Appendix — American Federation of Government Employees v. Skinner

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dOSEPH F. SPANION. UR.

K

™'N THE >

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

AFL-CIO, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

SAMUEL K. SKINNER,

Secretary of Transportation,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

MARK ROTH

JOE GOLDBERG

80 F Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

WALTER KAMIAT

LAURENCE GOLD

(Counsel of Record)

815 16th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 637-5390

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. Opinion Of The United States Court Of Appeals

For The District Of Columbia Circuit —......0............ la

B. Memorandum Opinion And Order Of The United

States District Court For The District Of

ITER wicacotcneianiacriciaresacncccantansacrtunaecaskelecnidteooncegutee rie 29a

C. United States Department Of Transportation

Order 3910.1, “Drug-Free Departmental Work-

ASI S ERE re et pets OR A Dn heres Tint Bee 38a

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 87-5417

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERMENT EMPLOYEES,

AFL-CIO, et al.,

Appellants,

V.

SAMUEL K. SKINNER,

Secretary Department of Transportation, et al.

Argued Oct. 18, 1988

Decided Sept. 8, 1989

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Civil Action No. 87-01815)

Joe Goldberg, with whom Mark D. Roth and Charles

A. Hobbie, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for

appellants.

John R. Bolton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, with

whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., Leonard Schaitman

and Robert V. Zener, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washing-

ton, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.

2a

William W. Osborne, Jr. and John R. Mooney, Wash-

ington, D.C., were on the brief, for amicus curiae urging

reversal.

Before WALD, Chief Judge; MIKVA and SENTELLE,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SEN-

TELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge:

On June 29, 1987, the Secretary of Transportation an-

nounced a plan for testing certain employees of the De-

partment of Transportation (‘Department’) for unlaw-

ful drug use. Order 3910.1, “Drug-Free Departmental

Workplace,” U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, June 29, 1987

(“Order 3910.1”), Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 17. De-

pending on the safety and security “criticalness” of the

duties or prospective duties, employees and applicants

may be subjected to urinalysis in one or more of seven

circumstances.’ Those employed in “Category I”’ positions

—jobs determined by the Department to have a direct

impact on public health, safety, or national security—

may be required to submit to random testing.

Appellants, the American Federation of Government

Employees and certain Category I employees, brought

suit to enjoin the suspicionless testing, alleging, inter alia,

1 Order 3910.1 provides for the following types of testing:

(1) random; (2) periodic; (3) reasonable suspicion; (4) pre-

employment/pre-appointment; (5) accident or unsafe practice;

(6) voluntary; and (7) follow-up. Order 3910.1, Ch. III § 3(A),

J.A. at 28-29. All covered employees are subject to reasonable

suspicion, accident or unsafe practice, and voluntary testing.

Only those who participate in a drug rehabilitation and/or

abatement program are subject to follow-up testing. Id. § 4(G),

J.A. at 30. Periodic testing may be required for certain em-

ployees who are already required to be periodically medically

examined. Jd. §3(A), J.A. at 29.

3a

violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Re-

habilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. $§ 701-795i (1982 &

Supp. V 1988), and the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. $$ 551, et seg. (1982). The District

Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis focused on our opin-

ion in NFFE v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C.Cir.

1987), which the trial court interpreted to require the

balancing of factors bearing on reasonableness. AFGE

v. Dole, 670 F.Supp. 445, 447 (D.D.C.1987). After weigh-

ing a variety of factors,* the Court determined that, on

balance, “[t|he random urine drug testing plan is rea-

sonable on its face and must be sustained at this stage.”

Id. The Court disposed of appellants’ statutory challenges

in short order, concluding in a footnote that they were

“not significant.” Jd. at 447 n. 6. Accordingly, the Court

granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment.

In this appeal appellants renew their contentions of

Fourth Amendment and statutory violations. We affirm.

3

According to Executive Order 12,564, signed by Presi-

dent Ronald Reagan on September 15, 1986, on- or off-

duty illegal drug use by federal employees “evidences less

2 On the governmental side of the Fourth Amendment balance, the

Court weighed “whether the search was justified at its inception,

whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect work related drug

use will be uncovered, whether those subjected to the test... are

only those who in fact occupy critical positions . . . and whether

use of illegal drugs is likely to impair a critical employment work

efficiency.” 670 F.Supp. at 448. On the other side of the balance,

the District Court weighed the employees’ privacy interests, while

identifying factors tending to diminish that interest. The Court

emphasized the Department’s advance notice of program implemen-

tation, the employees’ “familiarity with testing safeguards and

procedures,” the preexistence of a periodic urinalysis testing pro-

gram, and the “discreet and private” testing procedures. Id. at

447-48.

4a

than the complete reliability, stability, and good judg-

ment that is consistent with access to sensitive informa-

tion and creates the possibility of coercion, influence, and

irresponsible action under pressure.” Exec. Order No.

12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301

note at 175-77 (Supp. IV 1986). The Order accordingly

directed executive-branch agencies to establish mandatory

programs to test employees in “sensitive positions” for

the use of illegal drugs. The Department became the

first executive agency to impiement a drug-testing pro-

gram pursuant to the President’s Order. Departmental

Order 3910.1 establishes two categories of employees sub-

ject to testing, so designated because of their “safety and

security criticalness.” Order 3910.1, Ch. III, § 2, J.A. at

28. Employees whose positions bear “a direct and im-

mediate impact on public health and safety, the protec-

tion of life and property, law enforcement, or national

security,” 7i.e., Category I employees, are made subject

to five types of testing: (1) random; (2) periodic “if

they are required to take periodic physical examina-

tions”; (3) reasonable suspicion; (4) accident or unsafe

practice; and (5) follow-up. Order 3901.1, Ch. IIT, § 3

(A), J.A. at 28-29. All applicants for Category I posi-

tions must submit to pre-appointment testing. J/d., J.A.

at 29. All other employees in sensitive positions, classi-

fied as “Category II’ employees, are subject to reason-

able suspicion, accident or unsafe practice, and follow-up

testing. Jd. §3(B), J.A. at 29. As of June, 1987, the

Department had classified nearly 30,000 of its approxi-

mately 62,900 employees in Category I. J.A. at 769.

Nearly two-thirds of the employees subject to random

and periodic urinalysis testing are air traffic controllers,

id., a group of employees not party to these proceedings,

see Brief for Appellants at 23 n. 17.° Nearly twenty-two

3 The National Air Traffic Controllers Association, exclusive bar-

gaining representative of the approximately 12,000 controllers em-

5a

percent are employed as “electronic technicians.” J.A. at

769. The remaining twelve percent are, among others,

aviation safety inspectors (3%), motor carrier and high-

way safety specialists (1%), railroad safety inspectors

(1.1%), civil aviation security specialists (.9%), air-

craft mechanics (.7%), and motor vehicle operators

(.2%). Id. at 769-70.*

ployed by the Federal Aviation Administration, a subordinate

agency of the Department, appeared as an amicus curiae in these

proceedings.

4 The complete list of covered employees is as follows:

Office of the Secretary: motor vehicle operators.

United States Coast Guard: firefighters, nurses, criminal in-

vestigators, vessel traffic controllers, maritime traffic controllers

(pilot), electronics mechanics, aircraft electricians, instrument

merchanics, metals inspectors, shipwright foremen, transporta-

tion equipment operation family, aircraft oxygen equipment

mechanics, aircraft engine mechanics, aircraft mechanics, mas-

ter pilots (ferryboat), chief engineers (ferryboat), oiler (ferry-

boat and diesel).

Federal Aviation Administration: electronics technicians,

civil aviation security specialists, aviation safety inspectors, air

traffic control specalists, inspection/flight test pilcts, transpor-

tation equipment operation family, aircraft mechanics.

Federal Highway Administration: highway safety specialists,

motor carrier safety specialists, transportation equipment oper-

ation family.

Federal Railroad Administration: industrial hygienists

(headquarters), general engineer (field and headquarters), civil

engineers (field and headquarters), railroad safety series (field

and headquarters), motor vehicle operators, safety engineer

(headquarters), mechanical engineers (headquarters), electrical

engineers (headquarters), chemical engineer (headquarters),

transportation specialists (headquarters).

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation: lock and

dam operators, vessel traffic controllers, transportation equip-

ment operation family.

[Continued ]

6a

The testing procedures employed by the Department

are substantially identical to those used by the Army to

test its civilians, which we outlined in NFFE v. Cheney,

884 F.2d 603 (D.C.Cir.1989). Order 3910.1 explicitly

provides that the guidelines for drug testing published

by the Department of Heaith and Human Services are

to govern. Order 3910.1, Ch. III, $1, J.A. at 28. See

“Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Test-

ing, Programs,” 53 Fed.Reg. 11,970 (Apr. 11, 1988)

(‘HHS Regulations” or “HHS Reg.’). Order 3910.1

supplements the HHS Regulations with additional safe-

guards to be followed in both the sample-collection process

and in the chain of specimen-custody. Order 3910.1 Ch.

III, $$ 8-10, J.A. at 32-39. Like the Army, the Depart-

ment considers a test result positive for proscribed drugs

only if it is positive on each of two separate tests, an

initial test using immunoassay methods and a confirma-

tory test using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry

(GC/MS) techniques. See HHS Reg. § 2(4(e)-(f). “All

specimens negative on [the] initial test or negative on

the confirmatory test shall be reported as negative.” Or-

der 3910.1, Ch. III, §9(B), J.A. at 38 (emphasis in

original). The Department, like the Army, tests urine

for the presence of five drugs (or their metabolites) ;

marijuana, cocaine, PCP, opiates, and amphetamines. Zd.

11(A) (1)-(5), J.A. at 39-40.

Unlike the Army program, the Department’s plan per-

mits an employee who has tested positive to insist that

the sample be tested again, either at the site of the

original tests or, at his own expense, “at another quali-

4 [Continued ] —

Office of Inspector General: criminal investigators.

Maritime Administration: transportation equipment opera-

tion family, engineers (watchstander), maritime general main-

tenance mechanics (deck/engine).

See Order 3910.1 Appendix A. The record does not reveal the allo-

cation of employees in the various covered positions.

Ta

* fied laboratory identified by the employee.” Jd. § 9(E),

J.A. at 39. Although a Category I employee who tests

positive “will be assigned non-safety or non-security du-

ties,” id. Ch. IV, $6, J.A. at 42, he may not be dis-

charged solely because of a single positive test result, id.

Ch. VI, §1(B), J.A. at 45. Absent additional circum-

stances, an employee will be removed from federal service

only if he tests positive a second time.®

II.

As in Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C.Cir.

1989), and Cheney, supra, our analysis in the instant

case is guided by the Supreme Court’s recent opinions in

National Treasury Empioyees Union v. Von Raab,

US. , 109 S.Ct. 1884, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), and

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association,

U.S. ——, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). In Von

Raab, the Court sustained urinalysis testing of United

States Customs Service employees slated for promotions

into positions that involved either interdicting illicit

drugs or carrying a firearm. 109 S.Ct. at 1397. The

Court withheld judgment on the reasonableness of testing

employees solely because they would handle classified ma-

terial, instead remanding the case to the Court of Ap-

peals so that it could “clarify the scope of this category

of employees.” Jd. In Skinner, the Court upheld the Fed-

eral Railroad Administration (“FRA”) regulations au-

thorizing railroads to toxicologically test certain employ-

ees involved in train accidents or incidents of violations

of safety rules. 109 S.Ct. at 1420-21. In both cases the

5 The Department retains the right to remove immediately certain

drug-using employees, including employees found to be using illegal

drugs on duty or determined to have engaged in certain drug-related

offenses. Immediate discharge is also required for certain testing-

related violations: refusal to enter or successfully complete a

rehabilitation/abatement program, refusal to provide a specimen,

and adulteration or substitution of a specimen. See Order 3910.-1,

Ch. VI, §1(A)-(F), J.A. at 45.

Sa

Court concluded that suspicionless testing, while a search,

was reasonable and thus conformed with the dictates of

the Fourth Amendment.

In their supplemental brief, filed at our direction after

the Supreme Court issued its opinions, appellants argue

that Skinner and Von Raab “should have little or no

impact upon the decision in the instant case.” Supple-

mental Brief for Appellants at 2. On a general level,

appellants contend that “the results of NTEU and RLEA

have no bearing on the employees in the instant case,”

who are neither engaged in drug interdiction nor em-

ployed as “operational members of train crews.” Id. at

1. Appellants also argue that random testing, the exclu-

sive focus of our attention,” is “vastly more intrusive

than the limited drug testing” approved by the Supreme

Court. Id.

We first must determine whether the Department's

plan “serves special governmental needs, beyond the nor-

mal need of law enforcement.” Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at

1390. If it does, Skinner and Von Raab make clear that

the plan need not necessarily be supported by probable

‘ause or any level of particularized suspicion in order to

be constitutional. Id.; Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1414, 1417.

‘While it is not clear which aspects of the District Court's order

appellants intended to bring forward on appeal, compare Brief for

Appellants at 8 n. 9 “Appe'lants seek appeal of the district courts

dismissal only as to random, periodic, and accident or unsafe

practice drug testing.” vith Supplemental Brief for Appellants at

1 n. 2 (“The appellees (sic) have challenged only random, and acci-

ent or unsafe practice testing.”), in their most recent submission

appellants appear to indicate that their challenge is directed exclu-

ly at random testing, td. But see id. at 7 (Random testing is

the principle (sic) issue of the case presently before the Court.”)

We consider only the random aspect of the Department's plan, both

ause it was the only aspect appellants challenged in their com-

plaint, see Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2,

1A at 2. and because it was the only aspect passed upon by the

District Court, see 670 F. Supp. at 449

9a

Appellants point out that the Department tests only for

the presence of illegal drugs—rather than for any per-

formance-impairing agent—thus making “clear that the

agency’s concern is law enforcement rather than direct

public safety.” Brief for Appellants at 27. Moreover,

the failure to test for legal drugs such as valium “makes

a mockery out of the agency’s pious protestations of con-

cern with public safety.” Jd. at 28. Amicus similarly

argues that the “true objectives” of the Department’s

program have been displaced by “a more saleable” ra-

tionale based on the Department’s “rather idiosyncratic”

aviation safety rationale. Brief for Amicus Curiae at

4, 3.

These contentions give us little pause. Initially, even

if we were to assume, as amicus contends, id. at 5 n. 4,

that the animating motive behind Executive Order 12,564

was the mandatory testing of all federal employees,’ the

Department’s program tests only those whose duties bear

“a direct and immediate impact on public health and

safety, the protection of life and property, law enforce-

ment or national security.” Order 3910.1, Ch. III, §3

(A), J.A. at 28. Law enforcement appears nowhere

among the program’s stated goals, and more to the point,

nonconsensuai disclosure of test results to police author-

ities is proscribed both by regulation and statute. See

HHS Reg. § 2.8; Pub.L. No. 100-71, § 503(e), 101 Stat.

471 (1987).

There can be little doubt, then, that the testing plan

serves needs other than law enforcement, and therefore

need not necessarily be supported by any level of par-

ticularized suspicion. In order to determine the appropri-

ate standard of reasonableness, we are “to balance the

individual[s’] privacy expectations against the Govern-

ment’s interest to determine whether it is impractical to

7 This contention is belied by the fact that the Order recommends

testing only for those who occupy jobs “sensitive” from the stand-

point of security, health, and safety.

10a

require a warrant or some level of individualized sus-

picion in the particular context.” Von Raab, 109 §.Ct.

at 1390. Accord Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1414; see also

O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719, 107 S.Ct. 1492,

1499, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). This approach necessarily

recognizes that not every invasion of privacy is proscribed

by the Fourth Amendment. If a careful balancing of in-

terests suggests that the public interest would be best

served by requiring a standard of reasonableness short

of particularized suspicion, we should not hesitate to

adopt that standard. Cf. New Jersey v. T.L.0., 469 US.

325. 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1984) (adopt-

ing reasonableness balancing instead of probable cause).

The balance we strike in the present case is substantially

identical to that struck by the Supreme Court in Skinner

and by us in Cheney.

Ill.

The Department identified as Category I personnel

those employed in some twenty different positions relating

to air, rail, highway, and water transportation.” More

than 94° of the employees subject to random testing

under the plan work for the Federal Aviation Adminis-

tration (“FAA”). J.A. at 769. As we noted earlier,

nearly two-thirds of the covered employees occupy a

* The Department deemed the following positions as those having

the necessary impact on public health, safety, or national security to

warrant their inclusion in Category I: motor vehicle operators;

criminal investigators; vessel traffic controllers; air traffic con-

trollers: mechanics (general maintenance, electronic, instrument,

aircraft oxygen equipment, aircraft engine); aircraft electricians ;

inspectors (metals, aviation, railroad safety series) ; transportation

equipment operation family; pilots (master inspection / flight test) ;

civil aviation security specialists; safety specialists (highway, motor

carrier, railroad, safety engineer); engineers (general, civil, me-

chanical. electrical, chemical) ; firefighters; nurses; shipwright fore-

men: chief engineers (ferryboat); oiler (ferryboat and diesel ) ;

electronics technicians; industrial hygienists; transportation spe-

cialists; lock and dam operators.

lla

single position, air traffic controller, and are not parties

to this litigation. See supra note 3 and accompanying

text. Of the remainder, most are, to varying degrees,

employed in positions relating to transportation safety,

among them mechanics, inspectors, and engineers.

As the District Court noted, written justifications were

not produced for each covered position. See 670 F.Supp.

at 449. Nor for that matter have appellants at any stage

in this litigation challenged the inclusion of the vast

majority of the categories of employees. Rather, they

have singled out three categories, arguing that their in-

clusion evidences the unreasonableness of the entire test-

ing regime.

Before addressing the three specifically challenged posi-

tions, we note that the record amply evidences the

extraordinary safety sensitivity of the bulk of the cov-

ered positions. For example, FRA safety inspectors and

safety specialists are charged with the duties of review-

ing railroad operating practices, inspecting track and sig-

nal conditions, and enforcing compliance with safety laws

and regulations. J.A. at 465. The Federal Highway

Administration’s highway and motor carrier safety spe-

cialists are charged with similar duties, including han-

dling of hazardous materials, investigating trucking

companies’ safety system, and exploring unsafe practices

complaints. J.A. at 771.

The duties of lock and dam operators at the Saint

Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, an operating

administration within the Department, are responsible

for guiding commercial vessels and pleasure craft

through the lock area, which includes the lock chamber,

adjacent control towers, and approach walls. Lock oper-

ators are responsible for negotiating craft through the

lock chamber. J.A. at 471-72. Vessel traffic controllers

are similarly responsible for navigating traffic along 140

miles of the St. Lawrence River, its twenty ports and

Lake Ontario. J.A. at 472.

12a

It would appear that the Supreme Court’s rationale for

upholding testing of certain railroad personnel in Skin-

ner is the natural starting point to determine whether

the Department’s asserted safety interests justify the

testing of employees so intimately involved with safe

transportation. In Skinner, the Supreme Court reviewed

FRA-adopted regulations authorizing private railroads

to toxicologically test certain of their employees. Under

the FRA regulations, private railroads are empowered

to subject to urine and blood or breath tests all railway

crew members and other covered employees “directly in-

volved” in certain incidents and specified safety breaches.

Like the Department’s program, the FRA regulations

provide for two types of urine testing, a screening test

and a confirmatory test utilizing gas chromatography /

mass spectrometry methods, before a sample is deemed

positive for the presence of drugs.

The Court identified several governmental interests

advanced by testing railroad crew members who perform

“duties fraught with... risks of injury.” Skinner, 109

S.Ct. at 1419. First, testing would promote the compel-

ling interest of detecting regular drug users, who, the

Court determined, could ‘cause great human loss before

any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors

or others.” Jd. Second, “the FRA regulations supply an

effective means of deterring employees engaged in safety-

sensitive tasks from using controlled substances or alco-

hol in the first place.” Jd. Thus, because testing was

precipitated by “a triggering event, the timing of which

no employee can predict with certainty,” testing would

likely serve as an effective deterrent against on-duty

impairment. Jd. at 1420. Finally, post-incident testing

results would “help railroads obtain invaluable informa-

tion about the causes of major accidents... and to take

appropriate measures to safeguard the general public.”

Id. at 1420 (citations omitted).

We find this analysis fully applicable in the present

case. While it is true that the regulations sustained in

13a

Skinner required testing only after a triggering event

and in a medical environment, we do not find that either

of these facts compels “a fundamentally different analysis

from that pursued by the Supreme Court.” Harmon, 878

F.2d at 489. While it is true that random testing may

increase employee anxiety and the invasion of subjective

expectations of privacy, it also limits discretion in the

selection process® and presumably enhances drug-use

deterrence. Neither can we conclude that testing in a

medical environment is a sine qua non of constitutionally

permissible urine testing, for as even appellants admit,

the regulations approved in Von Raab provided for sam-

ples to be collected by non-medical personnel in a public

restroom. See Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 4.

We also find applicable the reasoning in our decision

in Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340-41 (D.C.Cir.

1987), vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones, U.S.

——, 109 S.Ct. 1633, 104 L.Ed.2d 149 (1989), replaced,

878 F.2d 1476 (D.C.Cir.1989). Appellee, a school bus

attendant in the District of Columbia Public School Sys-

tem’s transportation branch, challenged the School Sys-

tem’s employee drug-testing program. We found the

criteria for testing reasonable, though we questioned the

validity of testing procedures on grounds no longer vi-

able in light of the later Supreme Court opinions. After

the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in light of

Skinner and Von Raab, we recently reinstated our orig-

inal judgment after appropriately modifying the accom-

panying opinion. In so doing, we noted that “the School

System clearly had a legitimate justification” for testing

“employees involved in the transportation of handicapped

children.” Jones, 878 F.2d 1476, Judgment Order at 2.

Given our conclusion in Jones that the governmental

interest in the health and safety of handicapped children

9 Order 3910.1 requires that each Category I employee “have an

equal statistical chance for being selected for testing within a speci-

fied time frame.” Order 3910.1, Ch. III, §4(A), J.A. at 29.

14a

reasonably warranted testing employees who daily trans-

port them, we are hard pressed to develop any theory

that would prevent the testing of covered employees in

the present case. If anything, the safety justifications

presented here are, in the main, more compelling.

As we noted earlier, appellants have singled out for

attack the inclusion of three categories of employees:

motor vehicle operators, FRA hazardous material inspec-

tors, and FAA aircraft mechanics. See Brief for Appel-

lants at 28-29; cf. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at

1 n.1. The District Court concluded that the inclusion

of these employees was “fully justified within the pro-

gram.” Dole, 670 F.Supp. at 448. We agree. The record

reveals that the assigned duties of a hazardous material

inspector require exposure “to poisonous, explosive, and

highly flammable commodities that could be .. . sud-

denly ignited by improper handling.” J.A. at 771. Fur-

thermore, an FRA inspector may be required to inspect

hazardous materia] shipments and is required to verify

proper packaging, rail operating restrictions, and han-

dling and loading requirements. J.A. at 466. Appellants

have offered nothing to rebut these claims. Ensuring

that these employees—whose exclusive assigned duties

are so intimately related to the prevention of public harm

—are certifiably drug-free is, in our view, a reasonable

precaution against the occurrence of the feared harm.

While the danger posed by a drug-impaired inspector may

be of somewhat lesser proportions than that posed by one

who has “routine access to dangerous nuclear power

facilities,” Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1419, it closely paral-

lels the risk posed by drug-impaired Army guards sta-

tioned near explosive munitions. See Cheney, 884 F.2d

at 612. Ultimately, “the public should not bear the risk

that employees who may suffer from impaired perception

and judgment” occupy positions where they are so re-

sponsible for protecting the public. See Von Raab, 109

S.Ct. at 1393.

rea lca

15a

Appellants also challenge the inclusion of an FAA

aircraft mechanic who inspects and maintains FAA air-

craft. We need look no further than our recent opinion

in Cheney for guidance on this classification. In sustain-

ing the Army’s testing of air traffic controllers, pilots,

and aviation mechanics, we noted that “[{a] single drug-

related lapse by any covered employee could have irre-

versible and calamitous consequences.” Cheney, at 610.

The record in the present case amply supports the same

conclusion. Covered mechanics perform pre-flight inspec-

tions and overhauls, and install and maintain electronic

instrumentation and other flight control equipment. J.A.

at 772. Given that a drug-related lapse could portend

irreparable injury to life and property, mandatory, ran-

dem urinalysis does not appear to be an unreasonable

means of detecting and preventing that risk. See also

Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at 1895 & n. 3; United States v.

Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir.1974) (reasonable-

ness of search depends on balancing need for search

against offensiveness of intrusion); Cheney, 884 F.2d at

610.

The third challenged position, encompassing one-fifth

of one percent of the total number of Category I em-

ployees, is motor vehicle operator. See J.A. at 262. As

their sole argument of unconstitutionality, appellants

point to a union member driver whose exclusive duties

entail driving a mail van, and ask: “Is this a vital posi-

tion requiring compromise of the 4th Amendment for an

overriding public safety concern?” Brief for Appellants

at 28.

10 While appellants have not argued that testing is unnecessary

because of the availability of less intrusive alternatives, the sole

mechanic-affiant on which they rely asserted that each mechanic’s

work is reviewed by a “Quality Assurance Inspector” or “another

certified mechanic.” Even if the assertion rises to the level of a

properly submitted argument, it would fail for essentially the same

reasons we rejected the claim in Cheney that drug testing was

unnecessary in light of proscriptions already in force. See Cheney,

at 610-11; see also Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1419 n. 9.

16a

As noted by the District Court, strong safety interests

support the testing of most Department motor vehicle

operators, who are responsible for, inter alia, the trans-

portation of visiting foreign dignitaries and key Depart-

ment officials and the operation of passenger-laden shuttle

buses. See 670 F.Supp. at 448 n. 10; J.A. at 851-52.

Shuttle buses transport as many as 1,200 passengers each

day. J.A. at 852. Thus, obvious safety interests support

the testing of the majority of the Department’s motor

vehicle operators. Appellants’ objection to the inclusion

of motor vehicle operators may in part be rooted in their

mistaken understanding of the Department’s rationale for

testing, which counsel for appellants incorrectly sfm-

marized as follows: The “motor vehicle can run into a

school bus carrying 312 diplomats, cause an international

incident and can then cause a war.” Transcript of Pro-

ceedings at 9 (Oct. 20, 1988).

The inclusion of a mail van operator does not demon-

strate the unreasonableness of the plan. Initially, all

drivers are subject to extensive background investiga-

tions and have either a top secret or secret security clear-

ance. J.A. at 852. Von Raab teaches that the govern-

ment may properly make urine testing a requirement for

those who are “likely to gain access to sensitive informa-

tion.” 109 S.Ct. at 1397. Thus, the Court concluded that

employees seeking promotions to positions that would re-

quire handling classified information may be required to

submit to the Custom Service’s tests. Although the Court

did not delimit the boundaries of “sensitive information,”

nor define what categories of information would be suffi-

ciently sensitive to warrant mandatory drug testing,”

it bears noting that there is no indication in the Court’s

opinion that testing should be limited to those with the

highest security classification.

11 There are three levels of security classification: confidential,

secret, and top secret. See 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 6, 1982).

17a

In Harmon, we recognized that whatever the bound-

aries of “truly sensitive” information, top secret mate-

rials “lie at its very core.” Harmon, 878 F.2d at 492

(emphasis added). Accordingly we sustained the Depart-

ment of Justice’s program mandating drug testing for

personnel with top secret clearances. Jd. at 491-492. At

the same time, however, we rejected Justice’s claim that

its interest in protecting confidential but unclassified

information reasonably warranted the random testing of

all prosecutors and all personnel with access to grand

jury information. As we said there: “[{Wle believe that

the term [truly sensitive information] cannot include all

information which is confidential or closed to public view.

. The fact that the employees covered by the Depart-

ment’s drug testing regulations deal with confidential

information .. . does not distinguish them from .. . gov-

ernment employees generally.” Jd. at 492 (emphasis in

original).

In the present case, we believe that faithful application

of the Supreme Court’s teachings in Von Raab and our

own precedent command that we find that the govern-

ment’s interest in protecting truly sensitive information

from one who “ ‘under compulsion of circumstances or for

other reasons, . . . might compromise [such] informa-

tion,” Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at 1396 (quoting Depart-

ment of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, ——, 108 S.Ct.

818, 824, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988)), outweighs the privacy

interests of tested mail van operators. Their assigned

duties require both the acquisition of a secret or top

secret security clearance and regular access to classified

information. Moreover, all motor vehicle operators are

subject to background investigations, J.A. at 852, which,

the Supreme Court has clearly stated, ‘may be expected

to diminish [the employees’] expectations of privacy in

respect to a urinalysis test.” Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at

1397 (citation omitted). Each of the above-noted fea-

tures severely reduces motor vehicle operators’ expecta-

18a

tions of privacy, and, therefore, mandatory, random

urinalysis constitutes only a modest additional privacy

intrusion.

We also find significant the fact that employees in

each of the three covered positions work in settings other

than the “more traditional office environments,” Von

Raab, 109 S.Ct. at 1395, where “drug use is, presumably,

more easily detected by means other than urine testing,”

Harmon, 878 F.2d at 488. In short, “[t]he operational

realities of the workplace,” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.

709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1498, 9 4L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (plu-

rality opinion), are such that “a diminished expectation

of privacy attaches to information relating to the physi-

cal condition of covered employees.” Skinner, 109 S.Ct.

at 1419.

IV.

Apart from their claims of constitutional error, appel-

lants maintain that the District Court erred in granting

summary judgment, as there remained outstanding is-

sues of material fact. On appeal from an order granting

summary judgment, we review the record de novo to

determine whether it supports that order. Riddell v.

Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1485 (D.C.

Cir.1989) ; Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Rees, 852 F.2d 595,

598 (D.C.Cir.1988). In the “run-of-the-mill civil case,”

when the defendant moves for summary judgment, we en-

quire whether a “fairminded jury could return a verdict

for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505,

2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the record, viewed in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals

no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the mov-

ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,

summary judgment shall be granted in its favor. Id. at

250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. See FED.R.CIv.P. 56(c¢).

The Supreme Court has indicated that the allocation of

the substantive burden of proof informs our decision on

19a

the propriety of the grant of summary judgment. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct.

2548, 25538, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Celotex instructs

that summary judgment is properly entered “against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (emphasis added)

(nonmoving party bore ultimate burden of proof at

trial). See also Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d

1029, 1032 (D.C.Cir.1988) (applying Celotex-enunciated

rule where nonmoving party bore initial burden of pro-

duction, but not burden of proof).

There is surprisingly little authority discussing the

allocation of the burden of proof in drug-testing cases.

Although neither Von Raab nor Skinner directly ad-

dressed this question, Von Raab may hint that the bur-

den rests with the government to prove reasonableness:

“lWle believe that the Government has demonstrated

that its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders

and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations”

of personnel who interdict illegal drugs and carry fire-

arms. 109 S.Ct. at 1396. Such a conclusion would be

consistent with the array of criminal cases placing the

burden of demonstrating the lawfulness of a Fourth

Amendment encounter on the government. See, e.g.,

Unted States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct.

1870, 1878, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (government has

burden of proving consent to accompany government

agents); United States v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436, 1441

(10th Cir.1989) (“When a search ... is challenged as

violative of the Fourth Amendment, the burden is on

the government to prove its validity.”) (citations

omitted); United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341,

1349 (11th Cir.1984) (burden on government to prove

reasonable suspicion to justify strip search).

20a

On the other hand, in a civil action brought pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, it appears that the plaintiff should-

ers the burden of proving each element essential to his

ease, including the illegality of the government conduct

in question. See, e.g., Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507,

1512-138 & n. 7 (ilth Cir.1987) (placing on plaintiff

burden of demonstrating unreasonableness of drug-testing

scheme) ; Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d 1172, 1176

(7th Cir.1986) (discussing relative burdens in relation

to collateral estoppel) ; Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d

879, 888 (7th Cir.1984) (same).'* By the same token,

in the context of the civil forfeiture provisions of the

Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881(d), where

the government is the plaintiff, it bears the burden of

“establishing the lawfulness of the Fourth Amendment

encounter. See, e.g., Boas v. Smith, 786 F.2d 605, 609

(4th Cir.1986) (burden on government to show probable

cause to believe that the property is linked to illegal

activity); United States v. United States Currency

$31,828, 760 F.2d 228, 230 (8th Cir.1985) (same).

We need not resolve the question of the allocation of

the burden of proving the reasonableness vel non of the

testing regime, for even if we assume that the burden

rests with the government, we conclude that the govern-

ment established that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact that it must prove at trial and that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Among the issues identified by appellants as material,

and therefore preclusive of summary judgment, was the

accuracy of the urinalysis testing procedures used by

the Department. See Statement of Genuine Issues of

Material Fact 3, at 1-2, J.A. at 65-66. Inspection of the

12 These cases appear fully consistent with the line of cases under

section 1983 which place upon the defendant the burden of establish-

ing the defense of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987);

Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 263 ¢ D.C. Cir. 1987).

2la

referenced portions of the record reveals that the parties

did in fact disagree over the accuracy of the testing

procedures: while the Department contended that the

GC/MS technique could be 100% accurate, appellants

maintained that testing could produce an error rate of

one percent. See J.A. at 143; see also Reply to Defend-

ant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary

Injunction at 11. While in some contexts such a dis-

agreement might be sufficient to create a triable question

of faci, such is not the case here. First, because this is a

facial attack on the Department’s program, we decide

only “whether the tests contemplated by the regulations

ean ever be conducted.” Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1421 n. 10

(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861,

1885, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)) (emphasis in original).

Furthermore, the facts demonstrate “that the tests at

issue here are accurate in the overwhelming majority of

eases.”” Id. As such, Skinner suggests that, even when

viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, the facts

do not create an issue for trial, and summary judgment

was not on this basis improperly granted.

Appellants also identified as a genuine issue of ma-

terial fact the extent of drug use among Department

employees. See Statement of Genuine Issues of Material

Fact B, at 3, J.A. at 67. The referenced portion of the

record reveals that the declarant knew of no drug use

among the fifteen motor vehicle operators with whom

he worked. See J.A. at 262. Even if we were to assume

that the declaration sufficiently demonstrates a genuine

disagreement as to the extent of Department-wide drug

use, the claim would not create a triable issue of fact.

Von Raab indicates that a history of intra-agency drug

use is not an essential ingredient in establishing the

reasonableness of a testing regime. There it was con-

tended that the Customs Service’s program was unrea-

sonable because all but a few of the tested employees

were entirely innocent of wrongdoing. The Court re-

23a

hol, and other personal problems who have not been iden-

tified or tested.” Jd. The OIG also concluded that “FAA

does not know the seriousness of the problem or number

of employees because it does not have an effective drug

and alcohol policy and a strongly endorsed employee as-

sistance program.” Jd. Accordingly, the OIG recom-

mended that the FAA develop and implement a drug

screening and testing program. /d. at 788.

The FAA’s response was mixed. Rather ‘nan flatly

disputing the OIG’s conclusions, the FAA responded that

the OIG report was “unbalanced” because it omitted

“positive” information and was based on “unsupported

data.” J.A. at 802. Furthermore, the FAA did not deny

that some of its employees might be impaired by drug

use; it said only that “[flor the size of the FAA work

force” illicit drug use was “relatively” minimal. Id. at

803. Thus, the FAA concluded that the OIG report

“would more accurately describe the situation if it was

changed from ‘The FAA has .. .’ to ‘The FAA may

have....’” Id. at 802. In light of the sharp increase in

the number of Departmental employees entering drug

counseling programs in the years succeeding the OIG

teport (from 16 in 1984 to 133 in 1986), many of whom

were FAA employees (45 air traffic controllers in one

vear!, J.A. at 765-66, we cannot accept appellants’ con-

tention that the Department was acting upon no evidence.

From this vantage, far from demonstrating the unrea-

sonableness of the Department's action, the Department’s

response to the OIG’s report is more logically viewed as

a hallmark of responsible management.

Appellants also argue that they were wrongly denied

a trial because a genuine issue of fact remained as to

the correlation between a positive urinalysis test result

and current drug impairment. See Statement of Genuine

Issues of Material Fact C, at 3, J.A. at 67. The mater-

iality of such a fact is established, appellants argue, by

24a

the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that testing be

able to detect only job-impairing drug use.

Although the District Court concluded that the De-

partment “presented proof that drug use, at the level

sought by testing generally impairs the normal function-

ing of employees,” Dole, 670 F.Supp. at 448, the Depart-

ment admits that “|t]he district court did overstate the

principal thrust” of its evidence. Brief for Appellee at

20. Appellants’ first contention—that the judgment of

the District Court must be reversed because it accepted

a proposition which is scientifically incorrect—overlooks

the principle that our review of a grant of summary

judgment is de novo. Their alternative claim—that the

issue of the relationship between off-duty drug usage and

on-duty impairment is genuinely disputed and material,

and therefore precluded the granting of a motion for

summary judgment—while more significant, must also

fall.

It should initially be noted that the Department stip-

ulated that urinalysis tests do not necessarily measure

actual physical or mental impairment. Se Defendant's

Response to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Genuine Issues of

Material Fact at 7, J.A. at 74. Thus, we cannot conclude

that any factual disagreement precluded summary judg-

ment. Nor can we conclude that summary judgment was

improperly granted as a matter of law. As we explained

in Cheney, the Supreme Court’s opinions in Skinner and

Von Raab convince us that the failure of a testing tech-

nique to measure actual impairment does not necessarily

impugn its legitimacy. Cheney, 844 F.2d at 609-610.

In Skinner, the Ninth Circuit concluded, as appellants

contend herein, that drug testing was constitutionally

‘nfirm because of its inability to differentiate drug use

that results in on-duty impairment from that which does

not. Railway Labor Exe cutives’ Association v. Burnle ¥,

839 F.2d 575. 588 (9th Cir.1988), rev'd sub nom. Skin-

USS.

ner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association,

25a

) ——, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). The Su-

| preme Court rejected this view, in part because it over-

looked the principle that relevant evidence need only

make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and

in part because the regulations “are designed not only to

discern impairment but also to deter it.” Skinner, 109

S.Ct. at 1421.

Von Raab, where the Court sustained as reasonable the

Customs Service’s practice of urine testing those whose

post-promotion duties would require carrying a firearm,

also strongly suggests that the inability of the testing

procedures to differentiate on- and off-duty drug impair-

ment is not determinative of the regime’s constitutional-

ity. See Cheney, 884 F.2d at 609-10. As was true in

Von Raab, the agency’s responsibility to “ensur([e]

against the creation of th[e] dangerous risk’ posed by

drug-using covered employees, 109 S.Ct. at 1393, war-

rants reasonable measures to detect drug use. Thus, we

must reject, as we rejected in Cheney, the contention

that urinalysis testing is unconstitutional because of its

failure to differentiate on- and off-duty drug impairment.

884 F.2d at 609-610. Accordingly, the District Court did

not for this reason err in granting the Department’s

summary judgment motion.

Appellants also contend that a trial was necessary to

determine whether drug use manifests itself in signs of

impairment. See Statement of Genuine Issues of Ma-

terial Fact 9, at 2, J.A. at 66. Apps lants claim that the

detectability of impairment is material to the reason-

ableness of drug testing because it “directly affects the

governmental interest portion of the Fourth Amend-

ment.” Brief for Appellants at 48. We agree that in

certain circumstances the detectability of impairment by

means other than urine testing may be a relevant con-

sideration in determining the reasonableness of a drug-

testing plan. Thus, the Von Raab Court credited the

fact that it was “not feasible” to subject interdiction

ed

26a

agents or other field employees “to the kind of day-to-

day scrutiny that is the norm in Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at

1395. In Harmon, we concluded that the Court viewed

employment in a traditional office environment as rele-

vant because in such circumstances “drug use is, pre-

sumably, more easily detected by means other than urine

testing.”” Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489.

In the context of the present case, appellants have not

even argued that it would be practical or feasible to sub-

ject covered employees to the sort of day-to-day scrutiny

such that testing is unnecessary. We are unable to dis-

cern any other materiality in the ascertainment of

whether drug users display indicia of impairment. In

any event, we could not find that the reasonableness of

the Department’s plan “ ‘necessarily or invariably

turn{s]’”’ on the existence of less intrusive alternatives

to testing. See Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1419 n. 9 (quoting

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S.Ct. 2605,

2610, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983)). In the present case, no

less than in Skinner, the “insistence on less drastic alter-

natives would require us to second-guess the reasonable

conclusions drawn by the’’ Department. Jd. Moreover,

employees who are subject to testing in this category

“can cause great human loss before any signs of impair-

ment become noticeable to supervisors or others.” See id.

at 1419; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.

In short, appellants have offered no basis on which we

can find that summary judgment was improperly

granted.

V.

As to appellants’ statutory claims, we agree with the

District Court that they “are not significant.” Dole. 670

F.Supp. at 447 n. 6. First, appellants contend that the

Department’s drug-testing program discriminates against

“handicapped” persons in violation of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. $$ 701-7951 (1982 & Supp. V

1988). The Act protects an “otherwise qualified handi-

27a

capped individual” from discrimination “solely by reason

of his handicap.” Jd. § 794. It should surprise no one,

including appellants, that we will not in the context of

a facial challenge to the Department’s drug-testing pro-

gram conclude that the District Court erred in not adopt-

ing a rationale dependent on the theory that every poten-

tial employee testing positive for drug use is an “other-

wise qualified handicapped” person. Should a day arise

when a handicapped individual within the protection of

the Rehabilitation Act is disadvantaged by this program

and presents a claim in a concrete factual setting, that

will be soon enough to consider the effects of that statute

on the provisions of the testing program. See Doe v. New

York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1981) (con-

cluding that plaintiff must bear the ultimate burden of

showing “that in spite of the handicap he is qualified

and... that he is at least as well qualified as other

applicants.) ; Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716

F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir.1983) (reviewing plaintiff’s bur-

den of proof). See generally, School Bd. of Nassau

County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 n. 14, 107 S.Ct.

1123, 1130 n. 14, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987) (citing with

approval Strathie and Doe).

Appellants’ other statutory claim, based on the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $$ 551, et seg. (1982),

is hardly more substantial. Appellants argue that the

Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously by institu-

ting a drug-testing program that tested for the five

above-lised categories of drugs, but not for alcohol, “the

drug which is most abused.” Brief for Appellants at 45.

It has never been the law that the government is for-

bidden from addressing a problem unless it addresses all

other problems of similar magnitude. See, e.g., William-

son v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed.

963 (1955). In short, we conclude that the District

Court did not err in its summary disposition of the non-

constitutional claims.

28a

VI.

In their facial challenge to the Department’s imple-

mentation of mandatory, random urine testing, appel-

lants have challenged the program in toto. They have

specifically called into question the inclusion of only three

categories of employees. Although we explicitly requested

in our order for supplemental briefing that appellants

consider the extent to which the testing of the various

job classifications being considered warranted differing

treatment than that in Skinner and Von Raab, appellants

did not alter their previous course. We have found che

privacy interests of employees occupying the three spe-

cifically challenged positions outweighed by the Depart-

ment’s compelling interests in preventing drug _ use

among such personnel. Moreover, we have concluded that

the program is supported by sufficiently compelling cir-

cumstances to justify the invasions of privacy entailed

by conducting such searches without any measure of in-

dividualized suspicion. For these reasons, and the others

stated above, we hold that the mandatory, suspicionless

testing of Category I personnel is reasonable and con-

sistent with the Fourth Amendment, the APA, and the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Accordingly, the judgment

of the District Court is

Affirmed.

29a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civ. A. No. 87-1815

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

AFL-CIO, et al.,

a Plaintiffs,

¥>.

ELIZABETH H. DOLE, Secretary,

Department of Transportation,

Defendant.

Sept. 30, 1987

Mark D. Roth, Joe Goldberg, Washington, D.C. for

plaintiffs.

William W. Osborne, Jr., John R. Mooney, Washing-

ton, D.C., for amicus curiae, Nat. Air Traffic Controllers.

Robert Cynkar, Richard Greenberg, Dept. of Justice,

Richard K. Willard, Wayne Vance, Robert Chesnut,

Dept. of Transp., Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

GESELL, District Judge.

This is a suit to enjoin the Department of Transporta-

tion (“DOT”) from continuing to carry out its random

drug testing plan’ developed under authority of Execu-

1“Drug-Free Departmental Workplace,” U.S. Dep’t of Transpor-

tation, June 29, 1987.

30a

tive Order 12,564 captioned “Drug-Free Federal Work-

place.” Exec.Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987).

Plaintiff (“AFGE”) is a labor union representing cer-

tain employees subject to the DOT plan which was an-

nounced June 29, 1987, and went into effect September 8,

1987.

DOT has moved for summary judgment and in oppos-

ing. AFGE has moved for a preliminary injunction,

which in turn is opposed by DOT. Extensive papers

have been filed and all issues were fully argued.”

The DOT plan under attack here supplements other

DOT drug programs for testing certain employees at

time of employment and at intervals scheduled well in

advance by providing for random urinalysis testing of

certain employees in sensitive positions.* Only employees

2 The chronology of this litigation is as follows: AFGE filed the

complaint on July 7, 1987 and DOT promptly filed an answer on

July 15, 1987. On July 30, DOT moved for summary judgment and

AFGE obtained an extension to respond by August 21, with DOT

subsequently replying on August 31.

On August 6, AFGE was advised that if a motion for preliminary

injunction were to be filed it could in the Court’s absence be heard

by the motions judge before Labor Day. AFGE did not file its

motion for preliminary injunction until August 21, when respond-

ing to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. DOT promptly

responded in opposition on August 31, and AFGE replied on Sep-

tember 11. Oral argument was heard on Monday, September 14,

1987.

3 Employees in these positions are chosen for random testing

through haphazard neutral computer selection. At varying times

“from month to month” a list of employees to be tested is randomly

selected. Declaration of Melissa J. Allen, Deputy Assistant Secre-

tary for Administration of the Dept. of Transportation, Defend-

ant’s Exhibit J at para. 12. All employees subject to random testing

have an equal statistical chance to be chosen for each testing list

without regard to previous selections. Jd. This type of testing is

unannounced and could occur on any scheduled workday, apparently

once a month, although the number to be involved is not clear from

the record. See “Drug-Free Departmental Workplace,’”’ U.S. Dep’t

of Transportation, ch. III, § 4, p. III-2, June 29, 1987.

3la

having critical jobs and falling in Category I are sub-

ject to this random testing. These employees are in jobs

: concerned with public health, safety, national security,

and law enforcement; jobs which involve duties calling

for the highest degree of trust and confidence. Each

critical position subject to random testing is supported

by a written justification statement describing why the

job is critical and what would happen if an incumbent

used illegal drugs. These justifications are subject to re-

view and are monitored by an Assistant Secretary. Jobs

from GS-4 to GS-14 and equivalents are covered, thus

including both union and non-union supervisory em-

ployees.

Ninety-four percent of the employees covered hold

aviation-related positions such as air traffic controllers,

electronic technicians, aviation safety inspectors and air-

chaft mechanics. In addition, fire fighters, nurses, rail-

road safety inspectors, armed law enforcement officers

and “top secret” security clearance personnel are among

those subject to random testing. Testing is under con-

siderate procedures refiecting regard for personal pri-

vacy.* No criminal use will be made of the results and

no discipline other than an offer of rehabilitation service

will occur if a first-time random urinalysis test is posi-

tive.” All disciplinary actions that may occur upon fur-

4The Department testing plan is in strict accordance with the

mandatory policies and procedures outlined in the “Scientific and

Technical Guidelines for Drug Testing Programs” issued by the

Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration, Depart-

ment of Health and Human Services, on February 13, 1987 (changed

language July 20, 1987). Fed. Reg. (1987).

5 Before any official action is taken, positive test results are first

reported to the Medical Review Officer (“MRO”). The MRO, in

turn, contacts the employee and gives him or her the opportunity

to explain the test results as well as reviewing medical records sub-

mitted by the employee or any other relevant biomedical factors

necessary to determine whether there is a legitimate medical ex-

planation for the positive result. If the MRO determines that a

—VSV—< ~~

32a

ther testing are subject to the Civil Service Reform Act

of 1978. 5 U.S.C. § 1201 et seg. (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

To support its sweeping facial challenge to DOT’s ran-

dom drug testing plan, AFGE relies primarily on the

Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,® asserting that

under the facts and circumstances shown by the affida-

vits and materials filed, random testing constitutes an

unreasonable search.‘ Elaborating, the Union points,

among other things, to the admitted lack of probable

cause, the lack of indisputable evidence that drug use

always impairs employee performance, the lack of results

legitimate medical explanation exists, the test results may be re-

ported as negative. Thus, for example, an employee who uses a

spouse’s prescription medication without medical consultation for

a similar ailment and tests positive would be given the opportunity

to provide a legitimate medical explanation for the test results.

® The nonconstitutional claims are not significant. Even if a drug

user is considered handicapped, freedom from drug effects is a

proper standard governing critical jobs. See Heron v. McGuire, 803

F.2d 67 (2nd Cir. 1986) (per curiam). This has long been accepted

in these critical jobs with few exceptions and, accepting the agen-

cy’s expert’s view that drug use will injure job performance, there

is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in pursuing a drug-free work-

place for such employees through random testing. Moreover, the

tests are scientifically pointed to current drug usage (7.¢., use within

several days or hours prior to testing) and do not offend The Drug

Abuse Office and Treatment Act. 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-1(c)(1) (Supp.

III 1985). Under the test laid down by this Circuit, probable cause

is not required where a governmental employee’s drug usage might

endanger public health or safety and criminal sanctions following

a positive test are not contemplated. See Nat'l Fed’n of Fed. Em-

ployees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942-43 & n. 12 (D.C. Cir.

1987).

7 There were no formal rule-making proceedings since the plan

involves an internal personnel policy and AFGE has undertaken no

formal discovery. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1982) (notice of pro-

posed rulemaking shall be published “except to the extent that is

involved— ... (2) a matter relating to agency management or

personnel .. .”); Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

ES EO Oe ee

33a

procured in other non-random testing and the excessive

intrusion upon privacy which arbitrarily results.

The Court clearly has jurisdiction to consider this con-

stitutional challenge. There is no question that manda-

tory random urine testing is a search within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment under the controlling law of

this Circuit, as the guiding precedent, Nat’l Fed’n of

Fed’l Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C.

Cir.1987), makes clear. However, the Amendment only

prohibits “unreasonable” searches, and accordingly the

focus of the drug testing case, like other Fourth Amend-

ment testing cases, is factual, requiring the Court to

balance factors bearing on reasonableness.*

National Federation of Federal Employees v. Wein-

berger. 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.1987), deals with a uri-

nalysis drug testing program involving civilian employees

of the Department of Defense. The Court emphasized

that the balancing function concerns the ‘‘employees’ rea-

sonable expectations of privacy’’ considered against the

‘“ “government’s interest in the efficient and proper opera-

tions of the work place.’” Jd. at 942 (citations omitted).

As to the employees’ privacy expectations, relevant fac-

tors include the nature and quality of the intrusion or

search and whether employees have had reasonable ad-

vance notice and, of course, familiarity with testing

safeguards and procedures of the plan after its effective

date. In this situation 60 days’ advance notice was given.

Moreover, most employees subject to the random testing

have had their urine tested for drug use at various times

during their employment at scheduled intervals. The

random testing is obviously somewhat more intrusive

than the scheduled testing since it occurs in the midst of

8 See, e.g., Nat’l Employees Treasury Union v. Von Raab, 816

F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1362 (8th

Cir. 1987); Local 1812, American Fed’n of Gov't Employees v. Dep't

of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).

34a

a day’s work, and necessarily focuses special attention

on a particular employee whose name crops up through

chance computer selection.” Testing itself is discreet and

private.

On the other side of the balance the Court must con-

sider issues raised in the litigation which go to the gov-

ernment’s justification for its random testing plan.

These involve: considering whether the search was jus-

tified at its inception. whether there are reasonable

grounds to suspect work related drug use will be uncov-

ered, whether those subjected to the test, generally speak-

ing, are only those who in fact occupy critical positions

affecting safety and security and whether use of illegal

drugs is likely to impair a critical employee’s work

efficiency.

AFGE contends:

(1) that the true purpose of the testing is law en-

forcement, not safety and security:

(2) that based on past experience the testing will not

prove productive:

(3) that many subjected to random testing are not, in

fact, in critical jobs; and

(4) that recent drug-use, medically speaking, cannot

necessarily be shown to affect employment efficiency.

These positions are not supported in the factual record

before the Court insofar as they may have legal relevance

to the challenged testing personnel policy announced.

They are considered seriatim below:

(i) No ulterior motive was established. DOT simply

realized that illegal drug use has not been eliminated by

® This possible “shock” aspect can be minimized if the random,

nonspecific nature of the testing is explained clearly at the time it

occurs, emphasizing the lack of specific cause both to the employee

selected and others in the workplace who become aware of the test-

ing.

2 ed FNL.

35a

criminal law enforcement and felt an obligation to pro-

tect public safety and to gain confidence for its programs.

Tests are not used for criminal law enforcement pur-

poses.

(ii) The fact that testing after substantial advance

notice has not resulted in many positive urine samples

bears little or no relationship to what may occur from

random testing. The prospect of a random test may well

itself be prophylactic and scheduled testing gives no

measure of the random programs effectiveness.

(iii) AFGE presented no proof in support of its claim

that noncritical jobs are involved. The three examples

used by plaintiff in its brief proved fully justified within

the program.’”

10 AFGE cites, in cursory fashion, three examples in its brief of

positions within Category I it claims are not safety or security

sensitive—mail van opertaor, Federal Railroad Administration

Hazardous Material Inspector and FAA aircraft mechanic. Affi-

davits from Operating Element heads who must file job category

justification statements effectively refute these contentions. Hazard-

ous materials inspectors are “exposed to poisonous, explosive, and

highly flammable commodities that could be leaking from rail cars

or containers, or suddenly ignited by improper handling.” Declara-

tion of Melissa J. Allen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administra-

tion of the Department of Transportation, Defendant’s Exhibit J

at para. 11(d). Aircraft mechanies in the Department’s Coast

Guard and FAA perform a variety of tasks involving the installa-

tion, inspection and maintenance of aviation equipment and “failure

to perform properly any of these duties could result in an aircraft

crash.” Jd. at para. 11(e). Finally, as to the motor vehicle operators

in the Department, all operators are subject to background investi-

gations and have either a “Top Secret” or “Secret” security clear-

ance. Declaration cf Gary McCullough, Deputy Chief, Personal

Property Division, Office of Administrative Services and Property

Management, Defendant’s Exhibit N at para. 4. These drivers per-

form tasks including: transportation of visiting foreign dignitaries

and key DOT officials, carrying classified documents and driving

shuttle buses—all either safety or security related duties. Jd.

36a

(iv) DOT presented proof that drug use, at the level

sought by testing generally impairs the normal function-

ing of employees.

Thus, on balance, the preponderance of the proof sup-

ports the reasonableness of the random plan. DOT's duty

to assure the integrity of its sensitive aviation and other

critical jobs and to protect the public safety is undis-

puted. The plan reflects a high degree of concern for

employee privacy interests and is carefvlly tailored to

assure a minimum of intrusion. The plan must be sus-

tained against this generalized facial attack.

There is no proof of any results from a single random

test under the plan or indeed that one has occurred. The

written justification for each job in the critical category

was not produced by either side. Thus the broad facial

challenge to the entire plan has come to the Court in an

incomplete and untested context. Given the sparse record

and perhaps premature nature of the attack, the Court’s

conclusion leaves open the way for a later, more specific

challenge clearly directed to a job category or to the

beneficial or ineffective nature of the random program

after its effectiveness can be measured by ample ex-

perience.

In view of the limited form in which this matter has

been presented and to guarantee more informed review

should a more specific, discrete claim be later advanced

to some aspect of the plan as it develops, the Secretary

shail maintain full records of each random test and sub-

sequent personnel actions taken and it will be highly ad-

visable to develop more precise procedures for informing

any individual selected for a random test while safe-

guarding the employee against any possibility of misun-

derstanding in his immediate work place as to the cir-

cumstances under which the particular employee has been

singled out.

AFGE has failed to support its challenge to the ran-

dom drug testing plan or to demonstrate that the individ-

37a

ual plaintiffs should be exempted by reason of the na-

ture of their duties. The random urine drug testing plan

is reasonable on its face and must be sustained at this

stage. Summary judgment is granted for the Secretary

and AFGE’s motion for preliminary junction is denied.

The complaint is dismissed. An appropriate Order is

filed herewith.

ORDER

Upon consideration of plaintiffs’ motion for prelimi-

nary injunction and defendant's motion for summary

judgment, the responses thereto and the entire record,

and for the reasons set forth in the Court’s Memorandum

filed this day, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary

judgment is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that to facilitate any subsequent factual

challenge to any aspect of the random testing, the Court

directs that the Department of Transportation maintain

full records of each random test and any subsequent per-

sonnel actions taken as a result of such testing pending

further Order of the Court: and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for preliminary in-

junction is denied.

APPENDIX (¢

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39a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRUG-FREE DEPARTMENTAL WORKPLACE

Page

CHAPTER I—GENERAL PROVISIONS... [42a]

| Section 1. Purpose ....................... - [42a]

| Section 2. Policy... tt [42a]

| Section 3. Coverage... : [43a]

Section 4. References... [43a]

Section 5. Background... ae [45a]

Section 6. Kesponsibilities “ [46a]

Section 7. Medical Review Officer (MRO) [46a]

Section 8. Drug Program Coordinators........... [47a]

Section 9. Drug Use Determination...._...-----..----« [49a]

CHAPTER II—DRUG AWARENESS . [50a]

Section 1. Drug Awareness. . [50a]

CHAPTER III—DRUG TESTING [51a]

Section 1. Policy............. Seen [51a]

Section 2. General Provisions .. {51a}

Section 3. Categories of Employees [51a]

Section 4. Types of Testing [52a]

A. Random Testing . [52a]

B. Periodic Testing .... [53a]

C. Reasonable Suspicion Testing [53a]

D. Pre-employment’ Pre-appointment __ Test-

ing slides . {54a}

E. Accident or Unsafe Practice Testing [54a]

F. Voluntary Testing [54a]

G. Follow-up Testing [54a]

40a

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Section 5. Notification to Employees Subject to

Certain Types of Testing ...............

Section 6. Notification to Applications for Posi-

tions Subject to Testing ..................

action J, COROCUROUe, TRICO vncncccecksostesectsncvctetscvorsccnces

Section 8. Specimen Collection Process ...............

Coen OE CI wacikcrceckdcesacnsetemececstalnanc

B. Balance of Individual Privacy and Speci-

nA MELON RETR aon Ord nara cee

C. Collection Procedures ....... SRE A Ln res eA

Section 9. Laboratory Analysis Procedures

A. Policy Se oe ee ie EEN

B. Reporting Test Results to the MRO

C. Specimen Storage ..

D. Internal External Quality Assurance Pro-

gram ..

E. Independent Testing

Section 10. Reporting Test Results

Section 11. Range of Drugs

CHAPTER IV—REHABILITATION

Section 1. General

Section 2. Employee Assistance Program ....

Section 3. Rehabilitation Abatement Selected

Section 4. Cost

Section 5. Self-referral 0.0000...

Section 6. Reassignment to Other Duties .

CHAPTER V—CONFIDENTIALITY

Section 1.

Policy

Page

4la

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

Section 2. Procedures to Protect Confidentiality.. [69a]

CHAPTER VI—DISCIPLINARY ACTION ............. [71a]

Section 1. General ............... Fat ne ee [7la]

Section 2. Disciplinary Procedures... [72a]

CHAPTER VII—EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PRO-

GRAM . SOE)

Section 1. Policy... paeibedeseptecvece Te

Section 2. Assessment and Referral...............,s«&(73a}

A. Developing the Referral Source... [74a]

B. Assessing Rehabilitative/Abatement Or-

ganizations and the Quality of Serv-

ices fe cncatedcamineasbaae ee , . [74a]

C. Developing Procedures for Making F Refer-

vais :...... isaac aeeckis scibe nS otostas <a

Section 3. Training ............... 1 ascii dlde imi . [Tba]

A. Goals and Objectives .....0000000000000000.............. [76a]

B. Requirements - PRES

C. Specifics of Course Outline... Oe

Section 4. Contracting for EAP Services............. {77a}

CHAPTER VIII—IMPLEMENTATION PROCE-

DURES (RESERVED)......... . [78a]

APPENDIX A—CATEGORIZATION OF EMPLOY-

EES FOR DRUG TESTING ............. [79a]

APPENDIX B—LISTING OF SCHEDULES I AND

II CONTROLLEDSUBSTANCES.. [84a]

42a

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

of Transportation

Subject: DRUG-FREE DEPARTMENTAL

WORKPLACE

Distribution: All Secretarial Offices OPI: Office of

All Operating Administrations Personnel

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. PURPOSE.

This directive transmits the Department of Trans-

portation (DOT) policy and procedures for imple-

menting Executive Order 12564, “Drug-Free Federal

Workplace.”

SECTION 2. POLICY.

It is the policy of DOT to assure the establishment

and maintenance of a drug-free workplace as in-

tended by the Executive Order and as directed by

the President in his memorandum of October 4. 1986,

to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agen-

cies. In carrying out this requirement, emphasis

will be placed on the transportation mission of our

agency and the necessity for a drug-free transpor-

tation system.

Communication to all employees of the goals and ob

jectives of a drug-free workplace is the essence of a

successful program, especially communication of the

hazards of drug use, and the availability of aid and

assistance for employees to enable them to under-

stand and deal with potential drug problems.

Equally important is the assurance to employees that

43a

their dignity and privacy will be respected as fully

as possible in reaching the Department’s goal of a

drug-free workplace.

SECTION 3. COVERAGE.

This directive will apply to all Operating Adminis-

trations within the Department, the Office of the

Secretary (OST), and the Office of Inspector General

(OIG). The term “Operating Elements” will be used

throughout this directive to refer to the aforemen-

tioned organizations.

SECTION 4. REFERENCES.

A. Authorities

1) Executive Order 12564, “Drug-Free Federal

Workplace,” September 15, 1986.

(2) Scientific and Technical Guidance for Drug

Testing Programs issued by the Alcohol.

Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administra-

tion, U.S. Department of Health and Hu-

man Services (HHS), dated February 13,

1987, and establishing mandatory criteria

for Federal civilian Arug testing programs

pursuant to Executive Order 12564.

3' Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Re-

habilitation Act of 1972, as amended (42

U.S.C. Section 290ee-1 et seq.), establishing

requirements for prevention, treatment, and

rehabilitation programs and services for

drug abuse among Federal civilian em-

ployees.

1) Federal Employee Substance Abuse Educa-

tion and Treatment Act of 1986, Public Law

(P.L.) 99-570, Title VI, requiring agency

programs to provide prevention, treatment.

(6)

(8)

(9)

44a

rehabilitation and education services to Fed-

eral civilian employees with -espect to drug

and alcohol abuse.

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, P.L. 95-

454.

5 CFR Part 792, establishing regulatory re

quirements for alcoholism and drug abuse

programs and services for Federal civilian

employees.

42 CFR Part 2, establishing requirements

for assuring the confidentiality of alcohol

and drug-abuse patient records.

The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. Section

552a), prescribing requirements governing

the maintenance of records by agencies per-

taining to the individuals and access to these

records by the individual(s) to whom they

pertain.

49 CFR Part 10, implementing the Privacy

Act of 1974, within DOT.

B. Guidance

(1)

Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) Letters

792-16 and 792-17, setting forth guidelines

for Federal civilian agencies in establishing

a drug-free Federal workplace pursuant to

Executive Order 12564.

FPM Chapter 792, Federal Health and

Counseling Programs, providing guidance to

Federal agencies in establishing alcoholism

and drug abuse programs (subchapter 5)

and employee counseling services programs

(subchapter 6) for Federal employees with

alcohol or drug problems.

45a

(3) FPM Supplement, Chapter 792-2, providing

guidance for developing and maintaining ap-

propriate prevention, treatment and reha-

bilitation programs and services for alcohol-

ism and drug abuse among Federal em-

ployees.

(4) Departmental Personnel Manual (DPM),

Chapter 792, implementing FPM Chapter

792 and FPM Supplement, Chapter 792-2,

| within DOT.

SECTION 5. BACKGROUND.

On September 15, 1986, President Reagan signed

Executive Order 12564, “Drug-Free Federal Work-

place.” In addition, on October 4, 1986, the Presi-

dent issued a memorandum to the Heads of Execu-

tive Departments and Agencies on the subject:

“Federal Initiatives for a Drug-Free America.”

As the Executive Order sets forth, illegal drug use

is having serious adverse effects on the national work

force. As a major Federal employer, DOT is con-

cerned with the well-being of its employees, the suc-

cessful accomplishment of agency missions, including

assuring complete safety in the transportation sys-

tem, and the need to maintain employee productivity.

Most importantly, it is clear that nowhere does the

private choice to use drugs have more devastating

public consequences than in the transportation sec-

tor. The maintenance of a safe and effective trans-

portation system demands, in particular, that those

DOT employees whose jobs involve significant respon-

sibilities affecting publie safety and security remain

drug-free.

In order to assure the establishment and mainte-

nance of a drug-free Federal workplace, the Execu-

tive Order mandates that: (1) Federal employees

46a

are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs,

(2) the use of illegal drugs by Federal employees,

whether on or off-duty, is contrary to the efficiency

of the service, and (3) persons who use illegal drugs

are not suitable for Federal employment.

The Head of each Executive Agency is responsible

for developing a plan for achieving the objective of

a drug-free workplace, with due consideration of the

rights of the Government, the employee, and the

general public.

SECTION 6. RESPONSIBILITIES.

SE

A. The Assistant Secretary for Administration is

responsible for the following:

(1) Ensuring the consistent implementation of

this directive throughout the Department.

(2) Establishing any further procedures which

may be necessary to carry out this directive.

(3) Designating the Department’s Medical Re-

view Officers (MRO).

B. Heads of Operating Administrations, the Assist-

ant Secretary for Administration, and the In-

spector General are responsible for ensuring the

implementation of this directive within their or-

ganizations, appointing Drug Program Coordina-

tors and Employee Assistance Program (EAP)

Coordinators, and providing for the protection of

the confidentiality of test results.

CTION 7. MEDICAL REVIEW OFFICER (MRO).

A. In accordance with HHS criteria, the MRO will

be a licensed physician with knowledge of sub-

stance abuse disorders. This officer is responsible

47a

for the receipt, review, and interpretation of all

conurmed positive test results submitted to DOT

from the drug testing laboratory. His or her re-

view will be performed prior to the transmission

of any positive test results to Drug Program

Coordinators or any management officials.

B. A positive test result does not automatically

identify an employee/applicant as an illegal drug

user. The MRO should undertake the examination

of alternative medical explanations for a posi-

tive test result. This action could include the

conduct of employee medical interviews, review

of employee medical history, or the review of any

other relevant biomedical factors. The MRO is

required to review all medical records made avail-

able by the tested employee when a confirmed

positive test could have resulted from legally pre-

scribed medication.

C. If the MRO determines there is a legitimate med-

ical explanation for the positive test result, the

MRO may deem that the result is consistent with

legal drug use and take no further action other

than reporting the test result as negative. In

addition, the MRO, based on review of inspec-

tion reports, quality control data, multiple sam-

ples, and other pertinent results may deem the

result scientifically insufficient for further ac-

tion and declare the individual’s test result as

negative.

SECTION 8. DRUG PROGRAM COORDINATORS.

A. Each Operating Element shall have Drug Pro-

gram Coordinators assigned to carry out the pur-

poses of this directive. These coordinators shall

be responsible for implementing, directing, ad-

ministering, and managing the drug program

within their respective organizations.

48a

B. Drug Program Coordinators shall serve as the

principal contact with the drug testing labora-

tory in assuring the effective operation of the

testing portion of the drug program. In carry-

ing out this responsibility, the coordinators will

perform all of the following:

(1)

Assure that supervisors and employees are

notified of the scheduling of periodic testing.

Assure that supervisors and employees are

notified of tests to be conducted on a random

basis.

Assure that applicants for Category I posi-

tions are tested prior to employment or ap-

pointment.

Arrange for reasonable suspicion testing

when directed.

Arrange for accident or unsafe practice test-

ing resulting from an on duty incident where

required and in accordance with Chapter

VIII of this directive.

Arrange for follow-up testing when required.

Arrange for voluntary testing when appro-

priate.

Consistent with confidentiality procedures

set forth in Chapter V, receive notification

from the MRO of confirmed positive results.

Consistent with confidentiality procedures

set forth in Chapter V, notify appropriate

management officials and employees of con-

firmed positive test results.

Maintain appropriate statistical records, in-

cluding numbers of employees and applicants

tested and test results. Personal identifying

49a

information in these statistical records is

strictly prohibited.

C. In implementing the education and awareness

portion of the drug program, the coordinators

will be responsible for ensuring that:

(1) Training and education sessions regarding

drug use and rehabilitation are scheduled

and attended.

(2) Films, pamphlets, and promotional materials

are publicized and disseminated.

(3) Technical aid and assistance is available for

Operating Elements to implement all parts

of the drug awareness program.

(4) An evaluation plan to specifically measure

the impact of the program within the par-

ticular Operating Element is implemented.

SECTION 9. DRUG USE DETERMINATION

A. The determination that an employee uses illegal

drugs may be made on the basis of direct obser-

vation of drug use, a criminal conviction, con-

firmed positive test results of the agency’s drug

testing program, the employee’s own admission,

or other appropriate administrative inquiry.

B. Positive drug test results may be rebutted by

other evidence that an employee has not used il-

legal drugs.

5la

CHAPTER III

DRUG TESTING

SECTION 1. POLICY.

All collection and drug testing conducted by the De-

partment shall be done in strict accordance with the

mandatory policies and procedures contained in the

HHS “Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Drug

Testing Programs.”

SECTION 2. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

The Executive Order mandates that the extent to

which employees are tested and the criteria for test-

ing are to be determined by the head of each agency.

This determination shall be based upon the nature

of the agency’s mission and its employees’ duties,

the efficient use of agency resources, and the danger

to the public health and safety or national security

that could result from the failure of an employee to

adequately discharge the duties of his or her posi-

tion. The Department program provides for seven

types of testing: (1) random; (2 /periodic; (3)

reasonable suspicion; (4) pre-employment. pre-ap-

pointment; (5) accident or unsafe practice; (6) vol-

untary; and (7) follow-up. The type of testing re-

quirements an employee will be subject to is depend-

ent on the safety and security criticalness of the

employee's position.

‘TION 3. CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEES.

Two categories of safety and security criticalness,

as specified below, have been established for the pur-

pose of determining which positions will be subject

to specific types of testing. Appendix A sets forth

which positions within the Department are in each

category

1a

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SECTION 5. NOTIFICATION TO EMPLOYEES

SUBJECT TO CERTAIN TYPES OF

TESTING.

Employees subject to reasonable suspicion testing,

accident or unsafe practice testing or follow-up test-

ing shall receive notice prior to testing that includes

all of the following information:

A.

B.

D,

The reasons for the urinalysis test.

Assurance that the quality of testing procedures

is tightly controlled, that the test used to confirm

use of illegal drugs is highly reliable, and that

test results will be handled with maximum re-

spect for individual privacy, consistent with

safety and security.

. Notice of the opportunity and procedures for sub-

mitting supplemental medical documentation that

may support a legitimate use for a specific drug.

The consequences of a confirmed positive test re-

sult or refusal to be tested, including disciplinary

action.

». The availability of drug abuse counseling and

referral services, including the name and tele-

phone number of the local EAP Coordinator.

SECTION 6. NOTIFICATION TO APPLICANTS

A.

B.

FOR POSITIONS SUBJECT TO

TESTING.

Vacancy announcements for Category I positions

shall contain information that the applicant will

be tested for illegal drug use prior to appoint-

ment.

Applicants will be advised of the opportunity to

submit medical documentation that may support

57a

D. Applicants will be directed to report to the near-

est collection site. Applicants in remote locations

. will be reimbursed for reasonable expenses in-

curred in travel to the collection location.

SECTION 8 SPECIMEN COLLECTION PROCESS.

The procedures contained in this directive were de-

signed to provide consideration for individual pri-

vacy in conjunction with a controlled drug testing

program. The procedures set out below apply to all

seven types of testing, i.e., random, periodic, reason-

able suspicion, pre-employment pre-appointment, ac-

cident or unsafe practice, voluntary and follow-up.

A. Chain of Custody.

(1) In order to ensure that the urine sample

taken from an individual is properly identi-

fied and not accidently confused with any

other sample, strict procedures shall be used

when collecting and transferring the sample.

The total of the procedures, i.e., the official

transfers from the individual providing the

sample to the drug testing laboratory, in-

cluding storage of confirmed positive sam-

ples at the laboratory, is known as the chain

of custody.

'2) While performing any part of the chain of

custody procedures, it is essential that the

urine specimen and chain of custody docu-

ments be under the control of the collector.

The collector may not leave his or her work

station, even momentarily, without securing

the specimen and chain of custody form.

The specimen should be packaged for mail-

ing before the collector leaves the site.

(3) Collectors shall always have the container or

specimen bottle within sight before and af-

59a

tions shall be taken to ensure that a urine speci-

men has not been adulterated or diluted during

the collection procedure and that all information

on the urine bottle and in the log book can be

identified as belonging to a given individual. Col-

lection of urine specimens shall not be made un-

der observation except in those unusual circum-

stances allowed in Executive Order 12564 and

Office of Personnel Management FPM Letters

792-16 and 792-17.

C. Collection Procedures. To ensure that strict chain

of custody is maintained, the following procedures

will be used during the collection of urine speci-

mens:

(1) The collection process will usually be sched-

uled as close to the start of a work shift as

possible.

(2) Upon arrival at the collection site, the col-

lector shall request the individual to present

some type of photo identification. If the in-

dividual does not have proper identification,

this shall be noted on the chain of custody

form. Failure to provide identification will

be considered failure to cooperate and

grounds for possible disciplinary action. Ac-

ceptable forms of identification include:

Employee identification with photo

Driver’s license with photo

School identification card with photo

(3) If the individual fails to appear at the as-

signed time, the collector shall contact the

Drug Program Coordinator to obtain guid-

ance on action to be taken.

| (4: The individual will be asked to fill out a

pre-test information form which serves as

Or

(6}

-)

60a

an identification document for the urine sam-

ple collected. This form will also elicit in-

formation regarding prescription and non-

prescription drugs an employee uses which

may affect the outcome of the test.

The collector shall ask the individual to re-

move any unnecessary outer garments (e.g.,

coat, jacket) that might conceal items or

substances that could be used to tamper with

or adulterate his or her urine specimen.

Also, all personal belongings (e.g., purse,

briefcase) must remain with outer gar-

ments; the individual may, however, retain

his or her wallet. The collector shall note on

the chain of custody form any unusual be-

havior or appearance.

The individual shall be instructed to wash

and dry his or her hands prior to urination.

After washing hands, he or she shall remain

in the presence of the collector and not have

access to water fountains, faucets, soap dis-

pensers, or cleaning agents or any other

materials which could be used to adulterate

the specimen.

To deter the dilution of specimens at the

collection site, toilet bluing agents shall be

placed in the toilet tanks, wherever possible,

so the reservoir of water in the toilet bow]

always remain blue. There should not be

any other source of water (e.g., shower,

sink, ete.) in the enclosure where urination

occurs.

The individual may provide his or her speci-

men in the privacv of a stall, or otherwise

partitioned area that allows for individual

privacy. The collector shall note on the chain

(9)

(10)

cis}

6la

of custody form any unusual behavior by the

individual.

The individual shall be asked to void into a

disposable specimen container and asked not

to flush the toilet until the specimen has been

handed over to the collector. The individual

may then flush the toilet and should then

observe the collector complete the chain of

custody procedure. With regard to females,

a collection container with a wider mouth

may be used to collect the urine and the

sample is then transferred by the collector

to the specimen container. Any transfer of

urine from the collection container to the

specimen bottle should be observed by the

individual.

If the collection site is a public restroom, a

collector of the same gender as the individ-

ual shall accompany the individual into the

public restroom which must be secured dur

ing the collection procedure. Toilet bluine

should be placed into the toilet bowl. The

collector remains in the restroom but outside

the stall until the urine specimen is collected.

Upon receiving the specimen from the indi-

vidual, the collector will determine that it

contains at least 60 milliliters of urine. Tf

there is not sufficient urine in the container,

additional! urine should be collected. The in-

dividual shall be asked to drink fluids to

facilitate urination (e.g., a glass of water).

Employees will remain at the test site for

approximately 2 hours until a urine speci-

men is provided. The inability of an em-

ployee to provide the necessary specimen wil!

be treated as a refusal. The collector shal!

contact the Drug Program Coordinator to

obtain guidance on action to be taken.

(14)

§2a

After the specimen has been provided and

submitted to the collector, the individual

should be allowed to wash his or her hands.

Immediately after collection, the collector

shall measure the temperature of the speci-

men and conduct an inspection to deter-

mine the specimen’s color and signs of con-

taminants. Any unusual findings resulting

from the inspection must be included on the

chain of custody form. The time from uri-

nation to delivery of the sample for tem-

perature measurement is critical and in no

ease shall exceed 4 minutes. If the tempera-

ture of the specimen is outside the range of

32.5-37.7 C 90.5-99.8 F this gives rise t

reason to believe the specimen has been tam-

pered with. Another specimen shall be col-

lected under direct observation and _ both

specimens forwarded to the laboratory. An)

specimen suspected to be adulterated should

always be forwarded for testing.

30th the individual being tested and the col-

lector should keep the specimen in view at

all times until it has been packaged and

sealed for shipment. If the specimen is

transferred to a second container, the col-

lector shall request the individual to observe

the transfer of the specimen and the place-

ment of the tamperproof seal over the bottle

cap and down the sides of the bottle. The

collector will place the identification label

securely on the bottle.

The identification label should contain the

date and individual’s specimen number. The

individual shall initial the label on the speci-

men bottle.

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

63a

The collector will enter the identifying in-

formation in a ledger. Both the collector

and the individual shall sign the ledger next

to the identifying information.

The individual shall be asked to read and

sign a certification statement certifying that

the urine in the bottle came from his or her

body at the time of testing. Refusal to sign

this statement shall be noted on the state-

ment form by the collector.

The collector shall complete the appropriate

chain of custody form.

The urine sample and the chain of custody

form are now ready for shipment. If the

specimen is not immediately prepared for

shipment, it must be appropriately secured

during temporary storage. In no instance,

shall the specimen be stored longer than 24

hours after collection.

SECTION 9. LABORATORY ANALYSIS

PROCEDURES.

A. Policy.

(1)

All laboratory testing and laboratory chain

of custody procedures will be done in strict

accordance with the HHS “Scientific and

Technical Guidelines for Drug Testing Pro-

grams.”

The test for drugs will consist of initial

screening to detect the presence of drugs

and confirmation testing of samples where

an initial screen is positive.

The laboratory will assure the chain of cus-

tody procedures are adhered to from the

time of receipt of urine samples until test-

64a

ing is completed, results reported, and while

specimens are in storage.

B. Reporting Test Results to the MRO. Test results

shall be reported to a designated MRO within

five working days of receipt at the laboratory of

the specimens. The report should contain the

assigned specimen number, the drug testing lab-

oratory number, and results of the drug tests.

All specimens negative on initial test or negative

on the confirmatory test shall be reported as neq-

ative. Only specimens confirmed positive shall

be reported positive to the MRO. Results shall

be transmitted to the MRO in a manner con-

sistent with the Privacy Act. It is not permitted

to provide results verbally by telephone. A cer-

tified copy of the original chain of custody form,

signed by the aboratory director or laboratory

certifying official, shall be sent to the MRO.

Copies of all analytical results shall be available

from the laboratory when requested.

C. Specimen Storage. Negative samples will be dis-

carded by the laboratory. Only samples testing

positive after both the screening and confirma-

tion tests will be considered positive for purposes

of retaining the specimen. Positive samples will

be retained at the laboratory in a frozen state

for at least 365 days. Within this 365-day pe-

riod, the Drug Program Coordinator may re-

quest the laboratory to retain the specimen for

an additional period of time. This ensures that

the urine samples will be available for possible

retest during any administrative or disciplinary

proceeding. If the laboratory does not receive a

request to retain the specimen during the initial

365-day period, the specimen may be discarded.

D. Internal/External Quality Assurance Program.

In accordance with the HHS procedures, blind

65a

samples will be randomly intermingled by DOT

and the testing laboratory with individual speci-

men samples and analyzed in the same manner

to ensure the accuracy of our laboratory testing

program.

E. Independent Testing. An employee who tests pos-

itive may request a second test of the sample

coilected at the time of drug screening. That

test may be conducted at the laboratory used by

the Department or at another qualified labora-

tory identified by the employee. In the latter in-

stance, the laboratory used by the Department

will send a portion of the original sample to a

laboratory designated by the employee. The cost

of this test shall be paid by the employee. Strict

chain of custody procedures will be followed for

any transfer between laboratories.

SECTION 10. REPORTING TEST RESULTS.

A. Employees who test positive will receive written

notification of the positive finding. Employees

who test negative on initial screening or on con-

firmation will not receive written notification of

the negative finding.

B. Information will be elicited from employees prior

to providing urine specimens to indicate their

legitimate use for a specific drug. Employees who

test positive for a drug and whose pre-test in-

formation indicates the legitimate use for a spe-

cific drug causing the positive test result will be

notified in writing that their test result is con-

sidered negative.

SECTION 11. RANGE OF DRUGS.

A. Tests will be conducted for the illegal use of the

following drugs considered to be a controlled sub-

stance included in Schedule I or II, as defined by

66a

section 802(6) of Title 21 of the United States

Code, the possession of which is unlawful under

Chapter 13 of that Title:

(1) Marijuana

(2) Cocaine

(3) Opiates

(4) Amphetamines

(5) Pheneyclidine (PCP)

B. Before including any additional drugs (or classes

of drugs), listed in Schedule I or II of the Con-

trolled Substance Act in its testing program, the

Department will petition the Secretary of HHS

or his or her designee for written approval.

C. When conducting reasonable suspicion testing in

accordance with Chapter III, Section 4.C., the

Department may test for any drug identified in

Schedule I or II of the Controlled Substance Act

as set forth in Appendix B.

67a

CHAPTER IV

REHABILITATION

SECTION 1. GENERAL.

When it has been determined that an employee has

used illegal drugs off-duty, it is the responsibility of

management to direct an employee to the Employee

Assistance Program (see Chapter VII). The em-

ployee shall be given an opportunity following the

initial counseling to enter a drug rehabilitation/

abatement program as may be appropriate under the

circumstances. (Abatement is defined as the elimi-

nation of the use of, or dependence on, a substance

through the exercise of individual initiative or

through the encouragement and/or support of

others.) The employee will, in addition to the pro-

gram determined to be appropriate, be subject to

follow-up drug testing for a one-year period after

return to safety or security duties or completion of

the rehabilitation/abatement program, whichever is

later. An employee who successfully completes such

a program will not be subject to disciplinary action

for the first determination of illegal drug usage.

SECTION 2. EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

An employee directed to an EAP will receive short-

term diagnostic counseling and referral to a reha-

bilitation/abatement program. Information will be

provided to management in accordance with the con-

fidentiality requirements of Chapter V.

SECTION 3. REHABILITATION/ABATEMENT

SELECTED.

The determination of the type of rehabilitation/

abatement assistance required by an employee will

be made by the EAP Coordinator, in consultation as

appropriate, with supervisory and medical personnel.

68a

SECTION 4. COST.

The services provided under existing EAP programs

are provided at no cost to the employee. However,

the cost of further rehabilitative services or treat-

ment is the responsibility of the employee.

SECTION 5. SELF-REFERRAL.

An employee who voluntarily identifies himself or

herself as an off-duty drug user or volunteers for

drug testing prior to being identified through other

means, will not disciplined if he or she meets all of

the following criteria:

A. Obtains counseling and completes rehabilitation.

B. Agrees to follow-up testing for a one year period

after return to safety or security duties or com-

pletion of the rehabilitation/abatement program,

whichever is later.

C. Thereafter refrains from using illegal drugs.

SECTION 6. REASSIGNMENT TO OTHER DUTIES.

Employees in Category I will be assigned non-safety

or non-security duties when they are identified as

having used illegal drugs. This policy will also ap-

ply during any rehabilitation program. The em-

ployee may be removed if there are no non-sensitive

positions to which the employee may be transferred.

However, an employee assigned to non-safety or non-

security duties may be returned to safety or security

duties when an appropriate authority determines

such action would not pose a danger to public health

or safety or the national security. Employees re-

turned to safety or security duties are subject to

follow-up testing for a 1-year period after return to

safety or security duties or completion of the reha-

bilitation ‘abatement program, whichever is later.

69a

CHAPTER V

CONFIDENTIALITY

SECTION 1. POLICY.

Employees and the drug testing laboratory involved

in any aspect of the Departmental drug program are

required to maintain strict standards of confiden-

tiality in carrying out their responsibilities. This

includes all of the following:

A.

B.

C.

Maintaining maximum respect for individual pri-

vacy consistent with safety and security issues.

The handling of test results.

All contacts with medical and health personnel,

counselors, Drug Testing Coordinators, and EAP

Coordinators and administrators.

SECTION 2. PROCEDURES TO PROTECT

CONFIDENTIALITY.

The following procedures to protect the confidential-

ity of negative and confirmed positive- test results

and related medical and rehabilitation records shall

be observed.

A.

Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or

treatment of any employee who enters a rehabili-

tation/abatement program which are maintained

in connection with this program are patient rec-

ords that must be kept confidential and may be

disclosed only by consent of the patient or under

limited circumstances and specific purposes es-

tablished by 42 CFR Section 2.1 et seq.

Drug abuse treatment records may be disclosed

without the consent of the employee only under

one of the following circumstances:

70a

(1) To medical personnel to the extent necessary

to meet a genuine medical emergency.

(2) To qualified personnel for conducting scien-

tific research, management audits, financial

audits, or program evaluation, with all iden-

tifying information removed from the data.

(3) When authorized by an appropriate court

order granted after application showing good

cause.

C. Any other disclosure may be made only with the

written consent of the employee. Any disclosure

without such consent is strictly prohibited. Such

consensual disclosure may be made for verifica-

tion of treatment or a general evaluation of

treatment progress.

7la

CHAPTER VI

DISCIPLINARY ACTION

SECTION 1. GENERAL.

Disciplinary action as set forth below will be taken

under each of the described circumStances:

A.

Refusal to Enter or Successfully Complete a Re-

habilitation/Abatement Program. If an employee

refuses to enter or successfully complete a reha-

bilitation/abatement program, he or she will be

removed from the Federal service for illegal off-

duty drug use.

Repeat Usage. In all cases of illegal off-duty drug

use, employees who test positive a second time,

or for whom a second determination of illegal

drug use has been made, will be removed from

the Federal service.

. Refusal to Provide a Urine Specimen. An em-

ployee who refuses to provide a urine specimen

or otherwise refuses to cooperate with the collec-

tion procedures will be removed from the Federal

service.

Adulteration or Substitution of Specimen. An

employee who adulterates, substitutes or other-

wise attempts to falsify the results of a urinaly-

sis will be removed from the Federal service.

On-duty Use of Illegal Drugs. On-duty use or

possession of illegal drugs by an employee will

result in removal from the Federal service.

Other Drug-related Offenses. A determination

that an employee has engaged in illegal drug

trafficking, e.g., sale, manufacture, growing, dis-

tribution or transportation, will result in removal

from the Federal service.

72a

SECTION 2. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES.

Any disciplinary action under this Chapter will be

taken in accordance with the requirements of the

Civil Service Reform Act and other governing regu-

lations which may apply.

73a

CHAPTER VII

EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

SECTION 1. POLICY.

All Operating Elements within DOT shall have an

Employee Assistance Program in accordance with

the regulations, policies, and procedures issued by

the Department, the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM), and HHS. Accordingly, all Departmental

Employee Assistance Programs shall:

A. Provide the EAP with high visibility and, by

utilizing a concerted publicity outreach effort,

inform all employees of the purpose and opera-

tion of the program.

B. Designate an EAP Coordinator to oversee the

program’s operation.

C. Take appropriate steps to assure that only pro-

fessional, accredited, certified, and licensed reha-

bilitation services are provided in connection with

the EAP.

D. Have a plan to evaluate the operation of the EAP

and the quality of services provided.

E. Maintain appropriate records and information

systems.

F. Assure that both in-house and contracted services

comply with DOT, OPM and HHS regulations

and instructions.

G. Provide educational awareness programs on EAP

related subjects.

SECTION 2. ASSESSMENT AND REFERRAL.

All Departmental EAPs must have a rehabilitation/

abatement referral component which includes an up-

74a

to-date referral source of rehabilitation ‘abatement

organizations, the criteria used to assess the or-

ganizations and the quality of services provided, and

the procedures for making a referral.

A. Developing the Referral Source.

(1)

(2)

(3)

EAP Coordinators must maintain or have

readily available a list of rehabilitation/

abatement organizations which provide coun-

seling and rehabilitative programs.

The following information must be included

on each organization: (a) name, address,

and telephone number; (b) the type of serv-

ices provided; (c) hours of operation, in-

cluding emergency hours; (d) name and

telephone number of a contact person; (e)

fee structure, including insurance coverage;

(f) client specialization; and (g) other per-

tinent information.

EAP Coordinators shall establish and main-

tain liaison with counterparts in the em-

ployee assistance field through participation

in meetings, seminars, and other appropriate

professional activities.

B. Assessing Rehabilitative Abatement Organizations

and the Quality of Services.

(1)

EAP Coordinators periodically shall visit re-

habilitative/abatement organizations to: (a)

meet administrative and staff members; (b)

tour the site and observe the physical set-

ting; and (c) ascertain the experience, cer-

tification and edu.-ational level of staff.

EAP Coordinators shall verify licensing and

accreditation of organizations.

75a

(3) EAP Coordinators shall ascertain each or-

ganization’s policy concerning progress re-

ports on clients and post-treatment follow-

up.

C. Developing Procedures for Making Referrals.

(1) Factors that must be considered in making

a referral include: (a) the nature and sever-

ity of the problem; (b) location of the treat-

ment center; (c) cost; (d) levels of care,

i.e, the degree of restrictiveness and/or in-

tensity of treatment environment; (e) avail-

ability of inpatient and/or out-patient care;

and (f) other special needs, such as trans-

portation and child care.

(2) Whenever possible, the employee should be

involved in the selection and choice of a

provider.

(3) Employees shall be allowed up to 1 hour (or

more as necessitated by travel time) of ex-

cused absence for each counseling session, up

to a maximum of six sessions, during the

assessment/referral phase of rehabilitation.

Absences during duty hours for rehabilita-

tion abatement must be charged to the ap-

propriate leave category in accordance with

law and leave regulations.

SECTION 3. TRAINING.

As supervisors have a key role in establishing and

maintaining a drug-free work place, EAPs shall

have a training component to assist supervisors and

managers in identifying and addressing illegal drug

use by employees.

A. Goals and Objectives. All supervisory training

shall meet the following goals and objectives:

(1)

(8)

76a

To understand Departmental policies rele-

vant to work performance problems, drug

use, and the EAP.

To understand the responsibilities of offer-

ing EAP services to employees.

To recognize and document employee per-

formance and behavioral changes.

To understand the roles of the medical staff,

supervisors, personnel, and EAP personnel.

To understand the ways to use the EAP.

To understand how the EAP is linked to the

performance appraisal and the disciplinary

processes,

To understand the process of reintegrating

employees into the work force.

To be aware of legal and liability issues.

B. Requirements. All supervisory training shall

meet the following requirements:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Training is required of all supervisors,

managers, and union representatives where

appropriate.

Training shall be presented as a separate

course, or be included as part of ongoing su-

pervisory training programs.

Training shall be provided as soon as pos-

sible after a person assumes supervisory re-

sponsibility.

The training program shall contain written

material which the supervisor can _ utilize

back at the work site.

C. Specifies of Course Outline. Training courses

shall include but shall not be limited to the fol-

lowing segments:

Tia

(1) Overall Departmental policy.

(2) The prevalence of various employee prob-

lems, i.e., aleohol, drugs, emotional, etc.

(3) The EAP approach to handling problems.

(4) How to identify employees with possible

problems.

(5) Documentation of employee performance or

behavior.

(6) How to approach the employee.

(7) How to utilize the EAP.

(8) Disciplinary measures where employees de-

cline offers of assistance or refuse to com-

plete a rehabilitation’/abatement program.

(9) The reintegration of employees into the

work force.

SECTION 4. CONTRACTING FOR EAP SERVICES.

EAP services provided through contract shall meet

the same requirements as contained in DOT, OPM

and HHS regulations and instructions. In addition,

the Operating Elements must ensure the contract

statement of work provides all of the following:

A. A description of the services to be provided, i.e.,

couiseling and referral, rehabilitation, publicity

outreach, training, educational awareness, and

program evaluation.

B. The location and availability of services.

C. The qualifications of the administrative and

counseling staff.

D. The system for making a referral, i.e., criteria

used to determine appropriate referral and for

determining the quality of provider.

78a

E. A contractor self-evaluation program.

F. A confidentiality provision.

G. A reporting and information system.

H. An overall program evaluation plan.

CHAPTER VIII—IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

(RESERVED)

[DOT Logo]

Elizabeth Dole

Secretary of Transportation

79a

APPENDIX A

CATEGORIZATION OF EMPLOYEES FOR

DRUG TESTING

DEFINITIONS

Category I—Safety/Security Critical—These are posi-

tions characterized by their critical safety or security

responsibilities as they relate to the mission of the De-

partment. The job functions associated with these posi-

tions have a direct and immediate impact en public

health and safety, the protection of life and property,

law enforcement, or national security. These positions

require the highest degree of trust and confidence.

Category I1—These are positions not included in Cate-

gory I.

Positions are identified for inclusion within the above

categories by their organizational location, occupational

series, job title, security clearance, or combinations of

these characteristics.

POSITION COVERAGE BY SECURITY CLEARANCE

All positions occupied by individuals which require the

possession of a security clearance of “TOP-SECRET” or

higher are included in Category I regardless of their

organization or occupation.

POSITION COVERAGE BY OCCUPATION

The categorization of all other Department of Transpor-

tation positions is accomplished within the context of

their Operating Elements and their job duties. within

that administration. To assure overall consistency, cate-

gory determinations for including or excluding positions

from either Category I or Category II will be made by

the Office of the Secretary in consultation with the Oper-

ating Elements. References to a given job, occupation

series or family include all supervisors and employees in

the occupation regardless of pay plan unless otherwise

noted.

80a

JUSTIFICATION STATEMENTS FOR CATEGORY 1

POSITIONS

Each determination by an Operating Element, OST, or

OIG to include a particular job occupation in Category

I shall be supported by a justification statement clearly

describing why the job is safety/security critical and

specifying the adverse consequences that would likely oc-

cur if an incumbent in that position were to use illegal

drugs. A current justification statement for each job

occupation included in Category I shall remain on file

with the Assistant Secretary for Administration. The

Assistant Secretary for Administration reserves the

right to review each justification statement to ensure

overall consistentcy with the DOT drug program and

among varying occupations throughout the Department

and make appropriate recommendations.

Office of the Secretary

Category 1

Motor Vehicle Operators WG-57XX

United States Coast Guard

Category 1

Firefighters GS- 81

Nurses GS- 610

Criminal Investigators GS-1811

Vessel Traffic Controllers GS-2150

Marine Traffic Controllers (Pilot) GS-2150

Electronic Mechanics WG-2604**

Aircraft Electricians WG-2892**

Instrument Mechanics WG-3359**

Metals Inspectors WG-3801**

Shipwright Foremen WS-5220

Transportation Equipment Operation Family WG-57XX

Aircraft Oxygen Equipment Mechanics WG-8201**

Aircraft Engine Mechanics WG-8602**

8la

Aircraft Mechanics WG-8852**

Master Pilots, Ferryboat WM-9902

Chief, Engineers, Ferryboat WM-9931

Oiler, Ferryboat & Diesel WM-9961

All individuals with “competent person” collateral duties at

the Coast Guard Yard, Curtis Bay, Maryland. These indi-

viduals have responsibility for certifying areas as “safe” for

performing work (such as certifying fuel tanks safe for

welding).

** Only those individuals located at the Aircraft Repair and

Supply Center.

.

Federal Aviation Administration

Category I

Electronics Technicians GS-856

Civil Aviation Security Specialists ! GS-1801**

Aviation Safety Inspectors GS-1825**

Air Traffic Control Specialists ~ GS-2152**

Inspection/Flight Test Pilots GS-2181

Transportation Equipment Operation Family WG-57XX

Aircraft Mechanics WG-8852

** Only GS-2152, GS-1801 and GS-1825 employees who are

required to take periodic physical exams to retain medical

clearances are covered by this program.

Includes persons in other job series who perform Federal

Air Marshall duties and thus require periodic physical ex-

aminations.

Federal Highway Administration

Category I

Highway Safety Specialists GS-2125*

Motor Carrier Safety Specialists GS-2123*

Transportation Equipment Operation Family WG-57XX

* Includes only those GS-2123 and GS-2125 positions with

day-to-day responsibilities for field operations of inspection

and enforcement.

82a

Federal Railroad Administration

Category I

Industrial Hygienists (Headquarters) GS-690

General Engineer (Field & Headquarters) GS-801

Civil Engineers (Field & Headquarters) GS-810 **

Railroad Safety Series (Field & Headquarters) GS-2121**

Motor Vehicle Operators WG-57XX

Safety Engineer (Headquarters) GS-803

Mechanical Engineers (Headquarters) GS-830

Electrical Engineers (Headquarters) GS-855

Chemical Engineer (Headquarters) GS-893

Transportation Specialists (Headquarters) GS-2101*

* Includes only those positions which involve two or more

specialized transportation functions actively engaged in the

development, implementation and monitoring of railroad

safety programs. ‘

** For field positions, includes Railroad Safety Inspectors and

Specialists, Supervisory Inspectors and Specialists, mana-

gerial level Railroad Safety Specialists and Civil Engineers

actively engaged in the inspection of railroad equipment and

services.

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation

Category I

Lock and Dam Operators WG-5426**

Vessel Traffic Controllers GS-2150**

Transportation Equipment Operation Family WG-57XX**

** Employees in other series who periodically perform the

duties of Vessel Traffic Controller, Lock and Dam Operators

or Heavy Equipment Operators are also included in Category

I.

» 88a

Urban Mass Transportation Administration

Category I

Motor Vehicle Operators

WG-57XX

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Category I

Motor Vehicle Operators

Auto Enforcement Investigators

Criminal Investigators

WG-57XX

GS-1801

GS-1811

Research and Special Programs Administration

Category I

General Engineer (Pipeline)

Petroleum Engineer

Transportation Specialists

Motor Vehicle Operators

* Includes those at grade 13 and above.

Office of Inspector General

Category I

Criminal Investigators

Maritime Administration

Category I

Transportation Equipment Operation Family

Engineers (Watchstander)

Marine General Utility Maintenance

Mechanics (Deck/Engine)

GS-801

GS-881

GS-2101*

WG-57XX

GS-1811

WG-57XX

WM-5352

WM-5352

84a

APPENDIX B

LISTING OF SCHEDULES I AND II

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) (21 U.S.C. § 801

et seq.), among other things, establishes five schedules of

controlled substances. Initial listings of controlled sub-

stances are indicated in section 202 of the CSA (21

U.S.C. § 812). However, under the statute, the Attorney

General may by rule add any drug or other substance to

a schedule, remove it from the schedules or transfer it

between schedules if the drug or other substance meets

certain statutory criteria. The Attorney General’s au-

thority in this matter has been delegated to the Admin-

istrator, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S.

Department of Justice.

The schedules of controlled substances established by sec-

tion 202 of the CSA, as changed, updated and repub-

lished from time to time, are set forth in 21 CFR Part

1308. The current Schedule I and II listings (as of April

1, 1986) are as follows:

SCHEDULES

Section 1308.11 Schedule I.

(a) Schedule I shall consist of the drugs and other sub-

stances, by whatever official name, common or usual

name, chemical name, or brand name designated,

listed in this section. Each drug or substance has

been assigned the DEA Controlled Substances Code

Number set forth opposite it.

(b) Opiates. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed

in another schedule, any of the following opiates,

including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and

salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the

existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, salts is pos-

sible within the specific chemical designation:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)

(25)

(26)

(27)

(28)

(29)

(30)

(31)

(32)

(33)

85a

Acetylmethadol 9601

Alfentanil 9737

Allylprodine 9602

Alphacetylmethadol 9603

Alphameprodine 9604

Alphamethadol 9605

Alpha-methylfentany] (N-(1-(alpha-methyl-

beta-pheny]) ethyl-4-piperidyl) propionanilide;

1- (1-methy]-2-phenylethy]) -4- (N-propanilido)

piperidine) 9814

Benzethidine 9606

Betacetylmethadol 9607

Betameprodine 9608

Betamethadol 9609

Betaprodine 9611

Clonitazene 9612

Dextromoramide 9613

Diampromide 9615

Diethylthiambutene 9616

Difenoxin 9168

Dimenoxadol 9617

Dimepheptanol 9618

Dimethylthiambutene 9619

Dioxaphetyl butyrate 9621

Dipipanone 9622

Ethylmethylthiambutene 9623

Etonitazene 9624

Etoxeridine 9625

Furethidine 9626

Hydroxypethidine 9627

Ketobemidone 9628

Levomoramide 9629

Levophenacylmorphan 9631

Morpheridine 9632

Noracymethadol 9633

Norlevorphanol 9634

(e)

(34)

(35)

(36)

(37)

(38)

(39)

(40)

(41)

(42)

(43)

(44)

(45)

(46)

Opium derivatives.

86a

Normethadone

Norpipanone

Phenadoxone

Phenampromide

Phenomorphan

Phenoperidine

Piritramide

Proheptazine

Properidine

Propiram

Racemoramide

Tilidine

Trimeperidine

9635

9636

9637

9638

9647

9641

9642

9643

9644

9649

9645

9750

9646

Unless specifically excepted or

unless listed in another schedule, any of the follow-

ing opium derivatives, its salts, isomers, and salts of

isomers whenever the existence of such salts, iso-

mers, and salts of isomers is possible within the

specific chemical designation:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

Acetorphine

Acetyldihydrocodeine

Benzylmorphine

Codeine methylbromide

Codeine-N-Oxide

Cyprenorphine

Desomorphine

Dihydromorphine

Drotebanol

Etorphine (except hydrochloride salt)

Heroin

Hydromorphinol

Methyldesorphine

Methyldihydromorphine

Morphine methylbromide

Morphine methylsulfonate

9319

9051

9052

9070

9053

9054

9055

9145

9335

9056

9200

9301

9302

9304

9395

9306

(d)

87a

(17) Morphine-N-Oxide 9307

(18) Myrophine 9308

(19) Nicocodeine 9309

(20) Nicomorphine 9312

(21) Normorphine 9313

(22) Pholcodine 9314

(23) Thebacon 9315

Hallucinogeniec substances. Unless specifically ex-

cepted or unless listed in another schedule, any ma-

terial, compound, mixture, or preparation, which con-

tains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic

substances, or which contains any of its salts, iso-

mers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of

such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible

within the specific chemical designation (for pur-

poses of this paragraph only, the term “isomer” in-

cludes the optical, position and geometric isomers) :

(1) 4-bromo-2, 5-dimethoxy-amphetamine 7391

Some trade or other names: 4-bromo-2,5-

dimethoxy-alpha-methylphenethylamine;

4-bromo-2,5-DMA

(2) 2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine 7396

Some trade or other names; 2,5-dimethoxy-

alpha-methylphenethylamine; 2,5-DMA

(3) 4-methoxyamphetamine 7411

Some trade or other names: 4-methoxy-

alpha-methyl-phenethylamine;

paramethoxyamphetamine, PMA

(4) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy-amphetamine 7401

(5) 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine 7395

Some trade and other names: 4-methy]-2,5-

dimethoxy-alpha-methylphenethylamine;

“DOM”; and “STP”

(6) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine 7400

(7) 3,4,5-trimethoxy amphetamine 7390

(8)

(9)

(10)

(1)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

88a

Bufotenine 7433

Some trade and other names: 3- (beta-

Dimethylaminoethy]) -5-hydroxyindole;

3- (2-dimethylaminoethy]) -5-indolol; N,

N-dimethylserotonin ; 5-hydroxy-N,N-

dimethyltryptamine; mappine

Diethyltryptamine 7434

Some trade and other names: N,N-

Diethyltryptamine; DET

Dimethyltryptamine 7435

Some trade or other names: DMT

lbogaine 7260

Some trade and other names: 7-Ethyl-6,6

beta, 7,8,9,10,12,13-octahydro-2-methoxy

6,9-methano-5H-pyrido (1’, 2’:1,2) azepino

(5,4-b) indole; Tabernanthe iboga

Lysergic acid diethylamine 7315

Marihuana 7360

Mescaline 7381

Parahexy] 7374

Some trade or other names: 3-Hexy]-1-

hydroxy-7,8,9,10-tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-

6H-dibenzo(b,d) pyran; Synhexy]

Peyote 7415

Meaning all parts of the plant presently

classified botanically as Lophophora williamsii

Lemaire, whether growing or not, the seeds

thereof, any extract from any part of such

plant, and every compound, manufacture,

salts, derivative, mixture, or preparation of

such plant, its seeds or extracts.

(Interprets 21 USC 812(c), Schedule

1(c) (12) )

N-ethy1-3-piperidy] benzilate 7482

N-methyl-3-piperidy] benzilate 7484

Psilocybin 7437

(e)

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)

89a

Psilocyn 7438

Tetrahydrocannabinols 7370

Synthetic equivalents of the substances

contained in the plant, or in the resinous

extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic

substances, derivatives, and their isomers

with similar chemical structure and

pharmacological activity such as the following.

Delta 1 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and

their optical isomers.

Delta 6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol,

and their optical isomers.

Delta 3,4 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol,

and its optical isomers.

(Since nomenclature of these substances is not

internationally standardized, compounds of

these structures, regardless of numerical

designation of atomic positions covered.)

Ethylamine analog of phencyclidine 7455

Some trade or other names: N-ethyl-1-

phenylcyclohexylamine, (1-phenylcyclohexy])

ethylamine, N-(1-phenylcyclo-hexy])

ethylamine, cyclohexamine, PCE

Pyrrolidine analog of phencyclidine 7458

Some trade or other names: 1-(1-

phenylcyclohexy]) -pyrrolidine, PCPy, PHP

Thiophene analogy of phencyclidine 7470

Some trade or other names: 1-(1-(2-thieny]) -

cyclohexyl) -piperidine, 2-thienylanalog of

phencyclidine, TPCP, TCP

Depressants. Unless specifically excepted or unless

listed in another schedule, any material, compound,

mixture, or preparation which contains any quan-

tity of the following substances having a depressant

effect on the central nervous system, including its

salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the

90a

existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers

is possible within the specific chemical designation:

(1) Mecloqualone 2572

(2) Methaqualone 2565

Stimulants. Unless specifically excepted or unless

listed in another schedule, any material, compound,

mixture, or preparation which contain any quantity

of the following substances having a stimulant effect

on the central nervous system, including its salts,

isomers, and salts of isomers:

(1) Fenethylline 1503

(2) N-ethylamphetamine 1475

Temporary listing of substances subject to emer-

gency scheduling. Any material, compound, mixture

or preparation which contains any quantity of the

following substances:

(1) 8-Methylfentany] (N-(3-methyl-1- (2-

phenylethy]) -4-piperidy]) -N-

phenylprpanamide), its optical and geometric

isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9813

(2) 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine

(MDMA), its optical, positional and geometric

isomers, salts and salts of isomers 7405

(3) 1-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine

(MPPP), its optical isomers, salts and salts

of isomers 9661

(4) 1-(2-phenylethy]) -4-phenyl-4-

acetyloxypiperidine (PEPAP), its optical

isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9663

(5) N-(1-(1-methyl-2-pheny]) ethyl-4-piperidy]) -

N-phenylacetamide (acetyl-alpha-

methylfentany]l), its optical isomers, salts and

salts of isomers 9815

(6) N-(1-(1-methyl-2- (2-thieny]l) ethy]-4-

piperidyl)-N-phenylpropanamide (alpha-

methylthiofentany]), its optical isomers, salts

and salts of isomers 9832

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

~ (18)

9la

N- (1-benzyl-4-piperidy]) -N-

phenylpropanamide (benz «lfentany]), its

optical isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9818

N- (1-(2-hydroxy-2-pheny]) ethy]-4-piperidy]) -

N-phenylpropanamide (beta-hydroxyfentany]),

its optical isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9830

N- (3-methyl-1- (2-hydroxy-2-pheny]) ethyl-

4-piperidy]) -N-phenylpropanamide (beta-

hydroxy-3-methylfentany]), its optical and

geometric isomers, salts and salts

of isomers 9831

N- (3-methy!-1-2- (2-thieny]) ethyl-4-piperidy]) -

N-phenylpropanamide (3-methylthiofentany]),

its optical and geometric isomers, salts and

salts of isomers 9833

N-(1-(2-thienyl) methyl-4-piperidy]) -N-

phenylpropanamide (thenylfentany]), its

optical isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9834

N- (1-(2-(2-thieny!) ethyl-4-piperidy]) -N-

phenylpropanamide (thiofentany]), its optical

isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9835

N- (1-(2-phenylethy]) -4piperidy]) -N- (4-

fluoropheny]) -propanamide (para-

fluorofentany]), its optical isomers, salts and

salts of isomers 9812

Section 1308.12 Schedule II.

(a) Schedule II shall consist of the drugs and other sub-

(b)

stances by whatever official name, common or usual

name, chemical name, or brand name designated,

listed in this section. Each drug or substance has

been assigned the Controlled Substances Code Num-

ber set forth opposite it.

Substances, vegetable origin or chemical synthesis.

Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in an-

other schedule, any of the following substances

92a

whether produced directly or indirectly by extrac-

tion from substances or vegetable origin, or inde-

pendently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a

combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:

(1) Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound,

derivative, or preparation of opium or opiate

excluding apomorphine, dextrorphan, nalbuphine,

nalmefene, naloxone, and naltrexone, and their

respective salts, but including the following:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

Raw Opium

Opium extracts

Opium fluid

Powuered opium

Granulated opium

Tincture of opium

Codeine

Ethylmorphine

Etorphine hydrochloride

Hydrocodone

Hydromorphone

Metopon

Morphine

Oxycodone

Oxymorphone

Thebaine

9600

9610

9620

9639

9640

9630

9050

9190

9050

9183

9150

9280

9300

9143

9652

9333

(2) Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparative

thereof which is chemically equivalent or iden-

tical with any of the substances referred to in

paragraph (b)(1) of this section, except that

these substances shal! not include the isoquino-

(3) Opium poppy and poppy straw.

line alkaloids of opium.

98a

*(4) Coca leaves (9040) and any salt, compound,

derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and

any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation

thereof which is chemically equivalent or identi-

cal with any of these substances, except that the

substances shall not include decocainized coca

leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which ex-

tractions do not contain cocaine (9041) or

ecogonine (9180).

(5) Concentrate of poppy straw (the crude extract

of poppy straw in either liquid, solid or powder

form which contains the phenanthrene alkaloids

of the opium poppy), 9670.

(c) Opiates. Unless specifically excepted or unless in an-

other schedule any of the following opiates, includ-

ing its isomers, esters, ethers, salts and salts of

isomers, esters and ethers whenever the existence of

such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible

within the specific chemical designation, dextrorphan

and levopropoxyphene excepted:

(1) Alphaprodine 9010

(2) Anileridine 9020

(3) Bezitramide 9800

(4) Bulk dextropropoxyphene (non-dosage

forms) 9273

(5) Dihydrocodeine 9120

* The Drug and Alcohol Dependent Offenders Treatment Act of

1986, P.L. 99-570, Title I, Subtitle Q, amends subsection (a)(4) of

section 202(c) of the CSA (21 U.S.C. 812) as follows:

“(4) Coca leaves (except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves

from which cocaine, ecgonine, and the derivatives of or their

salts have been removed): cocaine, its salts, optical and geo-

metric isomers, and salts of isomers; and, its derivatives, their

salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.”

To date, 21 CFR Section 1308.12(b) (4) has not been revised to

reflect this legislative amendment.

id)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

Stimulants.

94a

Diphenoxylate

Fentanyl

Isomethadone

Levomethorphan

Levorphanol

Metazocine

Methadone

Methadone-Intermediate, 4-cyano-2-

dimetnylamino-4,4-dipheny! butane

Moramide-Intermediate, 2-methy]-3-

morpholino-1, 1-diphenylpropane-carboxylic

acid

Pethidine (meperidine)

Pethidine-Intermediate-A, 4-cyano-1-methyl-

4-phenylpiperidine

Pethidine-Intermediate-B, ethyl-4-

pheny!piperidine-4-carboxylate

Pethidine-Intermediate-C, 1-methy]-4-

phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid

Phenazocine

Piminodine

Racemethorphan

Racemorphan

Sufentanil

9170

9801

9226

9210

9220

9240

9250

9254

9802

9230

9232

9233

9234

9715

9730

9732

9733

9740

Unless specifically excepted or unless

listed in another schedule, any material, compound,

mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity

of the following substances having a stimulant effect

on the central nervous system:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and

salts of its optical isomer

Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and

salts of its isomers

Phenmetrazine and its salts

Methylphenidate

1100

1105

1631

1724

95a

(e) Depressants. Unless specifically excepted or unless

listed in another schedule any material compound

mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity

of the following substances having a depressant

effect on the central nervous system, including its

salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the ex-

istence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is

possible within the specific chemical designation:

(1) Amobarbital 2125

(2) Pentobarbital 2270

(3) Phencyclidine 7471

(4) Secobarbital 2315

(f) Immediate precursors. Unless specifically excepted

or unless listed in another schedule, any material,

compound, mixture, or preparation which contains

any quantity of the following substances:

(1) Immediate precursor to amphetamine and

methamphetamine:

(i) Phenylacetone 8501

Some trade or other names: pheny]-2-

propanone; P2P; benzy! methyl] ketone;

methyl benzy! ketone;

(2) Immediate precursors to phencyclidine

(PCP):

(i) 1-phenylcyclohexylamine 7460

(ii) 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile

(PCC) 8603

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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