Appendix — Huyssen v. First Union Home Equity Corp.

Supreme Court brief1990

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

| re tl

89 “2 y 9 _— |

In the a

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBEeR TERM, 1989

~ A

ULRICH HUYSSEN,

Petitioner,

versus

FIRST UNION HOME EQUITY CORPORATION

(formerly, First Union Mortgage Corporation),

Respondent.

aff”

~ 4

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIXES

Attorneys for Petitioner:

JOHNNIE A. JONES (Bar No. 8329),

Avair D. Jones (Bar No. 7342),

AND

JOHNNIE A. JONES, Jr. (Bar. No. 1083)

Co-Counsel of Record

JONES & JONES

Taylor Building, Suite 215

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: (504) 383-8573

brawklon Preee lem Baton Rouge. Louimana

APPENDIX ‘A’

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. 89-3232

SUMMARY CALENDAR

ULRICH HUYSSEN,

Plaintiff-appellant,

versus

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(86-77A) (October 18, 1989)

Before REAVLEY, KING AND JOHNSON CIRCUIT

JUDGES.

PER CURIAM.*

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that have

no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the

basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on

the public and burdens on the legal profession.” Pursuant to that

Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published.

Plaintiff Ulrich Huyssen appeals the district court's

directed verdict in favor of First Union Mortgage Corporation

and the denial of Huyssen’s motion for a new trial. For the

reasons cited herein, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ulrich Huyssen (Huyssen), a self-employed businessman,

applied for a loan in the amount of $30,900.00 from a Baton

Rouge, Louisiana branch office of First Union Mortgage Com-

pany (First Union) in late August, 1984. Huyssen’s application

was denied because his income to debt ratio, as calculated by

First Union’s North Carolina home office, did not meet

applicable guidelines for extending credit. At the time of

Huyssen’s loan application, First Union's policy when calculat-

ing a self-employed loan applicant’s income to debt ratio was

to treat depreciation as taxable income. Nevertheless,

Huyssen, contended that the real reason he was denied credit

was because he is German and a Christian minister. There-

after, Huyssen filed the instant Equal Credit Opportunity Act

(ECOA) claim against First Union seeking $1.5 million in

actual damages. At the ensuing trial after both sides had

rested, Huyssen and First Union each moved for a directed

verdict. The district court granted First Union’s motion and

dismissed Huyssen’s suit.

Some time after trial in 1988, Huyssen, using an alias, pre-

tended to apply for a loan at a First Union branch office in

Oklahoma. The branch manager advised Huyssen that

depreciation would be treated as non-taxable income in con-

nection with Huyssen’s purported loan application. There-

after, Huyssen moved the district court for a new trial on the

basis of this “newly discovered” evidence. The district court,

after considering affidavits from First Union, determined that

First Union's policy with regard to the treatment of deprecia-

tion as taxable versus non-taxable income had indeed changed

in 1987. Since that policy change was made well after

Huyssen’s 1984 application, however, the district court denied

Huyssen’s motion on the ground that the “newly discovered”

evidence would not have been impeaching or material to the

outcome of the case. Huyssen thereafter filed this timely

appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

The ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., prohibits discrimina-

tion on the basis of sex, marital status, age, race, color,

religion, national origin, receipt of public assistance benefits,

and the exercise of rights under the Consumer Credit Protec-

tion Act. A plaintiff may establish unlawful discrimination

under the ECOA under either the disparate impact theory or

the disparate treatment theory. See Griggs v. Duke Power

Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). On the facts presented by this

record, it appears that Huyssen sought to recover under a

disparate treatment theory rather than a disparate impact

theory. In either event, Huyssen has not established a viable

claim.

Assuming arguably that Huyssen did, in fact, establish a

prima facie case of discrimination against First Union, he has

consistently failed to come forth with any evidence other than

mere conjecture that First Union’s stated reason for denying

him credit was pretextual. On appeal, Huyssen continues to

argue that the “natural inference” to be drawn is that First

Union discriminated against him because he is German and a

Christian minister. Remarkably, however, Huyssen does not

contend that his application was treated differently than any

other self-employed loan applicant. At best, the most we are

able to discern from this record are Huyssen’s unsupported

allegations of discrimination, and as First Union points out,

assertions are no substitute for evidence. Accordingly,

because there was no question of fact to be determined by the

jury, we are unable to find error in the district court's directed

verdict in favor of First Union. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).

Huyssen also argues that the district court improperly

denied Huyssen’s motion for a new trial. A district court is

granted broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial,

and this Court will reverse only where there has been a clear

abuse of discretion. On the facts presented by this record, we

are unable to conclude that the district court abused its dis-

cretion in denying Huyssen’s motion for a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION

Concluding that Huyssen’s claim that he was unlawfully

denied credit because he is German and Christian is unsup-

ported by the evidence, we affirm the district court’s directed

verdict in favor of First Union. Further, because we find no

abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Huyssen’s

motion for a new trial, we do not disturb that ruling. The

judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

APPENDIX ‘B’

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BY THE DISTRICT COURT

(As dictated into the record at pp. 248-249 of the Trial Tran-

script.)

THE COURT: Okay. I understand your position. Don’t

argue your jury argument to me, I’m just interested in the

bare facts. ‘All right. We’ll take a recess; take a look at the

jury charges, and I'll — we'll probably visit on the jury

charges here, informally, if I do not grant the motion.

(Reporter’s Note: At 5:37 P.M., a recess was taken; at 5:45

P.M., court reconvened, out of the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, I have thought about the

motion for directed verdict, as I have done ever since plaintiff

rested, and have carefully reviewed, in my mind, all of the

evidence which has been presented to the court. And I con-

clude that there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury

could conclude that plaintiff has established that, in the pro-

cessing of this loan, that the defendant discriminated against

him by reason of his being a German national, or by reason of

his religious affiliation, and that, if this jury should come in

with a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, it would be my duty to

set it aside. Under those circumstanees, I grant the motion

for a directed verdict on behalf of the defendant, and will take

the case away from the jury. There is no probative evidence in

this case of intentional discrimination on the part of this defen-

dant in the processing of this loan. The only thing the plaintiff

has proved is that his loan was denied. The explanation offered

by the defendant has been totally unrebutted, unchallenged,

other than the calculation attempted by Dr. Duggar, whose

testimony is not of great benefit to the jury. Because, as |

commented a while ago, this is the defendant’s money that it’s

dealing with, and it can lay down whatever rules and regula-

tions, standards, requirements, that it wants when it lends its

money, provided it does not apply those standards unequally

and discriminate in the application of those standards, in the

words of the statute, on the basis of race, color, religion,

national origin, sex, or marital status, or age. | find no posi-

tive evidence, in this record, of any sort, that the defendant

has so discriminated. The motion is hereby granted. Get the

jury, Jim; we’re going home.

(Reporter's Note: The jury was returned to the courtroom

at 5:47 P.M., and the proceedings continued. )

THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, I’m going to

discharge you, at this time, and send you home.

APPENDIX ‘C’

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ULRICH HUYSSEN,

VERSUS

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE

CORPORATION

CIVIL ACTION NO. &6-77-A

JUDGMENT

This cause came on before the court for trial, the Honorable

John V. Parker, Chief Judge, presiding, and the court having

granted defendant’s oral motion for directed verdict,

IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGE AND DECREED that there

be judgment entered herein in favor of defendant, First Union

Mortgage Corporation, and against plaintiff, Ulrich Huyssen,

dismissing plaintiffs suit at plaintiffs costs.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, December 19, 1988.

sJJIOHN V. PARKER

John V. Parker, Chief Judge

Middle District of Louisiana

APPENDIX ‘D’

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ULRICH HUYSSEN

VERSUS

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

CIVIL ACTION NO. &86-77-A

RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

This matter is before the court on motion by plaintiff for

new trial. Defendant opposes the motion. There is no need for

oral argument.

The thrust of plaintiffs motion for new trial is that he has

newly discovered evidence which contradicts Ralph Richard-

son’s testimony that rental depreciation was treated as taxa-

ble income in calculating plaintiffs income-to-debt ratio in

accordance with defendant's policy. It seems that after the

trial plaintiff contacted a branch manager of one of defendant's

offices in Oklahoma, using the “pseudonym” of Steve Starr

and pretending to apply for a loan. The branch manager indi-

cated that rental depreciation would be treated as non-taxable

in connection with his proposed application for credit.

In determining whether a new trial should be granted on

the basis of newly discovered evidence, the court must con-

sider whether the new facts (1) would probably change the

outcome; (2) could have been discovered earlier with due dili-

gence; and (3) are merely cumulative or impeaching.

Johnston v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1986). Clearly,

plaintiffs motion must fall on all grounds. Moreover, the affi-

davits submitted by defendant in opposition to the motion

show that defendant's policy regarding the treatment of

depreciation changed in 1987, well past plaintiffs application

in 1984, which formed the basis for his ECOA action against

defendant. Therefore, this “new evidence” would not be

impeaching or material as to the outcome of the case.

In his motion, plaintiff claims that the court's action in

directing a verdict was contrary to the law and evidence.

Plaintiff has failed to brief this issue and it does not appear

that plaintiff has any grounds to support this broad conten-

tion. It suffices to say that plaintiff failed to present any evi-

dence (direct or circumstantial) to show that his national

origin or religion had any impact on defendant’s decision to

deny him credit, an essential element of his case. There is no

need for oral argument.

Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for new trial is hereby

DENIED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, February 21, 1989.

sJOHN V. PARKER

John V. Parker, Chief Judge

Middle District of Louisiana

APPENDIX ‘E’

Supreme Court of the United States

NO. A-495

ULRICH HUYSSEN.

Petitioner,

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel for

the petitioner,

IT IS ORDERED that the time for filing a petition for a

writ of certiorari in the above-entitled case, be and the same

is hereby, extended to and including February 5, 1990.

s BYRON R. WHITE

Byron R. White

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

of the United States

Dated this 4th day of January, 19990.

APPENDIX ‘F’

15 § 1691 CONSUMER CREDIT

SUBCHAPTER IV - EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY

§ 1691.

SCOPE OF PROHIBITION

Activities consiituting discrimination

(a) It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate

against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a

credit transaction—

(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,

sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant

has the capacity to contract);

(2) because all or part of the applicant's income derives

from any public assistance program; or

(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any

right under this chapter.

Activities not constituting discrimination

(b) It shall not constitute discrimination “r purposes of this

subchapter for a creditor—

(1) to make an inquiry of marital status if such inquiry is

for the purpose of ascertaining the creditor's rights

and remedies applicable to the particular extension

of credit and not to discriminate in a determination

of credit-worthiness;

(2) to make an inquiry of the applicant’s age or of

whether the applicant’s income derives from any

public assistance program if such inquiry is for the

purpose of determining the amount and probable

continuance of income levels, credit history, or other

pertinent element of credit-worthiness as provided

in regulations of the Board;

(3) to use any empirically derived credit system which

considers age if such system is demonstrably and

statistically sound in accordance with regulations of

the Board, except that in the operation of such sys-

tem the age of an elderly applicant may not be

assigned a negative factor or value; or

(4) to make an inquiry or to consider the age of an

elderly applicant when the age of such applicant is to

be used by the creditor in the extension of credit in

favor of such applicant.

Additional activities not constituting discrimination

(ec) Itis not a violation of this section for a creditor to refuse

to extend credit offered pursuant to—

(1) any credit assistance program expressly authorized

by law for an economically disadvantaged class of

persons,

(2) any credit assistance program administered by a

nonprofit organization for its members or an eco-

nomically disadvantaged class of persons; or

(3) any special purpose credit program offered by a

profit-making organization to meet special social

needs which meets standards prescribed in regula-

tions by the Board; if such refusal is required by or

made pursuant to such program.

Reason for adverse action; procedure applicable;

definition

(d)1) Within thirty days (or such longer reasonable time as

specified in regulations of the Board for any class of

credit transaction) after receipt of a completed applica-

tion for credit, a creditor shall notify the applicant of its

action on the application.

(2) Each applicant against whom adverse action is

taken shall be entitled to a statement of reasons for

such action from the creditor. A creditor satisfies

this obligation by—

(A) providing statements of reasons in writing as a

matter of course to applicants against whom

adverse action is taken; or

(B) giving written notification of adverse action

which discloses (i) the applicant’s right to a

statement of reasons within thirty days after

receipt by the creditor of a request made within

sixty days after such notification, and (ii) the

identity of the person or office from which such

statement may be obtained. Such statement

may be given orally if the written notification

advises the applicant of his right to have the

statement of reasons confirmed in writing on

written request.

(3) A statement of reasons meets the requirements of

this section nly if it contains the specific reasons for

the adverse action taken.

(4) Where a creditor has been requested by a third

party to make a specific extension of credit directly

or indirectly to an applicant, the notification and

statement of reasons required by this subsection

may be made directly by such creditor, or indirectly

through the third party, provided in either case that

the identity of the creditor is disclosed.

(5) The requirements of paragraph (2), (3), or (4) may be

statisfied by verbal statements or notifications in the

case of any creditor who did not act on more than

one hundred and fifty applications during the calen-

dar year preceding the calendar year in which the

adverse action is taken, as determined under regula-

tions of the Board.

(6) For purposes of this subsection, the term “adverse

action” means a denial or revocation of credit, a

change in the terms of an existing credit arrange-

ment, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the

amount or on substantially the terms requested.

Such term does not include a refusal to extend addi-

tional credit under an existing credit arrangement

where the applicant is delinquent or otherwise in

default, or where such additional credit would

exceed a previously established credit limit.

(Pub. L. 90-321, Title VII, § 701, as added Pub. L 93-495, Title

V § 503, Oct. 28, 1974, 88 Stat. 1521, and amended Pub.L.

94-239 § 2. Mar. 23, 1976, 90 Stat. 251).

§ 169la.

DEFINITIONS; RULES OF

CONSTRUCTION

(1) The definitions and rules of construction set forth in this

section are applicable for the purposes of this sub-

chapter.

(b) The term “applicant” means any person who applies to a

creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or con-

tinuation of credit, or applies to a creditor indirectly by

use of an existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a

previously established credit limit.

the Federal Reserve System.

(d) The term “credit” means the right granted by a creditor

to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debts

and defer its payment or to purchase property or ser-

vices and defer payment therefor.

(e) The term “creditor” means any person who regularly

extends, renews, or continues credit; any person who

regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or con-

tinuation of credit; or any assignee of an original creditor

who participates in the decision to extend, renew, or

continue credit.

(f) The term “person” means a natural person, a corpora-

tion, government or governmental subdivision or

agency, trust, estate, partnership, cooperative, or asso-

ciation.

(g) Any reference to any requirement imposed under this

subchapter or any provision thereof includes reference

to the regulations of the Board under this subchapter or

the provision thereof in question.

(Pub. L. 90-321, Title VII, § 702, as added Pub. L. 93-495, Title

V, § 503, Oct. 28, 1974, 88 Stat. 1522.)

§ 1691b.

PROMULGATION OF REGULATIONS

BY BOARD; ESTABLISHMENT OF

CONSUMER ADVISORY COUNCIL BY

BOARD; DUTIES, MEMBERSHIP,

ETC., OF COUNCIL

(a)

(b)

The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the

purposes of this subchapter. These regulations may con-

tain but are not limited to such classifications, differ-

entiation, or other provision, and may provide for such

adjustments and exceptions for any class of transac-

tions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or

proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to

prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to faciliate

or substantiate compliance therewith. In particular,

such regulations may exempt from one or more of the

provisions of this subchapter any class of transactions

not primarily for personal, family, or household pur-

poses, if the Board makes an express finding that the

application of such provision or provisions would not con-

tribute substantially to carrying out the purposes of this

subchapter. Such regulations shall be prescribed as soon

as possible after the date of enactment of this Act, but in

no event later than the effective date of this Act.

The Board shall establish a Consumer Advisory Council

to advise and consult with it in the exercise of its func-

tions under this chapter and to advise and consult with it

concerning other consumer related matters it may place

before the Council. In appointing the members of the

Council, the Board shall seek to achieve a fair represen-

tation of the interests of creditors and consumers. The

Council shall meet from time to time at the call of the

Board. Members of the Council who are not regular full-

time employees of theUnited States shall, while attend-

ing meetings of such Council, be entitled to receive com-

pensation at a rate fixed by the Board, but not exceeding

$100 per day, including travel time. Such members may

be allowed travel expenses, including transportation and

subsistence, while away from their homes or regular

place of business.

(Pub. L. 90-321, Title VII, § 703, as added Pub. L. 93-495, Title

V, § 503, Oct. 28, 1974, 88 Stat. 1522, and amended Pub. L.

94-239, § 3(a), Mar. 23, 1976, 90 Stat. 252.)

§ 1691c.

ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT

Enforcing agencies

(a) Compliance with the requirements imposed under this

subchapter shall be enforced under:

(1) Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, in

the case of—

(A) national banks, by the Comptroller of the Cur-

rency,

(B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System

(other than national banks), by the Board,

Corporation (other than members of the Federal

Reserve System), by the Board of Directors of

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

(2) Section 5(d) of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933,

section 407 of National Housing Act, and sections

6(i) and 17 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, by

the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (acting directly

or through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance

Corporation), in the case of any institution subject to

any of those provisions.

(3) The Federal Credit Union Act, by the Administrator

of the National Credit Union Administration with

respect to any Federal Credit Union.

(4) Subtitle IV of Title 49, by the Interstate Commerce

Commission with respect to any common carrier

subject to such subtitle.

(5) The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, by the Secretary

of Transportation with respect to any air carrier or

foreign air carrier subject to that Act.

(6) The Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 (except as

provided in Section 406 of that Act), by the Secre-

tary of Agriculture with respect to any activities

subject to that Act.

(7) The Farm Credit Act of 1971, by the Farm Credit

Administration with respect to any Federal land

bank, Federal land bank association, Federal inter-

mediate credit bank, and production credit associa-

tion;

(8) The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, by the Securi-

ties and Exchange Commission with respect to bro-

kers and dealers; and

(9) The Small Business Investment Act of 1958, by the

Small Business Administration, with respect to

small business investment companies.

Violations of subchapter deemed violations

of preexisting statutory requirements; additional

agency powers

(b)

For the purpose of the exercise by any agency referred

to in subsection (a) of this section of its powers under

any Act referred to in that subsection, a violation of any

requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be

deemed to be a violation of a requirement imposed under

that Act. In addition to its powers under any provision of

law specifically referred to in subsection (a) of this sec-

tion, each of the agencies referred to in that subsection

may exercise for the purpose of enforcing compliance

with any requirement imposed under this subchapter,

any other authority conferred on it by law. The exercise

of the authorities of any of the agencies referred to in

subsection (a) of this section for the purpose of enforcing

compliance with any requirement imposed under this

subchapter shall in no way preclude the exercise of such

authorities for the purpose of enforcing compliance with

any other provision of law not relating to the prohibition

of discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status

with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction.

Overall enforcement authority of Federal Trade

Commission

(c)

Except to the extent that enforcement of the require-

ments imposed under this subchapter is specifically com-

mitted to some other Government agency under

subsection (a) of this section, the Federal Trade Com-

mission shall enforce such requirements. For the pur-

pose of the exercise by the Federal Trade Commission of

its functions and powers under the Federal Trade Com-

mission Act, a violation of any requirement imposed

under this subchapter shall be deemed a violation of a

requirement imposed under that Act. All of the func-

tions and powers of the Federal Trade Commission

under the Federal Trade Commission Act are available

to the Commission to enforce compliance by any person

with the requirements imposed under this subchapter,

irrespective of whether that person is engaged in com-

merce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the

Federal Trade Commission Act, including the power to

enforce any Federal Reserve Board regulation

promulgated under this subchapter in the same manner

as if the violation had been a violation of a Federal Trade

Commission trade regulation rule.

Rules and regulations by

enforcing agencies

(d)

The authority of the Board to issue regulations under

this subchapter does not impair the authority of any

10f

other agency designated in this section to make rules

respecting its own procedures in enforcing compliance

with requirements imposed under this subchapter.

As amended Pub. L. 95-473, § 3(b), Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1466;

Pub.L. 98-443 § 9(n), Oct. 4, 1984, 98 Stat. 1708.)

§ 1691d.

APPLICABILITY OF OTHER LAWS

Requests for signature of husband and wife for creation of

valid lien, etc.

(a) A request for the signature of both parties to a marriage

for the purpose of creating a valid lien, passing clear

title, waiving inchoate rights to property, or assigning

earnings, shall not constitute discrimination under this

subchapter: Provided, however, That this provision shall

not be construed to permit a creditor to take sex or

marital status into account in connection with the eval-

uation of creditworthiness of any applicant.

State property laws affecting creditworthiness

(b) Consideration or application of State property laws

directly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness shall not

constitute discrimination for purposes of this sub-

chapter.

State laws prohibiting separate extension of consumer

credit to husband and wife

extension of consumer credit to each party to a marriage

shall not apply in any case where each party to a mar-

riage voluntarily applies for separate credit from the

lif

same creditor: Provided, That in any case where such a

State law is so preempted, each party to the marriage

shall be solely responsible for the debt so contracted.

Combining credit accounts of husband and wife with same

creditor to determine permissible finance charges or loan

ceilings under Federal or State laws

(d)

When each party to a marriage separately and volun-

tarily applies for and obtains separate credit accounts

with the same creditor, those accounts shall not be

aggregated or otherwise combined for purposes of deter-

mining permissible finance charges or permissible loan

ceilings under the laws of any State or of the United

States.

Election of remedies under subchapter or State law; nature

of relief determining applicability

(e)

Where the same act or omission constitutes a violation of

this subchapter and of applicable State law, a person

aggrieved by such conduct may bring a legal action to

recover monetary damages either under this subchapter

or under such State law, but not both. This eiection of

remedies shall not apply to court actions in which the

relief sought does not include monetary damages or to

administrative actions.

Compliance with inconsistent State laws; determination of

consistency

(f)

This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or

exempt any person subject to the provisions of this sub-

chapter from complying with, the laws of any State with

respect to credit discrimination, except to the extent

that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of

this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the incon-

12f

sistency. The Board is authorized to determine whether

such inconsistencies exist. The Board may not deter-

mine that any State law is inconsistent with any provi

sion of this subchapter if the Board determines that such

law gives greater protection to the applicant.

Ere mption hy requlation of credit transactions covered by

State law: failure to comply with State lau

ig) The Board shall by regulation exempt from the require-

ments of section 1691 and 1691a of this title any class of

credit transactions within any State if it determines that

under the law of that State that class of transactions is

subject to requirements substantially similar to those

imposed under this subchapter or that such law gives

greater protection to the applicant, and that there is

adequate provision for enforcement. Failure to comply

with any requirement of such State law in any transac

tion so exempted shall constitute a violation of this sub

chapter for the purposes of section 169le of this title

(Pub. L. 90-321, Title VII, § 705. as added Pub. L. 93-495, Title

V. § 508, Oct. 28, 1974, 88 Stat. 1523. and amended Pub. L

94-239, $5. Mar. 23. 1976. 90 Stat. 253.)

> 169le.

CIVIL LIABILITY

Individual or class action for actua' damage .

(a) Any creditor who fails to comply with any requirement

imposed under this subchapter shall be liable to the

aggrieved applicant for any actual damages sustained by

such applicant acting either in an individual capacity or

as a member of a class.

13f

Recovery of punitive damages in individual and class

actions for actual damages; exemptions; maximum amount

of punitive damages in individual actions; limitation on

total recovery in class actions; factors determining amount

of award

(b) Any creditor, other than a government or governmental

subdivision or agency, who fails to comply with any

requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be lia-

ble to the aggrieved applicant for punitive damages in an

amount not greater than $10,000, in addition to any

actual damages provided in subsection (a) of this section,

except that in the case of a class action the total recovery

under this subsection shall not exceed the lesser of

$500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor.

In determining the amount of such damages in any

action, the court shall consider, among other relevant

factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the

frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by

the creditor, the resources of the creditor, the number of

persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the

creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.

Action for equitable and declaratory relief

‘c) Upon application by an aggrieved applicant, the appro-

priate United States district court or any other court of

competent jurisdiction may grant such equitable and

declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the require-

ments imposed under this subchapter.

Recovery of costs and attorney fees

(d) In the case of any successful, action under subsection

(a), (b), or (c) of this section, the costs of the action,

together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined

by the court, shall be added to any damages awarded by

the court under such subsection.

; ‘ij ‘7; ,

r ;

; ; sj ; ; ;

j ; ; ’ ’

; , " r / ;

j ; j ; ‘ ‘ J ’ ;

ij ; ;

: ; # | : ’ : ; ’ ’ ; 4 ’

j : ;

7 : ,

P . a cet re , 9 tort " ¥ ' * ,? :

; : j . :

_— ‘ >) .% ‘4 r- rs a ’ " ; ahi ’ ’

: ‘ | : '

: : “AF

. thor ‘ thy | art 7 ™ eh ry ’ " >

; :

ey rootat . y ror. . , * ?? : , sf : "se

: b/s : ’ _ «s ,

; , . ; > " ; >

’ ’ ‘ rT ‘ rT : ' .

: j ‘iy iu

| +? ‘ , ry? rr ' oT ’ , rer

sf ; : : : s) : ;

: ’ - |

’ Ali ‘ ’ ; ; r ria ryy gt ’ :

j ir’ : ’ i? | : | ' '

‘ fey Tr ¥ > ’ 7? oF 4 ; 4 |

> > ” ° .

: 4 7 ; , 4 4 | ry’ 2¢). : :

: : ‘ . ”

" ; ;

: . ’ ; |

15f

then any applicant who has been a victim of the discrimi-

nation which is the subject of such proceeding or civil

action may bring an action under this section not later

than one year after the commencement of that proceed-

ing or action.

Request by responsible enforcement agency to Attorney

General for civil action

(g) The agencies having responsibility for administrative

enforcement under section 169lc of this title, if unable to

obtain compliance with section 1691 of this title, are

authorized to refer the matter to the Attorney General

with a recommendation that an appropriate civil action

be instituted.

Authority for Attorney General to bring civil action;

jurisdiction

(h) When a matter is referred to the Attorney General pur-

suant to subsection (g) of this section, or whenever he

has reason to believe that one or more creditors are

engaged in a pattern or practice in violation of this sub-

chapter, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in

any appropriate United States district court for such

relief as may be appropriate, including injunctive relief.

Recovery under both subchapter and fair housing

enforcement provisions prohibited for violation based on

same transaction

(i) No person aggrieved by a violation of this subchapter

and by a violation of section 3605 of Title 42 shall recover

under this subchapter and section 3612 of Title 42, if

such violation is based on the same transaction.

APPENDIX ‘G’

IN THE

NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

17 r T 4a °T

UNPrUNALIUN

ACTION NO. &e

wr .

SECTION ‘A

‘ 7 \ Vit ‘

’

‘+

’ r a ' 2) r ,

~ a bs ©c\ ccr ict sa lar i,t

i’ { ’ r 4 ar '

. if ¥ eet pr Der Iu

‘ 4 »

i ECOA i g denied Pla

- >

i ’ ‘ rs r 1 > wea «

‘ : ‘Dp -

‘| r p p) a i ; 1 i |

y ‘ iT ry re Vf

8. For the purposes of this action, the plaintiff, ULRICH

HUYSSEN, is an “Applicant” by definition under the provi-

sions of 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b).

IV. DEFENDANT

9. The defendant, FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPO-

RATION, is a business corporation, domiciled at Union Plaza

Cont-1, Charlotte, North Carolina 28288, engaged in the busi-

ness of lending money and/or extending credit, authorized to

do [and at all times applicable to this action is doing] business

in the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana,

through its “Branch Office” at 3636 South Sherwood Forest

Boulevard, Suite 690, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816; and,

therefore, is subject to the jurisdiction and venue of this

Court.

10. The defendant, FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPO-

RATION, may be served with process through:

Prentice-Hall Corporation System

1006 Hibernia Bank Building

New Orleans, Louisiana 70112,

its legally designated agent for service of process.

11. At all times relevant hereto, the defendant, FIRST

UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION, in the ordinary

course of its business, regularly extended, offered to extend,

arranged or offered to arrange the extension of credit to its

customers for which a finance charge is or may be imposed.

Therefore, for the purposes of this action, the defendant,

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION, is a “cred-

itor” by definition under the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 169la(e).

V. FACTUAL STATEMENT

12. Plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, after seeing and read

ing several advertisements in the daily local newspapers b:

which the defendant, FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPO

RATION, advertised, under Classified Ads, to extend credit

at 12.5% APR SECOND MORTGAGES, the plaintiff

ULRICH HUYSSEN, responding to the Defendant's adver

;

isements for customers appearing in the daily local news

papers, on August 29, 1984, made an application to the

defendant, FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

through its Branch Office, for an extension of credit aggregat

ing Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred and No/100 Dollars

S30) GOO OO” to ne sect “ed hy cert In re: estate as en Tera

. i Y ILaili i al a a Lida |

a is Wlll more [Tully appear DY reference to |{( nN

‘ ‘ A” ‘ P a ‘TT A’

{ { ) ' » { } i °

} y ‘ {)} { ) 4 i | {7y~ l?

y y

f ‘

| ~ ’ " y ’

I t

7 7 a ’ ’

tal t

| |

| ‘ , ; ’ ‘ b 4 | ;

mA! i ‘ 4 oP

y r"< r"<

' wY’s y y

| | ~ A

: ~ \ ’

‘ A” ‘ "

unlawful, willful and intentional discrimination against Plain-

tiff, with respect to the credit transaction, on the basis of

religion and national origin, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §

1691(a)(1), the Plaintiff, at all times relevant hereto, being not

devoid the capacity to contract.

VI. STATEMENT OF CLAIM

15. Defendant, FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORA-

TION, has unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff,

ULRICH HUYSSEN, with respect to the aforementioned

credit transaction, on basis of religon and national origin, in

violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).

16. Defendant, FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORA-

TION, is liable to plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, for actual

damages in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thou-

sand and No/100 Dollars ($1,500,000.00), plus legal interest

thereon from date of judicial demand until paid.

17. In addition to actual damages, the defendant, FIRST

UNION CREDIT MORTGAGE CORPORATION, is liable to

the plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, for punitive damages in

the amount of Ten Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($10,000.00),

plus legal interest thereon from date of judicial demand until

paid, all in accordance with the provisions of 15 U.S.C. §

1691(e)(b).

lk. Defendant, FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORA-

TION, is liable to the plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, for the

costs and expenses incurred by him in the prosecuting of this

action; and for attorneys’ fees at the rate of One Hundred

Seventy-five Dollars ($175.00) per hour, or an amount equal to

not less than One Third (%) of the gross amount of the aggre-

gate damages that may be awarded Plaintiff by the Court,

whichever is greater, all in accordance with the provisions of

15 U.S.C. § 1691le(d).

VIl. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON ALL ISSUES

19. The plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, as provided by

Rule 3&8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United

States District Courts (28 U.S.C.), requests trial by jury in

the above captioned action.

Vill. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN,

respectfully prays that this Court:

a) Adjudge and decree that defendant, FIRST UNION

MORTGAGE CORPORATION, did, in fact, unlawfully dis-

criminate against plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, on the

asis of religion and/or national origin, with respect to the

credit transaction on which this action is predicated, in viola

ion of 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).

b) Award judgment in favor of plaintiff, ULRICH

HUYSSEN, and against the defendant, FIRST UNION

MORTGAGE CORPORATION, for actual damages in the

amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand and No/100

Dollars ($1,500,000.00), plus legal interest thereon from date

of judicial demand until paid.

c) Award judgment in favor of plaintiff, ULRICH

HUYSSEN, and against the defendant, FIRST UNION

MORTGAGE CORPORATION, for punitive damages in the

amount of Ten Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($10,000.00), pius

legal interest tne! yn from date of judicial demand untill pala

d) Award judgment in faver of plaintiff, ULRICH

HUYSSEN, and against the defendant, FIRST UNION

MORTGAGE CORPORATION, for all costs and expenses

that incurred by the Plaintiff in the prosecution of this action.

e) Award judgment in favor of plaintiff, ULRICH

HUYSSEN, and against the defendant, FIRST UNION

MORTGAGE CORPORATION, for attorneys’ fees at the rate

of One Hundred Seventy-five and No/100 Dollars ($175.00) per

hour, or for an amount equal to not less than One Third (¥3) of

the gross amount of the aggregate damages that may be

awarded the Plaintiff by the Court in this action, whichever is

greater.

(f) For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just, fit and proper.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

sJOHNNIE A. JONES

Johnnie A. Jones, Trial Attorney

JONES & JONES

Taylor Building, Suite 215

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: (504) 383-8573

DATED: February 11, 1986

re) g

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

LOAN PROCESSING REPORT (2ND) MORTGAGE

APPLICATION DATE: 08/29/84

SUBMISSION DATE: 09/18/84

FROM (BRANCH): Baton Rouge, LA (ACCT. #): 048-018436

NAME: Ulrich Huyssen & wife, Gisela Propp Huyssen

ADDRESS: 4221 Rue de Valeur, Baker, Louisiana 70714

PROPERTY ADDRESS: 514 Myrtle Street, Baker, Louis:

ana 70714

MAIL PAYMENT BOOK TO: 4221 Rue de Valeur, Baker,

Louisiana 70714

PMT. VIA BANK DRAFT YES {fi NO

SOURCE (NAME): Baton Rouge Mortgage (CODE

AMT. REQUESTED: $30,640.00

FEES

POINTS

MIS.: $60.00

ATTN Y.: $200.00

INS. PREMIUM SIN‘

TOTAL CHECK: $30,900. 01

INTEREST RATE: 12

PAYMENTS: 12 $452

PAYRA(‘k

A RFS y i>

INS. COVERAGE: - 0 -

PMT. VIA BANK DRAFT: ([) YES [kj NO

Mrs. no S.S. #

Blank Financial Stmt.

GENERAL INFORMATION

(FOR BRANCH’S COMPLETION)

MAKE CHECK PAYABLE TO: Ulrich & Gisela Huyssen &

H. Matthew Chambers, Attorney

CONTINGENCIES

<x] PENDING CURRENT & SATISFACTORY IST

MORTG. BALANCE NOT TO EXCEED: $11,000.00

<; PENDING THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DOC-

UMENTATION: Homeowners to show FUMC as 2nd

mortgagee. Both husband and wife to sign Application and

pending receiving signed copy of ARM form that was sent

» customer 1n Mall.

MISC

CREDIT DECISION (GENERAL OFFICE USE ONL}

APPROVED

Valid Pay Debts Indicated Close Credit Lines

Eliminate Credit Cards Commitment Basis Only

(Jtner

PENDING

REJECTED

L’naeceptable Credit Ratings Excessive Use of Credit

l0g

«x Income Debt Ratio (1) Loan/ Value Unacceptable

| Value of Property © Job Staility () Out Of Policy

tequest _ Other

Signed (Approved) s R.E. REILAND

R.E. Reiland, Need Title

DATE: 9-20-84

COMPLAINT EXHIBIT A)

lig

FIRST UNION

October §, 1954

Mr. & Mrs. Ulrich Huyssen

514 Myrtle Street

Baker, Louisiana 70714

RE: Loan application with First Union Mortgage Corporation

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Huyssen:

We regret to inform you that we cannot place your loan at

this time. Federal law requires us to provide certain notices to

each applicant that has been denied credit or that have volun-

tarily withdrawn their application. Attached you will find a

copy of this notice.

We do appreciate your considering us, and hopefully in the

near future we can be of service.

Very truly yours,

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

«BRIAN HOLLENBACK

Brian Hollenback, Manager

BH:t)

Enclosure

COMPLAINT EXHIBIT B

APPENDIX ‘H

endant’c reacnr

ia ’

t net 1.4

| ’ ; of

: j ]

ne reocit ¢ tho I

i i

] ry . ‘ ;

~ . "y ;

i , 9

TTT - —_ P

/ ‘

, 4 “4 im]

1”

against Plaintiff based on national origin and/or reli-

gion, in circumvention of the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. §

1691 et seq.

10. The documents submitted to the Home Office of

FIRST UNION by the Baton Rouge Branch Man-

ager for Approval of Plaintiffs loan met (meet) all of

the “Standards of Creditworthiness” described in

FIRST UNION’s Lending Policy Manual; and Plain-

tiffs Income to Debt Ratio was calculated to show

$2,881.02 of adjusted monthly income available to

service $2,595.70 monthly debt, which is an income

to debt ratio of 1.11; and adequately met (meets)

FIRST UNION’S guidelines.

11. At all times applicable to this action, the FIRST

UNION was not acting in ignorance of Plaintiffs

national origin, nor his religious affiliation.

12. Based on the evidence to be adduced on the trial of

this action, the sole inference to be drawn, or conclu-

sion to be reached, as grounds for FIRST UNION’s

failure of compliance, or for its denial of Plaintiffs

mortgage loan application and refusal to extend

Plaintiff credit was (is) a pretext for unlawful dis-

rimination ayainst Plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN,

based on national origin (German), and/or religion (a

Gospel Minister” of the Interdenominational Mis-

n Association), in violation of the Equal Credit

pportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq

DEFENDANT CLAIMS

SSENTIAL ELEMENTS: Defendant agrees that

> > ~* > >

rin tne essentlai eiel

rs riy <e ents oO

of the Federal Reserve Board

evaluating Huyssen’s credit

considered no prohibited fact

the effect of discriminatir

of applicants. Instead, First

requirements of ECOA

In reviewing and evaluating Huyssen’s credit appli-

cations, First Union’s underwriter reviewed the

applicant’s credit history, the value of the proposed

collateral in relation to the amount of the loan

sought, the applicant's income-to-debt ratio, and the

applicant’s job security.

Whenever an applicant is self-employed, First Union

calculates and evaluates the applicant’s income on a

basis of his past two year’s federal income tax

In reviewing and evaluating the income-to-debt

ratio, In connection with Huyssen’s 1984 loan appli

ition, First Union’s underwriter calculated

Huyssen’s income-to-debt ratio, based on the

1983-1982 federal income tax returns submitted by

Huyssen with his loan appliation. The sole reason

Huyssen’s loan application was denied was for insuf-

ficient income-to-debt ratio, based on calculations

taken from Huyssen’s federal income tax returns

lhe calculations made by First Union's underwriter

were based on its standard formula used by First

Union in calculating income-to-debt ratio on the

basis of tax returns for self-employed applicants

First Union uniformly applies its credit evaluatior

riteria to all loan applicants, and these same crit

ria were applied to Huyssen’s applicatio1

‘FIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Defendants asserts as its affirmative defens«

comphance with the ECOA

Although plaintiff was an applicant and defe:

ereditor for purposes ol ECOA and plaintiff ay

: ' ; : : .

to defendant fora loan, defendant reiected plair

laon anialr, sont las +f A — + + ,

1Oan SOleL\ be ause plaintiff did no ef ne sis

tent criteria, applied Dy defendant t 4 ipy

7 First Union does business in East Baton Rouge Parish,

Louisiana; and has a branch office at 3636 South Sher

wood Forest Boulevard, Suite 690, Baton Rouge, Louis!

ana 70816

, sant 4} . lint; ne nro?

This Court has jurisdiction; and venue Is proper

i WU VUSts i> a j is a i

; . .

+ » {

inder tne (le ’ tor cyt 15 I ~ | ~ 1bYlal«

1¢ ‘ L’ + + ‘ I + }

‘ ‘ .

lr alt \ug ls 1934, Tiuyvssen contacted Dato vouye

\f > >*? > > >

‘ 7 ' , y y |

yiortgage Compal nan attemt] ) ODta i Sé

m -+ + + 47 \ +

f rtg ive ay! 7 Tne prope! cated 1 yi4 | : ‘

. Dd '

SLTete Hbaker, Loulslana

‘ | . | . + >

ry lve Vi rtivgage Was al 4 iepel 1e7 i! ? - }

> > LJ . 4s? . > > ‘

, rn Dasis nu ~I-¥ ~ a ra ng rorory

J Loi pct , ’

4 iT ’ ‘ L] ‘ ;

) i™ } " y\? |

i ‘AUP U fo : 1U ~¢ 8) t rif

T> T>

‘ . . D, . | £4

I I ry ly lisla i Dra

s 7 ” ‘ ’ ' ry rt¢ ive ,7 , ay = 4 lred ,

, ¥ ory? ris | 4 ] ‘

, AG ’

> , = r

41 7

17.

18.

19.

20.

a |

10h

Shortly after November 11, 1984, Huyssen received a

second ECOA notice, stating that his application was

denied for the basis of insufficient income to debt ratio.

First Union Home Equity Corporation (“First Union”)

was named “First Union Mortgage Corporation” until

February 2, 1987, at which time the corporate name was

changed.

At the time of Huyssen’s application, and at the present

time, Ralph E. Richardson (“Richardson”) is First

Union’s Director of Credit.

Richardson was the Director for First Union since 1975.

VI. CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACTS:

The contested issues of facts are:

Whether the Plaintiff qualified, or met the require-

ments, for the loan under the criteria, the “Standards of

Creditworthiness,” spelled out in Defendant’s Lending

Policy Manual?

Whether the reasons given by Defendant for its failure

of compliance, the denial of Plaintiffs second mortgage

loan application and its refusal and failure of extension of

credit to Plaintiff, were “pretext” for unlawful discrimi-

nation?

The amount of actual damages to which Plaintiff is enti-

tled, including, but not limited to lost profits and lost

appreciation.

Whether Defendant's failure of compliance entitle Plain-

tiff to recovery of punitive damages, in addition to actual

damages, against the Defendant as provided by ECOA,

15 U.S.C. § 169le(b)?

Whether Plaintiff tried or undertook any action to miti-

gate his damages?

llh

VII. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW:

The contested issues of law are:

Whether the Defendant eluded to a method of calcula-

tion of Plaintiffs income to debt ratio with the purpose of

evading the requirements of ECOA, or whether in the

absence of purposeful discrimination, equitable relief is

necessary to enforce the requirements imposed by

ECOA?

Whether Defendant, in its failure of compliance, acted

contrary to its own guidelines spelled out in its Lending

Policy Manual and by so doing acted in reckless dis-

regard of the requirements of ECOA even though there

was no specific intention to discriminate against Plaintiff

on unlawful grounds; but, nevertheless, Plaintiff is enti-

tled to recovery of both actual and punitive damages as

provided by ECOA under Section 169le(a) and (b)?

Whether any specific intent to discriminate or statistical

showing of adverse impact on protected class is neces-

sary to establish prima facie case of violation under

ECOA?

Whether ECOA imposes a duty upon Plaintiff to under-

take measures to mitigate his damages?

VIIl. EXHIBITS AND WITNESSES:

The parties attach the following as appendices to the pre-

trial order:

Lists or schedules of all exhibits that will be offered in

evidence at the trial.

1. The lists shall describe the exhibits sufficiently for

ready identification.

2. The lists shall indicate those exhibits agreed by the

parties to be admissible at trial.

12h

With respect to each exhibit on the lists, counsel

shall either agree as to admissibility of the exhibit or

reach such stipulation as to the exhibit are as possi-

ble.

If a party objects to an exhibit to be offered against

him, he shall note his objection immediately under

the listing of the exhibit, as part of the list. The

notation shal! include citations to the Federal Rules

of Evidence and other legal authorities supporting

the objection.

At trial should any party fail to introduce any

exhibit on his list, any other party may introduce

that exhibit, even if he did not place the exhibit on

his exhibit list.

(B)—List of witnesses, except impeachment witnesses but

including rebuttal witnesses, with their addresses.

The parties shall divide their witnesses into “Will

Call” and “May Call” witnesses. Any party listing a

person on his “ Will Call” list shall bear the responsi-

bility of producing that witness at trial. At trial,

should any party fail to call any witness on his “Will

Call” list, any other party may call that person as his

witnesses, even if he did not list the person on his

list.

2. The following provisions shall apply to EXPERT wit-

nesses:

(a) With respect to expert witnesses. . . names and

written reports of such experts Plaintiff intends

to call will be furnished to opposing counsel at

least sixty (60) days before the pretrial confer-

ence; Defendant shall furnish to opposing coun-

sel names and written reports of such experts it

expects to call at least thirty (30) days before the

pretrial conference.

13h

(b) All expert witnesses, . . . who will testify must

submit written reports so that the parties can

comply with this order.

nesses.

1. A final list of “Will Call” witnessess should be for-

warded to opposing counsel and filed with the clerk

of Court ten (10) days before trial; all “May Call”

witnesses will be deleted at that time. This restric-

tion shall not apply to impeachment witnesses.

IX.

NO EXHIBIT OR WITNESS (except those for impeach-

ment purposes) SHALL BE USED AT TRIAL UNLESS

LISTED IN THE PRETRIAL ORDER, except for good

cause shown. A “reservation of rights” to call witnesses or to

introduce exhibits on the witness list or exhibit list of another

party SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE A LISTING IN THE

PRETRIAL ORDER.

The following amendments to the pleadings are allowed:

None. .

XI.

The following additional matters, to aid in the disposition of

the action, were determined: None.

XII.

The probable length of the trial this case is four (4) DAYS.

14h

APPROVED BY:

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

sJJOHNNIE A. JONES

Johnnie A. Jones, Trial Attorney

and

Ann 8.B. Jones

JONES & JONES,

Attorneys at Law

Taylor Building, Suit 215

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: 504/383-8573

Attorneys for Defendant:

sJOSE R. TARAJANO, JR.

Kelly Wilkinson

and

Jose R. Tarajano, Jr.

RUBIN, CURRY, COLVIN & JOSEPH

A Professional Law Corporation

One American Place, Suite 1400

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825

Telephone: 504/383-1400

15h

APPENDIX ‘4’

JOINT LIST OF EXHIBITS:

Exhibit

1. August 29, 1984, Credit Application, with no attach-

ments.

Exhibit

2. Calculation of Income-to-debt ratio accompanying orig-

inal credit application.

Exhibit

3. Original computerized Credit Report.

Exhibit

4. Appraisal by Brian Hollenback of property at 514 Myrtle

Street, Baker, Louisiana.

Exhibit

5. Unsigned equity/value sheet entitled “Huyssen Rental

Income.”

Exhibit

6. | Copy of Ulrich Huyssen’s 1983 personal financial state-

ment.

Exhibit

7. Copy of list of rental property signed by Ulrich

Huyssen.

16h

Exhibit

8. | Copy of residential lease of 514 Myrtle Street, Baker,

Louisiana.

Exhibit

9. Copy of Lending Policy Manual, which applied to

Huyssen’s application and was used by First Union dur-

ing 1984.

Exhibit

10. Deposition of Brian D. Hollenback, taken on Friday,

February 26, 1987. The parties stipulated to the

admissibility of the deposition, in lieu of live testimony,

on the grounds that Mr. Hollenback is no longer an

employee of First Union Mortgage Corporation; and, to

the best of the parties’ knowledge, he now resides in

Florida, outside the subpoena power of this Court.

Exhibit

ll. Copy of ECOA notice, dated October 8, 1984, Notice of

adverse action.

Exhibit

12. Huyssen letter dated November 5, 1984.

Exhibit

13. Copy of November 12, 1984, second ECOA notice.

17h

APPENDIX ‘B’

FIRST UNION LIST OF WITNESSES

First Union will call the following witnesses at trial:

Ralph E. Richardson

(Affidavit does not give street address)

Indian Trail, North Carolina 28079

Ms. Pamela Kinamore

Business Address:

3636 South Sherwood Forest Boulevard, Suite 690

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816

Mr. Wendell Foushee

Business Address:

4911 Bennington Avenue

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808

Home Address:

1262 Glasgow Avenue

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808

First Union may call the following witneses for trial:

Lane Manning

7960 Wrenwood

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

David James Englund

14317 Royal Oak Avenue

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816

18h

Ms. Diane P. Furr

Business Address:

First Union Corporation

Legal Division

Charlotte, North Carolina 28288

Mr. Alan W. Martin

c/o Richard M. Lawrence

4526 Pearl Road

Prairieville, Louisiana 70769

Mr. Donald Ray Singleton

and Ms. Lorraine Singleton

c/o Raymond L. Simmons

1606 Scenic Highway

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802

19h

APPENDIX ‘C’

FIRST UNION’S LIST OF EXHIBITS:

First Union plans to offer the following Exhibits into evi-

dence at the trial:

Exhibit

The following attachments to the August 29, 1984 credit

application of Ulrich Huyssen:

1.1. First Union’s Loan Processing Report;

1.2 First Union’s Mortgage Verification to Fidelity National

Bank;

1.3. A copy of excerpts of Ulrich Huyssen’s and Gisela P.

Huyssen’s 1983 Federal Income Tax Return;

1.4 <A copy of excerpts of Ulrich Huyssen’s and Gisela P.

Huyssen’s 1982 Federal Income Tax Return;

1.5 First Union Mortgage Company’s form, Adjustable

Rate Mortgage Loan Information Sheet.

Exhibit

2. Copies of foreclosures and/or sheriffs sales, occurring in

the 19th Judicial District Court, East Baton Rouge Par-

ish, Louisiana, of immovable property owned by Ulrich

Huyssen, et ux, and/or World Mission for Jesus, since

August 29, 1984 to the present time:

2.1 Certified copy of proces verbal in Suit No. 305,781 —

First Bank Mortgage vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial District

Court.

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.6

2.9

2.10

2.11

20h

Certified copy of proces verbal in Suit No. 319,084 —

Federal Home Loan vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial District

Court.

Certified copy of proces verbal in Suit No. 319,435 —

Federal Home Loan vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial District

Court.

Certified copy of petition and sequestration order in Suit

No. 324,187 — FSLIC vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial Dis-

trict Court.

Certified copy of petition and amended petition in Suit

No. 324, 645 — Horizon Federal vs. Huyssen, 19th Judi-

cial District Court.

Certified copy of petition and order for writ of sale and

seizure in Suit No. 324,730 — First Bank Mortgage

Company vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 319,084 — Federal

Home Loan vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 319,435 — Federal

Home Loan vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 324,187 — F SLIC

vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 324,645 — Horizon

Federal vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 324,730 — First

Bank Mortgage Company vs. Huyssen, 19th Judicial

District Court.

NOTE: Plaintiff objects to th. exhibit as irrelevant and

immaterial and prejudicial, citing Rules 402 and 403 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.

21h

Exhibit

Appraisals of the following rental properties owned by

Ulrich Huyssen, et ux:

514 Myrtle Street, Baker, Louisiana

4920 Oaklan Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

2413 Boxwood Street, Baker, Louisiana

3641 Cooledge Street, Baker, Louisiana

5012 Sumrall Street, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

4416 Ashland Street, Baker, Louisiana

5366 Rickover Street, Baker, Louisiana

4509 Greenwood Street, Baker, Louisiana

NOTE: Plaintiff objects to this exhibit as irrelevant and

immaterial and prejudicial, citing Rules 402 and 403 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.

Exhibit

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

Certified copies of all petitions filed by Huyssen in rental

collection suits from January 1, 1987 to the present time.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 325,517 — Ulrich

Huyssen vs. Jeffrey Jones, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 320,813 — Huyssen

vs. Spangler, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 320,815 — Huyssen

vs. Ross, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 323,045 — Huyssen

vs. Clark, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 323,047 — Huyssen

vs. Stokes, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 323,048 — Huyssen

vs. Gates, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 323,298 — Huyssen

vs. Smith, 19th Judicial District Court.

4.8

4.9

4.10

4.11

4.12

4.13

4.14

4.15

4.16

4.17

4.18

4.19

4.20

4.21

22h

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 323,299 — Huyssen

vs. Singleton, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 323,795 — Huyssen

vs. Thompson, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 323,797 — Huyssen

vs. Martin, 19th Judicial District Court. ae:

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 316,661 — Huyssen

vs. Carney, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 311,377 — Huyssen

vs. Jones, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 311,800 — Huyssen

vs. McCrary, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 311,975 — Huyssen

vs. Lockwood, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 312,691 — Huyssen

vs. Anthony, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 317,691 — Huyssen

vs. Coleman, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 317,827 — Huyssen

vs. Robique, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 318,649 — Huyssen

vs. Kendrick, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 318,651 — Huyssen

vs. Samuel, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 319,971 — Huyssen

vs. Lann, 19th Judicial District Court.

Certified copy of petition in Suit No. 320,380 — Huyssen

vs. Cobb, 19th Judicial District Court.

23h

NOTE: Plaintiff objects to this exhibit as irrelevant and

immaterial and prejudicial, citing Rules 402 and 403 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.

Exhibit

5. Expert Report of Wendell Foushee, dated July 6, 1988.

24h

APPENDIX ‘D’

HUYSSEN’S LIST OF WITNESSES:

The plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, will call the following

witnesses at trial:

1. Ulrich Huyssen, Plaintiff

2823 Westerwood Drive

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816

Dr. Jan W. Duggar

Duggar & Associates, Inc.

9613 Interline Avenue

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809

3. Mrs. Judith Harrison

4452 Beaver Creek Drive

Greenwell Springs, Louisiana 70739

4. Jake LaBello

172 Tallwood Drive

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816

25h

APPENDIX ‘E’

HUYSSEN’S LIST OF EXHIBITS

Plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, plans to offer, in addition

to the exhibits enumerated in Appendix ‘A’ (the Joint List of

Exhibits), the following exhibits into evidence at the trial.

Exhibit

1. Income Tax Return (a copy), complete as filed by Ulrich

Huyssen and Gisela P. Huyssen for the taxable year,

1983.

Exhibit

2. Income Tax Return (a copy), complete as filed by Ulrich

Huyssen and Gisela P. Huyssen for the taxable year,

1982.

Exhibit

3. Affidavit Anlaysis and Calculation of Huyssen’s “Income

to Debt Ratio” by the expert witness, Dr. Jan Warren

Duggar, dated March 27, 1987.

Evrhibit

4. An Analysis of Ulrich Huyssen’s Loan Request made to

First Union Mortgage Corporation, prepared for

Huyssen’s by Dr. Jan Warren Duggar, dated June 16,

1988.

Exhibit

5. Sale With Assumption of Mortgage and Mortgage, from

Hall to Huyssen dated March 18, 1982.

APPENDIX ‘7’

JUDICIARY - PROCEDURE

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

FEDERAL QUESTION

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.

APPENDIX ‘J’

APPLICATION FOR CREDIT

DATE: 8/29/84

INSURED: L) YES NO

SOURCE: Baton Rouge Mtg.

(J INDIVIDUAL CREDIT — Not relying on the asset of

another person as the basis

for repayment of the credit

requested. Complete sec-

tions A, C, and D.

<x] JOINT CREDIT WITH ANOTHER PERSON — Com-

plete Sections A, B, C, and D.

AMOUNT REQUESTED: 30,900

PURPOSE OF LOAN: Misc. Improvements to Rental

TERM (YRS.): 10 - 12.5 ART

SECTION A - INFORMATION REGARDING

APPLICANT

NAME (FIRST, MIDDLE, LAST): Ulrich Huyssen

AGE: 40

BIRTHDATE: 3/14/44

PRESENT ADDRESS: 4221 Rue De Valeur

YEARS THERE: 7-1/2

SOC. SEC. NO.: 333-42-1407

CITY: Baker

STATE: LA

ZIP: 70714

TELEPHONE NUMBER: 504-775-3216 / 775-1243

PREVIOUS ADDRESS: N/A

YEARS THERE:

MARRIED () UNMARRIED () SEPARATED

NAME OF YOUR BANK: Ist State Bnk. of Baker

CHECKING SAVINGS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER:

World Missions for Jesus

TELEPHONE NUMBER: 504-775-3216

POSITION OR TITLE: Missionary

LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT: 16 Years Months

PRESENT SALARY OR COMMISSION: () Net Gross

$14,500 Plus Hse. per yr.

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS: 5

AGES OF DEPENDENTS: 33, 17, U1, 3, 1

ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT, OR SEPARATE MAINTE-

NANCE INCOME NEED NOT BE REVEALED IF YOU

DO NOT WISH TO HAVE IT CONSIDERED AS A BASIS

Se oe

FOR REPAYING THIS OBLIGATION. ALIMONY,

CHILD SUPPORT, SEPARATE MAINTENANCE RE-

CEIVED UNDER: COURT ORDER [J WRITTEN

AGREEMENT (J ORAL UNDERSTANDING L}

OTHER INCOME: $67,558 per yr.

SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME: Rental

IS ANY INCOME LISTED IN THIS SECTION LIKELY

TO BE REDUCED BEFORE THE CREDIT REQUESTED

IS PAID OFF? YES LJ (EXPLAIN ON SEPARATE

SHEET) NOC)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PREVIOUS EMPLOYER: N/

YEARS THERE:

NAME OF NEAREST RELATIVE NOT LIVING WITH

YOU: Erika Huyssen

ADDRESS: Natruter St. 12 45 Osnabrueck, W. Germany

RELATIONSHIP: Mother

SECTION B - INFORMATION REGARDING JOINT

APPLICANT OR OTHER PARTY

NAME (FIRST, MIDDLE, LAST): Gisela Propp Huyssen

AGE: 33

BIRTHDATE: 7/19/51

PRESENT ADDRESS: 4221 Rue De Valeur

YEARS THERE: 7-1/2 _

SOC. SEC. NO.:

CITY: Baker

STATE: LA

ZIP: 70714

TELEPHONE NUMBER: 504-775-3216

PREVIOUS ADDRESS: N/A

YEARS THERE:

MARRIED |] UNMARRIED () SEPARATED

NAME OF YOUR BANK: Ist State Bnk. of Baker

CHECKING SAVINGS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER:

Housewife

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

POSITION OR TITLE:

LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT:

PRESENT SALARY OR COMMISSION: () Net CL) Gross

$ - 0 - per

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS: 0

AGES OF DEPENDENTS: N/A

ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT, OR SEPARATE MAINTE-

NANCE INCOME NEED NOT BE REVEALED IF YOU

DO NOT WISH TO HAVE IT CONSIDERED AS A BASIS

FOR REPAYING THIS OBLIGATION. ALIMONY,

CHILD SUPPORT, SEPARATE MAINTENANCE RE-

CEIVED UNDER: COURT ORDER([) WRITTEN

AGREEMENT () ORAL UNDERSTANDING

OTHER INCOME: - 0 - per

SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME: N/A

IS ANY INCOME LISTED IN THIS SECTION LIKELY

TO BE REDUCED BEFORE THE CREDIT REQUESTED

IS PAID OFF? YES (J (EXPLAIN ON SEPARATE

SHEET) NOC)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PREVIOUS EMPLOYER: N/

YEARS THERE:

NAME OF NEAREST RELATIVE NOT LIVING WITH

YOU: Werner Propp

ADDRESS: Fichlestr #5 7448 Trickenhausen, W. Germany

RELATIONSHIP: Parents

SECTION C - INFORMATION REGARDING

OUTSTANDING DEBTS (Including all applicants)

AUTOMOBILES - MAKE: 84 Ford

FINANCED BY: Capital Bank

MAKE: 84 Mercedes

FINANCED BY: Ist State Bank

OUTSTANDING DEBTS (INCLUDE CHARGE

ACCOUNTS, INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS, CREDIT

CAKDS, RENT, MORTGAGES, ETC. USE SEPARATE

SHEET IF NECESSARY.)

CREDITOR OR REFERENCE,

FIRST LIST MORTGAGES, THEN AUTO,

THEN OTHERS: Capital Savings & Loan

6) -

TYPE OF DEBT OR ACCT NO.: Ist on Res.

NAME IN WHICH ACCT. CARRIED: Joint

ORIGINAL DEBT: 54,000

PRESENT BALANCE: 49,500

MONTHLY PAYMENT: 436.00

CREDITOR OR REFERENCE,

FIRST LIST MORTGAGES, THEN AUTO,

THEN OTHERS: Mortgage Associates

TYPE OF DEBT OR ACCT NO.:: Ist on Rental/193447-2

NAME IN WHICH ACCT. CARRIED: Joint

ORIGINAL DEBT: -0-

PRESENT BALANCE: 11,000

MONTHLY PAYMENT: 136.00

CREDITOR OR REFERENCE,

FIRST LIST MORTGAGES, THEN AUTO,

THEN OTHERS: Capital Bank as

TYPE OF DEBT OR ACCT NO.: 84 Ford

NAME IN WHICH ACCT. CARRIED:

ORIGINAL DEBT: 14,277

PRESENT BALANCE: 12,492

MONTHLY PAYMENT: 297.00

CREDITOR OR REFERENCE,

FIRST LIST MORTGAGES, THEN AUTO,

THEN OTHERS: Ist State Bank

TYPE OF DEBT OR ACCT NO.: Mercedes

NAME IN WHICH ACCT. CARRIED:

ORIGINAL DEBT: 40,000

PRESENT BALANCE: 23,418

MONTHLY PAYMENT: 525.95

CREDITOR OR REFERENCE,

FIRST LIST MORTGAGES, THEN AUTO,

THEN OTHERS: Am Bnk Bnk Crd

TYPE OF DEBT OR ACCT NO.: Res.

NAME IN WHICH ACCT. CARRIED:

ORIGINAL DEBT: 3,804

PRESENT BALANCE: 508

MONTHLY PAYMENT: 58.00

CREDITOR OR REFERENCE,

FIRST LIST MORTGAGES, THEN AUTO,

THEN OTHERS: Ist State Bank

TYPE OF DEBT OR ACCT NO.:

NAME IN WHICH ACCT. CARRIED:

ORIGINAL DEBT: 35,000

PRESENT BALANCE: 3,572

MONTHLY PAYMENT: 676.00

TOTALS:

ORIGINAL DEBT:

PRESENT BALANCE: 100,490

MONTHLY PAYMENT: 2,128.95

9/24/84 to income to debt ins (sic) income verification B.

Hollenback

OTHER OBLIGATIONS - (SUCH AS PAYMENT OF ALI-

MONY, CHILD SUPPORT, SEPARATE MAINTENANCE,

ETC.)

L} APPLICANT

TYPE OBLIGATION(S):

AMOUNT:

FREQUENCY:

L] JOINT APPLICANT

TYPE OBLIGATION(S): N/A

AMOUNT:

FREQUENCY:

SECTION D - INFORMATION REGARDING

PROPERTY TO BE MORTGAGED

3-1/2 Years

PROPERTY TO BE MORTGAGED: 514 Myrtle, Baton

Rouge, LA

LOT SIZE:

LEASED:

TYPE OF PROPERTY:

GROSS PURCHASE PRICE: $50,000

IMPROVEMENTS: $500

PRICE TOTAL COST: $50,500

TITLE IN NAME OF: Ulrich & Gisela Huyssen

RENTS RECEIVED: $470.00

ORIGINAL FIRST MORTGAGE: $

FIRST MORTGAGE AND ACCT. NO.: Mortgage Associates

193447-2

PAYMENTS: $136.00

BAL. DUE FIRST MTGE.: $11,000

IMPROVEMENT ALREADY MADE: Paint, Maint.

IMPROVEMENT TO BE MADE:

WARRANTY OF APPLICANT(S)

The undersigned Applicant(s) warrants and represents that

all statements, representations and warranties appearing

hereon are correct, being made by them (and expressly relied

upon by First Union Mortgage Corporation) to induce this

Lender to approve their within Loan Application. Appli-

cant(s) additionally warrant that any and all other papers in

connection with this Loan, are true and made for the sole

purpose of procuring this Loan and to show their financinal

status. You are authorized to check my credit and empioy-

ment history and to answer quesions about your credit experi-

ence with me. This application includes additional representa-

tions on reverse side hereof being incorporated here by refer-

ence.

(WITNESS): s/BRIAN HOLLENBACK and s/w MVI over

phone

(APPLICANT) (SEAL):

(CO-APPLICANT) (SEAL):

VOLUNTARY INFORMATION FOR GOVERNMENT

MONITORING PURPOSES

If this loan is for purchase of a home, the following informa-

tion is requested by the Federal Government to monitor this

lender’s compliance with Equal Credit Opportunity and Fair

10;

Housing Laws. The law provides that a lender may neither

discriminate on the basis of this information nor on whether or

not it is furnished. Furnishing this information is optional. If

you do not wish to furnish the following information, please

indicate below.

Applicant: I do not wish to furnish this information (INI-

TIALS):

Race/National Origin: () American Indian (J Alaskan Native

() Asian () Pacific Islander () Black (1) Hispanic (J) White

() Other (Specify):

Sex: (J Female (1) Male

Co-Applicant: I do not wish to furnish this information (INI-

TIALS):

Race/National Origin: () American Indian () Alaskan Native

() Asian (J Pacific Islander () Black (1) Hispanic (J) White

() Other (Specify):

Sex: [) Female () Male

FOR FUMC USE ONLY (Notes and Explanations)

Adjustable Rate Mortgage Information (How Given): Sent to

cust. in mail 8/29/84

11)

HUYSSEN RENTAL INCOME

o_O

RENTAL GROSS PER MONTH: $16,725.00

x 12

, $200,700.00

| TOTAL MONTHLY PAYMENT: 6,612.11

x 2

79,345.32

GROSS RENTAL: 200,700.00

LESS 10% VACANCY: (20,070.00)

10,630.00

LESS PAYMENTS: (79,345.00)

| NET PER YEAR: 101,285.00

LESS 3 FOR MAINTENANCE: (33,727.00)

. ADJUSTED NET RENTAL INCOME: $67,558.00

APPENDIX ‘K’

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ULRICH HUYSSEN

VERSUS

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

CASE NUMBER 86-077

DIVSION ‘A’

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public for East

Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, personally appeared JAN

WARREN DUGGAR, PH.D., an adult resident of East

Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, who first being duly sworn

did state:

1. Iam an Economist with a Doctor of Philosophy in Eco-

nomics received from Florida State University in 1967. I

have been active as a consultant to financial institutions

since 1968. I was the Chairman and CEO of an insurance

company with a mortgage division from 1982 through

1985. The mortgage divisiun was an FHA, VA, and

FNMA approved lender. I was the Chairman of the

Board of a consumer loan office from 1982 through 1985.

I am familiar with all aspects of mortgage lending.

I have reviewed the documents attached as Exhibit “A”

to this Affidavit, which I understand were contained in

the files of First Union’s Baton Rouge branch office and

submitted in September, 1984, to First Union’s home

office for approval.

I have reviewed the Lending Policy Manual of First

Union Mortgage Corporation provided to me by plain-

tiffs counsel.

The documents submitted to the home office for approval

meet all of the Standards of Creditworthiness described

in the Lending Policy Manual.

Specifically, Form FUMC 235, Calculation, Income to

Debit Ratio, reports $2,881.02 available to service

$2,595.70 of debt monthly. This is the only document

prepared in September 1984 dealing with the income to

debt ratio. It shows adequate income and meets First

Union’s Lending Policy guidelines. There is no document

available disputing or refuting the income debt ratio in

the records of the loan file.

After the law suit was instituted, various depositions of

employees of First Union have been taken. In these

depositions the employee’s have been asked to calculate

the income to debt ratio. These calculations all mate-

rially differ from the calculation of income to debt ratio

included in the loan file.

The current calculations of income to debt ratio provided

by Ralph E. Richardson in C-1 and C-2 are flawed in the

treatment of depreciation and exclude certain minor,

regular income items. The correct treatment of Mr.

Huyssen’s income as reported on this U.S. Individual

Income Tax Return is shown in Table 1. The difference is

that Mr. Richardson ignores Mr. Huyssen’s business loss

($15,039) and income from interest, dividends and oil

royalties ($4,570). Further, when he adds depreciation

back, he treats it as a taxable event. The adding back of

depreciation is never a taxable occurance. It should be

shown as non taxable income. The correct treatment

: shows $2,622.49 available to service $2,595.70 of debt

monthly.

8. The First Union Standards of Creditworthiness (page 4)

indicate that if an applicant “ .. does not meet any of

the above standards, this weakness may be offset by

exceptional strength in other factors.” Additional

strength can be attributed to the Huyssen application

due to his capital gains income on both the 1982 and 1983

income tax return. Some of this capital gain is reoccur-

ing on installment purchases. Further, the first mort-

gage balance is so low relative to the value of the

property, the second mortgage position is well protected

in the event of default. These two factors add excep-

tional strength to the loan request.

s/JJAN WARREN DUGGAR

Jan Warren Duggar

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me, Notary Pub-

lic of East Baton Rouge Parish, State of Louisiana, on this

27th day of March, 1987.

ee oe

s/JJOHNNIE A. JONES

Johnnie A. Jones, Notary Public

East Baton Rouge Parish

State of Louisiana

ee ee ee eS

TABLE 1

CALCULATION OF INCOME TO DEBT RATIO

TAXABLE 1983 INCOME TAX RETURN

Housing Allowance: $10,800.00

Rental Property: (23,517.00)

Interest Income: 4,418.00

Dividend Income: 135.00

Oil Royalty: 17.00

Business Income: (15,039.00)

Total Taxable Income $(23,186.00)

NON TAXABLE

Depreciation, Schedule C: $11,440.00

Depreciation, Schedule E: 68,965.00

Total Non Taxable Income 80,405

Total Taxable Income: (23,186.00)

Net Tax Factor: 70%

Net Taxable Income: (23,186.00)

Non Taxable Income: 80,405.00

Total Net Annual Income: 57,219.00

Divided by 12 Months

Net Monthly Income 4,768.00

Times 55% for FUMC’s

Debt to Income Ratio $2,622.00

(Debt to Income Ratio is Greater than Total Monthly Obliga-

tions of $2,595)

tae

CALCULATION

INCOME TO DEBT RATIO

CREDITOR: Capital Savings & Loan

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $436.00

CREDITOR: Capital Bank

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $297.45

CREDITOR: Ist State Bank

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $525.95

CREDITOR: Am Bank M/Card

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $58.00

CREDITOR: Ist State Bank

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $676.00

ESTIMATED TAXES & INSURANCE FUMC IST MORT-

GAGES ONLY:

FUMC PAYMENT: $452.30

SUB TOTAL: $2,445.70

UTILITY ALLOWANCE (+): $150.00

TOTAL MONTHLY OBLIGATIONS: $2,595.70

VERIFIED INCOME: Applicant: Depreciation Hse.

Allowance/Primary Employment: $22,240.00

VERIFIED INCOME: Other Sources - Rental Income less

10% & maint. 1/3: $67,558.00

VERIFIED INCOME: Co-Applicant:

Primary Employment:

Other Sources:

TOTAL GROSS INCOME (TAXABLE): $89,798.00

VERIFIED INCOME:

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - NONTAXABLE:

TOTAL GROSS INCOME (NON TAXABLE):

TOTAL TAXABLE INCOME: $89,798.00

(X’S) NET TAX FACTOR: 70%

NET TAXABLE INCOME: $62,858.60

NON TAXABLE INCOME (+):

TOTAL NET ANNUAL INCOME: $62,858.60

+ BY # MONTHS: 12

NET MONTHLY INCOME: $5,238.22

(X’S) 55% FOR FUMC’S DEBT TO INCOME RATIO:

$2,881.02

APPENDIX ‘L’

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

POLICY MANUAL

SECTION: LENDING

SUBJECT: POLICY

DATE ISSUED OR REVISED: 11-10-80

PAGE NO.: 1

SECTION: 300

TOPIC: .001

In the General Section under the subject Structure, Pur-

pose, and Scope, we find a discussion of the lending policy of

FUMC.

It is important to re-emphasize two points which are: /t is

the policy of FUMC to provide credit consistent with sound

credit practice and prudent business judgement.

It is further the policy of FUMC to review loan request

based upon information gathered in the credit application and

investigation procedures. Credit is granted based upon ability

to repay, disregarding sex, age, race, marital status or other

prohibited factors. The securing of the loan with a Ist or 2nd

Deed of Trust as collateral is felt to be a prudent lending

policy, not a primary credit granting factor.

To assist FUMC personnel in evaluating loan request in a

consistent manner “Standard Appraisal Guidelines” and

“Lending Guidelines and Criteria” have been developed for

use as FUMC’s general policy statement. In evaluating credit

these guidelines will be reviewed and as a matter of policy

adhered to; however, certain situations may occur when one

set of factors greatly outweighs the others and exceptions to

the above guidelines may occur. These exceptions will be

closely monitored by FUMC management personnel to assure

the safekeeping of sound credit practices by FUMC.

— || — Be 8G eh ee

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

POLICY MANUAL

SECTION: LENDING

SUBJECT: POLICY - STANDARDS OF CREDITWORTHI-

NESS

DATE ISSUED OR REVISED: 8-26-81

PAGE NO.: 2

SECTION: 300

TOPIC: .001

SUB TOPIC: .01

ag.

ITT.

A complete, written application is necessary on all loan

request.

Source of Incorne — must be stable with a probable

continuity for the term of the loan.

Employment — (other than self-employed) as

sources of income should reflect one year at present

employment or two at previous employment.

Source of income is other than employment (e.g.

retirement benefits, rental income, public assistance

benefits, alimony/child support, stock dividends,

etc.)

1. Verify source of income

2. Ascertain probable continuity of income.

Employment of self-employed individuals should

reflect income for 2 years at present employment and

two years at a previous employment of similar nature.

Adequacy of Income.

Verify all income.

Income must be sufficient to meet normal living

expenses plus service all debts.

ADD: All income upon which loan decision is to

be based (total should be net of taxes)

ADD: All monthly debt payments (include pay-

ment on requested loan) plus monthly shelter

payment (rent or mortgage payment) plus

allowance for utilities.

Total payments (No. 2 above) should never

exceed 55% of net income (No. 1 above).

IV. Stable Residency

A. Two years at present or previous address, unless loan

is for purchase of residence.

B. Transient types of residency (hotels, rooming houses,

etc.) are not acceptable.

V. Credit History

A. All FUNB records to be checked direct (consumer

loans, commercial, revolving credit) We should use

FUNBS’ CIS system to check all loans made in N.C.

B. Up to date (no older than 6 months) credit report

reflecting a reasonable history of prompt repayment

of all obligations.

Unacceptable ratings include:

Bankruptcy unless applicant(s) can offer an

acceptable explanation.

Repossessions or charge offs unless applicant(s)

can offer an acceptable explanation.

Accounts reflecting payments made 60 or more

days late unless applicant can offer an acceptable

explanation.

ee nk te aha, i, AE MET a la am

VI. Collateral

A. On residential loans the amount loaned should not

exceed FUMC guidelines for the type of collateral

being secured.

B. With individual applicants, if the collateral being

pledged is jointly owned, you must require the sig-

nature of the co-owner of the property on necessary

documents to create a valid lien. You may not require

the co-owner’s signature on the note.

VII. Exceptions to all of the above may be made when security

offered is prime collateral with acceptable equity mar-

gins.

VIII. If applicant(s) does not meet these standards, the loan

request may be considered with a co-maker or guarantor

who does meet these standards. However, if the appli-

cant(s) has (have) a bad credit history, you should not

request or consider a co-maker or guarantor.

If applicant(s) does (do) not meet any of the above stan-

dards, this weakness may be offset by exceptional strength in

other factors. For example, a recent college graduate may not

have the required two years employment and credit history,

but he may have a larger than normal income with little or no

debts to service.

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

POLICY MANUAL

SECTION: LENDING

SUBJECT: DOCUMENTATION - INCOME VS DEBT CAL-

CULATION - FUMC 235 REV. 6-81

DATE ISSUED OR REVISED: 11-19-81

PAGE NO.: 36-37

SECTION: 300

TOPIC: .002

SUB TOPIC: .10

In an attempt to standardize our approach in qualifying an

applicant on ability, we have developed a debt to income cal-

culation form. By using this form in qualifying all of our loan

applicants, we should eliminate the expense and time in put-

ting together a submission only to find it’s a reject for ability.

Below is a brief outline of key factors in properly using this

form.

(1) The left column “creditor” is designed to use in listing

those debts and associated payments that our borrower

will have after our loan is made. A separate space is

provided for the listing of our payment. In this section

we have allowed for the addition of a “utility” allowance.

To keep this allowance on a consistent basis you should

$125 for any home 2,000 square feet or less and $150 for

any home over 2000 square feet. Any deviation from

these figures must be explained on the reverse of this

form. The addition of all figures in this Volume are to be

recorded as “Total Monthly Obligations.”

(2) The right side “Verified” income is for the recording by

borrower and type of income that FUMC has been able

to verify which is taxable. Income should be shown as

“annual gross” figures. We realize some income such as

social security is non-taxable and should be considered

as “net” income. Any non-taxable verified income should

be shown in the middle right column.

(3) The lower right side is for the calculation of FUMC's

debt to income ratio.

(a) Enter the borrower's “Total annual taxable income”

from volume above.

(b) Multiply this income by a factor to produce “net”

after tax income. This factor is 70% except in Flor-

ida and Tennessee where it is 75%.

(d) Add to this figure any non-taxable income shown in

the column for “non-taxable” income.

(e) We now have calculated the borrower's “Net Annual”

income.

(f) This annual figure must now be reduced by dividing

it by the appropriate number of months for which it

is received (which is usually 12)

(g) Now we have our “net” monthly income to which we

can apply our debt to income percentage per com-

pany policy.

(h) Multiply the “net” monthly income by 55% our debt

to income percentage, to determine the amount we

would allow in monthly obligations.

After these calculations compare your results to “total

monthly obligations” in the left hand column. If your calcula-

tion yields the higher number, we have an acceptable debt to

income ratio. If your calculation is lower than “total monthly

obligations” our borrower(s) lack ability and should be

rejected.

This form is to accompany all submissions as well as becom-

ing a part of your closed loan package.

CALCULATION

INCOME TO DEBT RATIO

CREDITOR: First Mortgage Payment

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $

CREDITOR: FUMC Payment

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $

CREDITOR: Sub Total

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $

CREDITOR: Utility Allowance (+ )

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $

CREDITOR: Total Monthly Obligations

MONTHLY PAYMENT: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Applicant - Primary Employment

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Applicant - Other Sources

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Applicant - Other Sources

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Co-Applicant - Primary Employment

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Co-Applicant - Other Sources

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Co-Applicant - Other Sources

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Total Gross Income (Taxable)

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: 1.

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - NONTAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Co-Applicant - Other Sources

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - NONTAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: 2.

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - NONTAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Total Gross Income (Non Taxable)

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - NONTAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Total TAXABLE Income

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: (X’s) Net Tax Factor

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: %

VERIFIED INCOME: Net TAXABLE Income

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: NON TAXABLE Income ( + )

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Total Net Annual Income

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: + by # Months

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: Net Monthly Income

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

VERIFIED INCOME: (X's) % For FUMC’s Debt to Income

Ratio

ANNUALIZED GROSS AMOUNT - TAXABLE: $

10L

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

POLICY MANUAL

SECTION: LENDING

SUBJECT: DOCUMENTATION - MORTGAGE VER-

IFICATION (FUMC 11) Rev. 12-81

DATE ISSUED OR REVISED: 3-10-82

PAGE NO.: 38

SECTION: 300

TOPIC: .002

SUB TOPIC: .11

The “mortgage verification” is designed to provide FUMC

an exact Ist and or 2nd mortgage balance, plus credit experi-

ence on the loan applicant.

This verification is required on all FUMC loan request. This

information may be gathered by:

(1) Telephone — All information that the Ist mortgagee will

provide should be gathered and so noted on the appropriate

space. The section “Information released by” must be com-

pleted when telephone verification is used and appropriate

signature of FUMC personnel so indicated.

(2) By Mail — If telephone verification is not possible the

mortgage verification from must be mailed to the Ist mort-

gagee. It is imperative that a stamped-self addressed enve-

lope accompany the mortgage verification request. All mail

request must contain name of property secured and be signed

by at least one applicant.

NOTE: A “Mortgage Verification” is also required on exist-

ing FUMC loans that are being refinanced or renewed. This

information is to be gathered from local branch records. See

refinance page 12, section 300 for additional data to be

included on this form.

NOTE: If FUMC is making a “junior” mortgage to a cus-

tomer whose primary mortgage is held by “The Farmers

Home Administration,” we must have written approval from

the Ist mortgage holder prior to closing our loan and record-

ing our lien.

—Copy of sample subordination form attached—

NOTE: Many times an escalation of the rate and monthly

payment will cause our customer to exceed our standard debt

to income ratio. Every effort must be made prior to submis-

sion to verify the terms and conditions of the lst mortgage

assumption.

12L

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

POLICY MANUAL

SECTION: LENDING

SUBJECT: GENERAL LOAN DECLINATION/REJEC-

TION

DATE ISSUED OR REVISED: 3-10-82

PAGE NO.: 102

SECTION: 300

TOPIC: .003

SUB TOPIC: .03

Not all loan request are of the nature to permit acceptance

by FUMC. Many request must be completely declined or

altered severely. Due to this we have designed the “Fair

Credit Reporting & Equal Credit Opportunity Acts Notice”

(FUMC 67 Rev. 1/82) and the “Reason for Adverse Action”

(FUMC 24).

These forms were designed to provide FUMC a method by

which to notify customers of loan request that were declined

or terms altered. It was further designed to comply with the

Federal “Fair Credit Reporting Act” and “Equal Credit

Opportunity Act” both of which make certain demands upon

FUMC. Additionally, all loans “cancelled” by the applicants

should be so recorded on FUMC 67 Rev. V/82 and a copy

mailed to the applicants. The correct completion and thorough

understanding of this form is mandatory. An example of the

correct completion and use of these forms accompany the

attached sample form.

NOTE: For each loan that is rejected, cancelled, etc. the

branch manager must date, initial, and explain the reject or

cancellation on the face of the application.

i. oh ee aes ee

APPENDIX ‘M’

AMENDMENT 7 - CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT VII - CIVIL TRIALS

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy

shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be

preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise

reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according

to the rules of the common law.

APPENDIX ‘N’

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ULRICH HUYSSEN,

Plaintiff

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 86-77

SECTION ‘A’

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

Pam Kinamore, Manager

First Union Mortgage Corporation

3636 South Sherwood Forest Boulevard

Suite 690

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816

Brian Hollenback, Former Manager

First Union Mortgage Corporation

c/o Baton Rouge Mortgage, Inc.

8738 Quarters Lake Road

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809

David Englund

8674 Quarters Lake Road

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809

D Lane Manning, President

Baton Rouge Mortgage, Inc.

8732 Quarters Lake Road

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure the plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, wilt

take the depositions of the following named witnesses before a

duly authorized Court Reporter at the time and place here-

inafter noted.

Counsel for the defendant, FIRST UNION MORTGAGE

CORPORATION, is hereby notified to appear and take part

as they deem appropriate.

TO BE DEPOSED:

1. Pam Kinamore

2. Brian Hollenback

3. David Englund

4. D Lane Manning

WHEN:

9:30 a.m. on Monday, February 23, 1987

WHERE:

Metropolitan Reporters

Taylor Building, Suite 315

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: 504/383-1700

Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure, please bring with you and produce at the February 23,

1987, deposition any and all documents contemplated within

the meaning or definition of Rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, which documents are in your possession,

custody, and control in connection with the Application dated

August 29, 1984, by ULRICH HUYSSEN, and under sub-

mission date of September 18, 1984, to the defendant, FIRST

UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION, at its Branch Office

in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, under Account Number

048-018436, requesting an aggregate amount of $30,900.00.

Particularly, but not exclusively, bring any and all docu-

mentations which show how the “Income/Debt Ratio” was cal-

culated; and the entire Minutes of The Underwriting Depart-

ment of First Union Mortgage Corporation (FUMC) relative

and pertaining to the Loan Approval of Plaintiffs application

of August 29, 1984.

Also bring the Loan Register of the Baton Rouge Branch of

FUMC for the period commencing June 1, 1984, and ending

December 31, 1984, inclusively.

Bring and produce a list or roster of the names of the Loan

Officer of FUMC who calculated the “Income/Debt Ratio” rel-

ative to Plaintiff loan Application.

Bring and produce a list or roster of the names of the Com-

mittee Members of The Underwriting Department of FUMC

who rejected Plaintiffs loan Application dated August 29,

1984, and submitted to FUMC on September 18, 1984, under

Account Number 048-018436 of the Baton Rouge Branch of

FUMC.

Bring and produce any and all documentations which

FUMC forwarded or submitted te Comptroller of the Cur-

rency, in both Washington and the Atlanta Offices of the

Comptroller of the Currency, relative to FUMC’s handling of

Plaintiffs loan Applicatiori.

These depositions will continue from day-to-day until com-

pleted, subject to such modifications as may be mutually

agreed upon by counsel attending the taking of these deposi-

tions.

Attorney for Plaintiff:

s/JJOHNNIE A. JONES

Johnnie A. Jones, Trial Attorney

JONES & JONES

Attorneys at Law

Taylor building, Suite 215

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: 504/383-8573

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Undersigned counsel of record for the plaintiff, Ulrich

Huyssen, does hereby certify that a copy of the above and

foregoing Notice of Depositions is, by regular United States

Mail, first-class postage prepaid, being forwarded to opposing

counsel of record, addressed as follows:

Ms. Kelly M. Wilkinson

RUBIN CURRY COLVIN & JOSEPH

A Professional Law Corporation

One American Place, Suite 1400

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825

Telephone: 504/383-1400

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 11 day of February 1987.

sJJOHNNiE A. JONES

Johnnie A. Jones, Trial Attorney

JONES & JONES

Attorneys at Law

Taylor Building, Suite 215

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: 504/383-8573

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ULRICH HUYSSEN,

Plaintiff,

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendant

CASE NUMBER 86-77-A

DEPOSITION SUBPOENA

TYPE OF CASE: &j CIVIL [] CRIMINAL

SUBPOENA FOR: Jj PERSON {j DOCUMENT(S) OR

OBJECT(S)

TO:

Pam Kinamore, Manager

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

3636 South Sherwood Forest Boulevard

Suite 690

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816

Telephone: 504/291-5966

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at the

place, date, and time specified below to testify at the taking of

a deposition in the above case.

PLACE:

Metropolitan Reporters

Taylor Building, Suite 315

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: 504/383-1700

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, February 23, 1987, 9:30 a.m.

YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the

following document(s) or object(s):*

1. Any and all documentations in your possession, custody,

and control in connection with the loan Application of

ULRICH HUYSSEN, dated August 29, 1984, under Septem-

ber 18, 1984, submission date to FIRST UNION MORTGAGE

CORPORATION as Account Number 048-018436 (from Baton

Rouge, Louisiana Branch), requesting an extension of credit

in the amount of $30,640.00, or an aggregate amount of

$30,900.00.

2. Any and all documentations which show how the

“Income/Debt Ratio” was calculated.

3. The “entire minutes” of the Underwriting Department of

First Union Mortgage Corporation (FUMC) relative and per-

taining to the Loan Approval of the application of ULRICH

HUYSSEN, dated August 29, 1984.

4. The “Loan Register” of the Baton Rouge Branch of

FUMC for the period commencing June 1, 1984, and ending

December 31, 1984, inclusively.

*If not applicable, enter “none.”

5. The roster or a list of the names and addresses of Loan

Officers, or members of the Underwriting Department of

FUMC, who calculated the “Income/Debt Ratio” relative or

pertaining to the loan Application of ULRICH HUYSSEN,

dated August 29, 1984, under submission date of September

18, 1984, to FUMC from its Baton Rouge, Louisiana Branch,

under Account Number 048-018436.

6. Any and all documentations which FUMC forwarded or

submitted to the Comptroller of the Currency, in both Wash-

ington and the Atlanta Offices of the Comptroller of the Cur-

rency, relative and pertaining to FUMC’s handling of the loan

Application of ULRICH HUYSSEN, dated August 29, 1984.

[Referenced under Correspondence Number 0620850003260,

Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 20580, letter

dated 29 October 1984. ]

[] Please see additional information on reverse

Any subpoenaed organization not a party to this suit is hereby

admonished pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, to file a designation with the court specifying one

or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other per-

sons who consent to testify on its behalf, and setting forth, for

each person designated, the matters on which he will testify

or product documents or things. The persons so designated

shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to

the organization.

U.S. MAGISTRATE OR CLERK OF COURT: Lee Dupuis

(BY) DUPUTY CLERK: s/BETTY McCAUIN

DATE: FEB. 12, 1987

— ears:

ake Tay

This subpoena is issued upon application of the:

Plaintiff (J Defendant (1) U.S. Attorney

QUESTIONS MAY BE ADDRESSED TO:

Johnnie A. Jones

JONES & JONES, Attorneys at Law

251 Florida Street, Suite 215

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: 504/383-8573

RETURN OF SERVICE!

RECEIVED BY SERVER:

DATE: February 13, 1987

PLACE: Jones & Jones, Attorneys at Law

251 Florida Street, Suite 215, Baton Rouge, LA

70801

SERVED:

DATE: February 13, 1987

PLACE: First Union Mortgage Corporation

3636 S. Sherwood Forest Blvd., Baton Rouge, LA

70816

SERVED ON (NAME): Pam Kinamore

FEES TENDERED: (J) YES {j NO AMOUNT $ None

SERVED BY: Lisa S. Milo

TITLE: Process Server

' As to who may serve a subpoena and the manner of its service

see Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or Rule 45(c),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

10n

STATEMENT OF SERVICE FEES

TRAVEL:

SERVICES: $15.00

TOTAL: $15.00

DECLARATION OF SERVER?

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the

United States of America that the foregoing information con-

tained in the Return of Service and Statement of Service Fees

is true and correct.

Executed on (DATE) February 13, 1987

Signature of Server:

s/LISA S. MILO

Lisa S. Milo

12213 Littlewoods Drive

Baton Rouge, LA 70807

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

* “Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the deponent upon

service of a subpoena issued on behalf of the United States or an

officer or agency thereof (Rule 45(c), Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure; Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) or on behalf

of certain indigent parties and criminal defendants who are unable

to pay such costs (28 USC 1825, Rule 17(b) Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedures).”

we =

mime 9

—<——— —— .

lin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ULRICH HUYSSEN,

Plaintiff,

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendant

CASE NUMBER 86-77-A

DEPOSITION SUBPOENA

TYPE OF CASE: kj CIVIL CL) CRIMINAL

SUBPOENA FOR: {x} PERSON DOCUMENT(S) OR

OBJECT(S)

TO:

Brian Hollenback, Former Manager

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION

‘“ Baton Rouge Mortgage, Inc.

8738 Quarters Lake Road

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809

Telephone: 504/922-9146 or 9141

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at the

place, date, and time specified below to testify at the taking of

a deposition in the above case.

PLACE:

Metropolitan Reporters

Taylor Building, Suite 315

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: 504/383-1700

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, February 23, 1987, 9:30 a.m.

YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the

following document(s) or object(s):*

1. Any and all documentations in your possession, custody,

and control in connection with the loan Application of

ULRICH HUYSSEN, dated August 29, 1984, under Septem-

ber 18, 1984, submission date to FIRST UNION MORTGAGE

CORPORATION as Account Number 048-018436 (from Baton

Rouge, Louisiana Branch), requesting an extension of credit

in the amount of $30,640.00, or an aggregate amount of

$30,900.00.

2. Any and all documentations which show how the

“Income/Debt Ratio” was calculated.

3. The entire minutes of the Underwriting Department of

First Union Mortgage Corporation (FUMC) relative and per-

taining to the Loan Approval of the application of ULRICH

HUYSSEN, dated August 29, 1984.

4. The “Loan Register” of the Baton Rouge Branch of

FUMC for the period commencing June 1, 1984, and ending

December 31, 1984, inclusively.

*If not applicable, enter “none.”

wi nec ctag nde SU AD

13n

5. The roster or a list of the names and addresses of Loan

Officers, or members of the Underwriting Department of

FUMC, who calculated the “Income/Debt Ratio” relative or

pertaining to the loan Application of ULRICH HUYSSEN,

dated August 29, 1984, under submission date of September

18, 1984, to FUMC from its Baton Rouge, Louisiana Branch,

under Account Number 048-018436.

6. Any and all documentations which FUMC forwarded or

submitted to the Comptroller of the Currency, in both Wash-

ington and the Atlanta Offices of the Comptroller of the Cur-

rency, relative and pertaining to FUMC’s handling of the loan

Application of ULRICH HUYSSEN, dated August 29, 1984.

(Referenced under Correspondence Number 0620850003260,

Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 20580, letter

dated 29 October 1984.)

(] Please see additional information on reverse

Any subpoenaed organization not a party to this suit is hereby

admonished pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, to file a designation with the court specifying one

or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other per-

sons who consent to testify on its behalf, and setting forth, for

each person designated, the matters on which he will testify

or product documents or things. The persons so designated

shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to

the organization.

U.S. MAGISTRATE OR CLERK OF COURT: Lee Dupuis

(BY) DUPUTY CLERK: s/BETTY McCAUIN

DATE: FEB. 12, 1987

14n

This subpoena is issued upon application of the: [x] Plaintiff 1)

Defendant () U.S. Attorney

QUESTIONS MAY BE ADDRESSED TO:

Johnnie A. Jones

JONES & JONES, Attorneys at Law

251 Florida Street, Suite 215

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: 504/383-8573

RETURN OF SERVICE!

RECEIVED BY SERVER:

DATE: February 13, 1987

PLACE: Jones & Jones, Attorneys at Law

251 Florida Street, Suite 215, Baton Rouge, LA

70801

SERVED:

DATE: February 13, 1987

PLACE: First Union Mortgage Corporation

8738 Quarters Lake Road, Baton Rouge, LA 70809

SERVED ON (NAME): Brian Hollenback

FEES TENDERED: (J YES {kx} NO/ AMOUNT $ None

SERVED BY: Lisa S. Milo

TITLE: Process Server

' As to who may serve a subpoena and the manner of its service

see Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or Rule 45(c),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

15n

STATEMENT OF SERVICE FEES

TRAVEL:

SERVICES: $15.00

TOTAL: $15.00

DECLARATION OF SERVER?

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the

United States of America that the foregoing information con-

tained in the Return of Service and Statement of Service Fees

is true and correct.

Executed on (DATE) February 13, 1987

Signature of Server:

s/LISA S. MILO

Lisa S. Milo

12213 Littlewoods Drive

Baton Rouge, LA 70807

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

“ “Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the deponent upon

service of a subpoena issued on behalf of the United States or an

officer or agency thereof (Rule 45(c), Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure; Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) or on behalf

of certain indigent parties and criminal defendants who are unable

to pay such costs (28 USC 1825, Rule 17(b) Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedures).”

pute l i ids

ne Stibabaall BERANE wnt Roh * 6 OBA mw Ba!

wbadbiviw pen

APPENDIX ‘O’

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ULRICH HUYSSEN,

Plaintiff,

versus

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 86-077

SECTION ‘A’

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

NOW INTO COURT — through his undersigned counsel of

record, and pursuant to Rules 7(b)(1) and 59(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civii Procedure, and Rule 5 of the General Rules of

this Court — comes the plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN, and

moves the Court to set aside the findings of fact and conclu-

sions of law heretofore filed herein and to vacate and set aside

the judgment herein entered on December 19, 1988 (which

was received by Plaintiffs counsel of record on December 20,

1988), and to grant Plaintiff a new trial on the following

grounds, to-wit:

1. Newly discovered and material evidence, discovered since

the trial, and which could not have been obtained on the trial

by the exercise of reasonable diligence — simply, because

Plaintiff relied upon the pretrial discovered evidence, the

—

Defendant's (FUMC's) Lending Policy Manual (Joint Exhibit

9), page, 37, Section 300, Paragraph (d), and had no reason to

believe that the witness, Ralph E. Richardson, would, under

Oath, in anywise testify contrarily thereto — as more fully

appears by references to the communications between the

plaintiff, ULRICH HUYSSEN (pseudonym, Steve Starr),

and Bob G. Black, Branch Manager of First Union Home

Equity Corporation (formerly, First Union Mortgage Corpo-

ration (FUMC)), and the Affidavit of the plaintiff, ULRICH

HUYSSEN, all of which being attached and made a part

hereof as if herein set forth at length. [Cf. New Trial E'xhibit-

A, and New Trial Exhibit-B, respectively. ]

2. The Court erred in its failure to submit the case to the

jury after the presentation of all evidence by both parties; and

to have the issue. Whether, based on the evidence adduced,

the Defendant had violated Plaintiffs protected rights under

the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and discriminated against

him based on religious and national origin?

3. The findings and judgment are contrary to the law and

the evidence.

4. The judgment is erroneous because it is based on false

and erroneous evidence.

For these reasons the Court should grant this motion for a

new trial, or amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law,

vacate and set aside the judgment entered in this case on

December 19, 1988, and enter a judgment in accordance with

the facts and equities in the case.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

sJJOHNNIE A. JONES

Johnnie A. Jones, Trial Attorney

and

Ann S. B. Jones

JONES & JONES

Attorneys at Law

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: 504/383-8573

DATED: December 29, 1988

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Undersigned counsel of record for the plaintiff, Ulrich

Huyssen, does hereby certify that a copy of the above and

foregoing Motion for New Trial, together with the compan-

ioned Exhibits, Affidavit, Memorandum and Notice of Motion

are, by regular United States Mail, first-class postage pre-

paid, or by hand-delivery, being forwarded to the opposing

counsel of record, whose address is as follows:

Ms Kelly Mangum Wikinson

and

Mr Jose R Tarajano

RUBIN CURRY CLOVIN & JOSEPH

A Professional Law Corporation

One American Place Suite 1400

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825

Telephone: 504/383-1400

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 29 day of December, 1988.

sJOHNNIE A. JONES

Johnnie A. Jones, Trial Attrorney

and

Ann S. B. Jones

JONES & JONES

Attorneys at Law

Taylor Building, Suite 215

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 7080!

Telephone: 504/383-8573

Steve Starr

2823 Westerwood Dr.

Baton Rouge, LA 70816

First Union Home Equity Corporation

N.W. Office Center

4334 N.W. Expressway, Suite 214

Oklahoma City, OK 73116

Dec. 13th, 88

Dear Mr. Black,

Thank you very much for sending me your loan application

forms! Would you please kindly advise me regarding a couple of

further questions yet.

I have seen an Income/Debt calculation Form of one mortgage

company, where all income was put into a 30% tax bracket. Is

First Union as example reflecting the new tax change and

deducting 28% for tax considerations?

There also had been two separate columns for income, one for

“Taxable Income” and one for “Non Taxable Income.” Would

First Union put the amounts like depreciation amounts under

“Non Taxable Income?” And what other kind of income could

possibly go under that kind of the bracket? I personally think

that depreciation must be treated as non taxable, but I must

know for sure since my depreciation is so very considerable and

28% or 30% taxes (whatever) would make a good monthly

amount of difference!

Looking forward to hearing from you soon! With kind regards

and thanks,

s/STEVE STARR

Steve Starr

(New Trial Exhibit - A)

First Union Home Equity Corporation

Northwest Office Center

4334 Northwest Expressway, Suite 214

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73116

405 848-4455

Steve Starr December 22, 1988

2823 Westerwood Dr.

Baton Rouge, La. 70816

Dear Mr. Starr,

In response to your letter received 12/16/88, I have enclosed

a copy of First Union's sole proprietorship worksheet. This

form shows the method in which First Union calculates

Schedule C income. This bottom-line income is taxed at 30%

and 55% of the resulting net income is considered available for

debt service.

You will note that the worksheet does not address the mat-

ter of rental depreciation. The reason for this is that rental

depreciation is added to the above calculation as non-taxable

income.

I hope this answers your questions with regard to Schedule

C and rental income. Should you have further questions or if I

can be of further assistance, please advise.

Regards,

s/BOB G. BLACK

Bob G. Black, Branch Manager

Page 2 of [New Trial Exhibit - A}

SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP WORKSHEET FOR

INCOME AVAILABLE FOR DEBT SERVICE

APPLICANT'S NAME:

ADDRESS:

BUSINESS NAME:

FUHEC BRANCH/NUMBER:

YEAR (Most current year):

INCOME SOURCE: Income from Sole Proprietorship

(see page 17)

LOCATION: Schedule C

INCOME: $

INCOME SOURCE: Depreciation of Business Assets

(see page 17)

LOCATION: Schedule C

INCOME: $

INCOME SOURCE: Interest on Business Indebtedness

(see page 18)

LOCATION: Schedule C

INCOME: $

INCOME SOURCE: Rent on Office (in home only)

(see page 18)

LOCATION: Schedule C

INCOME: $

INCOME AVAILABLE FOR DEBT SERVICE:

The figures reported on this worksheet are accurate and fully

comply with the definitions provided in the accompanying

guide.

Signed: |

Page 3 of [New Trial Exhibit - A]

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ULRICH HUYSSEN,

Plaintiff,

versus

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 86-077

SECTION ‘A’

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

PARISH OF EAST BATUN ROUGE

ULRICH HUYSSEN, the plaintiff in the above-captioned

action, being first duly sworn, says:

[New Trial Exhibit - B}

100

I am the Plaintiff in the above-captioned action. I under-

stand that I am asking the Court to give me a new trial in my

suit against the defendant, FIRST UNION HOME EQUITY

CORPORATION (formerly First Union Mortgage Corpora-

tion (F UMC), who I have sued in this Federal Court. I have

read, and I have had read and explained to me my motion for —

new trial; and I agree with its contents. I was in Court when

my expert witness, Dr. Jan W. Duggar, testified that FUMC

had calculated Plaintiffs income-to-debt ratio inconsistent

with and contrary to its own Lending Policy Manual (Joint

Exhibit-9), page 37, Section 300, Paragraph (d), which pro-

vides:

(d) Add to this figure any non-taxable income

shown in the column for “non-tarable” income.

That he (Plaintiff-Affiant) also knows that his expert wit-

ness, Dr. Jan W. Duggar, testified that based on information

taken from Plaintiffs 1983 and 1982 Federal Income Tax

Returns (Plaintiffs Exhibits-1 and 2, respectively) he (Dr.

Duggar) had made an independent calculation of Plaintiffs

income-to-debt ratio under the provided formula detailedly

spelled out in FUMC’s Lending Policy Manual, and found

Plaintiffs income-to-debt ratio to be acceptable for the exten-

sion of credit by FUMC to Plaintiff in the amount of

($30,900.00) the loan sought by Plaintiff.

Plaintiffs Expert witness, Dr. Jan W. Duggar, also, testi-

fied that upon examination of the material furnished to him for

study and examination in his preparation to submit affidavits

in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Page 2 of [New Trial Exhibit - B]

llo

and to furnish testimony in the trial of this lawsuit, he (Dr.

Duggar) discovered that Plaintiffs income-to-debt ratio was

acceptable for the extension of credit by FUMC to Plaintiff

under the calculation(s) of income-to-debt ratio made by

FUMC upon the submission of Plaintiffs Loan Application,

and at all times prior to the commencement of this lawsuit.

I, ULRICH HUYSSEN, the plaintiff in this lawsuit, was,

also, in Court during the trial of this lawsuit when FUMC'’s

witness, Mr. Ralph E. Richardson, the underwriter or loan

approval officer for FUMC, testified that FUMC treats/con-

siders depreciation or rental depreciation as taxable income,

with respect to all such loan applicants as myself, notwith-

standing that FUMC’s Lending Policy Manual provides oth-

erwise.

Since the trial of my case, this lawsuit, I have contacted and

consulted by telephone with several Branch Managers of

FIRST UNION HOME EQUITY CORPORATION (for-

merly, FUMC) and made the same inquiry of them as I did as

appearing from my attached letter of December 13, 1988, by

me under the pseudonym, Steve Starr to Mr. Bob G. Black,

Branch Manager of First Union’s Northwest Office Center in

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, who advises in Paragraph 2 of his

letter of December 22, 1988 (which is in response to Plaintiffs

letter of December 13, 1988), that:

“You will note that the worksheet does not address

the matter of rental. The reason for this is that rental

depreciation is added to the above calculation as non-

taxable income.”

Page 3 of [New Trial Exhibit - B)

120

Appearing from the many irregularities appearing of

record in the handling of my loan application by FUMC, it is

evidenced that FUMC resulted to disparate treatment dis-

crimination and denied the extension of credit to me for rea-

sons other than the legitimate reason it articulates, which is

stated by FUMC to be for insufficient income, or rather, my

lack of ability to service the debt.

s/ULRICH HUYSSEN

Ulrich Huyssen

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED, Before Me, at Baton

Rouge, Louisiana, on this 29 day of December, 1988.

sJOHNNIE A. JONES

Johnnie A. Jones

Attorney/Notary Public

Page 4 of [New Trial Exhibit - B]

130

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ULRICH HUYSSEN,

Plaintiff,

versus

FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 86-077

SECTION 4’

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

This memorandum is in support of Plaintiffs motion for new

trial, in a case which commenced as a trial by jury; and in

which all of the evidence was taken before the jury; but,

however, the Court being of the opinion that the evidence and

the law was clearly in favor of the defendant, FIRST UNION

HOME EQUITY CORPORATION (formerly, First Union

Mortgage Corporation (FUMC)), granted the Defendant's

motion for directed verdict, without having the issue of:

Whether from the evidence adduced the jury — being com-

prised of reasonably prudent persons — could arrive at and

140

return a verdict finding that FUMC’% articulated reason for its

denial of extension of credit to plaintiff, ULRICH

HUYSSEN, was a pretext to discriminate against him, based

on religion and national origin, in violation of the Equal Credit

Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.?

It is the duty of trial judge to set aside verdict and

grant new trial if, in his opinion, verdict is based

upon evidence which is false or if verdict results in

miscarriage of justice, and trial court is empowered

to do this even though there may be substantial evi-

dence which would prevent direction of verdict. /sley

v. Motown Record Corp., 69 F.R.D. 12 (DC NY 1975)

Similarly Rule 59(a)(2) allows a new trial to be granted in a

nonjury action if a new trial might be obtained under similar

| i? Aad

circumstances in a jury action under 59(a)(1). Cf. U.S. v. 5.77

Acres of Land, More or Less, In Borough of Brooklyn, Kings

County, 3 F.R.D. 298 (DC NY 1944); Timken Co. v. United

States, 569 F. Supp. 65,67 (C.1.T. 1983); Jonian Shipping Co.

v. Tyson Shipping Co., 49 F.R.D. 3384 (DC NY 1969).

Federal district court may, in a proper case, grant

a new trial because of fraud on the court, misconduct

of a party, or newly discovered evidence, or whenever

justice requires relief; whether relief is proper is a

matter addressed to the discretion of the court;

among the factors that may be considered are

whether the movant actually was prejudiced and, if

so, whether the movant could have done anything at

trial to avoid the prejudice. Frankel v. Lull Engi-

neering Co., 334 F. Supp. 918 (DC Pa. 1971).

In considering motion for new trial, trial Judge's

discretion goes further than mere inquiry as to suffi-

ciency of evidence and even where there is substan-

tial evidence, judge may set aside verdict for reason

150

that it is against clear weight of evidence, that

damages are excessive, or that substantial errors

occurred in admission or rejection of evidence. Key-

stone Floor Products Co. v. Beattie Mf. Co. 482 F.

Supp. 869, 877 (DC Pa. 1977).

Due diligence standard was inapplicable to motion

to vacate judgment or for new trial on basis of alleged

perjurious testimony. Tas Intern. Travel Service,

Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 96

F.R.D. 205 (DC NY 1982)

The defendant’s witness, Mr. Ralph E. Richardson, who

gives and makes the final dispositions of all loan applications

for extension of credit made to FUMC, testified, une-

quivocally, that all such loan applicants falling in the category

of the Plaintiff were treated exactly the same and non-

disparately; or was not in anywise discriminated against. This

testimony of Mr. Richardson is refuted by Mr. Black’s letter

[New Trial Exhibit-A].

In considering whether a given ground has not been

advanced in the motion made by the party, it should be borne

in mind that the particularity called for it stating ihe grounds

for a new trial motion is the same as that required for all

motions by Rule 7(b)(1), which does not require ritualistic

details; but rather a fair indication to court and counsel of the

substance of the grounds relied on. Cf. Lebeck v. Williams A.

Jarvis Co., 250 F. 2d 285 (CA3 1957); Tsai v. Rosenthal, 297 F.

2d 614 (CA8 1961): General-Motors Corp. v. Perry, 303 F. 2d

544 (CAT 1962); Grimm v. California Spray-Chemical Corp.,

264 F. 2d 145 (CA9 1959); Cooper v. Midwest Feed Products

Co., 271 F. 2d 177 (CA8 1959).

The Court should grant the Plaintiffs motion for new trial,

or amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law or make

new findings of fact and conclusions of law, vacate and set

160

aside the judgment entered in this cause on December 19, 1988

(which was received by Plaintiffs counsel of record on Decem-

ber 20, 1988), and enter a judgment in accordance with the

facts and equities in the case.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

sJIOHNNIE A. JONES

Johnnie A. Jones, Trial Attorney

and

Ann 8S. B. Jones

JONES & JONES

Attorneys at Law

Taylor Building, Suite 215

251 Florida Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801

Telephone: (504) 383-8573

Date: December 29, 1988

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.