Opposition Brief — Friedrich v. Sullivan
Supreme Court brief1990
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
as?
a
:
res RES Te, oe
Yel
; CLERK
No. 89-1879 JOSEPH F. SPANIO
L, JR. 4 Se ,
le
* on :
: vy et a, 4Ee ’
’ * tig
a “
‘ es
$ Jy
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
MICHAEL J. FRIEDRICH, PETITIONER
y.
Louis W. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
STUART M. GERSON
Assistant Attorney General
ANTHONY J; STEINMEYER
JOHN S. KOPPEL
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217
7 sOBEST AVAILABLE COPY!
ca
©.
%
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Secretary’s national coverage determina-
tion that chelation therapy is not covered by Medicare Part
B is an “interpretative rule” exempt from the notice-and-
comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).
2. Whether application of that national coverage deter-
mination to petitioner’s claim for reimbursement for chela-
tion therapy violated his right to due process of law.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Te ee ctw heave veces ee ae’ l
a ee devs wk vis venveuae’s l
cc ch seo es ies bre sseeeesas 2
Ne a de cee see WR et O88 7
ce dees bhi ee ee se eee suse 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593 (9th Cir.
ba cue ecu a wes sas 9
Allen v. Bergland, 661 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
es ai a a swt bees 8
American Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037
snc eeu chats es dea wees 8
American Postal Workers Union v. United States
Postal Serv. , 707 F.2¢ 548 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984) .............. 8, 9, 10
Bio-Medical Applications of Providence, Inc. v.
Heckler, 593 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd,
oe 8 ee | 10
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA,
ee 12
Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir.
Ee TSE RS 8
Energy Consumers & Producers Ass’n v. Department
of Energy, 632 F.2d 129 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980) ............ y
Federal Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33
ROE TE Jp Son Re 11-12
General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074
re Se Nau ly ons ais does 5,8
IV
Cases — Continued: Page
Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir.
SN ot cau busch ae ade es dneaveneebacasbens 8
Hatcher v. Heckler, 772 F.2d 427 (8th Cir.
Dn tienele cus kak whecne gabe hier eer cee +) 12
Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984) ........ 11
Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176 (6th Cir.
SE Wien G owra sad wl hd scene cane Renn ene 40:8 y
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) .... 3,4
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) .. 12
St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n,
i oe & fy Ee A | ee 10
United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043 (Sth Cir.
SE Se ee shee crew hi eas vac ars cance erekstes 2
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
era a eso tees 6 ah tie eas 7
Statutes and regulations:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
- RE ee 7
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874:
ho SR RE eee 10
§ 9341(b), 100 Stat. 2038 ................. 10
Social Security Act, Tit. XVIII, 42 U.S.C. 1395 er
seq.:
me ee 3
42 U.S.C. 1395u (1982 & Supp. V 1987)... 3
ee a) I ars sob vs ob oe ence e's 4
42 U.S.C. 1395u(b)(3)(C) (1982 & Supp. V
SE oe ar Ge Me ui cs ox dweekon ce eey eer e. 4
42 U.S.C. 1395y(ay(1(A) (1982 & Supp. V
a ey re eer eee 3-4, 9
42 U.S.C. 1395ff(b)(3) (Supp. V 1987) .... 10
42 U.S.C. 1395ff(b)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1987) .. 10
Vv
Statutes and regulations — Continued: Page
ee Ne iv adaveeuseneiweswnenees 4
42 C.F.R.:
0 ESS SEE Ea Pr a re 4
Sections 405.807-405.812 .............04.- 4
Sections 405.820-405.860 ................. 4
eS | 2 errs ere 4
Sb are rrr rrr TT 4
Miscellaneous:
35 Fed. Reg. 438 (1970) .........2--. eee eeee 2
45 Fed. Reg. 41,222 (1980) ..........-----ee: 3
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on
the Administrative Procedure Act (1947 & photo.
SONNE FOFND, ccs ccc cceveccsveccdevseseres 7
Jn the Supreme Court of the Tnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No. 89-1879
MICHAEL J. FRIEDRICH, PETITIONER
V.
Louis W. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES .
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-A19)
is reported at 894 F.2d 829. The opinion of the district court
(Pet. App. A22-A35) is unreported. The decision of the
Medicare hearing officer (Pet. App. A37-AS57) is
unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
A20-A21) was entered on January 25, 1990. A petition for
rehearing was denied on March 7, 1990. Pet. App. AS58.
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on May 31,
1990. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).
(1)
2
STATEMENT
1. Chelation therapy is a treatment for atherosclerosis
that involves the intravenous injection of disodium edetate
solution. Proponents contend that disodium edetate binds
(“chelates”) with calcium, thereby facilitating the removal
of calcium-containing atherosclerotic plaque from blood
vessels. However, chelation therapy has been widely
discredited by the general medical community on the grounds
that the theory underlying its use is implausible and that its
safety and effectiveness have not been demonstrated in con-
trolied clinical trials. See, e.g., United States v. Evers, 643
F.2d 1043, 1045 (Sth Cir. 1981); Pet. App. A3-A4, A26-A27.
The Health Care Financing Administration, which ad-
ministers the Medicare program, first issued instructions in
1970 that restricted Medicare coverage of disodium edetate
to treatment for ailments other than atherosclerosis. Pet.
App. A4. These instructions were based on the recommen-
dation of the Public Health Service, which consulted with
several medical organizations and governmental agencies,
including the Food and Drug Administration. /bid.; see also
id. at A2-A3. The FDA-approved labeling for the drug has
stated that disodium edetate is indicated for the treatment
of hypercalcemia and scleroderma, but not for the treat-
ment oi atherosclerosis. Pet. App. A4 (citing 35 Fed. Reg.
438 (1970)).
The HCFA instructions on disodium edetate remained
in effect until 1980, when HCFA replaced most specific drug
coverage determinations with general criteria for in-
termediary and carrier use in determining coverage. Pet.
App. A4. These criteria permitted payment for any use of
an FDA-approved drug determined by the carrier to be
reasonable and necessary, except for those uses specifically
disapproved by the FDA or for which coverage might be
precluded by a national instruction. /bid.
Subsequently, HCFA requested the Public Health Serv-
ice to review chelation therapy and develop a recommen-
dation concerning its suitability for Medicare coverage. Pet.
App. A4. The Public Health Service published a Federal
Register notice announcing its plans to undertake that
assessment and requesting interested parties to submit rele-
vant information. /bid. (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 41,222 (1980)).
In addition, the Public Health Service separately solicited
evaluations of chelation therapy from a number of profes-
sional organizations and medical specialty groups, including
those groups advocating the treatment. Pet. App. A4; see
id. at Al9.
After considering all the information submitted, the
Public Health Service issued a comprehensive report and
assessment recommending that the Medicare program not
cover chelation therapy. Pet. App. AS. Based on this assess-
ment, HCFA issued in February 1982 a “national coverage
determination” that chelation therapy was not covered by
Medicare; this determination was incorporated in the
Medicare Carriers Manual. Jbid. See Pet. App. A5-A6
(quoting the relevant directions in the Medicare Carriers
Manual). Carriers paying claims under Part B of the
Medicare program, 42 U.S.C. 1395j ef seq., and hearing
officers adjudicating disputes over such claims are obligated
to follow the Manual’s instructions.'
| As the Court noted in Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 189-190
(1982), the Medicare program consists of two parts. Part A, which is
not at issue in this case, provides insurance against the costs of institu-
tional health care. Part B covers a portion (usually 80%) of the
reasonable charge for certain physician services, outpatient physical
therapy, X-rays, laboratory tests, and other medical and health care.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services has contracted with private
carriers to pay qualifying Part B claims on his behalf. See 42 U.S.C.
1395u (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Part B of Medicare does not cover services that are not medically
“reasonable and necessary.” 42 U.S.C. 139Sy(antMA) (1982 &
4
2. a. Petitioner began receiving chelation therapy for
treatment of atherosclerosis in 1983 and filed claims for pay-
ment under Medicare Part B. The Medicare carrier denied
the claims on the basis of the direction in the Medicare Car-
riers Manual. At his hearing before a hearing officer ap-
pointed by the carrier, petitioner presented the testimony
of his treating physician and submitted materials contain-
ing anecdotal evidence and uncontrolled “trials” that pur-
ported to demonstrate the effectiveness of chelation therapy.
The carrier hearing officer relied upon the Manual instruc-
tions regarding chelation therapy in upholding the denial
of coverage. Pet. App. A37-A57.
b. Petitioner then commenced this action. By agreement
of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c), the case was
referred to a magistrate for decision. The parties cross-
moved for summary judgment, and the magistrate granted
petitioner’s motion. Relying on a 1975 decision by the Ap-
peals Council of the Sociai Security Administration that
allowed reimbursement for chelation therapy under Part A
of Medicare, the magistrate ruled that the 1982 instructions
Supp. V 1987). When a Part B carrier has been billed for a particular
medical service, the carrier determines whether the service satisfies this
standard and is otherwise covered under Part B; the carrier also
establishes the “reasonable charge” that may be paid for covered serv-
ices and items. 42 U.S.C. 1395u(a); 42 C.F.R 405.803, 421.200. A
claimant is entitled to challenge the carrier’s determination by means
of a “review determination” (a procedure involving the submission of
written materials) and, as to disputes over $100 or more, an oral hear-
ing before a hearing officer selected by the carrier. 42 U.S.C.
1395u(b)(3)(C) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 42 C.F.R. 405.807-405.812,
405.820-405.860. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. at 191.
In administering the Medicare program, the carrier and any hearing
officer are bound by the Medicare statute, the regulations, and the in-
structions and guidelines issued by the Secretary in his capacity as ad-
ministrator of the Part B program. 42 C.F.R. 405.860. See Schweiker
v. McClure, 456 U.S. at 197.
“represented a change in the policy of the Secretary, as op-
posed to a mere clarification of an existing regulation.” Pet.
App. A31-A32. Thus, the magistrate reasoned, the instruc-
tions “are substantive rather than interpretative and are sub-
ject to the notice and comment provisions of the A.P.A.”
Id. at A32. Because the instructions on chelation therapy
had not been promulgated in accordance with those pro-
cedures, the magistrate held the instructions invalid as ap-
plied to petitioner’s claim. /d. at A33. The magistrate also
held that petitioner’s right to due process entitled him to
a ruling on his chelation therapy claim without reference
to invalid instructions. Jd. at A34.
3. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with in-
structions to dismiss the complaint. Applying general prin-
ciples articulated by the D.C. Circuit in General Motors
Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985), and approved in subsequent
Sixth Circuit decisions, the court of appeals held that the
Secretary’s national coverage determination is an inter-
pretative rule exempt from the notice-and-comment re-
quirements of the APA. Pet. App. Al0-A17.?
The court rejected petitioner’s contention that the chela-
tion therapy instructions at issue were a departure from prior
practice, explaining that “[t]he record as a whole convinces
us that the Secretary has been consistent in his determina-
> The principles that the court applied in determining whether the
national coverage determination was interpretative (as Opposed to
substantive or legislative) were as follows (Pet. App. All (quoting from
General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d at 1565)):
First, the agency’s own label, while relevant, is not dispositive. . . .
An interpretative rule simply states what the administrative agency
thinks the statute means, and only “ ‘reminds’ affected parties of
existing duties.” . . . On the other hand, if by its action the agency
intends to create new law, rights or duties, the rule is properly con-
sidered to be a legislative rule.
6
tion that Chelation therapy is not reasonable and necessary
for the diagnosis or treatment of atherosclerosis.” Pet. App.
A13-A14-fhe magnitude of that coverage determination’s
potential impact on Medicare beneficiaries was not a pro-
per factor on which to rely in determining whether the deter-
mination was an interpretative rule, the court continued,
nor could the determination be considered a “gap-filling”
substantive rule. Jd. at Al4.
The court observed that “[n]Jational standards are essen-
tial if there is to be uniformity and equality in the ad-
ministration of Medicare,” and that “[i]t is inconceivable
* * * that the Secretary might be required to comply with
the full panoply of APA notice and comment requirements
in promulgating national standards for individual drugs and
medical procedures.” Pet. App. Al6. The national coverage
determination does not “ ‘fill the gaps’ in the statute,” “ ‘sup-
plement’ it,” or create new law, the court concluded, but
rather “interprets the statutory language ‘reasonable and
necessary’ as applied to a particular medical service or
method of treatment.” Jd. at Al7. Accordingly, the court
held, the magistrate “erred in concluding that the determina-
tion is a legislative rule and therefore is invalid for failure
of the Secretary to comply with the requirements of 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b).” Ibid.
Finally, the court determined that petitioner was not
denied due process by the application of the instructions
on chelation therapy to his claim. The court stated that its
reversal of the magistrate’s determination that the national
coverage determination was invalid had eliminated that
ground for petitioner’s due process claim. Noting that “[peti-
tioner] had no more than a unilateral expectation that he
would receive reimbursement under the Medicare program
for chelation therapy” and that the Secretary had relied on
voluminous materials in issuing the coverage determination,
the court also held that petitioner “does not have a due
process right to have his individual claim considered de novo
in the face of the Secretary’s determination.” Jd. at A18,
Al9.
ARGUMENT
In characterizing the national coverage determination as
an interpretative rule, the court of appeals correctly applied
well-established principles to this particular directive. Con-
gress has provided that with respect to services provided
after January 1, 1987, national coverage determinations
shall not be overturned on the basis of a failure to comply
with the APA’s notice-and-comment provision. Thus, the
court’s decision on this question has little, if any, prospec-
tive importance. Petitioner’s due process claim is without
merit. Further review is therefore unwarranted.
1. a. The APA specifically excludes “interpretative”
rules from its notice-and-comment procedures. 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(A). Although in some cases the question whether a
particular rule is interpretative can present a difficult issue
of line drawing, certain general principles have achieved
widespread acceptance. The court of appeals applied those
principles here.
The Attorney General’s Manual on the APA defines in-
terpretative rules as “rules or statements issued by an agen-
cy to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the
statutes and rules which it administers.” United States
Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947 & photo. reprint
1979).3 Thus, interpretative rules are those that do not
’ The courts have given deference to the interpretations of the At-
torney General's Manual “because of the role played by the Depart-
ment of Justice in drafting [the APA].” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. \. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546
(1978)
8
“srant or deny rights” or “impose obligations which do not
already exist in the statute.” Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234,
238 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194
F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In issuing an interpretative
rule, an agency does not require or rely upon delegated
authority to make law. See, e.g., American Postal Workers
Union v. United States Postal Serv. , 707 F.2d 548, 558-559
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
“Substantive” rules (also called “legislative” rules), by con-
trast, “create law, usually implementary to an existing law.”
Allen v. Bergland, 661 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1981).
Thus, substantive rules have “effect[s] completely indepen-
dent of the statute.” Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d at 238 &
n.9 (quoting Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d at 331).
The court of appeals conducted its analysis of the 1982
national coverage determination in accordance with these
principles. Relying on General Motors Corp. Vv.
Ruckelshaus, supra, and two of its own decisions that had
applied a similar approach, the court considered whether
the Secretary’s determination on chelation therapy “simply
states what the administrative agency thinks the statute
means” or, on the other hand, was intended “to create new
law, rights or duties.” Pet. App. All. The court concluded
that the Secretary’s instruction to deny coverage “creates
no new law,” but rather “interprets the statutory language
‘reasonable and necessary’ as applied to a particular medical
service or method of treatment.” Pet. App. A17. Petitioner
does not argue that the general principles on which the court
relied are incorrect or inconsistent with those applied by
other courts of appeals in comparable cases. The applica-
tion of those principles to the particular administrative direc-
tive at issue here—“an extraordinarily case-specific
endeavor,” American Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037,
1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987)— presents no question calling for this
Court’s review.
re NN a aR annus at te
9
In any event, the court’s analysis of the national coverage
determination is correct. In promulgating an instruction that
chelation therapy is not covered by Medicare Part B, the
Secretary did not exercise delegated power to make law apart
from that embodied by the statute. Rather, he determined
that a particular procedure, chelation therapy, is not
“reasonable and necessary for the * * * treatment of illness
or injury” within the meaning of the Medicare statute, 42
U.S.C. 1395y(a)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See American
Postal Workers Union, 707 F.2d at 559 (in changing an an-
nuity computation formula, agency was merely interpreting
the statutory term “average pay”); Energy Consumers & Pro-
ducers Ass’n v. Department of Energy, 632 F.2d 129,
139-141 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (agency rule interpreting
statutory exemption for “stripper wells” was exempt from.
notice-and-comment requirement), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
832 (1980). Contrary to petitioner’s contention (Pet. 10),
the fact that the Secretary’s determinations are binding upon
agency and carrier employees that administer the Medicare
Part B program does not alter their interpretative nature.4
* As the court of appeals found (Pet. App. Al2-A14), the national
coverage determination on chelation therapy was not a departure from
longstanding agency practice; there is thus no merit to petitioner’s con-
tention (Pet. 9) that prior to 1980 the Secretary allowed insurance car-
riers and hearing officers to determine “on a case by case basis” whether
chelation therapy to treat atherosclerosis was reimbursable under the
Medicare Act. In any event, the fact that an agency directive may change
an agency’s position does not require the conclusion that the directive
is a substantive rule. See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 182-184
(6th Cir. 1986) (holding that “[a]n administrative agency may reexamine
its prior decisions and may depart from its precedents provided the
departure is explicitly and rationally justified” and that memorandum
first articulating a new interpretation of the Clean Air Act was an in-
terpretative rule that did not require notice-and-comment rulemaking
under the APA); Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“[t}hat the regulations may have altered administrative duties or other
10
An agency is not obligated to promulgate a substantive rule
in order to require officials acting under the agency’s
authority —including, in this case, hearing officers bound
by the Secretary’s contracts with Part B carriers, see p. 3
& note 1, supra—to adhere to the agency’s considered in-
terpretation of a statute it administers.
b. Section 9341 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
A-t of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 1395ff(b)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1987), pro-
vides that a national coverage determination “shall not be
held unlawful or set aside on the ground that a requirement
of section 553 of title 5 * * *, relating to publication in the
Federal Register or opportunity for public comment, was
not satisfied.”* This provision is applicable to claims for
goods or services furnished on or after January 1, 1987.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-509, § 9341(b), 100 Stat. 2038. Thus, with respect to
claims for items or services furnished during the last three-
and-a-half years or to be furnished in the future, Congress
has foreclosed the claim —advanced by petitioner in this
hardships does not make them substantive”); American Postal Workers
Union, 707 F.2d at 558-560 (holding that agency’s new method of com-
puting annuities was interpretative rule, despite fact that it changed old
method).
The court of appeals’ conclusion is consistent with decisions on similar
directives issued under Medicare. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 788 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1986) (Medicare Pro-
viders Reimbursement Manual); Bio-Medical Applications of Pro-
vidence, Inc. v. Heckler, 593 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1984) (Medicare
Renal Dialysis Facility Manual), aff'd mem., 776 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
5 Section 1395ff(b)(3) also provides that a national coverage deter-
mination is not subject to review by an administrative law judge, and
that a court, on finding inadequate support for the determination, may
not substitute a revised determination that the service or item is covered
but instead must remand the matter to the Secretary to supplement the
record.
At BS EN Nd date
11
case—that national coverage determinations are invalid
unless promulgated in accordance with the APA’s notice-
and-comment requirements for substantive rulemaking.
Consequently, the question whether the court of appeals
correctly characterized the rule at issue in this case has little,
if any, prospective importance.
2. Petitioner also contends (Pet. 10-11) that even if the
1982 national coverage determination is a valid interpretative
rule, due process entitles him to an administrative deter-
mination of his claim by a hearing officer who is not bound
to follow it. This contention, if accepted, would mean that
each Medicare Part B claimant would have a constitutional
right to a determination by a hearing officer of the issue
whether, despite a valid interpretative rule to the contrary,
a particular treatment is reasonable and necessary within
the meaning of the Medicare statute.
Petitioner cites no authority whatever for this position —
which would mandate a perverse regime for the administra-
tion of the Nation’s multi-billion dollar Medicare program.
As the court of appeals recognized, “National standards are
essential if there is to be uniformity and equality in the ad-
ministration of Medicare.” Pet. App. Al6. Implementation
of such standards requires, in turn, that the Secretary be
able to assemble information on the general effectiveness
and safety of medical procedures and to issue instructions
embodying his judgments that are binding on those who
act on his behalf. The Constitution does not require that
each hearing examiner be empowered to reconsider those
decisions. Cf. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 617 (1984)
(noting, with respect to Part A Medicare claim, “[{t]he
Secretary’s decision as to whether a particular medical ser-
Vice is ‘reasonable and necessary’ and the means by which
she implements her decision, whether by promulgating a
generally applicable rule or by allowing individual adjudica-
tion, are clearly discretionary decisions”); Federal Power
12
Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39 (1964) (Commis-
sion is not precluded “from particularizing statutory stand-
ards through the rule-making process and barring at the
threshold those who neither measure up to them nor show
reasons why in the public interest the rule should be
waived.”); Hatcher v. Heckler, 772 F.2d 427, 432-433 n.9
(8th Cir. 1985) (“[iJf * * * [hearing] officers were allowed _
to disregard HCFA guidelines in the exercise of their discre-
tion during a hearing, the uniformity of result obviously
needed in such a massive system of claims determination
would suffer”).
Agents of an administrative agency may constitutionally
be obligated to follow the agency’s interpretative rules, leav-
ing to whatever judicial review is available the question of
the rules’ consistency with the governing statute.® Petitioner’s
contention that under the Constitution, a Medicare Part B
6 Interpretative rules are not binding on courts to the same degree
as are legislative rules. Rather, as this Court explained in Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134; 140 (1944), interpretative rules,
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authori-
ty, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it the power to persuade, if lack-
ing power to control.
Because the Secretary’s instructions regarding chelation therapy rest on
“factual premises within [the agency’s] expertise,” they are entitled to
very substantial deference. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983). Petitioner does not seek review
in this Court of the correctness of the Secretary’s application of the
statute to chelation therapy. Rather, the petition is limited to the ques-
tions whether the rule was adopted in violation of the APA and whether
its binding effect on the hearing officer is consistent with due process.
Pet. i.
——
13
hearing officer must be allowed to reconsider the Secretary’s
national coverage determinations presents no question call-
ing for this Court’s review.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
STUART M. GERSON
Assistant Attorney General
ANTHONY J. STEINMEYER
JOHN S. KOPPEL
Altorneys
JUNE 1990
*: US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1990—262.203/00959
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.