Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Griffing v. Children's Home Society of Florida, Inc.
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Supreme Court, U.S, ~T
Y)
89. 1579 FILED
APR 10 1990
_ No. = JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
IN THE -
Supreme Court Of The United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1989
MARY CELESTE GRIFFING,
PETITIONER,
V.
THE CHILDREN’S HOME SOCIETY OF FLORIDA, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARL .
TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT
JOHN PATTON RACIN
1721 Lamont Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20010
202 265-2516
Attorney for Petitioner
.\
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, in a Section 1983 action brought by a woman
whose liberty interest in the care and custody of her four young
children was extinguished without notice, the state-licensed
agency alleged to have taken the children and placed them for
adoption in derogation of due process was entitled to summary
judgment based on an immunity derived solely from the exist-
ence in its files of court orders purporting to terminate parental
rights, where no record of these orders exists as required by law;
and where petitioner presented affirmative evidence that the
orders are invalid, and that the agency knowingly participated
with a county judge to take permanent custody illegally.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ee en a ere a i
EER ee ee een iii
EPICS EE TREC Loe ee iv
Petition for Writ of Certiorari ................ 1
rs ov. cp 5 sp 5 ¥ % 8 w 8.0.08 1
ras Sas San st es 0 + 68 8 8 ea 2
Constitutional Provision Involved .............. 2
ee a ne a a 2
SSE TERETE 3
Reason for Granting the Writ ................ 20
The State Court Decisions Are in Conflict
With Immunity Principles Governing Actions
Under 42 U.S.C. 1983
eid Se Ge 6 Sw 48 668 oe ee we ee 26
ee ee ee ee re ee la
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Anderson v. Creighton, —U.S.—, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987) . . . 24
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) . 22, 23,25
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) ........ 21, 24
Chapman v. Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Serv.,
517 So.2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) .......... 19
Davis v. Scheur, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) ............. 24
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) ........... 21, 22
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F2d 817 (2d Cir.1977) ..... 21
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) ............. 23
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) ........... 24
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) .........-.-... 25
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980),
rehearing denied, 445 U.S. 920(1980) ........ 23
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) ............ 24
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ............ 24
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) . . . . 19,23
Parks v. City of Homestead, 414 So.2d 1142
8 ee aera 19, 23
Penthouse, Inc. v. Saba, 399 So.2d 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981),
review denied, 408 So.2d 1095 (1981) ........ 19
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942) .......... 24
Vv
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645(1972) .......... 20, 25
Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) ............. 21
West v. Atkins, —U.S.—, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (1988) ....... 20
STATUTES
UEC) ......... SS canvases 2
SP, 96 i oo cs 6 ae eee passim
PUR PEED. nee we ewe eacaee ens 4
pk, BY ek aera 4,16
OTHER AUTHORITY
Rule 9.030(a)(2), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Florida Rules of Court-State (West, 1990Ed.) ........ 20
Rule 1.510(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Florida
Rules of Court-State (West, 1990 Ed.) ...........-.. 18
Florida Evidence Code, sec. 90.902(2), Florida Rules
of Court-State (West, 1990 Ed.) ...........4.-.-. 13
a eps
ne et”
No.
IN THE
Supreme Court Of The United States
October Term, 1989
MARY CELESTE GRIFFING,
Petitioner,
v.
THE CHILDREN’S HOME SOCIETY OF FLORIDA, INC.,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT
Mary Celeste Griffing (“petitioner” hereafter) prays that
this Court review on certiorari the judgment of the District Court
of Appeal of Florida, Third District, which affirmed without
opinion a summary judgment entered for the Children’s Home
Society of the State of Florida, Inc. (“respondent” hereafter) by
the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Dade
County (“Circuit Court” or “trial court” hereafter).
DECISION BELOW
The unpublished order granting “Summary Final Judg-
ment” to respondent is set out in the Appendix, at 1a—2a.
2
JURISDICTION
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District,
affirmed without opinion on October 17, 1989, Appendix 3a,
and on January 10, 1990 denied rehearing, or rehearing en banc.
Appendix 4a. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
US.C. §1257(3).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, §1
«“ * *
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law....
STATUTE INVOLVED
42 USC 1983
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress....
ts Adalat Sat
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner filed suit against respondent in February 1987,
alleging claims under 42 USC 1983 and Florida common law
based upon respondent's knowing participation in the termina-
tion of her parental rights in four young children without notice
or opportunity to be heard; and its subsequent concealment of
the fact that it had taken custody of petitioner's children and
caused them to be placed for adoption.
Petitioner alleged that in 1959 she was a citizen of Florida
residing in Key West, Monroe County. Separated from her
husband, she had sole custody of her four children, Debra
Anderson, age 6; Wayne Goldman, 5; Robin Goldman, 3; and
Adrienne Goldman, 1. Amended Complaint, 15.
In October 1959, petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor
arising from unauthorized travel aboard a government aircraft.
She was sentenced to three months imprisonment, during
which she was forced to entrust her children to the care of a
babysitter. Id.. {6. Upon her release in February 1960,
petitioner discovered that her children were missing. Id., {8.
It was to take heralmost twenty-five years to learn what became
of them. Id., {23.
1 Petitioner filed her Complaint February 27, 1987, which she amended
on March 18, 1987, in respects not relevant here. Respondent answered this
Amended Complaint, and for this reason petitioner refers to it.
4
Petitioner alleged that following her release from prison she
immediately set about contacting local, county and state offi-
cials, all of whom denied knowledge of her children or their
whereabouts. Id., {11.
She sought assistance from the Clerk of Court for Monroe
County, but was told that there existed no record concerning
either the temporary or permanent termination of her parental
rights. Id., 412.
Petitioner also traveled to Dade County in search of her
childyen, and there made the first of many inquiries to respon-
dent, id., {414-17, whose officials denied having any
knowledge of petitioner's children. Ibid. For a perioc of twen-
ty-three years, respondent's officials repeatedly denied having
any information about petitioner's children. Id., {21.
In 1984, petitioner finally learned what had happened: An
investigative reporter working for ABC News discovered that
respondent took custody of petitioner's children in 1960, and
thereafter caused each of them to be placed for adoption. Id.,
1122-23.
Petitioner's claims of constitutional deprivation under 42
USC 1983 were alleged, in most pertinent part, as follows:
* * *
28. Plaintiff...possessed a federal constitutional
right to family privacy and the integrity of her family
? Florida laws required that orders respecting the temporary or
permanent deprivation of custody rights be maintained permanently; and
that natural parents have access to these records. 1951 Fla. Laws, c. 26880,
§1 (current version at Fla. Stat. §39.411 (1988)). Appendix 20a.
3 Respondent is a Florida corporation, Amended Complaint, 93, and at
all relevant times has been a “licensed child placing agency,” Fla. Stat.
§39.01(31) (1988) (originally enacted by 1951 Fla. Laws, c. 26880, §1), “a
person, society, association or institution licensed by the state welfare
board to care for, receive, or board children, and to place children in
a...foster or adoptive home.”
babes
nen eh) RES CNT eR LA mittee w
5
unit guaranteed by the United States Constitution, in-
cluding the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.
29. On or about January, 1960, the Plaintiffs four
children were illegally taken from the custody of the
Plaintiff's babysitter in Key West, Florida. The children
were taken without providing the Plaintiff with legally
sufficient notice, or a hearing conforming with the re-
quirements of due process justifying the termination of
the Plaintiff's parental rights.
30. Atall times material, Defendant CHS was acting
under color of state law. Defendant CHS unconstitu-
tionally used state procedures to exercise functions per-
taining to the taking of children into custody and
removing them from their parents. This was a function
which was the exclusive prerogative of the State, and
CHS exercised this function with the help of State offi-
cials causing a deprivation of the Plaintiffs rights to a
family relationship as guaranteed by the United States
constitution.
31. At all times material, CHS acted in concert with
State officials, or obtained significant aid from State
officials in conjunction with the unconstitutional taking
of the Plaintiff's four children.
32. On or about January, 1960, Defendant CHS took
physical custody of the Plaintiff's four children:
Wayne, Debra, Robin and Adrienne.
33. Defendant CHS took custody of the Plaintiff's
children without her consent and without assuring that
the Plaintiff had been accorded due process as required
by the United States Constitution and state law.
34. At the time CHS took physical custody of the
Plaintiffs children, CHS had actual knowledge, or inthe
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the
Plaintiff had not been provided a hearing or notice
6
authorizing the termination of the Plaintiff’s parental
rights.
35. After taking custody of the children, Defendant
CHS was further repeatedly advised that the Plaintiff's
children were taken from her without providing the
Plaintiff a hearing, but CHS acting under color of state
law ignored these notifications and retained custody of
the Plaintiff's four children although it had actual
knowledge that it had no lawful right to keep custody
of the children from the Plaintiff.
36. Nevertheless, Defendant CHS kept custody of
the four children for an extended period of time and
then gave the children up for adoption — permanently
depriving the Plaintiff of the love, companionship and
parentage of her children.
Amended Complaint.
Respondent answered on September 8, 19874, asserting a
general denial and a number of “affirmation defenses,” includ-
ing that “the Plaintiff’s damages, if any, were the result of the
action of third-parties over whom this Defendant has no control
or custody....” Answer to Amended Complaint, 4.
Following discovery, respondent moved for summary
judgment. It submitted a supporting affidavit from
respondent's current president. Notice of Filing, Affidavit of
Stephen S. Zaricki, April 15, 1988. Though he had no personal
knowledge of the events at issue, he asserted that two of
petitioner’s children were permanently committed to
“Respondent had moved to dismiss on May 7, 1987, on grounds of
statute of limitations and laches, and also asserted a failure to state claims
under 42 USC 1983 and Florida law. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. On
August 20, 1987, the Circuit Court entered an order deferring a ruling until
the time of trial. Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended
Compiaint.
7
respondent’s custody on April 7, 1960, id., {2; and that her
remaining two children were permanently committed to
respondent's custody on August 29, 1961. Id., {2. It was further
alleged that “(t]he permanent commitment of each of the...four
children...was founded on Court Orders issued by the Juvenile
Court of Monroe County, which found each of these children
to be dependent on the State of Florida for their care,” id., 14;
and that respondent could find no record of any inquiry from
petitioner, which would have been documented in its files. Id.,
1110-12.
Attached to this affidavit were uncertified copies of orders
purported to have been entered by the Juvenile Court of Mon-
roe County in 1960 and 1961. Appendix 5a—16a.
The “orders” in question indicate that each purported cus-
tody proceeding was initiated on petition of one “Roberta
Pettie, Child Welfare Supervisor” of the State Department of
Public Welfare. Ibid. Ms. Pettie, however, supplied an affidavit
for petitioner in which she denied any knowledge of the cus-
tody proceedings purported to have taken place, and alleged
that the orders were irregular and inconsistent:
1. My name is Roberta Pettie. I am over eighteen
years of age, legally competent, and testifying based
upon personal knowledge. I currently reside in Monroe
County, Florida.
2. I worked asa child welfare supervisor for Monroe
County, State of Florida, Department of Public Welfare
from 1957 to 1976.
3. During that time I :outinely dealt with the
Children’s Home Society as an agency that received
5 These are form documents in which specific representations about the
children have been crudely inserted by typewriter. The reproductions in
the Appendix cannot reflect this; nor can they reveal places in which form
language has been altered by typewritten insertions.
8
children from the State of Florida for both temporary
and permanent commitment. I have reviewed the
copies of what purpor* to be court orders that were filed
by the defendant in the above captioned matter....
4. The defendant has produced a xerox copy of a
document purporting to be a court order issued on
April7, 1960 placing Deborah [sic] Michelle [sic] Ander-
son in the custody of the Children’s Home Society.
[Appendix 5a-6a] This order states that I filed the peti-
tion and that the child was brought before the court and
there was an evidentiary hearing. It does not indicate
that the child’s mother was in court. Contrary to the
statements contained in that purported order, I did not
file this petition or appear in court on that matter.
5. There is a second copy of a purported court order
referring to Deborah Michelle Anderson that is dated
August 29, 1961 and which purportedly terminates the
parental rights of the natural parents.[Appendix 7a—8a]
This order states that I was before the court along with
the child and the mother on April 7, 1960. It then
terminates the parental rights on August 29, 1961, ap-
proximately a year and a half later. I was not before the
court for any hearing terminating parental rights on
April 7, 1960 or any date thereafter pertaining to this
child. Based upon my experience, I think that these
orders are irregular. For example, it is unusual that
parental rights were terminated based upon a prelimi-
nary hearing held a year and a half earlier for the
purpose of initial commitment to a child caring agency.
It is also unusual that one order states that the mother
was present on April 7, 1960, while the other order does
not.
6. The defendant has also provided purported or-
ders regarding the commitment of Wayne Andrew
Goldman. [Appendix 9a-12a] These orders are virtually
the same as the ones regarding Deborah, they contain
the same dates and make the same representations.
9
However, I was not present at any hearing regarding
Wayne Andrew Goldman. These orders reflect the
same inconsistencies as the orders concerning Deborah.
7. The defendant has also submitted a purported
order regarding Robin Jeanette Goldman.[Appendix
13a-14a] This purported order is dated April 7, 1960
however [sic] it discusses a hearing that allegedly oc-
curred on February 4, 1960 and states that I was present
before the court with Robin Jeanette Goldman. It states
that the cause was heard due to a sworn petition filed
by meand the order states that it is committing the child
to the Children’s Home Society for subsequent adoption
and terminating the rights of the natural parents. I was
not at a hearing on February 4, 1960 to terminate the
parental rights and permanently commit Robin Jeanette
Goldman to the Children’s Home Society. Based upon’
my experience, this order seems unusual because it was
not signed until April 7, 1960 and is inconsistent with
the other two orders regarding Robin’s siblings,
Deborah and Wayne.
8. Additionally, the defendants have filed a pur-
ported order of permanent commitment regarding
Adrian [sic] Celeste Goldman that is virtually the same
as the order concerning Robin Jeanette Goldman.[Ap-
pendix 15a-16a] This order also states that I filed a
petition and was present at a hearing. I was not at a
hearing regarding Adrian Celeste Goldman. This order
has the same inconsistencies as the order concerning
Robin.
9. Finally, I was not present at any court hearings for
any of these four (4) children. Based upon my nineteen
years of experience as a child welfare supervisor for
Monroe County, I believe these orders appear both
irregular and inconsistent with one another.
10
Plaintiff's Notice of Filing Affidavits in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, May 26, 1988.
Affidavit of Roberta Pettie.
Petitioner also submitted an affidavit. Id., Affidavit of
Plaintiff Mary Celeste Griffing. She denied ever having ap-
peared in, or having notice of, proceedings to deprive her of
custody, on a temporary of permanent basis. Id., {{5-6. She
alleged that she contacted the Clerk of the Circuit Court for
Monroe County during 1960 and 1961 and had been told that
no record existed of any custody proceedings pertaining to her
children. Id., 49. She alleged further that “[djuring my
numerous inquiries to The Children’s Home Society commenc-
ing in 1960 I made it clear to representatives of The Children’s
Home Society that I knew nothing pertaining to the circumstan-
ces causing the disappearance of my children and, therefore,
gave actual notice...that my children had been taken from me
without a hearing or any sort of due process.” Id., 412.
In a hearing on its motion for summary judgment, respon-
dent relied almost exclusively on the evidence of the “orders”
in its files:
[W]e have an affidavit by Steven [sic]
Zaricki....whereby we attached all of the Monroe Coun-
ty Court orders that were received by the Children’s
Home Society in 1960 establishing that Court hearings
had been held, that notice had been given and that the
children were being turned over to us by the State of
Florida pursuant to hearing and notice given to the
Plaintiff. And that we, acting on those particular orders,
went ahead and took the children and ended up putting
them up for adoption.
The record is unrefuted in this case that that is exactly
what occurred. Meaning that the Children’s Home
Society’s role was based solely on the State of Florida
coming to it, providing it with Court orders and telling
it, based on the statute dealing with children’s home
care facilities in the State of Florida, to do exactly what
11
this Defendant’s business was, which was to take care
of children and put them up for adoption.
Transcript of Proceedings, May 27, 1988, pp. 4-5.
Petitioner's counsel responded in part as follows:
[T]he law back in 1955, the law in 1960 and the law
all the way through to today is that any orders for the
permanent commitment of children must be kept per-
manently by the Clerk of the Court. We have our client
who went to the Clerk of the Court in ‘60 and ’61 and
no such orders existed. They haven’t come forward
with certified copies. That in and of itself raises a
genuine issue of material fact as to the genuineness of
the orders.
** * *
Secondly, your Honor, we have alleged there were
breaches of duty on the part of Children’s Home
Society. There were breaches of duty under State law
and breaches of duty under the Federal Constitution.
We have said that our client lost her children in
February of 1960. When she came back in February,
1960 to her home her children were missing and no
explanation as to why her children were gone. She has
said under oath there was no Court hearing. The record
in this case shows the Children’s Home Society took
custody of these children in January of 1960. There was
no legal authorization for them to take custody in
January of 1960 even under their version of the facts.
The earliest of these Court orders is dated in April, of
1960.
12
There are two Court orders that are dated as iate as
August of 1961. This has raised some very real question
about the validity of these orders and we have sup-
ported our opposition with a memo of law saying that
if there is any question as to the validity of a Court order,
the person that received a Court order can’t rely on it.
Also, there is no showing the Children’s Home
Society ever received certified copies of Court orders.
There has been no showing there are any official records
pertaining to the taking of these children.
We have said that our client went to the Children’s
Home Society in 1960 when she discovered that her
children were missing and she said to the Children’s
Home Society, “My children have disappeared. Do you
know anything about the children? I didn’t have a
hearing.”
The response of the Children’s Home Society was
essentially, “We don’t know anything about your
children.”
They were put on notice first by the invalidity of these
orders on their face that there wasn’t a hearing.
Secondly, our client went to them and gave them
actual notice there wasn’t any due process. And they
continued to participate in the permanent deprivation
of her four children from her.
We alleged this in our Complaint specifically. We
have alleged it in the affidavit in which our client has
factually said she put them on notice.
x * *
Furthermore, your Honor, we have in our memo of
law supporting our motion by Federal cases and of
course Federal cases are applicable to our claim under
Section 1983, U.S. Code, and those cases as recently as
—_ |
13
two years ago from the United States Supreme Court
say that when a person has a judicial authorization, a
judicial order, that this in and of itself on its face does
not insulate an official if the order is invalid on its face
or if the official had something to do with the procuring
of the order.
We know under the factual record that the Children’s
Home Society was involved with these children and the
custody of these children in January of 1960. We know
the last order pertaining to the permanent deprivation
of thesechildren from their mother was dated in August
of 1961.
So, there are issues of fact as to whether this Defen-
dant was involved in the procurement of the depriva-
tion of these children from their mother.
Transcript of Proceedings, May 27, 1988, pp. 12-16.
The fact that no record of the orders existed in the Monroe
County Court, id., pp. 7, 11, troubled the judge a great deal. Id.,
21 (“I’ve just never in all my years...have ever encountered
when [sic] there is not some record of some orders having been
entered somewhere.”) Nevertheless, he made clear that if the
signatures appearing on the documents were in fact genuine’,
he would find respondent “immune from any litigation,” id., p.
20, and grant summary judgment:
What I’m going to do anyhow in view of these allega-
tions on which I think the case pretty much turns, I don’t
mind telling you all. I’m talking about Summary Judg-
ments whether these are valid orders or not. If they’re
° Florida rules of evidence provide that “[e)xtrinsic evidence of
authenticity as a condition prededent to admissibility is not required
for...{a] document not bearing a seal but purporting to bear a signature of
an officer [of a court)...affixed in his official capacity.” Florida Evidence
Code, §90.902 (2), Florida Rules of Court-State (West 1990 Ed.)
14
valid orders I’m going to grant a Summary Judgment.
I'm going to tell you that. If they’re not valid orders, of
course, I’m going to deny the Summary Judgment,
simple as that. To me it’s crucial to my ruling that you
determine whether or not these are valid court orders
or forgeries as there is some allusion to.
So, you all are going to have to set out to either find
out if such orders were ever entered, as I said, by way
of a handwriting expert, determine whether or not this
is that Judge’s signature and so forth. If they’re valid
Court orders there is no question in my mind that the
Children’s Home Society is immune from any litigation
and grant their Summary Judgment.
But if you can’t establish the validity of those orders
I will deny it and let you proceed.
Id., pp. 19-20.
Thereafter, a handwriting expert certified that the signa-
tures on the documents did in fact appear to be genuine,
Defendant's Notice of Filing Affidavit of Ronald M. Dick in
Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Final Judgment,
December 2, 1988, a determination which petitioner did not
challenge.
Petitioner did, however, enter on the record a document
which cast further doubt upon both the validity of the orders,
and respondent's disavowal of any knowing participation in
securing the orders—and the children—in the absence of notice
to petitioner. It also called into question the extent to which
respondent had been fully responsive to petitioner's discovery
requests. Notice of Filing Exhibit “C” to Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, September 2, 1988.
This was a letter dated March 10, 1960 from one of
respondent's officials to the judge in Monroe County whose
signature appears on the orders. Though apparently taken
from respondent’s own records, it was furnished to petitioner
15
not by respondent but by a third party. Transcript of Proceed-
ings, January 3, 1989, p. 3. Its text was as follows:
This will confirm my telephone conversation with
you yesterday, March 9, 1960, regarding Judith
Goldman’s [petitioner's] four children. As I stated on
the telephone, we feel it is important that you know the
position of The Children’s Home Society of Florida
regarding these children.
We have had Robin Jeanette and Adrienne Celeste,
the two younger children, in one of our foster homes
since January 19, 1960... However, Deborah Michelle
Anderson and Wayne Andrew Goldman were placed
in the American Children’s Home and we do not know
them, inasmuch as we have not received our material
until this week. For this reason it is necessary for us to
say to you that we are not in a position to be able to
accept permanent commitment on these two older
children, narnely, Deborah and Wayne, at this time.
However, we want you to know that we are very
willing to have you give us temporary commitment on
these two older children. If you can see fit to do this, we
would then let you know when we have completed our
preadoptive study on them and should this indicate
they are adoptable, we would then send you a request
for permanent commitment of the two older children.
Based on our present findings, we expect to send you
our request for permanent commitment of Robin and
Adrienne, the two younger children, at the time of the
hearing on March 23, 1960.
16
You will recall our discussion of the handling of this
on the same basis as the H Children, whom
you committed to us under the same circumstances.
Please be assured of our desire to work with you and
Mrs. Pettie in the best interest of these dependent
children. Perhaps I should say here that I expect to
furnish some material to Mrs. Pettie regarding our ex-
perience of approximately two months with these two
younger children.
I would appreciate your letting me know whether or
not this pian is acceptable to you.
Appendix 17a-18a.
This letter revealed that respondent had engaged in infor-
mal, ex parte communications directed to securing custody
orders during the very period when petitioner contends she
was searching frantically for the children. It confirmed
moreover that during this same period respondent had taken
custody of Robin and Adrienne in the absence of any judicial
order. It also suggested that hearings on the permanent cus-
tody of these two younger children may not have taken place
February 4, 1960, as recited by the “Orders of Permanent Com-
mitment” of April 7, 1960." The writer does not mention any
such hearings, though they presumably would bear upon, if not
7 Florida law then authorized only a law enforcement officer or
“counselor or assistant counselor” of the juvenile courts to take custody of
a child without a court order where “the welfare of the child require[d]
[it],” 1951 Fla Laws, c. 26880, §1 (current version at Fla. Stat. 39.401 (1988)),
Appendix 19a, while mandating that the person “notify the parents...of the
child......at the earliest practicable time, and...deliver the child.,...if the judge
has so ordered, to a ...licensed child caring institution....” (emphasis added).
Ibid.
8 These orders are irregular in a way not mentioned by Ms. Pettie:
Neither bears a case number. Appendix. 13a, 15a.
BS ES ee ce ee
17
indeed obviate the need for, the “request for permanent com-
mitment of Robin and Adrienne” which the writer anticipates.
Petitioner addressed the factual issues generated by this
document in a supplemental hearing on respondent’s motion
for summary judgment:
We have the Children’s Home Society procuring their
own orders. We have ex-party [sic] communications
with the judge. We have the children with the
Children’s Home Society without any court orders and
I also point out in January when they say they had the
children, the Plaintiff was in federal prison as the Court
may remember. The Plaintiff got out of prison in
February and her testimony is in her affidavit she
started asking for these children and nobody knew
anything about it. There weren’t any court orders in the
courthouse and there aren’t to this day.
She started asking about her children and it appears,
and the Plaintiff submits when she started asking for her
children, the Children’s Home Society started asking
the judge for court orders.
Transcript of Proceedings, January 23, 1989, pp. 4-5.
For its part, respondent continued to rely heavily upon the
orders:
In this case these orders are proper. If there is any
irregularity, which I submit there isn’t, even if there
were under the statutes, it’s clear. The plaintiff hasn’t
come forth with one witness to say that anyone at the
Home Society had any knowledge of irregularities, had
[sic] not stated the Home Society did anything improper
in this case, and that it specifically relied on court orders
under the law were deemed to be correct orders. In light
of that we think there are no issues in this matter and
we're entitled to a summary judgment.
Id., pp. 7-8.
18
The court determined to grant summary judgment for
respondent, id., p. 15, while denying petitioner the opportunity
for additional discovery to develop, inter alia, issues generated
by the letter and respondent's failure to produce it. Id. , pp. 3,
15. On February 3, 1989, the court entered a “summary final
judgment” on the record.” Appendix 1la-2a.
On February 24, 1989 petitioner noted an appeal to the Third
Dis*ic* Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. She argued,
in most relevant part, that summary judgment on petitioner's
Section 1983 claims was improper where she had been unable
to complete discovery; and where respondent’s knowing par-
ticipation in the unlawful taking of petitioner's children, and
the objective reasonableness of its purported reliance on the
orders in question were very much in issue. Initial Brief of
Appellant, June 23, 1989, pp. 9-26. Respondent argued, in sum,
as follows: “[T]he alleged factual vagaries [sic] asserted by
appellant are irrelevant to any consideration of the propriety of
summary judgment.” Answer Brief of Appellee The Children’s
Home Society of Florida, Inc., July 25, 1989, p. 7; and “the
juvenile court orders . . . unequivocally establish that [respon-
dent] did not participate in or instigate the taking of
[petitioner's] children; rather, [it] simply received these
children pursuant to those valid juvenile court orders.” Id., p. 8.
With respect to the letter dated March 10, 1960, respondent
argued that it “is insufficient to create any liability. [It] is
merely, as it states, a recitation of [respondent’s] position
regarding these children in an attempt to keep the court in-
formed ....” Id., p. 9.
® Rule 1.501 (c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Florida Rules of Court-State (West, 1990 Ed.)
19
On October 17, 1989, the court affirmed the judgment of the
Circuit Court without opinion. Appendix 3a. It did, however,
cite several cases in support of its judgment, including Parks v.
City of Homestead, 414 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (verdict
for police officer in false arrest suit upheld, where there was
sufficient evidence for a jury to have found that officer
reasonably believed that magistrate had requisite authority to
issue warrant); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
(1980)) (municipality may not assert the good faith immunity
of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under Section
1983); Penthouse, Inc. v. Saba, 399 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981),
review denied, 408 So. 2d 1095 (1981)) (Section 1983 action held
properly dismissed, where challenge to county commissioners’
refusal to approve a building plan involved no asserted viola-
tion of federal right); and Chapman v. Dept. of Health and
Rehabilitative Serv., 517 So. 2d 104, 105 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987)
(Section 1983 action does not lie against a state agency and its
attorney for their role in imprisoning plaintiff for non-payment
of child support, where plaintiff alleged only that they “had
‘negligently’ failed to determine that the apparently valid final
judgment against [him] was void because he had not been
personally served in the underlying action...”).
On January 10, 1990 the court denied petitioner's motion for
rehearing, or for rehearing en banc. Appendix 4a. Petitioner did
not proceed to the Supreme Court of Florida because its discre-
tionary jurisdiction is limited to the following classes of cases:
(2) Discretionary Jurisdiction. The discretionary
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be sought to
review:
(A) decisions of district courts of appeal that:
(i) expressly declare valid a state statute;
(ii) expressly construe a provision of the state
or federal constitution;
20
(iii) expressly affect a class of constitutional or
state officers;
(iv) expressly and directly conflict with a
decision of another district court of appeal or of
the Supreme Court on the same question of law;
(v) pass upon a question certified to be of
great public importance;
(B) orders and judgments of trial courts cer-
tified by the district court of appeal in which the
appeal is pending to require immediate resolution
by the Supreme Court, and:
(i) to be of great importance, or
(ii) to have a great effect on the proper ad-
ministration of justice.
Rule 9.030 (a) (2), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Florida
Rules of Court—State (West, 1990 Ed.).
KEASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The State Court Decisions Are in Conflict
With Immunity Principles Governing
Actions Under 42 USC 1983
The elements of an action under 42 USC 1983 are well-es-
tablished: “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law” (citation omitted). West
v. Atkins, — U.S.—108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988).
Petitioner here alleged that a liberty interest long deemed
fundamental, “the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care custody, and management of...her children,” Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), was extinguished without
notice in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
21
Amendment. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965)
(decree granting stepfather’s petition for adoption was entered
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the “failure
to give [the child’s father] notice of the pending proceeding
violated the most rudimentary demands of due process of
law”).
She alleged, moreover, (1) that respondent “used state pro-
cedures to exercise functions pertaining to the taking of
children into custody and removing them from their
parents...[,] a function which was the exclusive prerogative of
the State...,”"" Amended Complaint, {30; and (2) that respon-
dent “acted in concert with State officials, or obtained sig-
nificant aid from State officials in conjunction with the
unconstitutional taking of [petitioner's] four children.” Id.,
131.
Respondent did not challenge the fundamental nature of
the asserted liberty interest, the process which was due
petitioner under the Fourteenth Amendment, or suggest that
these principles were any less firmly entrenched at the time the
children were taken. Rather, it relied solely upon the existence
of the orders in its file to insulate it from liability.
1See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (private child care
institutions falling withing New York statutory definition of “authorized
agencies” empowered to take custody of children from state and city
officials were acting under color of law).
See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (otherwise private person
acts “under color of” state law when engaged in a conspiracy with state
judge to deprive another of federal rights); Tower v. Glover, 467 US 914,
920—921 (1984) (public defender acts under color of state law when
engaged in conspiracy with state officials to deprive criminal defendant of
federal rights).
22
The trial court made clear that its decision to hold respon-
dent “immune from any litigation” depended entirely upon the
existence of genuine signatures on orders purporting to ter-
minate parental rights and to grant respondent permanent
custody of the four children. Whether the orders were entered
illegally, or indeed, whether they were entered at all; whether
respondent knowingly participated with the Monroe County
Juvenile Court judge to terminate petitioner’s parental rights
unlawfully; and whether it then concealed from petitioner facts
which should have been available to her as a matter of right,
these genuine issues of fact’~ were necessarily deemed inade-
quate as a matter of law to preclude entry of summary judg-
ment.
The immunity thus afforded to respondent here was akin
to the derivative judicial immunity claimed by the co-con-
spirator in Dennis v. Sparks, supra. A unanimous Court rejected
the argument that in the absence of this derivative immunity
“the [judge’s] official immunity will be seriously eroded,” id. at
29, for there is “nothing indicating that, historically, judicial
immunity insulated from damages liability those private per-
sons who corruptly conspire with the judge” (footnote
omitted). Ibid.
12See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (a “dispute
about a material fact is ‘genuine’...if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”)
23
Petitioner here presented “affirmative evidence”, Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 257, evidence which was “to be
believed, and [from which] all justifiable inferences [were] to
be drawn in [her] favor” (citation omitted), ibid., establishing a
genuine issue as to whether respondent “corruptly conspire[d]
with the. jud ”, to secure custody of petitioner's children il-
re» The court thus erred in preventing petitioner from
roceeding to trial under principles established in Dennis v.
joints ,
The District Court of Appeal’s per curiam order referred, in
most relevant part, to Owen v. City of Independence, supra, in
which the Court addressed the propriety of extending to
municipalities the good faith immunity enjoyed by its officials;
and to Parks v. City of Homestead, supra, a case in which the
objective reasonableness of a police officer's reliance ona search
warrant was at issue where the judge had subsequently been
found to lack the requisite authority to issue the warrant. This
suggests that it affirmed, not on the ground of a derivative
judicial immunity, but on the ground of qualified immunity.
This decision was no more tenable than the trial court’s.
The affirmative defense of qualified immunity, see Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980), is a “shield[] from liability for
civil damages insofar as [the] conduct does not violate clearly
1She did so despite the denial of additional discovery after she managed
to obtain a copy of respondent's letter to the judge. Cf. ibid. (“the plaintiff
must present affirmative evidence...even where the evidence is likely to be
within the possession of the defendant, so long as the plaintiff has had a
full opportunity to conduct discovery.”)
M4, state court exercising jurisdiction of a Section 1983 claim, see Martinez
v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283, n. 7 (1980), rehearing denied, 445 U.S. 920
(1980), is bound to apply federal principles. Id. at 284, n. 8.
24
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). ~ The Court recently explained:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an
official action is protected by qualified immunity unless
the very action in question has been previously held
unlawful, ... but it is to say that in the light of preexisting
law the unlawfulness must be apparent. (citation
omitted)
Anderson v. Creighton, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987).
The fundamental nature of the liberty interest at stake was
as apparent in 1960 as it is today. Parental rights had long been
deemed “essential”, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);
among the “basic civil rights of man”, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); and “far more precious...than property
rights.” May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). The right to
notice, that “most rudimentary demand[] of due process...”,
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. at 550, prior to the abridgment of
any such an interest, was equally well-established: “[T]here can
be no doubt that at a minimum [due process] require[s] that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case.” Ibid. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
In light of these well-established principles, the District
Court of Appeal seems to have determined that it was objec-
tively reasonable as a matter of law to rely on judicial authoriza-
tion for the challenged conduct. This isa position similar to one
'SThe rule on qualified immunity established in Harlow, a suit against
federal officials is also applicable in actions brought against state officials
under Section 1983. Davis v. Scheur, 468 U.S. 183, 194, n. 12 (1984)
25
advanced by the police officer in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
345 (1986) sued when he allegedly applied for and obtained an
arrest warrant in the absence of probable cause. He argued in
part that his conduct had been per se objectively reasonable
because “he [was] entitled to rely on the judgment of a judicial
officer in finding that probable cause exist[ed] and hence issu-
ing the warrant.” Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1098. The Court, however
found that entitlement to qualified immunity does not turn on
any such judicial imprimatur: “The...question is whether a
reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner's position would
have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause
and that he should not have applied for the warrant.” (footnote
omitted) Ibid.
A per se rule of qualified immunity is no more appropriate
in this context, where the facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to petitioner, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477
US. at 255, establish respondent's knowing participation with
a judicial officer in the destruction of petitioner's parental
rights.
The District Court of Appeal thus erred in denying
petitioner a trial on her Section 1983 claims, the only means she
now has of vindicating the liberty interest of a mother per-
manently deprived of her children. We respectfully submit that
it failed to remember this Court’s words in Stanley v. Illinois:
The private interest...of a [woman] in the children
she has [borne]..., undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It
is plain that the interest of a parent in the companion-
ship, care, custody, and management of...her children
‘come{s] to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements.’”
Id., 405 US. at 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S. 77, 95
(1949))
26
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully requests
that this Court review on certiorari the judgment of the District
Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District affirming the trial
court’s entry of summary judgment; and that the Court reverse
the judgment and remand the case for trial.
JOHN PATTON RACIN
1721 Lamont St. N.W.
Washington D.C. 20010
202 265-2516
Attorney for Petitioner
— 7. z
la
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11TH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL JURISDICTION DIVISION
CASE NO.: 87-08837 CA 19
MARY CELESTE GRIFFING,
Plaintiff,
VS.
THE CHILDREN’S HOME SOCIETY OF
FLORIDA, INC.,
Defendant.
SUMMARY FINAL JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE having come before the Court on January 23,
1989, on the Motion of the Defendant, THE CHILDREN’S
HOME SOCIETY OF FLORIDA, INC., for Summary Final Judg-
ment, and the Court having heard argument of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Motion for Summary Final Judgment of the Defen-
dant, THE CHILDREN’S HOME SOCIETY OF FLORIDA,
INC., is hereby granted.
2. Summary Final Judgment is hereby entered in favor of
the Defendant, THE CHILDREN’S HOME SOCIETY OF
FLORIDA, INC., and the Plaintiff, MARY CELESTE GRIFF-
ING, takes nothing by this action and that Defendant, THE
CHILDREN’S HOME SOCIETY OF FLORIDA, INC., go hence
without day [sic] and shall recover costs from the Plaintiff in a
sum to be determined by this Court at a later date.
2a
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Dade
County, Florida, this 27 day of Jan., 1989.
/s/ JACK M. TURNER
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Jan L. Jacobowitz, Esquire
Ellen Leesfield, Esquire
William S. Reese, Esq.
FEB 1 1989
3a
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT
JULY TERM, A.D. 1989
MARY CELESTE GRIFFING,
Appellant,
vs. CASE NO. 89-461
THE CHILDREN’S HOME
SOCIETY OF FLORIDA, INC.,
Appellee.
Opinion filed October 17, 1989.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Jack M.
Turner, Judge.
Dunn, Dresnick, Lodish & Miller and Jan L. Jacobowitz and
Helen L. Stone, for appellant.
Wicker, Smith, Blomqvist, Tutan, O’Hara, McCoy, Graham
& Lane and Shelley H. Leinicke, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J.,and BARKDULL and HUBBART,
JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,89S.Ct. 1243,
22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) [sic]; Parks v. City of Homestead, 414
So.2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); Penthouse,
Inc. v. Saba, 399 So.2d 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), review denied,
408 So.2d 1095 (1981); Chapman v. State Dep’t of Health and
Rehabilitative Servs., 517 So.2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987);
Robertson v. Deak Perera (Miami), Inc., 396 So.2d 749 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1981), review denied, 407 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 1981).
i
4a
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
THIRD DISTRICT
JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1989
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1990
MARY CELESTE GRIFFING,
Appellant,
vs. CASE NO. 89-461
THE CHILDREN’S HOME SOCIETY
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, INC.,
Appellee.
Upon consideration, appellant’s motion for rehearing and
motion for rehearing en banc are hereby denied.
A True Copy
ATTEST:
LOUIS J. SPALLONE
Clerk District Court of
Appeal, Third District
By _/s/
Deputy Clerk
cc: Jan L. Jacobowitz
Shelley H. Leinicke
/ih
5a
THE JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA
IN THE INTEREST OF
DEBRA MICHELE ANDERSON CASE NO. 438
A CHILD
ORDER OF COMMITMENT TO CHILD CARING AGENCY
WHEREAS Roberta Pettie, Child Welfare Supervisor, State
Dep’t Welfare of said County, has filed a petition under oath in
this court alleging that Debra Michele Anderson is a dependent
child within the intent and meaning of Chapter 26.880 Laws of
Florida, Acts of 1951, and it appearing to the court that all
persons entitled to notice of hearing have been duly notified
thereof, and said child having been brought before the court,
and due examination held, upon the evidence adduced at the
hearing, the court finds:
That Debra Michele Anderson is a child within the jurisdic-
tion of this court, found, living or domiciled in Monroe County,
Florida, of the age of 7 years; that the said Debra Michele
Anderson is a dependent child as defined by Section 29.01 of
the Florida Statutes, by reason of the following facts: Wards
[sic] of Court since 9/16/59; committed to care of Division of
Children’s Services, State Welfare since then. Father were [sic]
duly searched for but unable to locate them[sic]. Mother has
failed to present a plan for care of children, has served sentence
in Federal Prison & is now returned. It is deemed in the best
interest of child that she be placed with The Children’s Home
Society for care ieading to permanent commitment for sub-
sequent adoption. and it appearing to the court that it is for the
best interest of said child that she be removed from the custody
and control of her parent(s) the said Carl Wayne Anderson &
Mrs. Jody Anderson alias Mrs. Judith Goldman and from the
home and surroundings in which she is now situated, and the
The Children’s Home Society of Florida is duly licensed by the
6a
Florida State Board of Public Welfare as a Child Caring Agency
under the provisions of Section 409.06 Florida Statutes, 1941,
and is willing to receive said child, therefore,
It is hereby ordered that the said Debra Michele Anderson
be and she is hereby removed from the custody and control of
her said parent(s) or C. W. Anderson & Jody Anderson alias
Judith Goldman and committed to the care, custody and super-
vision of the said Child Caring Agency, the said Children’s
Home Society of Florida until the further order of this court,
and jurisdiction of said child and of this case is hereby retained
for the purpose of making such other orders herein as to the
court may seem necessary.
WITNESS my hand as Judge and the seal of the Juvenile
Court of Monroe County, Florida, this 7th day of April, 1960.
Received by /s/ Elanore C. Marien /s/ Eva Wamer Gibson
By Judge of the Juvenile
Court of Monroe County,
Title Florida
7a
ORDER OF PERMANENT COMMITMENT
IN THE JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA
IN THE INTEREST OF
DEBRA MICHELE ANDERSON CASE NO. 438
DEPENDENT Female CHILD
This cause came on to be heard before me upon the sworn
petition filed by Roberta Pettie, Child Welfare Supervisor, State
Dept. Welfare of Monroe County In the above entitled cause on
the 7th day of April A.D., 1960, Carl Wayne Anderson, legal
father having been duly searched for and not found; Roberta
Pettie representing the Department of Public Welfare; Debra
Michele Anderson dependent child and Judith Jean Donnelly
aka Anderson aka Goldman mother having been before the
Court and the Court finding that all persons entitled to notice
of this hearing have been duly notified, or that the parent or
parents of said child have duly surrendered said child to The
Children’s Home Society of Florida, a child placing agency
licensed under the Laws of the State of Florida; and that said
Debra Michele Anderson, having been born on or about the
20th day of December 1952, is dependent within the meaning
and intent of the Laws of the State of Florida, and is a suitable
child for adoption, and that it is manifestly to the best interests
of said child that this order be made and entered. The Court
further finds and determines that The Children’s Home Society
of Florida is a duly licensed child placing agency and that the
said Society is willing to receive the said child into its per-
manent custody.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the said dependent child be and is hereby permanently
committed to the care and custody of the said The Children’s
Home Society of Florida for subsequent adoption.
8a
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the said dependent child shall forthwith become the ward of,
and the person of the said child shall be subject to the guardian-
ship of The Children’s Home Society of Florida, and said
Society is hereby given the authority to place the said child in
a family home for the purpose of adoption, and may become a
party to any proceeding for the legal adoption of the said
dependent child, and may consent thereto, and by its repre-
sentative or attorney may appear in any court where such
proceeding is pending, and participate therein as the guardian
of said dependent child.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the natural parent, or parents, of the said dependent child, and
the legal guardian, if such there be, other than the said The
Children’s Home Society of Florida, and all other persons, are
hereby jointly and severally permanently deprived of all rights
to such child, all of which said rights are hereby declared
permanently forfeited.
DONE AND ORDERED AT Key West, Monroe County,
Florida, this 29th day of August A.D., 1961.
(A True Copy)
/s/Eva Warner Gibson
JUDGE
ls/
Clerk
9a
THE JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA
IN THE INTEREST OF
WAYNE ANDREW GOLDMAN CASE NO. 439
A CHILD
ORDER OF COMMITMENT TO CHILD CARING AGENCY
WHEREAS Roberta Pettie, Child Welfare Supervisor, State
Dep’t Welfare of said County, has filed a petition under oath in
this court alleging that Wayne Andrew Goldman is a depend-
ent child within the iritent and meaning of Chapter 26.880 Laws
of Florida Acts of 1961, and it appearing to the court that all
persons entitled to notice of hearing have been duly notified
thereof, and said child having been brought before the court,
and due examination held, upon the evidence adduced at the
hearing, the court finds:
That Wayne Andrew Goldman is a child within the juris-
diction of this court, found, living or domiciled in MONROE
County, Florida, of the age of 6 years; that the said Wayne
Andrew Goldman is a dependent child as defined by Section
30.01 of the Florida Statutes, by reason of the following facts:
Wards [sic] of Court since 9/16/59; committed to care of
Division of Children’s Services, State Welfare since then. Father
was duly searched for but not found. Mother has failed to
present plan for care of child, has served sentence in Federal
Prison & is now returned. Deemed in best interest of child that
he be placed with The Children’s Home Society for care leading
to permanent commitment for subsequent adoption, and it
appearing to the court that it is for the best interest of said child
that he be removed from the custody and control of his parent(s)
or legal custodian, the said Ronald J. Goldman & Jody Ander-
son alias Mrs. Judith Goldman and from the home and sur-
10a
roundings in which he is now situated, and that The Children’s
Home Society of Florida is duly licensed by the Florida State
Board of Public Welfare as a Child Caring Agency under the
provisions of Section 409.06 Florida Statutes, 1941, and is will-
ing to receive said child, therefore,
It is hereby ordered that the said Wayne Andrew Goldman
be and he is hereby removed from the custody and control of
his said parents(s) R. J. Goldman & Jody Anderson alias Mrs
Judith Goldman and committed to the care, custody and super-
vision of the said Child Caring Agency, the said Children’s
Home Society of Florida until the further order of this court,
and jurisdiction of said child and of this case is hereby retained
for the purpose of making such other orders herein as to the
court may seem necessary.
WITNESS my hand as Judge and the Seal of the Juvenile
Court of Monroe County, Florida, this 7th day of April, 1960.
Received by /s/ Elanore C. Marien__/s/ Eva Warmer Gibson
Judge of the Juvenile Court
of Monroe County, Florida
lla
ORDER OF PERMANENT COMMITMENT
IN THE JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA
IN THE INTEREST OF
WAYNE ANDREW GOLDMAN CASE NO. 439
DEPENDENT Male CHILD
This cause came on to be heard before me upon the sworn
petition filed by Roberta Pettie, Child Welfare Supervisor, State
Department of Welfare, of Monroe County.
In the above entitled cause on the 7th day of April A.D.,
1960, Ronald Jay Goldman, legal father, having been duly sear-
ched for and not found; Judith Jean Donnelly Anderson
Goldman, natural mother and Roberta Pettie representing State
Department of Welfare and Wayne Andrew Goldman depend-
ent child having been before the Court and the Court finding
that all persons entitled to notice of this hearing have been duly
notified, or that the parent or parents of said child have duly
surrendered said child to The Children’s Home Society of
Florida, a child placing agency licensed under the Laws of the
State of Florida; and that said Wayne Andrew Goldman, having
been born on or about the 10th day of December 1953, is
dependent within the meaning and intent of the Laws of the
State of Florida, and is a suitable child for adoption, and that it
is manifestly to the best interests of said child that this order be
made and entered. The Court further finds and determines that
The Children’s Home Society of Florida is a duly licensed child
placing agency and that the said Society is willing to receive the
said child into its permanent custody.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the said dependent child be and is hereby permanently
committed to the care and custody of the said The Children’s
Home Society of Florida for subsequent adoption.
12a
Itis further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the said dependent child shall forthwith become the ward of,
and the person of the said child shall be subject to the guardian-
ship of The Children’s Home Society of Florida, and said
Society is hereby given the authority to place the said child in
a family home for the purpose of adoption, and may become a
party to any proceeding for the legal adoption of the said
dependent child, and may consent thereto, and by its repre-
sentative or attorney may appear in any court where such
proceeding is pending, and participate therein as the guardian
of said dependent child.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the natural parent, or parents, of the said dependent child, and
the legal guardian, if such there be, other than the said The
Children’s Home Society of Florida, and all other persons, are
hereby jointly and severally permanently deprived of all rights
to such child, all of which said rights are hereby declared
permanently forfeited.
DONE AND ORDERED AT Key West, Monroe County,
Florida, this 29th day of August A.D., 1961.
___Eva Warner Gibson
JUDGE
(A True Copy)
/s/
Clerk
13a
ORDER OF PERMANENT COMMITMENT
IN THE JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA
IN THE INTEREST OF
ROBIN JEANETTE GOLDMAN CASE NO.
DEPENDENT Female CHILD
This cause came on to be heard before me upon the sworn
petition filed by Mrs. Roberta Pettie, Child Welfare Supervisor,
Florida Dept. of Public Welfare of Monroe County in the above
entitled cause on the 4th day of February A.D., 1960, Mrs.
Roberta Pettie, Child Welfare Supervisor, Florida Department
of Public Welfare and Robin Jeanette Goldman having been
before the Court and the Court finding that all persons entitled
to notice of this hearing have been duly notified, or that the
parent or parents of said child have duly surrendered said child
to The Children’s Home Society of Florida, a child placing
agency licensed under the Laws of the State of Florida; and that
said Robin Jeanette Goldman, having been born on or about the
15th day of April 1956, is dependent within the meaning and
intent of the Laws of the State of Florida, and is a suitable child
for adoption, and that it is manifestly to the best interests of said
child that this order be made and entered. The Court further
finds and determines that The Children’s Home Society of
Florida is a duly licensed child placing agency and that the said
Society is willing to receive the said child into its permanent
custody.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the said dependent child be and is hereby permanently
committed to the care and custody of the said The Children’s
Home Society of Florida for subsequent adoption.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the said dependent child shall forthwith become the ward of,
14a
and the person of the said child shall be subject to the guardian-
ship of The Children’s Home Society of Florida, and said
Society is hereby given the authority to place the said child in
a family home for the purpose of adoption, and may become a
party to any proceeding for the legal adoption of the said
dependent child, and may consent thereto, and by its repre-
sentative or attorney may appear in any court where such
proceeding is pending, and participate therein as the guardian
of said dependent child.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the natural parent, or parents, of the said dependent child, and
the legal guardian, if such there be, other than the said The
Children’s Home Society of Florida, and all other persons, are
hereby jointly and severally permanently deprived of all rights
to such child, all of which said rights are hereby declared
permanently forfeited. f
DONE AND ORDERED AT Key West, Monroe County,
Florida, this 7th day of April A.D., 1960
(A True Copy) /s/ Eva Warmer Gibson
JUDGE
ee
15a
ORDER OF PERMANENT COMMITMENT
IN THE JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA
IN THE INTEREST OF
ADRIENNE CELESTE GOLDMAN CASE NO.
DEPENDENT Female CHILD
This cause came on to be heard before me upon the sworn
petition filed by Mrs. Roberta Pettie, Child Welfare Supervisor,
Florida Dept. of Public Welfare, Monroe County.
In the above entitled cause on the 4th day of February A.D.,
1960, Mrs. Roberta Pettie, Child Welfare Supervisor, Florida
Department of Public Welfare and Adrienne Celeste Goldman
having been before the Court and the Court finding that all
persons entitled to notice of this hearing have been duly
notified, or that the parent or parents of said child have duly
surrendered said child to The Children’s Home Society of
Florida, a child placing agency licensed under the Laws of the
State of Florida; and that said Adrienne Celeste Goldman,
_ having been born on or about the 19th day of November, 1958,
is dependent within the meaning and intent of the Laws of the
State of Florida, and is a suitable child for adoption, and that it
is manifestly to the best interests of said child that this order be
made and entered. The Court further finds and determines that
The Children’s Home Society of Florida is a duly licensed child
placing agency and that the said Society is willing to receive the
said child into its permanent custody.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the said dependent child be and is hereby permanently
committed to the care and custody of the said The Children’s
Home Society of Florida for subsequent adoption.
S——_eeea. aN
16a
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the said dependent child shall forthwith become the ward of,
and the person of the said child shall be subject to the guardian-
ship of The Children’s Home Society of Florida, and said
Society is hereby given the authority to place the said child in
a family home for the purpose of adoption, and may become a
party to any proceeding for the legal adoption of the said
dependent child, and may consent thereto, and by its repre-
sentative or attorney may appear in any court where such
proceeding is pending, and participate therein as the guardian
of said dependent child.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the natural parent, or parents, of the said dependent child, and
the legal guardian, if such there be, other than the said The
Children’s Home Society of Florida, and all other persons, are
hereby jointly and severally permanently deprived of all rights
to such child, all of which said rights are hereby declared
permanently forfeited.
DONE AND ORDERED AT Key West, Monroe County,
Florida, this 7th day of April A.D., 1960.
(A True Copy) Eva Warner Gibson
_/s/ Isabel Fleming _
Clerk
17a
March 10, 1960
Hon. Eva Warner Gibson
Juvenile Court of Monroe County
Monroe County Court House
Key West, Fla.
Re: Children:
Debra Michele Anderson _ B. 12-20-52
Wayne Andrew Goldman _B. 12-10-53
Robin Jeanette Goldman B. 4-15-56
Adrienne Celeste Goldman B.11-19-58
Dear Judge Gibson:
This will confirm my telephone conversation with you
yesterday, March 9, 1960, regarding Judith Goldman’s four
children. As | stated on the telephone, we feel it is important
that you know the position of The Children’s Home Society of
Florida regarding these children.
We have had Robin Jeanette and Adrienne Celeste, the two
younger children, in one of our foster homes since January 19,
1960. Therefore, we know these children and have been in the
process of a pre-adoptive evaluation. However, Debra Michele
Anderson and Wayne Andrew Goldman were placed in the
American Children’s Home and we do not know them, inas-
much as we had not received our referral material on them until
this week. For this reason it is necessary for us to say to you
that we are not in a position to be able to accept permanent
commitment on these two older children, namely, Debra and
Wayne at this time.
However, we want you to know that we are very willing to
have you give us temporary commitment on these two older
children. If you can see fit to do this, we would then let you
know when we have completed our pre-adoptive study on
them and should this indicate that they are adoptable, we
18a
would then send you a request for permanent commitment of
the two older children.
Based on our present findings, we expect to send you our
request for permanent commitment of Robin and Adrienne, the
two younger children at the time of the hearing on March 23,
1960.
You will recall our discussion of the handling of this on the
same basis as the H. Children, whom you com-
mitted to us under the same circumstances. Please be assured
of our desire to work with you and Mrs. Pettie in the best
interest of these dependent children. Perhaps I should say here
that I expect to furnish some material to Mrs. Pettie regarding
our experience of approximately two months with these two
younger children.
I would appreciate your letting us know whether or not this
plan is acceptable to you.
Sincerely yours,
(Mrs.) Elanore C. Marien
Supervisor
Southeastern Division
cc. Mrs. Roberta Pettie
FDPW, Key West, Fla.
Mrs. Dee Winterstrom
Bar Harbour 9, Miami
19a
1951 Fla. Laws, c. 26880, §1
(current version at Fla. Stat. Sec. 39.401 (1988))
39.03 Taking a child into custody; detention.—
(1) No child shall be taken into custody without an order
of the judge of the juvenile court of the county or district
wherein the child is found, living, or domiciled, unless (a) the
child is in such condition or surroundings that the welfare of
the child requires that the child be immediately taken into
custody, or (b) the child shall be alleged to have committed a
violation of law. In case either of those special circumstances
shall exist, any law enforcement officer whose duty it would be
todo so if thechild were an adult, and any counselor or assistant
counselor, may take the child into custody without order of the
judge.
*“* *
(3) The person taking and retaining a child in custody shall
notify the parents or legal custodians of the child at the earliest
practicable time, and shall, without delay for the purpose of
investigation or any other purpose, deliver the child, by the
most direct practicable route, to the court of the county or
district where the child is taken into custody, or, if the judge has
so ordered, to a detention home or licensed child caring institu-
tion or county or city jail, within the county or district, desig-
nated by the judge, and shall at the earliest practicable time
report in writing to the court the facts by reason of which the
child was taken into custody...
20a
1951 Fla. Laws, c. 26880, §1
(current version at Fla. Stat. 39.411 (1988))
39.12 Seal; records; privileged information.—
**~ * *
(2) The juvenile court shall make and keep records of all
cases brought before it, and shall preserve the records pertain-
ing to a child until ten years after the last entry was made, and
may then destroy them, except that records of cases where
orders were entered permanently depriving a parent of the
custody of a child shall be preserved permanently....
(3) Juvenile court records shall not be public records, and
shall not be open to inspection by the public. Records shall be
inspected only upon order of the judge, by persons deemed by
the judge to have a proper interest therein, except that a child
and the parents or legal custodians of the child and their attor-
neys shall always have the right to inspect and copy any official
record pertaining to the child...
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.