Amicus Curiae Brief — Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. James
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FILED
; ee :
Ce) ee, JAN 25 91
Nos. 89-1973 and 90-69 YOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR
cremate eater acer EEK
In the Supreme Court of the nites States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
JOSLYN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, PETITIONER
VY.
T.L. JAMES & COMPANY, INC.
POWERLINE SUPPLY COMPANY, INC. ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
T.L. JAMES & COMPANY, INC.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
RICHARD B. STEWART
Assistant Attorney Genera!
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Deputy Solicitor General
JEFFREY P. MINEAR
Assistant to the Solicitor General
ANNE S. ALMY
BRADLEY M. CAMPBELL
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a parent corporation is liable under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act for response costs resulting from the release
of hazardous substances at a subsidiary corporation’s facility
where the parent maintained a separate corporate identity
and had no actual involvement in the operation of the sub-
sidiary’s facility.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
eS a a ee he
ae ek 0 Re
a aroun ries yt he ee ae Ce,
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944) ......
Bell v. Wolfish, 411 U.S. 520 (1979) ..........
Capital Telephone Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734 (D.C.
oO a ee es a ams a hn
Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic &
Comm. Ass’n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918) ..........
Conway v. California Adult Auth., 396 U.S. 107
RR ee eS hn ee i eas
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Ex-
terior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) .........
Knetch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) ...
O'Neill v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert.
Gemeeg, 110-5. -<t. Libs (1990) ... 2.65.50 ess.
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
he bani sy k WAS Se aS, O
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
ne rl, Dhan g gts ime Caries
Riverside Market Devel. Corp. v. International Bldg.
Products, No. 88-5317 (E.D. La. May 23, 1990)
Me SoG ka bbs eu kaeh a ya
Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (Sth Cir. 1988) ..........
Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215 (lst
iE ee BS ae eae wa
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
es ae oar We are in asi Ws
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56
I Eat Pee ee he he oe
13
10
IV
Cases — Continued: Page
United States vy. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802
ads sw we See Aree a 8 3
United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc , 768 F.2d 686
(Sth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014
Res er LR nllanh sly Aee ae ae ee 14
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp.
15 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990),
petition for cert. pending, No. 90-816 ....... 8, 11,
13, 15
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 600 (1989) . 3
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) .............. 8, 11, 15
United States v. South Carolina Recycling &
Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1989),
aff'd sub nom., United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S.
SE h'n-b GLH nlkk-r 0 0009408 b R60 54064 ORO OS® 3
Statutes:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7601 ef seq. ......... 15
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 960i ef
eee oh eee eke eas ©. eeeees's
ee atk te 6). era
§ 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. 9601(20)(A) .......
Bee Boa eae. | ee
§ 104(a)(i), 42 U.S.C. 9604(a)(1) ..........
S 1GWied. G2 UGC. Fire «sss. a ones.
§ 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1) ..........
§ 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(4) ....
§ 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2) .........-. 4,
§ 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(A) ....
§ 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4(B) .....
Bis Re Se ie. eer
- Tk iL arreerreerr TT eer ere ree
NY NNN YI WW ON W WW PV
Miscellaneous: Page
1 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Cor-
powatsoms (rev. WOOO)... <i oc cc ccc cnn 14, 15
10 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Cor-
pretvams Grav. BUG) 5. cc ks vce wi ccaececs 9
W. Knepper & D. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Of-
ficers and Directors (4th ed. 1988) .......... 9
R. Stevens, Handbook on the Law of Private Cor-
poratsons CoG G6. THOR) 2 inn cs occ vc cuccs )
Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No. 89-1973
JOSLYN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.
T.L. JAMES & COMPANY, INC.
No. 90-69
POWERLINE SUPPLY COMPANY, INC. ET AL.. PETITIONERS
Vv.
T.L. JAMES & COMPANY, IN«
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
[his brief is submitted in response to the Court’s invita-
tion to the Solicitor General to express the views of the
United States.
STATEMENT
Petitioners Joslyn Manufacturing Company, Inc. and
Powerline Supply Company, Inc. are, respectively, a past
owner and a present partial owner of the “Lincoln” site,
located in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, that was formerly used
to treat wood and to process creosoting chemicals. Respond-
ent T.L. James & Company, Inc. (James Company) is a
past owner of a dissolved corporate subsidiary, Lincoln
(1)
ty
Creosoting Co., that conducted wood treating and
creosoting operations at that site. In 1986 and 1987, the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ordered
petitioners, respondent, and other parties to clean up haz-
ardous substance contamination at the site. Joslyn filed this
action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
9601 ef seq., and state law against Powerline, the James
Company, and others to require those parties to share in
the clean-up costs. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana en!ered summary judgment
for the James Company, holding that it was not liable under
CERCLA for the cost of clean-up. 89-1973 Pet. App.
9a-3la. The court of appeals affirmed. /d. at la-8a.
1. CERCLA enhances the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA’s) authority to deal effectively with the
release of hazardous substances into the environment. See
generally Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
Under Section 104(a)(1) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9604(a)(1),
EPA may take direct “response” actions to abate any ac-
tual or threatened release of any hazardous substance. 42
U.S.C. 9604(a)(1). Congress has established the Hazardous
Substance Superfund to pay for federal response actions.
See 26 U.S.C. 9507. CERCLA provides that the federal
government may bring cost recovery actions pursuant to
Section 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(A), to replenish
the fund when EPA has expended money in performing
response actions. Sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(t) of
CERCLA also authorize non-governmental parties to
recover their necessary costs of response in certain cir
cumstances. See 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(B); 42 U.S.C. 9613(1.
A party seeking recovery of response costs under
CERCLA must establish four elements: (1) the defendant
falls within one or more of the classes of liable persons
described in Section 107(a); (2) the site is a “facility” as
detined in Section !01(9); (3) a “release” or “threatened
release” of a “hazardous substance” has occurred or is oc-
curring; and (4) the release or threatened release has caused
the party to incur “response costs.” 42 U.S.C. 9607(a). See,
e.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal,
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 991-992 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd sub
nom. United States vy. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).'
As to the first of these four elements, CERCLA
establishes four broad classes of liable persons: (1) the
owners and operators of hazardous substance facilities and
sites; (2) persons who owned or operated a facility at the
time hazardous substances were disposed of at that facili-
ty; (3) persons who arranged for disposal or treatment of
the hazardous substances; and (4) persons who transported
the hazardous substances and selected the disposal facility.
§ 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(4). CERCLA defines
the term “owner or operator” to include “any person own
Ing Or Operating such facility,” § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C.
9601(20)(A), and it defines the term “person” to include “an
individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, con
sortium, [or] joint venture,” § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. 9601(21)
Petitioner Powerline does not dispute that it currently
owns a portion of the Lincoln site and is therefore liable.
under Section 107(a)(1), for clean-up expenditures at the
site. Similarly, petitioner Joslyn does not dispute that it
It is well settled that responsible parties are strictly liable under
CERCLA. E.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 167: Tanglewood East
Homeowners v. Charles- Thomas, Inc. 849 F.2d 1868, 1572 (Sth Cir.
1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp. , 739 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir
1985). In addition, they are jointly and severally liable when the en
\ironmental harm is indivisible. E.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176.
178 (ist Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. L11S (1990): Vonsanto,
8S8 F.2d at 172; United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 | Supp. 802,
S10-811 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
4
owned and operated the wood treating and creosote proc-
essing facility at the Lincoln site from 1950 through 1969
and is therefore liable, under Section 107(a)(2), for clean-
up expenditures at the site. However, petitioners assert that
respondent James Company is also liable under Section
107(a)(2) because its now dissolved subsidiary, Lincoln
Creosoting Co., owned and operated the wood treating and
creosote processing facility from the fazility’s inception in
1935 until its sale to Joslyn in 1950.
Joslyn filed its action against the James Company on
September 18, 1987. After extensive discovery as to the rela-
tionship of the various parties to the Lincoln site, the parties
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the James Company. The court
assumed, as a matter of general, pre-CERCLA, corporate
law, that the James Company could not be heid liable for
Lincoln Creosoting Co.’s activities at the site without “first
piercing the corporate veil.” 89-1973 Pet. App. 10a-15a.
Surveying several cases recognizing the limited liability of
shareholders (id. at 12a-14a), the court stated:
Based upon the foregoing authorities, this court holds
that the corporate form, including limited liability for
shareholders, is a doctrine firmly entrenched in
American jurisprudence that may not be disregarded
absent a specific congressional directive. Neither the
clear language of CERCLA nor its legislative history
provides authority for imposing individual liability on
corporate officers or direct liability on parent
corporations.
Id. at 14a.
The district court “decline{d] to adopt the analysis”
set forth in other cases, including New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985), imposing CERCLA
liability on corporate officers and shareholders who par-
ticipate in the operation of facilities that release hazardous
substances. 89-1973 Pet. App. lla & n.4, 30a n.20. The
court explained that those cases “involved factual situations
where the personal participation in the illegal disposal of
hazardous waste by the corporate officers was significant.”
Id. at 30a n.20. The court stated that if the James Com-
pany and its officers and directors “had been actively in-
volved in the day-toxlay operations of Lincoln, including
the disposal of hazardous waste, then, arguably liability
would attach.” Jbid.
The district court next examined whether the James Com-
pany’s relationship with Lincoln Creosoting Co. provided
a basis for “piercing the corporate veil” and holding the
parent corporation liable for the actions of its subsidiary.
The court first observed that it was “undisputed” that federal
law would govern that question in this case. 89-1973 Pet.
App. I5a. The court concluded, however, that the federal
and state tests, which turn on the degree of the parent’s in-
volvement in the subsidiary’s operations, are used “inter-
changeably” and are “essentially the same.” /d. at 16a. The
court identified a list of factors relevant to that “heavily
fact-specific” inquiry (/d. at 17a-18a) and then examined the
relationship between the parent and its subsidiary in this
case (id. at 19a-27a). The court found that while the James
Company provided capital for Lincoln’s initial incorpora-
tion, the James Company had virtually no involvement in
Lincoln’s actual operations:
The lengthy factual account set forth [in the district
court’s opinion] establishes beyond doubt that Lincoln
strictly adhered to basic corporate formalities by keep-
ing its own books and records and frequently and
periodically holding shareholder and director meetings.
The daily operations of Lincoln and James Company
were kept separate. The driving forces behind Lincoln
NA
6
were Messrs. Hayes and Tooke, neither of whom was
employed by James Company. Lincoln owned its own
property where the physical plant was situated. This
property was not utilized for the business of James
Company. None of Lincoln’s employees were on the
payroll of James Company. Though James Company
provided capital for Lincoln’s initial incorporation, it
was the effort and initiative of Messrs. Tooke and
Hayes that resulted in the formation of Lincoln.
Id. at 27a. The court concluded that despite “substantial
discovery” Joslyn produced no triable issue of fact as to
the separate identities of the James Company and Lincoln,
and thus there was no legal basis for piercing the corporate
veil. Jd. at 29a-30a.
3. The court of appeals affirmed. 89-1973 Pet. App.
la-8a. The court stated that the issues presented were
whether CERCLA imposes “direct liability on parent cor-
porations for violations of their wholly-owned subsidiaries”
and whether “absent such liability, the corporate veil should
be pierced to impose liability in the instant case.” Jd. at 2a.
As to the first issue, the court of appeals observed that
CERCLA does not expressly “hold parents directly liable
for their subsidiaries’ activities” and that imposing liability
on that theory “would dramatically alter traditional con-
cepts of corporation law.” Jd. at Sa. The court concluded
that in the absence of “an express Congressional directive
to the contrary, common-law principles of corporation law,
such as limited liability, govern [the] court’s analysis.” Jd.
at 6a. As to the second issue, the court of appeals agreed
with the district court that the ‘undisputed facts here “militate
against piercing the corporate veil” and that the disputed
facts, even if resolved in petitioners’ favor, would not alter
the result. Jd. at 6a-7a. The court of appeals accordingly
held that the district court properly entered summary judg-
ment. /d. at 8a.’
DISCUSSION
Petitioners contend that the court of appeals’ decision
creates a conflict among the federal courts of appeals as
to the scope of CERCLA liability. We disagree. In our view,
the decision does not create a genuine conflict. Moreover,
although its analysis is incomplete, the court’s ultimate
resolution, based on the record before it, is not necessarily
incorrect. The decision is unlikely to affect government and
other private cost recovery actions and, indeed, contributes
little in defining the contours of CERCLA liability. Accord-
ingly, the petitions for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
1. CERCLA imposes liability on persons — including
corporations — “who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of.” § 107(a){2), 42
U.S.C. 9607(a)(2). The court of appeals plairily perceived
the question in this case as whether CERCLA imposes
liability on a parent corporation merely because the parent
corporation owns a subsidiary that is itself liable under the
statute. The court repeatedly framed the question presented
in terms of whether CERCLA imposes “direct liability on
parent corporations for violations of their wholly-owned
subsidiaries.” 89-1973 Pet. App. 2a.* And it provided its
? The United States participated as amicus curiae in the court of ap-
peals, identifying its theories of parent corporation liability and sug-
gesting that the case be remanded for further factual development rele-
vant to those theories. See C.A. Amicus Br. for the United States; C.A.
Amicus Reply. Br. for the United States.
3 See also 89-1973 Pet. App. Sa (“Joslyn urges this court to read
CERCLA’s definition of ‘owner or operator’ liberally and broadly to
reach parent corporations whose subsidiaries are found liable under
the statute.”); ibid. (“Joslyn asks this court to rewrite the language of
answer in those terms as well: “CERCLA does not define
‘owners’ or ‘operators’ as including the parent company of
offending wholly-owned subsidiaries.” /d. at Sa.* Instead,
the court ruled, a parent corporation may be held liable for
its subsidiary’s acts only if the separate incorporation “is
used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal
liability.” /d. at 8a. In those circumstances, a court could
“pierc[e] the corporate veil” and hold the parent corpora-
tion “indirectly liable for [the subsidiary’s] activities.” /bid.
The court of appeals thus rejected the theory that
CERCLA imposes liability on a parent corporation by vir-
tue of the parent’s mere ownership of a liable subsidiary.
Whatever the merits of that broad theory, no court of ap-
peals has accepted it. Rather, the courts have indicated, as
in this case, that a parent corporation may be held liable
based on its ownership of a liable subsidiary only by “pierc-
ing the corporate veil.”
Petitioners are thus mistaken in suggesting that the court
of appeals’ ruling conflicts with decisions of other courts
of appeals. As we explain below, petitioners rely on cases
that address a question distinct from that presented here:
whether parent corporations and stockholders who them-
the Act significantly and hold parents directly liable for their sub-
Sidiaries’ activities.”).
* See also 89-1973 Pet. App. 7a (“Congress is quite capable of creating
statutes that hold shareholders or controlling entities liable for the acts
of valid corporations.”); bid. (“Similarly, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section
30:2276 (West 1989 Supp.) does not impose direct liability on parent
corporations for the acts of their subsidiaries.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem
Co., 8310 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987):
New York \. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1082 (2d Cir. 1985);
see also United States \. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724. Supp. 18, 23 (D.R.1
1989), atf'd on other grounds, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), petition for
vert. pending, No. 90-816 (filed Nov. 23, 1990)
9
selves participate in the operation of the subsidiary’s facili-
ty are directly liable under Section 107(a) of CERCLA as
operators of the facility. Indeed, we expect that the ques-
tion whether a parent corporation may become liable under
CERCLA by virtue of mere ownership of a liable subsidiary
is unlikely to generate a conflict among the courts of ap-
peals. It is not the policy of the United States, which is the
usual plaintiff in CERCLA cost recovery actions, to seek
cost recovery from a parent corporation based solely on the
parent’s ownership of a liable subsidiary. There is, accord-
ingly, no warrant for further review of the court of appeals’
decision.
2. Although the United States does not seek cost
recovery from parent corporations based on their mere
ownership of liable subsidiaries, the government may seek
cost recovery from a parent corporation based on 2 number
of other established theories of corporate liability. For ex-
ample, it “is a well-established rule that a corporation will
be held liable for the torts and wrongful acts of its direc-
tors, officers, and employees within the scope of their
authority.” W. Knepper & D. Bailey, Liability of Corporate
Officers and Directors § 2.11 (4th ed. 1988).° Accordingly,
® See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
344, 395 (1922) (“A corporation is responsible for the wrongs commit-
ted by its agents in the course of its business, and this principle is en-
forced against the contention that torts are u/tra vires of the corpora-
tion.”); see also, e.g., 10 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the Law of Private
Corporations § 4877, at 323 (rev. 1986) (“corporations can commit
almost any kind of a tort that individuals can commit, and are liable
for the acts of their agents and servants in the same degree as natural
persons are liable for the acts of their servants and agents * * *; that
is now hornbook law, unless changed by statute”); R. Stevens, Hand-
book on the Law of Private Corporations 359 (2d ed. 1949) (“In ap-
plying the doctrine of respondeat superior to any master, corporate or
noncorporate, the fundamental question is whether the servant acted
within the actual or apparent scope of is employment.”).
10
in an amicus curiae brief filed in this case, the United States
suggested that the court of appeals consider whether the
James Company is liable based on any activities of its of-
ficers or employees in operating the Lincoln facility. See
C.A. Amicus Br. for the United States 14-25.
The court of appeals did not discuss or dircctly
acknowledge the government’s theory. Rather, it limited its
discussion to the theory advanced by Joslyn: namely, that
a parent corporation is liable under CERCLA based on its
power to control its subsidiary —a power that will always
exist where the parent owns a majority of the subsidiary’s
stock.’ As we have explained (pp. 7-8, supra), the court of
appeals rejected that theory. Although it would have been
proper for the court of appeals to consider the government’s
alternative theory, we cannot say that the court of appeals
erred in failing to do so, or that the matter raises any issue
warranting this Court’s review. A court is not obligated,
of course, to consider issues raised by amici.’ And the
government expressly acknowledged in its amicus brief that
Joslyn had not squarely presented the government’s theory
\o the court of appeals.’ Furthermore, the government
Joslyn argued that CERCLA “imposes liability on parent corpora-
tions if they knew or should have known about the pollution and had
the authority to control or abate it, but did not.” Joslyn C.A. Br. 19.
See also Powerline C.A. Br. 34-36. Joslyn makes a similar argument
in this Court. See 89-1973 Pet. 9. Powerline’s position on the merits
in this Court is unclear. See 90-69 Pet. 6-11.
* See, e.g., United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitcne 4, 451 U.S. 56, 60
n.2 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 530 n.13 (1979); Knetch v.
United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370 (1960).
* The government stated below that “[t]he specific positions asserted
by the United States in [its] brief are not presented by and, in at least
One respect, are in direct conflict with the positions pressed by the ap
pellants in their briets.” C.A Amicus Br. tor the United States, State
ment Regarding Oral Argument. While statements in Joslyn’s court of
appeals brief might be interpreted to coincide with the government's
1]
conceded that the factual record before the court of appeals
might not support imposition of liability under that theory
in this case.!°
At all events, we do not interpret the court of appeals’
decision as rejecting the government’s theory, which has
been adopted by three other courts of appeals and rejected
by none. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d
24, 26-27 (Ist Cir. 1990), petition for cert. pending, No.
90-816 (filed Nov. 23, 1990); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp. , 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). The court
of appeals “declined” Joslyn’s suggestion that the court
“follow the several courts, including the Second Circuit,
which have extended CERCLA liability to parents.” 89-1973
Pet. App. Sa. The court’s decision, however, cannot
reasonably be read as rejecting the standard of liability set
forth by the Second Circuit in Shore Realty Corp.; rather,
the court of appeals apparently agreed with the district court
that the Second Circuit’s Shore Realty Corp. standard was
simply not apposite on the record in this case.
In Shore Realty Corp., the Second Circuit held the cor-
porate officer and shareholder who “made, directed, and
controlled” all corporate decisions and actions, who was “in
charge of the operation of the facility in question,” and who
“specifically directs, sanctions, and actively participates
theory, the court of appeals did not interpret Joslyn’s argument in that
manner, and its failure to do so does not present any question war-
ranting review,
* The government explained that its interest was limited to an ar-
ticulation of “the proper /ega/ standard” and that “the tacts related to
James Compe ny’s participation in the management of Lincoln should
be tully deve oped and assessed by the district court after the proper
legal standard is articulated by this Court.” C.A. Amicus Reply Br.
tor the United States 7-8.
12
in Shore’s maintenance of the nuisance” to be directly liable
as an “operator” under CERCLA. 759 F.2d at 1038, 1052.
In this case, the district court concluded that while the James
Company participated in the initial capitalization of the
Lincoln Creosoting Co., there was no showing that the
James Company or its officers participated in the opera-
tion of the Lincoln facility. See 89-1973 Pet. App. 27a. The
district court accordingly declined to adopt the Second Cir-
cult’s analysis. /d. at 30a n.20. The district court explained,
however, that the Shore Realty Corp. analysis would likely
control if the James Company had actively participated in
the operation of the Lincoln facility:
If T.L. James & Company and its officers and direc-
tors had been actively involved in the day-to-day opera-
tions of Lincoln, including the disposal of hazardous
waste, then, arguably, liability would attach.
Ibid. We believe that the court of appeals likewise declined
to follow Shore Realty Corp. because the Second Circuit’s
liability standard was simply not applicable to the facts
before the court in this case.!!
In sum, the court of appeals’ decision in this case holds
that the James Company may not be held directly liable
under CERCLA by virtue of its mere ownership of a liable
subsidiary. The decision does not address the distinct (and
in this case purely hypothetical) question whether a parent
corporation may be held directly liable based on its own
activities at the facility. As the First Circuit recently ex-
plained, the court of appeals’ decision in this case does not
A district court in the Firth Circuit has since similarly observed
that “fi]t, as in the cases cited by Judge Stagg, [a shareholder] personally
participated in the disposal of hazardous wastes, then he may be liable
for the wrongtul acts of the corporation even under Judge Stagg’s Jos/vn
opinion.” See Riverside Market Devel. Corp, \. International Bldg.
Products, No. 88-5317 mem. op. (6.D. La. May 23, 1990) (1990 WI
he «
2249, *3-*4).
13
conflict with the uniform view of the First, Second, and
Eighth Circuits that corporate parents or their officers may
become directly liable as operators under CERCLA if they
actively participate in operating a subsidiary’s facility.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d at 26-27. There is, accordingly,
no occasion for this Court to address that issue (or other
non-applicable theories of direct corporate liability) in this
case. Cf. Conway v. California Adult Auth. , 396 U.S. 107,
110 (1969) (review of a “hypothetical issue” would constitute
“an advisory opinion” and “an unjustifiable intrusion on
the time of the Court”).
3. The court of appeals recognized that a parent cor-
poration may be held liable for its subsidiary’s activities if
there are grounds for disregarding the parent’s and the sub-
sidiary’s separate corporate identities. See pp. 6-7, supra.
The court agreed with the district court, however, that “the
facts here militate against piercing the corporate veil.”
89-1973 Pet. App. 7a. Powerline does not challenge this
aspect of the court of appeals’ decision. Joslyn contends,
however, that the court of appeals erred by employing an
unduly restrictive standard to make that determination. /d.
at 11, 9, 12.
There is no real disagreement as to the broad principles
that determine whether corporate forms should be dis-
regarded. This Court has recognized on numerous occasions
that an incorporated entity “is not to be regarded as legally
separate from its owners in all circumstances.” First Nat’l
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983). “In particular, the Court has con-
sistently refused to give effect to the corporate forrn where
it is interposed to defeat legislative policies.” /d. at 630. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362-363 (1944).
Where, as here, the legislative policies are expressed in a
federal statute, the question whether separate corporations
14
should be treated as one is determined as a matter of federal
law. /d. at 365.
As we have expiained (pp. 7-8), the court of appeals re-
jected the notion that a parent corporation “owns” or
“operates” a facility, for purposes of CERCLA, by virtue
of its mere ownership of a subsidiary that holds title to the
facility. The question, then, is what additional factors would
justify treating a parent —that is not directly liable based
on its actuai participation in the operation of the facility —
indirectly liable for its subsidiary’s actions. Under traditional
corporate law principles (which inform interpretation of the
federal statute), the separate corporate identities of a parent
and its subsidiary may be disregarded in a number of cir-
cumstances, including where “stock ownership has been
resorted to, not for the purpose of participating in the af-
fairs of the corporation in the normal and usual manner,
but for the purpose * * * of controlling a subsidiary com-
pany so that it may be used as a mere agency or instrumen-
tality of the owning company or companies. ” Chicago M.
& St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic & Comm, Ass’n, 247 U.S.
490, S501 (1918). See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chemicals,
Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (Sth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. JO14 (1986); 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the Law of
Private Corporations § 43, at 729-731 (rev. 1990). Apply-
ing that standard, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court’s determination that, in this case, the corporate veil
should not be pierced.
We agree that CERCLA liability may be imposed on a
parent corporation if a subsidiary that functions as the
parent's “alter ego,” “agent,” or “instrumentality” is found
liable. See Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 691. Those
metaphorical terms, however, derive their meaning largely
through “a careful review of the entire corporate relation-
ship between various corporate entities, their directors and
otficers” (1 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the Law of Private
15
Corporations, supra, at 731). Corporate forms might be
disregarded under CERCLA in other circumstances as well,
depending on the manner in which those forms are employed
in the CERCLA context. Cf. Capital Telephone Co. v.
FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This case,
however, does not present an appropriate occasion to ad-
dress that topic.
First, there currently is no conflict among the courts of
appeals on the extent to which corporate forms may be
disregarded under CERCLA. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit is
the first court of appeals to rule on the issue.'? Second, in
many cases where it would be appropriate to disregard
separate corporate identities, the parent corporation may
be held directly liable, without piercing the corporate veil,
based on its own actual participation in the operation of
the facility in question. See Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d
at 26-28 & n.11; United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 744; Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d at 1052. See 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the
Law of Private Corporations, supra, § 41.27. Thus, the issue
may have limited practical importance. Finally, “the ques-
tion of corporate identity is normally one of fact; each case
is determined according to its own circumstances.” /d. at
§ 43, at 730. In this case, the district court found that Joslyn
fell far short of establishing the factors normally associated
with “piercing the corporate veil,” 89-1973 Pet. App.
25a-27a, and the court of appeals affirmed, without ex-
tended discussion, the district court’s “heavily fact specific”
determination (id. at 18a). In view of (1) the absence of a
‘2 The case that Joslyn cites as presenting a conflict, Town of
Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215 (ist Cir. 1981), involved the ques-
tion whether a university-owned corporation qualified as a non-profit
health or educational institution for the purpose of a regulatory ex-
emption under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7601 ef seq.
16
conflict among the courts of appeals, (2) the possibility that
the issue may have limited importance in many cases, and
(3) the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, this Court’s review
is not warranted at this time.
CONCLUSION
The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
RICHARD B. STEWARI
Assistant Attorney General
LAWRENCE G. WALLACI
Deputy Solicitor General
TEEEREY P. MINEAR
Assistant to the Solicitor General
ANNE S. ALMY
BRADLEY M. CAMPBELL
Attorneys
JANUARY 199]
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