by failing to perform an

Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 ef seq.

and a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study pursuant to 40

C.F.R. 300.68(f), (g), and (h). Schalk’s complaint asked the

court to order the EPA to submit a document that complied

with the written requirements of an Environmental Impact

Statement or the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, and

to order the EPA to conduct adequate public hearings.

Plaintiffs Sarah Frey and “People Against the Incinerator,"

a nonprofit corporation, filed a similar complaint in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia in February 1988.

Frey accused the EPA of taking “unlawful actions" in

connection with the plan to clean up hazardous wastes in

Bloomington. Frey attacked the EPA’s failure to authorize an

Environmental Impact Statement, its failure to allow

meaningful public participation and its failure to study other

potential remedial measures. Frey sought declaratory and

injunctive relief that would require EPA to conduct further

studies required by the National Environmental Policy Act and

select an appropriate remedy “on the basis of proper studies,"

and without giving any special weight to the agency

determination in favor of an incinerator.

Both cases were removed to the Southern District of

Indiana, which handled the Westinghouse case. In December

of 1988, the district court separately dismissed each complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court

concluded that the citizens suit provision of CERCLA, as

amended by SARA, deprived the court of jurisdiction.

Although the district court found the statute to be "not entirely

10(a)

clear," it examined legislative history and ruled that

preenforcement review of EPA removal actions was

premature.

In this consolidated appeal, the plaintiffs provide us with

numerous reasons why they believe the district court had

jurisdiction. They argue (1) that the section removing

jurisdiction from the federal courts is inapplicable because this

is a postenforcement challenge; (2) that the statute is

improperly being applied retroactively; and (3) that they are

not “challenging” a remedial action within the meaning of the

statute.

We affirm the district court’s judgement that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over both suits. However, because

the statute’s plain language substantiates our holding, an

extensive examination of the legislative history, as performed

by the district court, is not necessary.

III. Analysis

A. CERCLA’s Plain Language

[1] Federal court review of the remedial action

proposed by Westinghouse and the EPA in their consent

decree is explicitly barred by CERCLA’s plain language.

Under the heading “Timing of review," 42 U.S.C. § 96.3(h)

limits federal court jurisdiction to five specific circumstances.

Plaintiffs assert that § 9613(h)(4), ome of the five

circumstances, confers jurisdiction on their challenge to their

remedial action. In conjuncture with relevant portions of §

9613(h)(4), it reads:

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal

law . . . to review any challenges to removal or

remedial action selected ... except...

11(a)

- ~ ial ™ * ~

(4) An action under section 9659 . . . alleging

that the removal or remedial action taken under section

9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this

title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter.

Such an action may not be brought with regard to a

removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at

the site. (Emphasis added.)

The obvious meaning of this statue is that when a remedy

has been selected, no challenge to the cleanup may occur

prior to completion of the remedy. As the Eleventh Circuit

explained in State of Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557

(11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original):

The plain language of the statute indicates that section

113(h)(4)? applies only after a remedial action is

actually completed. The section refers in the past tense

to remedial actions taken under section 104 or secured

under 106. Absent clear legislative intent to the

contrary, this language is conclusive.

[2] The final sentence in (h)(4) provides further support

for this understanding of the statute’s plain meaning.

In a challenge to a removal action where a remedial action" is

to be undertaken," no action may be brought. That is our

situation. An incinerator has been chosen as the method to

dispose of hazardous wastes in the Bloomington area, but the

remedial action outlined in the consent decree has not yet been

undertaken. Congress intended by this statute to prevent

unnecessary delay in implementing hazardous waste cleanups.

. CERCLA section 113(h)(4) is codified at 42

U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4).

12(a)

That type of delay would surely result if plaintiffs were

successful in requiring the EPA to conduct Environmental

Impact Statements and further Feasibility Studies. The statue

precludes federal court review at this stage -- when a remedial

plan has been chosen, but not “taken” or "secured."

B. CERCLA’s Legislative History

Because we believe the plain language of the statue is

clear, we need not engage in the lengthy examination of

legislative history undertaken by the district court.‘ To the

extent that we do review the legislative history, we are

persuaded the district court correctly determined that the

history supported its construction of the statute. The

legislative history supports the conclusion that federal courts

are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction where remedial

action has not been completed. The Eleventh Circuit reached

the same result in Sate of Alabama v. EPA: “The legislative

history behind this section supports rather than clearly

contradicts this conclusion." 871 F.2d at 1557.

: While the district court found the plain language of

the statute “not entirely clear," that description more

appropriately describes the statute’s legislative history. Both

sides support their interpretation of the statute with lengthy

quotations from senators and congressmen trying to put their

spin on the statute’s interpretation; these contradictory

explanation further demonstrate the dangers of judicial

reliance on legislative history instead of statutory text. See,

e.g., U.S. v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 2423-

2424, 101 L.Ed.2d 287 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); I.N.S.

v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1224, 94

L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring); Wallace v.

Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1560 (9th Cir.1986)(Kozinsky,

J., dissenting).

13(a)

The final conference committee report that reconciled

conflicting House and Senate versions explained that only

"completed" remedial actions could be challenged. H.R.Re.

No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1986) U.S.Code Cong.

& Admin. News 1986, p. 2835. The House Committee on

Energy and Commerce stated that "there is no right to judicial

review of the Administrator’s selection and implementation of

response actions until after the response action have been

completed to their completion [sic]." H.R.Rep. No. 253(D,

99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1986), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin

News 1986, p.2863. The house Judiciary Committee noted

that "[t]his provision is not intended to allow review of the

selection of a response action prior to completion of the

action...." H.R.Rep. No. 253(IID, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.

23 (1986), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin News 1986, p.3046.

These committee reports, along with many other statements of

congressional leaders, far outweigh the few contrary remarks

of individual legislators cited by plaintiffs. The statute as

written clearly states the intent of Congress.

C. Applicability of the SAR Amendments

The plaintiffs contest the applicability of § 9613(h) to this

case on essentially two theories. First, they argue that

"retroactive" application of the 1986 SARA amendments to

the 1984 consent decree creates a "manifest injustice."

Second, they contend that this isn’t really a “challenge” at all

within the meaning of the statute. Neither of these

contentions have merit.

[3] Frey suggests that the district court’s use of 42

U.S.C. § 9613(h) to concluded that it lacked jurisdiction was

improper because it constitutes retroactive application of that

statute. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the

jurisdiction of the district court over the 1984 consent decree

was not at issue; the jurisdiction of the court over the

14(a)

plaintiffs’ claims was. Both plaintiffs filed their citizens suit

challenges after the effective date of the 1986 SARA

amendments; Schalk in August 1987 and Frey in March 1988.

Second, even if this is considered "retroactive" application, a

court should "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its

decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or

there is a statutory direction of legislative history to the

contrary." Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416

U.S. 696, 711, 94. S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974).

The plaintiffs’ arguments for "manifest injustice" are

unpersuasive. See U.S. v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 679

F.Supp. 859 (S.D.Ind.1987)(plaintiffs seeking injunction to

halt EPA cleanup not deprived of due process by .ctroactive

application of CERCLA). The jurisdictional bar in SARA

merely codified the established rule that preimplementation

review of response actions would not be allowed. See e.g.,

Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886-87

(3rd Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.1115, 106 S.Ct. 1970,

90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986) ("The statutory approach to the

problem of hazardous waste is inconsistent with the delay that

would accompany pre-enforcement review. ... [W]e find

in [CERCLA] an implicit disapproval of pre-enforcement

judicial review."); State of Alabama vy. EPA, 871 F.2d at

1558 ("Prior to the 1986 amendments that enacted section

113(h), courts uniformly held that challenges to a Record of

Decision were barred before full implementation.)

Furthermore ample opportunity for public comment and

involvement has been provided and much more will be

allowed prior to implementation. This is not the plaintiffs’

only chance to stop the incinerator.* No injustice is created

. The government points our that in addition to the

public participation already provided by the EPA according to

Department of Justice regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 50.7, further

opportunities will present themselves as plans for the

(continued. ..)

15(a)

by applying current law.

[4] The plaintiffs also assert that they are not really

challenging the consent decree or its choice of an incinerator,

but merely asking that certain procedural requirements be

met. However, challenges to the procedure employed in

selecting a remedy nevertheless impact the implementation of

the remedy and result in the same delays Congress sought to

avoid by passage of the statute; the statute necessarily bars

these challenges. The judicial review itself slows the process

down. See Jefferson County v. United States, 644 F.Supp.

178, 182 (E D.Mo. 1986) ("[JJudicial review of agency clean-

up activities would hinder and delay the hazardous waste

disposal. This delay would be inconsistent with the intent of

congress to allow swift clean-up actions. ")

[5] In any event, the plaintiffs are in fact challenging

the remedy selected; the purpose of Environmental Impact

Statements and Feasibility Studies can only be to demonstrate

the need for a different remedy. Counsel for plaintiffs

admitted at oral argument that if one of those studies

suggested a better remedy the next step would be to enjoin

implementation of the consent decree. See State of Alabama

v. EPA, 871 F.2d at 1559 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that

they were not "challenging" the remedial action plan selected

since they were asking that it be enjoined). The district court

correctly concluded that a "fair reading of plaintiffs’

complaint here reveals that it is the EPA’s selection of a

remedy, not the implementation, that plaintiffs are

5(...continued)

incinerator take shape. The consent decree requires

Westinghouse to obtain at least nine permits and approvals

prior to construction of the incinerator, all of which require

public input and are appealable.

16(a)

challenging." In briefs and at oral argument, plaintiffs have

persisted in attacking and ridiculing the incinerator remedy as

dangerous, untested, and unworkable. At oral argument

Frey’s attorney reiterated that these studies should have been

done "before they made their decision," and should still be

performed “before [the incinerator project] goes forward."

D. Jurisdiction Under the Administrative Procedure Act

[6] The district court properly rejected plaintiffs’

argument that the court had jurisdiction to consider the EPS’s

failure to perform an Environmental Impact Study under the

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). while NEPA

claims are presumptively reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),

5 U.S.C. § 702, APA review is not available when a federal

Statute specifically precludes judicial review. Block y.

Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 345, 104 S.Ct.

2450, 2453, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). As the Eleventh Circuit

stated in rejecting an identical assertion of jurisdiction:

We have already concluded that Congress intended to

remove challenges to remedial action plans from the

jurisdiction of the federal courts until the remedial

action has been taken. The district court thus lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the claims brought

under the APA.

State of Alabama vy. EPA 871 F.2d at 1560.

E. Constitutional Deprivations

Plaintiffs and amicus curiae Indiana Public Interest

Research Group assert that plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights

to substantive and procedural due process, meaningful access

17(a)

to the courts, and equal protection are violated by the district

court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. These

novel theories rest on undesirable expansions of the meaning

of the Fifth Amendment, and we decline to adopt them. As

we already have made clear, the plaintiffs in this matter and

other interested citizens have received numerous opportunities

for input into the process, and will receive more such

opportunities in the future. No recognized constitutional

rights are implicated.

IV. Conclusion

Federal courts lack subject mater jurisdiction to consider

challenges to remedial actions that have not been "taken" or

"secured." The judgement of the district court dismissing the

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is therefore

AFFIRMED.

18(a)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

SARAH ELIZABETH FREY and

PEOPLE AGAINST THE

INCINERATOR (PATI)

Plaintiffs,

-VS- NO. IP 88-948-C

LEE M. THOMAS, Administrator,

United States Environmental

Protection Agency,

mee ee eee ee ee

Defendant.

IUDGMENT

The Court having this day filed its entry in the above

captioned matter in the following words and figures:

( H. I.), now therefore in accordance therewith,

IT IS CONSIDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiffs’

complaint is herby dismissed without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

Date this 6th day of December , 1988.

S. Hugh Dillin, Judge

19(a)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

SARAH ELIZABETH FREY and )

PEOPLE AGAINST THE )

INCINERATOR (PATI) )

)

Plaintiffs , )

)

-VS- ) NO. IP 88-948-C

)

LEE M. THOMAS, Administrator, )

United States Environmental )

Protection Agency, )

)

Defendant. )

ENTRY

This cause is before the Court on a motion by

defendant, Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of the United

States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), to

dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief

can be granted, pursuant to Rules 12 (b)(1) and 12(b)(6),

F.R.Civ.P. For the following reasons, the motion to

dismiss is granted, and plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

20(a)

Background

Plaintiffs, Sarah Elizabeth Frey and People Agains the

Incinerator (PATI), residents of Bloomington, Indiana, filed

this action in February 1988 in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to the cintizen’s

suit provisions of the Superfund Amendments and

Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9659.

Plaintiffs allege that in acting to clean up ploychlorinated

bipheny! ("PCB") contamination in Monroe County,

Indiana, the United States government, through EPA, failed

to perform nondiscretionary statutory and regulatory duties.

The cause was transferred to this court in August 1988.

Plaintiffs’ complaint arised out of action taken by the

EPA in the early 1980s. In response to PCB contamination

of several sites in Monroe County, the EPA, in Janyuary

1983, brought suit against Westinghouse Electric

Corporation in this court. The State of Indiana intervened

as a plaintiff, the Monsanto Company was joined as a third-

party defendant, and the case was ultimately consolidated

with an earlier suit filed by the City of Bloomington against

Westinghouse. In late 1983 and 1984, the parties to these

consolidated actions engaged in settlement negotiations

which culminated in a proposed consent decree approved by

the Court in August 1985, whereby Westinghouse assumed

major responsibility for cleaning up the PCB contamination,

with extensive oversight by the various government entities

involved.

In the present action, plaintiffs contend that in evaluating

the PCB contamination in Monroe County and in working

out the terms of the consent decree, the EPA failed to

prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), as

required by the National Environmental Policy Act

("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c), and failed to conduct an

adequate Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study

21(a)

("RI/FS"), as required by the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compentation, and Liability Act

of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9605, and its

implementing regulations codified at 40 C.F.R § 300.68.

Plaintiffs request the Court to order the EPA to provide

these documents and studies. Defendant has moved to

dismisss plaintiffs’ complaint, arguing plantiffs’ claims are

barred by the doctrines of stare decisis and law of the case

and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of this

cause of action.

Discussion

It is axiomatic that a federal court, as a court of limited

jurisdiction, cannot proceed to adjudicate a dispute over

which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs contend

jurisdiction is conferred by the citizen's suit provisions of

SARA, 42 U.S.C. § ef seq.

Considering first whether the APA confers jurisdiction,

the Court notes that while 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides a

general right to judicial review of action by an

administrative agency, § 701(a)(1) restricts application of

this provision where federal statues preclude judicial

review. The Supreme Court has interpreted these

provisions as barring judicial review where a specific

statute, considered in light of its legislative history, reflects

a congressional intent to limit judicial review of specific

agency action. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467

U.S. 340, 345-46, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2453-54, 81 L.Ed.2d

270, 275-76 (1984).

In case at hand, a specific statute, SARA, directly

addresses the scope of judicial review of EPA actions in

these circumstances. In SARA, Congress expressly stated:

22(a)

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under

Federal law other than under section 1332 of Title 28

(relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or

under State law which is applicable or relevant and

appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating

to cleanup standards) to review any challenges to

removal or remedial action selected under section

9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under

section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except one

of the following:

(4) An action under section 9659 of this title

(relating to citizens suits) alleging that the removal or

remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title

or secured under section 9606 of this title was in

violation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an

action may not be brought with regard to a removal

where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the

site.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). It is undisputed that the EPA action

of which plaintiffs complain involves removal or remedial

action pursuant to sections 104 and 106(a) of CERCLA, 42

U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606(a). Thus, by the express language

of Congress, the only basis of jurisdiction of plaintiffs’

challenge to this EPA remedial action is SARA’s citizen's

suit provision.

This analysis is consistent with that of the Eleventh

Circuit, which found that the limited judicial review

provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) reflected congressional

intent to preclude more expansive judicial review that might

otherwise be available under the APA. Dickerson v.

Administrator, EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 977-78 (11th Cir.

1987); of. Wheaton Indus. v. United States EPA, 781 F.2d

354, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986); Jefferson County, Mo. v.

United States, 644 F. Supp. 178, 181-82 (E.D.Mo. 1986)

Se

23a)

(pre-SARA cases finding specific provisions and

congressional intent in CERCLA control general judicial

review provisions of APA). Accordingly, the Court finds

that the APA does not provide a jurisdictional basis for this

lawsuit.

Plaintiffs also assert subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to the citizen's suit provision of SARA, which states:

Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e)

of this section and in section 9613(h) of this title

(relating to timing of judicial review), any person

may commence a civil ac.ion on his own behalf --

(2) against the President or any other officer

of the United States (including the Administrator of

the Environmental Protection Agency and the

Administrator of the ATSDR) where there is alleged

a failure of the President or such other officer to

perform any act or duty under this chapter,.. .

which is not discretionary with the Presidency or

such other officer.

42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2). The words “this chapter" in the

statue refer to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 ef seq.

Plaintiffs here allege a failure to perform two

nondiscretionary acts -- a failure to provide an

Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") and conduct an

adequate Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study

("RI/FS").

The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")

requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS whenever they

undertake major action affecting the environment. See 42

U.S.C. § 4332(C). However, NEPA is not CERCLA, and

is in a different chapter of the United States Code. Thus,

24(a)

SARA’s citizen’s suit provision cannot be used to compel a

federal official to perform an act allegedly required by

NEPA. Because, as noted above, the only possible basis

for jurisdiction of plaintiffs’ challenge to EPA action taken

pursuant to §§104 and 106(a) of CERCLA is this citizens’

suit provision and because the citizen’s suit provision does

not encompass NEPA, the Court finds no jurisdictional

basis for plaintiffs’ allegation under NEPA. Plaintiffs’

claim that the EPA failed to provide an EIS is therefore

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Finally, the Court must consider whether it has

jurisdiction, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2), of

plaintiffs’ claim that the EPA failed to conduct an adequate

RI/FS. Section 9659(a) of 42 U.S.C. provides that

citizens’ suits are controlled by the timing of judicial review

provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), set out on page 4

hereof.

Defendant argues that this section precludes judicial

review under the citizen’s suit provision until the remedial

action selected by the EPA has been taken or secured.

Finding that the statute is not entirely clear about just when

in the course of a remedial action a citizen’s suit may be

brought, the Court will look to the legislative history of this

section. In describing this provision of SARA, the House

Committee on Energy and Commerce stated:

Review may also occur pursuant to the terms of a

consent decree, through a citizen suit alleging that the

response action that had been taken was in violation

of the requirements of the Act, or through a

reimbursement suit by a potentially responsible party

under the new procedures provided in this section.

The section is intended to codify the current position

of the Administrator and the Department of Justice

with respect to pre-enforcement review: there is no

=

25(a)

right of judicial review of the Administrator’s

selection and implementation of response actions until

after the response action have been completed to their

completion [sic].

H.R. Re. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in

1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 2835, 2863.

According to the House Judiciary Committee:

This provision is not intended to allow review

of the selection of a response action prior to

completion of the action: the provision allows for

review only of an “action taken... ." Thus, after

the RI/FS has been completed, the remedial action

has been selected and designed, and the construction

of the selected action has begun, persons will be able

to maintain suit to ensure that a specific on-the-

ground implementation of the response action is

consistent with the requirements of the Act. For

example, a suit under this provisions [sic] may be

appropriate where a specific aspect of the remedial

action, which has been taken, in fact fails to attain a

standard required under this Act. The Committee

emphasizes that this paragraph is not intended to

allow delay of the clean-up and that, in actions under

this paragraph, courts should not entertain claims to

re-evaluate the selection of remedial action. Also, in

reviewing actions under this sub-section, the courts

should used their powers to ensure that such review

does not disrupt clean-up remedies.

H.R. Rep. no. 253(III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted

in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3038, 3046

(emphasis added by the Committee). A fair reading of

plaintiffs’ complaint here reveals that it is the EPA’s

selection of a remedy, and not the implementation, that

plaintiffs are challenging.

26(a)

Finally, the Conference Committee explained:

In new section 113(h)(4) of the substitute, the

phrase "removal or remedial action taken” is not

intended to preclude judicial review until the total

response action is finished if the response action

proceeds in distinct and separate stages. Rather an

action under section 310 [42 U.S.C. § 9659] would

lie following completion of each distinct and separate

phase of the cleanup. For example, a surface

cleanup could be challenged as violating the standards

or requirements of the Act once all the activities set

forth in the Record of Decision for the surface

cleanup phase have been completed.... Any challenge

under this provision to a completed stage of a response

action shall not interfere with those stages of the

response action which have not been completed.

H.R. Conf. Rep. 962, 99th Cong.., 2d Sess. 224 reprinted

in 1986 U.C. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3276, 3317.

Comments from the floor debates shed further light on

Congress’ intent with respect to the timing of citizens’ suits.

Senator Thurmond explained:

[The preenforcement review] provision confirms and

builds upon existing case law. In particular, the

timing of review section ensures that Government and

private cleanup resources will be directed toward

mitigation, not litigation. The section is designed to

preclude piecemeal review and excessive delay of

cleanup. Interested parties will be able to participate

early in a more regularized administrative process

instead of making premature challenges in court to

remedy selection or liability.

. . .[C]itizen suits. . . must be utilized in a

manner consistent with the timing of review

27(a)

provisions.

The timing of review section is intended to be

comprehensive. It covers all lawsuits, under any

authority, concerning the response actions that are

performed by EPA and other Federal agencies, by

States pursuant to a cooperative agreement, and by

private parties pursuant to an agreement with the

Federal Government. The section also covers all

issues that could be construed as a challenge to the

response, and limits those challenges tc he

opportunities specifically set forth in the section.

; . . . [T]Jhere is no jurisdiction to review a

response action through a citizen suit except as

provided in the timing of review section. Citizens. .

. cannot seek review of the response action... .

unless the suit falls within one of the categories

provided in this section... .

. . .[Under the timing of review] provision,

no person may bring any lawsuit in Federal court

regarding a federally approved removal or remedial

action except when the removal action has been

completed or when the remedial action has been

taken or secured. “Taken or secured" means that all

of the activities set forth in the record of decision

which includes the challenged action have been

completed. . .. Thus, for example, review of the

Ra ge pero a rR tial action itself had | ion.

The section is designed to preclude lawsuits

: by any person concerning particular segments of the

response action . . . until those segments of the

response have been constructed and given the chance

to operate and demonstrate their effectiveness in

meeting the requirements of the act.

132 Cong. Rec. $14,928-29 (daily ed Oct. 3, 1986)

28(a)

(emphasis added). By this interpretation, plaintiffs’ action

here assailing the adequacy of a RI/FS could not be brought

until the remedial action has been implemented.

In explaining to the House of Representatives the

permissible timing of citizen’s suits, Representative

Glickman made essentially the same remarks as Senator

Thurmond. See 132 Cong. Rec. H9,582 (daily ed. Oct,

1986) (remarks of Rep. Glickman).

Similarly, Senator Mitchell stated that in response to

concerns tha: citizens would not be able to enforce

the standards until the remedy was complete [and that

in some cases where treatment] could take decades

and thus citizens would be barred from suit until it

was too late to effect an improved remedy... .

The conferees agreed that some

preimplementation review would be provided so that

citizens would not be disadvantaged by having to wait

until cleanup was complete ... A suit to compel

compliance with the CERCLA standards would be

permitted, under section 113(h) after each stage of

cleanup is complete. In this way, an entire cleanup

need not be complete before a citizen can sue.

132 Cong. Rec. $14, 917 (daily ed. October 3, 1986).

Some Congressmen had a somewhat different perception

of what section 9613(h)(4) means with respect to the timing

of citizen’s suits. Representative Roe opined:

The legislation allows citizens to bring a

lawsuit under section 310 as soon as the agency

announces its decision regarding how a cleanup is

structured. A final cleanup decision, or plan,

constitutes the taking of action at a site, and the

legislative language makes it clear that citizens’ suits

... Willlie...as soonas ... “action is taken."

ee. ete wee

ee hn a

LS etilbeire Lager

29(a)

132 Cong. Rec. H9,600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). Senator

Stafford appears to have had the same impression:

It is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain

citizens’ rights to challenge response action, or final

cleanup plans, before such plans are implemented

even in part because otherwise the response could

proceed in violation of the law. . . .

132 Cong. Rec. $14, 898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989).

however, Representative Glickman, responding to a

question about Senator Stafford’s comments, suggested that

the Senator was “attempting to revise the Superfund

conference agreement under the guise of interpretation" and

declared emphatically that the sentence quoted above was

“clearly contrary to the conference agreement." 132 Cong.

Rec. H9, 582 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986).

Representative Glickman continued:

[T]he conferees explicitly agreed that all persons

would have the same limited access to

preimplementation judicial review.

[Senator Stafford’s] approach assumes that

section 113(h) of the conference report allows judicial

review of challenges to the selection of the remedy --

cleanup plan -- before the remedy is implemented --

built. This is clearly not the effect of section 113(h).

The statement of managers accompanying the

conference report is explicit on this point.

Id. Representative Glickman further explained that despite

arguments that permitting the EPA to proceed with an

inappropriate remedy might waste money,

the conferees decided to ensure expeditious cleanups

by restricting such preimplementation review. To

balance this restriction on judicial review of the

remedy selected by the EPA, the conferees included

provisions that require EPA to develop extensive

procedures for public participation in the selection of

30(a)

the cleanup plant and the compilation of an

administrative record.

. . . Clearly the conferees did not intend to allow any

plaintiff, whether the neighbor who is unhappy about

the construction of a toxic waste incinerator in the

neighborhood, or the potentially responsible party

who will have to pay for its construction, to stop a

cleanup by what would undoubtedly be a prolonged

legal battle. It was for this very reason that the

conferees included section 113(h).

Id. at H9,583. The Court finds that the interpretations of

Senator Thurmond and Representative Glickman precluding

a citizens’ suit challenging EPA action until at least the first

phase of the remedy has been implemented are far more

consistent with the official committee reports accompanying

SARA than is that of Senator Stafford. See H.R. Re. No.

253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81; H.R. Conf. Rep. No.

962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224, reprinted in 1986 U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin. News 2863, 3046, 3317.

In light of this legislative history, the Court finds that 42

U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) permits citizens’ suits challenging EPA

actions only once a remedial action or discrete phase of a

remedial action has been completed. As the eleventh

Circuit noted, "42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) clearly provides that

federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction for

preenforcement reviews of EPA removal actions pursuant to

section 9604." Dickerson, 834 F.2d at 977 (footnote

omitted); cf. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 669 F.

Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1987) (permitting judicial review,

pursuant to section 9613, of EPA procedures in selecting a

remedy once first phase of cleanup was completed).

Although one federal district court has stated that section

9613(h)(4) “arguably permits citizens’ suits to be brought

before an EPA response action is implemented, see Cabot

Corp. v. United States EPA, 677 F.Supp. 823, 828-29

ae ss.

31(a)

(E.D.Pa. 1988), this comment is dictum and is based on

only a partial review of the legislative history.

Therefore, because the EPA remedial action challenged

here by Frey and PATI has not yet been implemented, the

Court finds their citizen’s suit is premature pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4). Accordingly, the Court must dismiss

plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Dated this 6th day of December, 1988.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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