Appendix — Sapia v. Charter Marketing Co.

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) J il g o % . Supreme Court, U.S,

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Case No. | MAR 16 39%

JOSEPH F, SPANION UR |

CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

DEBORAH JEAN SAPIA,

PETITIONER

CHARTER MARKETING COMPANY, GEORGE YOUNG,

EARL KIGHT, JR., CAPITOL CITY CREDIT COMPANY,

JACK SMITH, CREDIT BUREAU SERVICES, FRANK

MOZZICATO, HARTFORD HOSPITAL, RICHARD A.

LAWSON, MARGE RAMSDELL, AND JOHN S. GUTMAN,

RESPONDENTS

and

CONNECTICUT NATIONAL BANK, JOHN F. STOCKINGER,

AND OSWALD ANTHONY SHERWOOD,

RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE U.S.

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

JOINT APPENDIX

DEBORAH JEAN SAPIA

50 BLACKMAN ROAD

HEBRON, CONNECTICUT

(203) 228-9610

PRO SE PETITIONER

* . S " ek ~ *¥ Se hati nt ~ " a pay ee ee

ee ee Ie Le Fe Pe Oe me ey OEM eee eS jy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS.

DATED OCTOBER 11, 1988

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS

DATED MARCH 8, 1989

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ORDER DATED DECEMBER 18, 1989

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1990.

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Page

106

112

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

DEBORAH JEAN SAPIA

-vVs- :Civil No. H-87-962

CHARTER MARKETING COMPANY =: (PCD)

et. al.

October 1l, 1988

RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Deborah Jean Sapia brings this action

pro se alleging violations of the federal and

Connecticut constitutions; violations of

federal statutes respecting civil rights,

employment discrimination, antitrust, and

fair credit; defamation; and numerous other

torts under state law. The amended com-

plaint, in over 70 pages, sets out 21 pur-

ported causes of action Each cause is

asserted against one or more of the 26

defendants, for a total of 302 separate

counts in all. Some of the defendants are

former employers of the plaintiff;1l/ others

are credit reporting companies 2/ officials

of the Connecticut Department of Labor ,3/

plaintiff's former attorneys4/ and her

uncle>/. The complaint recounts a series of

events - roughly in reverse chronological

order -- dating back to 1970 and continuing

up through August 1985. No brief summary of

these allegations is possible, but the grava-

men of plaintiff's charges is that she has

been the victim of a widespread conspiracy

1l/Including defendants Charter Marketing Co;

Connecticut National Bank; Hartford

Hospital; Rolf H. Olson; Coburn &

Meredith, Inc.; and John S. Gutman

2/Defendants Capitol City Credit Company;

Credit Bureau Services; and Company X.

3/Defendants Donald E. Wasik; Leon G. Philbrick;

and Samuel F. Petrus. Defendant Robert Langer

is an assistant attorney General for the

State of Connecticut

4/Defendants James L. Kestell and James Patrick

Connolly.

5/Defendant Frank R. Mozzicato

to deprive her of employment and of the

opportunity for employment. Beginning in

1975, plaintiff encountered difficulties

obtaining and keeping employment. She

charges her former employers with violations

of her rights under the first and fourteenth

amendments; sex discrimination in violation

of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e, et. seq.;

engaging in an antitrust conspiracy to black-

list her with other employers; breach of

her employment contracts; intentional

infliction of emotional distress upon her;

and defaming her to other potential employers

and credit reporting agencies by providing

derogatory credit and employment references.

Some of these actions, plaintiff alleges,

were authorized or sanctioned by state offi-

cials. Plaintiff also alleges that the

employers or other defendants, including her

attorneys and the state officials, frustrated

her attempts to appeal an unfavorable decision

by the Employment Security Division of the

Connecticut Department of Labor.

Defendants Wasik, Langer, Philbrick,

Petrus, Charter Marketing Company, Young,

Kight, Meredith, Coburn & Meredith, Kesteli,

and Mozzicato move to dismiss counts of the

Complaint direc..d against them. 6/

Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, all

well-pleaded material allegations are taken

as true and the complaint must be construed

in favor of the plaintiff, drawing reason-

able inferences in support of her claim.

Cruz v. Beto, 401 U.S. 319, 323 (1972).

A dismissal a not enter unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

6/Defendants Wasik, Langer, Philbrick, and

Petrus ("'the State defendants") move to dis-

miss the entire complaint as against them.

Defendants Charter, Young and Kight (the "'Char-

ter defendants"') also move to dismiss the

entire complaint, as do defendants Coburn,

Coburn & Meredith, and Mozzicato. Defendant

Kestell moves to dismiss only plaintiff's

negligence claim.

nf facts in support of her claim which would

entitle her to relief. Conley v. Gibson,

335 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). While the plead-

ings of a plaintiff acting pro se are held

to a less stringent standard than those of

attormeys, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

1971), they must at minimum allege a specific

factual basis for relief sought. Thus,

plaintiff is obliged to provide more than

conclusory, vague, or general allegations of

constitutional violations; she must allege

specific instances of misconduct. See Black

v. United States, 543 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir.

1976); Ostrerer v. Aronwald, 567 F 2d 551,

Joe (2a Cie. i977}:

Statute of Limitations

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's

constitutional, 81983, 81985, 81986, Title VII,

defamation, and negligence claims as barred by

statutes of limitations. The defense of a

statute of limitations may be raised by a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim. Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Hub

Pharmacy, Inc., 707 F. 2d 1030, 1032 n.1

(9th Cir. 1983). However, the motion may be

granted only where it appears from the face

of the complaint that the limitations period

has run on plaintiff's claim and that plain-

tiff can prove no set of facts under the

complaint which would toll the period and

entitle her to relief. See Jablon v. Dean

Witter & Co., 614 F. 2d 677, 682 (9th Cir 1980) ;

Guy v. Swift & Co., 612 F. 2d 383, 385 (8th

Cir. 1980); Rauch v. Day 576 F2d 697, 702

(6th Cir. 1978).

On the face of the complaint, it is clear

that as to plaintiff's claims under § 1983,

$ 1985, and the first and fourteenth amend-

ments, the limitations period has expired.

The appropriate statute of limitations to be

applied to these claims is the three-year

period established by Conn. Gen. Statutes

8 52-577 for personal injury actions.

Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667 (2nd Cir. 1977);

Diverniero v. Murphy, 635 F. Supp. 1531, 1534

(D. Conn. 1986); see Wilson v. Garcia, 471

U.S. 261, 273-275, 278 n. 38 (1985).

Plaintiff's original complaint was filed Dec.

14, 1987. Thus, where plaintiff's complaint,

on its face, cannot be based on conduct of a

particular defendant which occurred after

December 14, 1984, and injured her constitu-

tional rights, such claims must be dismissed

as to that defendant.

During times relevant to the complaint,

defendant Wasik was employed as an assistant

attorney general assigned to the Connecticut

Labor Department. Complaint P.10. Plaintiff's

only allegations involving Wasik are that he

discussed her employment history with Young in

May of 1983, Compliaint P. 38, and that in July,

1983 he telephoned plaintiff and made "dis-

paraging and intimidating remarks about her

unemployment appeal then pending with the Labor

Department. Complaint P. 54. While plaintiff

alleges that Wasik "authorized" harrassment of

her by defendants Young and Kight during her

employment by defendant Charter, she presents

no specific allegations of fact to support that

conclusion. See Koch v. Yunich, 533 F. 2d

80, 85 (2d Cir. 1976); Ellentuck v. Klein,

570 F. 2d 414, 426 (2d Cir. 1978) (conclusory

allegations of concerted action insufficient).

Even assuming plaintiff's rights were violated

by Wasik in 1983, her allegations of isolated

incidents in May and July 1983 cannot reason-

ably support any inference that Wasik committed

or participated in, any act after December,

1984 which violated her rights.

Similarly, the complaint is silent with

respect to any conduct by defendant Langer

after March 1983, of defendant Petrus after

June 1980, or of defendant Philbrick after

July, 1982. Plaintiff claims that Langer, an

Assistant Attorney General, discussed her

employment problems with her in February 1983

and acknowledged that ''wrongful action had

occurred and that he was empowered to pursue

a remedy,'' but never responded to her March,

1983 letter requesting action. Complaint 856.

Defendant Petrus was Assistant Director of

the OSHA Division of the Labor Department.

He allegedly met with plaintiff on three

occasions, the last in June 1980, to discuss

her employment probiems at Connecticut

National Bank, but fialed to take action on

her behalf. Complaint 88127-130. Defendant

Philbrick was an Appeals Referee in the Emp-

loyment Security Division of the Department.

He presided cver plaintiff's unemployment

appeal hearing in June 1982. He issued a

décision adverse to plaintiff in July 1982.

Complaint 8 60-61.

The face of the Complaint shows that

plaintiff's claims against Wasik, Langer, Petrus

and Philbrick are time-barred. No reasonable

inference can be drawn from plaintiff's

allegations that any conduct of these defend-

ants toward plaintiff continued through

December 1984, well over a year after the

incidents described in the complaint. /7/

Accordingly, plaintiff's direct claims

under the constitution and her claims under

§ 1983 and §1985 are barred by the statute

of limitations as to defendants Wasik, Langer,

Petrus, and Philbrick, and are dismissed. 8/

The dismissed claims are the only federal

claims asserted against these defendants.

Defendants are citizens of Connecticut, as

is plaintiff; there is thus no diversity

of citizenship upen which to base jurisdict-

ion Over the rewaining claiuws pasea on state

7/Defendants have informed the court that

Mr. Petrus died in Florida on January i7,

1984, and have attached a copy of his

death certificate to their memorandum.

Plaintiff concedes that Petrus' death de-

prives the court of jurisdiction over him.

However, the information outside the

pleadings is not relied on in determining

whether the limitations period has run as

to the other defendants.

8/The 81986 claim asserted against Petrus must

~ also be dismissed. Section 1986 contains

its own one-year limitations period which

has clearly expired as to defendant Petrus.

42 U.S.C. 31986.

law and the action is dismissed in its

entirety as to defendants Wasik, Langer,

Petrus, and Philbrick. United Mine Workers

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (where

federal claims dismissed before trial,

pendant state claims ordinarily should be

dismissed as well.)

Defendant Kestell, an attormey, moves

to dismiss plaintiff's negligence claim as

brought "more than three years from the date

of the act or omission complained of."' Conn.

Gen. Stat. 852-584. Plaintiff alleges that

in November 1981 she retained defendant

Kestell to provide legal assistance with her

employment problems. Complaint P. 62-63.

She claims that Kestell failed to assist or

to advise her, and did not pursue an invest-

igation of her case. Kestell siatsk ininailia

plaintiff at her unemployment appeal hearing

but, inter alia, allegedly was unprepared,

failed to act on plaintiff's behalf, testi-

fied unfavorably to her, and prevented her

from testifying and entering evidence into

the record. Complaint P. 65. Moreover,

after an adverse decision on her appeal,

rendered on July 13, 1982, Kestell allegedly

did not return plaintiff's telephone calls

or make himself available to appeal the

decision. Complaint P. 66. Kestell argues

that, since plaintiff's appeal was decided

on July 13, 1982, and plaintiff did not eng-

age him to represent her further, her action

for negligence in the course of the represent-

ation is barred by 52 852-584 and the passage

of time. Plaintiff argues that she attempted

to contact defendant regarding an appeal.

However, even assuming that Kestell was

negligent in failing to assist plaintiff in

taking an appeal from the decision of the

appeals referee, the negligent "act or

omission" occurred, at the latest, when the

time for plaintiff's appeal had run. Conn.

Gen. Stat. 8 31-249 provides that any appeal

from the decision of an employment security

referee must be taken before the decision

becomes final; i.e., within 22 days after

mailing of the decision. See Conn. Gen.

Stat. 8 § 31-248-249. Plaintiff's neg-

ligence allegations relate solely to the

unemployment proceedings and to Kestell's

failure to assist her appeal from the un-

favorable ruling of July 13, 1983. Thus,

any negligent act or omission on Kestell's

part relating to the appeal occurred long

before December 14, 1984, and plaintiff's

negligence claim is barred by § 52-584.

Plaintiff argues that disputed factual

issues remain as to circumstances which

could toll the statutes of limitations:

"fraud, willful nondisclosure, deception,

misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment,

duress, advice of counsel justifying inaction,

and due diligence."' Plaintiff's Memorandum

of Law in Opposition to Defendant Kestell's

Motion at 1. Fraud amounting to intentional

concealment of a cause of action in order to

induce delay in bringing suit tolls the

accrual of the cause until the plaintiff

could reasonably have discovered it.

Conn. Gen Stat. 8 52-595; see, e.g., In re

Danmar, 43 B.R. 423 (D. Conn. 1984). However,

plaintiff's complaint shows on its face that

she was aware of both the necessity for an

appeal to protect her rights and that Kestell

had not responded to her communications re-

garding such an appeal. See Complaint P. 66.

Plaintiff cannot escape the operation of the

limitations period, clearly applicable on the

face of the Complaint, by'conclusory allegea-

tions of fraud in her memorandum. Plaintiff

alleges that Kestell promised to provide

legal services, but did not. Complaint P. 233.

Such a promise was not a misrepresentation of

fact and does not constitute fraud. Plaintiff

does not identify any other statement, mis-

representation, or omission of fact, or advise

of Kestell upon which she relied in delaying

her lawsuit. See Dayco Corp. v. Firestone,

386 F. Supp. 546, 547 (N.D. Ohio 1974)

(Plaintiff must allege actual act of conceal-

ment, not mere non-disclosure); cf. Rule 9

(b) (circumstances of fraud must be pleaded

with particularity). Without at least ident-

ifying such statements or advice, she is not

entitled to make a general inquiry through

discovery. Accordingly, plaintiff's negli-

gence claim, Count LXX, Complaint P. 232, is

dismissed as to defendant Kestell.9/

Defendant Gutman moves to dismiss all

claims asserted against him as barred by

applicable statutes of limitation. However,

defendant's memorandum addresses this issue

only as to plaintiff's contract, tort, and

slander claims against him and this ruling

9/Defendant Kestell's motion to dismiss does

~ not address the other claims asserted against

him by plaintiff. However, the pendent state

claims, for which there is no basis for

diversity jurisdiction are addressed infra.

is limited to those claims.

Plaintiff was employed by Gutman's

firm intermittently from 1970 until 1977.

Complaint P. 150-161. She alleges that

Gutman discriminated against her by requiring

her to perform tasks, or attend meetings, not

required of male employees. She further

alleses that she was compelled by this treat-

ment to resign and that subsequently defend-

ant Gurman "deliberately and willfully em-

barked on a malicious, vindictive course of

action designed to prevent plaintiff from

securing...employment and to punish plaint-

iff for asserting her rights."" ID. Ps. 164-5.

As defendant contends, all claims

arising out cf plaintiff's employment by Gutman

are now barred by statutes of limitation.

Plaintiff's last contact with Gutman relating

to employment was in 1979, eight years before

this action was begun. Id. P. 162. Her tort

and negligence claims are barred by the three

year limitations periods established by Conn.

Gen. Stat. 8 52-577 (action founded on tort)

and Conn. Gen. Stat. e 52-584 (negligence).

Any contract-based claims are barred by

Conn. Gen. Stat. 8 52-581 (3-year limitation

on action on oral contract) and Conn. Gen.

Stat. 8 52-576 (6-year limitation on action

on written contract). While plaintiff argues

that the limitation periods are tolled by

fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment

on the part of defendant Gurman, the allega-

tions of fraud are insufficient on their face

to permit such tolling. There is no allega-

tion of a specific misrepresentation or

affirmative act of concealment by defendant.10/

10/For example, plaintiff claims that Gutman

promised to pay her employment benefits,

insisted that the requirement that she attend

extra functions was a normal and reasonable

condition of her employment, and promised to

provide favorable references. These state-

ments are either unkept promises or mere ex-

pressions of opinion, certainly they do not

amount to representations of fact which

could support'a claim of fraud. Moreover,

since plaintiff states she was forced to re-

sign from Gutman's employ by his discrimina-

tory behavior, she cannot claim that she re-

lied upon his representations after that time.

Accordingly, plaintiff's contract,

negligence, intentional infliction of dis-

tress, and interference with contract claims

are dismissed as barred by statute of

limitations. (Counts CCXCVII, CCXCVIII,

CCXCIX, and CCC.) Piaintiff argues that

defendant's conduct after 1979 constituted

slander and libel, which have continued

until the present. She claims that defend-

ant Gutman has given, or is giving, false

and unfavorable references to employers and

emplcyment agencies with respect to her.

Complaint Ps. 165-66. She does not allege

any specific communication, its contents,

its date, or the recipient. Thus, the com-

plaint alleges continuing defamatory com-

munications in a conclusory manner. While

it would permit a showing that such communi-

10/ (continued)Plaintiff's attempts to plead

fraud are an obvious, but insufficient, effort

to escape the effects of the statutes of lim-

itation, clear on the face of the complaint.

cations occurred within the two-year statu-

tory limitations period of Conn. Gen. Stat.

8 52-597, it does not allege any specific

communication within the statutory period

which would qualify as defamation. Thus,

the libel and slander claims must be dis-

missed because of the failure to allege

a specific defamation within the statute of

limitations. It may be that such allega-

tions can, in compliance with Fed R. Civ.

P. 11, be pleaded. As of now, they are not

and so long as they are not the conclusory

allegations do not permit the complaint to

stand against the defense of the statute of

limitations. Accordingly, the motion to

dismiss is granted as to Counts CCXCIV,

CCXCV, and CCXCVI.

Title VII Claims

Defendants Meredith and Coburn & Meredith

move to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claims,

42 U.S.C. 8 2000e, et. seq.11/ Defendants

argue that because plaintiff never filed a

timely administrative charge of discrimina-

tion with the appropriate state agency, the

Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and

Opportunity ("CHRO"), or with the Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and has

never received a right to sue letter from the

EEOC, there can be no jurisdiction over her

Title VII claim. See 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-5(£) (1);

Carey v. New York Gaslight, 598 F.2d 1253 (2d

Cir. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 54 (1980). The

timely filing of an administrative charge and

the receipt of a right to sue letter are not

jurisdictional prerequisites to a Title VII

action. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

455 U.S. 385 (1982). However, timely filing

and a right-to-sue letter are statutory con-

11/Defendants Charter, Young, Kight, and Gutman

have made similar motions which will not be

discussed separately.

ditions precedent to such an action, which

can be excused only on equitable grounds.

See Id. at 393; Bradley v. Consolidated

Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 657 F.Supp.197,

203 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Hladki v. Jeffrey's

Consolidated, Ltd., 652 F. Supp. 388, 392

(E.D.N.Y. 1987). Compliance with such con-

ditions precedent must be pleaded, at least

generally. Hladki, 652 F. Supp. at 393,n.11;

Rule 9(c).

Plaintiff's complaint mentions no admin-

istrative filings nor any right-to-sue letter.

It does not allege satisfaction of statutory

conditions precedent to suit. It is, there-

fore, defective and subject to dismissal on

those grounds. See Hladki, 652 F. Supp. at

394 (dismissed for failure to comply with

Rule 9(c) in absence of allegations as to

right-to-sue letter). Plaintiff's memoran-

dum represents that she did "contact" the

CHRO and EEOC with her grievances and that

"representatives of each body said, in essence,

(

that it surpassed their scope and capabilit-

ies and that plaintiff should ‘get a lawyer.'"

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant Mozzicato's Motion at 1 (May 5, 1988).

She states that the agencies to no action and

"refus(ed) to provide plaintiff with proper

paperwork.'' Id. However, there is no showing

that plaintiff has received a right-to-sue

letter or has attempted to obtain one.

Moreover, plaintiff was last employed

by defendant Gutman in 1977, by defendant

Coburn & Meredith in 1978, and by defendant

Charter Marketing in 1985. Thus, even if

plaintiff did file an administrative charge

and received a right-to-sue letter, the

statements in plaintiff's memorandum give

no hint whether plaintiff filed any charge

within 300 days of the alleged discrimination,

ae US.C. g 2000e-5(£) (1). Plaintiff's rep-

resentations do not suggest compliance with

the statutory conditions for weie. nor that

equitable considerations might excuse those

y a

requirements. In particular, plaintiff's

general representation that she contacted

the administrative agencies does not dis-

tinguish among the numerous defendants

against whom Title VII claims are raised,

nor among her various claims of discrimina-

tory conduct occurring over an eight year

period. Only sheer speculation would permit

the conclusion, as to any particular defend-

ant or claim, that plaintiff has met statu-

tory requirements as to her Title VII claims.

Despite plaintiff's pro se posture, permit-

ting her claims to stand with such deficienc-

ies would require indulgence in speculation.

It is more appropriate to dismiss the Title

VII claims with leave to amend to correct

the deficiency, if possible. Consistent

with her obligations under Rule ll, Fed. R.

Civ. p12), on or before October 31, 1988,

12/Rule 11, which applies to pro se parties

as well as to counsel states:

Every pleading, motion, and other

paper of a party represented ty an

plaintiff may amend the complaint to allege

compliance with the statutory requirements

with respect to specific defendants and

claims. Such a pleading would, at minimun,

(1) speicfy any charges filed by plaintiff

with the EEOC and/or CHRO and the date,

persons name , and conduct complained of

attorney shall be signed by at

least one attorney of record in

the attorney's individual name,

whose address shall be stated. A

party who is not represented by

an attorney shall sign the party's

pleading, motion, or other paper

and state the party's address.

The signature of an attorney or

party constitutes a certificate

by the signer that the signer has

read the pleading, motion, or other

paper; that to the best of the sign-

er's knowledge, information and be-

lief formed after reasonable inquiry

it is well grounded in fact and is

warranted by existing law or a good

faith argument for the extension,

modification or reversal of existing

law, and that it is not interposed for

any improper purpose, such as to harass

or to cause unnecessary delay or need-

less increase in the cost of litigation.

...L1f a pleading, motion or other paper

is signed in violation of this rule, the

court, upon motion or upon its own

initiative, shall impose upon the person

who signed it, a sanction, which may in-

clude an order to pay to the other party

in each charge; (2) specify the date of any

right-to-sue notice received by plaintiff in

connection with such charges; and (3) to the

extent no timely charge was filed, or no

right-to-sue notice received, or suit was

not filed within the 90-day period, specify

the facts, circumstances and conduct of each

defendant and/or administrative agency which

plaintiff contends justifies excuse or mod-

ification of these requirements. Accordingly,

plaintiff's Title VII claims are dismissed

without prejudice as to all defendants, for

fialure to comply with the statutory require-

ments and with the minimum pleading require-

ments of Rule 9(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. Hladki,

652 F.Supp. at 394.

Or parties the amount of the reasonable

expenses incurred because of the filing

of the pleading, motion or other paper,

including a reasonable attorney's fee.

(Emphasis added).

y So

Antitrust Claims

Defendants Charter, Young, and Kight

move to dismiss plaintiff's Sherman Act

claims for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b) (6).

Defendants argue that plainitff has not

alleged an antitrust injury sufficient to

confer standing to assert a claim under

Lo U.S.C. 4 and 16, which authorizes

private suits for violation of the federal

antitrust laws. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort

of Colorado, Inc., 107 S.Ct. 484, 491 (1986).

In order to bring an action under either 8 4

or § 16, a private plaintiff mst allege

threatened loss or damage "'of the type that

the antitrust laws were designed to prevent

and that flows from that which makes the de-

fendants' acts unlawful.'" Id., quoting

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.

429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977). "(O)nly harm

stemming from a reduction in competition

qualifies as injury cognizable under the

antitrust laws.'' Adams v. Pan American

World Airways, 828 F.2d 24, 26 (D.C. Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1225 (1988).

The law protects competition, not competitors.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 370 U.S. 294,

320 (1962). Plaintiff has alleged that de-

fendants' harassment and discriminatory treat-

ment compelled her to resign from their employ,

harmed her reputation, and rendered her un-

employable. See Complaint P. 48-49. Plaint-

iff's loss of employment and diminished re-

putation are injuries personal to her, not

injuries to competition, the public, or the

market. She does not allege any effect on

competition, or cn any market in which de-

fendants operate. Plaintiff was not defend-

ants' competitor, she was their employee;

her termination is not alleged to be the

result of any scheme or agreement to reduce

competition for defendants' services or

products. Even if defendants' alleged consp-

EE __ eEE—eESV3w OOOO Eee

iracy restricted the demand for her own

services, such an effect could not, by it-

self, constitute the requisite antitrust

injury. See Daley v. St. Agnes Hosp., Inc.,

490 F. Supp. 1309, 1317-18 (E.D. Pa. 19890)

(plaintiff alleging he was blacklisted by

former employer must show anticompetitive

effect other than with regard to labor;

Sherman Act does not provide remedy for

Title VII claims). Work as an employee of

another is not an independant business

enterprise or property and thus the loss of

employment is not an injury protected by

15 U.S.C. 8 15. Plumbers & Steamfitters

Local 598 v. Morris, 511 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.

Wash. 1981); see also 15 U.S.C. 817

("labor of a human being is not a commodity

or article of commerce" within meaning of

Sherman Act.) Accordingly, plaintiff has

not alleged an antitrust injury.

In addition, plaintiff's claims under

Section 2 of the Sherman Act must be dismiss-

ed because she has failed to allege a

necessary element of a Section 2 violation:

the possession of monopoly power in the

relevant market. California Computer Prod.

v. I.B.M., 613 F 2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1979);

see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.

563, 570-71 (1966). Monepoly power is defin-

ed as "the power to control market prices or

exclude competition.'' Greyhound Computer

Corp. v. I.B.M., 559 F2d 488, 496 (9th Cir.

1977). Plaintiff has made no allegation as

to the relevant product and geographic mar-

kets, nor alleged that defendants have a pre-

dominent share. See Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.

at 571, 575 (discussing relevant product and

geographic markets). Indeed, the complaint

does nothing more that attach the label

"monepoly" to the actions of the defendants;

it does not identify the entities with which

they are aleged to have conspired, or the

business in which those entities are

engaged. }3/ Moreover, the claim that, even

collecticely, the defendants could possess

monopoly power in the general market for

employment in Connecticut such that they

could control wages or exclude competition

is patently frivolous. Accordingly, defend-

ants’ motion to dismiss the antitrust counts

is granted.

First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

Defendants Charter, Young, Kight,

Coburn & Meredith, and Meredith move to dis-

miss plaintiff's direct claims under the

first, fifth and fourteenth amendments to

the constitution for failure to state a

cuase of action. Plaintiff does not oppose

the motion as to defendants Coburn & Meredith.

13/As defendants Young and Kight were employ-

ees of defendant Charter, it is doubtful that

their contacts with eachother could support

an allegation of conspiracy to restrain trade.

No allegations are made that these defendants

contacted or communicated with other potent-

ial employers of plaintiff.

Accordingly, the constitutional claims are

dismissed as to those two defendants.

Defendants Charter, Young & Kight argue

that the direct constitutional claims must

be dismissed because the complaint does not

adequately allege facts showing defendants'

conduct constituted state action. It is well

settled that the constitutional guarantees

of free speech, due process and equal pro-

tection are restraints only upon government

action, and not purely private conduct.

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837

(1982). "A state normally can be held re-

sponsible for a private decision. . .only

when it has exercised coercive power or has

provided such significant encouragement, ei-

ther overt or covert, that the choice must

in law be deemed to be that of the state.

Mere approval of or acquiescence in

the initiatives of a private party is not

sufficient to justify holding the state re-

sponsible for those initiatives under terms

of the Fourteenth Amendment." Blum v.

Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (emphasis

added; citations omitted) (finding no state

action in suit under 8 1983). Plaintiff does

not allege that defendants stand in a sym-

biotic relationship with the state or that

they perform a public function such that

defendants should be considered instrument-

alities of the government. See, e.g.,

Janusaitis v. Middlebury Voluntary Fire Dept.,

607 F. 2d 17, 23, (2d Cir. 1979) (state action

where volunteer fire company was"intertwined"

with government entity and performed

traditionally exclusive government function) ;

Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F. Supp. 903, 907 (D.

Conn. 1979).

Here, plaintiff's sole factual allega-

tion of state involvement in the conduct of

defendants Charter, Young, and Kight is her

claim that defendant Wasik, a state official,

communicated false and defamatory information

to defendant Young prior to her employment

by Charter. Complaint P. 38. Despite this

alleged defamation, plaintiff was hired by

Charter. Complaint P. 36. Young and Kight

allegedly subjected plaintiff to harassment

and discrimination while she was employed by

Charter, including instructing plaintiff's

coworkers not to cooperate or socialize with

her and giving her unreasonable work assign-

ments. Complaint P. 42. In addition, she

alleges that "acting upon the unlawful

authorization of, or with the culpable

knowledge and sanction of, defendant Wasik

and/or other unknown, Connecticut Department

of Labor officials, ... defendants Young and

Kight each engaged in a course of action...

designed to harass, humiliate and frustrate

plaintiff in the performance of her job duties

in a calculated effort to remove her from her

position by forcing her involuntary resigna-

tion.'' Complaint P. 47.

Plaintiff's vague and general allega-

tion of "authorization" does not meet the

level of particularity which has been re-

quired in order to state a cause of action

for violation of constitutional rights.

See Ellentuck, 570 F. 2d at 426 (conclu-

sory allegations of concerted action) ;

Holt v. Continental, 631 F. Supp. 653, 659

(D. Conn. 1985) (unsupported allegation that

defendant acted in concert with state offic-

ials insufficient). Plaintiff alleges that

the private defendants discriminated against

her and forced her to resign her position at

Charter. However, there are no facts alleged

in the Complaint from which it could be in-

ferred that defendants were thereby exercis-

ing a power "'possessed by virtue of state

law and made possible only because the wrong-

doer is clothed with the authority of state

law.''' Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184

(1961), quoting United States v. Classic,

313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (defining action

"under color of state law''). Plaintiff has

not alleged any contact between state offic-

ials and her employers other than the alleged

defamatory statements of Wasik to Young; nor

does she allege that Wasik compelled or in-

fluenced Young to take any action, see

Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841, or reached

an understanding that she would be the tar-

get of discrimination. Indeed, no employer

could reasonably act on the belief that a

state official was empowered to require

gender discrimination or harassment against

an employee. Nor is there any allegation

that defendant Charter had a "symbiotic

relationship" with the state such that the

state or its officials profited from

Charter's conduct. Id. at 842-43; Janu-

saitis, 607 F2d at 23. Moreover, even tak-

ing as true plaintiff's conclusory allegation

that defendants acted with the "authcriza-

tion . . . or culpable knowledge and sanction

of'' Wasik or other state officials, the com-

plaint would not be sufficient to allege

EEE EEE ee

state action. A state official's ''(m)ere

approval of or acquiescence in the initia-

tives of a private party," standing alone,

cannot support a finding of state action.

Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05.

There must be some allegation, not made here,

that the defendants willfully participated

in joint action with the state or its agents

before a constitutional claim would lie.

see, e.g., Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc.,

744 F. 2d 244, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1984).

Accordingly, plaintiff's constitutional

claims are dismissed as to defendants Charter,

Young, and Kight.

Statutory Civil Rights Claims

Defendants Charter, Young, and Kight

also move to dismiss plaintiff's claims under

42 u.s.c. 38 1983, 1985(2) and (3), and 1986

for failure to state a cause of action.

Defendants statutory civil rights

claims are based on the same factual allega-

tions of defendants' conduct as her claims

under the first, fifth, and fourteenth

amendments. Her § 1983 claim alleges

that defendants' actions "done under color

of state law, comprised a substantial and

injurious deprivation of plaintiff's civil

rights, privileges, and immunities as

secured by the United States Constitution

and laws.'' Complaint P. 178. The 8 1985

claims allege that defendants' actions con-

stituted a conspiracy to '"discriminat(e)

against plaintiff because she is a woman

and because of her advocacy of women's

rights in the workplace" and to "impede,

hinder, obstruct or defeat the due course

of justice with a purposeful intent to dis-

criminate against the plaintiff and to deny

her the equal protection of the law."

Complaint P. 179-180.

Neither the 8 1983 nor § 1985(3)creates

any substantive rights; both merely provide

a civil remedy for violations of certain

otherwise defined federal rights. Chapman

v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441

U.S. 366, 372 (1979); ch. Tragezis v. St.

Barbera's Creek Orthodox Church, No. 87-9056,

slip op. at 4722 (2d Cir. June 30, 1988)

(§ 1985(3) provides no substantive rights,

declining to decide whether statute provides

remedy for conspiracy to deprive person of

equal protection of state law.) To state a

cause of action under 8 1983, plaintiff must

allege facts showing that the defendants

acted "under color of state law."' 42 U.S.C.

8 1983. As discussed above in relation to

State action, plaintiff has not alleged

sufficient state involvement in defendants'

conduct to meet this requirement. Her bare,

unsupported allegation that the defendants'

conduct was "authorized" by state officials

is inadequate to show defendants were '''will-

ful participant(s) in joint activity with the

state,''' Adickes v. S.H.Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

144,152 (1970), quoting United States v. Price

’

383 U.S.787, 794, (1966). Defendants are

private citizens who acted in their capacity

as her employers and not pursuant to state

law or in concert with state officials.

Moreover, since the plaintiff has not

adequately alleged state action sufficient

to state a claim for violation of the first,

fifth, or fourteenth amendments, the 8 1985

(3) claim cannot be based upon any claim of

constitutional violation. Nor can a claim

under 8 1985 (3) be based upon plaintiff's

allegations of sex discrimination. Section

1985 (3) does not provide a remedy for a con-

spiracy between private persons to discrimin-

ate on the basis of gender or to otherwise

violate Title Vii. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378

(no remedy for Title VII violations); see

id. at 384 (Stevens, ¥. enbesarving) (8 1985

(3) provides remedy only for violations of

constitutional, not statutory rights).

Accordingly, sieintitt's claims under 8 1983

and e 1985 (3) are dismissed.

Defendants Charter, Young, and Kight

argue that plaintiff's § 1985 (2) claim must

be dismissed because there is no allegation

that they were successful in impeding her

access to the state unemployment procedures

or the courts or otherwise obstructing jus-

tice. The statute provides a civil action

against ‘two or more persons who conspire

for the purpose of impeding, hindering, ob-

structing, or defeating ... the due course

of justice in any state or territory, with

intent to deny any citizen the equal pro-

tection of the laws, or to injure him or his

property for lawfully enforcing, or attempt-

ing to enforce, the right of any person, or

class of persons, to the equal protection of

the laws."' 42 U.S.C.8 1985(2). This does

not give plaintiff a cause of action merely

because she did not prevail in the state

proceedings, or because she was the victim

of harassment or discrimination, but only if

defendant's conduct precluded her opportunity

to have her claim decided in the state pro-

ceedings. Plaintiff must only allege that

the conspiracy existed and that she suffered

injury as a result of an act done in further-

ance of the conspiracy.. See 42 U.S.C. 81985

(3). Paragraphs 40-44 of the complaint

allege that defendant Young told plaintiff

that "they would let you work if you drop

your case;'' that after plaintiff filed her

unemployment appeal, her working conditions

at Charter deteriorated and she was singled

out for discriminatory treatment; and that

after Kight replaced Young as her supervisor,

the discrimination continued. Plaintiff also

alleges that the discrimination compelled her

to resign. Even taking the allegations as

true, an agreement to obstruct plaintiff's

access to the unemployment procedures, or to

hinder her appeal, cannot be inferred merelv

from Young's remark, which was made before

the appeal was begun. Plaintiff does not

identify the nebulous "they'' whose desires

Young was reporting, nor what possible motive

the Charter defendants could have to seek

the abandonment of her unemployment dispute.

While plaintiff claims that defendants Young

and Kight harassed and discriminated her,

she does not allege that defendants acted in

concert with the prohibited purpose, i.e.,

to obstruct her access to the state proced-

ures. Rather, she alleges that they sought

to remove her from her position by forcing

her to resign. Complaint P. 47.

To state a claim for violation of the

civil rights laws, plaintiff must allege more

than vague, conclusory allegations of con-

spiracy. Here plainitff has made what is

essentially a claim of Title VII employment

discrimination. Even were a conspiracy in-

volving defendants to discriminate against

her established, she has provided no nexus

between that alleged conduct and her access

to the state unemployment procedures or

courts. She has not alleged any negative

effect on her access to those procedures or

442 |

that she was prevented from invoking them,

or any purpose on defendants' part to do so.

Absent such a nexus and improper purpose,

there can be no violation of 8 1985(2).

Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss

the ° 1985(2) claim is granted.

The charter defendants also move to

dismiss plaintiff's 8 1986 claim as barred

by the one year statute of limitations pro-

vided in that statute. Section § 1986 pro-

vides that "no action...under this section

shall be sustained which is not commenced

within one year after the cause of action has

accrued." Plaintiff alleges that harassment

and discrimination by defendants Young and

Kight compelled her to resign her employment

at Charter on August 23, 1985. The complaint

is devoid of allegations of conduct by any

of the Charter defendants after that date:

nor are the Charter defendants alleged to have

discriminated against plaintiff after she had

left Charter's employ. As to the allegations

of conspiracy and discrimination, the § 1986

claim is barred.

Plaintiff argues that discovery should

be permitted as to facts which might permit

equitable tolling of the statute of limita-

tions, such as fraudulent concealment or mis-

representation of her cause of action. How-

ever, plaintiff does not allege that any of

defendants' conduct was concealed from her;

indeed, she claims that she felt compelled

to resign by the open harassment and dis-

crimination allegedly practiced upon her by

defendants. Complaint P. 48. She has not

suggested how any tolling doctrine might

conceivably apply or what discovery could

possibly reveal; nor has she specified any

material fact which was affirmatively mis-

represented or concealed from her. She

relies on conclusory allegations of fraud,

but has not alleged any actual act of conceal-

ment by defendants nor shown that plaintiff

herselr used due diligence in seeking to dis-

cover her rights. See Dayco Corp., 386 F.

Supp. at 547. Plaintiff has not claimed

that she was otherwise prevented from filing

Suit within the allotted time. As the con-

plaint shows clearly on its face that § 1986

claim accrued no later than August 23, 1985,

and this action was not filed until December,

1987, the 8 1986 claim is barred by the

statute of limitations. It would be purely

speculative that discovery would reveal any

facts material to this issue. Defendants

should not be subjected to discovery absent

allegations of a plausible theory for recovery.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 8 1986

claim is granted.

Fair Credit Reporting Act

Defendants Coburm and Cobum & Meredith

move to dismiss plaintiff's claims under the

Fair Credit Reporting Act (''FCRA"), 15 U.S.C.

”

S 1681, et. seq. Defendants argue that civil

OE i ©

liability under the FCRA applies only to "any

consumer reporting agency or user of inform-

ation," 15 U.S.C.8 1681(n), and that they

do not come within that definition. Plaint-

iff concedes defendants' reasoning on this

point. If defendants furnished false inform-

ation to credit reporting agencies, no claim

is stated under the FCRA because defendants

are not subject to the Act's requirements.

See Mitchell v. First Nat'l Bank of Dozier,

905 F. Supp. 176, 177 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (one

who merely furnishes information not covered

by the FCRA). Accordingly, the motion to

agismiss is granted as to these claims.

Personal Jurisdiction

Defendant Mozzicato moves to dismiss

the complaint, or in the alternative to quash

service of the summons, on the grounds that

the court lacks jurisdiction over his person.

Mozzicato, a citizen and resident of Florida,

Complaint P. 14, argues that plaintiff's

cause of action does not come within any

provision of the Connecticut long-arm

statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59(b), and

thus there is no basis for this court to

assert jurisdiction over him.

Count LXXV of the complaint alleges

that Mozzicato engaged in a conspiracy in

violation of 42 U.S.C. 8 1985 (2) and (3)

Count LXXVI alleges that he has violated

the FCRA. There is no federal statute

authorizing nationwide service of process for

either claim. See Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Maxwell, 53 F.R.D. 116, 117 (D.C. Pa. 1971);

15 U.S.C. 8 1681(p) (providing for juris-

diction in "appropriate district court’,

without authorizing nationwide service).

Thus, contrary to plaintiff's contention, the /

federal claims do not authorize exercise of

jurisdiction over the defendant in this dis-

trict. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf

Wolff & Co., 108 U.S. 404, 409 (1987) (exer-

cise of personal jurisdiction requires auth-

orization for service on defendant). In ab-

sence of a federal statute authorizing ser-

vice of the complaint upon Mozzicato out-

side this district, defendant can be served

only "under the circumstances and in the

manner prescribed in" the Connecticut long-

arm statute 3 52-59(b). Rule 4(e), Fed. R.

Civ. Pro.; see Rule 4(f) (defendant may be

served outside territorial limits of state

in which district court is held, when auth-

orized by federal statute or rule of pro-

cedure); Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 410.

In diversity and federal question

actions, before a federal court can proper-

ly assert personal jurisdiction over non-

resident dezendants, the exercise of such

jurisdiction must be (1) authorized by the

state's long arm statute; and (2) consistent

with the requirements of due process, 14/

14/Here, defendant Mozzicato does not claim

that his contacts with Connecticut are so

meager that the exercise of jurisdiction over

him would offend due process. See Interna-

tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310

(1945).

see Greene v. Sha-Na-Na, 637 F. Supp. 591,595

(D. Conn. 1986); International Shoe Co., 326

U.S. at 316. Section 52-59(b) provides in

relevant part:

(a) As to a cause of action arising

from any of the acts enumerated in

this section, a court may exercise

personal jurisdiction over any non-

resident individual,...who in per-

son or through an agent: (1) trans-

acts any business within the state;

or (2) commits a tortious act with-

in the state, except as to a cause

of action for defamation of char-

acter arising from the act; or (3)

commits a tortious act outside the

State, causing injury to person or

property within the state, except

as to a cause of action for defama-

tion of character arising from the

act, if he (A) regularly does or

solicits business, or engages in

any other persistent course of con-

duct, or derives substantial revenue

from goods used or consumed or ser-

vices rendered, in the state, or (B)

expects or should reasonably expect

the act to have consequences in the

State and derives substantial revenue

from interstate or international

commerce ;

Plaintiff alleges that defendant offered her

a job with his Florida Company, Complaint P.

70; that he checked plaintiff's employment

references, questioned her about derogatory

information received from defendant Connecti-

cut National Bank, and promised to send her

a letter about the references, Complaint P./71;

and that he later withdrew his offer of employ-

ment and refused to send the proposed letter

or discuss the matter further. Complaint P.

72. These actions, plaintiff claims, violated

42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 15 U.S.C. 8 1€81n (the

FCRA) and constituted the torts of negligence,

slander, fraudulent misrepresentation and

fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff has not

alleged that defendant Mozzicato transacted

any business within Connecticut from which

her claims arise, nor that he has committed

any tortious act within the state. See

Complaint P. 70 (referring to defendant's

company in Florida). Thus, 8 52-59(b) (1)

and (2) are inapplicable and jurisdiction may

mot be exercised over Mozzicato with respect

to the slander claim. Accordingly, the sland-

er claim, Count LXXVII, is dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction over the defendant. In addi-

tion, jurisdiction may be exercised with re-

spect to the remaining claims only if 8 52-

59 (b)(3) is satisfied. Thus, it must be

shown that defendant regularly solicits

business, derives revenue, or engages in a

persistent course of conduct in Connecticut,

or that expects or he should reasonably ex-

pect his act to have consequences in the

state and derives substantial revenue from

interstate commerce.

Plaintiff argues that discovery is

ne cessary to determine whether defendant is

subject to suit in Connecticut. Plaintiii

represents that she "has reason to believe

defendants Mozzicato and Kestell may have

been in contact with eachother during 198?,

the purpose and result of which were in

furtherance of the antitrust conspiracy

alleged herein.'' Memorandum in Opposition

(Mozzicato) at 2. No basis for this belief

nas been alleged however. Moreover, the

sufficiency of the antitrust claims asserted

against Mozzicato is doubtful, in view of

the dismissal of similar claims against

defendants Charter, Young, and Kight.

However, plaintiff also claims that Mozz-

icato has made frequent visits to Connecticut

during which he may have committed further

unspecified tortious acts in the state.

Id. She claims that discovery would reveal

such acts, whereupon she would amend her com-

plaint to include them.

Neither party has submitted affidavits

or other evidence on the subject of defend-

ant Mozzicato's activities and/or contacts

within Connecticut. On this record, it can-

not be determined whether Mozzicato may have

engaged in a ''persistent course of conduct"

in Connecticut sufficient for the application

of 8 52-59(b) (3). Accordingly, plaintiff sh

shall be permitted to take discovery of def-

endant Mozzicato, limited to jurisdictional

issues only. She shall complete such dis-

covery on or before November 11, 1988. Mozz-

52 sisson

icato's motion to dismiss is granted as to

Count LXXVII and denied without prejudice as

to the remaining counts. Defendant may renew

his claim upon the completion of the discovery

period established herein.

Pendent Jurisdictionl3/

Plaintiff has asserted numerous claims

based upon state law, including claims for

violation of the state constitution and for

defamation, breach of contract, interference

i13/Thecourt notes that all defendants except

Kight and Mozzicato are, like plaintiff,

citizens of the State of Connecticut, and

there is no diversity jurisdiction over the

great majority of plaintiff's state claims.

The remaining defendants have either not yet

filed motions to dismiss or have filed motions

which were not yet ripe at tne time of this

ruling was prepared. A review of the federal

claims asserted against the remaining defend-

ants suggests that many of these claims may

be subject to dismissal on grounds similar to

those discussed in this ruling. If so, the

considerations expressed herein with respect

to pendent jurisdiction would strongly suggest

that plaintiff's state claims, to the extent

they do not come within diversity jurisdiction,

should be dismissed in their entirety. While

pendent clainis will not be dismissed sua sponte

at this juncture, plaintiff is hereby placed

on notice that dismissal of ail remaining pend-

ent claims will be considered upon motion of

with contract, emotional distress, assault

and fraud. Defendants Charter, Young and

Kight move the court to decline pendant

jurisdiction and dismiss the state claims.

Plaintiff is a citizen of Connecticut.

Complaint at P. 6. Defendant Charter is a

corporation having its principle place of

business in Connecticut and defendant Young

is a citizen of Connecticut.

Defendant Kight is a citizen of Rhode

Island. Complaint P. 9. As to Kight, there-

fore, the complaint alleges diversity juris-

diction and thus there is no discretion to

dismiss the state claims on jurisdictional

grounds.

the remaining defendants and that her response

to their motions to dismiss should address

the issue of why the court should not decline

to exercise jurisdiction over all remaining

pendent state claims, taking into account

the principles set forth in Gibbs and applied

in Billings v. Stone & Webster, 678 F. Supp.

984 (D. Conn. 1988); see Perez v. Ortiz, No.

88-7002 (2d Cir. June 27, 1988) (dismissal of

pendent claims requires notice and opportun-

ity to be heard).

However, as to Charter and Young there

is ample reason to decline pendant juris-

diction over the state law claims. Pendent

jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,

not of right. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.

Where all federal claims asserted against a

defendant are dismissed prior to trial, pend-

ent claims ordinarily should be dismissed as

well. See Id. Similarly, pendent state

claims should be dismissed where issues of

State law otherwise would predominate over

the federal claims or where they present

opportunity for jury confusion. Gibbs,

383 U.S. at 726-27; Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc.

559 F.Supp. 117, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd,

704 F. 2d 674 (2d Cir. 1983). Here, plain-

tiff's only federal claim to survive these

motions to dismiss is the claim of 8 1985 (2)

conspiracy. Sheer numbers suggest that the

lone federal claim is likely to be lost in

a thicket of state claims, many of which

appear to be time-barred. Inevitably, the

presence of the state claims will delay the

resolution of the federal issues by increas-

ing the complexity of motions to dismiss and

for summary judgment, as well as by protract-

ing discovery.

Moreover, plaintiff's 8 1985 claim de-

pends upon proof of conspiracy to obstruct

the course of justice, allegedly through an

attempt to hinder plaintiff's access to the

state unemployment procedures. Her allega-

tions of haressment and discrimination are

relevant to this claim only to the extent

they are shown to have been undertaken in

furtherance of the conspiracy and for the

prohibited purpose of obstructing her access

to the state procedures. However, the alle-

gations of harassment and discrimination are

in themselves the basis of plaintiff's

intentional infliction of emotional distress,

wrongful termination/breach of contract, and

slander claims; these claims do not depend

upon a showing of conspiracy or of a particu-

lar unlawful purpose. Thus, the presence of

the state claims will substantially expand

the scope of the issues at trial. See Gibbs,

383 U.S. at 726. A jury might be confused

in distinguishing between harassment, dis-

crimination and eventual termination as

torts or a breach of contract in themselves

and as acts done in furtherance of an unlaw

ful conspiracy to obstruct justice. In the

former instance, defendants’ purpose would

be irrelevant; in the latter, an essential

element of the claim. In shart, the state

claims "present() the possibility of con-

fusion of the issues and complications in the

presentation and resolution of the case."

Billings, 678 F. Supp. at 987. Further,

some of the issues will probably have to be

tried separately to avoid confusion and will

seriously sap federal judicial resources.

As a matter of discretion, jurisdiction over

these claims is declined as to defendants

Charter and Young.

Conclusion

For the sake of clarity,

the resolu-

tion of the motions to dismiss is summarized

below with respect to individual counts of

the complaint:

Defendants Counts Ruling

Charter, Young, Kight |) > eee Granted

CO ae Granted

ce eer Denied

Wasik, Langer,

Philbrick Ee i 5: oh kk Granted

Kestell TP tie awe me Grae Granted

Mozzicato (> | one Denied

Petrus yg} Ee J > Se Granted

Meredith, Coburn &

Meredith 243-244. ...... Granted

248-249....... Granted

2 2S > ¢ Sees Granted

i, oF Sperm Granted

Gutman ., » ee Granted

296-296. ......; Granted

‘. 7s: | Granted

This ruling has not

addressed claims which

defendants moved to dismiss but did not argue

any grounds in the memoranda in support of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

DEBORAH JEAN SAPIA

-vs- : Civil No. H-87-962(PCD)

CHARTER MARKETING COMPANY =:

et. al. March 8, 1989

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS

Plaintiff's amended complaint, dated

May 2, 1988, stands subject to dismissal of

Counts 1-29, 37-63, 70, 238-44, 248-49, 271-

72, 276-77, 292, 294-300, as ordered on

October 11, 1988, and subject to plaintiff's

amendment dated December 30, 1988.1/

Plaintiff's wholesale onslaught against

twenty-six defendants remains a mass of con-

1/to expedite the resolution of pending mat-

ters and to move the case along, the amend-

ment will be deemed filed. As the amendment

P. 167a-d, does not cure the defects previous-

ly discussed in the Order of October 11, 1988

at 14-14, and adds nothing to the merits of

plaintiff's claims, it is stricken.

fusion, even though the order of October ll,

1988, removed a substantial number of un-

founded claims. The nature of the claims

discussed in that order will not be repeated.

This order will deal with pending motions.

A. Motion to Dismiss Claims Against

Defendant Credit Bureau Services

(filed September 16, 1988)

This motion is directed against Causes

of Action 3, 4, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 20 and 21.

This defendant is claimed to have dis-

seminated false information concerning plaint-

iff to unspecified clients, maintained a file

of defamatory matter, denied plaintiff access

to her file, delivered to plaintiff a file

different than the file she was shown (a

contradiction in her claims), and did not

take steps to gather accurate information

about plaintiff. Complaint Ps. 80-85.

(1) Count 99 (XCIX), Cause of Action 3,

alleges a conspiracy in restraint of trade

in violation of 15 U.S.C. 81. This count is

dismissed. There is no allegation of joint

action, endeavors, or agreement on the part

of Credit, nor are any of the acts alleged

as to it conceivably likely to impact on

interstate commerce. Plaintiff alleges no

facts to show competition on her part with

Credit and her personal employment is a mar-

ket for which antitrust protection is intend-

ed.

(2) Count 100 (C), Cause of Action 4,

alleges a conspiracy to monopolize in the

attempted exclusion of plaintiff from the

job market. Credit is not alleged to comp-

ete in the job market with plaintiff. Nor

are there allegations to support a concert

between Credit and any other whereby plain

tiff was excluded. There is no allegation

on which to find Credit had, or achieved by

concert, monopoly power, nor that interstate

commerce was affected. Count 100 is dismissed.

(3) Count 101 (CI), Cause of Action 9,

alleges Credit's information gathering and

dissemination intended to injure plaintiff

in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

("FRCA"), 15 U.S.C. 88 168le, 168lg, 1681i,

16811, 168ln, 168lo. Plaintiff alleges con-

clusorily Credit's violation of each section.

No facts are alleged that would sustain a

finding of a violation. No specific publica-

tion or dissemination is alleged. No specif-

ically deficient procedures are alleged. No

specific reports are identified as having

been requested, only her file, which was

produced, nor were any specific items

identified to be re-investigated as disputed

or deleted and no consumer report is alleged

to have been issued. Accordingly, this c

count is dismissed with leave to plaintiff

to amend, within fifteen days(15) hereof, to

plead facts sufficient to support the alleged

violation.

Count 101 is subject to the two-year

limitation within which an action under the

FCRA must be brought 15 U.S.C. 8 l68lp.

Plaintiff alleges against Credit specific

conduct in 1982. There is nothing alleged

which avoids the time requirement. See

Houghton v. Insurance Crime Prevention Insti-

tute, 793 F. 26 322, 324 (3rd Cir. 1966).

Accordingly, Count 101 is dismissed with

leave to plaintiff to amend, within fifteen

(15) days, to rectify the deficiencies noted.

(4) Count 102 (CII), Cause of Action

12, alleges a conspiracy without specifica-

tion of the conduct by which plaintiff was

defamed nor how the separate acts came to be

joined by a common purpose or intent. The

last publication activities alleged occurred

in 1982. Complaint P. 82. Actions for libel

and slander are barred after''two years from

the date of the act...complained of."' Conn.

General Statutes 8 52-597. Even if the claim

is considered one founded upon a tort, the

applicable limitations period would be only

three years. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577. This

case was brought in December 1987, long after

the three years expired. See Ghartey v. St.

John's Queens Hosp., slip op. 1671, 1675

(2d Cir. February 28, 1989). Further, no con-

spirators are specified and no publication is

specified. Count 102 is dismissed.

(5) In Count 103 (CIII), Cause of Action

14, libel is alleged without specification of

what was published, by whom, or when. Such is

conclusory and insufficient as a matter of law.

Dismissal is in order. Ordinarily plaintiff

would be granted leave to amend to plead

sufficiently. However, no acts within the

period of limitations, Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-

597, are alleged. Thus, an unfilled pleading

gap will remain. Count 103 is dismissed.

(6) Count 104 (CIV), Cause of Action

15, alleges willful, reckless, and negligent

conduct by defendants. Credit's acts are

outside the three year limit of Conn. Gen.

Stat. 8 52-597 (two years for libel or

slander). Further, negligence is not a basis

for recovery for defamation. Accordingly,

Count 104 is dismissed.

(7) Count 105 (CV), Cause of Action 16,

alleges publication of falsehoods concerning

plaintiff which interferred with unspecified

existing or prospective contractual relations.

For want of a specific, binding contract or

ongoing business relationship, intentionally

interfered with, the right to the economic

benefit from which was thus lost, plaintiff

may not recover. These elements are not

alleged. Nothing alleged as to Credit sug-

gests any action or conduct on its part which

meets the requisite elements of this cause of

action. Further, Credit's acts are not alleg-

ed to have occurred within three years of

suit. Conn. Gen. Stat. 8 52-577. Count 105

is dismissed.

(8) In count 106 (CVI), Cause of Action

20, plaintiff alleges false representations

as to plaintiff, with intent to deceive plain-

tiff, who relied thereon. The stretch of

fraud will not be adequate to reach this claim.

There is no claim of actual misrepresenta-

tion; no facts to suggest a fraudulent intent

on the part of Credit; and no basis on which

to find any reasonable reliance by and detri-

ment to plaintiff from any conduct alleged as

to Credit. The allegations are conclusory.

They do not state the acts relied on with

particularity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The

allegations of false information in the file

Credit allegedly maintained on plaintiff,

Ps. 80-85, is totally at odds and inconsist-

ent with the allegation of fraud in P. 245.

Further, fraud is also subject to the statute

of limitations, Conn. Gen. Stat. 8 52-577.

No act by Credit occurred within three years

of the Complaint. Count 106 is dismissed.

(9) Count 107 (CVII), Cause of Action 21,

alleges a failure to disclose to plaintiff, a

fraudulent concealment. Rule 9(b) is not com-

plied with -- there is no particularity in the

basis of fraud. It is utterly without merit

that any non-disclosure could have caused

plaintiff to withhold a suit for five years.

Non-disclosure of the name of a former

employer is at odds with the allegations of

false information. No basis for any continu-

ingduty is alleged. Plaintiff had her file

as of May 1982. Therefore, this claim is

barred also. Conn. Gen. Stat. 8 52-577.

Count 107 is dismissed. Accordingly, Counts

99 through 107 are dismissed.

B. Defendant Barry M. Coburn's Motion

to Dismiss (filed September 26, 1988)

This motion attacks Causes of Action

1, 2, 8 and 10. Barry M. Coburn was president

of the brokerage firm of Coburn & Meredith

("C&M"), by which, in 1978, plaintiff claims

to have been employed. Coburn is alleged to

have noted the need for permission of plain-

tiff's prior employer, defendant Gutman, be-

fore she could be hired. Coburn is also alleg-

ed to have ignored her claim of sexual harass-

ment by one of the firm's employees. Lastly,

he is alleged to have told her to reduce her

hours for a subsequent pay period to accomod-

ate an overpayment. With no further facts,

she alleges he made reports of defamatory

information to others in conspiracy with un-

named co-conspirators, other than perhaps the

defendants C & M and Meredith individually.

(1) Count 257 (CCLVII), Cause of Action

1, alleges a violation of the first amendment,

freedom of speech and association. There is

no allegation that plaintiff's right to speak

or associate was interferred with or even

threatened. No government action is attribut-

able to or involved with Coburn's alleged

conduct. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.

830, 838 (1982); Kuczo v. Westerm Connecticut

Broadcasting Co., 566 F. 2d 384, 387 (2d Cir.

1977). This count is dismissed.

(2) Count 258 (CCLVIII), Cause of Act-

ion 2, involves the fifth and fourteenth amend-

ments, alleging deprivation of liberty and

property without due process or equal protect-

ion. A citizen cannot violate the fifth amend-

_———————Y

ment. Canadian Transport Co. v. United States,

663 F. 2d 1081, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The

fourteenth amendment provides that no "State

deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-

erty without due process of law; nor deny to

any person...the equal protection of the laws."

Without question, these create no cause of

action against an individual in his private

capacity. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison,

419 U.S. 345 (1974); Shelley v. Kraemer,

334 U.S. 1, 9 (1948). Count 25& is dismissed.

(3) Count 262 (CCLXII), Cause of Action

8, alleges creation of an employment atmos-

phere of sexual harassment constituting con-

structive discharge, in violation of 42 U.S.C.

e 2000e-2(a) and 3. Plaintiff has alleged no

filing of a complaint with either the federal

or state agency, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74, as

required nor the acquisition of a right to sue

letter reflecting the agency's fulfillment of

its mediation efforts. Thus, for failure of

conditions precedent to suit, within the time

set from the notice of the act complained of,

Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250

(1980), see 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-5(£) (1); 29 C.F.R.

§ 1601 et seq, et seq., which plaintiff does

not allege as she must to invoke properly the

jurisdiction of this court, plaintiff may not

maintain this action. See Alexander v.

Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 35, 47 (1974)

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385,

393 (1962). Count 262 is dismissed.

(4) Count 263 (CCLXIII) Cause of Action

10, alleges a violation of the FCRA. This

defendant is not shown to have issued or used

a consumer report. What claimed as to Coburn

is not asserted as a matter of personal know-

ledge. In any event, the FCRA applies to a

reporting agency or user of information.

15 U.S.C. § 1681(n). Coburn is not alleged

to have been either. This count is dismissed.

Accordingly, Counts 257, 258, 262 and 263 are

dismissed.

C. Defendants Connecticut National Bank,

Oswald Anthony Sherwood and John F.

Stockinger's Motion to Dismiss (filed

August 15, 1988)

These defendants are described as inv-

olved with plaintiff from approximately

October 1979 to February 1981 -- Connecticut

National Bank ("'CNB") as her employer; Sher-

wood and Stockinger as CNB employees who

allegedly acted in relation to plaintiff.

Complaint Ps. 116-26. In essence, she alleges

inquiry by Stockinger of plaintiff's prior

employers, which she believes generated false

commentary and/or information which he report

ed to her as negative. Thereafter, she des-

cribes her employment as involving harassment

and discrimination in the form of false per-

formance reviews that she was warned not to

refute, by whom is not alleged; demands on

her for overtime; unsubstantiated accusations

of errors, by whom is not alleged; a threat of

demotion and a pay cut, by whom is not alleged;

harassment of co-employees who affiliated with

her, of whom and by whom is not alleged; un-

founded charges of improper conduct, by whom

is not alleged, a snipping of her hair by

Sherwood; Stockinger's failure to sustain

her grievance about the snipping incident

and warning her about the incident; placement

of defamatory material in plaintiff's file,

what and by whom is not alleged; unconstruct-

ive counselling in which a Mr. LaPenta (one

who has escaped the swath of plaintiff's

reach for redress) refused to discuss an

adverse employment reference from a prior

employer. This scenario is described as

directed or controlled by Sherwood and Stock-

inger and as forcing plaintiff to leave the

job, allegedly a constructive discharge

achieved by conspiracy against plaintiff's

constitutional rights to defame her, for all

of which CNB is claimed to be liable.

(1) Counts 184 (CLXXXIV), 198 (CXCVIII),

and 213, respectively, charge CNB, Stockinger

and Sherwood (""movants"') with violation of

plaintiff's first amendment rights of ass-

ociation and free speech. For the reasons

set forth in B(1) above, these counts are

dismissed.

(2) Counts 185 (CLXXXV), 199 (CXCIX),

and 214 (CCXIV), respectively, charge movants

with violations of plaintiff's fifth and four-

teneth amendment rights of due process and

equal protection (Cause of Action 2). For

the reasons set forth in B(2) above, these

counts are dismissed.

(3) Counts 186 (CLXXXVI), 187 (CLXXXVII)

and 200 (CC), 201 (CCI), 215 (CCXV), and 216

(CCXVI), respectively, charge movants with

antitrust violations, 15 U.S.C. 88 1, 2, and

15. The same reasons as are set forth in A(1)

and (2) above, the circumstances of which are

equally applicable to movants, control here.

Further, any acts of these defendants occurred

in or prior to February, 1981, outside the

period of limitations, 15 U.S.C. 8 15b.

Accordingly, these six counts are dismissed.

(4) Count 188 (CLXXXVIII) asserts,

against CNB, conspiracy to violate plaint-

iff's liberty and property rights, contrary

to 42 U.S.c. 8 1986 (Cause of Action 7).

That statute bars any action not brought

"within one year after the cause of action

has accrued." 42 U.S.C. 8 1986. Plaintiff's

employment was terminated in February 1981.

This action is clearly outside the time period,

Creative Environment, Inc. v. Estabrook, 491

F. Supp. 547, 554 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd, 680

F. 2d 822 (lst Cir.), cert.denied, 459 U.S

989 (1982), and is dismissed.

(5) Counts 202 (CCII) and 217 (CCXVIIL)

allege violations of 42 U.S.c. 8 1985 (2) and

(3) against Stockinger and Sherwood (Cause of

Action 6). The limitations period, by resort

to Connecticut Law, is three years. Burnett

v. Gratton, 468 U.S. 42, 49-55 (1984); See

Owens v. Ukure, 57 U.S.L.W. 4065 (Jan. 10, 1989),

under the tort statute, Conn. Gen. Stst. § 52-

577. The last act possibly causative of plain-

tiff's termination could not have been later

than February 1981. These counts are dis-

missed

(6) Counts 189 (CLXXXIX), 203 (CCIII),

and 218 (CCXVIII) allege sexual harassment

and discrimination contrary to 42 U.S.C. =

2000e-2(a) and 3 (Cause of Action 8). For

reasons set forth in B(3) above, these counts

are dismissed.

(7) In counts 190 (CXC), 204 (CCIV),

and 219 (CCXIX) movants are charged with vio-

lations of the FCRA (Cause of Action 10).

Actions for redress under that act are subject

to a two-year limitation. 15 U.Ss.c.8 1681p.

Plaintiff's allegations of violative conduct

on the part of movants are wanting. Indeed,

in largest measure movants are alleged to

have received information. Their conduct, in

any event, is not alleged in any way constru-

able as within two years prior to commencement

of this action. Thus, these counts must also

be dismissed.

(8) In Counts 192 (CXCII), 193 (CXCIII),

206 (CCVI), 207 (CCVII), 221 (CCXXI), 222

(CCXXII) movants are alleged to have defamed

plaintiff (Causes of Action 13, 14) and in

Counts 191 (CXCI), 205 (CCV) and 220 (CCXX)

are alleged to have conspired to do so (Cause

of Action 12). The only conduct alleged is

receipt of information and it is dubious

that placing information in one's personnel

file constitutes publication. Further the

conduct occurred in the course of plaintiff's

employment and thus in or before February 1981.

There is no allegation suggestive of conduct

within two years of this action. Thus, the

claims for defamation are barred by Conn. Gen.

Stat. § 52-597, which should also control the

claims of conspiracy. If conspiracy is re-

garded as a separate tort, it would nonetheless

be barred by the three year statute. 8 52-577.

Accordingly, these counts are dismissed.

(9) In counts 194 (CXCIV), 208 (CCVIII),

and 223 (CCXXIII) plaintiff alleges negligence

against all movants (Cause of Action 15),

while in counts 209 (CCIX) and 224 (CCXXIV)

solely against Stockinger and Sherwood, she

alleges willful interference with contractual

relations (Cause of Action 16). For the rea-

sons set forth in A(6) and (7) above, these

counts are dismissed.

(10) In Count 195 (CXCV), against CNB,

plaintiff alleges a willful and malicious

violation of plaintiff's implicit contractual

relationship, arising from her employment

(Cause of Action 17). She alleges no distinct

contract, only employment. A breach of con-

tract action is subject to one of two statutes.

Section 52-576, Conn. Gen. Stat. is claimed

by defendant to control. It bars an action

for breach of contract unless brought within

six years of the breach. Plaintiff's employ-

ment was, by her allegations, terminated in

February 1981, and thus her action, not brought

until December 14, 1987, is not within the

limitation period and is barred. This count

is dismissed.

(11) In counts 210 (CCX) and 225 (CCXXV),

plaintiff alleges the intentional infliction

of emotional distress (Cause of Action 18) by

both Stockinger and Sherwood, while in Count

226 (CCXXVI) she alleges, against Sherwood

only, assault (Cause of Action 19). These

claims are for torts which could only have

occurred, according to the complaint, within

her employment and thus in or prior to

February 1981. This case was not brought

within three years thereof, Conn. Gen. Stat.

S 52-577, and are thus barred. These counts

are dismissed.

(12) Counts 196 (CXCVI), 211 (CCXI)

and 227 (CCXXVII) allege the making of false

representations about plaintiff by Sherwood,

by Stockinger (who is alleged to have been

involved, in an unspecified manner) and by

CNB which condoned them (Cause of Action 20).

Plaintiff alleges she was thereby forced to

terminate her employment. These acts necess-

arily occurred in or prior to 1981. As

false statements allegedly made to plaintiff,

they can only be claims of misrepresentation.

As torts they are barred by Conn. Gen. Stat.

§ 52-577. These counts are dismissed.

(13) In counts 197 (CXC VII), 212 (CCXII),

and 228 (CCXXVIII) plaintiff alleges conceal-

ment of false information known to movants

(without alleging a basis for an obligation

to disclose) such that plaintiff refrained-

from initiating litigation (Cause of Action

21). Notwithstanding lack of knowledge of

this supposed information, she obtained and

maintained employment at CNB until she left

by reason of complaints arising in the course

of that employment. Nonetheless, as a claim

of fraud, it is barred by the three year tort

limitation, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577. These

counts are also dismissed.

In opposition to this motion, plaintiff

relies on "equitable, substantive justice" or

"well-established case law."' Plaintiff's

——aon———

Memorandum of Law, filed September 1, L988

at 1. She suggests the statutes of limita-

tion should be ignored in the interests of

justice, should not be treated separately,

and should not be construed narrowly. The

presence of questions of fact and the grav-

ity, novelty, importance and scope of her

claims as grounds to evade the unchallenged

letter of the statutes are noted. She sug-

gests that the counsel she contacted misled

her and others, unidentified, deceived her,

subjectea her to duress or undue influence.

Perhaps her accrual of rights of action was

not specific in time and in occurrence of

damage. She claims a tolling of the statutes

without specification of defendants' conduct

warranting such. She exhorts the haven of

equity as the ‘'Law should be the hand-maiden

to Justice'’ and should open its doors to

afford her relief. She importunes the court

for credit to her claims of ignorance, fraud,

deceit which precluded her ability to sue

Pee re een ee I

earlier and thus she relies onthe federal

concealment rule,"

a rule undistinguished by support in any cited

legal authority. She notes her efforts to

complain about each and every mistreatment

thrust upon her. None of these have any

legitimate basis, in alleged facts or lawful

principle, to excuse her failure to bring

suit in timely fashion.

The review of plaintiff's voluminous

amended complaint (84 pages by the courts

count, as about the only detail plaintiff

missed was the pagination, 297 paragraphs,

302 counts, 55 prayers for relief) has given

her the benefit of all doubt. It reflects

many legal phrases and concepts“/ She is

now here pro se, but her original and now the

amended complaint smack of considerable

sophistication and even taints of consider-

able legal acumen if not guidance.

2/One discovery motion seeks production or

"an in camera''inspection by the court.

Pleading #134.

She was afforded appcinted counsel who was

permitted to withdraw without recording his

reasons to prevent a compromise of plaintiff's

claims. It is at least reasonable to infer

that she failed to use properly the attorney

provided to her. She suggests the ''case is

insufficiently developed," a difficult con-

cept to apply in view of what she has already

presented. She has filed the original and

now an amended complaint, 9 motions with

supporting memoranda, 4 requests for default,

discovery requests, compliances and objections

responses to motions for more definite state-

ments, opposition memoranda to numerous motions

to dismiss. While it is apparent that this is

a plaintiff who is not unfamiliar with the law,

she has nonetheless been accorded the defer-

ence due a pro se claimant. Haines v. Kermer,

404 U.S. 519 (1971). She cites many cases,

but inappropriately extracts principles there

recited.

However, this complaint does not pre-

sent equitable claims. Plaintiff has present-

ed a litany of her tribulations, inappropri-

ately in one complaint. See Fed R. Civ. P. 20.

Yet, she simply has failed to meet the dead-

lines imposed by the law. Defendants have

rights as does plaintiff and they may not be

subjected to actions for damages after they

have been entitled to put the past behind

them. Assuming she has been done wrong by

movants, she presents no lawful reason why

defendants’ rights to protection fzom late

claims must not be honored. Nothing in the

way of rules or cases cited by plaintiff

permits, authorizes or requires the court to

refuse to honor defendants’ right to the pro-

tection of the several statutes of limitations.

Accordingly, the case is dismissed in

allrespects as to defendants Connecticut

National Bank, Oswald Anthony Sherwood, and

John F. Stockinger.

D. Defendant John S. Gutman's Supplemental

Motion to Dismiss (filed Nov. 29, 1988)

Gutman's prior motion resulted in the

dismissal of Counts 292, 294-300. Now he

seeks dismissal of Counts 287-91, 293, 301

and 302, thus terminating all claims against

him.

Defendant was the president of John

Gutman, Inc., by which plaintiff was employed

from 1970 to 1975 and from 1976 to January

1977. It is from this employment, and con-

duct arising from it, that plaintiff's claims

against Gutman arise. See Complaint Ps. i132,

133, 134, 140, 150-66. Plaintiff asserts

that Gutman provided information in relation

to her seeking employment which was obtained

on February 27, 1978. Construed broadly,

other disclosures may be intended or inferred,

but none are specific as to date or recipient.

Plaintiff's claims in counts 287 (CCL

XXXVII) (Cause of Action 1), 288 (CCLXXVIII)

(Cause of Action 2), 289 (CCLXXXIX) (Cause of

Action 3), 290 (CCXC) (Cause of Action 4), 291

(CCXCI) (Cause of Action 6), 293 (CCXCIITI)

(Cause of Action 10), 301 (CCCI) (Cause of

Action 20), and 302 (CCCII) (Cause of Action

21) are, respectively, subject to dismissal

for the reasons discussed in paragraph B(1)

and (2), A(l) and (2), and C(5), (7), (12)

and (13). No anti-competitive acts or

attempts to monopolize are alleged as requir-

ed for antitrust actions. No conspiratorial

conduct is alleged in the sense of Gutman

having joined with anyone for antitrust or

discriminatory purposes. Coincidental con-

duct is insufficient. Though plaintiff claims

an impact on her employment, after Gutman's

employment of her she obtained employment and

any hostility in such subsequent employment

is not the responsibility of Gutman. Guttman

is not a consumer nor credit reporting agency.

As plaintiff has cited no basis to sustain

the foregoing as viable causes of action2/,

3/ Though given to December 30, 1988, to reply

to Gutman's motion, plaintiff has not filed

anything further.

as more fully discussed in Section C above,

Counts 287-91, 293, 301 and 302 are dismissed.

E. Defendant Frank Mozzicato's Motion

to Dismiss (filed December 23, 1988)

Defendant Mozzicato moves for dismissal

for want of personal jurisdiction, Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and for failure to state

claims against hin, Rule 12(b) (6), with

respect to the claims set forth in Counts 75

(LXXV) (Cause of Action 6), 76 (LXXVI) (Cause

of Action 10), 78 (LXXVIII) (Cause of Action

15), 79 (LXXIX) (Cause of Action 20), and 80

(LXXX) (Cause of Action 21). Count 77 (LXXVII)

(Cause of Action 13) was previously dismissed.

Mozzicato is a resident of Florida,

where he conducts his business Complaint P. 14.

He is plaintiff's uncle and offered her employ-

ment in 1982. He noted receipt of allegedly

negative information pertaining to plaintiff,

but declined to discuss details. He is

claimed to have chastised her, but provided

no further information, thus alienating her

nN ”

aaa memati,

from her family. Complaint Ps. 70-73. There

is no allegation of activity on his part in

Connecticut. Though the denial of informa

tion may have impacted plaintiff in Connecti-

cut, it is insufficient to permit plaintiff

to reach him through Connecticut's Long Arm

Statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59(b); Greene

v. Sha Na Na, 637 fF. Supp. 59 (D. Conn. 2986),

or in the face of a due process challenge.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310 (1945).

Even if this court could exercise per-

sonal jurisaiction over Mozzicato, tne claims

against him, Causes of Action 6, 10, 15, 20

and 21, would be subject to the observations

set forth in C(5), (7), and (12) and (13) and

A(6) above. In addition, as noted with other

defendants, plaintiff's allegations simply

allege her concept of grievances against her

uncle, but with insufficient allegations of

fact on which to premise a 8 1985 claim (no

conspiratorial acts are alleged), a fair

credit reporting claim (he made no report

and was not a reporting agency), a negligence

claim (no basis for a duty is alleged), nor

found in the making of a representation or

in a concealment (no present fact was misrep-

resented nor was any duty to disclose est-

ablished).

Accordingly, the five counts against

Mozzicato are dismissed.

F. Defendants Charter Marketing Company

George Young and Earl Kight, Jr.'s

Motion to Dismiss (filed May 5, 1989)

Defendants' prior motion to dismiss

counts 1-29 was granted and they now seek

dismissal of Counts 30-36, which apply to

Kight only. While the prior dismissal of

Counts 1-29 removes them from this case and

precludes a further dismissal on other

grounds as requested by Charter and Young,

it is appropriate to note the applicability

of the comments herein as to the dismissed

claims against Charter and Young.

Counts 30 (XXX) (Cause of Action 12),

31 (XXXI) (Cause of Action 13), 32 (XXXII)

(Cause of Action 15, 33 (XXXIII) (Cause of

Action 16), 34 (XXXIV) (Cause of Action 18),

35 (XXXV) (Cause of Action 20), and 36 (XXX

VI) (Cause of Action 21) are all subject to

the same analysis, reasoning and ruling as

is set forth in paragraphs A(4) and C(8), A

(6) and (&), C(1l) A(8) and (9), respectively.

Additionally, the pleadings are deficient as

no conspiratorial acts are specified, no basis

is set forth for a duty (Causes of Action 15,

20 and 21), there are no egregious acts causa-

tive of emotional distress, and there is no

basis to find a misrepresentation nor conceal-

ment. For all the reasons thus pertinent,

Counts 30-36 are dismissed.

G. Defendants Jack Smith and Capitol

City's Motion to Dismiss (filed

December 23, 1988)

Defendants move to dismiss for failure

to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6),

as to Causes of Action 3,4,9,12,14,15,16, 20

and 21. Smith was an employee of Capitol, a

credit reporting entity. Its file on plain-

tiff is alleged to have material false inforn-

ation which was not corrected and was dis-

seminated in or prior to May, 1982. Complaint

Ps. 74-81. Plaintiff's claims are in Counts

81 (LXXXI) to 98 (XCVIII). They are subject

to the analysis, reasoning, and decision set

forth in paragraphs A(1)-(9), subject to

slight modifications to accomodate different

dates of the alleged conduct of these defend-

ants. The claims are also subject to the

pleading deficiencies discussed in relation

to other defendants, but applicable to these

defendants also, including the want of facts

suggesting a conspiracy, the lack of anti-

competitive or monopolizing conduct causing

damage to one's business, the absence of

egregious conduct causative of emotional dis-

tress, the lack of a basis for finding a duty

Cause of Action 15, 20 and 21), the lack of

any actual contract being interfered with

(plaintiff was employed and prospective emp-

loyment is not a contract) and the want of

anything on which to premise fraudulent int-

ent Accordingly, the foregoing counts are

dismissed.

H. Defendant James Patrick Connolly's

Motion for Summary Judgment (filed

February 10, 1989)

Defendant has moved for summary judg-

ment on the grounds that the statute of

limitations bars suit against him and that

there was no attorney-client relationship on

which plaintiff can premise her claim. His

motion alludes to the complaint without

specification of the counts and thus his

argument will be considered as to all of the

counts in which he is charged. Connolly is

an attorney in Bristol, Connecticut, whom

plaintiff allegedly contacted, paid a retainer,

and arranged to represent her as to her employ-

ment problems at Hartford National Bank and

Olson Mobeck. He is alleged, over several

months in 1981 and 1982, to have failed to

give her advice or to communicate with her,

to have canceled appointments, to have failed

to act on the wrongs she claimed, to have

abandoned her representation, to have failed

to commence litigation, to have acted un-

skill-fully. Counts 108 (CVIII) (Cause of

Action 2), 109 (CIX) (Cause of Action 5), 110

(CX) (Cause of Action 6), 111 ((CXI) (Cause of

Action 11), 112 (CXII) (Cause of Action 15),

113 (CXIII) (Cause of Action 17), 114 (CXIV),

(Cause of Action 20), and 115 (CXV) (Cause

of Action 21) assert plaintiff's claims again-

st him.

Connolly supports his motion with his

affidavit which recites his first contact

with plaintiff in 1980 and discussions of the

circumstances of her employment. He made

inquiryes about the matters and conferred

further with plaintiff, whom he informed that

he could not proceed with any action, claim

or suit, would not represent her in any matter

against any particular party, and returned

her papers to her. His last contact with her

was in January 1981. In response, plaintiff

filed no affidavit, only her memorandum with

a bill from Connolly (per its letterhead) and

a letter to him from her. The bill contrad-

icts Connolly as it recites his representa-

tion of plaintiff at an unemployment compen-

sation hearing on July 6, 1981, his charge,

and the credit applied. The letter, dated

November 5, 1980 merely recites her forward-

ing material from her bank unemployment and

solicits his comments. Her memorandum refers

to the foregoing and inconsistencies in

Connolly's responses to the claims in her

complaint. She further asserts, not under

oath, Connolly's undertaking to obtain in-

formation at Hartford Hospital in September,

1981, his meeting with her in the December

1981 to February 1982 period to discuss her

claims. Whether they had merit is in dispute.

She notes his"reluctance to pursue litigation."

Memorandum of Plaintiff dated February 22,

1989, at 3. She claims his failure to pro-

ceed with litigation is malpractice, as was

his failure to communicate with her. She

makes the same equitable claims to avoid

the statute of limitation ("'antidotal to the

statute of limitations defense," id. at 4).

Yet, she concedes that,though delayed, he

discussed her claims and their merits and

then refused to bring suit.

Though plaintiff has not filed a state-

ment of contested facts, Local Rule 9(c)2, nor

an affidavit, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), none-

the less, it is apparent that there is evi-

dence that an attorney-client relationship

existed and the motion will not be granted on

that basis.

Nonetheless:

(1) Plaintiff's claim of due process

and equal protection (Count 108) is unavail-

ing and barred by the statute of limitations.

See Paragraph B(2) above; Order of October

11, 1988, at 4-5.

(2) Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C.

B88 1983, 1985 (Causes of Action 5 and 6) fail

for the reasons set forth in said order. ld.

They are time-barred.

(3) Plaintiff's claim of negligence is

also time barred. See Paragraph A(6) above.

Plaintiff's general claim of representation

is curtailed by her statement that Connolly

declined to initiate litigation. That result-

ed in his limitation of the representation

and there is no allegation of his undertaking

any specific litigation. Indeed, an attorney

cannot be bound to have agreed to litigate a

claim merely because he has agreed to talk

to a client about the matter. He is obliged

to inquire and determine the existence of a

legal and factual basis for making the claim

before he files and serves a complaint. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 11. However, any duty arising out

of the relationship would, at the latest, have

been breached in February 1981. There was

then a disclosure. Nothing is shown to have

then remained concealed. Thus, a negligence

claim would thereafter be barred if not

brought within two years of the injury or,

at most, three years of the act or omission

complained of. Conn. Gen. Stat. 8 52-584.

(4) Plaintiff's claim of breach of con-

tract is not well founded as no contractual

undertaking is alleged as to any specific

litigation. Further, there is no allegation

of a written contract, but only, at best, an

executory contract controlled by the three-

year limitation. Conn. Gen. Stat. 8 52-581.

See Campbell v. Rockefeller, 134 Conn. 585

(1948).

(5) Plaintiff's claims of fraudulent

| misrepresentation and concealment are also

barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. 8 52-577.

As the foregoing is dispositive of all

claims against Connolly except the claim in

Count lll (Cause of Action 11) of violation

of the Connecticut Constitution, as to which

L 97

there is no federal question jurisdiction nor

diversity, Count 111 is also dismissed.

Connolly's motion is granted as plaintiff has

not demonstrated any question of fact as to

the applicability of the pertinent statutes.

I. Defendant James L. Kestell's Motion

to Dismiss (Filed February 13, 1989)

Defendant also moves for dismissal for

failure to allege a claim against him, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). He is also a lawyer

in Hartford with whom plaintiff consulted

about her employment problems in November

1981 and who promised legal assistance.

However, she alleges that, over the ''subse-

quent three to four months," he was of no

help, but discouraged plaintiff from further

inquiry, did not inquire himself, gave her

no advice, and represented her on July l,

1982, at a hearing without preparation, in-

effectively, obstructive of her efforts, and

by stating her inactive pursuit of employ-

ment. Thereafter, he refused to communicate

with her.

Count 70 (Cause of Action 15) has been

dismissed. Kestell, without citation, now

seeks to invoke the statute of limitations

to bar plaintiff's claims. Im point of fact,

Causes of Action l, 2, 5, 6, 13,17,18, 20 and

21 are subject to dismissal as discussed in

paragraphs B(1) and (2), Ruling of October ll,

1988, at 4; Paragraphs C(5), (8), (10), (11)

and A(8) and (9) above, and Counts 64-67, 69,

71-74 are subject to dismissal. While the

facts alleged differ slightly, much of what

is said in Section H above applies also to

be claims against Kestell. Likewise, Count

68 (Cause of Action 11), based on the

Connecticut Constitution, is dismissed.

Accordingly, Kestell's motion is granted and

Counts 64-69 and 71-74 are dismissed.4/

47/It is noted that plaintiff has filed no

opposition to this motion.

J. Defendants Hartford Hospital, Richard J.

Lawson and Marge Ramsdell's Motion for

Summary Judgment (filed February 28, 1989)

Defendants have moved for summary

judgment on the basis that:

(a) The constitutional claims, Causes

of Action 1 and 3, Counts 116,117,129,130,142

and 143 are time barred and do not allege

State action.

(b) The claims under 42 U.S.C. 88 1985,

1986 and Title VII, Counts 120, 121, 1331 134,

146 and 147 (Causes of Action 7 and 8) are

time barred and (as to 3 1985) assert no

requisite state action and (as to Title VI)

fail to assert the administrative proceedings

which are a prerequisite to any assertion of

the jurisdiction of the court.

injury in Counts 118, 119, 131, 1321 144 and

145 (Causes of Action 3 and 4).

(d) The claims of defamation, conspiracy,

infliction of emotional distress, negligence,

100

interference with contractual relations,

breach of contract, misrepresentation,

fraudulent concealment and assault, Counts

122-28, 135-41, 148-56 (Causes of Action 12-

21) are time barred anc should not be the

subject of the exercise of pendent juris-

diction.

Plaintiff, on application, was employ-

ed by the hospital from June 1, 1981 to

November 11, 1981. Lawson and Ramsdell were

employed by the hospital. Plaintiff claims

they obtained information as to her prior

employment, the source of which was false.

Her working conditions deteriorated after the

unemployment hearing in July 1981 in petty

ways. She was negatively evaluated without

explanation, but with verbal abuse, only to

be constructively discharged (she resigned).

The actions not committed by Lawson or

Ramsdell are attributed to other employees

within the hospital's knowledge and acquiesc-

ence. Complaint Ps. 94-106.

101

The counts listed in (a) above (Causes of

Action 1 and 2) are dismissed for the reasons

in B(1) and (2) above. The counts in (b)

above (Causes of Action 6, 7 and 8) are dis-

missed for the reasons set forth in paragraphs

C(4) and (5), B(3) and the Ruling of October

11, 1988, at 12-16, subject to the adjustment

to accomodate the dates of plaintiff's employ-

ment by the hospital. The counts in (c)

above (Causes of Action 3 and 4) are dismissed

for the reasons set forth in paragraphs A(1)

and (2) above. The counts listed in (d) above

(Causes of Action 12-21) are dismissed for the

reasons set forth in paragraphs A(4),C(8),A(5)

through (9), and C(10-(12).

K. Defendants Donald E. Wasik, Robert

M. Langer and Leon G. Philbrick's

Motion for Final Judgment (filed

November 21, 1988)

All counts against these defendants were

dismissed on October ll, 1988.°/ They were

2/This is reflected in the Order of October

11, 1988, at 6-7.

102

charged in Causes of Actions l, 2, 5, 6, ll-

16, 18, 20-21. The pendent state claims were

dismissed, but they were further time barred

by the applicable statute of limitations.

See Paragraphs C(5), (8), (10)-(12) and A(4)-

(9) above; October 11, 1988 Ruling at 4.

As to Cause of Action 1l, asserted against

Wasik (Count 41), Langer (Count 50) and

Philbrick(Count 58), as it alleges no federal

question and there is no other ground of

jurisdiction, it will be dismissed. As there

is no reason why a final judgment should not

enter in their favor, their motion, as auth-

orized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), is granted.

L In Counts 229-37 (CCXXIX - CCXXXVIT)

plaintiff asserts claims against ''Company X"'

which has not been further identified, has not

not been served, has not appeared, and against

which there are no factual assertions except

that its identity is unknown. Complaint P. 27.

As this case is now fifteen months old,

it is inappropriate that these claims continue.

Accordingly, they are dismissed with-

out prejudice.

M. Plaintiff has named a defendant

Willis A. Benham, Jr. the record reflects no

service of process upon this person and for

the purpose of clearing the record, Counts

157-69, in which he is named Defendant, are

dismissed, without prejudice.

Summary

As a result of this order and the order

of October 11, 1988, all counts have been dis-

missed except:

(a) Counts 179-83 (Defendant Olson)

(b) Counts 245-47 and 250-56 (Defend-

ant Coburn & Meredith)

Coburn)

(d) Counts 273-75 and 278-86 (Defendant

Meredith)

104

SO ORDERED.

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 8th day

of March, 1989.

Peter C. Dorsey

United States District Judge

105

Conn.

H-87-962

Dorsey (0513)

LWP

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United

States Court of Appeals, held at the U.S.

Courthouse in the city of New York, on the

18th day of December, One thousand nine hun-

dred and eighty nine.

Present:

HONORABLE ELLSWORTH A. VAN GRAAFEILAND,

HONORABLE LAWRENCE W. PIERCE,

HONORABLE ROGER J. MINER,

CIRCUIT JUDGES

DEBORAH JEAN SAPIA, Filed

: PLAINTIFF APPELLANT, pecember 18

CHARTER MARKETING COMPANY, GEORGE YOUNG, iin

EARL KIGHT, JR., DONALD E. WASIK, ROBERT M.

LANGER, LEON G. PHILBRICK, JAMES L. KESTELL,

FRANK MOZZICATO, CAPITOL CITY CREDIT CO.,

JACK SMITH, CREDIT BUREAU SERVICES, JAMES

PATRICK CONNOLLY, HARTFORD HOSPITAL, RICHARD

J. LAWSON, MARGE RAMSDELL, WILLIS A. BENHAM, Jr.,

ROLF H. OLSON, CONNECTICUT NATIONAL BANK, JOHN

F. STOCKINGER, OSWALD ANTHONY SHERWOOD, COMPANY

X, SAMUEL F. PETRUS, COBURN & MEREDITH, INC.

BARRY M. COBURN, THOMAS M. MEREDITH AND

JOHN S. GUTMAN,

=e ORDER

DEFENDANTS, erat

CHARTER MARKETING COMPANY, GEORGE YOUNG,

EARL KIGHT, JR., HARTFORD HOSPITAL, RICHARD

J. LAWSON, MARGE RAMSDELL, CAPITOL CITY CREDIT

COMPANY, JOHN S. GUTMAN, JACK SMITH, FRANK

MOZZICATO AND CREDIT BUREAU SERVICES,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

SAPIA V. CHARTER MARKETING

Nocket No. 89-7658

Page 2

Deborah Jean Sapia, pro se, appeals

from a final judgment entered on June 1,1989,

pursuant to an order dated May 30, 1989 and

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) in the United

States District Court for the District of

Connecticut (Dorsey, J.), dismissing her

claims against defendants-appellees. The

district court expressed its reasons for the

dismissals in two lengthy orders, dated

October 11, 1988 and March 8, 1989, respect-

ively.

Sapia commenced this action in Dec-

ember, 1987. On May 2, 1988, she filed an

Amended Complaint, which set out twenty-one

causes of action against twenty-six defendants.

Inter alia, she claimed violations of the

first, fifth and fourteenth amendments, the

Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 88 1 and 2), the

Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15), the Fair Credit

107

_eeaeaeeEeEeGeEeEeEeGeQyeyE a

Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 168le, 1681lg,

1681i, 16811, 168ln and 1681lo), and various |

civil rights laws (42 U.S.C. $ 1983, 1985

and 2000e). Broadly speaking, the gravamen

of Sapia's charges is that beginning in 1970

she has been the victim of a widespread

conspiracy to deprive her of employment and

of the opportunity for employment.

Defendants-appellees include former

employers of Sapia, former work supervisors,

credit reporting companies, and her uncle.

Most of her claims were dismissed by the

district court due to an abscnce of state

action or upon statute of limitations grounds.

On appeal, Sapia contends (1) that the dist-

rict court's rulings were based on "fallacious

legal reasoning"; (2) that the district court

proceedings violated her due process rights;

(3) that the district court judge was biased

against her; and (4) that the district court

mishandled her requests for pro bono counsel.

108

nnn

For the reasons stated in the dist-

trict court's detailed orders of October 11,

1988 and March 8, 1989, we conclude that the

District Court did not err in dismissing

Sapia's claims. Further, Sapia's claim of

bias is wholly unfounded. "'To be disqual-

ifying, (bias) must stem from an extra-

judicial source and result in an opinion on

the merits on some basis other than what the

judge learmed from his participation in the

case. United States v. Grinnell Corp.,

384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). Sapia makes no

allegation sufficient to satisfy this

standard.

Finally, Sapia contends that the dist-

rict judge's refusal to appoint a second

attorney for her after her first appointed

lawyer successfully filed an application to

be relieved from his appointment constituted

a "gross abuse of discretion.'' This claim is

meritless. Given appellant's apparent inabil-

ity to properly use the services of her

109

previously appointed counsel, the district

court judge acted well within his discretion

in refusing to appoint a second attorney.

The judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED.

vee ee ae SO

—

eed eee

110

SAPIA v. CHARTER MARKETING

Docket No. 89-7658

Page 3

/ a

HONORABLE ELLSWORTH A. VAN GRAAFEILAND,

" —_—

a we ee

HONORABLE LAWRENCE Wi PIERCE,

a 7

N- 4 ea - | a

HONORABLE ROGER J. MINER,

“Ne

Circuit Judges.

N.B. THIS SUMMARY CRDER WILL NOT BE

PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER 7

_AND SHQULD NOT BE CITED OR OTHERWISE .

_BELIED UPON IN UNRELATED CASES BEFORE

_THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT.

lll

JON

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated Term of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse

in the City of New York, on the 7th day of

February, One thousand nine hundred and ninety.

PRESENT: HONORABLE WILLIAM H. TIMBERS, Conn.

HONORABLE JON O. NEWMAN, H87-cv-962

HONORABLE FRANK X. ALTIMARI, Dorsey

Circuit Judges.

DEBORAH JEAN SAPIA,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

V. 89-7850

CONNECTICUT NATIONAL BANK, JOHN F.

STOCKINGER, AND OSWALD ANTHONY SHERWOOD,

Defendants-APPELLEES

= meme meee eee eee eee eee

Filed

ORDER February 7, 1990

Deborah Jean Sapia appeals pro se

from a July 21, 1989, judgment of the Dist-

rict Court for the District of Connecticut

(Peter C. Dorsey, Judge), dismissing her

112

SECC

claims against appellees Connecticut National

Bank, John F. Stockinger, and Oswald Anthony

Sherwood. Judgment was entered pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Appellant disputes

the District Court's conclusion that her

claims were time-barred and contends that in

any event grounds existed for tolling the

statutes of limitations that apply to her

various claims. For reasons fully set forth

in Judge Dorsey's thorough opinion, appel-

lant's contentions are without merit.

The judgment of the District Court

is affirmed.

William H. Timbers

Jon O. Newman

Frank X. Altimari1

N.B. This summary order Circuit Judges

will not be published in the

Federal Reporter and should not

be cited or otherwise relied upon in

unrelated cases before this or any

other court.

—)

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