Opposition Brief — FMC Corp. v. Gander

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. FILED

WN 18 199

o JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

No. 89-1829 —

An Tue

_: Supreme Court of the Bnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

FMC CorPoORATION,

Petitioner,

VS.

Topp GANDER,

Respondent.

_ BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

THE HULLVERSON LAW FIRM

JAMES E. HULLVERSON, JR.

Counsel of Record

1010 Market Street, Suite 1550

St. Louis, Missouri 63101

(314) 421-2313 pce

and

STEPHEN H. RINGKAMP

Counsel for Respondent

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 13307 Manchester Road 63131 314-231-4477

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. In a diversity action for personal injuries based

on product liability law of Missouri, does federal

law mandate jury instructions on (a) the effect of

taxes on future lost earnings and (b) the non-

taxability of a jury’s award of damages where ap-

plicable Missouri law precludes such instructions?

II. Is an appropriate case presented for review of

Question I by certiorari where the defendant failed

to tender such instructions at trial and made no

complaint in the Court of Appeals regarding the

absence of such instructions?

III. In such a diversity action, does federal law

_-mandate cross-examination by defense counsel of

plaintiff's economist regarding the income tax ef-

fects on lost future earnings where Missouri law

precludes such cross-examination?

IV. Is an appropriate case presented for review of

Question III by certiorari where the trial court

allowed defense counsel to conduct such cross-

examination, but also stated it would grant a

mistrial if plaintiff could show that such cross-

examination was improper, and defense counsel

_ Voluntarily chose to make no further efforts to

cross-examine the economist about income taxes?

V. Where Missouri law permits no reduction of

damages under a strict liability theory in connec-

tion with an assessment of a percentage of fault to

plaintiff under a comparative negligence theory,

and where the Court of Appeals expressly recogniz-

ed that the jury was properly instructed on those

issues, is a new trial mandated by «@@" of a con-

gluding “‘note’’ in a verdict form \.vt an instruc-

tion as petitioner represents to the Court) which the

Court of Appeals held was legally correct but

‘‘potentially confusing’?

‘VI. Is an appropriate case presented for review of

Question V by certiorari where the defendant made —

no specific objection to the concluding ‘‘note”’.

under Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.Pro., and tendered no

alternative verdict form or language to clarify the

meaning of that ‘‘note’’?

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented ............. ccc cece eee cece cee i

Table of Authorities .............. geieiiel take ae

Statement of the Case ............ccccceeceeeeeeees 1

Summary of Argument .................0e ec ee eens 4

PNAS, elas oia5'v tine nins <k dive cpees eyesansds’ 6

Conclusion Red Fidhe hehe o¥ed.seseyevanescctecrences 23

Appendix

Appendix A: Test of Court of Appeals Opinion

Gander v. FMC Corp., 892 F.2d 1373 (8th

er eee eee A-1

Appendix B: District Court Judgment, July 13,

DR IRCL Sa redy ccc taecacetroceeecieyes A-24

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Adams v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 820 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.

IGGT) vive bis Se sae cde eR ewheesedddbesessecs heew

Ce POO aio cic siccccucs Mek |

Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084 (Sth Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, sub nom Bromley Corp. v. Cortese,

450 U.S. 981, 101 S.Ct. 1516, 67 L.Ed.2d 816

(1981) ........ Wiis ahaa ae eebveatieas sete

(1952) ...... ecu clea dug aw owede Gav's cUUSC ES.

Estate of Spinosa, 621 F.2d 1154 (Ist Cir. 1980) .......

Fenasci v. Traveler’s Insurance Co., 642 F.2d 986 (Sth

Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123, 100 S.Ct. 971,

TE Lib Ae PIB Gs oc va ciccccddccsvecsdcccce

Page

11,12

Gander v. FMC Corp., 892 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1990) . .2,3,7,11

Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 69

L.Ed.2d 784, 101 S.Ct. 2870 (1981) .............

Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d

1036 (Sth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051,

105 S.Ct. 1749, 84 L.Ed.2d 814../..............

In Re: Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 701 F.2d

-1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866, 78

L.Ed.2d 178, 104 S.Ct. 204 (1983) ..............

Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83 (Mo.

Do hind daeweseescevdb erect ocecceccigess

2 ve " :

Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1104 (8th

Cor BRED ba ieee AnSek ei Bias. 17

Lippard v. Houdaille Industries, 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo.

SOE Goa GA cs dace tsb bokbavides ctnesevas dlecstegl, tt

Losey v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics

Corp., 792 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1986) .............. 7

Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc . 707 S.W.2d

371 (MO. 1986)... cc ccc cece pe cecevess oe 12,17

Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490,

62 L.Ed.2d 689, 100 S.Ct. 755 (1980) ............ 4,6,7

Rouse v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,

474 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1973)................4.. 21

Senter v. Ferguson, 486 S.W.2d 644 (Mo.App. 1972)... 7

Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d

I ET ih idwntanscdnocddnestcetsbeces 8

Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218 (Mo.

a and b da oho c's keene shee ekeei codes 7

Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1981). 7,8

Vanskike v. ACF Industries, Inc., 665 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1632,

pip) dh, > 1 ee Pe 17

Statutes, Rules and Texts:

Ne PE, Foc pccccccvccescsdcvcecis 23

Rc oc criccenixpsenesnccesesces 19,20

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(2) ............ 15

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 611(b)............... 15

Federal Jury Practice & Instructions, Devitt, Blackmar

& Wolff, Vol. 3, Fourth Edition, Sec. 74.12 ...... 22

vi

Federal Jury Practice &.Instructions, Devitt, Blackmar

& Wolff, Fourth Edition, Vol. 3, Sec. 85.11 ......

9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure,

Sec. 2551 and 2553 (1971).....eecccccccccccecce

Missouri Approved Jury Instructions, Third Edition,

AE Ge 0 0.0. 0:0/0.04 dOOR The ceed deeb wil aen ble

Missouri Approved Jury Instructions, Third Edition,

Illustration 35.15, 1989 Pocket Part, pages 122-133

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 43 U.S.C., Sec. 1331

5 Bs .0:h'0-00.0'c.4 Ladin wane chdee bn cetekaw anade

Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 914(a)(2) (1977) ...

Supreme Court Rule 10.1(a@) ...........ccccccceeeecs

DTG TEND Bcd voce ccccndescceceetecivencn

ED UNTIED 0.0 0 p.nes. 50400 bheenaccawaue

No. 89-1829

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Bnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

Ww

FMC CorPoRATION,

Petitioner,

vs.

Topp GANDER,

Respondent.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant FMC Corporation (hereinafter ‘‘FMC’’) appealed

a judgment in favor of Todd Gander for Two Million Dollars.

This judgment was entered by the District Court on July 13,

1988, following a jury trial.

Jurisdiction in the District Court was based on diversity of

citizenship. Missouri law of product liability was applicable.

Gander’s theories of recovery for personal injuries were alter-

native theories of strict liability and negligence. Under Missouri

law, comparative negligence applied only to a negligence theory

and not to the strict liability theory. The jury found in favor of

Gander on the strict liability theory. The jury also found in

favor of Gander on the negligence theory and assessed ten per-

cent fault to FMC and ninety percent fault to Gander. The jury

assessed Gander’s total damages at Two Million Dollars.

hae aaen

The District Court initially entered judgment for Two Hun-

dred Thousand Dollars. However, on Gander’s motion to

amend judgment, the District Court held that Gander was en-

titled to Two Million Dollars on the strict liability claim which

could not be reduced by Gander’s comparative fault under

Missouri law. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed

by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Gander v. FMC Corp., 892 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1990).

On February 23, 1985, while working for Anheuser-Busch in

St. Louis, Todd Gander lost his right arm at the elbow while

working as a coal conveyor operator. At the time of trial, the

average pay for coal conveyor operators was approximately

$48,000.00 plus benefits.

The coal conveyor on which Gander was injured was

manufactured by defendant FMC without a guard at the in-

running nip point at the head pulley drum.

As coal was being conveyed, coal dust would accumulate on

the drum. On February 23, 1985, the head pulley drum on the

FMC conveyor had become clogged with coal and was responsi-

ble for a major coal spill. Gander had been taught to clean the

drum with a fox tail brush. As Gander proceeded to clean the

drum with a fox tail brush, the rolling drum caught the brush

and pulled Gander’s forearm into the device before he was able

to let go. Gander’s right arm was severed at the elbow when it

came into contact with a shear guard.

Gander was taken to a hospital where his arm was reattached.

However, his arm is useless. Attempts at vocational rehabilita-

tion were unsuccessful and Gander was discharged from work in

August of 1987. He now does volunteer work at a local

hospital.

Uncontradicted figures for lost wages, past and future,

establish damages in excess of Two Million Dollars. Gander’s

lost wages for his work life expectancy of twenty-seven years

" -

would be close to One Million Seven Hundred Thousand

Dollars. R., Vol. 1, 318. Alternative lost wage scenarios ranged

from One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars to Two

Million Two Hundred Thousand Dollars. Jd. at 320-22.

Gander’s physicians testified that his right arm was almost

useless. He has no use of his fingers, which frequently swell and

develop ulcers. Gander has permanent, burning pain in his fin-

gers, which are otherwise numb. He must wear a splint to sup-

port his wrist and a glove to keep down the swelling in his hand.

The arm is subject to injury and heals slowly. These injuries are

permanent. R., Vol. 2 at 34-59.

Gander’s psychiatrist testified that his injuries have caused

substantial psychological problems. Initially, Gander was

severely depressed and suicidal and had to be hospitalized for

treatment. R., Vol. 2 at 75. Gander is still under monthly psy-

chiatric treatment with his symptoms in a constant state of flux.

R., vol. 2, 75, 80. While Gander is no longer suicidal, the scars

on his body from skin grafts, nerve and vein transplants, and

muscle harvesting are devastating to Gander’s self-image. R..,

Vol. 2 at 77. Gander suffers from insomnia, is easily frustrated

and irritable, has decreased interest in intimacy with his wife,

and harbors feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness with a

poor outlook for the future. R., Vol. 2 at 90. The psychiatrist

testified that Gander was totally disabled on the basis of his psy-

chiatric difficulties alone. R., Vol. 2 at 84. Thus, the Court of

Appeals held that there was substantial evidence supporting the

jury’s calculation of total damages at Two Million Dollars. 892

F.2d at 1380. See Appendix, A-12.

aaien

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Tand II. This Court’s decision in Liepelt does not mandate jury

instructions on the effect of taxes on future lost earnings and

the non-taxability of a jury award for personal injuries in a

diversity action based on product liability law of Missouri.

Missouri law precludes such jury instructions. The Eighth Cir-

cuit correctly ruled this issue. Petitioner failed to request any

**tax’’ iastructions in the District Court and made no complaint

in the Court of Appeals regarding the absence of such instruc-

tions. Therefore, Petitioner does not present an appropriate

issue for review by this Court.

Ii and IV. Liepelt does not mandate cross-examination of plain-

tiff’s economist regarding income tax effects on lost future earn-

ings in a diversity action under Missouri law. Missouri law

precludes such cross-examination. The Eighth Circuit correctly

ruled this issue. The relevant District Court ruling actually a//ow-

ed Petitioner to conduct such cross-examination with the caveat

that plaintiff would be granted a mistrial if plaintiff proved the

ruling to be wrong. Petitioner vo/untarily made no further ef-

forts at such cross-examination and made no offer of proof.

Therefore, Petitioner does not present an appropriate issue for

i=,

review.

V and VI. Under Missouri law of product liability, comparative

negligence of the plaintiff does reduce damages under a strict

liability theory. Jury instructions on those issues were held to be

clear and correct by the Eighth Circuit. A new trial is not re-

~~

quired because of a closing ‘‘note’’ on a verdict form (not an in-

struction as represented by Petitioner) which the Court of Ap-

peals also held was legally correct but may have been ‘‘poten-

tially confusing’. Petitioner failed to object to that ‘‘note’’ at

trial (Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.Pro.) and failed to tender an alter-

native verdict form or clarifying language for the ‘‘note’’. The

Court of Appeals correctly ruled this issue. Therefore, Peti-

tioner does not present an appropriate case for review.

— a

ARGUMENT

I

THIS CASE INVOLVES A DIVERSITY ACTION FOR

PERSONAL INJURIES BASED ON PRODUCT

LIABILITY LAW OF MISSOURI. APPLICABLE

MISSOURI LAW PRECLUDES JURY INSTRUC-

TIONS ON THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON FUTURE

LOST EARNINGS AND THE NON-TAXABILITY OF

A JURY’S AWARD OF DAMAGES. THIS COURT’S

DECISION IN LIEPELT DOES NOT MANDATE

SUCH INSTRUCTIONS IN DIVERSITY ACTIONS

DETERMINED UNDER STATE LAW.

Petitioner, FMC Corporation (hereinafter ‘‘FMC’’), inap-

propriately lumps together issues regarding evidence, argument,

and jury instruction involving the effects of federal income tax

on a plaintiff’s lost income stream and on the non-iaxability of

a jury’s damage award. FMC apparently does so in an attempt

to obfuscate the issues in order to obtain review by this Court

despite the fact that many of these issues were neither preserved

in the trial court nor raised in the Court of Appeals. FMC also

represents to the Court that the decision of the Court of Ap-

peals in this case is in conflict with the decision of the Seventh

Circuit in Jn Re: Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 701 F.2d

1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866, 78 L.Ed.2d 178, 104

S.Ct. 204 (1983). FMC conveniently fails to cite to this Court

the vast body of law decided by the United States Courts of Ap-

peals to the effect that taxability instructions in diversity cases

are questions of state law and that such instructions are not

mandated in diversity cases by this Court’s decision in Norfolk

& Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 62 L.Ed.2d 689,

100 S.Ct. 755 (1980).

This case involves a diversity action for personal injuries bas-

ed on product liability law of the State of Missouri. Plaintiff,

Todd Gander, had his arm literally torn off by an unguarded

piece of machinery manufactured by FMC.

Ce

—_ on

Applicable Missouri law precludes jury instructions on the ef-

fect of taxes on future lost earnings and the non-taxability of a

jury’s award of damages. Missouri Approved Jury Instruc-

tions, Third Edition, MAI 4.01; Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp.,

693 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1985); Tennis v. General Motors Corp.,

625 S.W.2d 218 (Mo.App. 1981); and Senter v. Ferguson, 486

S.W.2d 644 (Mo.App. 1972).

"This Court’s decision in Liepelt determined that, in FELA ac-

tions, the jury should receive evidence of the effect of income

taxes on lost wages and an instruction on the non-taxability of a

final award. The decision in Liepelt was premised upon the

federal questions involved in FELA cases and the need for uni-

formity in cases decided under federal law.

The rationale of Liepe/t was further delineated by this Court

in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 69

L.Ed.2d 784, 101 S.Ct. 2870 (1981). In Gulf Offshore Co., this

Court remanded a case under the Outer Continental Shelf

Lands Act (43 U.S.C., Sec. 1331 et. seq.) to the Texas Court of

Civil Appeals for a determination of whether Louisiana law re-

quired a ‘‘non-taxability instruction”’ and, if it did not, whether

Liepeit displaced the state rule in an OCSLA case. That case

was remanded with directions from this Court that, if it was er-

ror to refuse such an instruction, the state court could then ad-

dress arguments that failure to give such an instruction did not

constitute prejudicial error.

Numerous decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals

have expressly recognized that taxability instructions are ques-

tions of state law in diversity cases and that Liepelt does not

mandate such instructions in diversity actions determined under

state law. Gander v. FMC Corp., 892 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1990);

Adams v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 820 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1987);

Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523 (8th Cir.

1980); Losey v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics

Corp., 792 F.2d 58, 61-62 (6th Cir. 1986); Estate of Spinosa,

621 F.2d 1154, 1158-59 (1st Cir. 1980); Vasina v. Grumman

Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1981); Shu-Tao Lin v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1984);

Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1096-97 (Sth Cir.

1980), cert. denied, sub nom Bromley Corp. v. Cortese, 450

U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 1516, 67 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981); Hansen v.

Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1045 (Sth Cir.

1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051, 105 S.Ct. 1739, 84 L.Ed.2d

814; Fenasci v. Traveler’s Insurance Co., 642 F.2d 986, 989 (Sth

Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123, 100 S.Ct. 971, 71 L.Ed.2d

110 (1981).

A close reading of the Seventh Circuit decision in Jn Re: Air

Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 701 F.2d 1189, 1200 (7th Cir.

1983), indicates that there is no real conflict among the circuits.

In that case, the Seventh Circuit reviewed Illinois law and stated

its belief that Illinois decisions were based on a misapprehension

of federal law and that the giving of a ‘‘non-taxability instruc-

tion’’ would be harmless at most. Jd. 701 F.2d 1199, 1200. The

Seventh Circuit also recognized that its conclusion would be dif-

ferent if Illinois interpreted its own substantive law to preclude

such an instruction. Jd. 701 F.2d at 1200, n. 7. The Seventh

Circuit did not hold that federal law mandated such an instruc-

tion in a diversity case. Rather, the Seventh Circuit held that

the District Court was free to give the tax instruction despite

contrary state procedure. Jd. 701 F.2d 1200.

Therefore, under Supreme Court Rule 10.1(a), there is no

‘*conflict’”” among the circuits on these issues. Rather, the Cir-

cuit Courts of Appeals are relatively uniform and support the

decision of the Eighth Circuit in this case.

-_ 9

PETITIONER FAILED TO TENDER ANY “INCOME

TAX”’ INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TRIAL COURT AND

MADE NO COMP IN THE COURT OF AP-

PEALS REGARDING THE ABSENCE OF SUCH IN-

STRUCTIONS. THEREFORE, THIS CASE IS NOT

APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW BY CERTIORARI ON

THAT ISSUE.

Supreme Court Rule 15.1 requires that a Brief in Opposition to

a Petition for Certiorari should address any perceived misstate-

ments of fact or law which have a bearing on the question of

what issues would properly be before the Court if certiorari were

granted. FMC seeks review by certiorari by contending that

Liepelt mandates the giving of ‘‘taxability instructions’. How-

ever, FMC completely fails to advise this Court that FMC totally

failed to preserve any such issue in either the District Court or in

the Court of Appeals.

FMC requested no instructions regarding income tax effects

on lost future income.

FMC requested no instruction on the non-taxability of a

jury’s award of damages.

FMC made no objection to the damage instruction given by

the trial court at the request of plaintiff.

The only instruction relating to damages tendered by FMC at

trial was a ‘‘present value’’ instruction patterned after Federal

Jury Practice & Instructions, Devitt, Blackmar & Wolff, Fourth

Edition, Vol. 3, Sec. 85.11. This ‘‘present value’ instruction

had absolutely no relationship to, and did not mention, taxes.

In its Brief on Appeal before the Eighth Circuit, the only

issue raised by FMC related to cross-examination of plaintiff’s

damage witnesses and closing argument. Quoted portions from

FMC’s “‘Brief for Appellant’’, consisting of Question 3 from

on

the Questions Presented section, and Point III from the Argu-

ment section, are as follows:

Question 3: Whether counsel for FMC Corporation

should have been permitted to cross examine plaintiff’s

damages witnesses regarding the effects of ineome tax

upon plaintiff’s lost income stream, and to mention those

effects during closing argument. (Brief for Appellant,

page 3.)

POINT III

“OUNSEL FOR FMC SHOULD HAVE BEEN PER-

NM.:TTED TO CROSS EXAMINE PLAINTIFF’S

DAMAGES WITNESSES REGARDING THE EFFECTS

OF INCOME TAX UPON THE PLAINTIFF’S LOST

INCOME STREAM, AND TO ARGUE THOSE EF-

FECTS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT. (Brief for

Appellant, page 17)

As is obvious, FMC completely failed to preserve any allega-

tion of error regarding instructions relating to taxes in either the

District Court or in the Court of Appeals.

For these reasons, review by certiorari would not be ap-

propriate.

MISSOURI LAW PRECLUDES' CROSS-

EXAMINATION REGARDING INCOME TAX EF-

FECTS ON LOST FUTURE EARNINGS. FEDERAL

LAW DOES NOT MANDATE SUCH CROSS-

EXAMINATION.

The Eighth Circuit quite properly held that Missouri law

precludes cross-examination and closing argument regarding in-

come tax effects on lost future earnings. Gander v. FMC Corp.,

892 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1990). In Dempsey v. Thompson,

363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952); the Missouri Supreme

Court held that:

The trial court did not err either in refusing to permit

defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff’s actuarial witness

relative to income tax liability or in refusing to permit

defendant to argue to the jury that in arriving at the

amount of its award it should consider only the amount of

future earnings lost to plaintiff after deduction of income

taxes for which he would have been liable had he continued

his employment without injury.

In this regard, Missouri follows the majority rule set forth in

the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 914(a)(2) (1977), which

provides as follows:

*‘The amount of an award of tort damages is ordinarily

not diminished because of the fact that, although the

award is not of itself taxed, all or part of it is to compen-

sate for the loss of future benefits that would have been

subject to taxation.”’

wee

_—

For all of the reasons set forth in Point I of this Brief, federal

law does not mandate such cross-examination or closing argu-

ment in a diversity case.

FMC attempts to rely on Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft,

Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986). Nesseirode did not involve

any issue of cross-examination or closing argument regarding

income tax effects on lost future earnings. Rather, Nesselrode

involved alleged error in the use of a table which allegedly did

not contain reductions to present value. Jd. at 385-386. This

‘‘present value’ issue in Nesselrode was decided in light of the

fact that the defendant itself failed to present any evidence of

present value. Jd. at 387. In deciding this issue, the Missouri

Supreme Court mentioned in passing that cross-examination

was conducted with regard to the fact that the decedent’s pro-

jected stream of lost income did not take into consideration his

anticipated income tax obligations. Jd. at 388.

The propriety of this cross-examination was not at issue in

Nesselrode and was not addressed by the Missouri Supreme

Court. The decision in Dempsey was not even discussed in

Nesselrode. Certainly the decision in Dempsey was not overrul-

ed by Nesselrode.

The Eighth Circuit properly decided this issue and certiorari

would be inappropriate in this case.

— 13 —

IV

THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT iT WOULD

ALLOW PETITIONER TO CROSS-EXAMINE PLAIN-

TIFF’S ECONOMIST ON INCOME TAX EFFECTS ON

FUTURE EARNINGS, AND ALSO STATED THAT IT

WOULD GRANT A MISTRIAL IF PLAINTIFF

COULD SHOW SUCH CROSS-EXAMINATION WAS

IMPROPER. PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY CHOSE

TO MAKE NO FURTHER EFFORTS TO CROSS-

EXAMINE THE ECONOMIST ABOUT INCOME

TAXES. THEREFORE, THIS CASE IS NOT AP-

PROPRIATE FOR REVIEW BY CERTIORARI ON

THAT ISSUE.

Despite the fact that the Eighth Circuit generously considered

the merits of FMC’s argument regarding cross-examination of

plaintiff’s economist on income tax effects on future earnings,

FMC fails to advise this Court that the ruling of the trial court

was actually in FMC’s favor. The trial transcript on appeal con-

tains the following exchange and ruling by the trial court. (R.,

Vol 1, pages 344, line 14 through 345, line 12).

** THE COURT: Mr. Hullverson says as a matter of law

that you can’t get into it.

MR. HULLVERSON: That’s correct.

MR. VENKER: I think that’s wrong, Judge, and I think

it would hamper me prejudicially with an economist pre-

sent to not be able to question him in that regard. That is,

if there were no economist maybe we couldn’t get an in-

struction on it at the end of the case.

THE COURT: Well, if you do I’ll go ahead and let you

— Mr. Hullverson shows that I’m wrong I’ll grant a

mistrial at your request, okay?

_—" o

MR. HULLVERSON: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VENKER: So we're talking about —

THE COURT: I’m going ahead and letting you based

on your representation, but if you’re wrong I’m going to

grant a mistrial.

MR. VENKER: Your Honor —

THE COURT: Okay?

MR. VENKER: — are we talking about income tax or

present value or both?

THE COURT: Whatever you want to do.

MR. VENKER: All right.’’

The trial court indicated that it would allow FMC to do

whatever it wanted to do with regard to cross-examination on

the subject of income taxes and present value. The trial court

cautioned that if plaintiff could show that such cross-

examination was improper, a mistrial would be granted.

FMC voluntarily chose to make no further efforts to cross-

examine the economist about income taxes.

On such a record, this case clearly is not appropriate for

review by certiorari on that issue.

The only other incident regarding income taxes which took

place at trial involved plaintiff’s witness, Crawford. Crawford

woe Bas

was a union representative who testified briefly about wages

earned by coal conveyor operators. FMC attempted to ask

whether Crawford’s income figures were ‘“‘net or gross’’. An

objection to this question of this witness was sustained. (R.,

Vol. 2, 70-71). The trial court was well within its discretion in

refusing to allow this cross-examination at this juncture of the

trial. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 611(b). Such evidence

would have been completely out of context and without any op-

portunity for explanation. Plaintiff's economist had concluded

his testimony and FMC had no economist waiting to testify.

Crawford was a lay witness - basically a records custodian.

No foundation was established by FMC that this witness was

competent to testify about income taxes. Even if the witness

had been allowed to respond that the wage rate for coal

Operators was a ‘“‘gross’’ rate, such testimony would have been

in a vacuum, unrelated to any meaningful testimony by any

economist or other witness.

FMC fails to advise this Court that FMC never even attemp-

ted to make an offer of proof with either one of these witnesses.

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)2).

Therefore, FMC was not the victim of an adverse ruling by

the trial court in connection with the economist’s testimony.

The only relevant ruling made by the trial court was actually in

favor of FMC. No appropriate issue was before the Appellate

Court. Certainly, there is no appropriate issue before this Court

for review by certiorari.

MISSOURI LAW PERMITS NO REDUCTION OF

DAMAGES AWARDED UNDER A STRICT LIABILI-

TY THEORY BY ANY PERCENTAGE OF FAULT

ASSESSED TO PLAINTIFF UNDER A .COM-

PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE THEORY. THE COURT

OF APPEALS EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZED THAT

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THOSE ISSUES

WERE CLEAR AND CORRECT. A NEW TRIAL IS

NOT REQUIRED BY REASON OF A CONCLUDING

‘‘NOTE”’ IN A VERDICT FORM (NOT AN INSTRUC-

TION AS REPRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER TO

THIS COURT) WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS

HELD WAS LEGALLY CORRECT BUT “POTEN-

TIALLY CONFUSING”.

This product liability case was submitted to the jury on alter-

native theories of strict liability and negligence against defen-

dant FMC in accordance with Missouri Supreme Court approv-

ed Illustration 35.15 (effective January 1, 1988). Missouri Ap-

proved Jury Instructions, Third Edition, 1989 Pocket Part,

pages 122-133. MAI Illustration 35.15 is the Missouri Supreme

Court approved method for submission of negligence and strict

liability where comparative fault is applicable only to the

negligence theory in accordance with the decision in Lippard v.

Houdaille Industries, 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986).

In Lippard, the Missouri Supreme Court stated as foliows:

‘“We conclude that there should be no change in the

Missouri common law rule, as established in the Keener

opinion (citation omitted), that the plaintiff’s contributory

negligence is not at issue in a products liability case. /t

should neither defeat nor diminish recovery . . . if the pro-

duct is a legal cause of injury, then even a negligent plain-

tiff should be able to recover.’’ (715 S.W.2d at 493, em-

phasis supplied).

— 17 —

‘*We adhere to the view that distributors of ‘defective pro-

ducts unreasonably dangerous’ should pay damages for in-

juries caused by the products, without reduction because a

plaintiff may have been guilty of a degree of carelessness. 5

(715 S.W.2d at 494).

The Missouri Supreme Court clearly has indicated the viabili-

ty of submission of alternative theories of strict liability and

negligence in a products liability case. Lippard v. Houdaille In-

dustries, 715 S.W.2d at 494, n. 3; and Nesselrode v. Executive

Beachcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Mo. 1986). Likewise,

the decisions of the Eighth Circuit have recognized that the sub-

mission of multiple theories of negligence and strict liabilitv is

appropriate under Missouri law. Vanskike v. ACF Industries,

Inc., 665 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1981); and Lewy v. Remington

Arms Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1988).

In this case, the jury clearly found in favor of plaintiff and

against the defendant on the strict liability theory. On the

negligence theory, the jury determined that both FMC and the

plaintiff were negligent. On this negligence theory, the jury

assessed ten percent fault to the defendant and ninety percent

fault to the plaintiff. Under Lippard, comparative fault applies

only to a negligence theory and does not apply to a theory of

strict liability. Finally, the jury determined that plaintiff's total

damages, disregarding fault on the part of the plaintiff, was

Two Million Dollars.

The following statement appears on pages 1 and 2 of the

Jurisdictional Statement of FMC’s Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari.

**On March 15, 1988, the jury returned a verdict in favor

of plaintiff and the trial judge entered judgment in the

amount of $200,000.00. See infra Appendix at A-!. On

July 13, 1988, the trial judge amended the jury’s award to

$2,000,000.00 and entered judgment in that amount. See

infra Appendix at A-2.”’

These characterizations of the verdict and the trial court’s ac-

tions are misleading. The only amount set forth by the jury in

the verdict form was Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00). A

Two Hundred Thousand Dollar figure nowhere appears in the

verdict form as completed by the jury. The trial judge did not

amend the jury award. The trial judge merely entered judg-

ment, in accordance with Lippard, for Two Million Dollars on

the strict liability theory, for Two Hundred Thousand Dollars

on the negligence theory, with the proviso that the amount

recoverable under the negligence theory would not be in addi-

tion to the amount recoverable under the strict liability theory.

See Appendix at A-24-25. This judgment was perfectly correct

under Missouri law. FMC inappropriately palters by referring

to the jury verdict as one ‘“‘for Two Hundred Thousand

Dollars’’ and by making it appear that the trial judge entered an

additur.

FMC concedes that the only difficulty with the verdict form is

contained in the closing ‘‘note’’. See Appendix at A-7. In seek-

ing certiorari on this basis, FMC conveniently omits any discus-

sion of the actual jury instructions in this case. In its opinion in

this case, 892 F.2d at 1378, the Eighth Circuit expressly held

that the actual jury instructions in this case ‘‘were quite clear

that the jury finding on comparative fault does not so apply’’ to

the strict liability theory. See Appendix at A-10. The Eighth

Circuit stated that the actual jury instructions properly in-

structed the jury that comparative fault principles do not apply

to strict liability claims. The Eighth Circuit also recognized that

the actual jury instructions advised the jury that the percentage

of fault assessed to plaintiff under the negligence theory would

only affect the recovery on that negligence theory. See Appen-

dix at A-9. y

The Eighth Circuit utilized the appropriate standard of ap-

pellate review with regard to jury instructions when it stated:

‘*As a whole, the instructions correctly and specifically in-

structed the jury about the ambiguities the [verdict] form

— 19 —

may have created. Given this correct and explicit instruc-

tion, it is mere speculation that the jury calculated total

damages at $2,000,000.00 in anticipation of a reduction for

plaintiff's comparative fault on the negligence claim.’’ 892

F.2d at 1378-79. See Appendix at A-10.

Given this very explicit finding by the Eighth Circuit, there is

simply no issue presented which is worthy of consideration by

this Court on a Petition for Writ of Certiorari under Supreme

Court Rule 10.1(a). This is particularly true, as more fully set

forth in Point VI of this Brief, because FMC failed to make any

specific objection to the closing ‘‘note’’ in the verdict form

under Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.Pro., and failed to offer an alter-

native verdict form or clarifying language.

a

VI

THE ISSUE INVOLVING THE CONCLUDING

‘‘NOTE” IN THE VERDICT FORM DOES NOT PRE-

SENT AN APPROPRIATE CASE FOR REVIEW BY

CERTIORARI WHERE THE PETITIONER MADE NO

SPECIFIC OBJECTION TO THAT “NOTE” UNDER

RULE 51, FED.R.CIV.PRO., AND FAILED TO

TENDER AN ALTERNATIVE VERDICT FORM OR

CLARIFYING LANGUAGE.

At trial, the only comment that counsel for FMC had with

respect to the verdict form is reflected at R., Vol. 3, page 209, as

follows:

‘* MR. VENKER: The only objection that I had to it,

Your Honor, was that I stated earlier and that is just that I

think with two verdict directors on two different theories

there should be two verdict forms. I mean I’ve seen this

this morning for the first time and haven’t had a chance to

draft my own, but I would just say simply that they ought

to be separate and not put together in the same verdict

form.”’

Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.Pro. provides in pertinent part, as

follows:

‘* |. . No party may assign an error the giving or the failing

to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto

before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating

distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the ob-

jection...”

a«e, eo

The only complaint relating to alleged-instructional error

made by petitioner FMC, pertains to the concluding ‘‘Note’’ on

the verdict form used at trial. At no time during trial did FMC

ever raise any issue with regard to that concluding ‘‘note’’. The

only objection made at trial by FMC with respect to the verdict

form was the suggestion by FMC that the claims based on

theories of negligence and strict liability should be submitted by

way of separate verdict forms on each theory.

As such, FMC has waived any allegation of error with respect

to that verdict form on the grounds asserted in its Petition.

Rouse v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 474

F.2d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 1973); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice & Procedure, Sec. 2551 and 2553 (1971).

“*A party may not state one ground when objecting to an

instruction and attempt to rely on a different ground for

the objection on appeal or on a motion for a new trial. Nor

will an objection to one part o° the charge permit a party to

assert error later in a different part of the charge.’’ Jd. at

645, 646.

FMC had every opportunity to appropriately object to the

concluding note in the verdict form. It failed to do so. FMC

had every opportunity to tender an alternative verdict form. It

failed to do so. FMC had every opportunity to suggest a

clarification or amendment to the verdict form used by the

District Court. It failed to do so. FMC had every opportunity

to tender a special verdict form submitting special inter-

rogatories recommended for a product liability case submitting

te HD nin

both negligence and strict liability, which may be found at

Federal Jury Practice & Instructions, Devitt, Blackmar &

Wolff, Vol. 3, Fourth Edition, Sec. 74.12. FMC failed to do so.

At no time did FMC object or attempt to clarify the ‘“‘note’’

which it now contends would have made the verdict form more

clear to the jury. Also, at no time during final argument did

FMC ever explain to the jury the effect of the joint submission

of negligence and strict liability theories. FMC had every op-

portunity to argue these issues to the jury. FMC failed to do so.

Under these circumstances, this case does not present an ap-

propriate issue for review by certiorari by this Court. This is

especially true by virtue of the fact that the Eighth Circuit ex-

pressly held that the concluding ‘‘note’’ in the verdict form was

legally correct and did not misstate Missouri law. 892 F.2d at

1377. See Appendix at A-8.

ee i

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, FMC’s Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari should be denied.

Given the numerous omissions of fact and law by FMC in its

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this Court may wish to consider

application of Supreme Court Rule 42.2 or a direction to the

District Court to consider application of Rule 11,

Fed.R.Civ.Pro.

Respectfully submitted,

The Hullverson Law Firm

James E. Hullverson, Jr.

Counsel of Record

1010 Market Street, Suite 1550

St. Louis, Missouri 63101

(314) 421-2313

and

Stephen H. Ringkam

Counsel for Respondent

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 88-2823

Todd Gander,

Appellee,

v.

FMC Corporation,

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

Submitted: September 13, 1989

Filed: January 12, 1990

Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit

Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

FMC Corporation appeals a judgment in favor of Todd

Gander for $2,000,000, entered on July 13, 1988, following a

jury trial. Gander’s theories of recovery for personal injuries

sounded in both strict liability in tort and negligence, and the

jury found in favor of Gander on both claims. The jury also

ee ll aes

assessed Gander’s comparative fault on the negligence claim at

90%. On appeal, FMC argues that the verdict form was confus-

ing and misstated the law, and that the district court should

have allowed FMC to cross-examine Gander’s witnesses about

the effects of income tax assessments on Gander’s lost income.

While we have some reservations about the verdict form, we af-

firm.

I. BACKGROUND

Gander lost his right arm at the elbow on February 23, 1985,

while working for Anheuser-Busch in St. Louis. Gander work-

ed as a coal conveyor operator, and made $34,560 plus benefits

in 1984. At the time of trial in 1986, the average pay for coal

conveyor operators was $47,891 plus benefits.

As a coal conveyor operator, Gander’s work entailed

shepherding coal from its entry into the plant to the boilers

where it was converted to electrical energy. The conveyor belts

which transported the coal frequently would ride to one side of

their drive drums as the result of coal dust accumulating on the

drums. When the conveyor belt rode to one side, it would often

climb the wall, causing coal spills.

On February 23, 1985, Gander was working near a head

pulley drum which had become clogged with coal, and which

was partly responsible for a major coal spill. Gander had been

taught to clean the drum with a fox tail brush, without shutting

off the system. Gander thus proceeded to clean the drum with

the fox tail brush, but the rolling drum caught the fox tail brush,

pulling Gander’s forearm into the device before he was able to

let go. The rolling drum literally lifted Gander off the ground,

and his arm was severed at the elbow when it came into contact

with a shear guard. Fellow workers took Gander to Barnes

Hospital where his arm was reattached.

Although Gander’s surgery was successful to the extent that

he still has his right arm, he testified at trial that the arm is

|

Merete —

a

essentially useless. ‘‘It’s just like an ornament hanging on, it’s

no good.”” Trial Transcript, vol. 1, at 122. He has only limited

movement in his shoulder and must wear a brace to keep his

wrist straight. It otherwise flops limply. Gander has no feeling

in his fingers, has lost his fingernails, and must wear a glove on

his hand to prevent swelling. Gander’s useless right arm causes

him problems with minor things, like buttoning the top of his

shirt or tying his shoe laces; Gander testified that these problems

cause him to be frustrated and irritable. Moreover, attempts at

vocational rehabilitation were unsuccessful, and Gander was

discharged from Anheuser-Busch on August 31, 1987. He now

does some volunteer work at a local hospital. The trial

testimony indicated that the injury has enormcusly changed

Ganders life.

As indicated, the case was tried to a jury on theories of strict

products liability and negligence. The single verdict form sub-

mitted to the jury contained reference to both theories. Part I

required a verdict on the strict liability claim. Part II required

the jury to assess the comparative fault of the plaintiff and the

defendant in the event that it found for the plaintiff or the

negligence claim. Part III required the jury to assess total

damages. The jury found for Gander on both theories, assessed

Gander’s fault at 90%, and found total damages to be

$2,000,000.

After the jury was dismissed, however, the district court ex-

pressed doubt about whether the jury verdict was for $2,000,000

or for $200,000; i.e., $2,000,000 total damages reduced by the

90% fault assessed to Gander. The district court initially

entered judgment for $200,000. On Gander’s motion to amend

the judgment, however, the court decided that Gander was en-

titled to $2,000,000 on the strict liability claim, which could not

be reduced by Gander’s comparative fault under Missouri law.

This appeal followed.

sy

li. DISCUSSION

A. The Verdict Form

FMC argues on appeal that the district court erred both in

submitting to the jury Gander’s verdict form, which it argues

was confusing and inaccurate, and in amending judgment.

While the arguments are closely related and both ultimately turn

on whether the verdict form correctly stated Missouri law, we

treat the arguments separately.

The verdict form was submitted by Gander, and was taken

from the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions. MAI 35.15 il-

lustration (3d ed. Supp. 1989) (the form is indicated as Verdict

A, and is taken from MAI 36.01 and 37.07). The form used is

approved, at least as an illustration, by the Missouri Supreme

Court for the submission of both strict liability and negligence

claims, and was new at the time of trial. Brief for Appeilant at

9. It contains three parts,' the first dealing with the strict liabili-

' Beginning with Part I, the verdict form reads as follows:

NOTE: Complete this form as required by your verdict.

On the claim of plaintiff Todd Gander for personal injury based on

the theory of strict liability against defendant FMC/Link-Belt Cor-

poration, we, the jury, find in favor of:

ses

PART II

NOTE: Complete the following by filling in the blanks as required by

your verdict on the claim of plaintiff for personal injury based on the

claim of negligence whether or not you found in favor of plaintiff on

his claim for personal injury based on product defect. If you assess a

percentage of fault to any of those listed below, write in a percentage

not greater than 100%. Otherwise, write in ‘‘zero’’ next to that name.

If you assess a percentage of fault to any of those listed below, the

total of such percentages must be 100%.

On the claim of plaintiff for personal injury based on negligence, we,

the jury, assess percentages of fault as follows:

eS

ty claim, the second with comparative fault on the negligence

claim, and the third with total damages. The difficulty the

district court had, and the arguable error in the form, stems

from the closing note, which explains the reduction in damages

for plaintiff’s comparative fault on the negligence claim.

After the jury had been dismissed, FMC remarked that the ver-

dict appeared to be $200,000; i.e., $2,000,000 total damages

reduced by the 90% fault assessed to Gander. - Trial Transcript,

vol, 3, at 270. Gander argued that the verdict was for 12,000,000,

since the jury found for Gander on the strict liability claim, which

could not be reduced by Gander’s comparative fault. Jd. at 272.

The district court replied: ‘‘Not based on the note on part three.’’

Id. After quoting the note, the court continued: ‘‘This is direct-

ing me to reduce that by 90 percent.’’ Jd. at 274. The district

court then entered judgment for $200,000.

NOTE: If you assessed a percentage of fault to any defen-

dant on plaintiff’s claim for personal injury based on negli-

gence, the judge will reduce the total amount of plaintiff’s

damages by any percentage of fault you assess to plaintiff.

Upon Gander’s motion to amend, however, the district court

decided that it had improperly reduced the total damages by the

PART Ill

NOTE: Complete the following paragraph if you find in favor of

plaintiff on his claim for personal injury besed on product defect or if

you assessed a percentage of fault to any defendant on plaintiff’s

claim for personal injury based on negligence.

We, the jury, find the total amount of plaintiff’s damages disregard-

ing any fault on the part of plaintiff to be

ees =

NOTE: If you assessed a percentage of fault to any defendant on

plaintiff’s claim for personal injury based on negligence, the judge

will reduce the total amount of plaintiff’s damages by any percentage

of fault you assess to plaintiff.

Tom

percentage of comparative fault assessed to Gander. ‘‘In-

asmuch as this is a case in which comparative negligence prin-

ciples apply only to the jury’s determination on the negligence

claim and not to the strict liability claim, the jury’s findings as

reflected on the verdict form entitle plaintiff to a judgment in

the amount of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000).’” Memoran-

dum and Order, No. 87-1155C(6), July 13, 1988, at 2.

To the extent that FMC argues that the district court erred in

amending its judgment, we disagree. ‘“The decision to grant or

deny a Rule 59 motion is committed to the sound discretion of

the trial court.”” A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School Dist., 813 F.2d

158, 165 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Slater v.

KFC Corp., 621 F.2d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 1980). Under Missouri

law, which we are bound to apply in this diversity case, see

Walker v. Paccar, Inc., 802 F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1986), the

district court was correct in amending the judgment. Missouri

law is clear that a verdict resting on a strict liability claim cannot

be reduced by a plaintiff’s comparative fault. In Lippard v.

Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986), the Missouri

Supreme Court held that ‘‘the plaintiff’s contributory negli-

gence is not at issue in a products liability case.’’ Id. at 493. The

court explained that negligence on the part of plaintiff should

neither prohibit nor reduce plaintiff’s recovery on a strict liabili-

ty claim. ‘‘We adhere to the view that distributors of ‘defective

products unreasonably dangerous’ should pay damages for in-

juries caused by the products, without reduction because a

plaintiff may have been guilty of a degree of carelessness.’’ Jd.

at 494. As defense counsel admitted at oral argument, the judg-

ment of $200,000 under the strict liability theory was clearly

incorrect as a matter of Missouri law. Therefore, we find no

abuse of discretion by the district court.

This does not, however, end the matter. FMC’s argument is

better stated in terms of the verdict form’s correctness. That is,

the fact that the amended judgment properly reflected Missouri

law does not mean that the verdict form itself did not misstate

—_

Missouri law or unduly confuse the jury. Thus, FMC argues that

the form was incorrect as a matter of law, or, in the alternative,

that it was so confusing that the intent of the jury is unclear. The

jury may, indeed, have been misled by the closing note, which

could be read (as first read by the district court) to apply com-

parative fault to the strict liability claim as well as to the

negligence claim. On its face, the note is not specifically limited

to one negligence claim. Nor does the note specifically apply to

the strict liability claim. Because of this ambiguity, the jury, ac-

cording to FMC, may have been led to conclude that total

damages would be reduced by any percentage of fault assessed to

Gander, even though it found in Gander’s favor on the strict

liability claim. Hence, FMC argues, the jury probably intended

that Gander receive only $200,000, and thus assessed total

damages of $2,000,000 because it thought that total damages

would be reduced by 90%. We must, therefore, consider wheth-

er the verdict form is legally incorrect or unduly misleading.

While it is a close question, we do not think that the verdict

form misstates Missouri law. FMC agreed at oral argument that

the difficulty with the form stems from the closing note, which,

as indicated, can be read to require a reduction, based on plain-

tiff’s comparative fault on the negligence claim, in the strict

liability claim. Although the note leaves open this possibility, it

does not, as the district court initially thought, require it.

Because of its grammatical structure and location, the note is

somewhat misleading. The note can be read to indicate a con-

nection between a finding of contributory fault on the negli-

gence claim and a reduction in total damages. Jf the jury asses-

ses a percentage of fault to any defendant, then ‘‘the judge will

reduce’ total damages accordingly. The reduction in damages

thus can be caused by the jury assessing fault, regardless of any

finding on the strict liability claim. While this is a possible

reading of the note, it is not a required reading.

However, as a matter of law, the note is not incorrect; it is

simply unclear. Given that Missouri law is clear that the judge

—

cannot apply comparative negligence principles to the strict

liability claim, the strict liability claim will, in fact, be unaf-

fected by any percentage of fault assessed to plaintiff on the

negligence claim. The note does not require otherwise, and thus

is not legally incorrect. It does not misstate Missouri law.

The verdict form is, however, at least potentially confusing to

the jury.2, We must, therefore, consider whether the form,

taken together with the instructions to the jury, is so misleading

or confusing that the jury verdict cannot stand. In determining

whether the verdict form is confusing, we must consider it in

light of the instruction given. See United States v. Hines, 728

F.2d 421, 427 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984). It

is enough if the ‘‘charge as a whole . . . state[s] the governing

law fairly; technical imperfections or a lack of absolute clarity

will not render the instructions erroneous.’’ Toro Co. v. R&R

Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir. 1986). We find that

the jury was correctly and adequately instructed on Missouri

law, and, therefore, that the verdict form, not clearly wrong,

also is not so confusing that the jury verdict must be upset.

The important inquiry is whether the jury was properly in-

structed that damages were to be calculated regardless of any

fault assessed to plaintiff on the negligence claim. Initially, we

note that the verdict form itself is clear and correct on this mat-

ter. In Part III, in which the jury finds total damages, the form

states: ‘‘We, the jury, find the total amount of plaintiff’s

2 Although we hold that the verdict form is technically correct, and

that we cannot set aside the jury verdict in this case, we recommend

that the form not be used by the federal district courts of this circuit as

presently written. The form could be substantially clarified by simply

eliminating the concluding note, which FMC agreed at oral argument

is the main problem with the form. MAI 37.03 as written in the MAI

35.15 illustration clearly and correctly instructs the jury on the same

matters which the concluding note attempts to cover. The note is,

therefore, unnecessary. If a note is deemed to be required, several

alternative versions that clarify the problem readily come to mind.

<_< a

damages disregarding any fault on the part of plaintiff to be

__.”’ (emphasis added). This instruction that comparative

fault is not to be considered in calculating total damages is much

clearer than is any inference from the concluding note that

might lead the jury to inflate total damages in anticipation of a

reduction for plaintiff’s comparative fault on the negligence

claim. Instruction number 18 further provided that, if the jury

found in favor of Gander on the strict liability claim, or assessed

a percentage of fault to FMC on the negligence claim, then

disregarding any fault on the part of plaintiff, you must

determine the total amount of his damages to be such sum

as will fairly and justly compensate him for any damages

you believe he sustained and is reasonably certain to sus-

tain in the future as a direct result of the occurrence men-

tioned in the evidence.

Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed, through instruc-

tion number 18, that it should calculate total damages regardless

of plaintiff’s fault. ‘‘In determining the total amount of plain-

tiff’s Camages, you must not reduce such damages by any per-

centage of fault you may assess to plaintiff.’’ Instruction

number 18, see also MAI 37.03 (3d ed. 1989 Supp.). Thus, the

district court correctly instructed the jury that its function was

not to determine the amount of plaintiff’s recovery, but to de-

termine the amount of plaintiff’s total damages. Any efforts by

the jury to calculate damages in terms of plaintiff’s recovery

would be contrary to the court’s instructions. |

Not only was the jury properly instructed on its role in calcu-

lating damages, but the district court also properly instructed

the jury that comparative fault principles do not apply to strict

liability claims. Instruction number 18 provided that: ‘‘The

judge will compute any recovery on plaintiff’s claim for per-

sonal injury based on negligence by reducing the amount you

find as plaintiff’s total damages by any percentage of fault you

assess to plaintiff.’’ Instruction number 18, see also MAI 35.15

=v

illustration (3d ed. Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).’ Thus, while

the verdict form may be unclear about whether its concluding

note applies to the strict liability claim, the instructions were

quite clear that the jury finding on comparative fault does not

so apply. As a whole, the instructions correctly and specifically

instructed the jury about the ambiguities the form may have

created. Given this correct and explicit instruction, it is mere

speculation that the jury calculated total damages at $2,000,000

in anticipation of a reduction for plaintiff’s comparative fault

on the negligence claim.

Moreover, mere speculation that a jury verdict may have been

based on the jury’s own misunderstanding of the law, even

though properly instructed, is an insufficient basis on which to

upset a jury verdict. ‘‘It is well settled that a jury’s misunder-

standing of testimony, misapprehension of law, errors in compu-

tation or improper methods of computation, unsound reasoning

or other improper motives cannot be used to impeach a verdict.”’

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. v. Speth, 404 F.2d 291, 295

(8th Cir. 1968). In Speth, the jury assessed plaintiff’s con-

tributory negligence at 40% and awarded $16,000 in damages.

The district court, sua sponte, asked the jury whether its damage

award was net or gross. The jury responded that its calculation

was a net figure, compensating for plaintiff’s contributory

negligence. The jury thus intended for plaintiff to recover

$16,000. When the district court sent the jury back to recalculate

damages, it returned with a figure of $40,000. On appeal, this

court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of

damages. /d. at 296. This is not to say, however, that when a

jury verdict ‘‘on its face shows a clear disregard for the court’s in-

‘MAI 37.03, from which the illustration is drawn, differs materially

from the illustration and from the instruction given at trial. MAI

37.03 does not discuss alternate theories of liability submitted to the

jury, and thus the specific reference to Gander’s claim based on

negligence, emphasized in the text above, varies from MAI 37.03.

— A-ll —

structions,’’ id. at 295, it cannot be corrected. But given correct

instruction on the law and no clear disregard for that instruction

on the face of the verdict, a jury verdict must remain immune

from questioning by the district court and from speculation by an

appellate court that the verdict may be based on a misunder-

standing of the law. Whether the jury misunderstood a correct

instruction of the law is an improper subject for mere specu-

lation. See 6A J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice { 59.08[4], at

59-115 to 116 (1989) (‘fa verdict cannot be upset by

speculation’’); id. at 59-127 (“‘A mere suspicion, however, that

the jury has not followed the court’s instructions is not sufficient,

since that would make the verdict too vulnerable and would

needlessly prolong litigation.’’); Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

807 F.2d 486, 490 (Sth Cir. 1987) (‘‘Whether or not the jury

misunderstood the charge of the court is not a question to be

reexamined after the verdict has been rendered.’’) (citation omit-

ted).

Our holding finds support as well in the cases which, based on

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), forbid improper impeachment

of a jury verdict. While no improper impeachment occurred in

this case, Rule 606(b) establishes that it would have been im-

proper to inquire of the jurors what they really intended by their

verdict. In Karl v. Burlington Northern Ry. Co., 880 F.2d 68

(8th Cir. 1989), the jury returned a verdict in a personal injury

action in favor of plaintiff. Jd. at 69. The jury found plaintiff

to be 75% at fault, id. at 70 n.3, and assessed damages at

$273,750. The jury was instructed to assess damages ‘‘without

taking into consideration any reduction of the plaintiff’s claim

due to her own negligence.’’ Jd. at 70 n.4. The district court,

however, called the jury foreman at the request of plaintiff’s

counsel, to determine whether the jury calculated damages with-

out regard for plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Jd. at 71. The

jury foreman explained that $273,750 was 25% of what plaintiff

asked for, and was what the jury intended plaintiff to recover.

Id. The district court then amended judgment to reflect actual

damages of $1,095,000. Jd. at 72.

— A-12 —

This court reversed the amended judgment. Relying on Rule

606(b), which provides that a juror may not testify about the

jury’s thought processes during deliberations for purposes of

impeaching the verdict, we found the amendment to be impro-

per. Jd. at 73-74. The impeaching testimony concerned ‘‘how

the jury interpreted the court’s instructions, and concerns the

jurors’ ‘mental processes.’ ’’ Jd. at 74. The testimony,

therefore, violated Rule 606(b). Given that ‘‘there is no other

indication that the jury’s first verdict was deficient,’’ id. at 75,

this court remanded to reinstate the first verdict.

Similarly, while no impeachment of the jury verdict took

place in this case, any inquiry by the district court would have

been improper. Nor is there any ‘‘other indication that the

jury’s verdict was deficient.’’ We are, therefore, unwilling to

speculate that the jury, even though properly instructed, mis-

understood the law and, therefore, did not intend to award

plaintiff damages of $2,000,000. See also Scogin v. Century

Fitness, Inc., 780 F.2d 1316, 1320 (8th Cir. 1985); Peveto, 807

F.2d at 489.

Finally we find it persuasive that the evidence of damages in

this case is sufficient to support the jury’s calculation of dam-

ages of $2,000,000. The uncontradicted figures for lost wages,

past and future, provided by plaintiff’s expert witness, Viscusi,

establish damages in excess of $2,000,000. Viscusi testified that

at the contract wage for an oiler (all Anheuser-Busch oilers were

actually paid more), Gander’s lost wages for the next twenty

seven years would be $1,395,711. Trial Transcript, vol. 1, at

316. Given Gander’s substantial earnings growth of 15% for

the four years prior to the accident, id. at 307, Viscusi called this

figure “‘ludicrous.’”’ Jd. at 317. Rather, Gander’s lost wages

were more accurately reflected by considering wages for the

average oiler, and would be closer to $1,693,000. Jd. at 318.

Viscusi also gave lost wage scenarios which calculated Gander’s

wage growth at better than the rate of interest, and gave figures

ranging from $1,808,714 to $2,217,761. Jd. at 320-22. Gander’s

Pee ee

— A-13 —

counsel used these figures, together with past wage losses,

medical bills and pain and suffering, to argue for $3,000,000 in

damages. /d. vol. 3, at 234-35.‘

Nor were these figures at all excessive in light of Gander’s in-

jury. Gander’s physician testified that Gander’s right arm is

almost useless; that he has no use of his fingers, which frequent-

ly swell and develop ulcers; that he has permanent, burning pain

in his thumb, index and middle fingers, which are otherwise

numb; that he must wear a splint to support his wrist and a

glove to keep down the swelling in his hand; that his arm is sub-

ject to injury and heals slowly; that the swelling in his arm is

likely permanent; and that Gander’s arm is 95% permanently

disabled. Id. vol. 2, at 34-59.

Gander’s psychiatrist also testified that the injury has caused

substantial psychological problems. When Gander first con-

tacted the psychiatrist, he was severely depressed and suicidal,

and had to be hospitalized for treatment. Jd. at 75. The psy-

chiatrist still sees Gander monthly, and testified that his symp-

toms are in a constant state of flux. Jd. at 80. While Gander is

no longer suicidal, the scars on his body from skin grafts, nerve

and vein transpiants, and muscle harvesting are devastating to

Gander’s self-image. Jd. at 77. Gander is also easily frustrated

and irritable, suffers from insomnia, a decreased interest in in-

timacy with his wife, feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness,

and generally has a poor outlook for the future. Jd. at 90.

Moreover, the psychiatrist testified that, on the basis of psy-

chology alone, Gander should not return to work, where he

would likely be frustrated and perhaps disposed to again think

of suicide. Jd. at 84. The psychiatrist testified that Gander’s

long range outlook is poor. Jd.

* While counsel said at oral argument that Gander asked for

$4,900,000 in damages, the trial transcript contains only the

$3,000,000 figure. Trial Transcript, vol. 3, at 234-35.

— Al4 —

Thus, given the substantial evidence supporting the jury’s

calculation of damages at $2,000,000, the correct instruction of

the law, and mere speculation that the jury may have intended

to award Gander only $200,000, we cannot set aside the jury

verdict on the ground that the verdict form was unclear.

B. Income Taxes

FMC next argues that the district court erred in not permit-

ting cross-examination of Gander’s witnesses about the effect of

income taxes on Gander’s lost income. FMC first attempted to

cross-examine Viscusi, the economist who testified about

Gander’s lost wages, FMC asked Viscusi whether the figures he

was using were in terms of gross-income. Counsel then asked

whether Gander would actually get those gross dollars, to which

Gander objected. Trial Transcript, vol. 1, at 340-41. At the

bench, Gander said that under Missouri law, income tax

assessments were inappropriate subjects for cross-examination,

and that any contrary holdings from FELA cases could not app-

ly in this diversity case. Jd. at 342. FMC suggested that it

should be able to cross-examine the economist, but when asked

by the court whether the law was clear that such cross-

examination was permissible, FMC counsel responded: ‘‘I think

I can.”’ Id. at 343. The district court allowed FMC to cross-

examine on income taxes, but also said that it would grant a

mistrial if Gander were able to show that such cross-

examination was improper. Jd. at 344. FMC made no further

efforts to cross-examine Viscusi about income taxes.

The second exchange over income taxes occurred at the

bench, when FMC presented to the court Nesselrode v. Ex-

ecutive Beachcraft, Inc., 7070 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986), which

FMC said permitted cross-examination on income taxes. Trial

Transcript, vol. 2, at 2-3. The district court noted, however,

that Nesselrode made the law no clearer, and thus adhered to its

original ruling. Jd. at 4.

FMC then attemped to cross-examine Crawford, Gander’s

witness from the union. Counsel asked Crawford, who testified

— A-15 —

about wages earned by coal conveyor operators at Anheuser-

Busch, whether his figures were net or gross. Gander objected

on the basis of the previous discussions, and this time the objec-

tion was explicitly sustained. Jd. at 70-71.’

Finally, FMC tendered an instruction on reduction to present

value, which it then linked to the issue of whether the total

award was subject to income taxation. /d. vol. 3, at 214-15.

Gander objected to the instruction and the court agreed, thus

precluding FMC from arguing the taxability of the award to the

jury. Jd. at 215.° It is somewhat unclear from the objections

and the discussions at trial whether FMC appeals from the

district court’s rulings on cross-examination or from the district

court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the judgment was not

subject to income taxation. In either case, however, Missouri

law is clear that the trial court did not err in its rulings.

We must first consider the appropriate governing law, for

FMC argues in its brief that these issues are controlled by Nor-

JSolk & Western Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980) and Jones &

Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983). In Liepelt,

and FELA action, the Supreme Court considered whether the

* While the district court’s initial ruling on Gander’s first objection

to FMC’s cross-examination was to conditionally allow it subject to

the same sort of cross-examination. Thus, while Gander argued at

oral argument that FMC could not appeal from the district court’s rul-

ing in its favor, we think that FMC’s claim that it was effectively pro-

hibited from undertaking its proposed cross-examination is essentially

accurate.

* It is clear that the prior discussions related only to cross-

examination about the effects of income taxes on Gander’s lost in-

come. With reference to the present value instruction and proposed

argument on income taxes, however, FMC makes reference to

Gander’s income tax liability on the judgment, a different matter.

Trial Transcript, vol. 3, at 215. FMC may have been concerned that

the jury would inflate the judgment to compensate for income taxes if

it were not informed that the judgment is not subject to income tax.

—~Ad6 —

jury should receive both evidence of the effect of income taxes

on lost wages and an instruction on the taxability of a final

award. As to the effects of taxes on a lost income stream, the

Supreme Court held that such evidence was neither too

speculative nor complex for a modern jury to understand, and

thus, was proper to establish after-tax earnings. Liepelt, 444

U.S. at 494. The Supreme Court also held that it was error to

refuse to give an instruction that the final award was not subject

to income tax. Jd. at 498.’ FMC argues that these cases

establish that the district court erred in its rulings.‘

Thése cases, however, are not controlling. We have

specifically held, in Adams v. Fuqua Indus., 820 F.2d 271 (8th

Cir. 1987), that Liepelt does not control in non-FELA cases. In

Adams, appellant argued that the rationale of Liepelt

transcends the FELA context and that it should, therefore, app-

ly in diversity actions. Jd. at 276. This court rejected the argu-

ment, and, in considering an instruction on the taxability of an

award, held that: ‘‘Whether to give or withhold a taxability in-

struction is a question of state law, which we are bound to

follow.’’ Id. at 277. More generally, the law is perfectly clear

that ‘‘when a tort action is brought in federal court pursuant to

diversity jurisdiction, basing liability on state law, the court

must apply state law in regard to availability and computation

of damages.’’ Jd. (quoting Losey v. North American Philips

Consumer Electronics Corp., 792 F.2d 58, 61-62 (6th Cir.

’ The Supreme Court relied in part on the Missouri case, Dempsey

v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). The approved in-

struction was as follows: ‘‘Your award will not be subject to any in-

come taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the

amount of your award.”’ Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 492.

* Jones & Laughlin essentially follows Liepelt, and holds that in

calculating a lost income stream, income tax evidence is appropriate.

**Since the damages award is tax-free, the relevant stream is ideally of

after-tax wages and benefits. Jones & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 534.

_

— A-17 —

(1986)). Moreover, this court in Adams specifically rejected a

Seventh Circuit case’ which applied Liepe/t in a diversity case.

We defer instead to ‘‘Missouri’s right to create its own law free

from federal interference.’’ Adams, 820 F.2d at 278. Thus, we

apply Missouri law. ,

Missouri law is clear that it is not error for a court to refuse to

give an instruction that an award is not subject to income taxa-

tion. At one time, Missouri law favored such an instruction. In

Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), an

FELA case, defendant argued error in the court’s refusal to give

an instruction that no income tax would be assessed on the judg-

ment. Jd. at 43-44. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, find-

ing no reason not to give the instruction, especially given the

danger that the jury could incorrectly overcompensate for taxes

on the judgment. It was, therefore, error to refuse the instruc-

tion. Jd. at 45. More recent Missouri cases, however, establish

that Dempsey has been superseded by Missouri Approved Jury

Instructions (MAI) outside of the FELA context, and that it is

not error to refuse such an instruction.

The Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed several decisions on

this issue in Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218

(Mo. Ct. App. 1981). Noting that Dempsey was an FELA case

and was decided before the Missouri Approved Jury Instruc-

tions were approved by the Missouri Supreme Court, the court

explained its ruling in Senter v. Ferguson, 486 S.W.2d 644 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1972), in which the court held that it was error to give

the same instruction given in Dempsey. In Tennis, the court ex-

plained that Senter was a post-MAI case, and that MAI 4.01,

not Dempsey, controlled the instruction issue in a non-FELA

case. MAI 4.01, the only permissible and authorized damage in-

struction in a non-FELA case, explicitly did not incorporate the

* In re Air Crash Disaster, 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

464 U.S. 866 (1983).

— A-18 —

Dempsey FELA instruction. Thus, to give the instruction

would be error, since the instruction is ‘‘clearly an addition to or

‘modification’ of MAI 4.01.’’ Tennis,-625 S.W.2d at 226.

Moreover, the second edition of MAI did not include the Demp-

sey instruction even in its damage instructions for FELA cases,

MAI 8.01 and 8.02. Following the Supreme Court decision in

Liepelt, however, both FELA instructions were modified in the

third edition to contain the charge that ‘‘ ‘any award you may

make is not subject to income tax.’ ”’ Jd. at 227. ‘‘It seems wor-

thy of note that although FELA instructions MAI 8.01 and 8.02

‘ were changed in the 3rd Edition of MAI in compliance with

Norfolk, MAI [4.01] has not been altered nor amended to in-

clude a direction that any awarded damages are ‘not subject iv

income tax.’ ’’ Id. Thus, in Tennis, the Missouri Court of Ap-

peals found no error in the lower court’s refusal to give the in-

struction in a non-FELA case.

Again, in Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83 (Mo.

1985), appellant argued error in the court’s refusal to give a

similar instruction. Jd. at 96. The Missouri Supreme Court

reviewed the law, and affirmed the lower court. ‘‘The trial

court here cannot be convicted of error, requiring a new trial, in

following the established law of this state.’’ Jd. at 96.

Thus, to the extent that FMC presented the court with an in-

struction that the judgment would not be subject to income tax-

ation, we find no error in the district court’s refusal to give such

an instruction.

Missouri law is somewhat less clear, however, regarding the

admissibility of evidence relating to the effects of income tax on

a lost-income stream. The controlling case appears to be Demp-

sey. In Dempsey, defendant argued on appeal that the trial

court had erred in refusing to permit defendant to cross-

examine plaintiff’s witness about the effects of income tax on a

personal injury award. Dempsey, 251 S.W.2d at 43. The

Missouri Supreme Court held that:

— A-19 —

The trial court did not err either in refusing to permit

defendant to cross-examine plaintiff’s actuarial witness

relative to income tax liability or in refusing to permit

defendant to argue to the jury that in arriving at the

amount of its award it should consider only the amount of

future earnings lost to plaintiff after deduction of income

taxes for which he would have been liable had he continued

his employment without injury.

Id. at 45. While it is unclear as to whether FMC’s attempted

cross-examination concerned Gander’s tax liability on the

award or the effects of income taxes on lost income, the

Missouri court’s reference to defendant’s proposed argument is

exactly on point. This is precisely what FMC attempted to do in

this case, and it is this point of law about which FMC admitted

to the district court that it was uncertain. To the extent that

Dempsey is the controlling law, the district court did not err in

refusing FMC’s proposed cross-examination.

The issue is somewhat clouded, however, by Nesselrode, 707

S.W.2d 371. FMC argues that in Nesselrode the Missouri

Supreme Court explicitly found the sort of cross-examination

that FMC attempted to be permissible. By implication, FMC

argues that Nesselrode silently overrules the precise holding of

Dempsey which found no error in refusing exactly the sort of

cross-examination FMC attempted. We do not agree that

Nesselrode controls this case.

Indeed, whether a defendant can cross-examine about the ef-

fects of income taxes on plaintiff’s lost income stream was not

even at issue in Nesselrode. Rather, the context in which the

court makes the reference to cross-examination on which FMC

relies concerns a dispute about the reduction of lost income to

present value. Both parties in Nesselrode argued error in failing

to establish the present value of plaintiff’s lost income. Specifi-

cally, defendant argued that the court should not have allowed

the jury to consider a table indicating plaintiff’s lost income,

E =

since the table contained no reductions to present value. /d. at

385-86. The Missouri Supreme Court characterized the issue

even more narrowly. It found the issue to be whether defendant

could object to the trial court’s ruling on plaintiff’s presentation

of lost income when defendant itself failed to present any

evidence of present value. Jd. at 387. ‘

In this context, the court mentioned in passing that while

defendant did not challenge plaintiff’s presentation of present

value, defendant did challenge plaintiff’s claim for damages.

‘*This was done by presenting evidence in connection with dece-

dent’s history of health problems, questioning the three

daughters’ monetary reliance on decedent, and by pointing out

through cross-examination that decedent’s projected stream of

lost-income does not take into consideration his income tax

obligations.’’ Id. at 388 (emphasis added). We do not believe

that this passing reference to cross-examination can be inter-

preted in such a way as to overrule Dempsey. The propriety of

the cross-examination was not at issue in Nesselrode and was

not addressed by the court. Nor, apparently, was the cross-

examination in Nesselrode the subject of an objection by plain-

tiff’s counsel at trial. This language in Nesselrode, then, is just

a mere, isolated reference in passing to the sort of cross-

examination attempted by FMC. This same sort of cross-

examination, by contrast, was specifically addressed in Demp-

sey. FMC presented no persuasive law to the district court in

support of such cross-examination, and it likewise presents none

here. Thus, we find no error in the district court’s ruling.

Ill. CONCLUSION

We have considered FMC’s other arguments on appeal and

find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated, we affirm

the judgment of the district court.

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

— is —

The majority acknowledges that the note at the end of the

verdict form was confusing; so confusing, in fact, that the

district judge read it one way at trial, only to reach a radically

different interpretation a few months later. The majority even

goes so far as to recommend that the form as it is now written

not be used in future cases. Nevertheless, the court is unable to

conclude that use of the form was improper here.

If the district court had given an appropriate instruction that

the plaintiff’s fault would not reduce his recovery under the

strict liability claim, I might be less concerned about the verdict

form. The majority points out that the trial judge instructed the

jury to find the total amount of damages ‘‘disregarding any

fault on the part of the plaintiff’’ and that the jury was told the

plaintiff's recovery for negligence would be reduced by the

percentage of his fault. These directives, however, provided no

guidance on whether the plaintiff’s fault would affect his

recovery under the strict liability claim. The jury could have

understood and followed all of its instructions and still have

logically interpreted the note on the verdict form to mean that

the plaintiff’s recovery under strict liability would be reduced by

the percentage of his fault. In these circumstances, I do not

believe that the ‘‘charge as a whole . . . state[d] the governing

law fairly.”’ Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208,

1215 (8th Cir. 1986).

There is another troublesome aspect to this case. The majori-

ty summarily dismisses without discussing the defendant’s argu-

ment that the district court should have defined the term

‘*defective condition’’ in instructing the jury regarding the strict

liability theory. The trial judge described in explicit detail what

would constitute negligence on the part of the defendant and the

plaintiff. See, e.g., Instruction No. 14 (instructing jury to assess

a percentage of fault to the defendant if at the time the coal con-

veyor was sold, the conveyor ‘‘had an in-running nip point and

shear edge at the transfer chute and was therefore dangerous

when put to a use reasonably anticipated’’); Instruction No. 16

— A-22 —

(‘‘The term ‘negligent’ or ‘negligence’ as used in these instruc-

tions with respect to Todd Gander means the failure to use that

degree of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent coal con-

veyor operator would use under the same or similar cir-

cumstances.’’). In contrast, the district court gave no descrip-

tion of what facts would warrant a finding that the conveyor

was sold in a ‘‘defective condition,’’ as required by the strict

liability theory. Given that the district court’s ultimate decision

regarding the plaintiff’s recovery was based on the outcome of

the strict liability claim without any regard to jury’s findings on

the negligence cause of action, it is ironic that the jury had such

explicit instructions regarding what particular facts would con-

stitute negligence while being left with no guidance at all regard-

ing the definition of a ‘‘defective condition.’”’

Concededly it might be permissible for a trial judge not to

give an instruction regarding the definition of a ‘‘defective con-

dition’’ in a single issue products liability action involving a sim-

ple consumer good. Yet I cannot agree that a jury may be left

with no guidance at all on the definition in a case involving fac-

tory equipment with which few typical jurors can be expected to

be familiar, and in a case where negligence is defined and the

jury can infer from the verdict form that recovery on either

negligence, strict liability, or both will be reduced by the percen-

tage of plaintiff’s fault.

' The Missouri Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that the

Missouri approved jury instructions (MAJ) require that the jury not be

given a definition of ‘‘defective condition.’’ See Nesselrode v. Ex-

ecutive Beachcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 378 & n.11 (Mo. 1986) (en

banc); see also Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d

828, 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). We have held, however, the MAI pro-

vide only guidance, not binding authority, for the giving of instruc-

tions in a federal diversity case. See, e.g., Bersett v. K-Mart Corp.,

869 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1989); cf. Cowens v. Siemens-Elema

AB, 837 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that

Nesselrode reasoning prohibited the district court in a diversity case

from defining the term ‘‘unreasonably dangerous’’ as used in a strict

liability instruction).

— A-23 —

I recognize that the plaintiff suffered a grievous injury that

might warrant a two-million dollar damage award. I am con-

cerned, however, that the award be the result of a verdict which

is free of the taints that affect the one here. Thus, I would

reverse and remand for a new trial.

A true copy.

Attest:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

ack Ren

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

No: 87-1155C(6)

Todd Gander,

Plaintiff,

vs.

FMC Corporation,

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

(Filed July 13, 1988)

This action came before the Court and jury with the parties

having appeared in person and by their respective attorneys.

The issues were duly tried and the jury rendered its verdict on

March 15, 1988.

WHEREAS, on the claim of plaintiff, Todd Gander, for per-

sonal injuries based on the theory of strict liablity/product

defect against defendant FMC Corporation, the jury returned a

verdict in favor of plaintiff, Todd Gander.

WHEREAS, on the claim of plaintiff, Todd Gander, for per-

sonal injuries based on the theory of negligence, the jury assess-

ed percentages of fault as follows: to defendant FMC Corpora-

tion - 10%; to plaintiff Todd Gander - 90%.

WHEREAS, the jury further found the total damages of

plaintiff, Todd Gander, to be TWO MILLION DOLLARS

($2,000,000.00).

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and

DECREED on plaintiff’s claim for personal injury based on the

theory of strict liability/ product defect, that the plaintiff, Todd

— A-25 —

Gander, have and recover from defendant, FMC Corporation,

the sum of TWO MILLION DOLLARS ($2,000,000.00),

together with court costs.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby further ORDERED, ADJUDG-

ED and DECREED that plaintiff, Todd Gander, on his claim

for personal injuries based on the theory of negligence, have

and recover from defendant FMC Corporation, the sum of

TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($200,000.00),

together with court costs.

It is further ORDERED that the amount of damages

recoverable under that portion of this JUDGMENT based on

the negligence theory shall not be in addition to the amount of

damages recoverable under that portion of this JUDGMENT

based on the theory of strict liability/product defect.

SO ORDERED:

/s/ George F. Gunn, Jr.

District Judge

DATE: 7/13/88

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