Appendix — Patterson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Supreme Court brief1990
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the Un
OCTOBER TERM, 1989
>
TODD PATTERSON
Petitioner,
—_vV.—_—
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE, an un-
known employee of the United States Government and
JOHN DOE AGENCY, an unknown agency of the United
States Government
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Frank Askin, Esq.
(Counsel of Record)
Rutgers School of Law
Constitutional Litigation Clinic
iS Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
(201) 648-5687
on behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union of
New Jersey
|
7
=
APPER OT 2
E
TABL F CONTENTS
OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT DATED
JANUARY 8, 1990, AFFIRMING DISTRICT
COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
DEFERUANT Osc ccccesececseeeeecececeseseee la
OPINION OF DISTRICT COURT DATED
FEBRUARY 7, 1989, GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS ON ALL COUNTS
OF PLALNTIFY’S COMPLAINT. cc ccccaccvees 21a
OPINION AND ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT
DATED AUGUST 16, 1989, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO VACATE THE COURT’S ENTRY OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD... cccsccceses 85a
OPINION AND ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT DATED
MARCH 30, 1989, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION « csc cccvesscecccuene 90a
DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT DATED
FEBRUARY 7, 1990, DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND REHEARING IN BANC....... 93a
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING IN
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
UNDER RULE 60(b), OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD ON APPEAL....... 127a
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECURSO LUC MRL EON 6 5 8 ee eee eee héeeneeue 133a
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION........ 136a
PLAINTIFF’S LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 16,
1989, IN RESPONSE TO THE DISTRICT COURT’S
REQUEST FOR CORRECTIONS OF ITS OPINION
DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1989 GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS .....-cceeeccces 143a
EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
HELD ON DECEMBER 15, 1988......cceeee 147a
PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT... .cccccccccccccccce 184a
AFFIDATE OF TODD PATTERSON........... 198a
AFFIDAVIT OF BETSY SUE ROUGHGARDEN
PATTERSON. .ccccsccccceesccecesscsssees 205a
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
WITH DEFENDANT’S RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS
TO INTERROGATORIES ATTACHED.......... 21lla
COMPLAINT... cccccccccccccsccccssccccce 248a
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS... cc cccccccccccsccscvssases 266a
la
Filed: January 8, 1990
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 89-5342 and 89-5781
TODD PATTERSON, A MINOR suing by his
father, EDGAR PATTERSON
VS.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE,
an unknown employee of the United States
Government and JOHN DOE AGENCY, an unknown
agency of the United States Government
Todd Patterson
Appellant in Nos. 89-5342
and No. 89-5781
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 88-2319)
Argued
November 9, 1989
Before: MANSMANN and GREENBERG,
Circuit Judges, and
2a
GAWTHROP, District Judge.*
Opinion filed: January 8,
(* Honorable Robert S. Gawthrop,
1990
III, of
the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
by designation.)
Frank Askin, Esq. (ARGUED)
Rutgers Constitutional Law
15 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Susan C. Cassell, Esq.
U.S. Attorney’s Office
970 Broad Street, Room 502
Newark, New Jersey 07102
COUNSEL FOR ALL APPELLEES
Douglas Letter, Esq. (ARGUED)
Robert E. Kopp, Esq.
Department of Justice
Civil division, Room 3617
9th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
sitting
COUNSEL FOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
OPINION OF THE COURT
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.
3a
These appeals were born of the
ambitious efforts of a sixth grade
elementary school student who, in the
lawful exercise of his constitutional
rights, caused himself to be the subject
of an investigation by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation ("FBI"). The appeals
constitute yet another illustration of the
competing need for disclosure of
information by government agencies and the
need to prevent injury to the national
security.
Todd Patterson ("Todd") appeals from
the district court’s orders granting
summary judgment to the FBI and denying
his post-trial motion filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).1
1. The appeals, filed separately from
each order, were consolidated for
4a
We hold that the information Todd seeks
from the federal agency was properly
exempt from disclosure. Therefore, we
will affirm the judgment of the district
s
court.
In 1983, Todd, then a sixth grade
elementary school student, embarked on a
precocious endeavor to write an
encyclopedia of the world as part of a
school project. Deciding that his
school’s resources were inadequate, Todd
wrote to 169 countries requesting
information. Significantly, Todd enclosed
much of this correspondence in envelopes
bearing the return address of Laboratory
disposition by order of the Clerk.
5a
Disposable Products, a business Todd’s
parents operated from their home.
The flood of international
correspondence engendered by the project
attracted the attention of the FBI by
means and methods undisclosed by the FBI.
In late 1983, an FBI agent appeared
unannounced at Todd’s home. The agent
spoke to Todd’s parents concerning Todd’s
activities and was shown the
correspondence received in response to
Todd’s requests. Soon after the visit,
Todd contacted the FBI agent and spoke
with him regarding the school project and
the information requests to other
countries.
As a result of the school project and
6a
the visit by the FBI agent, the FBI came
to maintain a file on Todd.2 The file
contained a directive for the FBI’s Newark
Lon to conduct an appropriate
fa)
tigation of Laboratory Disposable
& ‘.cts in accordance with Attorney
suidelines. Also included in the
[Ss a memorandum, prepared on or about
3, 1984, that changed the
~
—
subject heading from "Laboratory
Disposable Products" to "Todd Patterson."
The memorandum contains a description of
Todd’s project and states "Newark indices
as well as local criminal checks negative
2. The parties dispute the actual
number of files. It is clear from the
record that at least one file was created.
Todd, however, insists that at least six
files exist. This was also the district
court’s conclusion.
7a
on subject" and "(ijn view of the above,
Newark contemplates no further
investigation in this matter." 705
F.Supp. 1033, 1037 (D.N.J. 1989).
The FBI maintains that it conducted
no further investigation after 1983.3
However, a document released by the FBI
dated December 5, 1985, along with five
attachments not released, demonstrate that
as of that date some entity of the United
States Government continued to monitor
Todd’s activities. Todd insists that
surveillance remained in effect because he
continued to receive pieces of mail in
3. Todd subsequently received an
invitation from the Soviet Mission in New
York to visit their facility, which he did
after voluntarily contacting the FBI. He
was requested to and did contact the FBI
following his visit.
8a
damaged condition. In addition, Todd and
his parents report hearing strange
background noises on their telephones
Since 1983.
In April, 1987, Todd requested,
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), access to
records the F.B.I. in Washington, D.C.
might be maintaining on him. Todd was
informed that the information he requested
was exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (1) and 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2).
Todd appealed the denial of his FOIA
request to the Department of Justice,
Office of Information and Privacy, where
the determination was upheld. Thereafter,
Todd filed a second FOIA request, this
time directed to the FBI’s Newark Field
>
9a
Office.4
In May 1988, Todd initiated a civil
Suit against defendants FBI, John Doe (an
unknown employee of the United States
Government), and John Doe Agency (an
unknown agency of the United States
Government). Todd sought injunctive
relief, damages, and disclosure of the
requested documents. The complaint
presented three distinct causes of action:
(1) failure to comply with FOIA; (2)
violations of the Privacy Act; and (3)
violation of Todd’s First and Fourth
Amendment rights and of 18 U.S.C. § 1702
4. FOIA requests made to the FBI are
limited to files maintained at either the
FBI headquarters or the individual field
office where the request is made.
Appellee’s brief at 27.
10a
and 19 U.S.C. § 482, statutes relating to
the U.S. Mail.
The FBI responded initially to the
complaint by offering to expunge Todd’s
name from its records. The offer was
never accepted. ° Thereafter, the FBI
filed a motion for summary judgment on the
first and second causes of action,
reasserting that the requested information
was exempt from disclosure. As to the
third cause of action, the FBI moved to
dismiss pursuant of Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b) (2). Following oral argument on the
motion and in camera review of the
withheld documents, the district court
5. The FBI indicated at oral argument
that the offer remained open. Todd’s
position, voiced by his attorney, was that
he was unwilling to accept the offer
without first reviewing the documents.
lla
granted summary judgment to the FBI on
February 7, 1989, on all three causes of
action.© 705 F.Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1989).
Todd thereafter filed a motion, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), to vacate the
judgment or in the alternative to
supplement the record which was denied by
the district court on August 18, 1989. We
have jurisdiction to review the grant of a
motion for summary judgment and the denial
of a Rule 60(b) motion pursuant to 28
U.8.-C. § 3291.
ye
6. Because it had considered matters
outside the pleading, the district court
considered the motion to dismiss the third
cause of action as one for summary
judgment. See infra part II.C.
12a
Todd challenges the procedures
employed by the district court in its
adjudication of the alleged FOIA
violation. In particular, Todd contents
that the record does not justify the
district court’s use of an in camera
affidavit and its further in camera
examination of withheld documents.
In Lame v. United States Dept. of
Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 922 (3d Cir. 1981),
we expressly authorized the use of in
camera affidavits and submissions. We
noted that in the ordinary case, "a Vaughn
index correlating justifications for non-
disclosure with the particular portions of |
the documents requested will generally
suffice to narrow the disputed issues and
permit a reasoned disposition by the
13a
district court." Lame, 484 F.2d 820, 827
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
977 (1974).7
However, there are cases, albeit
unusual, where the preparation of a
detailed Vaughn index would require an
agency to disclose the very information
that it seeks to withhold. Under these
circumstances, we require an agency to
Submit a public affidavit setting forth,
in as detailed terms as possible, the
basis for the claimed exemption. Lame,
654 F.2d at 921. The district court must
strive to make the public record as
7. A Vaughn index is an affidavit
which supplies an index cf withheld
documents and details the agency’s
justification for claiming exemption. See
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
ae)
l4a
complete as possible, soliciting as much
information as can be willingly released
by the agency. If, however, "the agency
is unable to articulate publicly the
specific disclosure it fears and the
specific harm that would ensue, then in
camera inspection of a more detailed
affidavit must be resorted to." See Ferri
Vv. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, i224 (36 €3aF.
1981), opinion modified, 671 F.2d 768 (3d
Cir. 1982); Phillippi v. Central
Intelligence Agency, 546 F.2d 1009, 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1976). Moreover, to the extent
that any public affidavits may appear
sufficiently descriptive, it may
nonetheless be necessary for the district
court to examine the withheld documents in
15a
Camera to determine whether the agency
properly characterized the information as
exempt. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(4)(B); Lame 654
F.2d at 921; Ferri, 645 F.2d at 1222; see
also Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1012 (FOIA
clearly contemplates that courts will
resolve fundamental issues in contested
cases on the basis of in camera
examination of relevant documents).
We believe the procedural events in
the case sub judice are in accord with
those procedures outlined above. In
seeking discovery from the FBI, Todd
propounded interrogatories questioning,
inter alia, the internal investigatory
procedures of the FBI and the identities
of the persons and agencies assigned to
Todd’s case. The FBI provided answers to
16a
a few of the interrogatories, however, in
most instances it claimed exemption from
disclosure under the states military
secrets privilege and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1)
and § 552(b)(7)(c) of the FOIA. In
support of its claim of privilege, the FBI
submitted the public affidavits of Special
Agents Lieberman, Thomas, and Thorton.
The purpose of the Thomas affidavit was to
provide the district court with a Vaughn
index for the records requested by Todd
and withheld by the FBI. Lieberman’s
affidavit describes the withheld documents
and sets forth justifications for those
withholdings under the FOIA. Lastly, the
Thorton affidavit states that the
Patterson premises had never been the
17a
subject of electronic surveillance and the
FBI was innocent of opening intercepting
any mail directed to the Pattersons.
Ostensibly, the district court found
that these affidavits constituted
sufficient proof of the privileged nature
of the withheld information, for it was
not until after oral argument on the FBI’s
motion for summary judgment that in camera
inspection was ordered. Indeed, the
district court’s order directing the ex
parte review indicated the following:
because certain issues were raised in
Oral argument that were not
adequately addressed in the
Supporting papers, I have concluded
that in camera inspection of certain
withheld documents is required in
order for this Court to assure itself
that the FBI has acted in good faith
with regard to its investigation of
Todd Patterson, that the FBI complied
with all relevant government
18a
regulations, and that the FBI engaged
in no illegal conduct.
This in camera review was necessary with
respect to only two documents.
The FBI complied with the order by
submitting all of the unredacted documents
at issue as well as the declaration of
James Geer, the FBI Assistant Director in
charge of the Intelligence Division.
Geer’s declaration was provided as "an
explanatory affidavit that goes into more
detail than the public affidavits." The
FBI also filed publicly the Declaration
and Claim of Privilege of Attorney General
Thornburgh so as to assert formally the
state secrets privilege.§8
8. The state secrets privilege was
first recognized in United States v.
Reynolds, 354 U.S. 1 (1953). As explained
by the Court,
[i]t may be possible to satisfy the
19a
Thus, the public record consisted of
certain redacted documents initially
released by the FBI, a few answers to
interrogatories, and four affidavits. Not
surprisingly, these materials did not
allay Todd’s interest in the FBI’s files.
Under the circumstances, however, we
believe the public submissions represent a
good faith effort by the FBI to provide as
much access to the information as
court, from all the circumstances of
the case, that there is a reasonable
danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters
which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged.
When this is the case, the occasion
for the privilege is appropriate, and
the court should not jeopardize the
security which the privilege is meant
to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by
the judge alone, in chambers.
345 U.S. at 10.
20a
possible. We can appreciate Todd’s
objections to the anomalous situation of
having to defend against a motion for
summary judgment without being privy to
the very documents necessary for such a
defense. The Court of Appeals of the D.c.
Circuit, which has considered a
Significant number of FOIA cases, has
commented on how this "lack of knowledge
by the party seeing [sic] disclosure
seriously distorts the traditional
adversary nature of our legal system’s
form of dispute resolution." Vaughn, 484
F.2d at 824.9 However, the remedy for the
9. We note that notwithstanding this
imbalance between the parties, the D.C.
Circuit, as well as other circuits, have
allowed the use of in camera affidavits in
national security cases. See e.gq.,
Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intern.,
Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985);
2la
unfairness is an in camera examination by
the trial court of the withheld documents
and any supporting or explanatory
affidavits. Inasmuch as the record was
made as complete as possible in this
instance, we hold that the proper
predicates for accepting records and
affidavits in camera were satisfied in
this case.
Irrespective of the district court’s
in camera review, Todd argues that summary
judgment should not have been granted
because the FBI failed to sustain its
burden to show the sensitive nature of its
Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 279 (6th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983); and Hayden v. N.S.A., 608 F.2d
L382: -{0. €... Ca. 3979) 3
22a
withheld documents. In reviewing the
grant of summary judgment in proceedings
seeking disclosure of records under the
FOIA, this court’s scope of review is two-
fold: we must determine whether the
district court had an adequate factual
basis for its decision and whether its
conclusion was clearly erroneous. Cuccaro
v. Secretary of Labor, 770 F.2d 355 (3d
Cir. 1985); Lame v. United States Dept. of
Justice, 767 F.2d 66 (1985).
The FBI invoked two exemptions in
support of its denial of Todd’s FOIA
request. The first exemption provides
that documents which are "specifically
required by Executive Order to be kept
secret in the interest of the national
defense of foreign policy," are exempt
23a
from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b) (1) (1982). In support of its
position, the FBI submitted the Thomas
affidavit which identifies the relevant
Executive Order in this case as being the
Executive Order on National Security
Information, No. 12356, 3 C.F.R. 166
(1983). Reviewing the Thomas affidavit in
conjunction with Executive Order 12356,
the district court found, and we agree,
that the FEI adhered to the procedural
requirements of the Executive Order when
the withheld FOIA material was classified.
Next, the affidavit indicates that
the documents sought by Todd contain
information made eligible for
Classification by § 1.3(a)(4) of the
24a
Executive Order. Particularly, §
1.3(a) (4) provides that information shall
be considered for classification if it
concerns "intelligence activities
(including special activities), or
intelligence sources or methods." 3
C.F.R. 169. This section must be read in
conjunction with § 1.3(b):
Information that is determined to
concern one or more of the categories
in Section 1.3(a) shall be classified
when an original classification
authority also determines that its
unauthorized disclosure, either by
itself or in the context of other
information, reasonably could be
expected to cause damage to the
national security.
The remainder of the affidavit
includes Thomas’ description of the
documents, the location of the classified
OL
25a
portions, and his assertions that the
material satisfies the classification
criteria of § 1.3(a)(4) and ultimately
presents a threat to the national
security. The district court found
Thomas’ assertions deficient in only two
respects. The district court found his
references to Documents No. 4 and 5 to be
unduly vague and repetitive. Upon in
Camera inspection of the material,
however, the court was convinced that
release of the withheld material
reasonable could be expected to cause
damage to the national security.
We conducted our own in camera review
of the documents and accompanying Geer
affidavit, mindful that when dealing with
documents to which § 552(b)(1) applies
26a
courts are expected to accord "substantial
weight" to the agency’s affidavit. See
American Friends Serv. Com. v. Department
of Defense, 831 F.2d 441, 444 (3d Cir.
1987); see also S. Rep. No. 1200, 93d
Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6267,
6290. We find that the district court’s
decision has an adequate factual basis and
even on a plenary review we agree with
it.10
The second exemption invoked by the
FBI was § 552(b)(7) fc), which exempts from
disclesure:
10. On the basis of our in camera
review of the documents we have no
hesitation in stating that there is
nothing derogatory in them regarding Todd
Or any member of his family.
27a
(7) investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production
of such records would...
(c)constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy...
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(c).
In considering this claim, the
district court was required to engage in a
de novo balancing test: "weighing the
public benefit which would result from the
disclosure against the privacy interest
and the extent to which it is invaded."
Cuccaro, 770 F.2d at 359. In view of its
finding that the FBI had not participated
in any illegal conduct, the district court
concluded that only a negligible benefit
would inure to the public by releasing the
names of FBI personnel. As a result of
our independent examination of the
28a
documents, we find that the district
court’s conclusion is correct.
Todd also maintains that the blanket
exemption from release of the requested
documents and the Geer affidavit was
overbroad, and that all segregable, non-
sensitive portions of the withheld
documents should have been released. Our
rule in this circuit is that, in response
to a FOIA request, "[a]ny reasonably
segregable, non-exempt portion of a record
is to be made available to the person
requesting that record." Lame, 654 F.2d
at 921. In this case, the FBI did release
certain papers in which extensive
redaction was necessary. Those documents
completely withheld were simply
inappropriate for partial redaction,
29a
except in one instance. The Geer
affidavit contains some non-classified
portions which could have been disclosed.
Responding to questions propounded by this
court at oral argument, the FBI admitted
that the entire Geer affidavit need not
have been withheld. However, the FBI
explained that the non-classified parts otf
that document were available to Todd and
disclosure would be made upon request. We
are not convinced that earlier disclosure
of these non-classified parts would have
affected the outcome of the case. Future
disclosure will at least assuage some of
Todd’s curiosity.11
11. The district court denied Todd’s
request to have his attorney present at
the in camera proceedings. Although Todd
alleges error on appeal, we find that the
issue merits no further discussion.
30a
B.
Todd argues that the FBI violated his
rights under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552a(e) (7) by collecting information about
his protected correspondence with foreign
governments and by maintaining records of
his protected activity in permanent,
retrievable files indexed to his name.
The FBI counters with the assertion that
under § 552a(e)(7) of the Act the
requested records are exempt from
disclosure.l2 Concluding that the record:
12. The FBI’s counter-argument in the
district court was that its central record
system is exempt under § 552a(j)(2). The
district court rejected this contention,
finding that the FBI had failed to show
that its records on Todd were compiled
specifically for purposes of a criminal]
investigation. This particular argument
has been abandoned by the FBI on appeal.
3la
were entitled to exemption, the district
court granted the FBI summary judgment on
the second cause of action of Todd’s
complaint.
Our scope of review of the district
court’s determination with respect to
disclosure under the Privacy Act on
summary judgment is the same as that
utilized initially by the district court.
We must decide whether there exists a
genuine issue as to any material fact in
dispute, assuming resolution of any
disputed fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion, and determine whether
the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Cuccaro, 770 F.2d at
JD «
32a
Initially, and as a question of first
impression in this circuit, we must
interpret the meaning of a portion of §
552a(e) (7). Section 552a(e)(7) prohibits
federal agencies from maintaining records
"describing how any individual exercises
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment
unless expressly authorized by statute or
by the individual about whom the record is
maintained or unless pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized law
enforcement activitity." 5 U.S.C. §
552a(e) (7) (emphasis added). The precise
meaning of the emphasized portion is not
defined by the statute itself. The
district court compared the decisions of
other circuits which have interpreted this
particular section and adopted a rule
33a
requiring agencies "to demonstrate that
any and all records maintained on an
individual’s exercise of First Amendment
rights are relevant to an authorized law
enforcement activity of the agency, an
that there exists a sufficient basis for
the maintenance of such records." 705
F.Supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original).
It is this definition that the parties now
dispute. Todd argues that agencies should
be made to show a "substantial
relationship" between the records and the
government activity. He insists that a
"relevancy" standard acts to dilute his
First Amendment rights.
Congress’s intent, as revealed in the
statute’s legislative history, is for §
34a
552a(e) (7) to prevent "collection of
protected information not immediately
needed, about law-abiding Americans, on
the off-chance that Government or the
particular agency might possibly have to
deal with them in the future." S. Rep.
No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
6916, 697. The history also instructs:
that the kind of information about
individuals which an agency seeks to
gather or solicit, and the criteria
for programs to investigate
individuals will be judged by an
official at the highest policy making
level to be relevant and necessary to
a statutory purpose of the agency.
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6916,
6960 (emphasis added).
Only four court of appeals have
expressed an opinion as to the standard
35a
warranted when evaluating a claim under §
552a(e)(7). The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has held that Section
(e)(7) is violated "to the extent that the
[agency] has engaged in the practice of
collecting protected information,
unconnected to any investigation of past,
present or anticipated violation of the
statutes which it is authorized to
enforce..." Clarkson v. I.R.S., 678 F.2d
1368, 1375 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1031 (1987). A case-by-case
analysis of whether an agency’s actions
were pertinent to authorized law
enforcement activity was adopted by the
court in MacPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d
479 (9th Cir. 1986). Section (e)(7) was
interpreted by the Sixth Circuit as
36a
allowing “investigation with respect to
the exercise of first amendment rights if
such investigation is relevant to an
authorized criminal investigation or to an
authorized intelligence or administrative
one." Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272,
279 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. Genied 464 U.S.
863 (1983) (emphasis added). The Jabara.
standard was adopted in Nagel v. U.S.
Dept. of Heaith, Education and Welfare,
725 Ff. 28 1436, 1441 2.3 (9.6. Cir. 1984).
In our view, a relevancy standard is
more consistent with Congress’s intent and
will prove to be a more manageable
standard than employing one based on ad-
hoc review. The weight of authority
supports a rule requiring a federal agency
37a
to establish some nexus between its files
and classified activities. A burden as
heavy as that suggested by Todd has never
been imposed. We, therefore, hold that a
federal agency defending its maintanance
of records under Section (e)(7) must
demonstrate that its records on an
individual’s exercise of First Amendment
rights are relevant to an authorized law
enforcement activity of the agency. Thus,
the district court’s interpretation of the
section was legally correct.
Applying this standard to the FBI’s
records, especially the Geer affidavit, we
are persuaded, as was the district court,
that the records maintained by the FBI on
Todd’s exercise of First Amendment rights
are relevant to an authorized law
38a
enforcement activity of the FBI.
Continued maintenance of such records also
will not violate any provision of the
Privacy Act. Accordingly, with no issue
of material fact to resolve, the district
court properly entered summary judgment.
Cc.
The FBI filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) as to
Todd’s third cause of action, arguing that
in actions instituted in federal court
under federal law, courts have eliminated
fictitious defendants by motion. In his
motion in opposition to the summary
judgment motion, Todd maintained that
pleading fictitious defendants was
allowable until such time as the real
———
39a
parties in interest, who could only be
identified through further discovery,
could be substituted. The district court
found, as a matter of fact, that the FBI
and any FBI or other government employees
involved in activities concerning Todd has
acted in accord with all applicable |
statutory, regulatory, and administrative
guidelines. Further, the district court
held that the FBI had properly invoked the
state secrets privilege in defense to
Todd’s interrogatories. Because these
findings were made by considering matters
outside the pleadings, i.e., documents
submitted for in camera review, the
district court converted the motion to
dismiss into one for summary judgment, as
is authorized for Rule 12(b)(6) motions,
4Ca
and entered judgment in favor of the FBI.
Todd contends that in treating the Rule 12
(b) (2) motion as one for summary judgment,
the district court denied him the
opportunity to properly defend his
position on merits. The FBI concedes
procedural error but insists that it is
"plainly harmless."
We have had occasion to consider the
procedural distinction between a Rule
12(b) (6) motion and a Rule 12(b) (2)
motion. In Time Share Vacation Club v.
Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61 (3d
Cir. 1984), we explained the mechanics of
a Rule 12(b)(2) motion as follows:
A Rule 12(b)(2) motion, such as the
motion made by the defendants here,
is inherently a matter which requires
resolution of factual issues outside
4la
the pleadings, i.e. whether in
personam jurisdiction actually lies.
Once the defense has been raised,
then the plaintiff must sustain its
burden of proof in establishing
jurisdictional facts through sworn
affidavits of other competent
evidence. Contrary to the dissent’s
suggestion, therefore, at no point
may a plaintiff rely on the bare
pleadings alone in order to withstand
a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to
dismiss for lack of in personam
jurisdiction. See International
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Northwest Airlines, 673
F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1982). Once the
motion is made, plaintiff must
respond with actual proofs, not mere
allegation.
Time Share Vacation Club, 735 F.2d at 67
n.9.
In support of this motion, the FBI
submitted the Thornton, Thomas and
Lieberman affidavits and its answers to
interrogatories. Following oral argument
on the motion, the FBI produced the Geer
42a
affidavit and the total collection of
withheld documents. These materials, they
contended, clearly evidenced the
nonparticipation of the FBI in any mail
cover activity. To the extent that the
materials revealed the identities of
another agency or agencies whose
operations concerned Todd’s mailings, the
FBI asserted the state secrets privilege
to prevent disclosure. Todd’s case
consisted of the affidavits of himself and
his mother asserting that he had received
damaged mail.
A careful reading of the district
court’s opinion suggest that the court by
implication decided that an action could
at least be initiated against a John Doe
defendant. Such a determination, however
_—- arate
43a
begs the question whether Todd could
receive any further meaningful discovery,
so as to ultimately identify the real
parties in interest, in light of the FBI’s
assertion of the state secrets privilege.
Finding that "a ’reasonable danger’ that
harm to the national interest will ensue
if defendants are forced to comply with
plaintiff’s discovery requests," the
district court held that the state secrets
privilege had been properly invoked. 705
F.Supp. 1046. The district court then
reasoned that if the record contained no
evidence of abuse by the FBI, and the
privilege applied to other information
known to the FBI, then the case presented
no issue of material fact and should be
- 44a
dismissed accordingly.
A Rule 12(b) (2) motion cannot be
treated as one for summary judgment.
There are situations, however where "the
question of the district court’s
jurisdiction [is] entwined with the
ultimate question on the merits."
International Ass’n of Machinists v.
Northwest Airlines, 673 F.2d 700, 710 (3d
Cir. 1982). In such circumstances, it may
be necessary for the district court "to
proceed to a decision which impacts on the
merits." Id,; see also Land v. Dollar,
330 U.S. 731, 739 (1947) (district court
had jurisdiction to determine its
jurisdiction by proceeding to a decision
on the merits).
The facts of this case present this
45a
type of complicated review. At the time
the Rule 12(b)(2) motion was filed, Todd
had already received certain redacted
papers, three affidavits and answers to
interrogatories. After in camera review
of the withheld documents, the district
court concluded that Todd could not secure
any further discovery. The John Doe
defendants would thus remain unknown.
Since they suit could not be maintained
against a fictitious party, the district
lacked in personam jurisdiction.
We find it insignificant that the
district court treated the Rule 12(b) (2)
motion as one for summary judgment and
dismissed the cause of action for lack of
a genuine issue of material fact.13 Such
13. We can affirm, if the result
reached by the district court is correct,
46a
a finding is beyond the initial and
necessary inquiry of whether in personam
jurisdiction actually lies. The FBI’s
evidence, both public and in camera
materials, convinces us that (1) the FBI
is not of the John Doe Defendants, and (2)
the FBI is shielded from further
disclosure by the state secrets privilege.
Todd thus failed to sustain his burden or
proof in establishing in personam
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the cause of
action was properly dismissed.
D.
An order denying a motion for relief
even though our reasoning differs from
that of the district court. See Tunnell
v. Wiley, 514 F.2d 971, 975 n.4 (3d Cir.
1975).
47a
from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
60 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Laskey v. Continental Products Corp., 804
F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1986). In view of the
facts of this case, we find no evidence
that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Todd@’s Rule 60(b)
motion.
Lik.
For the foregoing reasons, we will
affirm the judgment of the district court
in both appeals.
48a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TODD PATTERSON, etc., : Civil Action
: No.
88-2319
Plaintiff,
Vv.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF “+ OPINION
INVESTIGATION, et al., :
Defendants.
APPEARANCES: FRANK ASKIN, ESQ.
Constitutional Litigation
Clinic
15 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
(Attorneys for Plaintiff)
SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. ESQ.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
BY: SUSAN C. CASSELL, ESQ.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
970 Broad Street -
Newark, New Jersey 07102
(Attorneys for Defendants)
49a
WOLIN, District Judge
Currently before the Court is the
motion of defendant Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") for summary judgment
as to the first and second causes of
action of plaintiff Todd Patterson’s
complaint and to dismiss the third cause
of action. For the reasons set forth
below, and after having reviewed in camera
documents withheld by the FBI, the Court
grants summary judgement in favor of the
FBI dismissing the first, second and third
causes of action of plaintiff’s complaint.
However, in consideration of the FBI’s
offer to expunge the name of plaintiff
from any files it may possess, the Court
encourages the FBI to abide by its offer
and to expunge the plaintiff’s name from
all files, indexes or records maintained
50a
by the FBI that encompass the First
Amendment activities of Todd Patterson.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of this case vividly
illustrate the parental concern and public
consternation which can be produced when
the apparently remote world of high-tech
intelligence and counter-intelligence is
applied to the everyday world of grade
school and school projects in the name of
national security.
In 1983, plaintiff Tode Patterson,
then a sixth grade elementary school
student, decided to write an encyclopedia
of the world. Not being content with the
local library’s resources, Tcdd undertook
to write to all the countries of the
world, 169 in all, to obtain information.
Significantly, plaintiff enclosed much of
5la
his correspondence in envelopes bearing
the return address of Laboratory
Disposable Products, a business Todd’s
parents operate from their home.
The flood of international
correspondence which Todd’s project
engendered apparently caught the eye of
the FBI, through means and methods which
the FBI does not wish revealed on account
of national security concerns. Todd and
his parents contend that many pieces of
mail from foreign countries were received
in damaged condition, particularly mail
from the Soviet Union. The FBI, through
affidavits and other Supporting papers,
denies any responsibility for opening or
damaging Todd’s mail.
What is undisputed is that, besides
mail, Todd’s project also caused Todd to
receive a visit from the FBI. In late
52a
1983, Agent John E. Butenschoen, from the
FBI’s Parsippany, New Jersey branch,
appeared unannounced at the plaintiff’s
home in North Haledon, New Jersey. Agent
Butenschoen spoke to Todd’s mother and
father, the latter by telephone,
concerning Todd’s project. Agent
Butenschoen was shown Todd’s room, the
correspondence received by plaintiff, and
the purpose Todd was using the
correspondence for.
Agent Butenschoen requested that
plaintiff, who was at elementary school at
the time of the visit, call the agent.
Soon after the visit, Todd did call Agent
Butenschoen and spoke with him regarding
plaintiff’s project and his information
requests to other countries.
As a result of Todd’s project and the
visit by Agent Butenschoen, it is clear
' a
53a
that the FBI came to maintain at least one
file on the plaintiff. Lieberman
Affidavit, p. 7. On or about July 13,
1983, an FBI airtel was written relating
to Laboratory Disposable Products. The
document requested that the Newark
Division "conduct appropriate
investigations regarding the captioned
company in accordance with Attorney
General Guidelines." Defendant’s Notice
of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B,
Document No. 1.
After Agent Butenschoen’s visit to
Todd’s home, and apparently as a result of
his investigation of the matter, an FBI
memorandum was written on or about
February 23, 1984. Defendants’ Notice of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B.
Document No. 2. This document changed the
subject heading from "Laboratory
54a
Disposable Products" to "Todd Patterson."
The memorandum contains a description of
Todd’s project and further states "Newark
indices as well as local criminal checks
negative on subject" and "[{ij]Jn view of the
above, Newark comtemplates no further
investigation in this matter." The
memorandum demonstrates that once the FBI
learned the source of the international
correspondence was not an entity called
"Laboratory Disposable Products" but was
in reality a seventh grader involved in a
school project, the FBI wisely concluded
that no espionage was being committed.
While Agent Butenschoen’s visit to
the Pattersons and the February 23, 1984
memorandum should have been the end of the
matter, the Patterson’s involuntary foray,
whether real or imagined, into the eis
of counter-intelligence and national
55a
security was not yet complete. During the
summer of 1984, Todd Patterson received an
invitation for a visit from the Soviet
Mission in New York City. Concerned that
the FBI was somehow monitoring plaintiff’s
activities, plaintiff’s father requested
that Todd contact Agent Butenschoen. Todd
did so and informed the agent of the
invitation. The agent requested that Todd
report back to him after the visit.
Affidavit of Todd Patterson, p. 3. Todd’s
visit to the Soviet Mission and his
subsequent "de-briefing" apparently went
off without incident.
The FBI continues to maintain that it
conducted no further investigation of
plaintiff after 1983. Defendant’s Reply
Memorandum, p. 3. However, an airtel
dated December 5, 1985, released by the
FBI, along with five attachments that were
56a
not released, demonstrates that as of that
date some entity of the United States
Government continued to conduct activities
that involved the plaintiff. Defendant’s
Notice of Motion, Exhibit B, Document No.
5. The FBI responds, somewhat
cryptically, that "(t]he specifics of how
that 1985 airtel information came to the
FBI is, of course, covered by the military
and state secrets privilege, but it was
not through any further investigation by
the FBI." Defendant’s Reply Memorandun,
Finally, throughout the entire period
of plaintiff’s contact with the FBI and
other unknown forces of counter-
intelligence, up to the present, plaintiff
maintains that at least 50 pieces of mail
have been received in damaged condition,
most of which originated in the Soviet
57a
Union. Plaintiff’s Statement of Material
|Facts, 49. Plaintiff and his parents also
"report of hearing strange background
_noises on their telephones since 1983.
| Indeed, a now deceased employee of the
Pattersons is said to have heard a voice
say "Operator, this is not the phone I
want tapped." Id. at q16.14 The FBI
strenuously refutes the Patterson’s
allegations of mail tampering and
wiretapping, and the FBI characterizes the
employee’s story as an attempt to feed
"Mr. Patterson’s paranoid fantasy of
governmental wiretapping." Defendant’s
Reply Memorandum, p. 2.
14. The Court notes that the
employee’s story, while ominous sounding,
is inherently unreliable and, because of
the employee’s death, inadmissible
hearsay.
58a
In early 1987, plaintiff learned that
he could request access to records the FBI
might be maintaining on him through use of
the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") .1°
Pursuant to FOIA, plaintiff made a request
to the FBI in Washington, D.C. for "copies
of my personal file in your records."
Exhibit A-7 to defendant’s notice of
motion for summary judgment. By letter
dated August 12, 1987, plaintiff was
informed that "(t]he information
pertaining to you in FBIHQ records is
exempt from disclosure pursuant to Title
5, United States Code, Section 552(b) (1)
and Title 5, United States Code, Section
i858. § U.S.C. §552 (1982 & Supp. II
(1985) (as amended by Freedom of
Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-570, Subtit. N, §§1801-1804, 100
Stat. 32076, 3248-3250 (1986)).
59a
552a(j)(2)."
Plaintiff appealed the denial of his
FOIA request by letter from his father to
the Department of Justice’s Office of
Information and Privacy. On October 20,
1987, Richard L. Huff, co-director of the
Office of Information and Privacy,
notified plaintiff that his FOIA appeal
had been denied. Plaintiff was also
notified of his right to seek judicial
review of the agency’s determination in
the United States District Court. One
month later, Huff wrote to inform the
Pattersons that, after a further review of
Todd’s request, six pages of the
plaintiff’s file were being declassified.
Exhibit A-11. In March, 1988, plaintiff
60a
initiated a second FOIA request, this time
directed at the FBI’s Newark Field Office.
In May of 1988, Todd initiated a civil
suit through his father, Edgar Patterson,
against defendants FBI, John Doe, an
unknown employee of the United States
Government, and John Doe Agency, an
unknown agency of the United State
Government.1© plaintiff’s suit seeks
injunctive relief and/or damages under
16. Plaintiff’s suit originally
concerned only plaintiff’s FOIA request to
the FBI’s Washington office. However, in
the interests of judicial economy, this
Court and defendant are treating
plaintiff’s second FOIA request as part of
this action, and the FBI has released the
pertinent de-classified documents, in
redacted form, complying with plaintiff’s
second request, and has included the
justification for the redactions in the
declarations and motions filed in this
action. Defendant’s Supporting
Memorandum, p. 2, n. 1l.
6la
three distinct causes of action: failure
to comply with FOIA; violations of the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §552a et seq., as a
result of the FBI’s maintenance of files
describing plaintiff’s exercise of rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment; and
violations of plaintiff’s First and Fourth
Amendment rights and of 18 U.S.C. §1702
and 19 U.S.C. §482, statutes relating to
the U.S. mail.
On September 26, 1988, the FBI filed
the summary judgment motion now before the
Court. At the close of oral argument on
defendant’s motion, the Court reserved
decision and ordered the defendant to
submit an in camera affidavit establishing
a rational link between specific law
enforcement objectives and statutes and
62a
the files which the FBI maintained on the
First Amendment activities of the
plaintiff. Subsequent to oral argument,
the Court further ordered that the FBI
submit to the Court for in camera
inspection certain specified documents
which the FBI is seeking to withhold from
tne plaintiff. Letter and Order, December
30, 1988 (attached as Appendix A to this
Opinion). The FBI responded to the
Court’s order by submitting for in camera
inspection by the Court the entire content
of records maintained by the FBI
concerning plaintiff’s FOIA request. The
defendant also formerly invoked the
military and state secrets privilege in
response to discovery sought by the
63a
plaintiff by means of an affidavit of
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh dated
January 13, 1989.
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s FOIA Claim
In all FOIA cases, the role of the
District Court is to review de novo all
agency claims that materiai requested
pursuant to FOIA is subject to an
exemption contained in the statute.17 In
such a case, the agency bears the burden
of justifying its decision to withhold
requested information.18 King vs. U.S.
Dept. of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773,
17. 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (4) (b) (1982).
is. “ia.
64a
776 (1984). The agency may meet this
burden through the filing of affidavits
that describe the material withheld and
articulate why the material falls within
the claimed exemption. King, 830 F.2d at
217; Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656
F.2d 724, 738 (1981). In the present
case, the FBI claims that the withheld
material falls under Exemption 1 of FOIA,
relating to National Security, and
Exemption 7, concerning protection of
privacy.
1. Exemption 1 - National Security
Exemption 1 of FOIA enables an agency
to refrain from disclosing information
that is "specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive Order
65a
to be kept secret in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy
and...are in fact properly classified
pursuant to such Executive Order." 5
U.S.C. §552 (b)(1). The relevant
Executive Order in this case is Executive
Order on National Security Information,
No. 12356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14874, issued by
President Reagan on April 2, 1982,
becoming effective on August 1, 1982.
When determining if an agency has
properly withheld information pursuant to
Execption 1, a district court, as in all
FOIA cases, must conduct a de novo review.
However, both the legislative history of
FOIA and the subsequent caselaw suggest
that courts must "accord substantial
weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning
66a
the details of the classified status of a
disputed record" given that "executive
departments responsible for national
defense and foreign policy matters have
unique insights into what adverse effects
might occur as a result of public
disclosure." Salisbury v. United States,
690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93 Cong. 2d
Sess. 12 (1974) (conference report)
reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1974, pp. 6267, 6290); accord King vs.
U.S. Department of Justice, 830 F.2d at
217 ("The court owes substantial weight to
detailed agency explanations in the
national security context.").
Even with the substantial weight
67a
standard, a court should grant summary
judgment to an agency invoking Exemption 1
only if the agency supplies affidavits]?
that describe the withheld documents and
the justifications for non-disclosure in
sufficient detail and particularity so as
to demonstrate that "material withheld is
logically within the domain of the
exemption claimed." King v. U.S.
Department of Justice, 830 F.2d at 217.
Moreover, a court should refrain from
considering the agency affidavits
dispositive if there is contradictory
evidence in the record or if the specter
19. An affidavit which supplies an
index of withhold documents detailing the
justification for exemption claims has
come to be known as a Vaughn index.
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, 94S.
Ct. 1564 (1974).
68a
of agency bad faith is demonstrated to the
court. Id.; Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d at
776; Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656
F.2d at 738.
In the case at hand, the FBI has
produced the affidavit of Special Agent
Philip W. Thomas to serve as a Vaughn
index with regard to the application of
Exemption One to plaintiff’s FOIA
requests. As the relevant section of
FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §552 (b) (1), requires, the
Thomas affidavit seeks to demonstrate that
the withheld material is under the purview
of an Executive Order and has been
properly classified pursuant to such
oraer.
Taking the procedural requirement
69a
first, the Court is satisfied that the
Thomas affidavit sufficiently establishes
that the FBI adhered to the procedural
requirements of Executive Order 12356 when
the withheld FOIA material was classified.
EO 12356, §§1.5(a)(1)-(4), 1.6.
Turning to the substantive
requirement of EO 12356, the Court must
evaluate the merits of the Thomas
affidavit’s assertion that the withheld
material fits under the classification
criteria of EO 12356. The Thomas
affidavit places its reliance on EO 12356,
§1.3(a) (4), which provides:
§1.3 Classification Categories
(a) Information shall be
considered for classification
1f 1t concerns:
(4) intelligence activities
including special activities),
70a
or intelligence sources oF
methods. ~
The above provision must be read
in conjunction with EO 12356,
§1.3(b):
Information that is determined
to concern one or more of the
categories in Section 1.3(a)
shall be classified when an
original classification
authority also determines that
its unauthorized disclosure,
either by itself or in the
context of other information,
reasonably could be expected to
cause damage to the national
security.
The FBI’s choice to rely on the
sources and methods classification
category of the Executive Order struck the
Court as eminently sensible considering
the unlikelihood that any intelligence
collected on a grade school student such
as Tood would directly implicate the
71a
security of the Republic. However, upon
initial review, the Court was unconvinced
that the Thomas affidavit sufficiently
demonstrated that the material withheld by
the FBI in response to plaintiff’s FOIA
request belonged under the purview of EO
12356 §1.3(a) (4), and that release of the
withheld material reasonably could be
expected to cause damage to the national
security. In particular, the Court found
that the Thomas Affidavit was unduly vague
and repetitive in referring to the
withholding of Document No. 4 in Exhibit F
of the FBI’s notice of motion, a one-page
FBI airtel dated January 6, 1984, along
with 17 attached pages, and Document No.
5, a one-page FBI airtel dated December 5
,
72a
1985, along with five attached pages. 29
20. The relevant protion of the
Thomas affidavit states:
(35) Document 4 has 17 separate
attachments which are classified
’Secret’ in their entirety. These
attachments contain specific,
detailed information provided by an
intelligence source, method or
activity. The information is
of such detail that it may pinpoint
a critical time frame, reflect a
special vantage point, or reveal a
style of reporting peculiar to that
source, method or activity, any of
which, if disclosed would reveal the
source of the information. Thus
exposed, the source’s methods, or
activity’s effectiveness would be
terminated and could reasonably be
expected to result in identifiable
damage to the national security. A
further discussion of the types of
damage to the national security has
been previously set forth at
Paragraphs 12-14, Supra.
zkxk
(41) Document #5 has 5 separate
attachments which are classified
’Secret’ in their entirety. These
attachments contain specific,
detailed information provided by an
intelligence source, method, or
activity. The reasons for
classifying this type of detailed
73a
While mindful of the limitations
faced by the FBI in its attempt to
describe why classified material is exempt
from FOIA, the Court was concerned that
allowing the FBI’s cursory description of
24 pages of withheld material to suffice
would not comport with this Court’s task
of conducting a meaningful de novo review
of defendant’s decision to withhold
material under FOIA. Therefore, the Court
ordered the FBI to submit the relevant
withheld material for in camera
inspection, although cognizant of the
presumption that recourse to in camera
inspection of classified documents should
not be resorted to lightly. See Church of
information have been previously set
forth at Paragraph 35, supra.
74a
Scie oay v. U.S. Department of the
Army, 611 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir 1979)
(citations omitted).
In this case, the Court found in
camera inspection of the relevant
documents to be the best means available
to render substantial justice to
plaintiff’s claims, yet also insure that
any legitimate intelligence activities,
sources or methods of the government
remain protected against public
disclosure. Having now conducted such an
in camera inspection of the original,
withheld material and the additional
affidavit of Assistant Director of the FBI
James H. Greer ("Greer Affidavit"), the
Court finds that the material withheld by
75a
the FBI falls under the purview of EO
12356 §1.3(a)(4), and that release of the
withheld material reasonably could be
expected to cause damage to the national
security.
An agency asserting the national
security exemption to FOIA need not
demonstrate that an actual or substantial
risk to the national security would result
if the requested material were to be
released. All that is required is for the
agency to make a plausible showing that
release of withheld documents would create
a reasonable expectation of damage to the
national security. Halperin v. Pe ee
629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The
withheld material, read in conjunction
with the Greer affidavit, does establish a
76a
logical connection between each withheld
or redacted document and the risk that
certain intelligence methods or sources
would be compromised if the withheld
material was released.
Furthermore, the Court is convinced
that the representations of the FBI, as
expressed in the Thomas and Greer
Affidavits, are not controverted either by
contrary evidence in the record or
substantive evidence of agency bad faith,
and that the FBI did not run afoul of EO
12356’s warning that:
In no case shall information be
classified in order to conceal
violations of law, inefficiency, or
administrative error; to prevent
embarrassment to a person,
organization, or agency; to restrain
competition; or to prevent or delay
the release of information that does
77a
not require protection in the
interest of national security.
EO 12356, §1.6(a).
The plaintiff’s allegation that much
of his international correspondence
arrived in damaged condition, when
evaluated in conjunction with the
documents inspected by this
Court in
camera, does not support a finding that
the FBI illegally opened plaintiff’s mail
Or create a genuine factual
whether any instrumentality
States Government illegally
with plaintiff’s mail. The
mail traveled, the size and
envelopes, and the naticnal
issue of
of the United
interfered
distance the
content of the
Origin of the
mail are the far more likely culprits in
assessing why plaintiff’s mail may have
78a
arrived in damaged condition. Also,
plaintiff’s allegation of electronic
eavesdropping is not substantiated by any
substantive, credible or admissable
evidence, and, as such, cannot support any
finding of bad faith on the part of the
FBI.
It is unfortunate that plaintiff’s
ambitious project has caused classified
documents to be prepared about him. At
first blush, the investigation appears
ludicrous. However, a review of the facts
suggests that the rate of plaintiff’s
correspondence and plaintiff’s use of
return envelopes marked "Laboratory
Disposable Products" could be expected to
prompt the FBI to collect information
about the correspondence using properly
79a
Classified intelligence sources and
methods. This fact, taken in conjunction
with the Court’s in camera inspection of
the withheld documents, necessitates a
finding, upon de novo review, that the FBI
properly withheld material pursuant to
Exemption One of FOIA. Therefore, the
Court will grant summary judgment
dismissing plaintiff’s FOIA Claim.
2. Exemption 7 - Investigatory
Records and Invasion of Privacy
Because the Court finds that the FBI
has properly withheld requested documents
under Exemption One to FOIA, the Court
need not consider at length the FBI’s
attempt to withhold names of FBI agents
and employees who worked on the Patterson
case through invocation of §552(b) (7) (Cc),
80a
which exempts from disclosure:
(7) investigatory records
compiled for law enforcement
purposes but only to the extent that
the production of such records
would...(C) constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal
Drivacy...-.
The Court finds that the relevant
caselaw supports the view that Exemption
7(C) of FOIA can apply to the invasion of
privacy of law enforcement personnel,
identification of whom "could conceivably
subject them to harassment and annoyance
in the conduct of their official duties
and in their private lives." Nix v.
United States, 572 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.
1978). The possibility of invasion of the
privacy of law enforcement personnel must
be balanced "against the public benefit
8la
that would result from disclosure." Lane
v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 654 F.2d 917,
923 (3d Cir. 2083}.
In the case at hand, the public
benefit that would result from releasing
the names of FBI personnel involved in the
investigation of Todd Patterson is
negligible, particularly in view of the
Court’s finding that the FBI engaged in no
illegal conduct in regard to its
investigation of plaintiff. Therefore,
the FBI properly invoked Exemption Seven
to justify the withhoiding of the names of
FBI personnel in response to plaintiff’s
FOIA. request.
B. Plaintiff’s Privacy Act Claim
The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §552(a)
(1982), like the Freedom of Information
82a
Act, “demonstrates a congressional desire
to foster open government and
accessibility to government records."
Vymetalik v. F.B.I., 785 F.2d 1090, 1092
(D.c. Cir. 1986). The Privacy Act is
primarily designed to make government
agencies more accountable regarding the
gathering, disseminating and accuracy of
records maintained in government files
about individuals. The Act limits the
discretion of agencies to collect and
maintain information about individuals and
requires that government records by
maintained “with such accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness as is
reasonably necessary to assure fairness to
the individual[.]" Greentree v. U.S.
83a
Customs Service, 674 F.2d 74, 76 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (discussing the purposes and
history of the Privacy Act.
In his second cause of action,
Plaintiff relies on §552a(e) (7), which
provides:
(€) Agency requirements. - Each
agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(7) maintain no record
describing how any individual
exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment
unless expressly authorized by
statute or by the individual
about whom the record is
maintained or unless pertinent to
and within the scope of an
authorized law enforcement
activity;
An individual can enforce a violation
of §552a(e)(7) by bringing a civil suit
pursuant
to §552a(g)(1).21
>
Whenever
(g)(1) Civil Remedies. -
any agency
wey
84a
As a preliminary matter, the FBI
(A) makes a determination under
subsection (d)(3) of this
section not to amend an
individual’s record in
accordance with his request, or
fails to make such review in
conformity with that subsection;
(B) refuses to comply with an
individual request under
subsection (d)(1) of this
section;
(C) fails to maintain any record
concerning any individual with
such accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness as
is necessary to assure fairness
in any determination relating to
the qualifications, character,
rights, or opportunities of, or
benefits to the individual that
may be made on the basis of such
record, and consequently a
determination is made which is
adverse to the individual; or
(D) fails to comply with any
@ther provision of this section,
or any rule promulgated
thereunder, in such a way as to
have an adverse effect on an
individual, the individual may
bring a civil action against the
85a
claims to have exempted its central
records system from the civil remedy
provision of the Privacy Act through
promulgation of 28 C.F.R. §16.96.
However, that rule exempts the central
records system "only to the extent that
information in this system is subject to
exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. [§]
552[a](j) and (k)." Section 552(43)(2), in
agency, and the district courts
of the United States shall have
jurisdiction in the matters
under the provisions of this
subsection.
(2) (A) In any suit brought under the
provisions of subsection (g)(1)(A) of this
section, the court may order the agency to
amend the individual’s record in
accordance with his request or in such
other ways as the court may direct. In
such a case the court shall determine the
matter de novo.
86a
turn, allows an agency to exempt records
only to the extent they were compiled for
purposes of a criminal investigation. 22
22. Section 552(j) provides:
(j) General exemptions. - The head
of any agency may promulgate rules,
in accordance with the requirements
(including general notice) of
sections 553(b)(1), (2), and (3),
(c), and (e) of this title, to exempt
any system of records within the
agency from any part of this section
except subsections (b), (c)(1) and
(2), (e(4) (A) through (F), (e) (6),
(7), (9), (10), and (11), and (1) if
the system of records is-
(1) maintained by the
Central Intelligence
Agency; or
(2) maintained by an agency
or component thereof which
performs as its principal
function any activity
pertaining to the
enforcement of criminal
laws, including police
efforts to prevent,
control, or reduce crime or
to apprehend criminals, and
the activities of
87a
The FBI cannot claim that all of its
Prosecutors, courts,
correctional, probation,
pardon, or parole
authorities, and which
consists of
(A) information compiled
for the purpose of
identifying individual
Criminal offenders and
alleged offenders and
consisting only of
identifying data and
notations of arrests, the
nature and disposition of
Criminal charges,
sentencing, confinement,
release, and parole and
probation status;
(B) information compiled
for the purpose of a
criminal investigation,
including reports of
informants and
investigators, and
associated with an
identifiable individual; or
(C) reports identifiable to
an individual compiled at
any stage of the process of
enforcement of the criminal
laws from arrest or
88a
records must necessarily be considered as
compiled for purposes of criminal
investigation merely by virtue of the
function that the FBI serves. Vymetalik,
785 F.2d 1090, 1095; Pratt v. Webster, 673
F.2d 408, 415 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Instead, the FBI must adequately
demonstrate that its recorgs on plaintiff
were compiled specifically for purposes of
a criminal investigat,on. In the case at
bar, the FBI has not made such a showing.
indictment through release
from supervision.
As shown by the above language, §552(j) (2)
also allows an agency to exempt records
related to identifying criminal offenders
or compiling reports about individuals
after indictment or arrest. However, only
category (B) information related to a
criminal investigation is pertinent here.
89a
Because of this, the FBI cannot properly
contend that the plaintiff’s Privacy Act
claim is barred by the FBI’s regulation
exempting the FBI’s central records system
from the civil remedy provision of the
Privacy Act.
However, even if the FBI has not
Satisfied the §552a(j) (2) standard of a
"Criminal investigation", the FBI would
still be entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim if it could
show that records the FBI maintained on
plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment
rights were "pertinent to and within the
scope of an authorized law enforcement
activity," under the dictates of
§552a(e) (7). Indeed, interpretation of
the Privacy Act suggests that it would be
=
90a
easier for the FBI to satisfy the "law
enforcement activity" standard of
§552a(e) (7) rather than the "criminal
investigation" standard of §552a(j) (2)-
Thus, the Court will focus on whether the
FBI has demonstrated that the records
maintained on plaintiff were pertinent to
an authorized law enforcement activity of
the FBI.
The precise meaning of "pertinent to
and within the scope of an authorized law
enforcement activity" is not provided by
the statute itself. The statute’s
definitions do not include the term "law
enforcement activities," and the phrase
does not appear anywhere else in the
statute. However, interpretation of the
9la
phrase must be viewed in light of
Congress’s intention for Section (e)(7) of
the Privacy Act to restrict the
information about individuals’ First
Amendment activities that the government
may collect and maintain and to prevent
"collection of protected information not
immediately needed, about law-abiding
Americans, on the off-chance that
government or the particular agency might
possibly have to deal with them in the
future." Ss, Rep. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 6916, 6971.
Thus, the relatively few circuit
courts which have interpreted Section
(€)(7) have all founda that the law
92a
enforcement activity exception must be
read narrowly and that the agency involved
must make an affirmative showing that the
records maintained on First Amendment
activities were in some way related to law
enforcement objectives, although the
courts have differed somewhat on the exact
standard warranted. See MacPherson \V.
I.R.S., 803 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1986)
(individual, case-by-case analysis of
whether agency’s actions were pertinent to
authorized law enforcement activity) ;
Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 279 (6th
Cir. 1982) (Section (e)(7) “allows
investigation with respect to the exercise
of First Amendment rights if such
investigation is relevant to an authorized
criminal investigation or to an authorized
intelligence or administrative one."),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863, 104 S. Ct. 193
93a
(1983); Clarkson v.
sk
678 F.2d 1368,
1375 (llth Cir. 1982)
(Section (e) (7)
is
Violated "to the extent that the [agency }
has engaged in the practice of collecting
protected information,
investigation of past,
anticipated violations
unconnected to any
present or
of the statutes
which it is authorized to enforce...
el ie
cert. denied, 481 U.S. aU32, i107 &. Ct.
1961 (1987). See also Nagel v. U.S. Dept.
of Health, Education and Welfare, 725 F.2d
1438, 1441 n. 3 (D.c. Cir. 1984) (adopting
Jabara standard) .23
This Court finds that the legislative
purpose of §552(e)(7) is best effectuated
by requiring agencies to demonstrate that
any and all records maintained on an
ELMS e ORS ar nn gL Cae ae
23. The Third Circuit has not yet
considered the question faced here.
SOAR TE
Pgh Orr Bak dt
94a
individuals’s exercise of First Amendment
rights are relevant to an authorized law
enforcement activity of the agency, and
that there exists a sufficient basis for
the maintenance of such records. “4
Moreover, the Court recognizes that any
question of relevance must be linked with
consideration of the facts of a particular
case. See MacPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d
at 484.
Turning to the facts of the case at
hand, the Court found on its initial
review that the FBI had not adequately
demonstrated that its activities directed
at plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment
24. All cases considering Section
(e) (7) have concluded that even after the
pertinent law enforcement activity has
been completed, the agency can continue to
maintain the related records.
95a
rights were relevant to an authorized law
enforcement activity. All defendant
Submitted in this regard was a five line
Paragraph citing to the Espionage Statute
and the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
without any reference to facts in some way
linking the plaintiff’s First Amendment
activities with enforcement of those
Statutes. 25
While the FBI need not make a showing
25. The FBI’s paragraph on
authorization states:
IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR FBI’S
INVESTIGATION
(L) A foreign counterintelligence
investigation was conducted by the FBI.
The authority for this type of
investigation includes such statutes as
Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 792-798
(Espionage) and Title 22, U.S.C., Section
611-621 (Foreign Agents Registration Act.)
Lieberman Affidavit, 410.
96a
that probable cause or reasonable
suspicion may have existed about
plaintiff, the agency must furnish facts
which at least demonstrate that the
records maintained on plaintiff’s exercise
of First Amendment rights, such as
letterwriting, were relevant to a
legitimate, authorized law enforcement
objective. Reference to statutes, without
any underlying factual basis, cannot
suffice given the intent of Congress to
curtail the extent of records government
agencies may maintain on individuals’
exercise of First Amendment rights. As
one court has stated:
The mere compilation by the
government of records describing
the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms creates the possibility that
those records will be used to the
speaker’s detriment, and hence has a
chilling effect on such exercise.
Nagel, 725 F.2d at 1441.
97a
Because the FBI had not made an
adequate showing of the relevance of
records maintained on plaintiff’s exercise
of First Amendment rights to an authorized
law enforcement activity, the Court
ordered the FBI to submit an in camera
affidavit which would further attempt to
demonstrate the required relevance. The
FBI subsequently submitted the Greer
Affidavit to serve this purpose. Upon
review of the Greer Affidavit, the Court
now finds that records maintained by the
FBI on plaintiff’s exercise of First
Amendment Rights are relevant to an
authorized law enforcement activity of the
FBI and that the continued maintenance of
such records does not violate any
provision of the Privacy Act.
In retrospect, it is clear that
plaintiff violated no laws in the course
98a
of his correspondence project nor was
involved in any clandestine activity, yet
the FBI could not have known this prior to
undertaking some type of investigation.
Such an investigation, and any related
records kept, would be justified as long
as the FBI complied with the relevant
statutes and undertook the investigation
in the least intrusive means possible
given the circumstances. The Court finds
the FBI’s investigation and maintainance
of records on plaintiff does fit within
statutory and regulatory limits. This
finding may be of only limited consolation
to plaintiff, whose legitimate exercise of
First Amendment rights resulted in an FBI
file. However, plaintiff can take
satisfaction in the fact that his resort
to the judicial process has resulted in
this Court conducting an independent
99a
examination of the FBI’s conduct in
accordance with the statutory standard as
set out by Congress in the Privacy Act.
In the Privacy Act, Congress implicitly
accepted that the slight chill on free
Speech created by Agency maintenance of
records on First Amendment activity is
necessary in light of the need for
Agencies to maintain adequate records
relevant to legitimate law enforcement
activities. After reviewing the Greer
Affidavit, the Court finds that the FBI
has acted properly in regard to records
maintained about plaintiff. However, the
in camera inspection also allows this
Court to assure plaintiff that any records
maintained by the FBI on him do not
reflect negatively on his character or
conduct. Accordingly, the Court can
assure plaintiff that the law enforcement
100a
activity conducted by the FBI in this case
should not in any way inhibit him from
pursuing any legitimate exercise of his
First Amendment rights, including writing
letters to countries throughout the world.
Furthermore, plaintiff’s fear of an
aborted or limited public service career
arising out of these events is misplaced.
Therefore, the Court will grant the
FBI’s motion for summary judgment,
dismissing the Privacy Act claim of
plaintiff’s complaint.
es Plaintiff’s Cause of Action Based on
Violations of the First and Fourth
Amendments and 18 U.S.C. §1702 and
396 S.C. BAe.
Apart from his FOIA and Privacy Act
causes of action, plaintiff alleges that
defendant violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights, as well as the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. §1702,2© and 19
26. 18 U.S.C. §1702 provides:
Obstruction of correspondence
Whoever takes any letter, postal
Car, Or package out of any post
office or any authorized
depository for mail matter, or
from any letter or mail Carrier,
or which has been in any post
office or authorized depository,
or in the custody of any letter
Or mail carrier, before it has
been delivered to the person to
whom it was directed, with
design to obstruct the
correspondence, or to pry into
the business or secrets of
another, or opens, secretes,
embezzles, or destroys the same,
shall be fined not more than
$2,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
27. 19 U.S.C. §482 provides:
Search of vehicles and persons
Any of the officers or persons
authorized to board or search
vessels may stop, search, and
examine, as well without as within
their respective districts, any
vehicle, beast, or person, on which
or whom he or they shall suspect
102a
1. First Amendment Claim
An individual alleging direct
violation of the Constitution may bring
there is merchandise which is
subject to duty, or shall have been
introduced into the United States in
any manner contrary to law, whether
by the person in possession or
charge, or by, in, or upon such
vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and
to search any trunk or envelope,
wherever found, in which he may have
a reasonable cause to suspect there
is merchandise which was imported
contrary to law; and if any such
officer or other person so
authorized shall find any
merchandise on or about any such
vehicle, beast, or person, or in any
such trunk or envelope, which he
shall have reascnable cause to
believe is subject to duty, or to
have been unlawfully introduced into
the United States, whether by the
person in possession or charge, or
by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast,
or otherwise, he shall seize and
secure the same for trial.
103a
Suit against federal officials for damages
and equitable relief. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
Of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999
(1971). Plaintiff in this case has named
John Doe, an unknown employee of the
United States government as a defendant.
A Bivens suit?® is available to remedy
violation of a number of Constitutional
provisions, including the First
Amendment.29 See e.g. Oaden v. United
28. Plaintiff’s claim is not
technically a Bivens action, since
plaintiff seeks no monetary damages. See
Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 869 (3d
Cir. 1975). However, legal analysis is
essentially the same as for a standard
Bivens action.
29. The Court notes that to the
extent plaintiff’s First Amendment claim
involves damages as a result of the FBI’s
maintenance of records on plaintiff, such
an acion is apt to be foreclosed by the
existence of the Privacy Act. This is in
104a
States, 758 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1985);
Angola v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1 (2d cir.
1981); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d
Cir. 1975).
The touchstone of a Bivens suit must
be some illegal or inappropriate conduct
on the part of a federal official which
results in a Constitutional violation.
Paton, 524 F.2d. After reviewing the
record as a whole, including in camera
inspection of the withheld documents and
the Greer Affidavit, the Court finds, as a
matter of fact, that the FBI and any FBI
or other government employees involved in
activities concerning plaintiff acted in
keeping with the principle that a Bivens
action is foreclosed if Congress provides
an alternative, adequate remedy. Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 378, 103 S. Ct. 2404
(1983).
105a
accord with all applicable statutory and
regulatory guidelines. Beyond finding
compliance with the relevant statutes and
regulatory guidelines, the Court finds
that regulations which authorized the
activities undertaken by defendant in this
case did not impermissably chill
plaintiff’s First Amendment right of free~
speech, and represent a lawful exercise of
the federal government’s responsibility
for conduct of foreign policy and nationa]
security affairs with negligible First
Amendment implications. See United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-68, 88 S. ct.
419, 425 (1967) ("We have recongized that,
while the Constitution protects against
invasions of individual rights, it does
106a
not withdraw from the government the power
to safeguard its vital interests....Faced
with a clear conflict between a federal
statute enacted in the interests of
national security and an individual’s
exercise of his First Amendment rights, we
have confined our analysis to whether
Congress has adopted a constitutional
means in achieving its concededly
legitimate legislative goal."). In the
current case, there is in fact no direct
conflict between plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights and the relevant
statutory provisions and administrative
regulations as applied. Moreover, any
limitations on plaintiff’s First Amendment
freedoms are minimal and appropriate
considering the important foreign policy
and national security objectives involved.
Therefore, plaintiff’s claim for
107a
injunctive relief based on the
government’s violation of the First
Amendment rights must be denied and
Summary judgment entered in favor of
defendants.
ie Fourth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff asserts that defendants
violated his Fourth Amendment rights
through the unlawful opening of his mail.
However, as with plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim, the Court finds after
reviewing the record and the in camera
Submissions of defendant, that the FBI
conducted no illegal searches involving
plaintiff and acted in accordance with al]
relevant statutory and administrative
guidelines.
Plaintiff argues that even if the
present record does not support a claim of
Fourth Amendment violation, summary
108a
judgment is foreclosed because of the
failure of the FBI *+:0 respond adequately
to plaintiff’s discovery requests.
However, this argument must fail in light
of the Court’s finding that the FBI has
properly invoked the military and state
secrets privilege. The standard for
evaluating a-claim of the state secrets
privilege was set forth at length by the
District of Columbia Circuit in Ellsberg
v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub nom., Russo v. Mitchell,
465 U.S 1038, 104 S. Ct. 1316 (1984);
cert. denied sub nom., Russo v. Mitchell,
U.S. _, 108 S. Ct. 197 (1987).
The D.C. Circuit stated:
Although there can be no abdication
of a judicial role in connection with
proposed applications of the state
secrets doctrine, it is nevertheless
rrequently noted that the trial judge
should accord considerable deference
to recommendations from the executive
109a
department. Moreover, it is
recognized that the government need
not demonstrate that injury to the
national interest will inevitably
result from disclosure; a showing of
‘reasonable danger’ that harm will
ensue is sufficient. Finally, when
assessing claims of a state secrets
privilege, a trial judge properly may
rely on affidavits and other
secondary sources more often than he
might when evaluating assertions of
other evidentiary privileges.
Id. at 59 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, the Court finds a
"reasonable danger" that harm to the
national interest will ensue if .
defendant’s are forced to compiy with
plaintiff’s discovery requests.
Therefore, the FBI’s proper assertion of
the state secrets privilege taken in
conjunction with the Court’s determination
that the present record contains no
evidence supporting a finding of illegal
conduct on the part of the FBI,
necessitates the Court granting
110a
defendant’s summary judgment d smissing
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment clain.
3. Plaintiff’s Statutory Claims
The plaintiff’s claims based on
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §1702 and
19 U.S.C. §482 are in large part
identical to the plaintiff’s First and
Fourth Amendment claims considered above.
To succeed on a claim based on either
statute, plaintiff would need to present
evidence of an illegal interference with
his mail. However, the Court finds, after
considering the in camera submissions of
defendant, that there is no evidence which
would support a finding of illegal
tampering or interference with plaintiff’s
mail. Furthermore, the FBI’s proper
invocation of the state secrets privilege
forecloses plaintiff from claiming
inadequate response to his discovery
requests.
Therefore, the Court must grant
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s
Claims brought under 18 U.S.C. §1702 and
29 U.S.C. §482.
D. The FBI’s Offer to Expunde
Plaintiff’s Name From Its Files
In its supporting papers and again at
oral argument, the FBI offered to expunge
the name of Todd Patterson from its
records. This offer strikes the Court as
a fair and practical resolution of this
litigation. It enables the FBI to
safeguard information concerned with
sources and methods of counter-
intelligence while at the same time it
eliminates any potential damage to
plaintiff which he envisions the FBI’s
past activities may cause him in the-
future. However, because the Court has
1ll2a
found that the FBI engaged in no illegal
or overly intrusive conduct, it would be
inappropriate for this Court to now order
the FBI to expunge plaintiff’s name from
its files. See Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d
at 868-69. Nonetheless, the Court invites
the FBl1 to abide by its offer to expunge
plaintiff’s name, as the Court believes it
to be the type of good faith gesture that
will help defuse the sense of outrage that
precipitated this proceeding.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the
Court grants defendant FBI’s motion for
summary judgment dismissing the first,
second and third causes of action of
plaintiff’s complaint, and the Court wili
order that judgment be entered in favor of
all defendants, real and fictitious, named
in plaintiff’s action.
11l3a
An appropriate order shall be
Submitted by counsel for defendant.
Dated: February 7, 1989
ALFRED M. WOLIN, U.S.D.J.
114a
United States District Court
District of New Jersey
Chambers of USPO & Courthouse
Alfred M. Wolin Bldg.
Judge Newark, NJ 07101
APPENDIX A
December 30, 1988
Susan C. Cassell, ESq.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
970 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Frank Askin, Esq.
Constitutional Litigation Clinic
Rutgers University School of Law
15 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Re: Todd Patterson Vv. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, et al.
Civil Action No. 88-2319
Dear Counsel:
Currently before the Court is the
FBI’s motion for summary judgment directed
against the claims of plaintiff Todd
Patterson. At the close of oral argument,
I indicated that an opinion on the motion
would be issued within a week. However,
because certain issues were raised in oral
argument that were not adequately
addressed in the supporting papers, I have
concluded that in camera inspection of
certain withheld documents is required in
order for this Court to assure itself that
the FBI has acted in good faith with
regard to its investigation of Todd
Patterson, that the FBI complied with all
relevant government regulations, and that
the FBI engaged in no illegal conduct.
Therefore, I am ordering the FBI to
turn over to the Court, for in camera
ee |
inspection, the document listed as
116a
Document No. 4 in Exhibit B of the FBI’s
Notice of Motion, the one-page FBI airtel
dated January 6, 1984, along with the 17
additional pages attached. I am also
ordering the FBI to submit for in camera
inspection the document listed as Document
No. 5 in Exhibit B of the FBI’s Notice of
Motion, the one-page FBI airtel dated
December 5, 1985, along with the five
additional pages attached. The documents
and the attached pages should be submitted
to the Court in complete and unredacted
form.
While I do not resort to in camera
inspection lightly, I believe in this case
that in camera inspection of the specified
documents is the best means available to
render substantial justice to plaintiff’s
claims, yet also insure that any
117a
legitimate intelligence activities,
sources or methods of the government
remain protected against public
disciosure.
After reviewing the specified
documents in camera, as well as the
affidavit ordered by the Court at cral
argument, I will then issue a formal
opinion addressing the FBI’s summary
judgment motion in its entirely.
Very truly yours,
ALFRED M. WOLIN
Vee Dou<
AMW: bv
118a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TODD PATTERSON, etc., : Civil Action No.
Plaintiff, : 88-2319
Vv. :
FEDERAL BUREAU OF ¢$ ORDER
INVESTIGATION, et al.,
Defendants.
In conformity with this Court’s
letter to counsel dated December 30, 1988,
It is on this 30th day of December,
1988,
ORDERED that defendant FBI turn over
to the Court, for in camera inspection,
the document listed as Document No. 4 in
Exhibit B of the FBI’s Notice of Motion,
the one-page FBI airtel dated January 6,
1984, along with the 17 additional pages
attached, and it is further
ORDERED that defendant FBI submit for
in camera inspection the document listed
as Document No. 5 in Exhibit B of the
119a
FBI’s Notice of Motion, the one-page FBI
airtel dated December 9, 1985, along with
the five additional pages attached, and it
is further
ORDERED that the specified documents
and attached pages should be submitted to
the Court in complete and unredacted form
within 21 days of the date of this order.
ALFRED M. WOLIN, U.S.D2J~
120a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FO® THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TODD PATTERSON, etc., >: Civil Action No.
Plaintiff, : 88-2319
Vv.
OPINION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF : and
INVESTIGATION, et al., : ORDER
Defendants. ;
Currently before the Court is the
motion of plaintiff, pursuant to Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, to vacate this Court’s entry ot
summary judgment or, in the alternative,
to supplement the record. Plaintiff
contends that new evidence disciosed by
defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation
in response to two Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") requests made by plaintiff on
September 7, 1988 and November 6, 1988 to
the Newark and New York F.B.I. field
offices is material to the Privacy Act, 5
l2la
U.S.C. § 552a et seq., cause of action
included in plaintiff’s Complaint.
| & BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
For a detailed discussion of the
factual and procedural background of this
case, the parties are referred to the
February 7, 1989 Opinion of the Court. In
that Opinion, the Court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants on all
three ceuses of action in plaintiff’s
complaint. Subsequently on March 15,
1989, plaintiff received the F.B.I.’s
response to his two Fall 1988 FOIA
requests. One item disclosed was a May
24, 1988 newspaper article describing
plaintiff’s bringing of a suit against the
F.B.I. It is the presence of this
newspaper article in the F.B.I.’s records
that apparently motivated this Rule 60 (b)
motion. On March 30, 1989, plaintiff’s
a ee
122a
motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
February 7, 1989 Opinion was denied. On
April 25, 1989, plaintiff filed a notice
of appeal to the Third Circuit.
Ordinarily, a notice of appeal divests the
district court of all jurisdiction in a
case. However, a district court does have
the power to both entertain and deny a
Rule 60(b) motion even while an appeal is
pending. Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117
(3d. Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff’s contention that the
materials disclosed by plaintiff’s
additional FOIA requests entitle plaintiff
to Rule 60(b) relief demonstrates a
misunderstanding of the procedural —
requirements for an action based on the
Privacy Act and of the procedural history
of this case. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a@) (2)-(3)
lays out the Privacy Act’s procedural
pee FE |
requirements for a party to request
amendment of an agency’s records. For
example, if plaintiff objected to the
newspaper article being contained in the
F.B.I. file, plaintiff could have
requested the F.B.I. to delete the
newspaper article, and if such request was
denied, plaintiff could then have sought
judicial review. 5 U.S.c. §
552a(g)(1)(A). Thus, the documents
disclosed pursuant to plaintiff’s
September 7, 1988 and November 6, 1988
FOIA requests do not constitute new
evidence for purposes of this action but
instead entitled plaintiff to seek
administrative redress, and, if necessary,
judicial review.
Plaintiff also cannot successfully
maintain that his Fall 1988 FOIA requests
are somehow under the purview of this
124a
lawsuit. This action grew out of
plaintiff’s 1987 FOIA request to the
F.B.I.’s Washington, D.C. office.
Defendant consented, however, to let this
suit also cover plaintiff’s March, 1988
FOIA request to the F.B.I.’s Newark field
office. These are the only FOIA requests
of plaintiff that are properly before this
Court. Obviously, a May 24, 1988
newspaper article would not be in
plaintiff’s F.B.I. file at the time of
plaintiff’s March, 1988 FOIA request. The
newspaper article is new material that was
released pursuant to additional FOIA
requests of plaintiff and cannot be
considered new evidence for purposes of
this action.
Accordingly,
It is on this 16th day of August,
1989,
125a
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pp. 60 (b) is
denied.
Alfred M. Wolin, U.S.D.J.
126a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TODD PATTERSON, etc.
Plaintiff, : Civil Action
: No.
VT « : 88-2319
FEDERAL BUREAU OF :
INVESTIGATION, et al., >: OPINION
: and
Defendants : ORDER
This matter comes before the Court
upon the motion of plaintiff, Todd
Patterson, by his attorney, Frank Askin,
Esq., for reconsideration of this Court’s
Order of February 27, 1989, which granted
summary judgment in favor of all named
defendants.
Plaintiff contends that the Court
erred in its decision granting summary
judgment because the Court improperly
relied on the in camera submissions of
defendant. Plaintiff’s position runs
a
127a
counter to the relevant statutes and
caselaw; therefore, plaintiff’s motion
must be denied.
The Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 ("FOIA"), specifically
provides for the Court’s use of and
reliance upon in camera submissions. 5
U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (B). Moreover, courts
have continually held that in camera
Submissions may be relied upon in cases
involving FOIA, the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C.
§ 552 et seq.), or government use of the
military and state secrets privilege. See
Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (in camera submissions
relied upon in a case involving FOIA and
invocation of military and state secrets
privilege); Weberman v. National Security
Agency, 668 F.2d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1982)
(In FOIA case involving in camera review
128a
of agency affidavit, the Court stated:
"Disclosure of the details of this
affidavit might result in serious
consequences to the nation’s security
operations. The risk presented by
participation of counsel, Hayden v. NSA,
608 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
outweighs the utility of counsel, or
adversary process, in construing a
supplement to the record."); Stein v.
Department of Justice & FBI, 662 F.2d 1245
(7th Cir. 1981) (Use of in camera
affidavit approved in case involving FOIA
and Privacy Act claims.).
As plaintiff’s sole ground for his
motion for reconsideration is without an
adequate basis in law, the motion must be
denied.
Therefore, it is on this 30th day of
March, 1989,
129a
ORDERED, that plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied.
Altred M. Wolin, U.S.D.J.
130a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 89-5342 and 89-5781
Todd Patterson, et al.
Appellant
Va e
Federal Bureau of Investigation, etc.
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Present: HIGGINBOTHAM, Chief Judge,
SLOVITER, BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN,
GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, and
NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and GAWTHROP,
District Judge*
The petition for rehearing filed by
appellant in the above entitled case
having been submitted to the judges who
participated in the decision of this court
and to all other available circuit judges
of the circuit in regular active service,
and no judge who concurred in the decision
having asked for rehearing, and a majority
of the circuit judges of the circuit in
—E—<—
l3la
regular active service not having voted
for rehearing by the court in banc, the
petition for rehearing is denied.
BY THE COURT
Circuit Judge
Dated: February 7, 1990
* District Judge Gawthrop voted only as to
panel rehearing.
132a
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
TODD PATTERSON, a minor JjU.S.C.A.
under 18, suing by his ]}#89-5342 and
father, EDGAR PATTERSON, ]#89-5781
}] (Consolidated)
Appellant,
Vv.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, JOHN
DOE, an unknown employee
of the United States
Government, and JOHN DOE
AGENCY, an unknown agency
of the United States
Government,
i td td td Od 8 td Ld Fd fF Fd td td
Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING IN
BANC
Frank Askin, Esq.
Constitutional Litigation Clinic
Rutgers Law School
15 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
201/648-5687
Attorney for Todd Patterson on behalf of
the American Civil Liberties Union of New
Jersey
133a
Student Inter
n on the brief:
Adam Todd
134a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Abourezk v. Reagan,
785 F.2d 1043,1061 (D.c. Cir.
1986), aff’d 484 U.S. 1 (1987)..12
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308
1 er ee Se 14
Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1374
(llth Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
Ce eee Ge ec ae ee ete oe ees 8
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
MS eee ee 13
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65
(0.0. Che BPSS) cece ccvccessesess 14
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l. Ltd.,
776 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir.
RR Oe eee ee ere 12
In Re United States, 872 F.2d 4472
Paes Ghee AOE soc anh eee es oe 12
Jabara v. Kelly, 476 F.Supp. 561 (E.D.
NIGH. ADTP) caccevcceceseeerteseves 8
McPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d 479, 483-
SE (SEH Cif. 3966) scccesevescrees 2,s
Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815
PR ire ee ew ete ate eee en 12
acre
135a
Nagel v. United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, 725 F.2d
1438, 1441 (D.c. Cir. 1984)
Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 [se Cir.
oe! Bae et a ee a eee eee ee beens
;
Paton v. LaPrade, 469 F.Supp 773 (D.N.J.,
1978) and 471 F.Supp. 166 (D.N.J.,
TE Ae eee ie aed eee ceca ec hea ce 2
. United States v. American Tel. & 7a...
| CO., 567 F.2d 121 2) os Peer 15
136a
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF
AUTHORITIES .ccccccvcccvccseceeeseeeresss il
I.
) eo
THE PANEL’S OPINION IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THIS COURT’S OPINION IN PATON
Vv. LAPRADE, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir.
THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE PANEL
OPINION TO 5 U.S.C. 552a(e) (7)
EFFECTIVELY GUTS THAT PROVISION AND
NULLIFIES THE INTENT OF CONGRESS, IN
ADOPTING THE PRIVACY ACT, TO PUT AN
END TO THE PRACTICE OF THE FBI AND
OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES OF MAINTAINING
INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBING
THEIR EXERCISE OF RIGHTS PROTECTED BY
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF
SUBSTANTIAL NEED... eee eee eee reer erees 3
.THE DETERMINATION BY THE PANEL OPINION
THAT A FEDERAL COURT MAY DECIDE
DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON
THE BASIS OF IN CAMERA, EX PARTE
TESTIMONY IS INCONSISTENT WITH
FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM «ccc cere ee eee ee CCH CCR CHEERS 10
CONCLUSION cc cccceveeeeeeessaeeresererevs 15
137a
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff petitions the Court,
pursuant to Rule 40 of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Practice, for a rehearing and
a rehearing in banc on his appeal in the
cases numbered 89-5342 and 89-5781. A
Judgment was entered and an Opinion was
filed in both of these cases by this Court
On January 8, 1990.
It is respectfully suggested that the
panel opinion is inconsistent with this
Court’s previous opinion in Paton v.
LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) and
decided important legal issues on the
basis of an erroneous understanding of
their factual underpinnings and legal
consequences. This is not surprising
considering the novelty as well as the
complex nature of the issues involved;
the balancing of national security
138a
interests and First Amendment rights, as
was presented in this case, is one of the
most difficult tasks faced by any court.
Petitioners understand that rehearing in
banc is not favored and ordinarily will
not be ordered, however, considering the
questions of exceptional importance raised
in this case, we ask this Court to grant a
rehearing pursuant to Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure 35 and 40.
As counsel, I express a belief, based
on a reasoned and studied professional
judgment, that the panel decision is
contrary to a prior decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, and that consideration by the
full court is necessary to secure and
maintain uniformity of decisions in this
Court, to-wit, the panel’s decision is
contrary to the decision of this Court in
the case Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862
=
139a
(1975). Furthermore, this appeal involves
the following questions of exceptional
importance, to-wit:
A. Whether the Privacy Act requires
that the term "pertinent to and within the
scope of" in Section (e)(7) of the Privacy
Act be read as requiring more than mere
"relevance",
B. Whether the Court may decide
disputed issues of material fact on the
basis of in camera, €xX parte testimony in
the face contrary to fundamental notions
of American jurisprudence and the
adversarial system.
kkk
140a
I. THE PANEL’S OPINION IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S OPINION IN
PATON V. LAPRADE, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir.
1975).
The failure of the panel opinion to
even acknowledge this Court’s opinion 15
years ago in Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d
862 (3d Cir. 1975) is mystifying.
Even prior to adoption of the Federal
Privacy Act, Paton v. LaPrade, recognized
a right to relief of a plaintiff under
very similar circumstances. Responding to
a claim that the F.B.I. was maintaining
information concerning the First Amendment
activities of a teenager after
intercepting her letter to a domestic
political organization as a result of a
mail cover, the court held the plaintiff
was entitled to seek judicial expungement
of her file directly under the First
Amendment. The court held that the
existence of such a file threatened
14la
palpable harm to plaintiff. 524 F.2d at
868. On remand, the District Court
provided such relief. Paton v. LaPrade,
469 F.Supp 773 (D.N.J., 1978) and 471
F.Supp. 166 (D.N.J. 1979).
Inexplicably, the panel determined
that Todd Patterson, now armed with the
additional weapon of Section (e) (7) of the
Privacy Act, providing an explicit remedy
for the improper maintenance of First
Amendment information, has no right to
Similar relief.
As the subsequent section will
reveal, the panel opinion is not only
inconsistent with this Court’s opinion in
Paton v. LaPrade, but misconceives the
meaning and intent of Section (e) (7).
II. THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE
PANEL OPINION TO 5 U.S.C. 552a(e) (7)
EFFECTIVELY GUTS THAT PROVISION AND
NULLIFIES THE INTENT OF CONGRESS,
INADOPTING THE PRIVACY ACT, TO PUT AN END
142a
TO THE PRACTICE OF THE FBI AND OTHER
FEDERAL AGENCIES OF MAINTAINING
INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBING
THEIR EXERCISE OF RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF
SUBSTANTIAL NEED.
The panel opinion betrays its
misinterpretation of the Federal Privacy
Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, in the very first
sentence when it asserts that Todd
Patterson "caused himself to be the
subject of an investigation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation." Opinion! at 2.
Todd Patterson no more caused his own
investigation than did the millions of
Americans upon whom J.Edgar Hoover’s
F.B.I. compiled the dossiers which led
Congress in 1974 to adopt Section (e) (7)
of the Privacy Act to prohibit such
1, All references to the panel’s
opinion of January 8, 1989, shall
hereinafter be refered to as "Opinion at
143a
practices. The purpose of Section (e) (7)
is to prevent "collection of protectéd
information not immediately needed, about
law-abiding Americans, on the off-chance
that Government or the particular agency
might possibly have to deal with them in
the future." S.Rep. 1183, 93d Cong.
Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code & Admin
News 6916, 6971;2 see also Ehlke, The
2. The legislative history quoted by
the appeals panel on page 15 of the
Opinion suggests a misreading of the
legislative history of the Privacy Act and
the interpretation of Section (e) (7). The
quote taken from page 6960 of 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 6916, is
referring only to general information
compiled by an agency, not information
concerning First Amendment activities. If
the panel had continued reading in the
Same legislative history that they cite,
they would have read that records z
concerning First Amendment activities
requires agencies to apply a higher level
of scrutiny. See 1974 U.S. Code and Cong.
& Admin. News 6916, at 6971. Even so, the
panel opinion emphasizes the word
"relevance" in the citation and ignores
the words that follow: "and necessary."
144a
Privacy Act After a Decade, 18 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 829 (1985).
The only thing Todd Patterson did was
exercise his curiosity about foreign lands
and write their governments for
information, a pristine exercise of rights
protected by the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. These
are the rights which Section (e) (7)
declares are not to be "describe[d]" in
F.B.I. files except when they are
"pertinent to and within the scope of an
authorized law enforcement activity."
The panel interpreted "pertinent to
and within the scope of an authorized law
enforcement activity" as to mean merely
"relevant to a law enforcement activity."
By interpreting "pertinent to and within
Opinion at 15.
145a
the scope of" to mean merely "relevant
to", Opinion at 15-16, it applied no
stricter a standard to the collection and
maintenance of records describing activity
protected by the First Amendment than was
already applicable, as a threshold matter,
to records of every kind kept by federal
agencies. This difference in standards
that agencies are to apply to general
information as opposed to information
concerning an individual’s First Amendment
activities was noted by the Office of
Management and Budget in its guidelines:
Whereas subsection (e€)(1) generally
enjoins agencies from collecting
information not "relevant and necessary"
to accomplish a purpose of the agency,
[subsection (e) (7) }
146a
establishes an even more rigorous standard
governing the maintenance of records
reaqarding the exercise of First
Amendment rights.
OMB Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28960,
28965 (July 9, 1975) (emphasis added).
The panel illustrates its
misapprehension of the purpose of the
Privacy Act and the nature of plaintiff’s
(e) (7) claim in a number of points in its
opinion. Footnote 10 in the Opinion and
its accompanying text states that after
having reviewed the documents and the
Greer affidavit, it found nothing
derogatory in the files regarding Todd or
any membes: of his family. Opinion 11. This
statement ignores the derogatory effect
the files have in and of themselves. As
one case put it:
We recognize that even "incidental"
surveillance and recording of
innocent people exercising their
147a
First Amendment rights may have a
chilling effect on those rights that
section(e) (7) was intended to
prohibit.
"The mere compilation by the
government of those records
describing the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms creates the
possibility that those records will
be used to the speaker’s detriment,
and hence has a chilling effect on
such exercise." Nagel v. United
States Department of Health
Education and Welfare, 725 F.2d 1438,
1441 (D.C.Cir. 1984).
McPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d 479,
483-84 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Paton v.
LaPrade, 524 F.2d at 868. Thus, the
panel’s misapprehension of the derogatory
effect of these files illustrates the need
for a rehearing.
The panel opinion also errs on page 3
when it states: "Significantly, Todd
enclosed much of his correspondence in
envelopes bearing the return address of
Laboratory Disposable Products, a business
Todd’s parents operated from their home."
However, the record suggests only that
148a
Todd sent his initial mailing, back in
1983, with this "suspicious" return
address. Subsequent mailings were written
with an "innocent" return address bearing
Todd’s home address, see Transcript of
District Court Proceedings, dated 12-15-
89, at 30-31 (Appeals Appendix at 289-90);
Plaintiff’s Brief for Appeal from Order
Denying 60(b) Motion, dated 10-20-89, at
10-11, thus leaving unanswered the
question as to why Todd’s later mail
bearing this "innocent" return address was
still being brought to the attention of
tie F.B.f.
The second error the panel makes in
the cited statement, is the significance
it places on the fact that the return
address, was in the name of "Laboratory
Disposable Products." Since Todd’s later
mail, even with an "innocent" home return
address was still being brought to the
149a
attention of the F.B.I., the nature of the
return address appears not to have been
determinative as to whether Todd’s mail
was being monitored in some way. What
should have been seen as significant by
the panel was that the F.B.I., once having
ascertained the innocent nature of Todd’s
correspondence, then changed the subject
heading in its files from "Laboratory
Disposable Products" to "Todd Patterson."
Opinion at 4.
The fact that the F.B.I. changed the
heading of its files from "Laboratory
Disposable Products" to "Todd Patterson"
is significant because Section (e)(7) of
the Privacy Act requires independent
justification for the maintenance by an
agency of information describing the
exercise by an individual of rights
protected by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, even if that
150a
information had been properly gathered.
The panel opinion seems to be assuming
that since the investigation of Todd
Patterson was proper, then, the continued
maintenance of the files on him is
similarly proper.3 The "relevancy"
standard put forward in the panel’s
opinion for the justified maintenance of
information on an individual’s exercise of
first amendment rights basically negates
any difference between "collection" and
"maintenance". If a piece of information
3, It is important to note that the
appeals panel decided the issue as to
whether the files maintained on Todd
Patterson were relevant to a law
enforcement activity by an ex parte, in
camera examination of the Geer Affidavit
which put forward defendant’s reasons as
to why the records at issue in this case
are "pertinent and within the scope of a
law enforcement activity." The plaintiff
had no opportunity to challenge the
assertions made in this affidavit that was
crucial in the panel’s decision on this
issue. Opinion at 16.
151a
is relevant enough to a law enforcement
activity to justify its collection, then
this opinion makes it automatically
justified for its maintenance into
perpetuity. It has been plaintiff’s
position that even if the intial
investigation of Todd was justified, once
his identity and purpose were established,
the records compiled should have been
dropped in the wastebasket.
The panel’s interpretation disregards
the plain meanings of the terms "collect"
and "maintain" and disregards the concerns
unique to each action. The absence of an
independent requirement for justifying
continued maintenance would allow an
agency to keep in perpetuity every piece
of information collected in the course of
152a
its operations. The spirit and intent of
(e) (7) of the Privacy Act requires that
such information not be maintained by the
investigating agency:
This section’s restraint is aimed
particularly at preventing
collection of protected information
not immediately needed, about law
abiding Americans, on the off-chance
that Government or-the particular
agency might possibly have to
deal with them in the future.
Senate Report, No. 93-1183 at 6960-
61. The case Macpherson reiterated this
point when it determined that once the
investigating agency had determined that
there had been no violation of any law,
the agency had a responsibility not to
maintain the information gathered on
plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment
rights. MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 482. The
court in that case cited with approval the
language of Jabara v. Kelley:
Merely because [an agency] may
act within its authority by
153a
monitoring the public or private
speeches of a person in the course
of a legitimate security
investigation, does not give
it the right to maintain records
relating to the contents of these
speeches where the investigation
does not focus on a past or
anticipated specific criminal act.
Jabara v.Kelly, 476 F.Supp. 561
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (emphasis in
original) (quoted with approval in
Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1374
(llth Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1984).
MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 483. Thus,
Since the panel applied a faulty standard
to its interpretation of the Privacy Act,
this Court should grant petitioners
request for a rehearing on this issue.
Compounding this error in applying
the wrong standard to information
coilected on an individual’s First
Amendment activities, the panel applied a
lesser standard to the collection and
maintenance of records of First Amendment
activity than that required for records in
— ee
154a
general -- by requiring only that records
maintained by an agency be relevant, and
not both relevant and necessary, to an
authorized law enforcement activity.
The panel opinion appears to have
completely ignored the word "necessary" in
the Privacy Act, where where it mandates
that agencies maintain "only such
information about an individual as is
relevant and necessary to accomplish a
purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or by executive
order of the President." 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(1) [emphasis added].4 The
relevancy standard upheld by the panel
makes the word "necessary" in this act
4. Note that in the quote on the top
of page 15 in the Opinion, the appeals
panel only emphasized the word "relevant"
and that the word "necessary" appears to
be completely ignored.
155a
mere surplusage. However, it is clear
that this word was not intended to be
repetitive but rather was supposed to
create a higher standard for the
collection and maintenance of information
than mere relevancy. As was noted by the
Office of Management and Budget:
The authority to maintain a
system of records does not give the
agency the authority to maintain any
information which it deems useful.
Agencies shall review the nature of
the information which they maintain
in their systems of records to
assure that it is, in fact,
"relevant and necessary."
Information may not be
maintained merely because it is
relevant; it must be both relevant
and necessary.
OMB Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28960 (July
9, 1975). This misinterpretation of the
Act requires that this Court grant a
rehearing en banc on this issue.
Furthermore, the complete absence of
mention of the more rigorous First
Amendment requirements of the Act under
156a
Section (e)(7) makes a rehearing on this
issue all the more imperative.
III. THE DETERMINATION BY THE PANEL
OPINION THAT A FEDERAL COURT MAY DECIDE
DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON THE
BASIS OF IN CAMERA, EX PARTE TESTIMONY IS
INCONSISTENT WITH FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM.
The notion of adversariness is so
central to the American notion of due
process that it hardly merits extended
discussion. A cogent statement is
contained in an article by Justice Alan
Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court:
An unmentioned premise of our
adversary system is that the truth
takes sides. Because we do
not know which side truth has taken,
we let the sides fight it out....The
premise of the modern adversary
system is that an impartial
factfinder, be it jury or judge,
will reach the correct determination
in weighing the evidence that has
been presented to it by the
advocates of each adversary party,
who are dedicated solely to
presenting their client’s position
in the best possible light. In this
157a ~
contest, the truth will out.
Handler, The Judicial Pursuit of
Knowledge: Truth or Justice, 41 Rutgers L.
Rev. 1, 4 (1988). Unfortunately, the panel
has upheld the thwarting of the
adversarial process by allowing the
District Court to reach a decision as to
disputed facts on the basis of evidence
not shared with the losing party.
The District Court granted the
government’s motion for summary judgment
as to all counts of plaintiff’s complaint
after reviewing in camera an affidavit
submitted by the government to justify
actions which on their face appeared to
violate provisions of the Privacy Act
forbidding the F.B.I. from maintaining
information describing how any person
exercised rights under the First
Amendment. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(e)(7). The
court’s opinion conceded that the public
158a
record contained genuine issues of
material fact which would have normally
precluded summary judgment but held that
the secret affidavit had satisfied the
court that the government’s action was
justified; i.e. the District Court decided
contested issues of fact in favor of the
government on the basis of evidence
concealed from the losing party. Appeals
Appendix at 423 (District Ct. Opinion
p.26). The panel upheld this procedure.
Opinion at 16.
The reliance of the District Court
and the panel on the secret Greer
affidavit to rule against plaintiff on
contested issues of material fact sharply
pose the question of the propriety of
courts bound by the due process clause of
the United States Constitution resorting
to secret "Kafkaesque" procedures, to
resolve factual disputes. The panel
159a
asserts that litigation involving alleged
issues of "national security" are of a
special genre exempt from the normal rules
governing federal civil proceedings. In
such cases, it permits two arms of the
government, the executive and the
judicial, to privately confer over secret
documents and together dispose of
citizens’ facially meritorious causes of
action.
To the extent that any such doctrine
is suggested by the language of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d
815 (1984), plaintiff asked the panel and
urges again on rehearing, that such an un-
American principle be rejected.
Moliero also may be distinguished
from the instant case in that the
plaintiff there had already been accorded
"considerable discovery" prior to the
160a
court’s in camera review and the entire
object of the suit was to establish a fact
that was a state secret. See Abourezk v.
Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir.
1986), aff’d 484 U.S. 1 (1987). In the
instant case, plaintiff has been denied
discovery and raises substantial issues in
addition to a right of access to the FBI’s
files.
Even if not distinguishable on the
facts, it is hard to imagine a principle
more destructive of constitutional rights
than this notion of "secret justice." It
abrogates fundamental rights of due
process and confrontation of witnesses and
denies a deserving litigant "the forum
provided under the Constitution for the
resolution of disputes...." Fitzgerald v.
Penthouse Int’l. Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242
(4th Cir. 1985). It is, as the majority
in In Re United States, 872 F.2d 4472
161la
(D.C.Cir. 1989) conceded, a "draconian"
result. 872 F.2d at 477.
Such a procedure is especially
pernicious when applied in litigation
between a citizen and the government
accused of violating that citizen’s
rights. In the present case, the panel
obviously believed that the neutral and
impartial judge will adequately protect
the rights of the litigant who is denied
access to crucial and decisive evidence.
But only in totalitarian regimes is a
citizen compelled to rely totally upon the
largesse of one branch of government in
disputes with another. Even the
independent federal judiciary in our own
country has been held to be too closely
identified with the Executive to allow it
to abrogate the right of jury trial in
Suits for violation of constitutional
rights. As explained by Justice White in
162a
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968):
Those who wrote our [Federal and
state] constitutions knew from
history and experience that it was
necessary to protect against
judges too responsive to the voice
of higher authority. The framers of
the constitutions strove to create
an independent judiciary but
insisted upon further protection
against arbitrary action.... [T]he
jury trial provisions in the Federal
and State Constitutions reflect a
fundamental decision about the
exercise of official power -- a
reluctance to entrust plenary powers
over the life and liberty of the
citizen to one judge or to a group
of judges.
While much of theconcern of the Founders
over "the biased, compliant or eccentric
judge," id., focused on protecting the
criminally accused, that concern is
equally applicable to cases involving
litigation between private citizens and
government agents other than the criminal
prosecutor. That is especially so in a
case such as this one which involves a
=
163a
suit against the law enforcement arm of
government by a citizen suffering injury
as a result of its criminal investigative
activities. Where the stake of the
Government in any single criminal
prosecution is quite limited, its stake is
quite high where government officials are
being actively prosecuted for official
wrongdoing.
Where release of sensitive
information in litigation would truly
jeopardize national interests, the proper
procedure is that enacted by Congress in
the Classified Information Procedures Act,
18 U.S.C. App. 6(c), which puts the
government to a choice in criminal cases
of releasing the information or abandoning
prosecution. In such a way, the conflict
between the right to a fair trial and the
government’s need to protect national
security information can be properly
164a
weighed by the government itself.
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308
(1976), presents an appropriate model. It
held that a valid assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination may subject a civil litigant
to appropriate sanctions, such as the
drawing of an adverse inference at trial.
Similarly, in civil cases such as this,
where plaintiff presents a prima facie
case of violation of fundamental rights,
if the government declines to reveal
material evidence, it ought to be required
to accept the consequence of an adverse
determination of what the concealed
information would demonstrate if
disclosed. At the very most, the
government should be entitled only to
remove the evidence from the case. See
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65
(D.C. Cir. 1983).° Certainly the
———<— 6 LU
165a
government should not be able to keep
information pertinent to a case from its
adversary but simultaneously use it as a
sword to establish a fact upon which it
has the burden to produce evidence --- it
cannot "have its cake and eat it too."
CONCLUSION
In view of the panel opinion’s
inconsistency with this Circuit’s previous
case in Paton v. LaPrade, as well as the
panel’s misapprehension of the Privacy Act
and its use of ex parte, in camera
testimony to decide material issues of
5, As an alternative, plaintiff has
previously suggested that counsel for the
plaintiff be allowed to review the -
| privileged information in camera under
protective order. See United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121,
133 (1977)
i
166a
fact, and considering the importance of
the issues involved in this case,
plaintiff respectfully urges the Third
Circuit to grant a rehearing in banc.
Dated: January 18, 1990
Respectfully submitted,
Frank Askin
Attorney for Todd Patterson
Constitutional Litigation Clinic
Rutgers Law School
15 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
201/648-5687
167a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TODD PATTERSON, a minor Civil Action
under 18, suing by his : No.
father, EDGAR PATTERSON : 88-2319
Plaintiff, : Hon. Alfred M.
: Wolin
Vv.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF >: NOTICE OF
INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE, : MOTION
an unknown employee of : PURSUANT TO
the United States >: RULE 60(b) TO
Government, and JOHN DOE VACATE THE
AGENCY, an unknown agency: JUDGEMENT OR,
of the United State : IN THE
Government, : ALTERNATIVE
>: TO SUPPLEMENT
Defendants. : THE RECORD
TO: SUSAN C. CASSELL, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney
970 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
MADAM:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 8,
1989, at 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter
as counsel may be heard, plaintiff will
move before the Court before the Honorable
Alfred M. Wolin, J.D.C., at the United
168a
States Court House, Newark, New Jersey,
for vacation of the judgment granting of
defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
due to newly discovered evidence, or, in
the alternative, to supplement the record.
The reason for this motion is that
plaintiff has recently discovered that
crucial evidence was withheld from
plaintiff during the Court’s consideration
of defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. Based on this newly discovered
evidence plaintiff believes that vacation
of the judgment is required pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In the
alternative, plaintiff requests that the
Court order that the record be
supplemented to include this newly
discovered evidence. Movant relies in
support of this motion on the attached
memorandum of law and affidavit of Frank
Askin, Esq.
169a
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK ASKIN, ESQ.
Constitutional Litigation
Clinic
Rutgers School of Law
15 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorney for Plaintiff, TODD
PATTERSON, on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey
This 6th day of April, 1989.
170a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TODD PATTERSON, a minor
under 18, suing by his : Civil Action
father, EDGAR PATTERSON : NO. 88-2319
Plaintiff, : Hon. Alfred M.
Wolin
W.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE,
an unknown employee of
the United States
Government, and JOHN DOE
AGENCY, an unknown agency:
of the United States :
Government, : AFFIDAVIT OF
FRANK ASKIN,
Defendants. ; ESQ.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY )
$ ss.
COUNTY OF ESSEX )
FRANK ASKIN, of full age, being duly
sworn according to law, on oath, says:
1. I am attorney for plaintiff, Todd
Patterson, in the above captioned case.
as The Court ruled on defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment on February
17la
27, 1989, granting summary judgment, in
favor of the defendant, on all issues in
this case. This ruling constitutes a
final judgment.
3. By letter dated March 15, 1989,
plaintiff received from Emil P. Moschella,
Chief Freedom of Information Privacy Acts
Section Records Management Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, additional documents
maintained by agencies of the FBI
concerning the activities of the
plaintiff. Such letter and documents are
annexed hereto and numbered Al through
A20.
4. I believe that none of the
documents numbered Al through A20 are
duplicates of documents previously
released by the FBI. My only slight
hesitation in making this assertion as to
each and every one of these doucments is
SS —_— ——~CY
172a
that the extreme redaction makes it
difficult to be absolutely certain whether
a couple of these documents are slightly
altered versions of previously seen
documents.
5. These documents were unavailable
to the Court at the time it rendered its
decision in the above captioned matter, at
which time the Court was under the
mistaken view that defendant had already
supplied all records concerning plaintiff
maintained by the FBI, for in camera
review. Slip Op. at 14.
FRANK ASKIN, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff, TODD
PATTERSON.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 6th
day of April, 1989.
EDWARD LLOYD
Attorney at Law
State of New Jersey
173a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TODD PATTERSON, a minor : Civil Action
under 18, suing by his > 88-2319
father, EDGAR PATTERSON,
>: Hon. Alfred M.
Plaintiff, : Wolin
Vv.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF : NOTIGE OF
INVESTIGATION, JOHN : MOTION FOR
DOE, an unknown employee : RECONSIDERATION
of the United States :
Government, and JOHN DOE
AGENCY, an unknown agency:
of the United Stated :
Government,
Defendants.
TO: SUSAN C. CASSELL
Assistant United State Attorney
970 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
MADAM:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March aT,
1989, plaintiff will apply to this court
before the Honorable Alfred M. Wolin,
J.D.C., at the United States Court House,
174a
Newark, New Jersey, for an order pursuant
to Rule 12(1I) of the General Rules of the
United State District Court for the
District of New Jersey granting
reconsideration of defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgement and for rehearing of
reargument of such motion.
The reason for this motion is that
there are matters and decisions which
plaintiff believes the Court has
overlooked in ruling on defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgement as more fully set
forth in the accompanying Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Attached hereto is a
proposed order requiring that the in
Camera submissions of defendants be
released to plaintiff, that plaintiff be
granted an opportunity to submit a
supplemental affidavit and/or a
supplemental brief pursuant to Federal
175a
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) and 56(f),
and that reargument of defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgement be set at a date and
time to be determined by the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK ASKIN
Constitutional Litigation Clinic
Rutgers School of Law
15 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorney for Plaintiff, TODD
PATTERSON, on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey
this 28th day of February, 1989.
176a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TODD PATTERSON, a minor :Civil
under 18, suing by his :Action
father, EDGAR PATTERSON, >No.
:88-2319
Plaintiff, :
Vv. :Hon.
:Alfred
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 3H.
JOHN DOE, an unknown employee of :Wolin
the United State Government, and =:
JOHN DOE AGENCY, an unknown agency:
of the United States Government, ::
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECONSIDERATION,
REHEARING OR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS BASED ON
EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Clearly provide that summary judgment
shall be granted based solely on fact
admisable in evidence. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(e). These facts may be contained in
177a
documents admissible at trial or
affidavits of witnesses detailing
testimony to be presented at a trial on
the merits. "Rule 56(e) requires that
both supporting [sic] and opposing
affidavits be made on personal knowledge,
set forth facts that would be admissible
in evidence, and show affirmatively that
the affiant is computent to testify to the
matters stated herein." 6 Moore’s Federal
Practice, section 56.11{1.-8] at 56-99
(1988) (footnote omitted). Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on
each count in reliance on an in camera
affidavit submitted by defendants.
Documents withheld from disclosure under
claims of privilege are not admissible as
evidence.
» The consideration of materials
inadmissible in evidence in ruling ona
motion for summary judgment has been held
178a
to provide grounds for reversal or vacatur
of a grant of summary judgment. In
Association for Reduction of Violence v.
Hall, 734 F.2d 63, 67 {lst Cir. 1984), the
First Circuit Court of Appeals faced the
issue of whether it was legitimate for the
District Court to have relied on documents
which it had previously determined to be
privileged and as to which it had denied
plaintiff’s discovery motion. In ruling
that the District Court’s grant to summary
judgment should be vacated and remanded to
the trial court, the First Circuit stated
that it was improper to rely on materials,
specifically materials determined to be
privileged and therefore inadmissible in
evidence, that do not fall within the
broad category established by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(c). Id. at 67.
Similarly, the Court in Bane v.
Spencer, 393 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1968),
179a
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 866 (1970),
emphatically addressed the inequity of
allowing the movant for summary judgment
to rely for its motion on materials
exclusively within its possession and held
exempt from disclosure. In Bane, the
defendant, a doctor, incorporated medical
records into an affidavit in support of
his motion for summary judgment.
Thereafter, the defendant successfully
moved under state law to impound these
medical records, rendering them
inaccessible to plaintiff. In remanding
the action, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit recognized that the District
Court had found that the records contained
nothing of use to the plaintiff. However,
the Court of Appeals then went on to state
that "the defendant should not be able to
use the records as a sword to seek summary
judgment and at the same time blind
180a
plaintiff so that he cannot counter.
Defendant’s affidavit must contain on its
face, for plaintiff to see, whatever
defendant wishes to rely upon to seek
summary judgment." Id. at 109.
The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York extended
the ex parte reasoning expressed in Bane
to a case involving claims of military and
state secret privileges. Kinoy v.
Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In
Kinoy, plaintiff sought damages for
alleged (and subsequently confirmed)
wiretapping. The court reserved decision
on several pending motions to allow the
government to make a formal claim of
privilege as to documents plaintiff had
subpoenaed and to allow the government to
move for summary judgment. 67 F.R.D. at
5. Exhibits were submitted in camera in
connection with both a formal claim of
18la
privilege and the motion for summary
judgment, a course of action which the
district court emphatically rejected:
Simultaneously, therefore,
the Government presents the
Court, in camera, with
material which it asserts must
be withheld from plaintiffs as
privileged, yet which it
requests the Court to consider
in ascertaining material fact
and drawing legal conclusions
concerning dispositive issues
in the case. In this Court’s
view such a course is wholly
unacceptable. Our system of
justice does not encompass ex
parte determinations on the
merits of cases in civil
litigation. Either the
documents are privileged, and
the litigation must continue
as best it can without then,
or they should be disclosed at
least to the parties, in which
case the Court will rule after
full argument on the merits.
67 F.R.D. at 15 (footnote omitted).
As the court in Kinoy suggested,
plaintiff should be allowed access to the
Affidavit of Assistant Director of the FBI
James H. Greer ("Greer Affidavit") and the
——————————————
182a
underlying documents on which the FBI
relies. In the alternative, the documents
should be held formally to be privileged
and should be excluded from consideration
in ruling on the defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Under either
circumstance the plaintiff respectfully
urges that he be granted a rehearing in
order to address the defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment in a fair, equitable
and meaningful manner.
CONCLUSION
| For the aforementioned reasons,
|
plaintiff respectfully requests that his
Motion for Reconsideration be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Frank Askin
Constutional Litigation Clinic
Rutgers School of Law
15 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07192
Attorney for Plaintiff, TODD
183a
PATTERSON, on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey
this 28th day of February, 1989.
184a
February 16, 1989
Hon. Alfred M. Wolin
United States District Court
USPO & Courthouse Bldg.
Newark, New Jersey 07101
Re: Patterson v. Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Civil Action No. 88-2319
Dear Judge Wolin:
This letter is written in response to
the Court’s letter of February 7, 1989
which requested the submission of changes
and corrections to the opinion issued in
the above-referenced case.
At the outset, it must be stressed
that counsel for the plaintiff is at a
distinct disadvantage in attempting to
respond to this invitation. Many of the
findings made by the Court are based on
its in camera inspection of the Affidavit
of Assistant Director of the FBI James H.
185a
Greer ("Greer Affidavit"), which was not
made available to the plaintiff or his
attorney. It is plaintiff’s intention to
respond to that fact with a separate
motion for reconsideration.
Based on the public record, we would
like to note the following errors in the
opinion:
1. Page 3: The sentence at the top of
the page which begins "Significantly"
should be changed to reflect that
envelopes bearing the return-address
"Laboratory Disposable Products" were used
by plaintiff in the initial mailing, see
Affidavit of Todd Patterson, paragraph 3;
however, all subsequent correspondence was
mailed in envelopes bearing the return
address of Todd Patterson.
2. Page 3: The second sentence of the
first full paragraph should be changed to
reflect that damaged, opened, and emptied
186a
correspondence received by plaintiff
originated from both foreign and domestic
sources. See Plaintiff’s Statement of
Material Facts, paragraph 4. Plaintiff
also wishes to make clear for the court
that all of the incoming correspondence
was addressed to Todd Patterson personally
and not to Laboratory Disposable Products.
This change should also be reflected in
the sentence beginning "Finally," at the
bottom of page 5.
3. Page 5: The last sentence of the
paragraph beginning at the bottom of the
page should be changed to reflect that the
FBI only denies wiretapping of the
Patterson’s home phone by the FBI;
however, it does not refute or admit
wiretapping of the Laboratory Disposable
Products phone line. See Declaratfon of
Vernon Thornton, paragraph 5.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that
187a
the above corrections and changes be
incorporated into the final version of the
opinion.
Respectfully,
Frank Askin, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
cc: Susan C. Cassell, Esq.
Clerk, USDC f£or District of New Jersey
188a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSY
TODD PATTERSON, a minor
under 18, suing by his $
father, EDGAR PATTERSON : Civil Action
: No. 88-2319
Plaintiff,
Vv.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF : TRANSCRIPT OF
INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE, : HEARING ON
an unknown employee of : MOTIONS
the United States :
Government, and JOHN DOE
AGENCY, an unknown agency:
of the United States :
Government ;
Defendants
Newark, New Jersey
December 15, 1989
BEFORE:
THE HON. ALFRED M. WOLIN, U.S.D.J.
APPEARANCES:
FRANK ASKIN, ESQUIRE,
Attorney for Plaintiff
SUSAN CASSELL, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, and
JOHN MARLEY, ESQUIRE, F.B.I. Field
Legal Counsel,
Attorneys for Defendants.
Reported by: CHARLES P. MCGUIRE, C.S.R.
Official Court Reporter
189a
* * *
Mr. Askin: ***
Now, turning to the specifics of the
summary judgment motion, and first of all,
as Your Honor has indicated, you’re
interested in Count 1, the Freedom of
Information Act count, and on that count,
which I agree is separable from the other
two but which I think has to be held in a
little bit of perspective until we can
also get through to the substance of
Counts 2 and 3, but on the FOIA dount
itself, the first count is whether the
Vaughn index is adequate, and I would
Suggest, Your Honor, that up to now, the
Vaughn index has not been -- is not
sufficient to satisfy the obligations of
the F.B.I. to explain what it is and what
kind of records they are keeping on Todd
and what he has a right to see, and let me
focus on two pieces of the Vaughn index.
190a
The very first, and again, it’s a
little difficult to separate our demand
for documents from our demand for
information, and of course, our discovery
motion is pending, and at one level, our
demand for documents may, in fact, be less
important than our access to information
contained in those documents, so
therefore, our discovery motion, really,
under Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint, our
Privacy Act claims, our constitutional
claims, it seems to me entitle us to
certain information in those files even if
the Court should decide that we are not
entitled to some of the documents
themselves because of FOIA exemptions
under Count 1.
But on the FOIA claim --
THE COURT: Well, how could you get
the information if you can’t get the
document?
19la
MR ASKIN: We’ve propounded
Interrogatories on the Defendants asking
them certain questions, factual
information contained in their file.
They
don’t have to show us the documents to
give us the information. We may be
entitled to that information separate and
apart from our rights under the Freedom of
Infcrmation Act. The Freedom of
Information Act is separate from the
Federal Rules for civil discovery.
if we did not have a Count 1,
had was Counts 2 and 3, we have a right
1f all
Civil discovery from the Defendants.
cannot at that point invoke FOIA
exemptions to say we don’t have a rig
certain information.
THE COURT: Wouldn’t it
that under the
O
ry
3
(D
ct
O
U
ey)
"tie
Privacy Act, you’re entitled
information, and decline the
document
Even
we
ct
192a
under Count 1?
MR. ASKIN: Oh, absolutely not, Your
Honor, because they’re two separate
questions. FOIA has to do with public
access to Government documents, and
anybody can make a claim for Government
documents; doesn’t even have to be
somebody who’s involved with those
documents. If somebody asks for Todd
Patterson’s files, they’d say, the
Government would say, well, we have to
protect his privacy, so nobody else can
get his files because of his privacy
rights. But if we never at all asked for
the documents, if all we’re doing is suing
the Government for violation of Todd’s
statutory and constitutional rights, we
have a right to engage in civil discovery.
At that point, the Government may make
other objections, they may claim other
privileges to certain information or
193a
certain questions, but they cannot invoke
the exemptions of FOIA. They’re
irrelevant to a civil suit for violation
of Todd’s rights.
So they are separate questions, but
on the FOIA claim itself --
THE COURT: How about if they deal
with national defense or foreign policy as
covered by the Executive Order?
MR ASKIN: Well, there is a military
Secrets privilege. The Government has a
right to assert that. There is a
procedure they have to follow, which they
have not as yet followed. They indicate
that they may be prepared to have the
Attorney General file the necessary claim;
I’m not sure that that’s correct, that
there’s that implication. Then the Court
has to follow through the procedures
announced in the Reynolds case about
whether or not to allow the Claim of what
194a
they call military or state secrets, and
at that level, the Court has to, because
of the need for the information, the fact
that Todd cannot get this information
anywhere else, the Court has an obligation
to very carefully examine into the
validity of the Government’s claim of
state secrets, whether this is really
something --
THE COURT: Haven’t they done that in
their argument to Count 3?
MR. ASKIN: No, Your Honor, I don’t
believe so. They indicated they may be
prepared for the Attorney General to file
that document, first of all, in the
procedure. I haven’t seen the document; I
don’t know if they’re ready to make that
representation in the Court. I assume it
is an act of some policy determination for
the Attorney General do decide, yes, I am
going to file a state secrets privilege
|
195a
claim in this case. Maybe they will,
maybe they won’t.
THE COURT: Maybe we should ask Ms.
Cassell right now.
Ms. Cassell?
MS. CASSELL: Your Honor, we
absolutely are prepared, and the papers
are being prepared in Washington now.
However, it’s our position that we don’t
need them until Your Honor rules on this
motion. If the motion is granted, well,
then, we won’t need to file it. But the
Attorney General has been made aware of it
and they’re in preparation.
THE COURT: OKay.
MR. ASKIN: At that point, then, Your
Honor, the Court would have to follow the
procedure laid out in the Reynolds case,
and as Reyno!ids says, "Where there is
trong showing of necessity on the part of
Y)
the Plaintiff," and I think here we have
ne
196a
strongest showing of necessity as
imaginable, the fact that without the
information, for example, the information
as to what other agencies are involved,
Plaintiff cannot pursue his constitutional
claims, that there is no other possible
source of that information, it says,
"Where there is a strong showing of
necessity, the claim of privileges should
not be ligntly accepted," and then it goes
on to say, "Even the most compelling
necessity, however, cannot overcome the
claim if the Court is ultimately satisfied
that military secrets are at stake."
I must tell you, Your Honor, I have
grave doubts that there are really
military secrets at stake in this case,
and I think the Court would have to very
seriously look at the Attorney General’s
declaration if in fact that claim were
made.
197a
Returning to the Vaughn index, there
are two specific pieces of the Vaughn
index I want to talk about, and again, I
must tell you; sometimes, dealing with
this kind of case, you feel like you’re
playing a game of blind man’s bluff, and
that’s why I think in several cases the
courts have said it is necessary that the
Defendants put all of their Vaughn claims
in one document. Frankly, running, trying
to run through this, you run from document
to document, from the Government’s brief
to the Thomas declaration to the Lieberman
declaration to a second declaration, the
Answers to Interrogatories, trying to
figure out exactly what the claims are in
each instance. But I want to refer
specifically to two pieces of information
hidden in these files which I don’t think
the Vaughn index accurately explains why
we cannot have it.
i i i
198a
The first is a very simple question:
What is Todd Patterson’s file prefix
number, and why won’t they tell us?
Now, let me tell Your Honor, that is
a very, very important piece of
information.
Now, Ms. Cassell has suggested that
in the Laurie Paton case, at the top of
her files was the word subversive. That’s
not true, Your Honor. At the top of her
file was a file number 100, 100, dash,
whatever the rest of her file was. It was
the 100 which labeled that file
subversive, because that’s what the 100
meant in the F.B.I.’s classification
system. The F.B.I. has a very extensive
classification system in which files are
identified by their prefix, two or three
number prefix, if 1t’s about bank
robberies or espionage or national
security or terrorism. The content of the
199a
file, the content of the investigation is
determined by the prefix.
We believe the Pattersons have a
right to know what kind of classification
the F.B.I. has given to Todd’s file.
Maybe it’s under curious precocious
teenager. Now, that wouldn’t upset the
Pattersons too much. Unfortunately, the
last time I looked, the F.B.I. didn’t have
such a classification.
On the other hand, if it’s classified
with a prefix that says investigation of
esplonage or national security matter or
subversive matter, then the Pattersons are
much more concerned about this file being
kept on Todd.
THE COURT: Wouldn’t your concern
diminish if the whole file is expunged?
MR. ASKIN: Some of the concern would
diminish, Your Honor, let me respond to
that, it’s true, and Ms. Cassell says the
i
200a
F.B.I. has now offered to expunge this
file.
Why is that not sufficient for Todd’s
interests at this moment? And frankly,
there are several reasons.
First of all, expunging his file is
no guarantee against repetition. Todd
continues to be curious. He continues to
write to foreign governments. He
continues to seek information. They
expunge his file now, we don’t know that
they won’t start up a new one tomorrow.
So expungement is no guarantee
against Todd’s future rights.
Secondly, he wants vindication of his
rights, including the right to know just
what his Government did to him and exactly
what it recorded about him.
THE COURT: Well, don’t I have to
balance that against national security?
MR. ASKIN: Well, at some point, I
20la
think you probably will, Your Honor, in
fact, and again, if in fact you are
convinced by the Government’s
presentations that somehow, this will
really jeopardize some kind of military
information and state secrets, the
Reynolds case says you have to acknowledge
their claim. But I think that burden is
on Your Honor to carefully examine whether
or not that is really, that there is such
a -- that this is really true, that the
impact on national security would be so
Significant that it really should preclude
Todd from knowing exactly who did what to
his mail, how and whether his
constitutional rights were infringed and
so forth.
I must tell Your Honor I litigated
the Paton case for seven years, and the
Government kept telling us, we can’t
divulge these files because tremendous
a aa,
202a
Gamage to the national security would be
done, and finally, Judge Whipple said
release the files, and suddenly it was
demonstrated there was nothing of the
slightest harm to national security
contained in those files.
Now, unfortunately, it was a
subterfuge, and that’s the problem with
these kinds of cases. The Government
makes these claims, this boilerplate
mumbo-jumbo about damage to national
security interests, and as I say, it’s
very difficult to try to understand
exactly what this is about, and that’s why
the Vaughn index must be so specific and
so detailed.
I mean, I cannot imagine how there
could be, and I think -- I can’t imagine
the Court will think that revealing the
prefix which the F.B.I. has given to
Todd’s file is going to damage national
security.
On the question of these other
agencies, documents four and five, let me
talk about them in regard to the Vaughn
index.
Documents four and five are both
cover letters to which there are
attachments of other pages which the
F.B.I. will not release at all. They have
been totally withheld. There are at least
four pages as I understand the Lieberman
and Thomas declarations. One document has
17 pages attached, of which three
specifically refer to Todd, the other one
has five pages attached, of which one
refers to Todd, and those pages have been
totally withheld from us.
The Government in its explanation in
the Thomas declaration repeats some
boilerplate language about threatened
damage to national security, which,
204a
frankly, is the exact, practically word
for word identical to the boilerplate
language which was offered in the King
case, which the D.C. Court of Appeals says
was inadequate, it’s just boilerplate,
it’s categorical, it doesn’t really mean
anything, it’s over broad, you’ve got to
be more specific, so that the Court can
really understand that, in fact, there’s
going to be -- what kind of danger is
really threatened here.
So those four pages as well as, it
seems to me, all this other information
concerning who it was, I mean, I don’t
know that Ms. Cassell this morning
suggests that there was some agency, and
by the way, on the mail cover, Your Honor,
the F.B.I. says it never tampered with
Todd’s mail. We never said the F.B.I.
tampered with Todd’s mail. We don’t
believe it was the F.B.I. tampered with
205a
Todd’s mail. We want to know what agency
did tamper with Todd’s mail. That’s what
we want to know. We never accused the
F.B.I. of doing it. Ms. Cassell
apparently states there was some kind of
mail cover, it’s the first concession
we’ve had of that, in which some of Todd’s
initial replies from embassies were picked
up.
Now, mail cover is regulated. Judge
Whipple held the mail cover regulation
unconstitutional. Now, the Postal Service
went back and revised its mail cover
regulation subsequent to the Paton case,
but if there is a mail cover in place now,
I don’t know if that mail cover, we don’t
know if it was properly authorized, we
don’t know if it met the criteria required
as a result of Judge Whipple’s opinion and
the new Postal Service regulation. We
think we have a right to inquire into
206a
that. Todd as an American citizen has a
right to write for information, even to
foreign embassies. That is his right as
an American, and I don’t Know under what
authority the F.B.I. -- well, not the
F.B.I., whatever Federal agency, as I Say,
we don’t believe it was the F.B.I., some
other agency claims the right to intercept
his mail to foreign embassies. We think
that’s a legitimate issue for trial in
this case, but first we have to know who
it was that was intercepting it and under
what authority it was being intercepted.
I mean, that is really precisely the same
issue that was involved in Paton v.
LaPrade 16 years ago in this courtroom.
On the issue, continuing the issue of
why expungement of Todd’s file is not an
adequate remedy for him, the fact is, Your
Honor, that every time the F.B.I. gets
caught violating the rights of someone
207a
like Todd and violating the Privacy Act,
it thinks all it has to say is, oops,
sorry about that, let’s just wipe out the
file and make believe it never happened,
and thus placing themselves beyond
judicial review, and the hundreds or maybe
thousands of people who don’t know about
the F.B.I.’s violations of their rights,
who don’t know that the F.B.I. intercepted
their mail and set up a file on them are
never the wiser.
Todd is willing to try to help
Vindicate their rights, too, because he is
interested not only in his own freedom of
inquiry but in living in a society in
which everyone else enjoys freedom of
inquiry as well, because that’s his right
as well as their right, to live ina free
society, and that’s another reason why
Todd would feel strongly about pursuing
this case, about our motion to designate
a
: 208a
this case as a class action, so that other
people, not just those who happened to get
lucky enough and catch the F.B.I. at what
they’re doing, that other people can have
their rights vindicated, and once and for
all make the F.B.I. abide by Section
(e) (7) of the Privacy Act which it has
honored in the breach for the past 14
years.
On the other two counts of Todd’s
complaint, again, initially, the
Defendants ignored them totally. They
tried to treat it as a FOIA case. They
now seem to concede that maybe there’s
something more to this case than that, but
even this morning, Ms. Cassell wants to
suggest that what the Privacy Act is about
is the misuse and dissemination of
information, improper disclosure. She
says the purpose of the Privacy Act is
improper disclosure. That’s not true,
209a
Your Honor. The purpose of the Privacy
Act was to stop the F.B.I. from
maintaining files on hundreds of thousands
or millions of Americans who were doing
nothing more than exercising their rights
of free speech and association under the
Constitution of the United States. That’s
what Section (e)(7) was about. Whether of
not the F.B.I. ever has used this
information, has disclosed this
information, the existence of this file
with possibly a negative prefix on it in
the F.B.I., six file cards somewhere with
Todd’s name on it, six separate files,
three main files, three cross reference
files, two in Washington, four in Newark,
these files sit there.
Todd is a young man with his whole
future ahead of him. He’s interested in
being a Foreign Service Officer. That’s
part of his interest in internal affairs
210a
and what goes on with other countries. He
wants to represent this Government. He’s
uneasy about having these six file cards
and files in the F.B.I. with who knows
what kind of classification on there,
because he’s going to be applying for
Government service, and he has a right, as
other Americans, that the F.B.I. not be
keeping these kinds of files.
We’ve never challenged the right of
the F.B.I. to open this investigation.
Maybe they had the right. Again, maybe it
was illegal on the interception of his
mail, we still don’t know, but if they
found out, somebody, Laboratory Disposable
Products was communicating with a foreign
government, maybe they had the right to go
out and ask some questions. They didn’t
have to start a file: Oh, it’s a
teenager, let’s tear it up, let’s throw it
in the wastebasket, let’s forget about
2lla
this thing right now.
So on Counts 2 and 3, it seems to me
it’s totally premature to even think about
Summary judgment. There are lots of
issues involved, there seems to be lots of
discovery to which we are entitled, and
there are lot of -- I mean, if anybody is
entitled to summary judgment in this case,
it’s probably the Pl
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