Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Frey v. Reilly
Supreme Court brief1990
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90-3 A) Supreme Cour,
04 i | F ILEY
Hi AUG 28
No. 90- if 4OSEPH F. spanio
CLERK
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In The | ies
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1990
SARAH ELIZABETH FREY and
PEOPLE AGAINST THE INCINERATOR (PATI),
An Unincorporated Association
Petitioners,
v.
WILLIAM K. REILLY, Administrator,
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent,
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
LOUIS CLARK
Government Accountability Project
25 E Street N.W. Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 347-0460
Counsel of Record
RICHARD E. CONDIT
Government Accountability Project
Date: August 28, 1990
a Ee
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did Congress intend that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) be
interpreted and applied to preclude only pre-enforcement
review, and not post-enforcement and post-consent decree
review of citizen claims that EPA acted ultra vires and in
violation of its Superfund and NEPA statutory mandates in
selecting a remedial response for a National Priorities List
hazardous waste site without conducting feasibility and
environmental impact studies of alternatives and providing
for public review and comment?
2. If 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) on its face precluded post-
enforcement pre-implementation review, would the federal
courts nonetheless have jurisdiction, under the "statutory
authority" exception, to review a blatantly lawless EPA
Superfund remedial decision process?
3. Does the District Court maintain post-enforcement pre-
implementation jurisdiction over denial of due process
claims despite the limiting language of 42 U.S.C. §9613(h)
where withholding judicial review will result in irreparable
harm to plaintiffs’ health and environment and deny them
an opportunity to seek review of EPA’s failure to provide
for notice and opportunity to be heard on EPA’s proposed
Superfund remedy decision and supporting analysis?
4. Does application of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) so as to
provide an industrial toxic waste polluter post-enforcement
review of EPA’s decision process and selected remedial
action before remedy implementation while denying this
same access to the courts to citizen plaintiffs constitute a
violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
of the laws, thereby voiding any jurisdictional limitation on
post-enforcement review by citizens?
iii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
1. Petitioners:
Sarah Elizabeth Frey,
People Against the Incinerator (PATI)*
an unincorporated association
- Respondent:
William K. Reilly, in his capacity as Administrator
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
* As required by Rule 28.1 of this Court, Petitioner PATI
states that it has no parent companies, subsidiaries, or
affiliates.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............. ae
LIST OF PARTIES ...................... ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................. vii
OPINIONS BELOW ...................--. 2
JURIMNCTION ..... =... 2. ee ceca eee 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ 7
Pie I on cet ewe 7
ES ea ee eee 9
I eee 12
REASONS FOR ISSUING THE WRIT
I. The 7th Circuit’s Decision that Judicial
Review of EPA’s Failure to Comply with
Provisions of CERCLA and NEPA that
Require Written Analyses of Hazardous Site
Cleanup Options and Meaningful
Opportunities for Public Comment and
Participation is Wrong, and is in Direct
Conflict with the 2nd, 5th, and 11th Circuits... 13
‘
;
:
'
i
:
neem or
II.
The 7th Circuit Fundamentally
Misinterpreted the Plain Meaning of the
Timing of review Provision in CERCLA §
oe he ee oe ee ee als ae
As a Result of the 7th Circuit’s Flawed
Statutory Interpretation, Its decision Directly
Conflicts with Other Circuits ..........
Resolution of the Issue of Proper
Interpretation of Citizen Enforcement Rights
is Important in Order to Ensure that
Citizen’s CERCLA §§ 9613, 9616, 9617
and NEPA Rights are Preserved .........
Constitutional Issues
The Due Process Guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment, in the Context of Non-
Emergency Hazardous Waste Cleanups
under CERCLA Requires More Than After
the Fact Public Comment and After the Fact
Review by Citizen Sut ............6..
Provision of Post-Enforcement Judicial
Review for the Corporate Wrong-Doer
While Denying Review to Citizen’s Acting
as Private Attorneys General Under
CERCLA Offends Fifth Amendment
Principles of Equal Protection ...........
vi
III. Assuming Arguendo, that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) On Its
Face Limits Jurisdiction of Post-
Enforcement Claims, the 7th Circuit’s
Failure to Recognize the “Statutory
Authority" Exception to Statutory
Jurisdictional Limitations is in Direct
Conflict with Decisions of this Court ....... 28
NED 04! 0"s aa wo dae Ws Od 8 Ow es 34
PNG Wo 6:8 «6 0 week ae 2 eee ne eae la
Vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
State of Alabama v. U.S. E.P.A., 871 F.2d 1548
co ee ee ee ee 19,20,21
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ....... 26
Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480-481 (19643
Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) .......... 28
wen v. Michi A f Family Physicians,
EN ee ee eee 21
rvi cal N
396 U.S. 460, 90 §.Ct. 661, 24 L.Ed.2d 653 (1970) ee
hip Clerks v for
ho. Senill of Mon otieact Emoloutes. 380 U.S. 650,
I 33
Browning-Ferris Industries of South Jersey, Inc. v,
Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151 (2nd Cir. 1990) ..... 19,21,24
Cabot Corp. v. U.S.E.P.A., 677 F.Supp.
823 (E.D.Pa. (1988) ............... una vat 29
Combustion Equipment Assoc. v. U.S.E.P.A., 838 F.2d 35
MI ie as rg ais naraals aw baal 19,22
Dickerson v. Administrator, E.P.A., 834 F.2d 934 (11th
OR eS eT a ee POOR reer eS eee ee 19,20
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) .......... 26
Viii
Frey v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) ... passim
Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933) ....... 25
Leedom vy, Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180,
PE ee 31-34
Logan v, Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (198225 ,26
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) ....... 25
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963) ............. 33
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
I eg a dea be be 8 25
O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 807, 811
i Ss ee a ek be ane 30
a a a PT ee eT
393 U.S. 233, 89 St.Ct. 414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968) . 33
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens —
i 5 ag RSE aie ae eee 21
Rucker v. Willis, 358 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd
0 Pr eer errr ers re er ere ee 25
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) 26
South Macomb Disposal Authority v. U.S.E.P.A., 681
Pa RPE, EOD 8 cc ceca scceees 27,28
Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336
ix
SE Ah ee Pd ere kB ei eae Drang 33
U.S. v, M, Genzale Plating, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 877, 883
PE et as os, 5 aa oo 6a eee ke eo’ 30
U.S. v. Rohm and Haas Co., Inc., 669 F.Supp. 672,
oo LE UL US. aaa eee eee 30
Versatile Metals v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1582
Ce ae 6 beds Oe 30
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d
DT nd so oe ok oes re ae cab ee 19,22
Statutes: Page:
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
("CERCLA" or "Superfund") as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986, ("SARA" Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 et seq. (1986))
CERCLA provisions
ke rr passim
I nao ns 4 30 «ob ed ee 6 eee passim
re passim
GED kv cece esses eencseear 29
UU Svcs eee eaceeudews 20,29
rr O 16
I ia nn 6 6 taco hee ee 15,25,28
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")
NEPA provisions
43 U.S.C. 4BBBGNME) ow ccc ccc c cr ecceccen 29
Regulations:
40 C.F.R. $300.68 (1982)... 0... 2 ee ee eee 25,30
40 C.F.R. §300.68 (1985)... 2... ee ee eee 25,30
Legislative Hi
H.R. Rep. No. 253(III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 22
ree eee er ee ee ee Pe 19
H.R. Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1986) . 18
H.R. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1986) 17,18
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. :
Fed .R.Civ.Proc. GO)... ww wcrc cc ccc ccccces 16
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1990
No. _90-
SARAH ELIZABETH FREY and
PEOPLE AGAINST THE INCINERATOR (PATI),
An Unincorporated Association
Petitioners,
Ve
WILLIAM K. REILLY, Administrator,
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent,
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Sarah E. Frey and People Against the Incinerator (PATI),
petition this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit entered in this proceeding on April 24,1990 and May 30
and 31, 1990.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, upholding the decision to dismiss for want
of jurisdiction by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana (Case No. IP-88-948-C) is reported
at 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990). The decision of the Court of
Appeals is printed in the Appendix hereto, infra, page 3a. The
opinion of the District Court is reported at 28 E.R.C.1655 (S.D.
Ind.). The decision of the District Court is printed in the
Appendix hereto, infra, page 18a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals (Appendix, infra,
page 3a) was entered on April 24, 1990. A timely petition for
rehearing was denied on May 30, 1990 with an Amended Order
issued on May 31, 1990. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. art. V. No person. . . shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),
42 U.S.C § 4332(2)(C).
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall--
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on--
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.
—
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, ("CERCLA" or "Superfund") as
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986, (“SARA” Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 et
seq. (1986)) provisions:
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). (a) (1) Whenever any hazardous
substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a
release into the environment ...the President is authorized to
act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove
...and provide for remedial action ... or take any other
response measure consistent with the national contingency
plan which the President deems necessary to protect the
public health or welfare or the environment.
42 U.S.C § 9606(a). when the President determines that
there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare or the environment because of an
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance...., he
may require the Attorney General ...to secure such relief as
may be necessary to abate such danger ... and the district
court ...shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the
public interest and the equities of the case may require.
42 U.S.C. §9613(h). No Federal court shall have jurisdiction
under Federal law . . . to review any challenges to removal
or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or
to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title,
in any action except one of the following:
(4) An action under section 9659 of
this title (relating to citizens suits) alleging
that the removal or remedial action taken
under section 9604 of this title or secured
under section 9606 of this title was in
violation of any requirement of this chapter
undertaken at the site. (Emphasis added.)
(5) An action under section 9606 of
this title in which the United States has moved
to compel a remedial action.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2)(B). Remedial action. The President
shall provide for the participation of interested persons ... in
the development of the administrative record on which the
President will base the selection of the remedial actions and
on which judicial review of remedial actions will be based.
The procedures developed under this subparagraph shall
include, at a minimum, each of the following:
(i) Notice to potentially affected persons and the
public, which shall be accompanied by a brief analysis of the
plan and alternative plans that were considered
(ii) A reasonable opportunity to comment and provide
information regarding the plan.
(iii) An opportunity for a public meeting ...
42 U.S.C. §9616(d). The President shall assure that remedial
investigations and feasibility studies (RI/FS) are commenced
for facilities listed on the National Priorities List, in addition
to those commenced prior to the date of enactment of
Superfund Amendments ... in accordance. with the following
schedule: ...
42 U.S.C. 9617. (a) Proposed plan. Before adoption of any
plan for remedial action to be undertaken by ...or by any
other person, under section 104, 106, 120, or 122..., the
President or State, as appropriate, shall take both of the
following actions:
(1) Publish a notice and brief analysis of the proposed
plan and make such plan available to the public.
(2) Provide a reasonable opportunity for submission
of ...comments and an opportunity for a public meeting ...
regarding the proposed plan ....
The notice and analysis published under paragraph (1) shall
include sufficient information as may be necessary to provide
a reasonable explanation of the proposed plan and alternative
proposals considered.
42 U.S.C. § 9622(m). In the case of consent decrees and
other settlements under this section (including covenants not
to sue), no provision of this Act shall be construed to
preclude or otherwise affect the applicability of general
principles of law regarding the setting aside or modification
of consent decrees or other settlements.
42 U.S.C. § 9659. Except as provided in ...section 113(h)
... (relating to timing of judicial review), any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf--
(1) against any person (including the United
States and any other ... or agency ...) who is
alleged to be in violation of any standard,
regulation, condition, requirement, or order
which has become effective pursuant to this
Act ...; or
(2) against the President or any other officer
of the United States (including the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency ... where there is alleged a failure of
the President or such other officer to perform
any act or duty under this Act ... which is not
discretionary ....
40 C.F.R. 300.61(c) (1982). In determining the need for and
in planning or undertaking fund-financed action, response
personnel should, to the extent practicable, consider the
following:
w * =
(3) Be sensitive to local community concerns (in
accordance with applicable guidance).
40 C.F.R. 300.67 (d) (1985). In remedial actions at NPL
sites, including Fund-financed and enforcement actions,
feasibility studies that outline alternative remedial measures
must be provided to the public for review and comment for a
period of not less than 21 calendar days. Such review and
comment shall precede selection of the remedial response.
40 C.F.R. 300.68(f)-(j) (1982).
(f) A remedial investigation should be undertaken by
the lead agency ...to determine the nature and extent of the
problem presented by the release.
(g) A limited number of alternatives should be
developed .... One alternative may be a no-action alternative
... for example, when response action may cause a greater
environmental or health danger than no action.
(h) The alternatives developed ... will be subjected to
an initial screening ....
(1) For each alternative, the cost of installing
or implementing the remedial action must be considered, ...
(2) The effects of each alternative should be
evaluated .... If an alternative has significant adverse effects,
it should be excluded from further consideration. ....
(i)(1) A more detailed evaluation will be conducted ...
(2) The detailed analysis of each alternative should
include: ...(D) An assessment of each alternative in terms of
the extent to which it is expected to effectively mitigate and
minimize damage to ... public health, welfare and the
environment, ...(E) An analysis of any adverse environmental
impacts ...
(j) The appropriate extent of remedy shall be
determined by ... selection of lowest cost alternative that is
... feasible and reliable and ... minimizes damage to ...
public health ...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case raises fundamental statutory and
constitutional issues affecting the health, safety and
environmental quality of millions of Americans and the
expenditure of literally billions of dollars in hazardous waste
response costs. It poses the question of whether and how
Congress may limit the timing of judicial review of blatantly
lawless agency action which is clearly harmful to public
health and the environment. This case involves consideration
of a 7th Circuit opinion which requires affected citizens and
groups to stand aside and watch illegal agency action proceed
for years causing serious harm to their families and
community, and then, after the harm has been done and the
issues of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
violation of fundamental constitutional and statutory
requirements have become moot, be allowed only to bring a
symbolic judicial action with no hope of effective remedy.
A. Statutory Background
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or
Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seg., in 1980 to address the
serious environmental and public health threats posed by
abandoned hazardous waste sites created through years of
reckless waste disposal by industry and government neglect.
Congress amended the Superfund Statute in 1986 by passage
of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA), Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 et seq. (1986).'
The Congress, in the Superfund statute, and EPA, in
' See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
the regulations promulgated to enforce the Act, require
specific safeguards and procedures to be followed in
addressing contaminated sites.? The first step in this required
procedure is for EPA to conduct a preliminary assessment/site
investigation (PA/SI) after discovery of a site, and issue a
PA/SI report. Once this assessment and investigation is
complete, the site is evaluated on the basis of the PA/SI and
ranked on a point scale under the Hazard Ranking System
(HRS) to determine if the site scores high enough (if it poses
such a serious threat) to qualify for placement on the National
Priorities List (NPL), and thereby qualify for federal cleanup
funds (from the Superfund).
If the site ranks high enough for placement on the
NPL, a second set of procedural safeguards are required.
These safeguards include the requirement that a remedial
investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) be conducted to define
the nature of the contamination problem and assess the
feasibility of alternative cleanup plans (remedies) and the
environmental impacts of each. 42 U.S.C. § 9616(d); 40
C.F.R. 300.68 (1982 and 1985). This requirement is
acknowledged by the 7th Circuit in its opinion. Frey v,
Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1093. If EPA fails to conduct an
RI/FS or conducts an RI/FS that fails to adequately address
the environmental impacts of the chosen remedy and all
reasonable alternatives (fails to perform the functional
equivalent of an EIS), then EPA must prepare a full
Environmental Impact Statement. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
Once the RI/FS or EIS is drafted, public comment
must be taken on the study and the alternatives described
therein, prior to finalizing the RI/FS or EIS and prior to
selecting a remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §
1503.1 (1987); 40 C.F.R. § 300.61 (1982) (and incorporated
guidance); 40 C.F.R. § 300.67 (1985); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k);
42 U.S.C. § 9617. The 7th Circuit also acknowledged this
requirement. Frey, 900 F.2d at 1093. The EPA selects a
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. and 40 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.
remedy based on the RI/FS and public comment thereon and
formalizes the decision in a Record of Decision (ROD) (or
Enforcement Decision Document (EDD)). EPA then
proceeds to implement that remedy either directly under 42
U.S.C. § 9604 using EPA funds or, after an enforcement
order or suit under 42 U.S.C. § 9606, through oversight of
actions of the party responsible for the pollution. If the
remedy selection was part of an enforcement litigation
settlement-as here, the ROD is incorporated into a federal
court consent decree. 42 U.S.C. § 9622. The decree itself is
subjected to (post-ROD pre-court approval) public review
during another comment period pursuant to Department of
Justice regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 50.7, not to be confused
with the public comment and participation required under
NEPA and Superfund which comes prior to selection of the
Both the studies done at the pre-remedial and remedial
Stages, as well as the site cleanup (remediation) itself are
expensive. RI/FS studies can cost $500,000 or more. Site
cleanups often cost millions of dollars, and sometimes
hundreds of millions of dollars. More importantly, if the
hazardous waste is handled improperly, serious harm can
occur to the environment and public health. The timely and
accurate assessment and reporting of such hazardous waste
sites is thus a critical step which will determine both whether
the responsible industry (or government) polluter will have to
pay millions of dollars in cleanup costs and whether public
health and environment will be harmed.
B. Facts
In January of 1983, eight years after EPA became
aware of the Bloomington Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB)
contamination problem, the EPA sued Westinghouse Electric
Corporation ("Westinghouse") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
9604, 9606, and 9607, and 42 U.S.C. § 6973, seeking the
cleanup of two (of several) toxic waste dumps near
10
Bloomington, Indiana.’ The State of Indiana intervened, and
Westinghouse joined the Monsanto Company as a third-party
defendant. Later, the case was consolidated with an earlier
tort suit filed by the City of Bloomington regarding two other
toxic waste dump sites containing Westinghouse waste.‘
In early 1984, the parties to the Westinghouse actions
began protracted consolidated settlement negotiations which
were conducted well out of public view. A proposed consent
decree resulted from these secret negotiations which inter alia
provided that the City of Bloomington and Monroe County
would pay Westinghouse, the polluter, to burn local garbage
as the primary fuel for a proposed Westinghouse designed and
operated experimental incinerator to be used to “treat” the
toxic PCB waste which Westinghouse had recklessly disposed
of in the community. The tipping fee paid to Westinghouse
together with fees from the sale of steam and electricity to be
generated from the proposed incinerator, and the profit from
sale of similar incinerators Westinghouse hoped to market,
was intended by Westinghouse to offset their cleanup costs.
The proposal covered only a few of the known contaminated
sites leaving others, notably the Westinghouse plant property
itself, unaddressed.
The first public meeting to take comment on the
proposed decree which emerged from the secret negotiations
was held December 5, 1984, one day after EPA had already
signed a record of decision (ROD) called an enforcement
decision document (EDD) selecting the remedy described.
This meeting and the successive public meetings revealed
wide-spread public opposition to and fear about the public
health dangers apparent in the experimental and limited-scope
cleanup plan.
* See United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. IP 83-9-C
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 4, 1983).
* See City of Bloomington, v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. IP
81-448-C (S.D. Ind. 1981).
11
The signing of the ROD/EDD document constituted
EPA’s final remedy selection decision, and the EPA filing of
the Superfund enforcement suit under 42 U.S.C. § 9606 to
compel Westinghouse to cleanup the sites in question
categorizes all subsequent EPA and citizen action as "post-
enforcement".
EPA selected the remedial plan (remedy) without
complying with the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act.* NEPA mandates preparation of a _
formal environmental impact statement ("EIS") before any
Federal agency undertakes any “major Federal actions
affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C). The ROD/EDD was signed without prior (or
post) performance or a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility
Study ("RI/FS"), an environmental assessment procedure
required by EPA Superfund regulations at 40 C.F.R. §300.68
to be performed before remedial decisions can be made and
implemented.
The eventual consent decree incorporating EPA’s
record(s) of decision provided for remedial action at (only)
six (of a large number) of contaminated sites, four of which
were Superfund National Priorities List sites. The EPA
performed limited studies of two of these sites in 1983 that
addressed remedial alternatives. However, these studies did
not address the feasibility or environmental impacts of the
remedy actually selected by EPA.
More specifically, these studies did not address the
feasibility of the experimental plan to use garbage as fuel for
an incinerator to be used to attempt to destroy toxic and
hazardous waste in soil and sludge. The studies did not
~ address the environmental impacts of such incineration in
Monroe County (or anywhere). Nor did the studies address
the full scope of known contamination from Westinghouse
waste disposal nor the impacts of addressing only part of such
contamination in the remedy selected. The other four sites,
* NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370a.
i2
each environmentally different and different in terms of the
nature of the contamination problem, were not addressed in
any study of feasibility, impacts, or alternatives.
No study, including the two inadequate ones that were
done, were submitted for public review prior to EPA’s final
action of signing the record of decision on December 4,
1984. These studies would not have been available at all
except for a freedom of information request by Indiana Public
Interest Research Group (InPIRG). The ROD/EDD itself
would never have been revealed to the public except for a
second freedom of information request by InPIRG which
finally, after some assistance from Indiana elected officials,
forced disclosure two and a half years later in August, 1987.
Following a series of public meetings to take public
comment on the proposed consent decree, in the absence of
the administrative record including the ROD and any
feasibility or impact studies of the selected remedy or
alternatives, during which over ninety percent of citizens
testifying explicitly condemned the proposal and decision
process, EPA moved the federal court to approve the
proposal. The District Court approved the proposal and
issued the consent decree in August, 1985 without holding a
hearing and without the benefit of the EPA ROD and any
supporting analysis, while denying as untimely citizen
intervention motions made in September, 1984.
C, PROCEEDINGS BELOW
After EPA made public disclosure of its ROD/EDD in
August of 1987, and after Petitioners analyzed the disclosed
materials, it became clear that no equivalent of an EIS was
ever performed by EPA. Consequently, Petitioners on
February 10, 1988 filed an action in the district court of the
District of Columbia claiming the decision constituted an
unlawful agency action in violation of NEPA due to failure to
prepare an EIS and provide for meaningful public
participation in the remedy selection process leading to the
EDD (ROD); and failure to prepare an RI/FS as required by
13
Superfund prior to selection of a remedy. Petitioners asked
for declaratory relief but no injunction. On July 25, 1988,
the Court granted the government’s motion to transfer the
action to the Southern District of Indiana.
On December 6, 1988, the Court granted
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-
pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
Petitioners’ appeal of the district court’s dismissal was
consolidated with that of David Schalk® and Ronald T.
Smith.’
On April 24, 1990, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit upheld the District Court’s dismissal.
The Appellate Court’s decision merely upheld the district
court’s interpretation of the preclusive affect of 42 U.S.C. §
9613(h)(4), and dismissed Plaintiff's and Amicus Curiae
InPIRG’s Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection
concerns as ". . . novel theories [that] rest on undesirable
expansions of the meaning of the Fifth Amendment" and
failed to respond to them, discuss them, or to distinguish case
law cited to support them. On May 30, 1990, the Court
denied Petitioners’ Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for
Rehearing In Banc, and issued an amended order to this effect
on May 31, 1990.
* Until 1984 David Schalk was the Bloomington City Chemist.
Upon EPA’s disclosure of the ROD/EDD, Schalk, like Petitioner, filed
an equitable action against the decision in the D.C. district court in
December, 1987. The suit was transferred to the Southern District of
Indiana and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
9613(h)4. His appeal was consolidated with Petitioners’.
” Ronald T. Smith succeeded David Schalk as Bloomington City
Chemist, and was a co-plaintiff in Schalk’s suit.
14
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The 7th Circuit’s Decision Denying Judicial Review
of EPA’s Failure to Comply with Provisions of
CERCLA and NEPA that Require Written
Analyses of Hazardous Site Cleanup Options and
Meaningful Opportunities for Public Comment and
Participation is Wrong, and is in Direct Conflict
with the 2nd, Sth, and 11th Circuits
A. The 7th Circuit Fundamentally Misinterpreted
the Plain Meaning of the Timing of review
Provision in CERCLA § 9613(h)
The 7th Circuit opinion is obviously and fatally
flawed because Judge Daniel A. Manion, writing for the 7th
Circuit, failed to acknowledge the legal significance of the
clear fact that EPA had already filed suit against
Westinghouse to enforce the Superfund statute and compel a
cleanup remedy, as evidenced by the 1985 consent decree of
the district court. Judge Manion acknowledges the EPA
enforcement suit and resulting consent decree in the 7th
Circuit opinion. Frey vy. Reilly, 900 F.2d at 1093. Thus
there is no dispute that Plaintiffs are in the posture of
bringing a post-enforcement review claim, not a pre-
enforcement review action, although Judge Manion does not
express this clearly in the 7th Circuit opinion.
It is clear, however, that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) limits
only pre-enforcement review, not post-enforcement review.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) states:
No Federal court shall have
jurisdiction under Federal law . . . to review
any challenges to removal or remedial action
selected under section 9604 of this title, or to
review any order issued under section 9606(a)
of this title, in any action except one of the
following:
15
(4) An action under section 9659 of
this title (relating to citizens suits) alleging
that the removal or remedial action taken
under section 9604 of this title or secured
under section 9606 of this title was in
violation of any requirement of this chapter
such an action may not be brought with regard
i wt ie) action ‘a to |
undertaken at the site. (Emphasis added.)
(5) An action under section 9606 of
this title in which the United States has moved
to compel a remedial action.
The plain meaning of § 9613, when read in its entirety and in
conjunction with the other referenced sections of CERCLA,
makes clear that Petitioners’ suit is not barred.
The introductory paragraph of the 42 U.S.C. §
9613(h) timing of review provision states exactly the types of
EPA action for which review is precluded as a general rule,
namely a 42 U.S.C. § 9604 EPA funded action (which is not
the case here) and a 42 U.S.C. § 9606 administrative order
(which is also not the case here). These categories of EPA
actions represent situations known as pre-enforcement since
EPA has not yet invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts
itself by filing a suit to inter alia compel a remedy, enforce an
administrative order, or establish liability and seek
reimbursement.
The opinions from other circuits and the legislative
history discussed infra show beyond doubt that the 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h) language “or to review any order issued under
section 9606(a) of this title" means agency orders issued by
EPA, not court orders such as consent decrees. Therefore,
an EPA enforcement suit under 42 U.S.C. § 9606 does not
fall within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The opinions
from other circuits and the legislative history show explicitly
that only pre-enforcement review is limited. It is in holding
that post-enforcement review is limited by 42 U.S.C. §
9613(h) that the 7th Circuit opinion conflicts directly with
other circuits, meriting the attention of this Court and
justifying the issuance of the Writ of Certiorari.
The error in the reasoning of the 7th Circuit which
placed it at odds with the other circuits becomes clear upon a
close reading. Following the introductory paragraph in §
9613(h) five items are listed which identify exceptions to the
general rule. The 7th Circuit errs by addressing the
exceptions to § 9613(h) as if they apply to post-enforcement
cases. The court fails to recognize that EPA enforcement
suits under 42 U.S.C.§ 9606, such as the one here, do not
fall within the parameters of the introductory language of §
9613(h), and thus are not cases where review is limited at all.
Consequently, there is no need to look at the list of
exceptions.*
* There are obvious reasons why review would not be limited where
a § 9606 suit had been filed. Once the court had assumed jurisdiction of
the EPA § 9606 enforcement complaint, it would necessarily have
jurisdiction to hear defenses from the responsible party defendants, as well
as any citizen plaintiffs with standing and a cause of action (such as a
citizen enforcement suit), under general principles of law and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Superfund statute recognizes this explicitly
in 42 U.S.C. § 9622(m) (“In the case of consent decrees and other
settlements under this section (including covenants not to sue), no provision
of this Act shall be construed to preclude or otherwise affect the
applicability of general principles of law regarding the setting aside or
modification of consent decrees or other settlements"). Because Plaintiff
Frey in the instant case brought a complaint alleging that the EPA decision
process that resulted in an ROD, which was then incorporated into a
consent decree following litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 9606, violated both
NEPA and Superfund, her complaint is either a challenge to a decree as
void due to illegality, a ground for relief from judgment under
Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 60(b) which is therefore allowed under 42 U.S.C. §
9622(m), or her complaint is not a “challenge” at all and therefore
17
It is significant that the 7th Circuit opinion in quoting
the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) omits the key
language which limits application of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) to
only 42 U.S.C. § 9604 actions and 42 U.S.C. § 9606
(administrative) orders, and not 42 U.S.C. § 9606 suits.
Erey, 900 F.2d at 1095. The failure of the 7th Circuit to
consider the 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) language in its entirety
results in an out of context reading of portions of the
provision which lead the 7th Circuit to the inevitable
conclusion (under the circumstances of the misreading) that
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) limits al] challenges to remedial actions
including post-enforcement challenges such as the case at bar.
See, Frey, 900 F.2d at 1098 ("Federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction to consider challenges to remedial actions
that have not been ‘taken’ or ‘secured.’"). The legislative
history cited in the Court's opinion is in itself sufficient,
however, to make clear the error in the 7th Circuit’s
reasoning, and that pre-enforcement review is all Congress
intended to limit.
The 7th Circuit cites the Conference Committee
Report, the Report from the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, and the Report from the House Judiciary
Committee all for the proposition that federal courts lack
jurisdiction over citizen suits where a remedial action has not
been completed (regardless of the enforcement status of the
case). Frey, 900 F.2d at 1096. However, each of these
reports clearly shows that Congress intended to limit only
pre-enforcement review. The 7th Circuit failed to note that
the Conference Report section laying out the § 9613(h) timing
of review provision was entitled "Pre-enforcement review".
H.R. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1986). The
7th Circuit opinion quotes the word “completed” out of this
pre-enforcement context and fails to note that the conference
substitute provision (now 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)) adopted the
first three “exceptions” of the Senate and House Amendments
jurisdiction of it is not removed by § 9613(h).
18
which allow for review of a response inter alia when EPA
brings a suit for abatement under 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a), which
is exactly the circumstance of the present case. H.R. Rep.
No.962 at 221, 223.
Judge Manion also quotes the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce Report to the effect that there is no
right of judicial review until completion of a response action.
However, the quote states that this is true for "the
Administrator’s selection and implementation of response
actions" [emphasis added]. Frey, 900 F.2d at 1096. This
makes clear that the Committee was speaking only of pre-
enforcement situations since the entire goal of enforcement is
to compel the responsible party to implement the response. If
any doubt remained, the section in the Committee on Energy
and Commerce Report from which Judge Manion quoted is,
as with the previous cite, entitled "pre-enforcement." H.R.
Rep. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1986).
To dispose of doubt on the matter entirely, this same
section states "Response actions or consent orders under
section 104 [42 U.S.C. § 9604] and orders under section 106
[42 U.S.C. § 9606] may be subject to judicial review at the
time the government seeks cost recovery or acts to enforce an
order or otherwise obtain injunctive relief." Id, The 7th
Circuit quoted the Committee cleariy out of context in that the
omitted part of the sentence from which the quote was taken
read "The section is intended to codify the current position of
the Administrator and Department of Justice with respect to
pre-enforcement review: ..."[emphasis added].
Finally, the 7th Circuit cited the House Judiciary
Report to the same effect that review of a response could not
be had until it was completed. Frey, 900 F.2d at 1096.
Suffice it to say that the relevant section of this report is also
entitled "pre-enforcement review", that the report
acknowledges review can be had when there is an action for
an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (as here), and states
"that, in the absence of a government enforcement action,
judicial review of the selection of a response action should
19
generally be postponed ....". H.R. Rep. No. 253(III), 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 22 (1986).
B. As a Result of the 7th Circuit’s Flawed Statutory
Interpretation, Its Decision Directly Conflicts with
Other Circuits
The 7th Circuit’s decision below is therefore in direct
conflict with the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 11th Circuits (as well as
with district court decisions in other circuits) which have
clearly found that Congress intended 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) to
limit pre-enforcement, not post-enforcement, review.
Browning Ferris Industries of South Jersey, Inc, v.
Muszynski, 891 F.2d 161 (2nd Cir 1990); State of Alabama
v. US, EP.A., 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 538 (1989); Combustion Equipment
Assoc., Inc v. U.S.E.P.A., 838 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir. 1988);
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380
(Sth Cir. 1989); Dickerson y.Administrator, E.P.A., 834
F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1987).
The 7th Circuit cites to Alabama as its primary
authority to support the erroneous conclusion that post-
enforcement review is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
Frey, 900 F.2d at 1095-1097. Therefore, the direct conflict
between the 7th Circuit decision below and the 11th Circuit
decision in Alabama is considered first. It should be made
clear that Alabama considered several different types of
claims and found jurisdiction was not available for some, but
was for others. This distinction the 7th Circuit failed to
make.
Alabama directly conflicts with the 7th Circuit opinion
in several ways. The most blatant and most fundamentally
important conflict is that in the Alabama opinion, contrary to
the out-of-context discussion of this decision in the 7th Circuit
opinion, the 11th Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review
plaintiffs claims that EPA had violated the Superfund statute
and had illegally denied notice and rights to participate in the
development of the record of decision, just as Petitioners
claim here. Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1559. “To the extent
plaintiffs’ complaint may in part be read as not challenging
the remedial action plan and therefore not removed from
federal jurisdiction by section 113(h), we address the merits
of plaintiffs’ claims ...." Id.
Further, the Alabama court stated "[t]o the extent
plaintiffs challenge the EPA’s cleanup under section 117(a)
and (b), it is clear that EPA has complied ...." Id.
"Consequently, we reverse ...." Id, Clearly, the 11th
Circuit held that it had jurisdiction and gave plaintiffs a
hearing on the merits of their claims that EPA violated the
decision process required by Superfund, including the
requirements for public participation. This is precisely
opposite the holding of the 7th Circuit.
The Alabama court also considered plaintiffs’
constitutional challenges to an EPA response action and
rejected them on standing grounds (rather than lack of
jurisdiction). Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1555-56. The Alabama
court further considered plaintiffs’ other statutory challenges
on the basis of which plaintiffs had requested an injunction
halting implementation of the remedial action and reopening
of the record of decision. Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1557-59.
In finding that such challenges were precluded by 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h) the Alabama court emphasized two
important points which place it in conflict with the 7th
Circuit. First, citing to the legislative history, the Aiabama
court repeatedly acknowledged that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)
limited “pre-enforcement review." Alabama, 871 F.2d at
1557-58; also see Dickerson v, Administrator, E.P.A., 834
F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1987). The Alabama court found it
lacked jurisdiction for plaintiffs’ claims on which injunctions
were requested to halt implementation of the remedy because
on the facts of Alabama there had been no EPA enforcement
action, unlike here. Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1559-60.
Further, in analyzing plaintiffs’ arguments that they
were not really “challenging” the response action but the
21
selection of an off-site remc Jial plan generally, the Alabama
court emphasized that plaintiffs’ argument failed because
plaintiffs sought to enjoin implementation, unlike here where
no injunction to halt implementation was sought. Alabama,
871 F.2d at 1558-59. The Alabama court’s reasoning makes
clear that judicial review of the decision process is not
prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Alabama, 871 F.2d at
1558-59.°
The 7th Circuit opinion is also in conflict with the
2nd Circuit. Browning Ferris Industries of South Jersey, Inc.
Vv. Muszynski, 891 F.2d 161 (2nd Cir 1990). The 2nd
Circuit in Browning Ferris, as the 11th Circuit in Alabama,
found that § 9613(h) limits pre-enforcement review.
Browning Ferris 891 F.2d at 154 ("While not dispositive, the
express congressional prohibition on pre-enforcement judicial
° The distinction between a challenge to a decision process and a
challenge to the merits of a decision was addressed by this Court in Bowen
y. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). In
Bowen this Court held that despite statutory preclusion of federal
jurisdiction for challenges to the merits of a particular agency decision, if
the challenge is really to the illegality of the decision process itself, the
courts retain jurisdiction. The 7th Circuit opinion wholly fails to make the
distinction or fails to apply the rule. In either case, the 7th Circuit is in
conflict with this Court’s holding in Bowen. The 7th Circuit attempts to
equate Petitioners’ claims that EPA violated NEPA in failing to perform
an EIS and take public comment prior to selecting a remedy with a claim
that the particular remedy chosen is inadequate. By erroneously equating
Petitioners’ procedural NEPA claim with a claim that the remedy chosen
is wrong, the 7th Circuit concludes that Frey is challenging the remedy and
therefore § 9613(h) removes jurisdiction. This is pure folly. Petitioners
have not altered their NEPA procedural claim nor have they amended their
complaint to seek an injunction. They may not be thrilled with the
experimental remedy selected. But seldom is an illegal decision process
that improperly shuts out public participation one that produces a satisfying
result. nonetheless, the process remains illegal, and nonetheless still a
process. The procedural nature of a NEPA claim was made clear recently
by this Court. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens, 490 U.S. _,
109 S.Ct. 1835 (1989).
review of CERCLA orders, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), suggests
."). See also Combustion Equipment Assoc., Inc v.
USEPA. 838 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir. 1988) ("In fact Congress
amended CERCLA in 1986 to make clear that the statute
precluded preenforcement judicial review. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9613(h)....").
The Sth Circuit has likewise acknowledged that the
limitation on review expressed in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) is a
pre-enforcement limit. “[C]Jourts have consistently held that
where judicial review will delay remedial ... activities, they
are barred from reviewing response actions prior to an
attempt by the EPA to enforce > orders or allegations of
liability” [emphasis added].
Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, Cr (Sth Cir. 1989).
"Section 113(h) of SARA, [footnote omitted] enacted in 1986,
codified earlier case law limitations on ‘pre-enforcement’
review of remedial and removal actions". Id, at 1387-88.
C. Resolution of the Issue of Proper Interpretation of
Citizen Enforcement Rights is Important in Order
to Ensure that Citizens’ CERCLA §§ 9613, 9616,
9617 and NEPA Rights are Preserved
The hazardous waste cleanup involved in
Bloomington, Indiana is, without any doubt, a truly major
agency action affecting the human environment. It is one of
the most extensive operations undertaken in the troubled
history of the Superfund program.
All of the parade of horrible chemical poisons, with
the possible exception of nuclear radiation, are present here.
The specter of poisonous chemical fallout from a recklessly
selected experimental hazardous waste incineration facility
randomly spreading toxic byproducts across the land is
present here. Petitioners represent a genuine community fear
and anxiety which, in normal circumstances, would be
reflected in the decision record in a major agency action. But
not here.
The voices of those willing to express the
community’s understandable fear and doubt have been
ignored and rejected. Instead of making affirmative efforts to
insure a good record of public participation in the selection of
remedies, here the EPA has gone to great lengths to deny and
oppose this participation.
Instead, the record speaks of secret negotiations
between major pollution generators to settle lawsuits in which
vitally interested citizen groups were denied intervention. It
speaks of secret and blatant agency lawlessness which
compromised both Petitioners’ faith in good government, and
in the ability of the federal judiciary to protect the statutory,
due process and property rights of Petitioners and other
concerned citizens.
When Petitioners turned to the Federal Courts for
justice, they were told that the Courts have no jurisdiction to
judge and right wrongs if the wrongdoing led to the taking of
a Superfund removal or remedial decision despite that the
polluter is given full access to the courts, being a party to
EPA’s longstanding Superfund enforcement suit. Does 42 _
U.S.C § 9613(h) really mark a boundary across which official
lawlessness and denial of due process becomes immune from
judicial review?
Surely not. The decision below completely undercuts
the citizen enforcement strategy envisioned by Congress as a
necessary complement to EPA enforcement, which can best
be described historically as too little too late. Under the rule
established by the 7th Circuit, all courts in the 7th Circuit
will be forced to postpone citizen suits brought to enforce
against EPA or industry violations of even the most
fundamental requirements of Superfund, as here, until after
the illegal action ani remedy of which it is part are complete.
Violation of any and all of the safeguards painstakingly
crafted into the Superfund statutory scheme by Congress are
insulated from citizen enforcement under the holding of the
7th Circuit, as well as all the safeguards of NEPA the Clean
Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the entire panoply of
24
environmental laws.
This cannot be what Congress intended. The potential
harm to public health and environment and potential waste of
billions of tax and industry dollars resulting from such
unchecked misguided or blatantly lawless agency action is so
great that it is unthinkable that Congress intended to place
EPA so high above the law.
The 7th Circuit failed to acknowledge that postponing
citizen enforcement against EPA’s statutory violations and
postponing citizen mandamus actions against the agency’s
refusal to perform its statutory duties until such actions are
moot, which is the clear consequence of the district court’s
ruling, effectively insulates the agency from enforcement of
the very law Congress has charged EPA with upholding.
This unwarranted preclusion of review encourages the very
agency misconduct which Congress intended to combat by
writing in the citizen suit provisions in the 1986 amendments
to the Superfund statute.
The 2nd Circuit in Browning Ferris also
acknowledged the importance of the jurisdictional issue
surrounding interpretation of § 9613(h), and because of the
sweeping impact interpretation of the section would have and
the difficulty of the issue, declined to resolve the question.
Instead, the 2nd Circuit decided the case on the merits after
assuming jurisdiction arguendo. 891 F.2d at 154-155. "A
comprehensive ruling on the jurisdictional issues would
necessarily have a broad impact on future EPA pollution
remediation efforts." Id, at 154. “Their resolution would
necessarily have a broad impact on an important legislative
scheme involving the expenditure of billions of dollars of tax
and private money ...." Id, at 160. Such considerations add
additional weight to the justification for issuance of a Writ by
this Court.
II. Constitutional Issues
A. The Due Process Guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment, in the Context of Non-Emergency
Hazardous Waste Cleanups under CERCLA
Requires More Than After the Fact Public
Comment and After the Fact Review
by Citizen Suit
In this case Petitioners have been denied their rights
to participate in or comment on EPA’s development of a
cleanup plan, and to bring suit under CERCLA and NEPA to
challenge EPA’s actions. These rights are vested by statute
or regulation." Yet, EPA and the courts below have
unjustly prevented Petitioners from exercising their rights.
This Court has recognized that a cause of action, like
those provided to Petitioners under NEPA and CERCLA, is a
species of property protected by the Due Process Clause."
While citizens do not have a right to a particular form of
remedy, there is a guarantee, under the due process clause,
that a citizen’s substantial right to redress by some effective
procedure will be preserved. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290
U.S. 326, 332 (1933). Other courts have similarly held that
'° Citizen enforcement of CERCLA is provid xd in 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
Public participation and comment rights are granted under 42 U.S.C. §§
9613, 9616, 9617 and the NCP (40 C.F.R. § 300.68). Prior to the
CERCLA amendments in 1986, public participation rights were granted
through the NCP. See, 40 C.F.R. § 300.61 (1982) and the applicable
guidelines; 40 C.F.R. § 300.67 (1985). The right for citizens to sue under
NEPA is governed by the Admihistrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. § 702)
and judicial decisions holding that citizens could act as private attorneys
general. Rucker v. Willis, 358 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd 484
F.2d 158.
'' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-282 (1980); Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-430 (1982).
a right to a judicial hearing must be made at a meaningful
time. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971);
Armstrong v, Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Logan, 455 U.S. at 437.
Like the situations in Boddie, Logan, Fuentes, and
others, Petitioners are being denied any timely and
meaningful opportunity to protect their rights in the courts.
Their health, property, and environment are threatened by
EPA proceeding with a hazardous waste response action in
their community without having first assessed the feasibility
and environmental impacts of alternative remedial plans,
including the plan being implemented. In order for Frey and
PATI to protect these important interests, they must have
timely access to the courts. Congress’ acknowledgement of
this fact is shown in the inclusion of citizen suit provisions in
almost all recent environmental legislation.
It is true that Congress intended, and the government
has an interest, which the public shares, in not delaying
urgently needed cleanups. However, EPA has been provided
means for dealing with emergencies through its powers to
conduct removal actions, to issue administrative orders (42
U.S.C. §9606), or through its power to conduct a fund
financed cleanup without delay (42 U.S.C. § 9604). EPA has
chosen none of these routes in the instant case and has
decided instead to pursue a lengthy litigation (since 1983) on
sites known to be contaminated since 1976.
In any case, Congress specifically mandated the RI/FS
procedure and public comment to be done to protect public
health and environment. The intent of Congress is to have
EPA conduct cleanups as quickly as possible in accordance
with law, so that proper care is taken. There is no
compelling government interest in recklessly rushing to
conduct a cleanup in a careless and illegal fashion. The 7th
Circuit’s decision deprives Petitioners of their entitlement to
sue to enforce CERCLA and NEPA and their fundamental
right to access to the courts, and is not supported by any
27
compelling government interest. The 7th Circuit’s decision
represents a fundamental violation of Due Process and
directly conflicts with the above cited decisions of this Court
in removing from Petitioners any forum in which they can
seek an effective remedy.
B. Provision of Post-Enforcement Judicial Review for
the Corporate Wrong-Doer While Denying Review
to Citizen’s Acting as Private Attorneys General
Under CERCLA Offends Fifth Amendment
Principles of Equal Protection
Under the 7th Circuit’s construction of CERCLA’s
review provision, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), citizens would be
denied the right to seek review of the EPA response action
both before EPA enforcement and after enforcement but
before response implementation. The interests which citizens
would seek review to protect after enforcement but before
implementation would be their vested right to enforce the
requirements of the Act itself, their due process right to
comment and an opportunity to be heard on the RI/FS and
proposed ROD prior to EPA’s final decision on the remedy,
their constitutional right to petition for redress, their interest
in the value of their property that might be harmed, their
interest in their health and that of their families, and their
interest in the quality of the environment. Surely these rights
and interests of citizen plaintiffs are as worthy of protection
as the PRP’s mere financial interest?
The CERCLA statute provides for PRPs to challenge
an EPA response action through post-enforcement review
before implementation, once the EPA has sought injunctive
relief, as in the present case. South Macomb Disposal
Authority, 681 F.Supp. at 1250; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Thus
28
pre-implementation review is available to PRPs in these
circumstances. To allow PRPs, as a class, access to pre-
implementation review while denying the same access to the
courts to citizen plaintiffs constitutes a violation of the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). No compelling or
even rational basis can be offered to explain this inequitable
classification of interests.
Since the CERCLA citizen suit provision (42 U.S.C.
§ 9659) and the §9613(h) timing of judicial review provision
were added by the 1986 Amendments, PRPs often have been
denied judicial review prior to completion of EPA response
actions unless EPA had brought suit under 42 U.S.C § 9606.
However, the statute has generally not been interpreted to
deny citizens the right to sue under §9659. In denying PRPs
the right to pre-implementation review, the courts have
explicitly stated that such a denial is not a violation of due
process only because the PRPs, unlike citizen plaintiffs under
§9659, have special opportunities to protect ‘heir financial
interests and seek review later. South Macomb Disposal
Authority, 681 F.Supp. at 1251, 1252;
E.P.A,, 677 F.Supp. 823, 829 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1988). The 7th
Circuit's discriminatory classification of citizen plaintiffs into
a class that is denied post-enforcement judicial review while
responsible parties are placed in a class where such review is
available represents a conflict with decisions of this Court
upholding citizens’ rights to equal protection. Moreover, the
7th Circuit opinion results in the wrong-doer having greater
rights than citizens acting as private attorneys general, which
is a gross miscarriage of justice.
Ill. Assuming Arguendo, that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) On
Its Face Limits Jurisdiction of Post-Enforcement
Claims, the 7th Circuit’s Failure to Recognize the
"Statutory Authority" Exception to Statutory
Jurisdictional Limitations is in Direct Conflict with
Decisions of this Court
Even assuming that the 7th Circuit's interpretation of
CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)) is correct, its refusal to
accept jurisdiction over this case for the sole purpose of
striking down the outrageous and illegal actions of EPA,
directly conflicts with prior well established Supreme Court
precedent. A brief discussion of EPA’s lawless conduct will
set the stage for the analyses of the Court's precedents that
follows.
EPA cannot credibly contest the fact that it failed to
obey mandatory statutory requirements to : 1) prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) or a functional
equivalent of an EIS as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act before choosing a remedy to clean
up 700,000 tons of soils and sludges contaminated by
PCBs", and conduct a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility
Study (RI/FS) prior to selecting a clean up remedy as
required by CERCLA.” In failing to meet these important
" NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) requires the preparation uf an EIS
for any “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." The EIS is supposed to discuss environmental
impacts and effects, alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship
between short term and long term environmental goals, and any irreversible
or irretrievable commitments of resources. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C\i-v).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9616(d), 9617 (as amended in 1986). In
section 9616 of CERCLA Congress delineated mandatory
requirements for the preparation of an RI/FS prior to selecting
a clean up remedy for a National Priorities List (NPL) site.
(continued...)
statutory requirements, EPA also intentionally prevented
masninatd public participation end scrutiny of tho CERCLA
clean up remedy selection process. This covert and illegal
SPA masteetailin of Goo qatetse tagt diieesn ont of 0
decision that will effect the health and property of over
100,000 persons in the communities surrounding these
horribly contaminated sites and the planned location of the
Westinghouse incinerator.
The “public comment", “intensive public scrutiny”,
“ample opportunity for public comment and involvement” and
“numerous opportunities for input into the process"
referred to in the erroneous 7th Circuit decision were
permitted after the remedy selection was completed, and
absent an RI/FS, EIS, or equivalent written analyses. In fact,
to this day EPA has refused to designate the information it
allegedly relied upon in making its illegal decision. EPA's
"(.. continued)
Prior to the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, the same RI/FS
was articulated in the National Contingency Plan
(40 C.F.R. § 300.68 (1982, 1985)). This regulation remains in
effect today. Cases that have considered the RI/FS requirement
agree that it is a mandatory component of the NPL site clean up
process. U.S. v. M. Genzale Plating, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 877,
883 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“once a site is listed on the NPL,
CERCLA mandates that an RI/FS be commenced in accordance
with a designated schedule."); U.S. v. Rohm & Haas Co,, 669
F. Supp. 672, 674-675 (D.N.J. 1987); Versatile Metals v.
Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1582 (E.D.Pa. 1988).
See, also, O" Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc,, 677 F. Supp.
807, 811 (E.D.Pa. 1988) for a discussion of the proper
procedure for EPA to utilize in selecting a clean up remedy
for a site prior to the 1986 SARA amendments.
~ = =e
See, 7th Circuit opinion in appendix at pages 5(a), 7 (a),
14(a), 17(a).
31
arrogant disrespect for the law and the rights of persons who
will be directly and irreparably effected by its decisions in
this matter must not be viewed complacently as the
stereotypical tension between an over-zealous citizenry and
struggling agency that is trying its best to manage its many
responsibilities. All Petitioners seek is compliance with the
law. Ata minimum, EPA must be required to meet this
obligation.
In failing to act to correct the blatantly lawless acts of
the EPA, the 7th Circuit positioned itself directly in conflict
with the decisions of this Court which dictate that the courts
have jurisdiction over cases where agencies have exceeded
their authority or ignored a specific statutory prohibition.
Such oversight is one of the most important roles of the
judiciary. In Leedom vy. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) this
Court had cause to exercise its oversight responsibility over
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In Leedom, a
233 member professional employees association had petitioned
the NLRB for certification as a collective bargaining unit.
The NLRB added 9 non-professional employees to the
bargaining unit and convened an election. The professional
employees objected to the addition of the 9 non-professional
employees and asked to exercise their statutory right to vote
on the issue. The NLRB refused to grant the professional
* their opportunity to vote as provided in the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(b)).
Consequently, the professional employees challenged
the NLRB’s decision in district court. The district court
voided the NLRB’s decision as violative of the NLRA. The
NLRB appealed, and challenged the district court’s
jurisdiction to review the NLRB’s decision under a provision
in the NLRA which limited the ability of the courts to review
NLRB bargaining unit certification decisions. The appeals
court affirmed the judgement of the district court and decided
that it had jurisdiction.
In reviewing the decisions of the lower courts, this
Court held that the courts had general jurisdiction to “strike
32
down an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated
powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act."
Leedom, 358 U.S. at 188. The Court reasoned that Congress
had provided the professional employees with a specific right
to vote on whether or not to accept non-professional
employees in their bargaining unit. The NLRB deliberately
violated the employees’ statutory rights when it refused to
allow them to vote on the issue. The Court determined that
when Congress limited judicial review of NLRB decisions, it
could not have intended to eliminate "judicial protection of
rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of
delegated powers." Leedom, 358 U.S. at 190. Where
Congress has given a right it must intend for that right to be
enforced.
The parallels between Leedom and Petitioners’ case
are striking. Like the NLRB in Leedom, EPA has attempted
to hide behind statutory protections limiting judicial review,
and has trampled specific rights provided by Congress for
citizens affected by NPL site clean ups. The loss of the
rights at stake for Petitioners are far greater in this case than
the bargaining rights of professional employees defended in
Leedom.
Interestingly, another parallel emerges between
Petitioners’ case and Leedom when the decision of the 7th
Circuit is compared with the dissenting opinion in Leedom.
In Leedom Justices Frankfurter and Brennan dissented
arguing that the limitations upon judicial review were a
purposeful effort by Congress to limit "time-consuming court
procedures [that] would seriously threaten to frustrate the
basic national policy of preventing industrial strife..."
Leedom, 358 U.S. at 191. The 7th Circuit used a similar
argument to support its position.
...challenges to the procedure employed in
selecting a [clean up] remedy nevertheless
impact the implementation of the remedy and
result in the same delays Congress sought to
avoid by passage of the statute; the statute
33
necessarily bars these challenges. The judicial
review itself slows the process down. [citation
omitted]
Whether the important statutory objective involves preventing
industrial strife or cleaning up NPL sites, agency actions that
contradict unambiguous statutory mandates cannot be tolerated
by the courts.'*
Beyond Leedom this Court has used similar rationale
to strike down agency actions when they have been beyond
the scope of statutory authority. In at least 2 cases this Court
acknowledged jurisdiction to overturn the illegal actions of
selective service boards despite statutory restrictions on
judicial review. Qestereich v. Selective Service Board No.
11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Breen v, Selective Service Local
Board No, 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970). In both cases this Court
found that the respective Selective Service Boards had acted
unlawfully, and concluded that statutory restraints on judicial
review did not apply.
Similarly, in a case involving review of a district
court remand order, this Court held that the district court had
exceeded its statutory authority and that the prohibition
against reviewing remand orders did not apply. Thermtron
Products, Inc, v, Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
Petitioners do not agree with the 7th Circuit’s
interpretation of their rights under CERCLA or EPA’s
obligations. However, if the 7th Circuit's statutory analysis
'S Frey, 900 F.2d at 1097.
'© This Court has subsequently interpreted Leedom
consistently. See, Boire v. Greyhound Corp,, 376 U.S. 473,
480-481 (1964); Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v.
380 U.S.
Assoc. for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees,
650, 659-660 (1965); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963).
is somehow correct, and judicial review of EPA’s post-
enforcement actions under CERCLA is properly limited, then
the court’s authority under the Leedom line of cases should
have been invoked to strike down EPA’s remedy selection
process for failure to complete an EIS, and/or RI/FS, and
permit meaningful public participation. By failing to utilize
the Leedom exception the 7th Circuit abdicated an important
judicial responsibility to hold EPA accountable for actions
taken beyond the scope of its delegated powers. Therefore,
the 7th Circuit’s decision directly conflicts with this Court’s
precedents and must be subjected to thorough review.
CONCLUSION
For these various reasons, this petition for certiorari
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Louis Clark
Government Accountability Project
25 E Street N.W. Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 347-0460
Attorney for Petitioners
RICHARD E. CONDIT
Government Accountability Project
25 E Street N.W. Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 347-0460
Of Counsel
wreck,
ae
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Amended: May 31, 1990
May 30, 1990
Before
Hon. Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judge
Hon. Kenneth F. Ripple, Circuit Judge
Hon. Daniel A. Manion, Circuit Judge
DAVID SCHALK and
RONALD T. SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 89-1141 v.
WILLIAM K. REILLY, Administrator,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
SARAH E. FREY and PEOPLE
AGAINST THE INCINERATOR
(PATI), an Unincorporated Association,
Plaintiffs-Appellants ,
No. 89-1276 Vv.
WILLIAM K. REILLY, in his official
Capacity as administrator of the
United States Environmental
Protection Agency,
Defendant--Appellee.
AMENDED ORDER
Appeals from
the United
States District
Court for the
Southern
District of
Indiana,
Indiapolis
Division
Nos. 88-C-344
and 88-C-948
S.Hugh Dillin,
Judge.
2(a)
Nos. 89-1141 & 89-1276 Page 2
On consideration of the petitions for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing in banc filed in the above-entitled
cause by Appellants, no judge in active service has
requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the
original panel have voted to deny a rehearing.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that thé aforesaid petition for
rehearing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.
3(a)
David SCHALK and Ronald T. SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
William K. REILLY, Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Defendant-Appellee.
Sarah E. FREY and People Against the Incinerator (PATI),
an Unincorporated Association, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
William K. REILLY, in his official capacity as
administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 89-1141, 89-1276.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Nov. 28, 1989.
Decided April 24, 1990.
Citizens brought action to challenge consent decree entered
into by corporation and Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) concerning clean up of hazardous waste sites. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, S. Hugh Dillin, J., dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, and citizens appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Manion, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), the federal court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider challenges to remedial actions
which had not yet been completed, and (2) federal court
lacked jurisdiction to consider EPA’s failure to perform an
environmental impact study under the National Environmental
Policy Act.
Affirmed.
4(a)
David Schalk, Bloomington, Ind., pro se.
Ronald T. Smith, Bloomington, Ind. pro se.
Deborah J. Daniels, U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., Martin
W. Matzen, M. Alice Thurston, Dept. of Justice, Land &
Natural Resources Div., Washington, D.C., for defendant-
appellee.
Edward L. Rogers, Washington, D.C., Rudolph W.
Savich, Bloomington, Ind., for plaintiffs-appellants.
John Blair, Indianapolis, Ind., Richard E. Condit,
Washington, D.C., amicus curiae, for Hoosier Environmental
Council and Indiana Public Interest Research Group.
Before WOOD, Jr., RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit
Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge.
David Schalk and Sara Frey brought separate citizens suit
challenges to a consent decree entered into by Westinghouse
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to clean up
hazardous waste sites in and around Bloomington, Indiana.
The district court separately dismissed both cases for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Schalk and Frey appealed, and
their cases were consolidated. We affirm.
—
I. Statutory Background
The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA), provides a statutory scheme for cleaning
up hazardous substances. These laws allow the EPA to
undertake direct removal or remedial action to protect the
5(a)
public health or welfare or the environment when it
determines that release of a hazardous substance poses an
imminent and substantial danger. The EPA may also
determine that the party responsible for the release will take
appropriate removal or remedial action.'
Before remedial action is taken, the site is studied and
various cleanup alternatives are considered. The National Oil
and Hazardous Subsiances Pollution Contingency Plan(NCP),
40 C.F.R. Pt. 300 (1988), sets out the criteria and procedures
to be followed in comparing remedial alternatives and
choosing a response. The NCP in effect when the consent
decree in this case was signed required the EPA to prepare a
Remedial Alternatives Assessment by signing an Enforcement
Decision Document. The Remedial Alternatives Assessment
served essentially the same purposes as the present-day
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study -- determining the
nature and extent of contamination, then studying the merits
of proposed alternatives. After a period of public comment,
the EPA was required to select a remedy and memorialize it
in an Enforcement Decision Document (now called a Record
of Decision).
The statutory authority for citizens suits pursuant to
CERCLA was added by the 1986 SARA amendments, section
310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659. the amendments allow a citizen to
maintain a civil action against any person or the government
: Removal refers to short-term action taken to halt
the immediate risks posed by hazardous wastes. See 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23). Remedial action refers to permanent
remedies taken instead of or in addition to removal, and
includes destruction of hazardous wastes. See 42 U.S.C. §
9601(24). See also State of Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548,
1551 n. 1 (11th Cir.1989). This case involves a proposed
remedial action.
6(a)
for violating any provision of CERCLA. Section 310(a)(2)
provides for suits against the President or any other officer of
the United States, including the administrator of the EPA,
"where there is alleged a failure . . to perform any act or
duty under [CERCLA]. . . which is not d
42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2). However, this section is qualified by
the phrase "Except as provided in . . . section 9613(h) of this
title (relating to timing of judicial review). cae
Section 9613(h)(4) provides:
(h) Timing of review
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law
other than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is
applicable or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of
this title (relating to cleanup standards) to review any
challenges to removal or remedial action selected under
section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under
section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except one of the
following:
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to
citizens suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action
taken under section 9604 of this title or secured under section
9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of this
chapter. Such an action may not be brought with regard to a
removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the
site.
Il. Proceedings
In 1983 the United States sued Westinghouse to force
— =
7(a)
cleanup of two landfills where Westinghouse had disposed of
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs) and other hazardous
substances. See United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,
No. IP 83-9-C (S.D.Ind.1981) Two more sites were brought
into settlement negotiations in late 1983.
The parties agreed to a consent decree in December 1984
and immediately released its terms to the public. The decree
involved all six sites, and required that comprehensive
remedial measures be undertaken at each site. The agreement
required the measures to be undertaken in two steps: first, a
removal action involving surface excavation and capping of
abandoned dump sites; and second, the burning of hazardous
wastes in a trash-fired incinerator.
The proposed consent decree was subjected to intensive
public scrutiny, including 14 public meetings, media
interviews and votes before various city, county and state
governmental bodies. None of those meetings was required
by federal law. The proposed consent decree was approved
and signed by each governmental entity that was a party to the
litigation. The consent decree was lodged with the district
court on May 20, 1985, pending conclusion of a 30-day
public comment period required by Department of Justice
regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.7. This comment period
was extended by two weeks at the request of the Bloomington
Common Council and area residents. :
During this period a number of citizens, including
plaintiffs David Schalk and Ronald Smith, commented on the
consent decree, raising criticisms similar to those put forward
in this lawsuit. Among other things, the comments suggested
that the consent decree’s proposed remedial measures were
inadequate, that there was a lack of opportunity for
meaningful public comment and review, that other remedial
alternatives were not considered, that incineration is not a safe
8(a)
method for disposing of PCBs,’ and that no adequate written
assessment of the potential environmental effects of the
remedy had been prepared.
The United States responded to the criticisms in its request
that the district court approve the final version of the consent
decree. The government noted that other methods of
treatment and disposal of PCBs were considered and rejected
as unsatisfactory. Further, more opportunities for public
comment had already been provided than were legally
necessary, although further public participation was planned
in connection with the processing of permits required by the
consent decree. The government further argued that the
incinerator would be required to meet regulatory standards to
ensure it did not release significant harmful emissions.
Finally, the government pointed our that the application
process for an incinerator permit required that a risk
assessment, along with the results of a test burn, be submitted
and evaluated.
The district court approved the consent decree in August
1985, holding that there were numerous public meetings prior
to its acceptance, and that the decree was “fair, adequate,
reasonable and appropriate.”
. David Schalk is the former Bloomington City
Chemist, and Ronald Smith succeeded Schalk in that post in
1984. The substantive component of their claim and Frey's
claim, which the district court did not reach, is the charge that
PCBs -- a type of man-made chemical compound that may
harm living organisms -- cannot properly be disposed of by an
incinerator. These plaintiffs believe that heating and burning
PCBs may even exacerbate damage to the environment and
risk poisoning many citizens.
Wa)
In December of 1987, Schalk filed a pro se complaint in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging
an “illegal plan to clean up hazardous wastes in and near
Bloomington, Indiana” pursuant to the Westinghouse consent
decree. Schalk’s complaint state that the administrator of the
EPA violated federal law by failing to perform an
Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 ef seq.
and a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study pursuant to 40
C.F.R. 300.68(f), (g), and (h). Schalk’s complaint asked the
court to order the EPA to submit a document that complied
with the written requirements of an Environmental Impact
Statement or the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, and
to order the EPA to conduct adequate public hearings.
Plaintiffs Sarah Frey and “People Against the Incinerator,"
a nonprofit corporation, filed a similar complaint in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia in February 1988.
Frey accused the EPA of taking “unlawful actions" in
connection with the plan to clean up hazardous wastes in
Bloomington. Frey attacked the EPA’s failure to authorize an
Environmental Impact Statement, its failure to allow
meaningful public participation and its failure to study other
potential remedial measures. Frey sought declaratory and
injunctive relief that would require EPA to conduct further
studies required by the National Environmental Policy Act and
select an appropriate remedy “on the basis of proper studies,"
and without giving any special weight to the agency
determination in favor of an incinerator.
Both cases were removed to the Southern District of
Indiana, which handled the Westinghouse case. In December
of 1988, the district court separately dismissed each complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court
concluded that the citizens suit provision of CERCLA, as
amended by SARA, deprived the court of jurisdiction.
Although the district court found the statute to be "not entirely
10(a)
clear," it examined legislative history and ruled that
preenforcement review of EPA removal actions was
premature.
In this consolidated appeal, the plaintiffs provide us with
numerous reasons why they believe the district court had
jurisdiction. They argue (1) that the section removing
jurisdiction from the federal courts is inapplicable because this
is a postenforcement challenge; (2) that the statute is
improperly being applied retroactively; and (3) that they are
not “challenging” a remedial action within the meaning of the
statute.
We affirm the district court’s judgement that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over both suits. However, because
the statute’s plain language substantiates our holding, an
extensive examination of the legislative history, as performed
by the district court, is not necessary.
III. Analysis
A. CERCLA’s Plain Language
[1] Federal court review of the remedial action
proposed by Westinghouse and the EPA in their consent
decree is explicitly barred by CERCLA’s plain language.
Under the heading “Timing of review," 42 U.S.C. § 96.3(h)
limits federal court jurisdiction to five specific circumstances.
Plaintiffs assert that § 9613(h)(4), ome of the five
circumstances, confers jurisdiction on their challenge to their
remedial action. In conjuncture with relevant portions of §
9613(h)(4), it reads:
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal
law . . . to review any challenges to removal or
remedial action selected ... except...
11(a)
- ~ ial ™ * ~
(4) An action under section 9659 . . . alleging
that the removal or remedial action taken under section
9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this
title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter.
Such an action may not be brought with regard to a
removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at
the site. (Emphasis added.)
The obvious meaning of this statue is that when a remedy
has been selected, no challenge to the cleanup may occur
prior to completion of the remedy. As the Eleventh Circuit
explained in State of Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557
(11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original):
The plain language of the statute indicates that section
113(h)(4)? applies only after a remedial action is
actually completed. The section refers in the past tense
to remedial actions taken under section 104 or secured
under 106. Absent clear legislative intent to the
contrary, this language is conclusive.
[2] The final sentence in (h)(4) provides further support
for this understanding of the statute’s plain meaning.
In a challenge to a removal action where a remedial action" is
to be undertaken," no action may be brought. That is our
situation. An incinerator has been chosen as the method to
dispose of hazardous wastes in the Bloomington area, but the
remedial action outlined in the consent decree has not yet been
undertaken. Congress intended by this statute to prevent
unnecessary delay in implementing hazardous waste cleanups.
. CERCLA section 113(h)(4) is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4).
12(a)
That type of delay would surely result if plaintiffs were
successful in requiring the EPA to conduct Environmental
Impact Statements and further Feasibility Studies. The statue
precludes federal court review at this stage -- when a remedial
plan has been chosen, but not “taken” or "secured."
B. CERCLA’s Legislative History
Because we believe the plain language of the statue is
clear, we need not engage in the lengthy examination of
legislative history undertaken by the district court.‘ To the
extent that we do review the legislative history, we are
persuaded the district court correctly determined that the
history supported its construction of the statute. The
legislative history supports the conclusion that federal courts
are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction where remedial
action has not been completed. The Eleventh Circuit reached
the same result in Sate of Alabama v. EPA: “The legislative
history behind this section supports rather than clearly
contradicts this conclusion." 871 F.2d at 1557.
: While the district court found the plain language of
the statute “not entirely clear," that description more
appropriately describes the statute’s legislative history. Both
sides support their interpretation of the statute with lengthy
quotations from senators and congressmen trying to put their
spin on the statute’s interpretation; these contradictory
explanation further demonstrate the dangers of judicial
reliance on legislative history instead of statutory text. See,
e.g., U.S. v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 2423-
2424, 101 L.Ed.2d 287 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); I.N.S.
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1224, 94
L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring); Wallace v.
Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1560 (9th Cir.1986)(Kozinsky,
J., dissenting).
13(a)
The final conference committee report that reconciled
conflicting House and Senate versions explained that only
"completed" remedial actions could be challenged. H.R.Re.
No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1986) U.S.Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1986, p. 2835. The House Committee on
Energy and Commerce stated that "there is no right to judicial
review of the Administrator’s selection and implementation of
response actions until after the response action have been
completed to their completion [sic]." H.R.Rep. No. 253(D,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1986), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin
News 1986, p.2863. The house Judiciary Committee noted
that "[t]his provision is not intended to allow review of the
selection of a response action prior to completion of the
action...." H.R.Rep. No. 253(IID, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
23 (1986), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin News 1986, p.3046.
These committee reports, along with many other statements of
congressional leaders, far outweigh the few contrary remarks
of individual legislators cited by plaintiffs. The statute as
written clearly states the intent of Congress.
C. Applicability of the SAR Amendments
The plaintiffs contest the applicability of § 9613(h) to this
case on essentially two theories. First, they argue that
"retroactive" application of the 1986 SARA amendments to
the 1984 consent decree creates a "manifest injustice."
Second, they contend that this isn’t really a “challenge” at all
within the meaning of the statute. Neither of these
contentions have merit.
[3] Frey suggests that the district court’s use of 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h) to concluded that it lacked jurisdiction was
improper because it constitutes retroactive application of that
statute. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the
jurisdiction of the district court over the 1984 consent decree
was not at issue; the jurisdiction of the court over the
14(a)
plaintiffs’ claims was. Both plaintiffs filed their citizens suit
challenges after the effective date of the 1986 SARA
amendments; Schalk in August 1987 and Frey in March 1988.
Second, even if this is considered "retroactive" application, a
court should "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or
there is a statutory direction of legislative history to the
contrary." Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416
U.S. 696, 711, 94. S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974).
The plaintiffs’ arguments for "manifest injustice" are
unpersuasive. See U.S. v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 679
F.Supp. 859 (S.D.Ind.1987)(plaintiffs seeking injunction to
halt EPA cleanup not deprived of due process by .ctroactive
application of CERCLA). The jurisdictional bar in SARA
merely codified the established rule that preimplementation
review of response actions would not be allowed. See e.g.,
Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886-87
(3rd Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.1115, 106 S.Ct. 1970,
90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986) ("The statutory approach to the
problem of hazardous waste is inconsistent with the delay that
would accompany pre-enforcement review. ... [W]e find
in [CERCLA] an implicit disapproval of pre-enforcement
judicial review."); State of Alabama vy. EPA, 871 F.2d at
1558 ("Prior to the 1986 amendments that enacted section
113(h), courts uniformly held that challenges to a Record of
Decision were barred before full implementation.)
Furthermore ample opportunity for public comment and
involvement has been provided and much more will be
allowed prior to implementation. This is not the plaintiffs’
only chance to stop the incinerator.* No injustice is created
. The government points our that in addition to the
public participation already provided by the EPA according to
Department of Justice regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 50.7, further
opportunities will present themselves as plans for the
(continued. ..)
15(a)
by applying current law.
[4] The plaintiffs also assert that they are not really
challenging the consent decree or its choice of an incinerator,
but merely asking that certain procedural requirements be
met. However, challenges to the procedure employed in
selecting a remedy nevertheless impact the implementation of
the remedy and result in the same delays Congress sought to
avoid by passage of the statute; the statute necessarily bars
these challenges. The judicial review itself slows the process
down. See Jefferson County v. United States, 644 F.Supp.
178, 182 (E D.Mo. 1986) ("[JJudicial review of agency clean-
up activities would hinder and delay the hazardous waste
disposal. This delay would be inconsistent with the intent of
congress to allow swift clean-up actions. ")
[5] In any event, the plaintiffs are in fact challenging
the remedy selected; the purpose of Environmental Impact
Statements and Feasibility Studies can only be to demonstrate
the need for a different remedy. Counsel for plaintiffs
admitted at oral argument that if one of those studies
suggested a better remedy the next step would be to enjoin
implementation of the consent decree. See State of Alabama
v. EPA, 871 F.2d at 1559 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that
they were not "challenging" the remedial action plan selected
since they were asking that it be enjoined). The district court
correctly concluded that a "fair reading of plaintiffs’
complaint here reveals that it is the EPA’s selection of a
remedy, not the implementation, that plaintiffs are
5(...continued)
incinerator take shape. The consent decree requires
Westinghouse to obtain at least nine permits and approvals
prior to construction of the incinerator, all of which require
public input and are appealable.
16(a)
challenging." In briefs and at oral argument, plaintiffs have
persisted in attacking and ridiculing the incinerator remedy as
dangerous, untested, and unworkable. At oral argument
Frey’s attorney reiterated that these studies should have been
done "before they made their decision," and should still be
performed “before [the incinerator project] goes forward."
D. Jurisdiction Under the Administrative Procedure Act
[6] The district court properly rejected plaintiffs’
argument that the court had jurisdiction to consider the EPS’s
failure to perform an Environmental Impact Study under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). while NEPA
claims are presumptively reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
5 U.S.C. § 702, APA review is not available when a federal
Statute specifically precludes judicial review. Block y.
Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 345, 104 S.Ct.
2450, 2453, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). As the Eleventh Circuit
stated in rejecting an identical assertion of jurisdiction:
We have already concluded that Congress intended to
remove challenges to remedial action plans from the
jurisdiction of the federal courts until the remedial
action has been taken. The district court thus lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims brought
under the APA.
State of Alabama vy. EPA 871 F.2d at 1560.
E. Constitutional Deprivations
Plaintiffs and amicus curiae Indiana Public Interest
Research Group assert that plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights
to substantive and procedural due process, meaningful access
17(a)
to the courts, and equal protection are violated by the district
court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. These
novel theories rest on undesirable expansions of the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment, and we decline to adopt them. As
we already have made clear, the plaintiffs in this matter and
other interested citizens have received numerous opportunities
for input into the process, and will receive more such
opportunities in the future. No recognized constitutional
rights are implicated.
IV. Conclusion
Federal courts lack subject mater jurisdiction to consider
challenges to remedial actions that have not been "taken" or
"secured." The judgement of the district court dismissing the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is therefore
AFFIRMED.
18(a)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SARAH ELIZABETH FREY and
PEOPLE AGAINST THE
INCINERATOR (PATI)
Plaintiffs,
-VS- NO. IP 88-948-C
LEE M. THOMAS, Administrator,
United States Environmental
Protection Agency,
mee ee eee ee ee
Defendant.
IUDGMENT
The Court having this day filed its entry in the above
captioned matter in the following words and figures:
( H. I.), now therefore in accordance therewith,
IT IS CONSIDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiffs’
complaint is herby dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Date this 6th day of December , 1988.
S. Hugh Dillin, Judge
19(a)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SARAH ELIZABETH FREY and )
PEOPLE AGAINST THE )
INCINERATOR (PATI) )
)
Plaintiffs , )
)
-VS- ) NO. IP 88-948-C
)
LEE M. THOMAS, Administrator, )
United States Environmental )
Protection Agency, )
)
Defendant. )
ENTRY
This cause is before the Court on a motion by
defendant, Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), to
dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted, pursuant to Rules 12 (b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
F.R.Civ.P. For the following reasons, the motion to
dismiss is granted, and plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
20(a)
Background
Plaintiffs, Sarah Elizabeth Frey and People Agains the
Incinerator (PATI), residents of Bloomington, Indiana, filed
this action in February 1988 in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to the cintizen’s
suit provisions of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
Plaintiffs allege that in acting to clean up ploychlorinated
bipheny! ("PCB") contamination in Monroe County,
Indiana, the United States government, through EPA, failed
to perform nondiscretionary statutory and regulatory duties.
The cause was transferred to this court in August 1988.
Plaintiffs’ complaint arised out of action taken by the
EPA in the early 1980s. In response to PCB contamination
of several sites in Monroe County, the EPA, in Janyuary
1983, brought suit against Westinghouse Electric
Corporation in this court. The State of Indiana intervened
as a plaintiff, the Monsanto Company was joined as a third-
party defendant, and the case was ultimately consolidated
with an earlier suit filed by the City of Bloomington against
Westinghouse. In late 1983 and 1984, the parties to these
consolidated actions engaged in settlement negotiations
which culminated in a proposed consent decree approved by
the Court in August 1985, whereby Westinghouse assumed
major responsibility for cleaning up the PCB contamination,
with extensive oversight by the various government entities
involved.
In the present action, plaintiffs contend that in evaluating
the PCB contamination in Monroe County and in working
out the terms of the consent decree, the EPA failed to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c), and failed to conduct an
adequate Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study
21(a)
("RI/FS"), as required by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compentation, and Liability Act
of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9605, and its
implementing regulations codified at 40 C.F.R § 300.68.
Plaintiffs request the Court to order the EPA to provide
these documents and studies. Defendant has moved to
dismisss plaintiffs’ complaint, arguing plantiffs’ claims are
barred by the doctrines of stare decisis and law of the case
and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of this
cause of action.
Discussion
It is axiomatic that a federal court, as a court of limited
jurisdiction, cannot proceed to adjudicate a dispute over
which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs contend
jurisdiction is conferred by the citizen's suit provisions of
SARA, 42 U.S.C. § ef seq.
Considering first whether the APA confers jurisdiction,
the Court notes that while 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides a
general right to judicial review of action by an
administrative agency, § 701(a)(1) restricts application of
this provision where federal statues preclude judicial
review. The Supreme Court has interpreted these
provisions as barring judicial review where a specific
statute, considered in light of its legislative history, reflects
a congressional intent to limit judicial review of specific
agency action. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467
U.S. 340, 345-46, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2453-54, 81 L.Ed.2d
270, 275-76 (1984).
In case at hand, a specific statute, SARA, directly
addresses the scope of judicial review of EPA actions in
these circumstances. In SARA, Congress expressly stated:
22(a)
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under
Federal law other than under section 1332 of Title 28
(relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or
under State law which is applicable or relevant and
appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating
to cleanup standards) to review any challenges to
removal or remedial action selected under section
9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under
section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except one
of the following:
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title
(relating to citizens suits) alleging that the removal or
remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title
or secured under section 9606 of this title was in
violation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an
action may not be brought with regard to a removal
where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the
site.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). It is undisputed that the EPA action
of which plaintiffs complain involves removal or remedial
action pursuant to sections 104 and 106(a) of CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606(a). Thus, by the express language
of Congress, the only basis of jurisdiction of plaintiffs’
challenge to this EPA remedial action is SARA’s citizen's
suit provision.
This analysis is consistent with that of the Eleventh
Circuit, which found that the limited judicial review
provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) reflected congressional
intent to preclude more expansive judicial review that might
otherwise be available under the APA. Dickerson v.
Administrator, EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 977-78 (11th Cir.
1987); of. Wheaton Indus. v. United States EPA, 781 F.2d
354, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986); Jefferson County, Mo. v.
United States, 644 F. Supp. 178, 181-82 (E.D.Mo. 1986)
Se
23a)
(pre-SARA cases finding specific provisions and
congressional intent in CERCLA control general judicial
review provisions of APA). Accordingly, the Court finds
that the APA does not provide a jurisdictional basis for this
lawsuit.
Plaintiffs also assert subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to the citizen's suit provision of SARA, which states:
Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e)
of this section and in section 9613(h) of this title
(relating to timing of judicial review), any person
may commence a civil ac.ion on his own behalf --
(2) against the President or any other officer
of the United States (including the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Administrator of the ATSDR) where there is alleged
a failure of the President or such other officer to
perform any act or duty under this chapter,.. .
which is not discretionary with the Presidency or
such other officer.
42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2). The words “this chapter" in the
statue refer to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 ef seq.
Plaintiffs here allege a failure to perform two
nondiscretionary acts -- a failure to provide an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") and conduct an
adequate Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study
("RI/FS").
The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")
requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS whenever they
undertake major action affecting the environment. See 42
U.S.C. § 4332(C). However, NEPA is not CERCLA, and
is in a different chapter of the United States Code. Thus,
24(a)
SARA’s citizen’s suit provision cannot be used to compel a
federal official to perform an act allegedly required by
NEPA. Because, as noted above, the only possible basis
for jurisdiction of plaintiffs’ challenge to EPA action taken
pursuant to §§104 and 106(a) of CERCLA is this citizens’
suit provision and because the citizen’s suit provision does
not encompass NEPA, the Court finds no jurisdictional
basis for plaintiffs’ allegation under NEPA. Plaintiffs’
claim that the EPA failed to provide an EIS is therefore
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court must consider whether it has
jurisdiction, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2), of
plaintiffs’ claim that the EPA failed to conduct an adequate
RI/FS. Section 9659(a) of 42 U.S.C. provides that
citizens’ suits are controlled by the timing of judicial review
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), set out on page 4
hereof.
Defendant argues that this section precludes judicial
review under the citizen’s suit provision until the remedial
action selected by the EPA has been taken or secured.
Finding that the statute is not entirely clear about just when
in the course of a remedial action a citizen’s suit may be
brought, the Court will look to the legislative history of this
section. In describing this provision of SARA, the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce stated:
Review may also occur pursuant to the terms of a
consent decree, through a citizen suit alleging that the
response action that had been taken was in violation
of the requirements of the Act, or through a
reimbursement suit by a potentially responsible party
under the new procedures provided in this section.
The section is intended to codify the current position
of the Administrator and the Department of Justice
with respect to pre-enforcement review: there is no
=
25(a)
right of judicial review of the Administrator’s
selection and implementation of response actions until
after the response action have been completed to their
completion [sic].
H.R. Re. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in
1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 2835, 2863.
According to the House Judiciary Committee:
This provision is not intended to allow review
of the selection of a response action prior to
completion of the action: the provision allows for
review only of an “action taken... ." Thus, after
the RI/FS has been completed, the remedial action
has been selected and designed, and the construction
of the selected action has begun, persons will be able
to maintain suit to ensure that a specific on-the-
ground implementation of the response action is
consistent with the requirements of the Act. For
example, a suit under this provisions [sic] may be
appropriate where a specific aspect of the remedial
action, which has been taken, in fact fails to attain a
standard required under this Act. The Committee
emphasizes that this paragraph is not intended to
allow delay of the clean-up and that, in actions under
this paragraph, courts should not entertain claims to
re-evaluate the selection of remedial action. Also, in
reviewing actions under this sub-section, the courts
should used their powers to ensure that such review
does not disrupt clean-up remedies.
H.R. Rep. no. 253(III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted
in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3038, 3046
(emphasis added by the Committee). A fair reading of
plaintiffs’ complaint here reveals that it is the EPA’s
selection of a remedy, and not the implementation, that
plaintiffs are challenging.
26(a)
Finally, the Conference Committee explained:
In new section 113(h)(4) of the substitute, the
phrase "removal or remedial action taken” is not
intended to preclude judicial review until the total
response action is finished if the response action
proceeds in distinct and separate stages. Rather an
action under section 310 [42 U.S.C. § 9659] would
lie following completion of each distinct and separate
phase of the cleanup. For example, a surface
cleanup could be challenged as violating the standards
or requirements of the Act once all the activities set
forth in the Record of Decision for the surface
cleanup phase have been completed.... Any challenge
under this provision to a completed stage of a response
action shall not interfere with those stages of the
response action which have not been completed.
H.R. Conf. Rep. 962, 99th Cong.., 2d Sess. 224 reprinted
in 1986 U.C. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3276, 3317.
Comments from the floor debates shed further light on
Congress’ intent with respect to the timing of citizens’ suits.
Senator Thurmond explained:
[The preenforcement review] provision confirms and
builds upon existing case law. In particular, the
timing of review section ensures that Government and
private cleanup resources will be directed toward
mitigation, not litigation. The section is designed to
preclude piecemeal review and excessive delay of
cleanup. Interested parties will be able to participate
early in a more regularized administrative process
instead of making premature challenges in court to
remedy selection or liability.
. . .[C]itizen suits. . . must be utilized in a
manner consistent with the timing of review
27(a)
provisions.
The timing of review section is intended to be
comprehensive. It covers all lawsuits, under any
authority, concerning the response actions that are
performed by EPA and other Federal agencies, by
States pursuant to a cooperative agreement, and by
private parties pursuant to an agreement with the
Federal Government. The section also covers all
issues that could be construed as a challenge to the
response, and limits those challenges tc he
opportunities specifically set forth in the section.
; . . . [T]Jhere is no jurisdiction to review a
response action through a citizen suit except as
provided in the timing of review section. Citizens. .
. cannot seek review of the response action... .
unless the suit falls within one of the categories
provided in this section... .
. . .[Under the timing of review] provision,
no person may bring any lawsuit in Federal court
regarding a federally approved removal or remedial
action except when the removal action has been
completed or when the remedial action has been
taken or secured. “Taken or secured" means that all
of the activities set forth in the record of decision
which includes the challenged action have been
completed. . .. Thus, for example, review of the
Ra ge pero a rR tial action itself had | ion.
The section is designed to preclude lawsuits
: by any person concerning particular segments of the
response action . . . until those segments of the
response have been constructed and given the chance
to operate and demonstrate their effectiveness in
meeting the requirements of the act.
132 Cong. Rec. $14,928-29 (daily ed Oct. 3, 1986)
28(a)
(emphasis added). By this interpretation, plaintiffs’ action
here assailing the adequacy of a RI/FS could not be brought
until the remedial action has been implemented.
In explaining to the House of Representatives the
permissible timing of citizen’s suits, Representative
Glickman made essentially the same remarks as Senator
Thurmond. See 132 Cong. Rec. H9,582 (daily ed. Oct,
1986) (remarks of Rep. Glickman).
Similarly, Senator Mitchell stated that in response to
concerns tha: citizens would not be able to enforce
the standards until the remedy was complete [and that
in some cases where treatment] could take decades
and thus citizens would be barred from suit until it
was too late to effect an improved remedy... .
The conferees agreed that some
preimplementation review would be provided so that
citizens would not be disadvantaged by having to wait
until cleanup was complete ... A suit to compel
compliance with the CERCLA standards would be
permitted, under section 113(h) after each stage of
cleanup is complete. In this way, an entire cleanup
need not be complete before a citizen can sue.
132 Cong. Rec. $14, 917 (daily ed. October 3, 1986).
Some Congressmen had a somewhat different perception
of what section 9613(h)(4) means with respect to the timing
of citizen’s suits. Representative Roe opined:
The legislation allows citizens to bring a
lawsuit under section 310 as soon as the agency
announces its decision regarding how a cleanup is
structured. A final cleanup decision, or plan,
constitutes the taking of action at a site, and the
legislative language makes it clear that citizens’ suits
... Willlie...as soonas ... “action is taken."
ee. ete wee
ee hn a
LS etilbeire Lager
29(a)
132 Cong. Rec. H9,600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). Senator
Stafford appears to have had the same impression:
It is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain
citizens’ rights to challenge response action, or final
cleanup plans, before such plans are implemented
even in part because otherwise the response could
proceed in violation of the law. . . .
132 Cong. Rec. $14, 898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989).
however, Representative Glickman, responding to a
question about Senator Stafford’s comments, suggested that
the Senator was “attempting to revise the Superfund
conference agreement under the guise of interpretation" and
declared emphatically that the sentence quoted above was
“clearly contrary to the conference agreement." 132 Cong.
Rec. H9, 582 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986).
Representative Glickman continued:
[T]he conferees explicitly agreed that all persons
would have the same limited access to
preimplementation judicial review.
[Senator Stafford’s] approach assumes that
section 113(h) of the conference report allows judicial
review of challenges to the selection of the remedy --
cleanup plan -- before the remedy is implemented --
built. This is clearly not the effect of section 113(h).
The statement of managers accompanying the
conference report is explicit on this point.
Id. Representative Glickman further explained that despite
arguments that permitting the EPA to proceed with an
inappropriate remedy might waste money,
the conferees decided to ensure expeditious cleanups
by restricting such preimplementation review. To
balance this restriction on judicial review of the
remedy selected by the EPA, the conferees included
provisions that require EPA to develop extensive
procedures for public participation in the selection of
30(a)
the cleanup plant and the compilation of an
administrative record.
. . . Clearly the conferees did not intend to allow any
plaintiff, whether the neighbor who is unhappy about
the construction of a toxic waste incinerator in the
neighborhood, or the potentially responsible party
who will have to pay for its construction, to stop a
cleanup by what would undoubtedly be a prolonged
legal battle. It was for this very reason that the
conferees included section 113(h).
Id. at H9,583. The Court finds that the interpretations of
Senator Thurmond and Representative Glickman precluding
a citizens’ suit challenging EPA action until at least the first
phase of the remedy has been implemented are far more
consistent with the official committee reports accompanying
SARA than is that of Senator Stafford. See H.R. Re. No.
253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81; H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2863, 3046, 3317.
In light of this legislative history, the Court finds that 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) permits citizens’ suits challenging EPA
actions only once a remedial action or discrete phase of a
remedial action has been completed. As the eleventh
Circuit noted, "42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) clearly provides that
federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction for
preenforcement reviews of EPA removal actions pursuant to
section 9604." Dickerson, 834 F.2d at 977 (footnote
omitted); cf. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 669 F.
Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1987) (permitting judicial review,
pursuant to section 9613, of EPA procedures in selecting a
remedy once first phase of cleanup was completed).
Although one federal district court has stated that section
9613(h)(4) “arguably permits citizens’ suits to be brought
before an EPA response action is implemented, see Cabot
Corp. v. United States EPA, 677 F.Supp. 823, 828-29
ae ss.
31(a)
(E.D.Pa. 1988), this comment is dictum and is based on
only a partial review of the legislative history.
Therefore, because the EPA remedial action challenged
here by Frey and PATI has not yet been implemented, the
Court finds their citizen’s suit is premature pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4). Accordingly, the Court must dismiss
plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Dated this 6th day of December, 1988.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.