Opposition Brief — Education Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos
Supreme Court brief1990
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FILED
SEP 1 1990
No. 90-84
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR
In the Supreme Court of the Ginited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
OA eh LER TOT RO TTR
EDUCATION ASSISTANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER
v.
LAURO F. CAVAZOS, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
STUART M. GERSON
Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM KANTER
NEIL H. KOSLOWE
Altorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217
“BEST AVAILABLE COPY
RR Se ea eae
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Section 3001 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987 (OBRA), 20 U.S.C. 1072(e) (repealed}, amended
provisions of the Guaranteed Student Loan Program
(GSLP) created by the Higher Education Act of 1965. Sec-
tion 3001 required agencies that guarantee GSLP loans to
transfer “excess” GSLP cash from their reserve funds to
the Secretary of Education, for deposit into the general
GSLP fund maintained by the Secretary for reimburse-
ment purposes. Section 3001 also made the guaranty agen-
cies’ right to receive federal reimbursement for losses sub-
ject to their compliance with the transfer requirement.
Section 3001 has been challenged on the ground that it
violates the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendments. The questions presented are:
1. Whether the guaranty agencies had “private prop-
erty” rights to the excess cash within the meaning of the
Takings Clause.
2. Whether Section 3001 “took” or abrogated the
guaranty agencies’ “vested right” to reimbursement under
pre-OBRA contracts between the agencies and the
Secretary.
(1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases’
Bowen v. Agencies Opposed to Social Security En-
trapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986)... 2... oe. ae oe
Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Cavazos, No.
89-2748 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 1990) .............. 1]
Statutes and regulation:
Higher Education Act of 1965S, 20 U.S.C. 107]
el seq.:
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Higher Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2081:
ff | Pere Tre Ter er CTT ee ree 3
90 Stat. 2120 ....... iia e eRe ane eater ks
Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-498, § 402(a), 100 Stat. 1308:
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Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub.
L.. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330:
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34. C.F.R.:
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Section 682.410(aM2)-(6) ..................
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Miscellaneous:
H.R. Cont. Rep. No. 495, !00th Cong., Ist Sess.
(6 ENR arama rary ya 4 9-n a ey enna 5
U.S. Government Accounting Office:
Better Criteria Needed for Financing Guaran-
fee Agencies (1986) .. 2... 0... ....... ma 5
Guidelines for Reducing Guaranty Agency
Se SE wn wn cals Dene es ce kes 5
Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No. 90-84
EDUCATION ASSISTANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER
LAURO F. CAVAZOS, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT CF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-25a)
is reported at 902 F.2d 617. The district court opinion
(Pet. App. 27a-47a) is not reported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
April 10, 1990. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on July 9, 1990. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
(1)
2
STATEMENT
1. a. The Higher Education Act of 1965 (the Act), 20
U.S.C. 1071, established the Guaranteed Student Loan
Program (GSLP). In that program, public and private
lending institutions make low-interest, higher-education
loans, subsidized by the federal government, to students.
State and nonprofit private agencies that participate in the
GSLP must execute an “insurance program agreement”
with the Secretary in which the agencies promise to oper-
ate a student loan insurance program that meets GSLP re-
quirements and to guarantee lenders they will pay 100% ot
the unpaid principal on a qualifying student loan in case of
default or other failure to repay. 20 U.S.C. 1078(b); 34
C.F.R. 682.410, 682.411. The agreements specify that the
state agency agrees to be bound by “all changes in the Act
or Regulations in accordance with their respective effec-
tive dates,” Pet. App. 3a, and the regulations similarly
provide that “[a]ll of the agreements are subject to subse-
quent changes in the Act or the regulations that apply to
the GSLP * * *.” 34 C.F.R. 682.400(d). In return, the
Secretary agrees to make interest subsidy payments, on
behalf of students, to lenders whose loans are guaranteed
by the agency. Pet. App. 2a-3a. The Act authorizes the
Secretary to pay “special allowances” to the lenders, so
that their return, is not “less than equitable.” 20 U.S.C.
1087-1(a),
The Higher Education Act of 1965 also authorizes the
Secretary to enter into a “guaranty agreement” with a par-
ticipating state guaranty agency in which the Secretary
agrees to reimburse the state guaranty agency for losses
resulting from the default of a student borrower on the un-
paid balance of the principal and accrued interest on any
GSLP loan. 20 U.S.C. 1078(c)(1)(A).' The amount ot re-
' Before 1976, guaranty agencies were required to insure only 80°%o
oft the principal amount of covered loans, and the Commissioner of
imbursement ranges between 80% and 100% of the
amount expended by the agency in discharge of its guar-
anty obligations, depending on the agency’s overall default
rate. Since 1986 guaranty agencies have been required to
pay a reinsurance fee to the Secretary, equal either to
0.25% of the total principal amount of covered loans
guaranteed by the agency that year, or 0.5% if the
agency’s overall default rate exceeded 5%. 20 U.S.C.
1078(c)(9).
As amended in 1986, the Higher Education Act of 1965
States that a participating state guaranty agency is
“deemed to have a contractual right against the United
States” during the life of each GSLP loan “to receive reim-
bursement” according to the provisions of that Act.
Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-498, 100 Stat. 1381 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
1078(c)(1)(A)). The guaranty agreement, however, like the
insurance program agreement, obliges each state guaranty
agency to comply with “all changes in the Act or Regula-
Education was authorized to enter into “reinsurance agreement{s]”
with them in which the Commissioner would undertake to reimburse
80% of the agencies’ guaranty losses. See 34 C.F.R. 682.404(a}(1).
Under the Higher Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-482, 90 Stat. 2114, 2120, the Commissioner was authorized to enter
into “supplemental reinsurance agreements” with agencies that insured
100% of their covered loans, in which the Commissioner would
undertake to reimburse 100% of their guaranty losses if they had an
overall default rate below 5% of the principal amount of all loans;
90% if the default rate was between 5% and 9%; and 80% if the
default rate exceeded 9%. See 34, C.F.R. 682.405. Under the Higher
Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, § 402(a), 100
Stat. 1371, all guaranty agencies must insure 100% of their covered
loans, and the reimbursement rate is the same as the Commissioner
undertook tn the supplemental reinsurance agreements. Since 1986 the
“reinsurance” and “supplemental reinsurance” agreements have been
reterred to collectively as “guaranty agreements.”
4
tions in accordance with their effective dates.” C.A. App.
21, 25-26. The guaranty agreement also provides that the
Secretary may withhold or demand compensation for
federal payments — including reimbursements — if the state
guaranty agency fails to comply with the Act or its im-
plementing regulations. /d. at 23, 28.
The Higher Education Act of 1965 authorizes or pro-
vides for other sources of revenue to state guaranty agen-
cies. It authorizes the Secretary to make cash advances to
help establish or strengthen such agencies, 20 U.S.C.
1072(a)(1); it permits such agencies to collect a single in-
surance premium from tenders of not more than 3% of the
principal amount of a loan, 20 U.S.C. 1078(b)(1)(H); it
permits such agencies to retain 30% of amounts they col-
lect trom defaulting borrowers after reinsurance payments
have been made to them, 20 U.S.C. 1078(c)(2)(D) and
(c)(6)(A)(ii);?_ and it directs the Secretary to pay (and pro-
vides that guaranty agencies shall “be deemed to have a
contractual right against the United States to receive”) a
portion of the agencies’ administrative costs, 20 U.S.C.
1078(H(1)(A) and (B).
Under the Secretary’s regulations, state guaranty agen-
cies must deposit reimbursements, revenue authorized or
provided by the Act, and all state appropriations, gifts,
grants, and investment earnings, into a “reserve fund.” 34
C.F.R. 682.410(a)(1). The regulations stipulate that none
of the money in the reserve fund may be used for purposes
other than GSLP purposes specified by the Secretary:
namely, guaranteeing loans, paying claims, refunding
? Under 20 U.S.C. 1078(c)(8), a state guaranty agency must assign
to the Secretary any loan for which the Secretary has made a reim-
bursement payment if the secretary determines that is required to pro-
tect the federal fiscal interest. When such an assignment is made, the
agency f ay not retain any portion of collections. 34 C.F.R.
682.409(b).
overpayments and advances, and adminisiering the pro-
gram. 34 C.F.R. 682.410(a)(2)-(6).
b. A major problem with the GSLP has been the in-
creasing accumulation and use of cash in the guaranty
agencies’ reserve funds. In a 1986 report commissioned by
Congress, the Comptroller General found that state guar-
anty agencies had accumulated huge cash reserves that
“exceed the risks guarant[y] agencies are asked to assume
{at the] expense of the federal government and student
borrowers.” U.S. Government Accounting Office: Better
Criteria Needed for Financing Guarantee Agencies |
(1986). The Comptroller General also found that at least
some agencies were using the reserves for improper pur-
poses. /d. at 4. The Comptroller General recommended,
among other things, that Congress set limits on the
amount of cash guaranty agencies could retain in their
reserve funds, to correspond to the actual financial risks
they face. /bid. The Comptroller General later submitted a
report to Congress with draft guidelines for establishing
maximum cash reserve levels. U.S. Government Account-
ing Office: Guidelines for Reducing Guaranty Agency
Reserves (1986).
c. On December 22, 1987, Congress enacted the Omn.-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-36 (the 1987 OBRA Amendments).
Section 3001 of OBRA amended several GSLP provisions
of the Higher Education Act of 1965. 20 U.S.C. 1072{e)
(repealed).’ Under Section 3002 of the 1987 OBRA Amena-
ments, 101 Stat. 1330-38, the provisions of Section 300!
were scheduled to, and did, expire on September 30, 1989
The 1987 OBRA Amendments required the Secretary to
determine the “maximum cash reserve[ ]” permitted each
‘ In the legislative hisory of the OBRA, Section 3001 appears |
the first time in the conference committee report. H.R. Cont. Re
No. 495, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 39-41 (1987)
6
guaranty for fiscal year 1986 under a statutory formula
based on the Comptroller General’s draft guidelines. 20
U.S.C. 1072(e)(1) (repealed).* If the Secretary determined
that any guaranty agency had, at the end of fiscal year
1986, cash reserves in excess of its “maximum,” the Secre-
tary was required to direct the agency to “eliminate” the
excess by one or more of the following methods: (a) repay-
ing advances of federal funds made by the Secretary to the
agency and not otherwise required to be repaid; (b) with-
holding and canceling reimbursement claims otherwise
payable by the Secretary to the agency; (c) reducing the
amount of administrative cost allowances for which the
agency Otherwise would apply to the Secretary; and (d)
any other method of reducing payments from, or increas-
ing payments to, the federal government. 20 U.S.C.
1072(e)(2) (repealed). The 1987 OBRA Amendments also
included provisions to enforce the transfer requirement.
Those provisions made the state guaranty agencies’ stat-
utory “contractual right” to receive reimbursements and
administrative cost allowances from the Secretary “subject
to” the agencies’ compliance with the transfer require-
ment. 20 U.S.C. 1078(c)(1)(A) and (f)(1)(B) (repealed). °*
* The maximum level was the greater of “({A) 40 percent of the total
amount paid by that agency on insurance claims during the preceding
fiscal year; (B) 0.3 percent of the original principal amount of loans
that are insured by that agency and that are Gutstanding at the end of
such preceding fiscal year; (C) an amount which, when combined with
all other parts of total agency reserves, equals 0.4 percent of such orig-
inal principal amount; (D) $500,000; or (E) the amount required to
comply with the reserve requirements of a State law as in effect on Oc-
tober 17, 1986.” 20 U.S.C. 1072(e)(1) (repealed).
> Similarly, the 1987 Amendments made the amount of the rein-
surance fee paid by agencies to the Secretary “subject to” the transfer
requirement. 20 U.S.C. 1078(c)(9)(A) (repealed). That allowed agen-
‘
The 1987 Amendments allowed the Secretary to waive
the requirement to eliminate excess cash reserves if he
determined that an agency’s financial position had
deteriorated significantly since the end of the preceding
fiscal year, that significant changes in economic circum-
stances or the agency’s loan insurance program rendered
the maximum reserve level inadequate for the continued
functioning of the agency, or that in eliminating the excess
cash reserves the agency would violate contractual obliga-
tions on the date the 1987 OBRA Amendments were
enacted requiring the agency to maintain a specific level of
reserve funds. 20 U.S.C. 1072(e)(3) (repealed). The
Amendments also set a nationwide limit of $250 million on
the amount of excess cash reserves to be eliminated. 20
U.S.C. 1072(e)(4) (repealed).
All excess cash transferred to the Secretary by guaranty
agencies under the 1987 Amendments was deposited in the
GSLP student loan insurance fund maintained by the
Secretary under 20 U.S.C. 1081. Pet. App. 4a. That fund
is used to make reimbursement payments to guaranty
agencies, aS well as to make payments for defaulted loans
insured directly by the Secretary. /d. at 4a-Sa.
2. On the day the 1987 OBRA Amendments became
effective, petitioner notified the Secretary that it con-
sidered them to abrogate the Secretary’s contractual
obligations, and that it would not comply with the transfer
requirement. Pet. App. 6a. Petitioner also announced that
it would no longer guarantee student loans, and it made
arrangements for another agency to guarantee student
loans in South Dakota. /bid. The Secretary counseled peti-
tioner against the steps it had taken, and he warned peti-
tioner that its refusal to guarantee student loans consti-
cies tO increase the fee in satisfaction of that requirement. See 20
U.S.C. 1072(e)(2)(D) (repealed).
tuted a termination of the existing GSLP agreements and
would end the Secretary’s reinsurance commitment for
loans guaranteedeby petitioner on or after December 21,
1987. Ibid.
Meanwhile, as required by the 1987 OBRA Amend-
ments, the Secretary calculated the statutory “maximum
cash reserve” for petitioner. The Secretary concluded that
petitioner had excess cash reserves, and directed petitioner
to transfer most of that excess to the federal government.°®
Petitioner applied for, but was denied, a waiver of the
transfer requirement. After petitioner continued to refuse
to comply with the Secretary’s directive, the Secretary
withheld GSLP reimbursements otherwise payable to peti-
tioner until the full amount of excess cash reserves Owed
was recovered. Pet. App. 7a.
Petitioner filed suit challenging the constitutionality of
the 1987 OBRA Amendments and the Secretary’s denial of
a waiver. The district court upheld the Amendments and
the Secretary’s action, and the court of appeals affirmed.
On the constitutional issues, the court of appeals first
held that the reserve fund “does not constitute property
deserving protection of the fifth amendment’s due process
or taking clause.” Pet. App. 17a.’ Rather than deciding
® Petitioner was required to transter $6,607,592 in excess cash
reserves. Pet. 7. Petitioner had certified to the Secretary that it had
cash reserves of $9,948,781, and the Secretary determined that peti-
tioner’s “maximum cash reserve” was $1,254,384. The amount of ex-
cess cash reserves petitioner was required to transfer was calculated by
subtracting the “maximum” from the amount certified, further sub-
tracting an amount owed to the Secretary under a different statute,
and ratably reducing the result to comply with the $250 million nation-
wide ceiling on the recovery of excess cash reserves.
’ The court of appeals initially addressed the waiver issue, because
resoluion of that issue in petitioner’s favor would have precluded con-
sideration of the constitutional issues. Pet. App. 7a-8a. After review-
ing the administrative record, the court held that the Secretary’s denial
9
whether or to what extent petitioner had a property in-
terest in the various and unsegregated sources of the
reserve fund, the court of appeals examined the fund “as a
whole,” and found that it was “entirely a creature of
federal regulation.” /bid. The court of appeals concluded
from the purpose of petitioner and its reserve fund, from
the understandings expressed in the GSLP agreements,
and from the governing regulations, that petitioner had no
protected Fifth Amendment interest in this fund. Jd. at
18a-20a.
Next, the court of appeals held that the Secretary’s im-
plementation of the 1987 OBRA Amendments authorizing
him to withhold reimbursements from non-complying
guaranty agencies, such as petitioner, did not unconstitu-
tionally abrogate petitioner’s contractual rights. While the
Amendments modified previous statutory language stating
that guaranty agencies had a “contractual right” to reim-
bursements, by making that right “subject to” the agencies’
compliance with the transfer requirement, the court of ap-
peals pointed out that this “did not alter [petitioner’s] pre-
existing legal rights” because petitioner’s right to reim-
bursement “was always contingent on [petitioner’s}] com-
pliance with federal law and regulations.” Pet. App. 20a.
Furthermore, the court of appeals noted that the guaranty
agreements themselves authorized the Secretary to
withhold reimbursements where, as here, petitioner failed
to comply with an applicable law. fd. at 21a.
Finally, the court of appeals ruled that even if the
Amendments authorizing the Secretary to withhold reim-
bursements were deemed to alter the terms of petitioner’s
guaranty agreements, they did not violate the Fifth
Amendment. Pet. App. 2la-25a. Relying on Bowen v.
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477
of a waiver was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to
law. /d. at 8a-1Sa. The waiver issue is not presented in this petition.
10
U.S. 41 (1986), the court of appeals found that because the
GSLP “is essentially a social welfare program designed to
help the nation’s youth gain access to higher education
that they otherwise could not afford,” and because the
Higher Education Act “needs to be responsive to ‘ever-
changing’ conditions,” Congress implicitly reserved the
right to impose additional requirements On guaranty agen-
cies not contemplated when the guaranty agreements were
signed. Pet. App. 22a-23a. While the court of appeals
noted that Congress could not impose additional re-
quirements that effectively nullified a contractual obliga-
tion, the conditioning of petitioner’s receipt of reim-
bursements upon its compliance with the transfer require-
ment did not abrogate petitioner’s contractual right to
reimbursements, and merely “add[ed] to the numerous
statutory and regulatory requirements with which * * *
[petitioner] must comply” before it may receive reim-
bursements. /d. at 25a.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner has sought review of the court of appeals’
jQdgment upholding the constitutionality of Section 3001
of the 1987 OBRA Amendments to the Higher Education
Act of 1965. The questions presented in the petition are
identical to the questions presented in Maryland Higher
Education Loan Corp. v. Cavazos, No. 89-1873, South
Carolina State Education Assistance Auth. v. Cavazos,
No. 89-2027, and North Carolina v. Cavazos, No. 90-4, ali
of which seek review of the judgment of the Fourth Circuit
upholding the constitutionality of Section 3001. Our con-
solidated brief in Opposition in those cases (a copy of
which has been provided to petitioner’s counsel) fully
1]
explains why review should not be granted in any of these
cases.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
STUART M. GERSON
Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM KANTER
Nett H. KOSLOWE
Attorneys
SEPTEMBER 1990
* Since the filing of that brief, another court of appeals has joined
the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits in upholding Section 3001.
Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Cavazos, No. 89-2748 (7th Cir.
Aug. 29, 1990). No court of appeals has ruled to the contrary.
US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1990 — 262.203/20100
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.