Appendix — Patterson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

Supreme Court brief1990

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Un

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

>

TODD PATTERSON

Petitioner,

—_vV.—_—

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE, an un-

known employee of the United States Government and

JOHN DOE AGENCY, an unknown agency of the United

States Government

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Frank Askin, Esq.

(Counsel of Record)

Rutgers School of Law

Constitutional Litigation Clinic

iS Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

(201) 648-5687

on behalf of the American

Civil Liberties Union of

New Jersey

|

7

=

APPER OT 2

E

TABL F CONTENTS

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT DATED

JANUARY 8, 1990, AFFIRMING DISTRICT

COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO

DEFERUANT Osc ccccesececseeeeecececeseseee la

OPINION OF DISTRICT COURT DATED

FEBRUARY 7, 1989, GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS ON ALL COUNTS

OF PLALNTIFY’S COMPLAINT. cc ccccaccvees 21a

OPINION AND ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT

DATED AUGUST 16, 1989, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO VACATE THE COURT’S ENTRY OF

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD... cccsccceses 85a

OPINION AND ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT DATED

MARCH 30, 1989, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION « csc cccvesscecccuene 90a

DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT DATED

FEBRUARY 7, 1990, DENYING PETITION FOR

REHEARING AND REHEARING IN BANC....... 93a

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING IN

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

UNDER RULE 60(b), OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE

TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD ON APPEAL....... 127a

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

RECURSO LUC MRL EON 6 5 8 ee eee eee héeeneeue 133a

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION........ 136a

PLAINTIFF’S LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 16,

1989, IN RESPONSE TO THE DISTRICT COURT’S

REQUEST FOR CORRECTIONS OF ITS OPINION

DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1989 GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS .....-cceeeccces 143a

EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HELD ON DECEMBER 15, 1988......cceeee 147a

PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT... .cccccccccccccccce 184a

AFFIDATE OF TODD PATTERSON........... 198a

AFFIDAVIT OF BETSY SUE ROUGHGARDEN

PATTERSON. .ccccsccccceesccecesscsssees 205a

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

WITH DEFENDANT’S RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS

TO INTERROGATORIES ATTACHED.......... 21lla

COMPLAINT... cccccccccccccsccccssccccce 248a

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS... cc cccccccccccsccscvssases 266a

la

Filed: January 8, 1990

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 89-5342 and 89-5781

TODD PATTERSON, A MINOR suing by his

father, EDGAR PATTERSON

VS.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE,

an unknown employee of the United States

Government and JOHN DOE AGENCY, an unknown

agency of the United States Government

Todd Patterson

Appellant in Nos. 89-5342

and No. 89-5781

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 88-2319)

Argued

November 9, 1989

Before: MANSMANN and GREENBERG,

Circuit Judges, and

2a

GAWTHROP, District Judge.*

Opinion filed: January 8,

(* Honorable Robert S. Gawthrop,

1990

III, of

the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

by designation.)

Frank Askin, Esq. (ARGUED)

Rutgers Constitutional Law

15 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

Susan C. Cassell, Esq.

U.S. Attorney’s Office

970 Broad Street, Room 502

Newark, New Jersey 07102

COUNSEL FOR ALL APPELLEES

Douglas Letter, Esq. (ARGUED)

Robert E. Kopp, Esq.

Department of Justice

Civil division, Room 3617

9th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

sitting

COUNSEL FOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION

OPINION OF THE COURT

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.

3a

These appeals were born of the

ambitious efforts of a sixth grade

elementary school student who, in the

lawful exercise of his constitutional

rights, caused himself to be the subject

of an investigation by the Federal Bureau

of Investigation ("FBI"). The appeals

constitute yet another illustration of the

competing need for disclosure of

information by government agencies and the

need to prevent injury to the national

security.

Todd Patterson ("Todd") appeals from

the district court’s orders granting

summary judgment to the FBI and denying

his post-trial motion filed pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).1

1. The appeals, filed separately from

each order, were consolidated for

4a

We hold that the information Todd seeks

from the federal agency was properly

exempt from disclosure. Therefore, we

will affirm the judgment of the district

s

court.

In 1983, Todd, then a sixth grade

elementary school student, embarked on a

precocious endeavor to write an

encyclopedia of the world as part of a

school project. Deciding that his

school’s resources were inadequate, Todd

wrote to 169 countries requesting

information. Significantly, Todd enclosed

much of this correspondence in envelopes

bearing the return address of Laboratory

disposition by order of the Clerk.

5a

Disposable Products, a business Todd’s

parents operated from their home.

The flood of international

correspondence engendered by the project

attracted the attention of the FBI by

means and methods undisclosed by the FBI.

In late 1983, an FBI agent appeared

unannounced at Todd’s home. The agent

spoke to Todd’s parents concerning Todd’s

activities and was shown the

correspondence received in response to

Todd’s requests. Soon after the visit,

Todd contacted the FBI agent and spoke

with him regarding the school project and

the information requests to other

countries.

As a result of the school project and

6a

the visit by the FBI agent, the FBI came

to maintain a file on Todd.2 The file

contained a directive for the FBI’s Newark

Lon to conduct an appropriate

fa)

tigation of Laboratory Disposable

& ‘.cts in accordance with Attorney

suidelines. Also included in the

[Ss a memorandum, prepared on or about

3, 1984, that changed the

~

—

subject heading from "Laboratory

Disposable Products" to "Todd Patterson."

The memorandum contains a description of

Todd’s project and states "Newark indices

as well as local criminal checks negative

2. The parties dispute the actual

number of files. It is clear from the

record that at least one file was created.

Todd, however, insists that at least six

files exist. This was also the district

court’s conclusion.

7a

on subject" and "(ijn view of the above,

Newark contemplates no further

investigation in this matter." 705

F.Supp. 1033, 1037 (D.N.J. 1989).

The FBI maintains that it conducted

no further investigation after 1983.3

However, a document released by the FBI

dated December 5, 1985, along with five

attachments not released, demonstrate that

as of that date some entity of the United

States Government continued to monitor

Todd’s activities. Todd insists that

surveillance remained in effect because he

continued to receive pieces of mail in

3. Todd subsequently received an

invitation from the Soviet Mission in New

York to visit their facility, which he did

after voluntarily contacting the FBI. He

was requested to and did contact the FBI

following his visit.

8a

damaged condition. In addition, Todd and

his parents report hearing strange

background noises on their telephones

Since 1983.

In April, 1987, Todd requested,

pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act

("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), access to

records the F.B.I. in Washington, D.C.

might be maintaining on him. Todd was

informed that the information he requested

was exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b) (1) and 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2).

Todd appealed the denial of his FOIA

request to the Department of Justice,

Office of Information and Privacy, where

the determination was upheld. Thereafter,

Todd filed a second FOIA request, this

time directed to the FBI’s Newark Field

>

9a

Office.4

In May 1988, Todd initiated a civil

Suit against defendants FBI, John Doe (an

unknown employee of the United States

Government), and John Doe Agency (an

unknown agency of the United States

Government). Todd sought injunctive

relief, damages, and disclosure of the

requested documents. The complaint

presented three distinct causes of action:

(1) failure to comply with FOIA; (2)

violations of the Privacy Act; and (3)

violation of Todd’s First and Fourth

Amendment rights and of 18 U.S.C. § 1702

4. FOIA requests made to the FBI are

limited to files maintained at either the

FBI headquarters or the individual field

office where the request is made.

Appellee’s brief at 27.

10a

and 19 U.S.C. § 482, statutes relating to

the U.S. Mail.

The FBI responded initially to the

complaint by offering to expunge Todd’s

name from its records. The offer was

never accepted. ° Thereafter, the FBI

filed a motion for summary judgment on the

first and second causes of action,

reasserting that the requested information

was exempt from disclosure. As to the

third cause of action, the FBI moved to

dismiss pursuant of Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b) (2). Following oral argument on the

motion and in camera review of the

withheld documents, the district court

5. The FBI indicated at oral argument

that the offer remained open. Todd’s

position, voiced by his attorney, was that

he was unwilling to accept the offer

without first reviewing the documents.

lla

granted summary judgment to the FBI on

February 7, 1989, on all three causes of

action.© 705 F.Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1989).

Todd thereafter filed a motion, pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), to vacate the

judgment or in the alternative to

supplement the record which was denied by

the district court on August 18, 1989. We

have jurisdiction to review the grant of a

motion for summary judgment and the denial

of a Rule 60(b) motion pursuant to 28

U.8.-C. § 3291.

ye

6. Because it had considered matters

outside the pleading, the district court

considered the motion to dismiss the third

cause of action as one for summary

judgment. See infra part II.C.

12a

Todd challenges the procedures

employed by the district court in its

adjudication of the alleged FOIA

violation. In particular, Todd contents

that the record does not justify the

district court’s use of an in camera

affidavit and its further in camera

examination of withheld documents.

In Lame v. United States Dept. of

Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 922 (3d Cir. 1981),

we expressly authorized the use of in

camera affidavits and submissions. We

noted that in the ordinary case, "a Vaughn

index correlating justifications for non-

disclosure with the particular portions of |

the documents requested will generally

suffice to narrow the disputed issues and

permit a reasoned disposition by the

13a

district court." Lame, 484 F.2d 820, 827

(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.

977 (1974).7

However, there are cases, albeit

unusual, where the preparation of a

detailed Vaughn index would require an

agency to disclose the very information

that it seeks to withhold. Under these

circumstances, we require an agency to

Submit a public affidavit setting forth,

in as detailed terms as possible, the

basis for the claimed exemption. Lame,

654 F.2d at 921. The district court must

strive to make the public record as

7. A Vaughn index is an affidavit

which supplies an index cf withheld

documents and details the agency’s

justification for claiming exemption. See

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.

1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).

ae)

l4a

complete as possible, soliciting as much

information as can be willingly released

by the agency. If, however, "the agency

is unable to articulate publicly the

specific disclosure it fears and the

specific harm that would ensue, then in

camera inspection of a more detailed

affidavit must be resorted to." See Ferri

Vv. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, i224 (36 €3aF.

1981), opinion modified, 671 F.2d 768 (3d

Cir. 1982); Phillippi v. Central

Intelligence Agency, 546 F.2d 1009, 1013

(D.C. Cir. 1976). Moreover, to the extent

that any public affidavits may appear

sufficiently descriptive, it may

nonetheless be necessary for the district

court to examine the withheld documents in

15a

Camera to determine whether the agency

properly characterized the information as

exempt. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(4)(B); Lame 654

F.2d at 921; Ferri, 645 F.2d at 1222; see

also Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1012 (FOIA

clearly contemplates that courts will

resolve fundamental issues in contested

cases on the basis of in camera

examination of relevant documents).

We believe the procedural events in

the case sub judice are in accord with

those procedures outlined above. In

seeking discovery from the FBI, Todd

propounded interrogatories questioning,

inter alia, the internal investigatory

procedures of the FBI and the identities

of the persons and agencies assigned to

Todd’s case. The FBI provided answers to

16a

a few of the interrogatories, however, in

most instances it claimed exemption from

disclosure under the states military

secrets privilege and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1)

and § 552(b)(7)(c) of the FOIA. In

support of its claim of privilege, the FBI

submitted the public affidavits of Special

Agents Lieberman, Thomas, and Thorton.

The purpose of the Thomas affidavit was to

provide the district court with a Vaughn

index for the records requested by Todd

and withheld by the FBI. Lieberman’s

affidavit describes the withheld documents

and sets forth justifications for those

withholdings under the FOIA. Lastly, the

Thorton affidavit states that the

Patterson premises had never been the

17a

subject of electronic surveillance and the

FBI was innocent of opening intercepting

any mail directed to the Pattersons.

Ostensibly, the district court found

that these affidavits constituted

sufficient proof of the privileged nature

of the withheld information, for it was

not until after oral argument on the FBI’s

motion for summary judgment that in camera

inspection was ordered. Indeed, the

district court’s order directing the ex

parte review indicated the following:

because certain issues were raised in

Oral argument that were not

adequately addressed in the

Supporting papers, I have concluded

that in camera inspection of certain

withheld documents is required in

order for this Court to assure itself

that the FBI has acted in good faith

with regard to its investigation of

Todd Patterson, that the FBI complied

with all relevant government

18a

regulations, and that the FBI engaged

in no illegal conduct.

This in camera review was necessary with

respect to only two documents.

The FBI complied with the order by

submitting all of the unredacted documents

at issue as well as the declaration of

James Geer, the FBI Assistant Director in

charge of the Intelligence Division.

Geer’s declaration was provided as "an

explanatory affidavit that goes into more

detail than the public affidavits." The

FBI also filed publicly the Declaration

and Claim of Privilege of Attorney General

Thornburgh so as to assert formally the

state secrets privilege.§8

8. The state secrets privilege was

first recognized in United States v.

Reynolds, 354 U.S. 1 (1953). As explained

by the Court,

[i]t may be possible to satisfy the

19a

Thus, the public record consisted of

certain redacted documents initially

released by the FBI, a few answers to

interrogatories, and four affidavits. Not

surprisingly, these materials did not

allay Todd’s interest in the FBI’s files.

Under the circumstances, however, we

believe the public submissions represent a

good faith effort by the FBI to provide as

much access to the information as

court, from all the circumstances of

the case, that there is a reasonable

danger that compulsion of the

evidence will expose military matters

which, in the interest of national

security, should not be divulged.

When this is the case, the occasion

for the privilege is appropriate, and

the court should not jeopardize the

security which the privilege is meant

to protect by insisting upon an

examination of the evidence, even by

the judge alone, in chambers.

345 U.S. at 10.

20a

possible. We can appreciate Todd’s

objections to the anomalous situation of

having to defend against a motion for

summary judgment without being privy to

the very documents necessary for such a

defense. The Court of Appeals of the D.c.

Circuit, which has considered a

Significant number of FOIA cases, has

commented on how this "lack of knowledge

by the party seeing [sic] disclosure

seriously distorts the traditional

adversary nature of our legal system’s

form of dispute resolution." Vaughn, 484

F.2d at 824.9 However, the remedy for the

9. We note that notwithstanding this

imbalance between the parties, the D.C.

Circuit, as well as other circuits, have

allowed the use of in camera affidavits in

national security cases. See e.gq.,

Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir.

1984); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intern.,

Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985);

2la

unfairness is an in camera examination by

the trial court of the withheld documents

and any supporting or explanatory

affidavits. Inasmuch as the record was

made as complete as possible in this

instance, we hold that the proper

predicates for accepting records and

affidavits in camera were satisfied in

this case.

Irrespective of the district court’s

in camera review, Todd argues that summary

judgment should not have been granted

because the FBI failed to sustain its

burden to show the sensitive nature of its

Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 279 (6th

Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863

(1983); and Hayden v. N.S.A., 608 F.2d

L382: -{0. €... Ca. 3979) 3

22a

withheld documents. In reviewing the

grant of summary judgment in proceedings

seeking disclosure of records under the

FOIA, this court’s scope of review is two-

fold: we must determine whether the

district court had an adequate factual

basis for its decision and whether its

conclusion was clearly erroneous. Cuccaro

v. Secretary of Labor, 770 F.2d 355 (3d

Cir. 1985); Lame v. United States Dept. of

Justice, 767 F.2d 66 (1985).

The FBI invoked two exemptions in

support of its denial of Todd’s FOIA

request. The first exemption provides

that documents which are "specifically

required by Executive Order to be kept

secret in the interest of the national

defense of foreign policy," are exempt

23a

from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. §

552(b) (1) (1982). In support of its

position, the FBI submitted the Thomas

affidavit which identifies the relevant

Executive Order in this case as being the

Executive Order on National Security

Information, No. 12356, 3 C.F.R. 166

(1983). Reviewing the Thomas affidavit in

conjunction with Executive Order 12356,

the district court found, and we agree,

that the FEI adhered to the procedural

requirements of the Executive Order when

the withheld FOIA material was classified.

Next, the affidavit indicates that

the documents sought by Todd contain

information made eligible for

Classification by § 1.3(a)(4) of the

24a

Executive Order. Particularly, §

1.3(a) (4) provides that information shall

be considered for classification if it

concerns "intelligence activities

(including special activities), or

intelligence sources or methods." 3

C.F.R. 169. This section must be read in

conjunction with § 1.3(b):

Information that is determined to

concern one or more of the categories

in Section 1.3(a) shall be classified

when an original classification

authority also determines that its

unauthorized disclosure, either by

itself or in the context of other

information, reasonably could be

expected to cause damage to the

national security.

The remainder of the affidavit

includes Thomas’ description of the

documents, the location of the classified

OL

25a

portions, and his assertions that the

material satisfies the classification

criteria of § 1.3(a)(4) and ultimately

presents a threat to the national

security. The district court found

Thomas’ assertions deficient in only two

respects. The district court found his

references to Documents No. 4 and 5 to be

unduly vague and repetitive. Upon in

Camera inspection of the material,

however, the court was convinced that

release of the withheld material

reasonable could be expected to cause

damage to the national security.

We conducted our own in camera review

of the documents and accompanying Geer

affidavit, mindful that when dealing with

documents to which § 552(b)(1) applies

26a

courts are expected to accord "substantial

weight" to the agency’s affidavit. See

American Friends Serv. Com. v. Department

of Defense, 831 F.2d 441, 444 (3d Cir.

1987); see also S. Rep. No. 1200, 93d

Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in

1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6267,

6290. We find that the district court’s

decision has an adequate factual basis and

even on a plenary review we agree with

it.10

The second exemption invoked by the

FBI was § 552(b)(7) fc), which exempts from

disclesure:

10. On the basis of our in camera

review of the documents we have no

hesitation in stating that there is

nothing derogatory in them regarding Todd

Or any member of his family.

27a

(7) investigatory records compiled for

law enforcement purposes, but only

to the extent that the production

of such records would...

(c)constitute an unwarranted invasion

of personal privacy...

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(c).

In considering this claim, the

district court was required to engage in a

de novo balancing test: "weighing the

public benefit which would result from the

disclosure against the privacy interest

and the extent to which it is invaded."

Cuccaro, 770 F.2d at 359. In view of its

finding that the FBI had not participated

in any illegal conduct, the district court

concluded that only a negligible benefit

would inure to the public by releasing the

names of FBI personnel. As a result of

our independent examination of the

28a

documents, we find that the district

court’s conclusion is correct.

Todd also maintains that the blanket

exemption from release of the requested

documents and the Geer affidavit was

overbroad, and that all segregable, non-

sensitive portions of the withheld

documents should have been released. Our

rule in this circuit is that, in response

to a FOIA request, "[a]ny reasonably

segregable, non-exempt portion of a record

is to be made available to the person

requesting that record." Lame, 654 F.2d

at 921. In this case, the FBI did release

certain papers in which extensive

redaction was necessary. Those documents

completely withheld were simply

inappropriate for partial redaction,

29a

except in one instance. The Geer

affidavit contains some non-classified

portions which could have been disclosed.

Responding to questions propounded by this

court at oral argument, the FBI admitted

that the entire Geer affidavit need not

have been withheld. However, the FBI

explained that the non-classified parts otf

that document were available to Todd and

disclosure would be made upon request. We

are not convinced that earlier disclosure

of these non-classified parts would have

affected the outcome of the case. Future

disclosure will at least assuage some of

Todd’s curiosity.11

11. The district court denied Todd’s

request to have his attorney present at

the in camera proceedings. Although Todd

alleges error on appeal, we find that the

issue merits no further discussion.

30a

B.

Todd argues that the FBI violated his

rights under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §

552a(e) (7) by collecting information about

his protected correspondence with foreign

governments and by maintaining records of

his protected activity in permanent,

retrievable files indexed to his name.

The FBI counters with the assertion that

under § 552a(e)(7) of the Act the

requested records are exempt from

disclosure.l2 Concluding that the record:

12. The FBI’s counter-argument in the

district court was that its central record

system is exempt under § 552a(j)(2). The

district court rejected this contention,

finding that the FBI had failed to show

that its records on Todd were compiled

specifically for purposes of a criminal]

investigation. This particular argument

has been abandoned by the FBI on appeal.

3la

were entitled to exemption, the district

court granted the FBI summary judgment on

the second cause of action of Todd’s

complaint.

Our scope of review of the district

court’s determination with respect to

disclosure under the Privacy Act on

summary judgment is the same as that

utilized initially by the district court.

We must decide whether there exists a

genuine issue as to any material fact in

dispute, assuming resolution of any

disputed fact in favor of the party

opposing the motion, and determine whether

the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. Cuccaro, 770 F.2d at

JD «

32a

Initially, and as a question of first

impression in this circuit, we must

interpret the meaning of a portion of §

552a(e) (7). Section 552a(e)(7) prohibits

federal agencies from maintaining records

"describing how any individual exercises

rights guaranteed by the First Amendment

unless expressly authorized by statute or

by the individual about whom the record is

maintained or unless pertinent to and

within the scope of an authorized law

enforcement activitity." 5 U.S.C. §

552a(e) (7) (emphasis added). The precise

meaning of the emphasized portion is not

defined by the statute itself. The

district court compared the decisions of

other circuits which have interpreted this

particular section and adopted a rule

33a

requiring agencies "to demonstrate that

any and all records maintained on an

individual’s exercise of First Amendment

rights are relevant to an authorized law

enforcement activity of the agency, an

that there exists a sufficient basis for

the maintenance of such records." 705

F.Supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original).

It is this definition that the parties now

dispute. Todd argues that agencies should

be made to show a "substantial

relationship" between the records and the

government activity. He insists that a

"relevancy" standard acts to dilute his

First Amendment rights.

Congress’s intent, as revealed in the

statute’s legislative history, is for §

34a

552a(e) (7) to prevent "collection of

protected information not immediately

needed, about law-abiding Americans, on

the off-chance that Government or the

particular agency might possibly have to

deal with them in the future." S. Rep.

No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted

in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News

6916, 697. The history also instructs:

that the kind of information about

individuals which an agency seeks to

gather or solicit, and the criteria

for programs to investigate

individuals will be judged by an

official at the highest policy making

level to be relevant and necessary to

a statutory purpose of the agency.

1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6916,

6960 (emphasis added).

Only four court of appeals have

expressed an opinion as to the standard

35a

warranted when evaluating a claim under §

552a(e)(7). The Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit has held that Section

(e)(7) is violated "to the extent that the

[agency] has engaged in the practice of

collecting protected information,

unconnected to any investigation of past,

present or anticipated violation of the

statutes which it is authorized to

enforce..." Clarkson v. I.R.S., 678 F.2d

1368, 1375 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,

481 U.S. 1031 (1987). A case-by-case

analysis of whether an agency’s actions

were pertinent to authorized law

enforcement activity was adopted by the

court in MacPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d

479 (9th Cir. 1986). Section (e)(7) was

interpreted by the Sixth Circuit as

36a

allowing “investigation with respect to

the exercise of first amendment rights if

such investigation is relevant to an

authorized criminal investigation or to an

authorized intelligence or administrative

one." Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272,

279 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. Genied 464 U.S.

863 (1983) (emphasis added). The Jabara.

standard was adopted in Nagel v. U.S.

Dept. of Heaith, Education and Welfare,

725 Ff. 28 1436, 1441 2.3 (9.6. Cir. 1984).

In our view, a relevancy standard is

more consistent with Congress’s intent and

will prove to be a more manageable

standard than employing one based on ad-

hoc review. The weight of authority

supports a rule requiring a federal agency

37a

to establish some nexus between its files

and classified activities. A burden as

heavy as that suggested by Todd has never

been imposed. We, therefore, hold that a

federal agency defending its maintanance

of records under Section (e)(7) must

demonstrate that its records on an

individual’s exercise of First Amendment

rights are relevant to an authorized law

enforcement activity of the agency. Thus,

the district court’s interpretation of the

section was legally correct.

Applying this standard to the FBI’s

records, especially the Geer affidavit, we

are persuaded, as was the district court,

that the records maintained by the FBI on

Todd’s exercise of First Amendment rights

are relevant to an authorized law

38a

enforcement activity of the FBI.

Continued maintenance of such records also

will not violate any provision of the

Privacy Act. Accordingly, with no issue

of material fact to resolve, the district

court properly entered summary judgment.

Cc.

The FBI filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) as to

Todd’s third cause of action, arguing that

in actions instituted in federal court

under federal law, courts have eliminated

fictitious defendants by motion. In his

motion in opposition to the summary

judgment motion, Todd maintained that

pleading fictitious defendants was

allowable until such time as the real

———

39a

parties in interest, who could only be

identified through further discovery,

could be substituted. The district court

found, as a matter of fact, that the FBI

and any FBI or other government employees

involved in activities concerning Todd has

acted in accord with all applicable |

statutory, regulatory, and administrative

guidelines. Further, the district court

held that the FBI had properly invoked the

state secrets privilege in defense to

Todd’s interrogatories. Because these

findings were made by considering matters

outside the pleadings, i.e., documents

submitted for in camera review, the

district court converted the motion to

dismiss into one for summary judgment, as

is authorized for Rule 12(b)(6) motions,

4Ca

and entered judgment in favor of the FBI.

Todd contends that in treating the Rule 12

(b) (2) motion as one for summary judgment,

the district court denied him the

opportunity to properly defend his

position on merits. The FBI concedes

procedural error but insists that it is

"plainly harmless."

We have had occasion to consider the

procedural distinction between a Rule

12(b) (6) motion and a Rule 12(b) (2)

motion. In Time Share Vacation Club v.

Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61 (3d

Cir. 1984), we explained the mechanics of

a Rule 12(b)(2) motion as follows:

A Rule 12(b)(2) motion, such as the

motion made by the defendants here,

is inherently a matter which requires

resolution of factual issues outside

4la

the pleadings, i.e. whether in

personam jurisdiction actually lies.

Once the defense has been raised,

then the plaintiff must sustain its

burden of proof in establishing

jurisdictional facts through sworn

affidavits of other competent

evidence. Contrary to the dissent’s

suggestion, therefore, at no point

may a plaintiff rely on the bare

pleadings alone in order to withstand

a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to

dismiss for lack of in personam

jurisdiction. See International

Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace

Workers v. Northwest Airlines, 673

F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1982). Once the

motion is made, plaintiff must

respond with actual proofs, not mere

allegation.

Time Share Vacation Club, 735 F.2d at 67

n.9.

In support of this motion, the FBI

submitted the Thornton, Thomas and

Lieberman affidavits and its answers to

interrogatories. Following oral argument

on the motion, the FBI produced the Geer

42a

affidavit and the total collection of

withheld documents. These materials, they

contended, clearly evidenced the

nonparticipation of the FBI in any mail

cover activity. To the extent that the

materials revealed the identities of

another agency or agencies whose

operations concerned Todd’s mailings, the

FBI asserted the state secrets privilege

to prevent disclosure. Todd’s case

consisted of the affidavits of himself and

his mother asserting that he had received

damaged mail.

A careful reading of the district

court’s opinion suggest that the court by

implication decided that an action could

at least be initiated against a John Doe

defendant. Such a determination, however

_—- arate

43a

begs the question whether Todd could

receive any further meaningful discovery,

so as to ultimately identify the real

parties in interest, in light of the FBI’s

assertion of the state secrets privilege.

Finding that "a ’reasonable danger’ that

harm to the national interest will ensue

if defendants are forced to comply with

plaintiff’s discovery requests," the

district court held that the state secrets

privilege had been properly invoked. 705

F.Supp. 1046. The district court then

reasoned that if the record contained no

evidence of abuse by the FBI, and the

privilege applied to other information

known to the FBI, then the case presented

no issue of material fact and should be

- 44a

dismissed accordingly.

A Rule 12(b) (2) motion cannot be

treated as one for summary judgment.

There are situations, however where "the

question of the district court’s

jurisdiction [is] entwined with the

ultimate question on the merits."

International Ass’n of Machinists v.

Northwest Airlines, 673 F.2d 700, 710 (3d

Cir. 1982). In such circumstances, it may

be necessary for the district court "to

proceed to a decision which impacts on the

merits." Id,; see also Land v. Dollar,

330 U.S. 731, 739 (1947) (district court

had jurisdiction to determine its

jurisdiction by proceeding to a decision

on the merits).

The facts of this case present this

45a

type of complicated review. At the time

the Rule 12(b)(2) motion was filed, Todd

had already received certain redacted

papers, three affidavits and answers to

interrogatories. After in camera review

of the withheld documents, the district

court concluded that Todd could not secure

any further discovery. The John Doe

defendants would thus remain unknown.

Since they suit could not be maintained

against a fictitious party, the district

lacked in personam jurisdiction.

We find it insignificant that the

district court treated the Rule 12(b) (2)

motion as one for summary judgment and

dismissed the cause of action for lack of

a genuine issue of material fact.13 Such

13. We can affirm, if the result

reached by the district court is correct,

46a

a finding is beyond the initial and

necessary inquiry of whether in personam

jurisdiction actually lies. The FBI’s

evidence, both public and in camera

materials, convinces us that (1) the FBI

is not of the John Doe Defendants, and (2)

the FBI is shielded from further

disclosure by the state secrets privilege.

Todd thus failed to sustain his burden or

proof in establishing in personam

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the cause of

action was properly dismissed.

D.

An order denying a motion for relief

even though our reasoning differs from

that of the district court. See Tunnell

v. Wiley, 514 F.2d 971, 975 n.4 (3d Cir.

1975).

47a

from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

60 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Laskey v. Continental Products Corp., 804

F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1986). In view of the

facts of this case, we find no evidence

that the district court abused its

discretion in denying Todd@’s Rule 60(b)

motion.

Lik.

For the foregoing reasons, we will

affirm the judgment of the district court

in both appeals.

48a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TODD PATTERSON, etc., : Civil Action

: No.

88-2319

Plaintiff,

Vv.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF “+ OPINION

INVESTIGATION, et al., :

Defendants.

APPEARANCES: FRANK ASKIN, ESQ.

Constitutional Litigation

Clinic

15 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

(Attorneys for Plaintiff)

SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. ESQ.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

BY: SUSAN C. CASSELL, ESQ.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

970 Broad Street -

Newark, New Jersey 07102

(Attorneys for Defendants)

49a

WOLIN, District Judge

Currently before the Court is the

motion of defendant Federal Bureau of

Investigation ("FBI") for summary judgment

as to the first and second causes of

action of plaintiff Todd Patterson’s

complaint and to dismiss the third cause

of action. For the reasons set forth

below, and after having reviewed in camera

documents withheld by the FBI, the Court

grants summary judgement in favor of the

FBI dismissing the first, second and third

causes of action of plaintiff’s complaint.

However, in consideration of the FBI’s

offer to expunge the name of plaintiff

from any files it may possess, the Court

encourages the FBI to abide by its offer

and to expunge the plaintiff’s name from

all files, indexes or records maintained

50a

by the FBI that encompass the First

Amendment activities of Todd Patterson.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case vividly

illustrate the parental concern and public

consternation which can be produced when

the apparently remote world of high-tech

intelligence and counter-intelligence is

applied to the everyday world of grade

school and school projects in the name of

national security.

In 1983, plaintiff Tode Patterson,

then a sixth grade elementary school

student, decided to write an encyclopedia

of the world. Not being content with the

local library’s resources, Tcdd undertook

to write to all the countries of the

world, 169 in all, to obtain information.

Significantly, plaintiff enclosed much of

5la

his correspondence in envelopes bearing

the return address of Laboratory

Disposable Products, a business Todd’s

parents operate from their home.

The flood of international

correspondence which Todd’s project

engendered apparently caught the eye of

the FBI, through means and methods which

the FBI does not wish revealed on account

of national security concerns. Todd and

his parents contend that many pieces of

mail from foreign countries were received

in damaged condition, particularly mail

from the Soviet Union. The FBI, through

affidavits and other Supporting papers,

denies any responsibility for opening or

damaging Todd’s mail.

What is undisputed is that, besides

mail, Todd’s project also caused Todd to

receive a visit from the FBI. In late

52a

1983, Agent John E. Butenschoen, from the

FBI’s Parsippany, New Jersey branch,

appeared unannounced at the plaintiff’s

home in North Haledon, New Jersey. Agent

Butenschoen spoke to Todd’s mother and

father, the latter by telephone,

concerning Todd’s project. Agent

Butenschoen was shown Todd’s room, the

correspondence received by plaintiff, and

the purpose Todd was using the

correspondence for.

Agent Butenschoen requested that

plaintiff, who was at elementary school at

the time of the visit, call the agent.

Soon after the visit, Todd did call Agent

Butenschoen and spoke with him regarding

plaintiff’s project and his information

requests to other countries.

As a result of Todd’s project and the

visit by Agent Butenschoen, it is clear

' a

53a

that the FBI came to maintain at least one

file on the plaintiff. Lieberman

Affidavit, p. 7. On or about July 13,

1983, an FBI airtel was written relating

to Laboratory Disposable Products. The

document requested that the Newark

Division "conduct appropriate

investigations regarding the captioned

company in accordance with Attorney

General Guidelines." Defendant’s Notice

of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B,

Document No. 1.

After Agent Butenschoen’s visit to

Todd’s home, and apparently as a result of

his investigation of the matter, an FBI

memorandum was written on or about

February 23, 1984. Defendants’ Notice of

Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B.

Document No. 2. This document changed the

subject heading from "Laboratory

54a

Disposable Products" to "Todd Patterson."

The memorandum contains a description of

Todd’s project and further states "Newark

indices as well as local criminal checks

negative on subject" and "[{ij]Jn view of the

above, Newark comtemplates no further

investigation in this matter." The

memorandum demonstrates that once the FBI

learned the source of the international

correspondence was not an entity called

"Laboratory Disposable Products" but was

in reality a seventh grader involved in a

school project, the FBI wisely concluded

that no espionage was being committed.

While Agent Butenschoen’s visit to

the Pattersons and the February 23, 1984

memorandum should have been the end of the

matter, the Patterson’s involuntary foray,

whether real or imagined, into the eis

of counter-intelligence and national

55a

security was not yet complete. During the

summer of 1984, Todd Patterson received an

invitation for a visit from the Soviet

Mission in New York City. Concerned that

the FBI was somehow monitoring plaintiff’s

activities, plaintiff’s father requested

that Todd contact Agent Butenschoen. Todd

did so and informed the agent of the

invitation. The agent requested that Todd

report back to him after the visit.

Affidavit of Todd Patterson, p. 3. Todd’s

visit to the Soviet Mission and his

subsequent "de-briefing" apparently went

off without incident.

The FBI continues to maintain that it

conducted no further investigation of

plaintiff after 1983. Defendant’s Reply

Memorandum, p. 3. However, an airtel

dated December 5, 1985, released by the

FBI, along with five attachments that were

56a

not released, demonstrates that as of that

date some entity of the United States

Government continued to conduct activities

that involved the plaintiff. Defendant’s

Notice of Motion, Exhibit B, Document No.

5. The FBI responds, somewhat

cryptically, that "(t]he specifics of how

that 1985 airtel information came to the

FBI is, of course, covered by the military

and state secrets privilege, but it was

not through any further investigation by

the FBI." Defendant’s Reply Memorandun,

Finally, throughout the entire period

of plaintiff’s contact with the FBI and

other unknown forces of counter-

intelligence, up to the present, plaintiff

maintains that at least 50 pieces of mail

have been received in damaged condition,

most of which originated in the Soviet

57a

Union. Plaintiff’s Statement of Material

|Facts, 49. Plaintiff and his parents also

"report of hearing strange background

_noises on their telephones since 1983.

| Indeed, a now deceased employee of the

Pattersons is said to have heard a voice

say "Operator, this is not the phone I

want tapped." Id. at q16.14 The FBI

strenuously refutes the Patterson’s

allegations of mail tampering and

wiretapping, and the FBI characterizes the

employee’s story as an attempt to feed

"Mr. Patterson’s paranoid fantasy of

governmental wiretapping." Defendant’s

Reply Memorandum, p. 2.

14. The Court notes that the

employee’s story, while ominous sounding,

is inherently unreliable and, because of

the employee’s death, inadmissible

hearsay.

58a

In early 1987, plaintiff learned that

he could request access to records the FBI

might be maintaining on him through use of

the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") .1°

Pursuant to FOIA, plaintiff made a request

to the FBI in Washington, D.C. for "copies

of my personal file in your records."

Exhibit A-7 to defendant’s notice of

motion for summary judgment. By letter

dated August 12, 1987, plaintiff was

informed that "(t]he information

pertaining to you in FBIHQ records is

exempt from disclosure pursuant to Title

5, United States Code, Section 552(b) (1)

and Title 5, United States Code, Section

i858. § U.S.C. §552 (1982 & Supp. II

(1985) (as amended by Freedom of

Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.

No. 99-570, Subtit. N, §§1801-1804, 100

Stat. 32076, 3248-3250 (1986)).

59a

552a(j)(2)."

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his

FOIA request by letter from his father to

the Department of Justice’s Office of

Information and Privacy. On October 20,

1987, Richard L. Huff, co-director of the

Office of Information and Privacy,

notified plaintiff that his FOIA appeal

had been denied. Plaintiff was also

notified of his right to seek judicial

review of the agency’s determination in

the United States District Court. One

month later, Huff wrote to inform the

Pattersons that, after a further review of

Todd’s request, six pages of the

plaintiff’s file were being declassified.

Exhibit A-11. In March, 1988, plaintiff

60a

initiated a second FOIA request, this time

directed at the FBI’s Newark Field Office.

In May of 1988, Todd initiated a civil

suit through his father, Edgar Patterson,

against defendants FBI, John Doe, an

unknown employee of the United States

Government, and John Doe Agency, an

unknown agency of the United State

Government.1© plaintiff’s suit seeks

injunctive relief and/or damages under

16. Plaintiff’s suit originally

concerned only plaintiff’s FOIA request to

the FBI’s Washington office. However, in

the interests of judicial economy, this

Court and defendant are treating

plaintiff’s second FOIA request as part of

this action, and the FBI has released the

pertinent de-classified documents, in

redacted form, complying with plaintiff’s

second request, and has included the

justification for the redactions in the

declarations and motions filed in this

action. Defendant’s Supporting

Memorandum, p. 2, n. 1l.

6la

three distinct causes of action: failure

to comply with FOIA; violations of the

Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §552a et seq., as a

result of the FBI’s maintenance of files

describing plaintiff’s exercise of rights

guaranteed by the First Amendment; and

violations of plaintiff’s First and Fourth

Amendment rights and of 18 U.S.C. §1702

and 19 U.S.C. §482, statutes relating to

the U.S. mail.

On September 26, 1988, the FBI filed

the summary judgment motion now before the

Court. At the close of oral argument on

defendant’s motion, the Court reserved

decision and ordered the defendant to

submit an in camera affidavit establishing

a rational link between specific law

enforcement objectives and statutes and

62a

the files which the FBI maintained on the

First Amendment activities of the

plaintiff. Subsequent to oral argument,

the Court further ordered that the FBI

submit to the Court for in camera

inspection certain specified documents

which the FBI is seeking to withhold from

tne plaintiff. Letter and Order, December

30, 1988 (attached as Appendix A to this

Opinion). The FBI responded to the

Court’s order by submitting for in camera

inspection by the Court the entire content

of records maintained by the FBI

concerning plaintiff’s FOIA request. The

defendant also formerly invoked the

military and state secrets privilege in

response to discovery sought by the

63a

plaintiff by means of an affidavit of

Attorney General Dick Thornburgh dated

January 13, 1989.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s FOIA Claim

In all FOIA cases, the role of the

District Court is to review de novo all

agency claims that materiai requested

pursuant to FOIA is subject to an

exemption contained in the statute.17 In

such a case, the agency bears the burden

of justifying its decision to withhold

requested information.18 King vs. U.S.

Dept. of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.

Cir. 1987); Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773,

17. 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (4) (b) (1982).

is. “ia.

64a

776 (1984). The agency may meet this

burden through the filing of affidavits

that describe the material withheld and

articulate why the material falls within

the claimed exemption. King, 830 F.2d at

217; Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656

F.2d 724, 738 (1981). In the present

case, the FBI claims that the withheld

material falls under Exemption 1 of FOIA,

relating to National Security, and

Exemption 7, concerning protection of

privacy.

1. Exemption 1 - National Security

Exemption 1 of FOIA enables an agency

to refrain from disclosing information

that is "specifically authorized under

criteria established by an Executive Order

65a

to be kept secret in the interest of the

national defense or foreign policy

and...are in fact properly classified

pursuant to such Executive Order." 5

U.S.C. §552 (b)(1). The relevant

Executive Order in this case is Executive

Order on National Security Information,

No. 12356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14874, issued by

President Reagan on April 2, 1982,

becoming effective on August 1, 1982.

When determining if an agency has

properly withheld information pursuant to

Execption 1, a district court, as in all

FOIA cases, must conduct a de novo review.

However, both the legislative history of

FOIA and the subsequent caselaw suggest

that courts must "accord substantial

weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning

66a

the details of the classified status of a

disputed record" given that "executive

departments responsible for national

defense and foreign policy matters have

unique insights into what adverse effects

might occur as a result of public

disclosure." Salisbury v. United States,

690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

(quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93 Cong. 2d

Sess. 12 (1974) (conference report)

reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News

1974, pp. 6267, 6290); accord King vs.

U.S. Department of Justice, 830 F.2d at

217 ("The court owes substantial weight to

detailed agency explanations in the

national security context.").

Even with the substantial weight

67a

standard, a court should grant summary

judgment to an agency invoking Exemption 1

only if the agency supplies affidavits]?

that describe the withheld documents and

the justifications for non-disclosure in

sufficient detail and particularity so as

to demonstrate that "material withheld is

logically within the domain of the

exemption claimed." King v. U.S.

Department of Justice, 830 F.2d at 217.

Moreover, a court should refrain from

considering the agency affidavits

dispositive if there is contradictory

evidence in the record or if the specter

19. An affidavit which supplies an

index of withhold documents detailing the

justification for exemption claims has

come to be known as a Vaughn index.

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.

1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, 94S.

Ct. 1564 (1974).

68a

of agency bad faith is demonstrated to the

court. Id.; Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d at

776; Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656

F.2d at 738.

In the case at hand, the FBI has

produced the affidavit of Special Agent

Philip W. Thomas to serve as a Vaughn

index with regard to the application of

Exemption One to plaintiff’s FOIA

requests. As the relevant section of

FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §552 (b) (1), requires, the

Thomas affidavit seeks to demonstrate that

the withheld material is under the purview

of an Executive Order and has been

properly classified pursuant to such

oraer.

Taking the procedural requirement

69a

first, the Court is satisfied that the

Thomas affidavit sufficiently establishes

that the FBI adhered to the procedural

requirements of Executive Order 12356 when

the withheld FOIA material was classified.

EO 12356, §§1.5(a)(1)-(4), 1.6.

Turning to the substantive

requirement of EO 12356, the Court must

evaluate the merits of the Thomas

affidavit’s assertion that the withheld

material fits under the classification

criteria of EO 12356. The Thomas

affidavit places its reliance on EO 12356,

§1.3(a) (4), which provides:

§1.3 Classification Categories

(a) Information shall be

considered for classification

1f 1t concerns:

(4) intelligence activities

including special activities),

70a

or intelligence sources oF

methods. ~

The above provision must be read

in conjunction with EO 12356,

§1.3(b):

Information that is determined

to concern one or more of the

categories in Section 1.3(a)

shall be classified when an

original classification

authority also determines that

its unauthorized disclosure,

either by itself or in the

context of other information,

reasonably could be expected to

cause damage to the national

security.

The FBI’s choice to rely on the

sources and methods classification

category of the Executive Order struck the

Court as eminently sensible considering

the unlikelihood that any intelligence

collected on a grade school student such

as Tood would directly implicate the

71a

security of the Republic. However, upon

initial review, the Court was unconvinced

that the Thomas affidavit sufficiently

demonstrated that the material withheld by

the FBI in response to plaintiff’s FOIA

request belonged under the purview of EO

12356 §1.3(a) (4), and that release of the

withheld material reasonably could be

expected to cause damage to the national

security. In particular, the Court found

that the Thomas Affidavit was unduly vague

and repetitive in referring to the

withholding of Document No. 4 in Exhibit F

of the FBI’s notice of motion, a one-page

FBI airtel dated January 6, 1984, along

with 17 attached pages, and Document No.

5, a one-page FBI airtel dated December 5

,

72a

1985, along with five attached pages. 29

20. The relevant protion of the

Thomas affidavit states:

(35) Document 4 has 17 separate

attachments which are classified

’Secret’ in their entirety. These

attachments contain specific,

detailed information provided by an

intelligence source, method or

activity. The information is

of such detail that it may pinpoint

a critical time frame, reflect a

special vantage point, or reveal a

style of reporting peculiar to that

source, method or activity, any of

which, if disclosed would reveal the

source of the information. Thus

exposed, the source’s methods, or

activity’s effectiveness would be

terminated and could reasonably be

expected to result in identifiable

damage to the national security. A

further discussion of the types of

damage to the national security has

been previously set forth at

Paragraphs 12-14, Supra.

zkxk

(41) Document #5 has 5 separate

attachments which are classified

’Secret’ in their entirety. These

attachments contain specific,

detailed information provided by an

intelligence source, method, or

activity. The reasons for

classifying this type of detailed

73a

While mindful of the limitations

faced by the FBI in its attempt to

describe why classified material is exempt

from FOIA, the Court was concerned that

allowing the FBI’s cursory description of

24 pages of withheld material to suffice

would not comport with this Court’s task

of conducting a meaningful de novo review

of defendant’s decision to withhold

material under FOIA. Therefore, the Court

ordered the FBI to submit the relevant

withheld material for in camera

inspection, although cognizant of the

presumption that recourse to in camera

inspection of classified documents should

not be resorted to lightly. See Church of

information have been previously set

forth at Paragraph 35, supra.

74a

Scie oay v. U.S. Department of the

Army, 611 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir 1979)

(citations omitted).

In this case, the Court found in

camera inspection of the relevant

documents to be the best means available

to render substantial justice to

plaintiff’s claims, yet also insure that

any legitimate intelligence activities,

sources or methods of the government

remain protected against public

disclosure. Having now conducted such an

in camera inspection of the original,

withheld material and the additional

affidavit of Assistant Director of the FBI

James H. Greer ("Greer Affidavit"), the

Court finds that the material withheld by

75a

the FBI falls under the purview of EO

12356 §1.3(a)(4), and that release of the

withheld material reasonably could be

expected to cause damage to the national

security.

An agency asserting the national

security exemption to FOIA need not

demonstrate that an actual or substantial

risk to the national security would result

if the requested material were to be

released. All that is required is for the

agency to make a plausible showing that

release of withheld documents would create

a reasonable expectation of damage to the

national security. Halperin v. Pe ee

629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The

withheld material, read in conjunction

with the Greer affidavit, does establish a

76a

logical connection between each withheld

or redacted document and the risk that

certain intelligence methods or sources

would be compromised if the withheld

material was released.

Furthermore, the Court is convinced

that the representations of the FBI, as

expressed in the Thomas and Greer

Affidavits, are not controverted either by

contrary evidence in the record or

substantive evidence of agency bad faith,

and that the FBI did not run afoul of EO

12356’s warning that:

In no case shall information be

classified in order to conceal

violations of law, inefficiency, or

administrative error; to prevent

embarrassment to a person,

organization, or agency; to restrain

competition; or to prevent or delay

the release of information that does

77a

not require protection in the

interest of national security.

EO 12356, §1.6(a).

The plaintiff’s allegation that much

of his international correspondence

arrived in damaged condition, when

evaluated in conjunction with the

documents inspected by this

Court in

camera, does not support a finding that

the FBI illegally opened plaintiff’s mail

Or create a genuine factual

whether any instrumentality

States Government illegally

with plaintiff’s mail. The

mail traveled, the size and

envelopes, and the naticnal

issue of

of the United

interfered

distance the

content of the

Origin of the

mail are the far more likely culprits in

assessing why plaintiff’s mail may have

78a

arrived in damaged condition. Also,

plaintiff’s allegation of electronic

eavesdropping is not substantiated by any

substantive, credible or admissable

evidence, and, as such, cannot support any

finding of bad faith on the part of the

FBI.

It is unfortunate that plaintiff’s

ambitious project has caused classified

documents to be prepared about him. At

first blush, the investigation appears

ludicrous. However, a review of the facts

suggests that the rate of plaintiff’s

correspondence and plaintiff’s use of

return envelopes marked "Laboratory

Disposable Products" could be expected to

prompt the FBI to collect information

about the correspondence using properly

79a

Classified intelligence sources and

methods. This fact, taken in conjunction

with the Court’s in camera inspection of

the withheld documents, necessitates a

finding, upon de novo review, that the FBI

properly withheld material pursuant to

Exemption One of FOIA. Therefore, the

Court will grant summary judgment

dismissing plaintiff’s FOIA Claim.

2. Exemption 7 - Investigatory

Records and Invasion of Privacy

Because the Court finds that the FBI

has properly withheld requested documents

under Exemption One to FOIA, the Court

need not consider at length the FBI’s

attempt to withhold names of FBI agents

and employees who worked on the Patterson

case through invocation of §552(b) (7) (Cc),

80a

which exempts from disclosure:

(7) investigatory records

compiled for law enforcement

purposes but only to the extent that

the production of such records

would...(C) constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal

Drivacy...-.

The Court finds that the relevant

caselaw supports the view that Exemption

7(C) of FOIA can apply to the invasion of

privacy of law enforcement personnel,

identification of whom "could conceivably

subject them to harassment and annoyance

in the conduct of their official duties

and in their private lives." Nix v.

United States, 572 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.

1978). The possibility of invasion of the

privacy of law enforcement personnel must

be balanced "against the public benefit

8la

that would result from disclosure." Lane

v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 654 F.2d 917,

923 (3d Cir. 2083}.

In the case at hand, the public

benefit that would result from releasing

the names of FBI personnel involved in the

investigation of Todd Patterson is

negligible, particularly in view of the

Court’s finding that the FBI engaged in no

illegal conduct in regard to its

investigation of plaintiff. Therefore,

the FBI properly invoked Exemption Seven

to justify the withhoiding of the names of

FBI personnel in response to plaintiff’s

FOIA. request.

B. Plaintiff’s Privacy Act Claim

The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §552(a)

(1982), like the Freedom of Information

82a

Act, “demonstrates a congressional desire

to foster open government and

accessibility to government records."

Vymetalik v. F.B.I., 785 F.2d 1090, 1092

(D.c. Cir. 1986). The Privacy Act is

primarily designed to make government

agencies more accountable regarding the

gathering, disseminating and accuracy of

records maintained in government files

about individuals. The Act limits the

discretion of agencies to collect and

maintain information about individuals and

requires that government records by

maintained “with such accuracy, relevance,

timeliness, and completeness as is

reasonably necessary to assure fairness to

the individual[.]" Greentree v. U.S.

83a

Customs Service, 674 F.2d 74, 76 (D.C.

Cir. 1982) (discussing the purposes and

history of the Privacy Act.

In his second cause of action,

Plaintiff relies on §552a(e) (7), which

provides:

(€) Agency requirements. - Each

agency that maintains a system of

records shall-

(7) maintain no record

describing how any individual

exercises rights

guaranteed by the First Amendment

unless expressly authorized by

statute or by the individual

about whom the record is

maintained or unless pertinent to

and within the scope of an

authorized law enforcement

activity;

An individual can enforce a violation

of §552a(e)(7) by bringing a civil suit

pursuant

to §552a(g)(1).21

>

Whenever

(g)(1) Civil Remedies. -

any agency

wey

84a

As a preliminary matter, the FBI

(A) makes a determination under

subsection (d)(3) of this

section not to amend an

individual’s record in

accordance with his request, or

fails to make such review in

conformity with that subsection;

(B) refuses to comply with an

individual request under

subsection (d)(1) of this

section;

(C) fails to maintain any record

concerning any individual with

such accuracy, relevance,

timeliness, and completeness as

is necessary to assure fairness

in any determination relating to

the qualifications, character,

rights, or opportunities of, or

benefits to the individual that

may be made on the basis of such

record, and consequently a

determination is made which is

adverse to the individual; or

(D) fails to comply with any

@ther provision of this section,

or any rule promulgated

thereunder, in such a way as to

have an adverse effect on an

individual, the individual may

bring a civil action against the

85a

claims to have exempted its central

records system from the civil remedy

provision of the Privacy Act through

promulgation of 28 C.F.R. §16.96.

However, that rule exempts the central

records system "only to the extent that

information in this system is subject to

exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. [§]

552[a](j) and (k)." Section 552(43)(2), in

agency, and the district courts

of the United States shall have

jurisdiction in the matters

under the provisions of this

subsection.

(2) (A) In any suit brought under the

provisions of subsection (g)(1)(A) of this

section, the court may order the agency to

amend the individual’s record in

accordance with his request or in such

other ways as the court may direct. In

such a case the court shall determine the

matter de novo.

86a

turn, allows an agency to exempt records

only to the extent they were compiled for

purposes of a criminal investigation. 22

22. Section 552(j) provides:

(j) General exemptions. - The head

of any agency may promulgate rules,

in accordance with the requirements

(including general notice) of

sections 553(b)(1), (2), and (3),

(c), and (e) of this title, to exempt

any system of records within the

agency from any part of this section

except subsections (b), (c)(1) and

(2), (e(4) (A) through (F), (e) (6),

(7), (9), (10), and (11), and (1) if

the system of records is-

(1) maintained by the

Central Intelligence

Agency; or

(2) maintained by an agency

or component thereof which

performs as its principal

function any activity

pertaining to the

enforcement of criminal

laws, including police

efforts to prevent,

control, or reduce crime or

to apprehend criminals, and

the activities of

87a

The FBI cannot claim that all of its

Prosecutors, courts,

correctional, probation,

pardon, or parole

authorities, and which

consists of

(A) information compiled

for the purpose of

identifying individual

Criminal offenders and

alleged offenders and

consisting only of

identifying data and

notations of arrests, the

nature and disposition of

Criminal charges,

sentencing, confinement,

release, and parole and

probation status;

(B) information compiled

for the purpose of a

criminal investigation,

including reports of

informants and

investigators, and

associated with an

identifiable individual; or

(C) reports identifiable to

an individual compiled at

any stage of the process of

enforcement of the criminal

laws from arrest or

88a

records must necessarily be considered as

compiled for purposes of criminal

investigation merely by virtue of the

function that the FBI serves. Vymetalik,

785 F.2d 1090, 1095; Pratt v. Webster, 673

F.2d 408, 415 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

Instead, the FBI must adequately

demonstrate that its recorgs on plaintiff

were compiled specifically for purposes of

a criminal investigat,on. In the case at

bar, the FBI has not made such a showing.

indictment through release

from supervision.

As shown by the above language, §552(j) (2)

also allows an agency to exempt records

related to identifying criminal offenders

or compiling reports about individuals

after indictment or arrest. However, only

category (B) information related to a

criminal investigation is pertinent here.

89a

Because of this, the FBI cannot properly

contend that the plaintiff’s Privacy Act

claim is barred by the FBI’s regulation

exempting the FBI’s central records system

from the civil remedy provision of the

Privacy Act.

However, even if the FBI has not

Satisfied the §552a(j) (2) standard of a

"Criminal investigation", the FBI would

still be entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim if it could

show that records the FBI maintained on

plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment

rights were "pertinent to and within the

scope of an authorized law enforcement

activity," under the dictates of

§552a(e) (7). Indeed, interpretation of

the Privacy Act suggests that it would be

=

90a

easier for the FBI to satisfy the "law

enforcement activity" standard of

§552a(e) (7) rather than the "criminal

investigation" standard of §552a(j) (2)-

Thus, the Court will focus on whether the

FBI has demonstrated that the records

maintained on plaintiff were pertinent to

an authorized law enforcement activity of

the FBI.

The precise meaning of "pertinent to

and within the scope of an authorized law

enforcement activity" is not provided by

the statute itself. The statute’s

definitions do not include the term "law

enforcement activities," and the phrase

does not appear anywhere else in the

statute. However, interpretation of the

9la

phrase must be viewed in light of

Congress’s intention for Section (e)(7) of

the Privacy Act to restrict the

information about individuals’ First

Amendment activities that the government

may collect and maintain and to prevent

"collection of protected information not

immediately needed, about law-abiding

Americans, on the off-chance that

government or the particular agency might

possibly have to deal with them in the

future." Ss, Rep. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d

Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &

Admin. News 6916, 6971.

Thus, the relatively few circuit

courts which have interpreted Section

(€)(7) have all founda that the law

92a

enforcement activity exception must be

read narrowly and that the agency involved

must make an affirmative showing that the

records maintained on First Amendment

activities were in some way related to law

enforcement objectives, although the

courts have differed somewhat on the exact

standard warranted. See MacPherson \V.

I.R.S., 803 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1986)

(individual, case-by-case analysis of

whether agency’s actions were pertinent to

authorized law enforcement activity) ;

Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 279 (6th

Cir. 1982) (Section (e)(7) “allows

investigation with respect to the exercise

of First Amendment rights if such

investigation is relevant to an authorized

criminal investigation or to an authorized

intelligence or administrative one."),

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863, 104 S. Ct. 193

93a

(1983); Clarkson v.

sk

678 F.2d 1368,

1375 (llth Cir. 1982)

(Section (e) (7)

is

Violated "to the extent that the [agency }

has engaged in the practice of collecting

protected information,

investigation of past,

anticipated violations

unconnected to any

present or

of the statutes

which it is authorized to enforce...

el ie

cert. denied, 481 U.S. aU32, i107 &. Ct.

1961 (1987). See also Nagel v. U.S. Dept.

of Health, Education and Welfare, 725 F.2d

1438, 1441 n. 3 (D.c. Cir. 1984) (adopting

Jabara standard) .23

This Court finds that the legislative

purpose of §552(e)(7) is best effectuated

by requiring agencies to demonstrate that

any and all records maintained on an

ELMS e ORS ar nn gL Cae ae

23. The Third Circuit has not yet

considered the question faced here.

SOAR TE

Pgh Orr Bak dt

94a

individuals’s exercise of First Amendment

rights are relevant to an authorized law

enforcement activity of the agency, and

that there exists a sufficient basis for

the maintenance of such records. “4

Moreover, the Court recognizes that any

question of relevance must be linked with

consideration of the facts of a particular

case. See MacPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d

at 484.

Turning to the facts of the case at

hand, the Court found on its initial

review that the FBI had not adequately

demonstrated that its activities directed

at plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment

24. All cases considering Section

(e) (7) have concluded that even after the

pertinent law enforcement activity has

been completed, the agency can continue to

maintain the related records.

95a

rights were relevant to an authorized law

enforcement activity. All defendant

Submitted in this regard was a five line

Paragraph citing to the Espionage Statute

and the Foreign Agents Registration Act,

without any reference to facts in some way

linking the plaintiff’s First Amendment

activities with enforcement of those

Statutes. 25

While the FBI need not make a showing

25. The FBI’s paragraph on

authorization states:

IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR FBI’S

INVESTIGATION

(L) A foreign counterintelligence

investigation was conducted by the FBI.

The authority for this type of

investigation includes such statutes as

Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 792-798

(Espionage) and Title 22, U.S.C., Section

611-621 (Foreign Agents Registration Act.)

Lieberman Affidavit, 410.

96a

that probable cause or reasonable

suspicion may have existed about

plaintiff, the agency must furnish facts

which at least demonstrate that the

records maintained on plaintiff’s exercise

of First Amendment rights, such as

letterwriting, were relevant to a

legitimate, authorized law enforcement

objective. Reference to statutes, without

any underlying factual basis, cannot

suffice given the intent of Congress to

curtail the extent of records government

agencies may maintain on individuals’

exercise of First Amendment rights. As

one court has stated:

The mere compilation by the

government of records describing

the exercise of First Amendment

freedoms creates the possibility that

those records will be used to the

speaker’s detriment, and hence has a

chilling effect on such exercise.

Nagel, 725 F.2d at 1441.

97a

Because the FBI had not made an

adequate showing of the relevance of

records maintained on plaintiff’s exercise

of First Amendment rights to an authorized

law enforcement activity, the Court

ordered the FBI to submit an in camera

affidavit which would further attempt to

demonstrate the required relevance. The

FBI subsequently submitted the Greer

Affidavit to serve this purpose. Upon

review of the Greer Affidavit, the Court

now finds that records maintained by the

FBI on plaintiff’s exercise of First

Amendment Rights are relevant to an

authorized law enforcement activity of the

FBI and that the continued maintenance of

such records does not violate any

provision of the Privacy Act.

In retrospect, it is clear that

plaintiff violated no laws in the course

98a

of his correspondence project nor was

involved in any clandestine activity, yet

the FBI could not have known this prior to

undertaking some type of investigation.

Such an investigation, and any related

records kept, would be justified as long

as the FBI complied with the relevant

statutes and undertook the investigation

in the least intrusive means possible

given the circumstances. The Court finds

the FBI’s investigation and maintainance

of records on plaintiff does fit within

statutory and regulatory limits. This

finding may be of only limited consolation

to plaintiff, whose legitimate exercise of

First Amendment rights resulted in an FBI

file. However, plaintiff can take

satisfaction in the fact that his resort

to the judicial process has resulted in

this Court conducting an independent

99a

examination of the FBI’s conduct in

accordance with the statutory standard as

set out by Congress in the Privacy Act.

In the Privacy Act, Congress implicitly

accepted that the slight chill on free

Speech created by Agency maintenance of

records on First Amendment activity is

necessary in light of the need for

Agencies to maintain adequate records

relevant to legitimate law enforcement

activities. After reviewing the Greer

Affidavit, the Court finds that the FBI

has acted properly in regard to records

maintained about plaintiff. However, the

in camera inspection also allows this

Court to assure plaintiff that any records

maintained by the FBI on him do not

reflect negatively on his character or

conduct. Accordingly, the Court can

assure plaintiff that the law enforcement

100a

activity conducted by the FBI in this case

should not in any way inhibit him from

pursuing any legitimate exercise of his

First Amendment rights, including writing

letters to countries throughout the world.

Furthermore, plaintiff’s fear of an

aborted or limited public service career

arising out of these events is misplaced.

Therefore, the Court will grant the

FBI’s motion for summary judgment,

dismissing the Privacy Act claim of

plaintiff’s complaint.

es Plaintiff’s Cause of Action Based on

Violations of the First and Fourth

Amendments and 18 U.S.C. §1702 and

396 S.C. BAe.

Apart from his FOIA and Privacy Act

causes of action, plaintiff alleges that

defendant violated his First and Fourth

Amendment rights, as well as the

provisions of 18 U.S.C. §1702,2© and 19

26. 18 U.S.C. §1702 provides:

Obstruction of correspondence

Whoever takes any letter, postal

Car, Or package out of any post

office or any authorized

depository for mail matter, or

from any letter or mail Carrier,

or which has been in any post

office or authorized depository,

or in the custody of any letter

Or mail carrier, before it has

been delivered to the person to

whom it was directed, with

design to obstruct the

correspondence, or to pry into

the business or secrets of

another, or opens, secretes,

embezzles, or destroys the same,

shall be fined not more than

$2,000 or imprisoned not more

than five years, or both.

27. 19 U.S.C. §482 provides:

Search of vehicles and persons

Any of the officers or persons

authorized to board or search

vessels may stop, search, and

examine, as well without as within

their respective districts, any

vehicle, beast, or person, on which

or whom he or they shall suspect

102a

1. First Amendment Claim

An individual alleging direct

violation of the Constitution may bring

there is merchandise which is

subject to duty, or shall have been

introduced into the United States in

any manner contrary to law, whether

by the person in possession or

charge, or by, in, or upon such

vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and

to search any trunk or envelope,

wherever found, in which he may have

a reasonable cause to suspect there

is merchandise which was imported

contrary to law; and if any such

officer or other person so

authorized shall find any

merchandise on or about any such

vehicle, beast, or person, or in any

such trunk or envelope, which he

shall have reascnable cause to

believe is subject to duty, or to

have been unlawfully introduced into

the United States, whether by the

person in possession or charge, or

by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast,

or otherwise, he shall seize and

secure the same for trial.

103a

Suit against federal officials for damages

and equitable relief. Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau

Of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999

(1971). Plaintiff in this case has named

John Doe, an unknown employee of the

United States government as a defendant.

A Bivens suit?® is available to remedy

violation of a number of Constitutional

provisions, including the First

Amendment.29 See e.g. Oaden v. United

28. Plaintiff’s claim is not

technically a Bivens action, since

plaintiff seeks no monetary damages. See

Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 869 (3d

Cir. 1975). However, legal analysis is

essentially the same as for a standard

Bivens action.

29. The Court notes that to the

extent plaintiff’s First Amendment claim

involves damages as a result of the FBI’s

maintenance of records on plaintiff, such

an acion is apt to be foreclosed by the

existence of the Privacy Act. This is in

104a

States, 758 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1985);

Angola v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1 (2d cir.

1981); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d

Cir. 1975).

The touchstone of a Bivens suit must

be some illegal or inappropriate conduct

on the part of a federal official which

results in a Constitutional violation.

Paton, 524 F.2d. After reviewing the

record as a whole, including in camera

inspection of the withheld documents and

the Greer Affidavit, the Court finds, as a

matter of fact, that the FBI and any FBI

or other government employees involved in

activities concerning plaintiff acted in

keeping with the principle that a Bivens

action is foreclosed if Congress provides

an alternative, adequate remedy. Bush v.

Lucas, 462 U.S. 378, 103 S. Ct. 2404

(1983).

105a

accord with all applicable statutory and

regulatory guidelines. Beyond finding

compliance with the relevant statutes and

regulatory guidelines, the Court finds

that regulations which authorized the

activities undertaken by defendant in this

case did not impermissably chill

plaintiff’s First Amendment right of free~

speech, and represent a lawful exercise of

the federal government’s responsibility

for conduct of foreign policy and nationa]

security affairs with negligible First

Amendment implications. See United States

v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-68, 88 S. ct.

419, 425 (1967) ("We have recongized that,

while the Constitution protects against

invasions of individual rights, it does

106a

not withdraw from the government the power

to safeguard its vital interests....Faced

with a clear conflict between a federal

statute enacted in the interests of

national security and an individual’s

exercise of his First Amendment rights, we

have confined our analysis to whether

Congress has adopted a constitutional

means in achieving its concededly

legitimate legislative goal."). In the

current case, there is in fact no direct

conflict between plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights and the relevant

statutory provisions and administrative

regulations as applied. Moreover, any

limitations on plaintiff’s First Amendment

freedoms are minimal and appropriate

considering the important foreign policy

and national security objectives involved.

Therefore, plaintiff’s claim for

107a

injunctive relief based on the

government’s violation of the First

Amendment rights must be denied and

Summary judgment entered in favor of

defendants.

ie Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff asserts that defendants

violated his Fourth Amendment rights

through the unlawful opening of his mail.

However, as with plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim, the Court finds after

reviewing the record and the in camera

Submissions of defendant, that the FBI

conducted no illegal searches involving

plaintiff and acted in accordance with al]

relevant statutory and administrative

guidelines.

Plaintiff argues that even if the

present record does not support a claim of

Fourth Amendment violation, summary

108a

judgment is foreclosed because of the

failure of the FBI *+:0 respond adequately

to plaintiff’s discovery requests.

However, this argument must fail in light

of the Court’s finding that the FBI has

properly invoked the military and state

secrets privilege. The standard for

evaluating a-claim of the state secrets

privilege was set forth at length by the

District of Columbia Circuit in Ellsberg

v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983),

cert. denied sub nom., Russo v. Mitchell,

465 U.S 1038, 104 S. Ct. 1316 (1984);

cert. denied sub nom., Russo v. Mitchell,

U.S. _, 108 S. Ct. 197 (1987).

The D.C. Circuit stated:

Although there can be no abdication

of a judicial role in connection with

proposed applications of the state

secrets doctrine, it is nevertheless

rrequently noted that the trial judge

should accord considerable deference

to recommendations from the executive

109a

department. Moreover, it is

recognized that the government need

not demonstrate that injury to the

national interest will inevitably

result from disclosure; a showing of

‘reasonable danger’ that harm will

ensue is sufficient. Finally, when

assessing claims of a state secrets

privilege, a trial judge properly may

rely on affidavits and other

secondary sources more often than he

might when evaluating assertions of

other evidentiary privileges.

Id. at 59 (citations omitted).

In the case at bar, the Court finds a

"reasonable danger" that harm to the

national interest will ensue if .

defendant’s are forced to compiy with

plaintiff’s discovery requests.

Therefore, the FBI’s proper assertion of

the state secrets privilege taken in

conjunction with the Court’s determination

that the present record contains no

evidence supporting a finding of illegal

conduct on the part of the FBI,

necessitates the Court granting

110a

defendant’s summary judgment d smissing

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment clain.

3. Plaintiff’s Statutory Claims

The plaintiff’s claims based on

alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §1702 and

19 U.S.C. §482 are in large part

identical to the plaintiff’s First and

Fourth Amendment claims considered above.

To succeed on a claim based on either

statute, plaintiff would need to present

evidence of an illegal interference with

his mail. However, the Court finds, after

considering the in camera submissions of

defendant, that there is no evidence which

would support a finding of illegal

tampering or interference with plaintiff’s

mail. Furthermore, the FBI’s proper

invocation of the state secrets privilege

forecloses plaintiff from claiming

inadequate response to his discovery

requests.

Therefore, the Court must grant

summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s

Claims brought under 18 U.S.C. §1702 and

29 U.S.C. §482.

D. The FBI’s Offer to Expunde

Plaintiff’s Name From Its Files

In its supporting papers and again at

oral argument, the FBI offered to expunge

the name of Todd Patterson from its

records. This offer strikes the Court as

a fair and practical resolution of this

litigation. It enables the FBI to

safeguard information concerned with

sources and methods of counter-

intelligence while at the same time it

eliminates any potential damage to

plaintiff which he envisions the FBI’s

past activities may cause him in the-

future. However, because the Court has

1ll2a

found that the FBI engaged in no illegal

or overly intrusive conduct, it would be

inappropriate for this Court to now order

the FBI to expunge plaintiff’s name from

its files. See Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d

at 868-69. Nonetheless, the Court invites

the FBl1 to abide by its offer to expunge

plaintiff’s name, as the Court believes it

to be the type of good faith gesture that

will help defuse the sense of outrage that

precipitated this proceeding.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the

Court grants defendant FBI’s motion for

summary judgment dismissing the first,

second and third causes of action of

plaintiff’s complaint, and the Court wili

order that judgment be entered in favor of

all defendants, real and fictitious, named

in plaintiff’s action.

11l3a

An appropriate order shall be

Submitted by counsel for defendant.

Dated: February 7, 1989

ALFRED M. WOLIN, U.S.D.J.

114a

United States District Court

District of New Jersey

Chambers of USPO & Courthouse

Alfred M. Wolin Bldg.

Judge Newark, NJ 07101

APPENDIX A

December 30, 1988

Susan C. Cassell, ESq.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

970 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Frank Askin, Esq.

Constitutional Litigation Clinic

Rutgers University School of Law

15 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Re: Todd Patterson Vv. Federal Bureau of

Investigation, et al.

Civil Action No. 88-2319

Dear Counsel:

Currently before the Court is the

FBI’s motion for summary judgment directed

against the claims of plaintiff Todd

Patterson. At the close of oral argument,

I indicated that an opinion on the motion

would be issued within a week. However,

because certain issues were raised in oral

argument that were not adequately

addressed in the supporting papers, I have

concluded that in camera inspection of

certain withheld documents is required in

order for this Court to assure itself that

the FBI has acted in good faith with

regard to its investigation of Todd

Patterson, that the FBI complied with all

relevant government regulations, and that

the FBI engaged in no illegal conduct.

Therefore, I am ordering the FBI to

turn over to the Court, for in camera

ee |

inspection, the document listed as

116a

Document No. 4 in Exhibit B of the FBI’s

Notice of Motion, the one-page FBI airtel

dated January 6, 1984, along with the 17

additional pages attached. I am also

ordering the FBI to submit for in camera

inspection the document listed as Document

No. 5 in Exhibit B of the FBI’s Notice of

Motion, the one-page FBI airtel dated

December 5, 1985, along with the five

additional pages attached. The documents

and the attached pages should be submitted

to the Court in complete and unredacted

form.

While I do not resort to in camera

inspection lightly, I believe in this case

that in camera inspection of the specified

documents is the best means available to

render substantial justice to plaintiff’s

claims, yet also insure that any

117a

legitimate intelligence activities,

sources or methods of the government

remain protected against public

disciosure.

After reviewing the specified

documents in camera, as well as the

affidavit ordered by the Court at cral

argument, I will then issue a formal

opinion addressing the FBI’s summary

judgment motion in its entirely.

Very truly yours,

ALFRED M. WOLIN

Vee Dou<

AMW: bv

118a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TODD PATTERSON, etc., : Civil Action No.

Plaintiff, : 88-2319

Vv. :

FEDERAL BUREAU OF ¢$ ORDER

INVESTIGATION, et al.,

Defendants.

In conformity with this Court’s

letter to counsel dated December 30, 1988,

It is on this 30th day of December,

1988,

ORDERED that defendant FBI turn over

to the Court, for in camera inspection,

the document listed as Document No. 4 in

Exhibit B of the FBI’s Notice of Motion,

the one-page FBI airtel dated January 6,

1984, along with the 17 additional pages

attached, and it is further

ORDERED that defendant FBI submit for

in camera inspection the document listed

as Document No. 5 in Exhibit B of the

119a

FBI’s Notice of Motion, the one-page FBI

airtel dated December 9, 1985, along with

the five additional pages attached, and it

is further

ORDERED that the specified documents

and attached pages should be submitted to

the Court in complete and unredacted form

within 21 days of the date of this order.

ALFRED M. WOLIN, U.S.D2J~

120a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FO® THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TODD PATTERSON, etc., >: Civil Action No.

Plaintiff, : 88-2319

Vv.

OPINION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF : and

INVESTIGATION, et al., : ORDER

Defendants. ;

Currently before the Court is the

motion of plaintiff, pursuant to Rule

60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, to vacate this Court’s entry ot

summary judgment or, in the alternative,

to supplement the record. Plaintiff

contends that new evidence disciosed by

defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation

in response to two Freedom of Information

Act ("FOIA") requests made by plaintiff on

September 7, 1988 and November 6, 1988 to

the Newark and New York F.B.I. field

offices is material to the Privacy Act, 5

l2la

U.S.C. § 552a et seq., cause of action

included in plaintiff’s Complaint.

| & BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

For a detailed discussion of the

factual and procedural background of this

case, the parties are referred to the

February 7, 1989 Opinion of the Court. In

that Opinion, the Court granted summary

judgment in favor of defendants on all

three ceuses of action in plaintiff’s

complaint. Subsequently on March 15,

1989, plaintiff received the F.B.I.’s

response to his two Fall 1988 FOIA

requests. One item disclosed was a May

24, 1988 newspaper article describing

plaintiff’s bringing of a suit against the

F.B.I. It is the presence of this

newspaper article in the F.B.I.’s records

that apparently motivated this Rule 60 (b)

motion. On March 30, 1989, plaintiff’s

a ee

122a

motion for reconsideration of the Court’s

February 7, 1989 Opinion was denied. On

April 25, 1989, plaintiff filed a notice

of appeal to the Third Circuit.

Ordinarily, a notice of appeal divests the

district court of all jurisdiction in a

case. However, a district court does have

the power to both entertain and deny a

Rule 60(b) motion even while an appeal is

pending. Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117

(3d. Cir. 1985).

Plaintiff’s contention that the

materials disclosed by plaintiff’s

additional FOIA requests entitle plaintiff

to Rule 60(b) relief demonstrates a

misunderstanding of the procedural —

requirements for an action based on the

Privacy Act and of the procedural history

of this case. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a@) (2)-(3)

lays out the Privacy Act’s procedural

pee FE |

requirements for a party to request

amendment of an agency’s records. For

example, if plaintiff objected to the

newspaper article being contained in the

F.B.I. file, plaintiff could have

requested the F.B.I. to delete the

newspaper article, and if such request was

denied, plaintiff could then have sought

judicial review. 5 U.S.c. §

552a(g)(1)(A). Thus, the documents

disclosed pursuant to plaintiff’s

September 7, 1988 and November 6, 1988

FOIA requests do not constitute new

evidence for purposes of this action but

instead entitled plaintiff to seek

administrative redress, and, if necessary,

judicial review.

Plaintiff also cannot successfully

maintain that his Fall 1988 FOIA requests

are somehow under the purview of this

124a

lawsuit. This action grew out of

plaintiff’s 1987 FOIA request to the

F.B.I.’s Washington, D.C. office.

Defendant consented, however, to let this

suit also cover plaintiff’s March, 1988

FOIA request to the F.B.I.’s Newark field

office. These are the only FOIA requests

of plaintiff that are properly before this

Court. Obviously, a May 24, 1988

newspaper article would not be in

plaintiff’s F.B.I. file at the time of

plaintiff’s March, 1988 FOIA request. The

newspaper article is new material that was

released pursuant to additional FOIA

requests of plaintiff and cannot be

considered new evidence for purposes of

this action.

Accordingly,

It is on this 16th day of August,

1989,

125a

ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pp. 60 (b) is

denied.

Alfred M. Wolin, U.S.D.J.

126a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TODD PATTERSON, etc.

Plaintiff, : Civil Action

: No.

VT « : 88-2319

FEDERAL BUREAU OF :

INVESTIGATION, et al., >: OPINION

: and

Defendants : ORDER

This matter comes before the Court

upon the motion of plaintiff, Todd

Patterson, by his attorney, Frank Askin,

Esq., for reconsideration of this Court’s

Order of February 27, 1989, which granted

summary judgment in favor of all named

defendants.

Plaintiff contends that the Court

erred in its decision granting summary

judgment because the Court improperly

relied on the in camera submissions of

defendant. Plaintiff’s position runs

a

127a

counter to the relevant statutes and

caselaw; therefore, plaintiff’s motion

must be denied.

The Freedom of Information Act, 5

U.S.C. § 552 ("FOIA"), specifically

provides for the Court’s use of and

reliance upon in camera submissions. 5

U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (B). Moreover, courts

have continually held that in camera

Submissions may be relied upon in cases

involving FOIA, the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C.

§ 552 et seq.), or government use of the

military and state secrets privilege. See

Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966

(D.C. Cir. 1982) (in camera submissions

relied upon in a case involving FOIA and

invocation of military and state secrets

privilege); Weberman v. National Security

Agency, 668 F.2d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1982)

(In FOIA case involving in camera review

128a

of agency affidavit, the Court stated:

"Disclosure of the details of this

affidavit might result in serious

consequences to the nation’s security

operations. The risk presented by

participation of counsel, Hayden v. NSA,

608 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979),

outweighs the utility of counsel, or

adversary process, in construing a

supplement to the record."); Stein v.

Department of Justice & FBI, 662 F.2d 1245

(7th Cir. 1981) (Use of in camera

affidavit approved in case involving FOIA

and Privacy Act claims.).

As plaintiff’s sole ground for his

motion for reconsideration is without an

adequate basis in law, the motion must be

denied.

Therefore, it is on this 30th day of

March, 1989,

129a

ORDERED, that plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration is hereby denied.

Altred M. Wolin, U.S.D.J.

130a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 89-5342 and 89-5781

Todd Patterson, et al.

Appellant

Va e

Federal Bureau of Investigation, etc.

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: HIGGINBOTHAM, Chief Judge,

SLOVITER, BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN,

GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, and

NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and GAWTHROP,

District Judge*

The petition for rehearing filed by

appellant in the above entitled case

having been submitted to the judges who

participated in the decision of this court

and to all other available circuit judges

of the circuit in regular active service,

and no judge who concurred in the decision

having asked for rehearing, and a majority

of the circuit judges of the circuit in

—E—<—

l3la

regular active service not having voted

for rehearing by the court in banc, the

petition for rehearing is denied.

BY THE COURT

Circuit Judge

Dated: February 7, 1990

* District Judge Gawthrop voted only as to

panel rehearing.

132a

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

TODD PATTERSON, a minor JjU.S.C.A.

under 18, suing by his ]}#89-5342 and

father, EDGAR PATTERSON, ]#89-5781

}] (Consolidated)

Appellant,

Vv.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, JOHN

DOE, an unknown employee

of the United States

Government, and JOHN DOE

AGENCY, an unknown agency

of the United States

Government,

i td td td Od 8 td Ld Fd fF Fd td td

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of New Jersey

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING IN

BANC

Frank Askin, Esq.

Constitutional Litigation Clinic

Rutgers Law School

15 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

201/648-5687

Attorney for Todd Patterson on behalf of

the American Civil Liberties Union of New

Jersey

133a

Student Inter

n on the brief:

Adam Todd

134a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Abourezk v. Reagan,

785 F.2d 1043,1061 (D.c. Cir.

1986), aff’d 484 U.S. 1 (1987)..12

Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308

1 er ee Se 14

Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1374

(llth Cir. 1982), vacated and

remanded, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.

Ce eee Ge ec ae ee ete oe ees 8

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,

MS eee ee 13

Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65

(0.0. Che BPSS) cece ccvccessesess 14

Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l. Ltd.,

776 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir.

RR Oe eee ee ere 12

In Re United States, 872 F.2d 4472

Paes Ghee AOE soc anh eee es oe 12

Jabara v. Kelly, 476 F.Supp. 561 (E.D.

NIGH. ADTP) caccevcceceseeerteseves 8

McPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d 479, 483-

SE (SEH Cif. 3966) scccesevescrees 2,s

Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815

PR ire ee ew ete ate eee en 12

acre

135a

Nagel v. United States Department of

Health, Education and Welfare, 725 F.2d

1438, 1441 (D.c. Cir. 1984)

Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 [se Cir.

oe! Bae et a ee a eee eee ee beens

;

Paton v. LaPrade, 469 F.Supp 773 (D.N.J.,

1978) and 471 F.Supp. 166 (D.N.J.,

TE Ae eee ie aed eee ceca ec hea ce 2

. United States v. American Tel. & 7a...

| CO., 567 F.2d 121 2) os Peer 15

136a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF

AUTHORITIES .ccccccvcccvccseceeeseeeresss il

I.

) eo

THE PANEL’S OPINION IS INCONSISTENT

WITH THIS COURT’S OPINION IN PATON

Vv. LAPRADE, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir.

THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE PANEL

OPINION TO 5 U.S.C. 552a(e) (7)

EFFECTIVELY GUTS THAT PROVISION AND

NULLIFIES THE INTENT OF CONGRESS, IN

ADOPTING THE PRIVACY ACT, TO PUT AN

END TO THE PRACTICE OF THE FBI AND

OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES OF MAINTAINING

INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBING

THEIR EXERCISE OF RIGHTS PROTECTED BY

THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF

SUBSTANTIAL NEED... eee eee eee reer erees 3

.THE DETERMINATION BY THE PANEL OPINION

THAT A FEDERAL COURT MAY DECIDE

DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON

THE BASIS OF IN CAMERA, EX PARTE

TESTIMONY IS INCONSISTENT WITH

FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS OF AMERICAN

JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ADVERSARY

SYSTEM «ccc cere ee eee ee CCH CCR CHEERS 10

CONCLUSION cc cccceveeeeeeessaeeresererevs 15

137a

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff petitions the Court,

pursuant to Rule 40 of the Federal Rules

of Appellate Practice, for a rehearing and

a rehearing in banc on his appeal in the

cases numbered 89-5342 and 89-5781. A

Judgment was entered and an Opinion was

filed in both of these cases by this Court

On January 8, 1990.

It is respectfully suggested that the

panel opinion is inconsistent with this

Court’s previous opinion in Paton v.

LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) and

decided important legal issues on the

basis of an erroneous understanding of

their factual underpinnings and legal

consequences. This is not surprising

considering the novelty as well as the

complex nature of the issues involved;

the balancing of national security

138a

interests and First Amendment rights, as

was presented in this case, is one of the

most difficult tasks faced by any court.

Petitioners understand that rehearing in

banc is not favored and ordinarily will

not be ordered, however, considering the

questions of exceptional importance raised

in this case, we ask this Court to grant a

rehearing pursuant to Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure 35 and 40.

As counsel, I express a belief, based

on a reasoned and studied professional

judgment, that the panel decision is

contrary to a prior decision of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit, and that consideration by the

full court is necessary to secure and

maintain uniformity of decisions in this

Court, to-wit, the panel’s decision is

contrary to the decision of this Court in

the case Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862

=

139a

(1975). Furthermore, this appeal involves

the following questions of exceptional

importance, to-wit:

A. Whether the Privacy Act requires

that the term "pertinent to and within the

scope of" in Section (e)(7) of the Privacy

Act be read as requiring more than mere

"relevance",

B. Whether the Court may decide

disputed issues of material fact on the

basis of in camera, €xX parte testimony in

the face contrary to fundamental notions

of American jurisprudence and the

adversarial system.

kkk

140a

I. THE PANEL’S OPINION IS

INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S OPINION IN

PATON V. LAPRADE, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir.

1975).

The failure of the panel opinion to

even acknowledge this Court’s opinion 15

years ago in Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d

862 (3d Cir. 1975) is mystifying.

Even prior to adoption of the Federal

Privacy Act, Paton v. LaPrade, recognized

a right to relief of a plaintiff under

very similar circumstances. Responding to

a claim that the F.B.I. was maintaining

information concerning the First Amendment

activities of a teenager after

intercepting her letter to a domestic

political organization as a result of a

mail cover, the court held the plaintiff

was entitled to seek judicial expungement

of her file directly under the First

Amendment. The court held that the

existence of such a file threatened

14la

palpable harm to plaintiff. 524 F.2d at

868. On remand, the District Court

provided such relief. Paton v. LaPrade,

469 F.Supp 773 (D.N.J., 1978) and 471

F.Supp. 166 (D.N.J. 1979).

Inexplicably, the panel determined

that Todd Patterson, now armed with the

additional weapon of Section (e) (7) of the

Privacy Act, providing an explicit remedy

for the improper maintenance of First

Amendment information, has no right to

Similar relief.

As the subsequent section will

reveal, the panel opinion is not only

inconsistent with this Court’s opinion in

Paton v. LaPrade, but misconceives the

meaning and intent of Section (e) (7).

II. THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE

PANEL OPINION TO 5 U.S.C. 552a(e) (7)

EFFECTIVELY GUTS THAT PROVISION AND

NULLIFIES THE INTENT OF CONGRESS,

INADOPTING THE PRIVACY ACT, TO PUT AN END

142a

TO THE PRACTICE OF THE FBI AND OTHER

FEDERAL AGENCIES OF MAINTAINING

INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBING

THEIR EXERCISE OF RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE

FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF

SUBSTANTIAL NEED.

The panel opinion betrays its

misinterpretation of the Federal Privacy

Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, in the very first

sentence when it asserts that Todd

Patterson "caused himself to be the

subject of an investigation by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation." Opinion! at 2.

Todd Patterson no more caused his own

investigation than did the millions of

Americans upon whom J.Edgar Hoover’s

F.B.I. compiled the dossiers which led

Congress in 1974 to adopt Section (e) (7)

of the Privacy Act to prohibit such

1, All references to the panel’s

opinion of January 8, 1989, shall

hereinafter be refered to as "Opinion at

143a

practices. The purpose of Section (e) (7)

is to prevent "collection of protectéd

information not immediately needed, about

law-abiding Americans, on the off-chance

that Government or the particular agency

might possibly have to deal with them in

the future." S.Rep. 1183, 93d Cong.

Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code & Admin

News 6916, 6971;2 see also Ehlke, The

2. The legislative history quoted by

the appeals panel on page 15 of the

Opinion suggests a misreading of the

legislative history of the Privacy Act and

the interpretation of Section (e) (7). The

quote taken from page 6960 of 1974 U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin. News 6916, is

referring only to general information

compiled by an agency, not information

concerning First Amendment activities. If

the panel had continued reading in the

Same legislative history that they cite,

they would have read that records z

concerning First Amendment activities

requires agencies to apply a higher level

of scrutiny. See 1974 U.S. Code and Cong.

& Admin. News 6916, at 6971. Even so, the

panel opinion emphasizes the word

"relevance" in the citation and ignores

the words that follow: "and necessary."

144a

Privacy Act After a Decade, 18 J. Marshall

L. Rev. 829 (1985).

The only thing Todd Patterson did was

exercise his curiosity about foreign lands

and write their governments for

information, a pristine exercise of rights

protected by the First Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States. These

are the rights which Section (e) (7)

declares are not to be "describe[d]" in

F.B.I. files except when they are

"pertinent to and within the scope of an

authorized law enforcement activity."

The panel interpreted "pertinent to

and within the scope of an authorized law

enforcement activity" as to mean merely

"relevant to a law enforcement activity."

By interpreting "pertinent to and within

Opinion at 15.

145a

the scope of" to mean merely "relevant

to", Opinion at 15-16, it applied no

stricter a standard to the collection and

maintenance of records describing activity

protected by the First Amendment than was

already applicable, as a threshold matter,

to records of every kind kept by federal

agencies. This difference in standards

that agencies are to apply to general

information as opposed to information

concerning an individual’s First Amendment

activities was noted by the Office of

Management and Budget in its guidelines:

Whereas subsection (e€)(1) generally

enjoins agencies from collecting

information not "relevant and necessary"

to accomplish a purpose of the agency,

[subsection (e) (7) }

146a

establishes an even more rigorous standard

governing the maintenance of records

reaqarding the exercise of First

Amendment rights.

OMB Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28960,

28965 (July 9, 1975) (emphasis added).

The panel illustrates its

misapprehension of the purpose of the

Privacy Act and the nature of plaintiff’s

(e) (7) claim in a number of points in its

opinion. Footnote 10 in the Opinion and

its accompanying text states that after

having reviewed the documents and the

Greer affidavit, it found nothing

derogatory in the files regarding Todd or

any membes: of his family. Opinion 11. This

statement ignores the derogatory effect

the files have in and of themselves. As

one case put it:

We recognize that even "incidental"

surveillance and recording of

innocent people exercising their

147a

First Amendment rights may have a

chilling effect on those rights that

section(e) (7) was intended to

prohibit.

"The mere compilation by the

government of those records

describing the exercise of First

Amendment freedoms creates the

possibility that those records will

be used to the speaker’s detriment,

and hence has a chilling effect on

such exercise." Nagel v. United

States Department of Health

Education and Welfare, 725 F.2d 1438,

1441 (D.C.Cir. 1984).

McPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d 479,

483-84 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Paton v.

LaPrade, 524 F.2d at 868. Thus, the

panel’s misapprehension of the derogatory

effect of these files illustrates the need

for a rehearing.

The panel opinion also errs on page 3

when it states: "Significantly, Todd

enclosed much of his correspondence in

envelopes bearing the return address of

Laboratory Disposable Products, a business

Todd’s parents operated from their home."

However, the record suggests only that

148a

Todd sent his initial mailing, back in

1983, with this "suspicious" return

address. Subsequent mailings were written

with an "innocent" return address bearing

Todd’s home address, see Transcript of

District Court Proceedings, dated 12-15-

89, at 30-31 (Appeals Appendix at 289-90);

Plaintiff’s Brief for Appeal from Order

Denying 60(b) Motion, dated 10-20-89, at

10-11, thus leaving unanswered the

question as to why Todd’s later mail

bearing this "innocent" return address was

still being brought to the attention of

tie F.B.f.

The second error the panel makes in

the cited statement, is the significance

it places on the fact that the return

address, was in the name of "Laboratory

Disposable Products." Since Todd’s later

mail, even with an "innocent" home return

address was still being brought to the

149a

attention of the F.B.I., the nature of the

return address appears not to have been

determinative as to whether Todd’s mail

was being monitored in some way. What

should have been seen as significant by

the panel was that the F.B.I., once having

ascertained the innocent nature of Todd’s

correspondence, then changed the subject

heading in its files from "Laboratory

Disposable Products" to "Todd Patterson."

Opinion at 4.

The fact that the F.B.I. changed the

heading of its files from "Laboratory

Disposable Products" to "Todd Patterson"

is significant because Section (e)(7) of

the Privacy Act requires independent

justification for the maintenance by an

agency of information describing the

exercise by an individual of rights

protected by the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution, even if that

150a

information had been properly gathered.

The panel opinion seems to be assuming

that since the investigation of Todd

Patterson was proper, then, the continued

maintenance of the files on him is

similarly proper.3 The "relevancy"

standard put forward in the panel’s

opinion for the justified maintenance of

information on an individual’s exercise of

first amendment rights basically negates

any difference between "collection" and

"maintenance". If a piece of information

3, It is important to note that the

appeals panel decided the issue as to

whether the files maintained on Todd

Patterson were relevant to a law

enforcement activity by an ex parte, in

camera examination of the Geer Affidavit

which put forward defendant’s reasons as

to why the records at issue in this case

are "pertinent and within the scope of a

law enforcement activity." The plaintiff

had no opportunity to challenge the

assertions made in this affidavit that was

crucial in the panel’s decision on this

issue. Opinion at 16.

151a

is relevant enough to a law enforcement

activity to justify its collection, then

this opinion makes it automatically

justified for its maintenance into

perpetuity. It has been plaintiff’s

position that even if the intial

investigation of Todd was justified, once

his identity and purpose were established,

the records compiled should have been

dropped in the wastebasket.

The panel’s interpretation disregards

the plain meanings of the terms "collect"

and "maintain" and disregards the concerns

unique to each action. The absence of an

independent requirement for justifying

continued maintenance would allow an

agency to keep in perpetuity every piece

of information collected in the course of

152a

its operations. The spirit and intent of

(e) (7) of the Privacy Act requires that

such information not be maintained by the

investigating agency:

This section’s restraint is aimed

particularly at preventing

collection of protected information

not immediately needed, about law

abiding Americans, on the off-chance

that Government or-the particular

agency might possibly have to

deal with them in the future.

Senate Report, No. 93-1183 at 6960-

61. The case Macpherson reiterated this

point when it determined that once the

investigating agency had determined that

there had been no violation of any law,

the agency had a responsibility not to

maintain the information gathered on

plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment

rights. MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 482. The

court in that case cited with approval the

language of Jabara v. Kelley:

Merely because [an agency] may

act within its authority by

153a

monitoring the public or private

speeches of a person in the course

of a legitimate security

investigation, does not give

it the right to maintain records

relating to the contents of these

speeches where the investigation

does not focus on a past or

anticipated specific criminal act.

Jabara v.Kelly, 476 F.Supp. 561

(E.D. Mich. 1979) (emphasis in

original) (quoted with approval in

Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1374

(llth Cir. 1982), vacated and

remanded, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863

(1984).

MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 483. Thus,

Since the panel applied a faulty standard

to its interpretation of the Privacy Act,

this Court should grant petitioners

request for a rehearing on this issue.

Compounding this error in applying

the wrong standard to information

coilected on an individual’s First

Amendment activities, the panel applied a

lesser standard to the collection and

maintenance of records of First Amendment

activity than that required for records in

— ee

154a

general -- by requiring only that records

maintained by an agency be relevant, and

not both relevant and necessary, to an

authorized law enforcement activity.

The panel opinion appears to have

completely ignored the word "necessary" in

the Privacy Act, where where it mandates

that agencies maintain "only such

information about an individual as is

relevant and necessary to accomplish a

purpose of the agency required to be

accomplished by statute or by executive

order of the President." 5 U.S.C.

552a(e)(1) [emphasis added].4 The

relevancy standard upheld by the panel

makes the word "necessary" in this act

4. Note that in the quote on the top

of page 15 in the Opinion, the appeals

panel only emphasized the word "relevant"

and that the word "necessary" appears to

be completely ignored.

155a

mere surplusage. However, it is clear

that this word was not intended to be

repetitive but rather was supposed to

create a higher standard for the

collection and maintenance of information

than mere relevancy. As was noted by the

Office of Management and Budget:

The authority to maintain a

system of records does not give the

agency the authority to maintain any

information which it deems useful.

Agencies shall review the nature of

the information which they maintain

in their systems of records to

assure that it is, in fact,

"relevant and necessary."

Information may not be

maintained merely because it is

relevant; it must be both relevant

and necessary.

OMB Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28960 (July

9, 1975). This misinterpretation of the

Act requires that this Court grant a

rehearing en banc on this issue.

Furthermore, the complete absence of

mention of the more rigorous First

Amendment requirements of the Act under

156a

Section (e)(7) makes a rehearing on this

issue all the more imperative.

III. THE DETERMINATION BY THE PANEL

OPINION THAT A FEDERAL COURT MAY DECIDE

DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON THE

BASIS OF IN CAMERA, EX PARTE TESTIMONY IS

INCONSISTENT WITH FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS OF

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ADVERSARY

SYSTEM.

The notion of adversariness is so

central to the American notion of due

process that it hardly merits extended

discussion. A cogent statement is

contained in an article by Justice Alan

Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court:

An unmentioned premise of our

adversary system is that the truth

takes sides. Because we do

not know which side truth has taken,

we let the sides fight it out....The

premise of the modern adversary

system is that an impartial

factfinder, be it jury or judge,

will reach the correct determination

in weighing the evidence that has

been presented to it by the

advocates of each adversary party,

who are dedicated solely to

presenting their client’s position

in the best possible light. In this

157a ~

contest, the truth will out.

Handler, The Judicial Pursuit of

Knowledge: Truth or Justice, 41 Rutgers L.

Rev. 1, 4 (1988). Unfortunately, the panel

has upheld the thwarting of the

adversarial process by allowing the

District Court to reach a decision as to

disputed facts on the basis of evidence

not shared with the losing party.

The District Court granted the

government’s motion for summary judgment

as to all counts of plaintiff’s complaint

after reviewing in camera an affidavit

submitted by the government to justify

actions which on their face appeared to

violate provisions of the Privacy Act

forbidding the F.B.I. from maintaining

information describing how any person

exercised rights under the First

Amendment. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(e)(7). The

court’s opinion conceded that the public

158a

record contained genuine issues of

material fact which would have normally

precluded summary judgment but held that

the secret affidavit had satisfied the

court that the government’s action was

justified; i.e. the District Court decided

contested issues of fact in favor of the

government on the basis of evidence

concealed from the losing party. Appeals

Appendix at 423 (District Ct. Opinion

p.26). The panel upheld this procedure.

Opinion at 16.

The reliance of the District Court

and the panel on the secret Greer

affidavit to rule against plaintiff on

contested issues of material fact sharply

pose the question of the propriety of

courts bound by the due process clause of

the United States Constitution resorting

to secret "Kafkaesque" procedures, to

resolve factual disputes. The panel

159a

asserts that litigation involving alleged

issues of "national security" are of a

special genre exempt from the normal rules

governing federal civil proceedings. In

such cases, it permits two arms of the

government, the executive and the

judicial, to privately confer over secret

documents and together dispose of

citizens’ facially meritorious causes of

action.

To the extent that any such doctrine

is suggested by the language of the United

States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia in Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d

815 (1984), plaintiff asked the panel and

urges again on rehearing, that such an un-

American principle be rejected.

Moliero also may be distinguished

from the instant case in that the

plaintiff there had already been accorded

"considerable discovery" prior to the

160a

court’s in camera review and the entire

object of the suit was to establish a fact

that was a state secret. See Abourezk v.

Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir.

1986), aff’d 484 U.S. 1 (1987). In the

instant case, plaintiff has been denied

discovery and raises substantial issues in

addition to a right of access to the FBI’s

files.

Even if not distinguishable on the

facts, it is hard to imagine a principle

more destructive of constitutional rights

than this notion of "secret justice." It

abrogates fundamental rights of due

process and confrontation of witnesses and

denies a deserving litigant "the forum

provided under the Constitution for the

resolution of disputes...." Fitzgerald v.

Penthouse Int’l. Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242

(4th Cir. 1985). It is, as the majority

in In Re United States, 872 F.2d 4472

161la

(D.C.Cir. 1989) conceded, a "draconian"

result. 872 F.2d at 477.

Such a procedure is especially

pernicious when applied in litigation

between a citizen and the government

accused of violating that citizen’s

rights. In the present case, the panel

obviously believed that the neutral and

impartial judge will adequately protect

the rights of the litigant who is denied

access to crucial and decisive evidence.

But only in totalitarian regimes is a

citizen compelled to rely totally upon the

largesse of one branch of government in

disputes with another. Even the

independent federal judiciary in our own

country has been held to be too closely

identified with the Executive to allow it

to abrogate the right of jury trial in

Suits for violation of constitutional

rights. As explained by Justice White in

162a

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156

(1968):

Those who wrote our [Federal and

state] constitutions knew from

history and experience that it was

necessary to protect against

judges too responsive to the voice

of higher authority. The framers of

the constitutions strove to create

an independent judiciary but

insisted upon further protection

against arbitrary action.... [T]he

jury trial provisions in the Federal

and State Constitutions reflect a

fundamental decision about the

exercise of official power -- a

reluctance to entrust plenary powers

over the life and liberty of the

citizen to one judge or to a group

of judges.

While much of theconcern of the Founders

over "the biased, compliant or eccentric

judge," id., focused on protecting the

criminally accused, that concern is

equally applicable to cases involving

litigation between private citizens and

government agents other than the criminal

prosecutor. That is especially so in a

case such as this one which involves a

=

163a

suit against the law enforcement arm of

government by a citizen suffering injury

as a result of its criminal investigative

activities. Where the stake of the

Government in any single criminal

prosecution is quite limited, its stake is

quite high where government officials are

being actively prosecuted for official

wrongdoing.

Where release of sensitive

information in litigation would truly

jeopardize national interests, the proper

procedure is that enacted by Congress in

the Classified Information Procedures Act,

18 U.S.C. App. 6(c), which puts the

government to a choice in criminal cases

of releasing the information or abandoning

prosecution. In such a way, the conflict

between the right to a fair trial and the

government’s need to protect national

security information can be properly

164a

weighed by the government itself.

Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308

(1976), presents an appropriate model. It

held that a valid assertion of the Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination may subject a civil litigant

to appropriate sanctions, such as the

drawing of an adverse inference at trial.

Similarly, in civil cases such as this,

where plaintiff presents a prima facie

case of violation of fundamental rights,

if the government declines to reveal

material evidence, it ought to be required

to accept the consequence of an adverse

determination of what the concealed

information would demonstrate if

disclosed. At the very most, the

government should be entitled only to

remove the evidence from the case. See

Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65

(D.C. Cir. 1983).° Certainly the

———<— 6 LU

165a

government should not be able to keep

information pertinent to a case from its

adversary but simultaneously use it as a

sword to establish a fact upon which it

has the burden to produce evidence --- it

cannot "have its cake and eat it too."

CONCLUSION

In view of the panel opinion’s

inconsistency with this Circuit’s previous

case in Paton v. LaPrade, as well as the

panel’s misapprehension of the Privacy Act

and its use of ex parte, in camera

testimony to decide material issues of

5, As an alternative, plaintiff has

previously suggested that counsel for the

plaintiff be allowed to review the -

| privileged information in camera under

protective order. See United States v.

American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121,

133 (1977)

i

166a

fact, and considering the importance of

the issues involved in this case,

plaintiff respectfully urges the Third

Circuit to grant a rehearing in banc.

Dated: January 18, 1990

Respectfully submitted,

Frank Askin

Attorney for Todd Patterson

Constitutional Litigation Clinic

Rutgers Law School

15 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

201/648-5687

167a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TODD PATTERSON, a minor Civil Action

under 18, suing by his : No.

father, EDGAR PATTERSON : 88-2319

Plaintiff, : Hon. Alfred M.

: Wolin

Vv.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF >: NOTICE OF

INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE, : MOTION

an unknown employee of : PURSUANT TO

the United States >: RULE 60(b) TO

Government, and JOHN DOE VACATE THE

AGENCY, an unknown agency: JUDGEMENT OR,

of the United State : IN THE

Government, : ALTERNATIVE

>: TO SUPPLEMENT

Defendants. : THE RECORD

TO: SUSAN C. CASSELL, ESQ.

Assistant United States Attorney

970 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

MADAM:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 8,

1989, at 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter

as counsel may be heard, plaintiff will

move before the Court before the Honorable

Alfred M. Wolin, J.D.C., at the United

168a

States Court House, Newark, New Jersey,

for vacation of the judgment granting of

defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

due to newly discovered evidence, or, in

the alternative, to supplement the record.

The reason for this motion is that

plaintiff has recently discovered that

crucial evidence was withheld from

plaintiff during the Court’s consideration

of defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment. Based on this newly discovered

evidence plaintiff believes that vacation

of the judgment is required pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In the

alternative, plaintiff requests that the

Court order that the record be

supplemented to include this newly

discovered evidence. Movant relies in

support of this motion on the attached

memorandum of law and affidavit of Frank

Askin, Esq.

169a

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK ASKIN, ESQ.

Constitutional Litigation

Clinic

Rutgers School of Law

15 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Attorney for Plaintiff, TODD

PATTERSON, on behalf of the

American Civil Liberties Union

of New Jersey

This 6th day of April, 1989.

170a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TODD PATTERSON, a minor

under 18, suing by his : Civil Action

father, EDGAR PATTERSON : NO. 88-2319

Plaintiff, : Hon. Alfred M.

Wolin

W.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE,

an unknown employee of

the United States

Government, and JOHN DOE

AGENCY, an unknown agency:

of the United States :

Government, : AFFIDAVIT OF

FRANK ASKIN,

Defendants. ; ESQ.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY )

$ ss.

COUNTY OF ESSEX )

FRANK ASKIN, of full age, being duly

sworn according to law, on oath, says:

1. I am attorney for plaintiff, Todd

Patterson, in the above captioned case.

as The Court ruled on defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment on February

17la

27, 1989, granting summary judgment, in

favor of the defendant, on all issues in

this case. This ruling constitutes a

final judgment.

3. By letter dated March 15, 1989,

plaintiff received from Emil P. Moschella,

Chief Freedom of Information Privacy Acts

Section Records Management Division, U.S.

Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, additional documents

maintained by agencies of the FBI

concerning the activities of the

plaintiff. Such letter and documents are

annexed hereto and numbered Al through

A20.

4. I believe that none of the

documents numbered Al through A20 are

duplicates of documents previously

released by the FBI. My only slight

hesitation in making this assertion as to

each and every one of these doucments is

SS —_— ——~CY

172a

that the extreme redaction makes it

difficult to be absolutely certain whether

a couple of these documents are slightly

altered versions of previously seen

documents.

5. These documents were unavailable

to the Court at the time it rendered its

decision in the above captioned matter, at

which time the Court was under the

mistaken view that defendant had already

supplied all records concerning plaintiff

maintained by the FBI, for in camera

review. Slip Op. at 14.

FRANK ASKIN, ESQ.

Attorney for Plaintiff, TODD

PATTERSON.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 6th

day of April, 1989.

EDWARD LLOYD

Attorney at Law

State of New Jersey

173a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TODD PATTERSON, a minor : Civil Action

under 18, suing by his > 88-2319

father, EDGAR PATTERSON,

>: Hon. Alfred M.

Plaintiff, : Wolin

Vv.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF : NOTIGE OF

INVESTIGATION, JOHN : MOTION FOR

DOE, an unknown employee : RECONSIDERATION

of the United States :

Government, and JOHN DOE

AGENCY, an unknown agency:

of the United Stated :

Government,

Defendants.

TO: SUSAN C. CASSELL

Assistant United State Attorney

970 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

MADAM:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March aT,

1989, plaintiff will apply to this court

before the Honorable Alfred M. Wolin,

J.D.C., at the United States Court House,

174a

Newark, New Jersey, for an order pursuant

to Rule 12(1I) of the General Rules of the

United State District Court for the

District of New Jersey granting

reconsideration of defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgement and for rehearing of

reargument of such motion.

The reason for this motion is that

there are matters and decisions which

plaintiff believes the Court has

overlooked in ruling on defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgement as more fully set

forth in the accompanying Memorandum in

Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration. Attached hereto is a

proposed order requiring that the in

Camera submissions of defendants be

released to plaintiff, that plaintiff be

granted an opportunity to submit a

supplemental affidavit and/or a

supplemental brief pursuant to Federal

175a

Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) and 56(f),

and that reargument of defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgement be set at a date and

time to be determined by the Court.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK ASKIN

Constitutional Litigation Clinic

Rutgers School of Law

15 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Attorney for Plaintiff, TODD

PATTERSON, on behalf of the

American Civil Liberties Union

of New Jersey

this 28th day of February, 1989.

176a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TODD PATTERSON, a minor :Civil

under 18, suing by his :Action

father, EDGAR PATTERSON, >No.

:88-2319

Plaintiff, :

Vv. :Hon.

:Alfred

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 3H.

JOHN DOE, an unknown employee of :Wolin

the United State Government, and =:

JOHN DOE AGENCY, an unknown agency:

of the United States Government, ::

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECONSIDERATION,

REHEARING OR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT BECAUSE

THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS BASED ON

EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Clearly provide that summary judgment

shall be granted based solely on fact

admisable in evidence. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e). These facts may be contained in

177a

documents admissible at trial or

affidavits of witnesses detailing

testimony to be presented at a trial on

the merits. "Rule 56(e) requires that

both supporting [sic] and opposing

affidavits be made on personal knowledge,

set forth facts that would be admissible

in evidence, and show affirmatively that

the affiant is computent to testify to the

matters stated herein." 6 Moore’s Federal

Practice, section 56.11{1.-8] at 56-99

(1988) (footnote omitted). Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on

each count in reliance on an in camera

affidavit submitted by defendants.

Documents withheld from disclosure under

claims of privilege are not admissible as

evidence.

» The consideration of materials

inadmissible in evidence in ruling ona

motion for summary judgment has been held

178a

to provide grounds for reversal or vacatur

of a grant of summary judgment. In

Association for Reduction of Violence v.

Hall, 734 F.2d 63, 67 {lst Cir. 1984), the

First Circuit Court of Appeals faced the

issue of whether it was legitimate for the

District Court to have relied on documents

which it had previously determined to be

privileged and as to which it had denied

plaintiff’s discovery motion. In ruling

that the District Court’s grant to summary

judgment should be vacated and remanded to

the trial court, the First Circuit stated

that it was improper to rely on materials,

specifically materials determined to be

privileged and therefore inadmissible in

evidence, that do not fall within the

broad category established by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(c). Id. at 67.

Similarly, the Court in Bane v.

Spencer, 393 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1968),

179a

cert. denied, 400 U.S. 866 (1970),

emphatically addressed the inequity of

allowing the movant for summary judgment

to rely for its motion on materials

exclusively within its possession and held

exempt from disclosure. In Bane, the

defendant, a doctor, incorporated medical

records into an affidavit in support of

his motion for summary judgment.

Thereafter, the defendant successfully

moved under state law to impound these

medical records, rendering them

inaccessible to plaintiff. In remanding

the action, the Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit recognized that the District

Court had found that the records contained

nothing of use to the plaintiff. However,

the Court of Appeals then went on to state

that "the defendant should not be able to

use the records as a sword to seek summary

judgment and at the same time blind

180a

plaintiff so that he cannot counter.

Defendant’s affidavit must contain on its

face, for plaintiff to see, whatever

defendant wishes to rely upon to seek

summary judgment." Id. at 109.

The United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York extended

the ex parte reasoning expressed in Bane

to a case involving claims of military and

state secret privileges. Kinoy v.

Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In

Kinoy, plaintiff sought damages for

alleged (and subsequently confirmed)

wiretapping. The court reserved decision

on several pending motions to allow the

government to make a formal claim of

privilege as to documents plaintiff had

subpoenaed and to allow the government to

move for summary judgment. 67 F.R.D. at

5. Exhibits were submitted in camera in

connection with both a formal claim of

18la

privilege and the motion for summary

judgment, a course of action which the

district court emphatically rejected:

Simultaneously, therefore,

the Government presents the

Court, in camera, with

material which it asserts must

be withheld from plaintiffs as

privileged, yet which it

requests the Court to consider

in ascertaining material fact

and drawing legal conclusions

concerning dispositive issues

in the case. In this Court’s

view such a course is wholly

unacceptable. Our system of

justice does not encompass ex

parte determinations on the

merits of cases in civil

litigation. Either the

documents are privileged, and

the litigation must continue

as best it can without then,

or they should be disclosed at

least to the parties, in which

case the Court will rule after

full argument on the merits.

67 F.R.D. at 15 (footnote omitted).

As the court in Kinoy suggested,

plaintiff should be allowed access to the

Affidavit of Assistant Director of the FBI

James H. Greer ("Greer Affidavit") and the

——————————————

182a

underlying documents on which the FBI

relies. In the alternative, the documents

should be held formally to be privileged

and should be excluded from consideration

in ruling on the defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. Under either

circumstance the plaintiff respectfully

urges that he be granted a rehearing in

order to address the defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment in a fair, equitable

and meaningful manner.

CONCLUSION

| For the aforementioned reasons,

|

plaintiff respectfully requests that his

Motion for Reconsideration be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Frank Askin

Constutional Litigation Clinic

Rutgers School of Law

15 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07192

Attorney for Plaintiff, TODD

183a

PATTERSON, on behalf of the

American Civil Liberties Union

of New Jersey

this 28th day of February, 1989.

184a

February 16, 1989

Hon. Alfred M. Wolin

United States District Court

USPO & Courthouse Bldg.

Newark, New Jersey 07101

Re: Patterson v. Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Civil Action No. 88-2319

Dear Judge Wolin:

This letter is written in response to

the Court’s letter of February 7, 1989

which requested the submission of changes

and corrections to the opinion issued in

the above-referenced case.

At the outset, it must be stressed

that counsel for the plaintiff is at a

distinct disadvantage in attempting to

respond to this invitation. Many of the

findings made by the Court are based on

its in camera inspection of the Affidavit

of Assistant Director of the FBI James H.

185a

Greer ("Greer Affidavit"), which was not

made available to the plaintiff or his

attorney. It is plaintiff’s intention to

respond to that fact with a separate

motion for reconsideration.

Based on the public record, we would

like to note the following errors in the

opinion:

1. Page 3: The sentence at the top of

the page which begins "Significantly"

should be changed to reflect that

envelopes bearing the return-address

"Laboratory Disposable Products" were used

by plaintiff in the initial mailing, see

Affidavit of Todd Patterson, paragraph 3;

however, all subsequent correspondence was

mailed in envelopes bearing the return

address of Todd Patterson.

2. Page 3: The second sentence of the

first full paragraph should be changed to

reflect that damaged, opened, and emptied

186a

correspondence received by plaintiff

originated from both foreign and domestic

sources. See Plaintiff’s Statement of

Material Facts, paragraph 4. Plaintiff

also wishes to make clear for the court

that all of the incoming correspondence

was addressed to Todd Patterson personally

and not to Laboratory Disposable Products.

This change should also be reflected in

the sentence beginning "Finally," at the

bottom of page 5.

3. Page 5: The last sentence of the

paragraph beginning at the bottom of the

page should be changed to reflect that the

FBI only denies wiretapping of the

Patterson’s home phone by the FBI;

however, it does not refute or admit

wiretapping of the Laboratory Disposable

Products phone line. See Declaratfon of

Vernon Thornton, paragraph 5.

Plaintiff respectfully requests that

187a

the above corrections and changes be

incorporated into the final version of the

opinion.

Respectfully,

Frank Askin, Esq.

Attorney for Plaintiff

cc: Susan C. Cassell, Esq.

Clerk, USDC f£or District of New Jersey

188a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSY

TODD PATTERSON, a minor

under 18, suing by his $

father, EDGAR PATTERSON : Civil Action

: No. 88-2319

Plaintiff,

Vv.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF : TRANSCRIPT OF

INVESTIGATION, JOHN DOE, : HEARING ON

an unknown employee of : MOTIONS

the United States :

Government, and JOHN DOE

AGENCY, an unknown agency:

of the United States :

Government ;

Defendants

Newark, New Jersey

December 15, 1989

BEFORE:

THE HON. ALFRED M. WOLIN, U.S.D.J.

APPEARANCES:

FRANK ASKIN, ESQUIRE,

Attorney for Plaintiff

SUSAN CASSELL, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, and

JOHN MARLEY, ESQUIRE, F.B.I. Field

Legal Counsel,

Attorneys for Defendants.

Reported by: CHARLES P. MCGUIRE, C.S.R.

Official Court Reporter

189a

* * *

Mr. Askin: ***

Now, turning to the specifics of the

summary judgment motion, and first of all,

as Your Honor has indicated, you’re

interested in Count 1, the Freedom of

Information Act count, and on that count,

which I agree is separable from the other

two but which I think has to be held in a

little bit of perspective until we can

also get through to the substance of

Counts 2 and 3, but on the FOIA dount

itself, the first count is whether the

Vaughn index is adequate, and I would

Suggest, Your Honor, that up to now, the

Vaughn index has not been -- is not

sufficient to satisfy the obligations of

the F.B.I. to explain what it is and what

kind of records they are keeping on Todd

and what he has a right to see, and let me

focus on two pieces of the Vaughn index.

190a

The very first, and again, it’s a

little difficult to separate our demand

for documents from our demand for

information, and of course, our discovery

motion is pending, and at one level, our

demand for documents may, in fact, be less

important than our access to information

contained in those documents, so

therefore, our discovery motion, really,

under Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint, our

Privacy Act claims, our constitutional

claims, it seems to me entitle us to

certain information in those files even if

the Court should decide that we are not

entitled to some of the documents

themselves because of FOIA exemptions

under Count 1.

But on the FOIA claim --

THE COURT: Well, how could you get

the information if you can’t get the

document?

19la

MR ASKIN: We’ve propounded

Interrogatories on the Defendants asking

them certain questions, factual

information contained in their file.

They

don’t have to show us the documents to

give us the information. We may be

entitled to that information separate and

apart from our rights under the Freedom of

Infcrmation Act. The Freedom of

Information Act is separate from the

Federal Rules for civil discovery.

if we did not have a Count 1,

had was Counts 2 and 3, we have a right

1f all

Civil discovery from the Defendants.

cannot at that point invoke FOIA

exemptions to say we don’t have a rig

certain information.

THE COURT: Wouldn’t it

that under the

O

ry

3

(D

ct

O

U

ey)

"tie

Privacy Act, you’re entitled

information, and decline the

document

Even

we

ct

192a

under Count 1?

MR. ASKIN: Oh, absolutely not, Your

Honor, because they’re two separate

questions. FOIA has to do with public

access to Government documents, and

anybody can make a claim for Government

documents; doesn’t even have to be

somebody who’s involved with those

documents. If somebody asks for Todd

Patterson’s files, they’d say, the

Government would say, well, we have to

protect his privacy, so nobody else can

get his files because of his privacy

rights. But if we never at all asked for

the documents, if all we’re doing is suing

the Government for violation of Todd’s

statutory and constitutional rights, we

have a right to engage in civil discovery.

At that point, the Government may make

other objections, they may claim other

privileges to certain information or

193a

certain questions, but they cannot invoke

the exemptions of FOIA. They’re

irrelevant to a civil suit for violation

of Todd’s rights.

So they are separate questions, but

on the FOIA claim itself --

THE COURT: How about if they deal

with national defense or foreign policy as

covered by the Executive Order?

MR ASKIN: Well, there is a military

Secrets privilege. The Government has a

right to assert that. There is a

procedure they have to follow, which they

have not as yet followed. They indicate

that they may be prepared to have the

Attorney General file the necessary claim;

I’m not sure that that’s correct, that

there’s that implication. Then the Court

has to follow through the procedures

announced in the Reynolds case about

whether or not to allow the Claim of what

194a

they call military or state secrets, and

at that level, the Court has to, because

of the need for the information, the fact

that Todd cannot get this information

anywhere else, the Court has an obligation

to very carefully examine into the

validity of the Government’s claim of

state secrets, whether this is really

something --

THE COURT: Haven’t they done that in

their argument to Count 3?

MR. ASKIN: No, Your Honor, I don’t

believe so. They indicated they may be

prepared for the Attorney General to file

that document, first of all, in the

procedure. I haven’t seen the document; I

don’t know if they’re ready to make that

representation in the Court. I assume it

is an act of some policy determination for

the Attorney General do decide, yes, I am

going to file a state secrets privilege

|

195a

claim in this case. Maybe they will,

maybe they won’t.

THE COURT: Maybe we should ask Ms.

Cassell right now.

Ms. Cassell?

MS. CASSELL: Your Honor, we

absolutely are prepared, and the papers

are being prepared in Washington now.

However, it’s our position that we don’t

need them until Your Honor rules on this

motion. If the motion is granted, well,

then, we won’t need to file it. But the

Attorney General has been made aware of it

and they’re in preparation.

THE COURT: OKay.

MR. ASKIN: At that point, then, Your

Honor, the Court would have to follow the

procedure laid out in the Reynolds case,

and as Reyno!ids says, "Where there is

trong showing of necessity on the part of

Y)

the Plaintiff," and I think here we have

ne

196a

strongest showing of necessity as

imaginable, the fact that without the

information, for example, the information

as to what other agencies are involved,

Plaintiff cannot pursue his constitutional

claims, that there is no other possible

source of that information, it says,

"Where there is a strong showing of

necessity, the claim of privileges should

not be ligntly accepted," and then it goes

on to say, "Even the most compelling

necessity, however, cannot overcome the

claim if the Court is ultimately satisfied

that military secrets are at stake."

I must tell you, Your Honor, I have

grave doubts that there are really

military secrets at stake in this case,

and I think the Court would have to very

seriously look at the Attorney General’s

declaration if in fact that claim were

made.

197a

Returning to the Vaughn index, there

are two specific pieces of the Vaughn

index I want to talk about, and again, I

must tell you; sometimes, dealing with

this kind of case, you feel like you’re

playing a game of blind man’s bluff, and

that’s why I think in several cases the

courts have said it is necessary that the

Defendants put all of their Vaughn claims

in one document. Frankly, running, trying

to run through this, you run from document

to document, from the Government’s brief

to the Thomas declaration to the Lieberman

declaration to a second declaration, the

Answers to Interrogatories, trying to

figure out exactly what the claims are in

each instance. But I want to refer

specifically to two pieces of information

hidden in these files which I don’t think

the Vaughn index accurately explains why

we cannot have it.

i i i

198a

The first is a very simple question:

What is Todd Patterson’s file prefix

number, and why won’t they tell us?

Now, let me tell Your Honor, that is

a very, very important piece of

information.

Now, Ms. Cassell has suggested that

in the Laurie Paton case, at the top of

her files was the word subversive. That’s

not true, Your Honor. At the top of her

file was a file number 100, 100, dash,

whatever the rest of her file was. It was

the 100 which labeled that file

subversive, because that’s what the 100

meant in the F.B.I.’s classification

system. The F.B.I. has a very extensive

classification system in which files are

identified by their prefix, two or three

number prefix, if 1t’s about bank

robberies or espionage or national

security or terrorism. The content of the

199a

file, the content of the investigation is

determined by the prefix.

We believe the Pattersons have a

right to know what kind of classification

the F.B.I. has given to Todd’s file.

Maybe it’s under curious precocious

teenager. Now, that wouldn’t upset the

Pattersons too much. Unfortunately, the

last time I looked, the F.B.I. didn’t have

such a classification.

On the other hand, if it’s classified

with a prefix that says investigation of

esplonage or national security matter or

subversive matter, then the Pattersons are

much more concerned about this file being

kept on Todd.

THE COURT: Wouldn’t your concern

diminish if the whole file is expunged?

MR. ASKIN: Some of the concern would

diminish, Your Honor, let me respond to

that, it’s true, and Ms. Cassell says the

i

200a

F.B.I. has now offered to expunge this

file.

Why is that not sufficient for Todd’s

interests at this moment? And frankly,

there are several reasons.

First of all, expunging his file is

no guarantee against repetition. Todd

continues to be curious. He continues to

write to foreign governments. He

continues to seek information. They

expunge his file now, we don’t know that

they won’t start up a new one tomorrow.

So expungement is no guarantee

against Todd’s future rights.

Secondly, he wants vindication of his

rights, including the right to know just

what his Government did to him and exactly

what it recorded about him.

THE COURT: Well, don’t I have to

balance that against national security?

MR. ASKIN: Well, at some point, I

20la

think you probably will, Your Honor, in

fact, and again, if in fact you are

convinced by the Government’s

presentations that somehow, this will

really jeopardize some kind of military

information and state secrets, the

Reynolds case says you have to acknowledge

their claim. But I think that burden is

on Your Honor to carefully examine whether

or not that is really, that there is such

a -- that this is really true, that the

impact on national security would be so

Significant that it really should preclude

Todd from knowing exactly who did what to

his mail, how and whether his

constitutional rights were infringed and

so forth.

I must tell Your Honor I litigated

the Paton case for seven years, and the

Government kept telling us, we can’t

divulge these files because tremendous

a aa,

202a

Gamage to the national security would be

done, and finally, Judge Whipple said

release the files, and suddenly it was

demonstrated there was nothing of the

slightest harm to national security

contained in those files.

Now, unfortunately, it was a

subterfuge, and that’s the problem with

these kinds of cases. The Government

makes these claims, this boilerplate

mumbo-jumbo about damage to national

security interests, and as I say, it’s

very difficult to try to understand

exactly what this is about, and that’s why

the Vaughn index must be so specific and

so detailed.

I mean, I cannot imagine how there

could be, and I think -- I can’t imagine

the Court will think that revealing the

prefix which the F.B.I. has given to

Todd’s file is going to damage national

security.

On the question of these other

agencies, documents four and five, let me

talk about them in regard to the Vaughn

index.

Documents four and five are both

cover letters to which there are

attachments of other pages which the

F.B.I. will not release at all. They have

been totally withheld. There are at least

four pages as I understand the Lieberman

and Thomas declarations. One document has

17 pages attached, of which three

specifically refer to Todd, the other one

has five pages attached, of which one

refers to Todd, and those pages have been

totally withheld from us.

The Government in its explanation in

the Thomas declaration repeats some

boilerplate language about threatened

damage to national security, which,

204a

frankly, is the exact, practically word

for word identical to the boilerplate

language which was offered in the King

case, which the D.C. Court of Appeals says

was inadequate, it’s just boilerplate,

it’s categorical, it doesn’t really mean

anything, it’s over broad, you’ve got to

be more specific, so that the Court can

really understand that, in fact, there’s

going to be -- what kind of danger is

really threatened here.

So those four pages as well as, it

seems to me, all this other information

concerning who it was, I mean, I don’t

know that Ms. Cassell this morning

suggests that there was some agency, and

by the way, on the mail cover, Your Honor,

the F.B.I. says it never tampered with

Todd’s mail. We never said the F.B.I.

tampered with Todd’s mail. We don’t

believe it was the F.B.I. tampered with

205a

Todd’s mail. We want to know what agency

did tamper with Todd’s mail. That’s what

we want to know. We never accused the

F.B.I. of doing it. Ms. Cassell

apparently states there was some kind of

mail cover, it’s the first concession

we’ve had of that, in which some of Todd’s

initial replies from embassies were picked

up.

Now, mail cover is regulated. Judge

Whipple held the mail cover regulation

unconstitutional. Now, the Postal Service

went back and revised its mail cover

regulation subsequent to the Paton case,

but if there is a mail cover in place now,

I don’t know if that mail cover, we don’t

know if it was properly authorized, we

don’t know if it met the criteria required

as a result of Judge Whipple’s opinion and

the new Postal Service regulation. We

think we have a right to inquire into

206a

that. Todd as an American citizen has a

right to write for information, even to

foreign embassies. That is his right as

an American, and I don’t Know under what

authority the F.B.I. -- well, not the

F.B.I., whatever Federal agency, as I Say,

we don’t believe it was the F.B.I., some

other agency claims the right to intercept

his mail to foreign embassies. We think

that’s a legitimate issue for trial in

this case, but first we have to know who

it was that was intercepting it and under

what authority it was being intercepted.

I mean, that is really precisely the same

issue that was involved in Paton v.

LaPrade 16 years ago in this courtroom.

On the issue, continuing the issue of

why expungement of Todd’s file is not an

adequate remedy for him, the fact is, Your

Honor, that every time the F.B.I. gets

caught violating the rights of someone

207a

like Todd and violating the Privacy Act,

it thinks all it has to say is, oops,

sorry about that, let’s just wipe out the

file and make believe it never happened,

and thus placing themselves beyond

judicial review, and the hundreds or maybe

thousands of people who don’t know about

the F.B.I.’s violations of their rights,

who don’t know that the F.B.I. intercepted

their mail and set up a file on them are

never the wiser.

Todd is willing to try to help

Vindicate their rights, too, because he is

interested not only in his own freedom of

inquiry but in living in a society in

which everyone else enjoys freedom of

inquiry as well, because that’s his right

as well as their right, to live ina free

society, and that’s another reason why

Todd would feel strongly about pursuing

this case, about our motion to designate

a

: 208a

this case as a class action, so that other

people, not just those who happened to get

lucky enough and catch the F.B.I. at what

they’re doing, that other people can have

their rights vindicated, and once and for

all make the F.B.I. abide by Section

(e) (7) of the Privacy Act which it has

honored in the breach for the past 14

years.

On the other two counts of Todd’s

complaint, again, initially, the

Defendants ignored them totally. They

tried to treat it as a FOIA case. They

now seem to concede that maybe there’s

something more to this case than that, but

even this morning, Ms. Cassell wants to

suggest that what the Privacy Act is about

is the misuse and dissemination of

information, improper disclosure. She

says the purpose of the Privacy Act is

improper disclosure. That’s not true,

209a

Your Honor. The purpose of the Privacy

Act was to stop the F.B.I. from

maintaining files on hundreds of thousands

or millions of Americans who were doing

nothing more than exercising their rights

of free speech and association under the

Constitution of the United States. That’s

what Section (e)(7) was about. Whether of

not the F.B.I. ever has used this

information, has disclosed this

information, the existence of this file

with possibly a negative prefix on it in

the F.B.I., six file cards somewhere with

Todd’s name on it, six separate files,

three main files, three cross reference

files, two in Washington, four in Newark,

these files sit there.

Todd is a young man with his whole

future ahead of him. He’s interested in

being a Foreign Service Officer. That’s

part of his interest in internal affairs

210a

and what goes on with other countries. He

wants to represent this Government. He’s

uneasy about having these six file cards

and files in the F.B.I. with who knows

what kind of classification on there,

because he’s going to be applying for

Government service, and he has a right, as

other Americans, that the F.B.I. not be

keeping these kinds of files.

We’ve never challenged the right of

the F.B.I. to open this investigation.

Maybe they had the right. Again, maybe it

was illegal on the interception of his

mail, we still don’t know, but if they

found out, somebody, Laboratory Disposable

Products was communicating with a foreign

government, maybe they had the right to go

out and ask some questions. They didn’t

have to start a file: Oh, it’s a

teenager, let’s tear it up, let’s throw it

in the wastebasket, let’s forget about

2lla

this thing right now.

So on Counts 2 and 3, it seems to me

it’s totally premature to even think about

Summary judgment. There are lots of

issues involved, there seems to be lots of

discovery to which we are entitled, and

there are lot of -- I mean, if anybody is

entitled to summary judgment in this case,

it’s probably the Pl

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