Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Van Vranken

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JOSEPH FS

trou

In the Supreme Court-.-— —

OF THE

United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1989 -

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,

Petitioner,

VS.

DON VAN VRANKEN,

on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, and

Lew & Ten's SERVICE, INC.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE UNITED STATES

WILLIAM H. ALSUP

Counsel of Record

F. BRUCE DODGE

SAMUEL R. MILLER

THEODORE P. SENGER

MORRISON & FOERSTER

345 California Sucet

San Francisco, California 94104-2675

Telephone: (415) 677-7000

Counsel for Petitioner

Atlantic Richfield Company

QUESTION PRESENTED

In order to be free of restrictions imposed by a substantively and

procedurally invalid regulation, must a regulated firm either participate

in litigation challenging the regulation or obtain the permission of the

regulating agency?

LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 28.1 LIST

The parties to the proceeding below were the petitioner Atlantic

Richfield Company (“ARCO”), the respondents Don Van Vranken

and Lew and Ted’s Service, Inc., and the respondent class of

wholesale purchaser-resellers of gasoline, butane, aviation fuels and

propane from ARCO between May 1976 and January 1981.

The following companies are subsidiaries of petitioner ARCO

(other than wholly-owned subsidiaries):

ARCO Chemical Company

Lyondell Petroleum Company

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Ss i

LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 28.1 LIST ................. t

ee Vv

a l

ee ac iicls cc iuniccnaccnancahvsesnonws l

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED .......... l

sd 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................. 3

I. THE DECISION OF THE TEMPORARY

EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

REQUIRING REGULATED FIRMS TO

EITHER PARTICIPATE IN LITIGATION

CHALLENGING A REGULATION OR

SEEK LEAVE OF THE REGULATING

AGENCY TO AVOID COMPLIANCE ONCE

THE REGULATION IS STRUCK DOWN

CONFLICTS IN PRINCIPLE WITH

DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

II. THE DECISION OF THE TEMPORARY

EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

DEPARTS FROM THE ACCEPTED

COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

AND PRESENTS IMPORTANT

QUESTIONS REGARDING JUDICIAL

SUPERVISION OF REGULATORY

AGENCIES WHICH SHOULD BE

SETTLED BY THES CUURT .......c0ccescersnens 6

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Bethesda Hospital Ass nv. Bowen,

485 U.S. 399,

Se a a a: A issn ciccinccdantesanteniabasebanaass |

Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE,

610 F.2d 796 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979),

Cart. Gemiad, GS U.S. Fat CHMOD svewssccdcevncscevataete 2

Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE,

647 F.2d 142 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) ............ 2

Mobil Oil Corp. v. DCE,

678 F.2d 1083 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982) ........... ae

Tallahassee Memorial Regional Med. Center v. Bowen,

815 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1987),

Cert. Gembed, WIGS. Ch. TS 7S CIGGE) cvs cevcccvesccesecse 4,5,7

Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co.,

Da7 Tae SUG CA RR: BI ccicetep erence 4,5,7

Statutes and Regulations

Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,

ecto ZIG, 12 U.K. © TSG GROG) occa ccccsccncesni 3

Section 211, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (note) .................... 3

Section 211(g), 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (note) ................ |

Vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,

TS U.S.C. BS 751, CF SOG. 2 .crccrcceccccccsccscossevcssees |

Section 4(b), 15 U.S.C. § 753(D)(1) «2... cece eee eee ee es 2

ee SES USL, © FIED vcciccevscseverssecssaeseceys 3

EB SZ IEL) oi cn sceccccssersccsassscccnccsonsennsasans 1

Be ME. © UPB). nn ccc cncccncsncsccvessnesseccesavenseasens 3

ot > Ra Ba) Serres hsaecapenenehaesheuee 3

PW ZISBHE) cccscccsserrscsccccvnescnssccssenssveses 1,2

BE CP R.. B ZUZ.1U2GLG) .n...nnccnrecccesccrnsonsernsscnnansees 1,5

39 Fed. Reg. 1924, 1954-56 (Jan. 15, 1974) «00... 2

39 Fed. Reg. 15139 (May 1, 1984) ..........ceeeeeee eee ee ees 1,2

The petitioner Atlantic Richfield Company (“ARCO”) respectfully

prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the decision of the

Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals entered on October 10,

1989.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals was

issued as a slip opinion on October 10, 1989, and has not yet been

reported. (Appendix A.)

The Nunc Pro Tunc June 1, 1988 Order of the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California entered

September 26, 1988 is not reported. (Appendix B, 10a.)

JURISDICTION

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals entered its final

decision on October 10, 1989, and denied ARCO’s timely motion for

rehearing on November 20, 1989. (See Appendix C, 27a, Order

Denying Rehearing.)

ARCO invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and section 211(g) of the Economic

Stabilization Act of 1970 (“ESA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

This action involves regulations promulgated by the Department of

Energy (““DOE”’) pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act

of 1973 (““EPAA”), 15 U.S.C. § 751 et seq. The regulation

involved, 10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c), and the invalid amendment to that

regulation, 39 Fed. Reg. 15139 (May 1, 1974), are reprinted at

Appendix D, 28a-29a. The “refiling ” regulation cited by the court

below, 10 C.F.R. § 212.126(d), is reprinted at Appendix E, 30a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the effect on regulated firms of a final decision

by a controlling court that a federal regulation is invalid on substantive

and procedural grounds.

Between 1973 and 1981, the prices of petroleum products were

controlled pursuant to regulations promulgated under the ESA and

EPAA. The method for calculating the maximum permissible price

was based on a formula for allocating crude oil and refining costs

among the various petroleum products. See 10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c),

39 Fed. Reg. 1924, 1954-56 (Jan. 15, 1974). On April 30, 1974,

DOE sought to amend the cost allocation formula without prior notice

to affected parties and without considering the factors and objectives

set out in the EPAA as a substantive limitation on DOE’s rulemaking

authority. See 39 Fed. Reg. 15139 (May 1, 1974). Mobil Oil

Corp. v. DOE, 610 F.2d 796, 801-02 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979),

cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980) (“Mobil I”).' This April 1974

amendment to the cost allocation regulations would have prevented

regulated firms from fully recovering their increased costs. See

Mobil 1, 610 F.2d at 800 and n. 4; Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE,

678 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 n.6 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982)

(“Mobil lil”). The April 1974 amendment was ultimately declared

void and invalid on procedural and substantive grounds by the

Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. Mobill, 610 F.2d

at 802-04; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 647 F.2d 142 (Temp.

Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (‘Mobil 1” ); Mobil II], 678 F.2d at 1088.

1! Under the EPAA, DOE was required to consider the following factors and

objectives, among others, in formulating regulations: “preservation of an

economically sound and competitive petroleum industry .. . economic

efficiency; and minimization of economic distortion, inflexibility, and

unnecessary interference with market mechanisms.” EPAA § 4(b),

15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1); see Mobil, 610 F.2d at 801 n.6.

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals has exclusive

appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under the ESA and EPAA and,

absent review by this Court, its 1979 decision striking down the April

1974 amendment was controlling precedent. ESA § 211, 12 U.S.C.

§ 1904 note; EPAA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 754(a). Prior to 1979,

ARCO complied with the April 1974 amendment in its cost

calculations. Shortly after the April 1974 amendment was struck

down, ARCO reallocated its costs in conformance with the pre-

existing regulations without obtaining permission from DOE.?

In 1979, plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to section 210 of the

ESA, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, alleging that ARCO had overcharged a

class of “wholesale purchaser-resellers " (see 10 C.F.R. § 211.51)

on purchases of petroleum products. A class of wholesale purchaser-

resellers was certified by the district court and plaintifis’ complaint

was subsequently amended to include purchases from May 1976

through January 1981.

On June 1, 1988, the district court ruled that ARCO was not

entitled to reallocate its costs based on the invalidation of the April

1974 amendment because it was not a party to litigation challenging

the amendment and had not obtained DOE’s permission to reallocate

its costs. (Appendix B, 19a-22a.) The Temporary Emergency Court

of Appeals granted ARCO leave to file an interlocutory appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and, by decision entered

October 10, 1989, affirmed the order of the district court.

(Appendix A.)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals

conflicts in principle with the decisions of other Courts of Appeal in

2 The reallocation permitted ARCO to recognize over $100 million in

additional increased costs in calculating its maximum permissible prices.

requiring a regulated firm to either participate in a legal challenge to a

regulation or seck the permission of the regulating agency in order to

be free of the requirements of an invalid regulation. The decision also

departs from the accepted course of judicial proceedings and raises

important questions regarding judicial supervision of regulatory

agencies by creating incentives for duplicative litigation and

authorizing regulatory agencies to determine the extent of their

compliance with judicial decisions invalidating regulations. Thus, as

explained below, ARCO’s petition for writ of certiorari should be

granted.

IL THE DECISION OF THE TEMPORARY

EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS REQUIRING

REGULATED FIRMS TO EITHER PARTICIPATE IN

LITIGATION CHALLENGING A REGULATION OR

SEEK LEAVE OF THE REGULATING AGENCY TO

AVOID COMPLIANCE ONCE THE REGULATION IS

STRUCK DOWN CONFLICTS IN PRINCIPLE WITH

DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL

Two Couns of Appeal have held that where a regulation is held to

be invalid, the regulation is unenforceable as to all persons similarly

situated, and not merely as to those who brought the suit attacking it.

See Tallahassee Memorial Regional Med. Center v. Bowen,

815 F.2d 1435, 1446 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.

1573 (1988) (“Tallahassee”) ‘ruling by controlling court that

regulation is invalid is “binding precedent’), Wirtz v. Baldor Electric

Co., 337 F.2d 518, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Temporary

Emergency Court of Appeals is the first federal appellate court to reach

a contrary result.

In Wirtz, the court recognized that invalidating a minimum wage

regulation as to only those plaintiffs bringing the lawsuit would give

them an “unconscionable ” advantage over other firms in the industry.

337 F.2d at 534. Further, the court found that Congress must have

intended in authorizing the promulgation of regulations that the

regulations be applied fairly and uniformly to all regulated firms. (/d.)

In contrast, the decision of the Temporary Emergency Coun of

Appeals in this case grants an economic advantage to Mobil Oil

Corporation as a reward for having brought the lawsuit challenging the

April 1974 amendment and punishes Mobil’s competitors for failing to

bring duplicative actions. (See Appendix A, 3a, 8a.)

In Tallahassee, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that a decision by a

controlling court invalidating a regulation is binding precedent in all

subsequent actions and the regulatory agency is powerless to alter that

precedent. 815 F.2d at 1446. As recognized by the court in

Tallahassee, a regulatory agency may in some cases seck to cure a

regulatory gap caused by the invalidation of a regulation by adopting a

new retroactive regulation. 815 F.2d at 1446-57. In this case,

DOE’s attempt to retroactively impose a regulation restoring the

requirements of the invalid April 1974 amendment was also struck

down by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. Mobil I//,

678 F.2d at 1090-91. Absent adoption of a valid retroactive

regulation, DOE lacked the power or authority to enforce the

requiremenits of the invalid April 1974 amendment.3

3 The decision below relies in part on a regulation regarding “refiling” of

cost allocation reports, 10 C.F.R. § 212.126(d). (See Appendix A, 6a-8a.)

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals would authorize DOE to use

the refiling regulation to preserve substantively and procedurally invalid

regulatory requirements. In contrast, in Bethesda Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen,

485 U.S. 399, 108 S. Ct. 1255, 1258 (1988), this Court stated that

“submission of a cost report in full compliance with the unambiguous

dictates of the... regulations does not, by itself, bar... claiming

dissatisfaction with the ... regulations.”

If the rule of law stated in Wirtz and Tallahassee is correct and an

invalid regulauon is void as to all regulated firms, then cither tie Temporary

Emergency Court of Appeals has simply misinterpreted the refiling

regulation, or DOE has sought through the refiling regulation to delegate to

itself a power which it cannot have -- the power to ignore decisions by the

Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and to impose invalid regulatory

requirements on some firms and not others.

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals in this

action ignores this fundamental principle of administrative law. The

decision would require regulated firms to either participate in every

legal challviige to a regulation or engage in the meaningless and time-

consuming ritual of obtaining approval of the regulatory agency to

conform to the dictates of binding judicial precedent. (Appendix A,

8a.) The decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of other

Courts of Appeal and should be reviewed by this Court.

Il. THE DECISION OF THE TEMPORARY

EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTS

FROM THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS AND PRESENTS IMPORTANT

QUESTIONS REGARDING JUDICIAL SUPERVISION

OF REGULATORY AGENCIES WHICH SHOULD BE

SETTLED BY THIS COURT

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals

departs from the accepted course of judicial proceedings and

introduces powerful incentives for regulatory noncompliance and

redundant lawsuits. Left unchecked, such incentives will disrupt

judicial supervision of regulatory action.

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals criticizes ARCO for

abiding by the 1974 amendment until it was struck down and failing to

file a lawsuit duplicative of the action brought by Mobil. The court

slates:

ARCO consistently abided by the April 1974

amendment.... Two companies - Mobil and Getty -

did not abide by the... amendment. Getty applied for and

was granted administrative relief. Mobil challenged the

validity of the amendment before a panel of this court.

If ARCO believed the 1974 amendment was invalid, the

company should have taken steps to protest the regulation

rather than attempt to jump on Mobil’s coattails [in 1979] five

years after the amendment became effective. ARCO could

have, like Mobil, challenged the regulation.

(Appendix A, 3a, 8a.) Having abided by the regulation and avoided a

redundant lawsuit, the court concludes that ARCO could not cease

abiding by the regulation after it was struck down absent permission

from DOE. (Appendix A, 6a-8a.) Indeed, under the court’s ruling,

DOE could have compelled ARCO to continue complying with the

invalid regulation since the count finds that “ARCO waived its right to

relief by not challenging the regulation in a timely manner. ”

(Appendix A, 8a.)

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals would

punish ARCO for its regulatory compliance and reward Mobil for its

legal challenge to the regulation by providing Mobil with an advantage

over other regulated firms in the industry. Thus, the ruling creates a

powerful incentive for regulatory noncompliance and duplicative

litigation, and results in the application of invalid regulatory

requirements to some firms and not others. In contrast, the accepted

rule of administrative law endorsed in Wirtz and Tallahassee

minimizes litigation, treats similarly situated firms equally, and avoids

punishing firms for regulatory compliance.

Further, by purporting to allow federal regulatory agencies to

decide which firms will be subject to invalid regulatory requirements,

the decision would permit federal agencies to determine the extent to

which they will comply with judicial decisions invalidating regulatory

requirements. Thus, the decision would severely limit the ability of

the federal courts to supervise the actions of federal regulatory

agencics.

CONCLUSION

An appellate decision encouraging duplicative lawsuits, punishing

regulatory compliance, and applying regulations to some firms and not

to others based only on the happenstance of which firm filed the

original legal challenge is a prescription for regulatory chaos. Only

this Court can provide the legal guidance necessary to restore the

proper incentives for regulatory compliance and legal restraint and

ensure fair and uniform application of regulatory requirements to

similarly situated parties. Consequently, ARCO respectfully submits

that the Court needs to speak.

Dated: December 20, 1989

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM H. ALSUP

Counsel of Record

F. BRUCE DODGE

SAMUEL R. MILLER

THEODORE P. SENGER

MORRISON & FOERSTER

345 Califomia Street

San Francisco, California 94104

(415) 677-7000

Counsel for Petitioner

Atlantic Richfield Company

EE ee ee

la

APPENDIX A

Cemporary Emergency Court of Appeals

of the United States

No. 9-101

DON VAN VRANKEN, et al.,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,

Vv.

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

(Civil Action No. C-79-0627)

Argued: May 26, 1989 Decided: October 10, 1989

F. BRUCE DODGE, Samuel R. Miller, Theodore P. Senger,-

Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, California, were on

the brief for Appellant Atlantic Richfield Company.

TRACY R. KIRKHAM and Robert B. Ericson. Hennigan &

Mercer, Los Angeles, California, and Josef D. Cooper,

San Francisco, California, were on the brief for Plaintiffs-

Appellees.

Before: BECKER, WEIGEL, and THORNBERRY, Judges.

THORNEERRY, Judge:

Defendant /appellant Atlantic Richfield Company

(“ARCO”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Don Van Vranken, et al. (plaintiffs /

appellees), prohibiting ARCO from retroactively reallo-

cating crude oil costs.

FACTS

In 1973, pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of

1970, 12 U.S.C. section 1904, et seg. (“the ESA”), the

2a

Cost of Living Council (“the CLC’) promulgated man-

datory price control regulations for all petroleum and pe-

troleum products. These regulations permitted compa-

nies to pass along increases in crude oil costs in the price

of their petroleum products. The method for calculating

the maximum permissible price depended on the nature

of the goods. This appeal concerns the calculation of

maximum prices for “covered goods” as that term is de-

fined in the regulations.

The CLC established a formula for determining the

amount of a refiner’s increased crude oil costs that could

be attributed to recover goods. This calculation, known

as the ‘“V factor,” entailed taking the total volume of a

given covered good sold and dividing it by the total vol-

ume of al] covered goods sold. The resulting fraction was

used to determine the amount of the increased crude oil

costs that could be attributed to the covered product. Re-

finers had the choice of either increasing the price of the

covered goods or banking the increased costs to be used

to offset overcharges.

Before the ESA was scheduled to expire on Apri! 30,

1974, Congress passed the Emergency Petroleum Ailoca-

tion Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. section 751 et seg. (“the

EPAA”), to succeed the ESA. Congress, however, ex-

empted certain petroleum products from the price con-

trols under the EPAA. Pursuant to the statute exempt-

ing these products, the Department of Energy (“the

DOE”) issued regulations reflecting the exemption of

these products from the price controls. The exclusion of

these products from the price controls had a significant

impact on the calculation of the permissible price in-

creases for covered goods. Under the new regulations,

the increased cost of crude oil used to produce the newly

exempt goods was included in the total increased cost

of producing covered goods; however, the volume of the

newly exempt goods that were sold was not included in

the denominator of the V factor. Increased crude oil

a |

3a

costs to produce newly exempt goods could therefore be

passed on in the price of non-exempt, covered goods. Ef-

fectively, under the new regulations, companies could

pass on the increased crude oil costs to produce newly

exempt goods in the price of the newly exempt goods

themselves and the price of the covered goods.

By emergency regulatory amendment, without provid-

ing an opportunity for notice or comment, on April 30,

1974, the DOE redefined the V Factor to add the volume

of newly exempt goods to the denominator of the V fac-

tor. This amendment resolved the problem created by the

post-EPAA regulations and prevented refiners from ap-

portioning increased crude oil costs attributable to ex-

empt goods to the price of their covered products. The

result was that only the increased crude oil costs attrib-

utable to covered goods could be passed on in the price

of covered goods.

ARCO consistently abided by the April 1974 amend-

ment, including allocating increased crude oil in direct

volumetric proportion to the covered goods sold. Two

companies—Mobil and Getty—did not abide by the V

factor provisions in the amendment. Getty applied for

and was granted administrative relief. Mobil challenged

the validity of the amendment before a panel of this

court. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 610 F.2d 796 ‘TECA

1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 2156, 64

L.Ed.2d 790 (1980) (Mobil I), a TECA panel found that

the 1974 amendment was invalid because DOE failed to

provide a period of notice and comment. Later. in Mobil

Oil Corp. v. DOE, 647 F.2d 142 (TECA 1981) (Mobil

II), this court permitted Mobil to reallocate crude oil

costs incurred producing exempt goods to the cost of

procucing covered goods. Following the decisions in ‘Joh?!

I and Mobil II, many refiners, including ARCO, sought

to retroactively reallocate millions of dollars of increased

crude oil costs used to produce exempt products that. ab-

4a

sent the 1974 amendment, could have been attributed to

covered products.’

In March 1979, the plaintiffs filed suit against ARCO,

alleging that ARCO had improperly recalculated its May

1973 costs for crude oil. In determining whether ARCO

had in fact overcharged the plaintiffs, the district court

had to review ARCO’s calculation of its banks of unre-

covered costs to determine whether ARCO’s banks were

sufficient to offset any overcharges. The effect of the in-

validation of the April 1974 amendment was critical to

determining the amount of ARCO’s banked unrecovered

costs. ARCO, in a motion for summary judgment, urged

that pursuant to the Mobil decisions it could retroactively

reallocate its costs for producing exempt goods to cov-

ered goods and thereby increase its banks. The plain-

tiffs in their motion for summary judgment, argued that

ARCO could not retroactively reallocate these costs. The

district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment.

On Appeal, ARCO urges that (1) in light of the in-

validation of the 1974 amendment, it must retroactively

reallocate its costs from exempt to covered goods: and

(2) it may reallocate its costs from exempt to covered

goods. Several lower courts have addressed these issues

and have rejected the arguments ARCO presently ad-

vances. See Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp.,

550 F.Supp. 297 (W.D. Mich. 1982), mod’d on other

grounds, sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 728 F.2d

1477 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255, 104 S.Ct. 3545,

82 L.Ed.2d 849 (1984) ; Kickapoo Oil Co., Inc. v. Murphy

1The DOF issued further regulations at various points

after the April 1974 amendment. Van Vranken urges that

these amendments were validly promulgated and that they

had the same effect as the April 1974 amendment. We need

not reach the validity of these amendments because we find

that ARCO cannot retroactively reallocate its costs even

absent the amendments.

5a

Oil Corp., No. 78-C-478-C (W.D. Wis. December 28,

1983); Martin Oil Service, Inc. v. Koch Refining Co.,

No. 81-C-1844 (N.D. Il. March 21, 1989); U.S. Oil

Comp., Inc. v. Koch Refining Company, No. 79-C-659

(E.D. Wis. March 13, 1989).

ARCO’S CLAIM THAT IT MUST RETROACTIVELY

REALLOCATE ITS COSTS

ARCO urges that because Mobil J invalidated the 1974

amendment the only legal method for allocating increased

crude oil costs is to allocate the increased crude oil costs

for producing exempt goods to covered gceods. For the

following reasons, we reject this argument. First, neither

Mobil I nor Mobil II required Mobil to retroactively re-

allocate costs. Rather, the Mobil I panel “permitted .. .

Mobil to allocate exempt product costs to covered prod-

ucts.” Mobil I, 620 F.2d at 805: see also Modi! II, 647

F.2d at 146-47 (holding that “the judgment is correct

insofar as it permits Mobil to allocate exempt product

costs to covered products...").

Second, even absent the 1974 amendment, nothing in

the regulations required that costs for exempt goods be

attributed to covered goods when calculating the maxi-

mum allowable price for covered goods. In fact. the rele-

vant regulation stated that “in computing [maximum al-

lowable] prices =. .a refiner may increase its May 15.

1973 selling prices ... by an amount to reflect .. . in-

creased product costs... .” 10 C.F.R. Section 212.83

‘c) (1) (emphasis added). Nothing in this regulation

requires that a refiner bank or increase the price of cov-

ered goods to compensate for increased crude 0‘! cos‘s.

Third, there vas nothing unlawful about the mann>r

in which ARCO allocated its increased costs. The price

ARCO charged for covered goods was within the lawful!

maximum. See Longview Refining Co. v. Shore. 554 F.2d

1006,_1017 (TECA), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 126, 434 U.S.

836 (1977) (holding that there is no legal wrong if a

6a

plaintiff is charged less than the maximum price). If, ab-

sent the 1974 amendment, the regulations required ARCO

to allocate the increased costs of producing exempt goods

to the price of covered goods, it would be unlawful for

ARCO to have failed to allocate the increased costs to

the price of the covered goods. No one, including the

DOE, has contended that ARCO violated the law.

ARCO’S CLAIM THAT IT MAY RETROACTIVELY

REALLOCATE ITS COSTS

Given that there is no support for ARCO’s contention

that refiners are required to retroactively reallocate costs

based on Mobil I and Mobil II, there remains only the

question of whether ARCO may retroactively reallocate

the costs to covered goods. In reviewing this question,

two issues arise: first, whether ARCO must obtain per-

mission from the DOE before retroactively reallocating

costs: and second, whether ARCO waived any right to

retroactive reallocation by failing to timely challenge the

1974 amendment.

ARCO’s failure to obtain the DOE’s permission to refile

In Eastern Air Lines v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 712

F.2d 1402, 1408-09 (TECA), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915,

104 S.Ct. 278, 64 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983), a panel of this

court prohibited ARCO from retroactively reallocating

costs to compensate for overcharges. In Eastern Airlines,

ARCO sought to take costs allocated to gasoline and re-

allocate them to a specified product group. Under the reg-

ulations, ARCO initially had the option of allocating the

costs to either gasoline or the product group. We found

that, although ARCO initially had the choice where to

allocate the costs, the regulations did not permit retroac-

tive reallocation absent permission from the DOE. 7d. at

1408, n.14. The relevant regulations provide that:

DOE will routinely accept resubmissions or refiling

of [eost allocation] reports only within one year

7a

after the original filing or submission. Any entry

contained in an otherwise timely report which pur-

ports to change or adjust retroactively an entry or

allocation contained in a report previously filed or

submitted shall be considered a refiling or resubmis-

sion for purposes of the paragraph and wiil not be

given force or effect absent compliance with the pro-

visions of this paragraph. ...

Notwithstanding the provisions . . . of this section,

a refiner may resubmit or refile reports until June

1, 1979, for months of measurement beginning with

September 1973; where expressly authorized by DOE

regulation or order; or where DOE grants written

permission to resubmit or refile for good cause

shown.

10 C.F.R. section 212.126 (d) (1)-(2) (emphasis added).

In the instant case, ARCO sought, but did not obtain.

permission from the DOE to retroactively reallocate costs.

As in Eastern Airlines, ARCO’s failure to obtain per-

mission from the DOE precludes it from any relief by

this court.*

ARCO attempts to distinguish Eastern Air Lines on

the grounds that in Eastern Air Lines ARCO could choose

how to allocate costs while in the instant case only one

method for allocating increased costs was available. We

do not find this distinction consequential. The central

basis of the decision in Eastern Air Lines was that

ARCO failed to obtain permission from the DOE to

retroactively reallocate costs as required by the regula-

tions. The failure to obtain permission from the DOE.

not the nature of the initial allocation of costs. deter-

mined the outcome in Eastern Air Lines. We therefore

2 If Arco thought the DOE erred in not granting the com-

pany permission to retroactively reallocate its costs, ARCO

could presumably have brought an action appealing the DOE’s

decision.

8a

find the distinction between Eastern Air Lines and the

instant case immaterial.

ARCO further argues that the above regulations are

not relevant in the context of a claim for relief based on

the invalidation of a regulation. ARCO urges that be-

cause the 1974 amendment was invalid, this court can

award relief in the form of retroactive reallocation re-

gardless of the DOE refiling regulations. We disagree.

Nothing in the invalidation of the 1974 amendment had

any effect on the refiling regulations and nothing in the

refiling regulations excepts refiners from compliance when

an allocation regulation is invalidated. We thus find that

the regulations governing retroactive reallocation are no

less effective because the 1974 amendment was invali-

dated. Had ARCO time!y challenged the 1974 amend-

ment as Mobil did, it could have sought relief from the

amendment and would have presumably been awarded

the relief it now seeks without having to file reallocation

reports. Having failed to do so, ARCO cannot avoid the

clear language of the regulation requiring permission

from the DOE before reallocating costs.

ARCO’s failure to timely challenge the regulation

We further find that ARCO waived its right to relief

by not challenging the regulation in a timely manner. At

oral argument, ARCO suggested that once we declared

the 1974 amendment invalid, refiners had an indefinite

period in which te retroactively reallocate their costs.

This argument is without merit. If ARCO believed the

1974 amendment was invalid, the company should have

taken steps to protest the regulation rather than attempt

to jump on Mobil’s coattails five years after the amend-

ment became effective. ARCO could have, like Mobil,

challenged the regulation. The company could have also

sought to intervene in Mobil’s action, or requested ad-

ministrative relief as Getty did. Having failed to chal-

9a

lenge the regulation in a timely manner, ARCO is not

entitled to relief at this late date.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s judgment.

10a

APPENDIX B

FILED

SEP 26, 1988

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DON VAN VRANKEN, on behalf

of himself and all others similarly

situated, and LEW & TED’S

SERVICE, INC.,

No. C-79 0627 SW

ORDER NUNC PRO

TUNC JUNE 1, 1988,

GRANTING PLAIN-

TIFFS’ CROSS-

MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT ON THE

‘V FACTOR’ ISSUE

AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT ON

DAMAGES

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD

COMPANY,

Defendant.

NN Ne NN a ee

On April 4, 1988, partics made cross-summary judgment motions

on the issue of volumetric apportionment, known as the *V factor.’

lla

The parties also bricfed the issue of whether any money sent to

plaintiff class members from the Department of Energy pursuant to the

Special Refund Proceeding HEF-0591 can be offset against any

damages award. Afier oral argument, the court took the matters under

submission. On June 1, 1988, this court filed its ruling which

granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff class

represented by Don Van Vranken and denied defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on the V factor issue. Section II of the order

addressed the issue of damages.

After the order was filed, counsel for both parties brought to the

court’s attention certain typographical errors and mischaracterizations

contained in the order. Therefore, this court now files this corrected

ordcr nunc pro tunc June 1, 1988.

REGULATORY BACKGROUND

Any coherent resolution of this complex and somewhat

anachronistic aspect of the petroleum regulations requires at Icast a

brief discussion of the unique background that applies to this case.

In 1974, when the authority to regulate the oil industry passed from

the Cost of Living Council to the Federal Energy Office (FEO), the

FEO established a cost allocation formula for the oil industry. At that

time, authority to regulate the oil industry was derived from two

Statutes, the Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1904

(hereinafter ESA), which controlled the price of most of the goods and

services in the nation’s economy, and the newly enacted Emergency

Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 751 (hereinafter EPAA),

which controlled the price of crude and refined petroleum products.

The FEO formula provided for volumetric apportionment of crude oil

costs known as the “V factor.” Its purpose was to allocate the total

increased crude oil costs among various refined products. The

V factor is a fraction. Under the EPAA, the numerator consists of the

total volume sold of a particular product in a specified time period.

The denominator is the total volume of all “covered products other

12a

than special products” sold in that same period. Among covered

products. the refiners could redistribute increased costs from

whichever of these products the refiner chose.! For the special

products, the refiner had to apportion exactly a pro rata share of costs

from the refiner’s increased costs associated with that special product.

When the ESA expired in 1974, the Department of Energy lost its

authority to regulate certain petroleum by-products. However, the

ESA expiration did not require the DOE to amend its cost allocation

formulas. The successor statute to the ESA, the Emergency Petroleum

Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 751 [hereinafter EPAA], exempted

certain petroleum by-products which previously fell under the price

controls of the ESA.2 On April 3, 1974, DOE amended the

regulations to redefine “ covered products.” It excluded those

products which it no longer had authority to regulate.

Unfortunaicly, the agency neglected to alter its allocation formulas

for the products. To keep the regulations intemally consistent, DOE

should have included the newly exempted petroleum by-products in

the V factor denominator which would have had the cffect of

excluding their costs from those available for allocation to regulated

products. On April 30, 1974, the date the ESA expired, DOE

promulgated an amendment to the Mandatory Petroleum Price

Regulations which included petroleum by-products in the V factor

denominator. 10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c)(2) [hereinafter April 30, 1974

! Alternatively, the refiner could “bank” these increased costs and use

them to offset any future overcharges for which the refiner might be

responsible.

2 These products were petroleum coke, petroleum wax, asphalt, road oil

and refinery gas. The substances are petroleum by-products, or refinery

residue, that result from the processing of crude oil into refined products

such as gasoline.

13a

amendment].? The upshot of this amendment was that refiners could

no longer reapportion to the price of covered products their increased

costs attributable to these petroleum goods in any manner they desired.

Mobil Oil Corporation was one refiner that made its objections to the

amendment known to DOE through administrative remedies. DOE

rejected Mobil’s protests. Finally, Mobil Oil sued.

DISCUSSION

I. VOLUMETRIC APPORTIONMENT

Don Van Vranken represents the plaintiff class. It has charged

ARCO with improperly reallocating exempt products to justify prices it

charged the plaintiff class for regulated products. The class claims that

up to $343 million of exempt product costs are in excess of the

maximum allowed by law.

Four conflicts surface in the cross-motions for summary judgment.

First, the partics dispute whether prior litigation between Mobil Oil

Corporation and the Department of Energy only provided relief to

Mobil based on an injunction which granted Mobil Extraordinary

Exception Relief from the V factor regulations after a showing of

serious hardship. Second, ARCO believes the voiding of the

April 30, 1974 amendment requires it to now add exempt product

costs to covered product prices. Plaintiff class, however, argues that

ARCO’s figures amount to illegal retroactive reallocation. Third,

plaintiff class coritends that if ARCO is allowed to add exempt product

costs it is limited to three months —- May, June and July 1974 -

because three V factor regulations promulgated in August 1974,

December 1974 and March 1975 prohibit the allocation of exempt

3 The denominator was changed to include “the total volume of all

covered products and all products refined from crude petroleum other than

covered products... .”

14a

product costs to covered product costs. Finally, it must be resolved

whether ARCO sought and received permission from DOE to add

exempt product costs.

A. Application of the Mobil Decisions

Defendant ARCO contends that three decisions by the Temporary

Court of Appeals —- or TECA — provide an avenue for refiners like

ARCO to add the increased costs to the V factor they used. The

defendant’s interpretation is too broad. These cases, the Mobil

decisions, do not necessarily apply across the board to all refiners

similarly situated.

In Mobil Oil v. Dep't of Energy, 610 F.2d 796 (TECA 1979)

{hereinafter Mobil !}, TECA upheld a district court holding and ruled

in favor of Mobil. The court held that DOE had failed to consider each

of the statutory commands of the EPAA when it promulgated the

Apnil 30, 1974 amendment. Thus, the amendment was procedurally

invalid. In addition, DOE failed to provide notice and comment to

interested partics as usually required by the Administrative Procedures

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 [hereinafter APA], for informal rulemaking

procedures. TECA established that none of the exceptions to the

notice and comment requirement applied to DOE. For instance, DOE

could not argue that the expiration of ESA came as a surprise. Nor did

the agency’s forgetfulness provide an excuse. Accordingly, TECA

reaffirmed the district court’s holding that the amendment was “

arbitrary and capricious” and therefore “ null and void.” /d. at 80S.

The disinict court had ruled that Mobil could retroactively allocate

increased costs from exempt petroleum by-products “ continuously

from April, 1974 up to the present (November, 1979].” Jd. TECA

held that a portion of this district court judgment contravened a

December 1975 amendment to the EPAA which prohibited any method

other than direct proportionate distribution of cost pass-throughs to

certain products, including No. 2 heating oil and No. 2 diesel fuel,

aviation fuel and propane produced from crude. 15 U.S.C.

15a

§ 753(b)(2)(D). Accordingly, TECA remanded the case for findings

consistent with these restrictions.4 On remand, the district court held

that Mobil could reallocate its costs from April 1974, except that from

February 1, 1976 forward, the restrictions on products such as No. 2

heating oil applied. Thus, Mobil could allocate exempt product costs

to covered products for the period prior to February 1, 1976.5

In Mobil 1], DOE appealed the remanded district coun holding.

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 647 F.2d 142 (TECA 1981).

DOE urged that Mobil should not be allowed to reallocate increased

crude oil costs from exempt products to covered products after

February 1, 1976. TECA agreed, and held that Mobil could reallocate

only for the period preceding February 1, 1976. TECA did point out

that the Mobil / decision did not address the question of whether the

later rulemakings, such as the February regulation, validly

promulgated the same regulation on their effective dates.

In Mobil III, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’ t of Energy, 678 F.2d 1083

(TECA 1982), TECA dealt with DOE’s attempted third bite at the

apple and the subsequent abolishing of the V factor altogether. On

January 16, 1981, DOE adopted a regulation which retroactively

repromulgated the April 30, 1974 amendiment to the April 1974 date.

TECA ruled that DOE could not retroactively repromulgate its rule.

The decision in Mobil / had made it clear that the April 1974

4 Mobil I also established that a new rulemaking in September 1974 did

not cure the April 30, 1974 amendment problems. First, TECA held that

the September statute addressed non-product costs pass-throughs. The April

1974 amendment concemed product cost pass-throughs, so the two were

unrelated. Second, TECA noted that an opportunity for notice and comment

regarding a subsequent rulemaking cannot cure previous rulemaking defects.

Mobil I, 610 F.2d at 805 n.11.

5 The district court used the February 1976 date instead of December

1975 because the December statute directed new regulations to take effect no

later than February 1, 1976. 15 U.S.C. § 758.

16a

amendment was not necessary to fulfill the EPAA’s design. Thus, a

retroactive statute did not fulfill that design. /d. at 1090.

In addition, the February 1, 1976 and other subsequent

amendments brought in a new cost allocation, the “ R factor,” for the

old V factor.© Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA),

5 U.S.C. § 751. TECA ruled that this substitution was prospective

enforcement and therefore proper. Mobil II], 678 F.2d at 1091.

In accordance with its filing regulations, DOE set up a specific

grace period and appeal process to determine whether the agency

would accept refilings based on the new invalidation of the Apnil

amendment. There was no carte blanche for all refiners to refer to the

Mobil decisions and increase their costs.

In general, DOE did not allow refiners to refile cost allocation

reports that sought to change the allocation of crude oil costs based on

the invalidation of the April 1974 amendment unless the refiners

applied within the grace period or with the permission of the DOE.

The agency noted that, if permitted, the filings could result in total

refiner claims for retroactive increases in banked costs of over

$50 billion at that time. 45 Fed. Reg. 58,872-73 (Sept. 5, 1980).’

© The V factor was based on volume of products sold. The R factor

was based on volume of products refined. The V factor was eliminated

entirely as of March 1, 1977 in favor of the R factor.

7 Indeed, DOE prophesied the exact complaint Van Vranken makes here:

Many (refiners) have claimed that, because the April 30, 1974 rule was

declared invalid, their pool of increased costs for the period thereafter can

be enlarged, such that alleged violations based on their

contemporancously reported increased costs are either diminished or

obliterated.

46 Fed. Reg. 7782 (Jan. 23, 1981). DOE found no good cause to allow

this to happen.

17a

The court agrees with the concems expressed in Kickapoo Oil

Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., No. C 78-478, slip op. at 17-24 (W.D.

Wis. Dec. 28, 1983). There, the court concluded that, while DOE

could not enforce the invalid regulation against nonparties to the Mobil

cases, those regulations do not necessarily enable all those who

applied the invalid regulation to later seek reallocation of their crude oil

costs increases.

The court does not, however, accept the interpretation of the Mobil

decisions offered by the plaintiff class. It suggests that the scope of

the decisions is limited to Mobil Oil Corporation because the holdings

provided emergency relief in accordance with an injunction. This is a

misreading of the cases. TECA struck down the April 30, 1974

amendment because it did not follow the APA or the EPAA. The court

clearly did not reach the issue of whether DOE was justified when the

agency tumed down Mobil’s administrative appeals for emergency

relief.

B. Reallocation of Exempt Product Costs

Having held that the Mobil decisions do not automatically allow

ARCO to reallocate its crude oil costs, this court must next determine

whether the April 30, 1974 amendment allows or mandates ARCO

add these costs to its covered product prices. The plaintiff class has

asked this court to rule that ARCO cannot inject additional increased

costs into its banks today when those costs were not contained in

contemporancous filings with the DOE. For the reasons presented

below, the court rules in favor of the class.

18a

1. The relevant issues.

ARCO contends that plaintiff class has mischaracterized the nature

of the issue presented. The refiner suggests that the question is

whether the class can establish that it was in fact overcharged during

the applicable time period. In antithesis, the court believes ARCO’s

approach places the cart before the horse.

ARCO relies on the ruling expressed in Longview Refining Co. v.

Shore, 554 F.2d 1006 (TECA), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977).

In that case, the court ruled that the customer had not shown that the

refiner had failed to implement the price regulations.’ Here, this court

must first determine what the pertinent price regulations require.

Then, after applying those regulations, plaintiff class must establish

that actual overcharges occurred, by, among other things, showing

that ARCO improperly inflated its banked costs used to support prices.

See Kickapoo, 788 F.2d at 20; Longview, 554 F.2d at 1011.

Finally, the class must then show that the overcharges or excessive

banks were made with the requisite intent and willfulness. /d.

at 1023.9

8 Shore complained that Longview Refining charged them too much for

gasoline and diesel as allowed under the applicable regulations. TECA

struck down the district court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law

because the facts did not sufficienuy support a conclusion that an overcharge

occurred. TECA noted that “plaintiffs have the burden in this case to

provide the specific data needed to prove the existence of an overcharge.”

Longview, 554 F.2d at 1011. TECA found many aspects of the district

court’s findings lacking in foundation, including the fact that the district

court apparently only used plainuff’s version of the proper pricing structure.

9 TECA also retied on the absence of a showing of intent in its reversal

in Longview. The court noted that a § 210 action requires plaintiff to prove

that defendants “intentionally charg[{ed] a price known to be in excess of the

applicable ceiling price allowable under the pricing regulations.” /d.

at 1022-23. Clear proof of willfulness is required because of the

complexity of the regulations: The court remarked that these regulations

were so convoluted that even the government could not determine how to

Footnote continucd on next page.

19a

2. Recovery of exempt product costs.

ARCO urges this court to rule that the refiner must follow the pre-

April 30, 1974 definition, that this definition required the recovery of

the five later exempted product costs in covered product prices, and

the invalidation of the April 30 amendmeni continued this mandate

until February 1, 1976. This cannot be.

Obviously the Mobil decisions invalidating the April 1974

amendment establish that a plaintiff cannot sue for over-recoverics

which stemmed from a refiner’s improper use of this rule. The

decisions indicate that correct posture for a refiner in an exogenous

world would have been to ignore the amendment and to continue to

include the exempt product prices in the denominator of the

V factor.!° Refiners like ARCO, however, followed the amendment

and excluded the prices. The fact that the Mobil decisions later

invalidated the amendment does not mean that ARCO can now go back _

and allocate more costs to the products it sold and thus expand its

banked costs. The court notes that this proposal would be akin to

properly calculate the pricing structures. The Longview court speaks of

willfulness “in the criminal sense.” Nonetheless, here TECA seems to refer

to the accountants’ inability to understand what they were supposed to do.

It is unclear how TECA would have ruled if the court had found that the

refiner understood the regulations but still failed to follow their

requirements. Thus, it is not clear that, in the case before this court, the

plainuff class must show ARCO acted with criminal intent. In addition,

this problem was not crucial to TECA’s analysis; TECA clearly could

reverse the district court without relying on this issue. Finally, TECA does

warn that “mere failure to employ the formula” is noi a “legal wrong.” But

this proscription provides for the case when the refiner fails to follow the

price formulas but still manages to charge the customer less than the price

to which the refiner is entitled.

10 The court does not think it unrealistic that refiners might indeed

realize that the EPAA was always intended to remain consistent even after

the expiration of its predecessor ESA and keep exempt products and covered

products separate.

20a

permitting a refiner to retum to its customers after a dozen years had

passed and inform them that it undercharged them: The refiner

mistakenly operated under a recently invalidated regulation which set

the prices too low, so it should now be permitted to ask the customers

to pay the difference on products sold and consumed many years ago.

Whether the costs are banked for the future or extracted from the

customer in the price of today’s goods, the result is the same.

The court finds support in the reasons expressed in Kickapoo and

Naph-sol Refining Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., 550 F. Supp. 297

(W.D. Mich. 1982), modified on other grounds sub nom. Mobil Oil

Corp. v. DOE, 728 F.2d 1477 (TECA 1983). These courts concluded

that DOE had indeed sect forth an invalid April 1974 amendment. As a

result, the amendment was improper, and refiners were to use the old,

albeit intemalliy inconsistent, rule which removed EPAA exempt

products from the V factor denominator.'! Thus, the Mobil

decisions allowed the refiners to use the amendment resulting from the

DOE’s slip-up. But the refiners were not required to use the

amendment at that time. /d. As plaintiff class points out, the Mobil

courts always uscd permissive language rather than compulsory

language when describing Mobil’s ability to allocate costs.

The court finds the reasoning in Kickapoo particularly persuasive

on this point. There, the court noted that the only directives the price

regulations ever contained regarding exempt product costs were

prohibitions barring thcir use to justify increasing covered prices. The

court interpreted the effect of the invalidation of the Apmnil 30

regulation on the cost allocation as a temporary suspension of this

pronibition. It follows that this temporary suspension does not

automatically compel the addition of exempt product costs to the

!! As noted above, the denominator should have included volumes of

both covered products and exempt products in order to exclude exempt

product costs from allocation to covered product prices. Discussion, supra,

at 2-3.

21a

covered prices calculation. As recognized in Kickapoo, it was never a

violation of the regulations to not increase covered product prices in

order to recover exempt product costs, even during the period that the

April 30 V factor prohibition was void.

It is one thing to allow refiners a pricing practice which violated the

spint of the EPAA but held consistent to the letter when that regulation

was in effect. It is a different thing to allow the refiner to retroactively

use that inconsistent regulation to its benefit now that the regulation is

Outdated. Indeed, this reasoning is the underpinning of the decisions

in Tenneco Oil Co., 1 DOE § 85,512 (1977), and Eastern Airlines,

Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 74-1207 Civ-JM (S.D. Fla.,

Jan. 12, 1982), aff d, 712 F.2d 1402 (TECA 1983), and points to

the root of the persuasiveness of those cases to that here. This court is

aware that the subject of those cases was voluntary reallocations of “

H factor dollars,”!? and not recalculation of the V factor, as is the

case here. In those cases, the seller chose the amouwt of costs to

assign to particular products and then later sought to reallocate costs to

eliminate over-recoverics. The courts refused to allow this practice.

The reasoning they expressed counsels against unnecessary retroactive

reallocations in general and indicates compelling policy concems that

this court, too, must consider.'3

Accordingly, this court rejects the suggestion by ARCO that it

analogize the casc fiere to that in Mamula v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, 346 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1965). In that case, a

taxpayer, in good faith, reported income pursuant to a method which

the government determined to be incorrect in a subsequent audit. The

court found he was not bound to the method he chose because the IRS

12 These reflect the costs allocated into and out of a product group.

13 Similarly, the Naph-Sol court noted that public policy should

prohibit letter a seller retroacuvecly adjust its prices in order to benefit itself,

550 F. Supp. at 313.

22a

had ruled that it did not appropriately apply to his income source. The

court allowed him to choose one of two other methods available to

recalculate the tax; naturally, he chose the system which better

benefitted his finances.

That is what ARCO would like to do here: choose between the pre-

amendment posture or the April 1974 amendment requirements to

achieve the highest banked costs. Yet, in the case before this court,

the government has never ruled that a recalculation is required.'4

Furthermore, the concept of volumetric allotment was considered

fundamental to the framework of the petroleum regulations. Unlike

the law in Mamula, the prohibition required by the April 30, 1974

amendment had always been, and later continued to be, the heart of the

volumetric regulations. The method of tax payment in Mamula never

was the appropriate choice for that piaintiff to follow. The fact that he

was later allowed to correct his mistake cannot be relevant to ARCO’s

predicament.

C. ARCO’s Revised Cost Forms

Because this court holds that ARCO’s recalculation of its V factor

constitutes an improper retroactive reallocation of its exempt product

costs, the court necd not address the issue of the August 1974,

September 1974 and March 1975 subsequent rulemakings. Instead,

this court must next confront the issue of ARCO’s revised cost forms.

If ARCO had reccived permission from the DOE to include the exempt

products costs in its covered products costs, or if ARCO ever applied

to the DOE during a grace period. it is possible that the refiner might

still be allowed to adjust its V factor as it desires. The coun

determines that ARCO did neither of these things.

14 The courts in Naph-Sol, 550 F. Supp. at 313, and Kickapoo,

No. C 78-478, at 21-24, make a similar distinction.

23a

10 C.F.R. § 212.126(d) states that the refiner must obtain DOE's

written permission for any refiling that covers a period more than

one year prior to the resubmission:

(1) DOE will routinely accept resubmissions or refiling of

such reports only within one year after the original refiling or

submission. Any entry contained in an otherwise timely

report which purports to change or adjust retroactively an

entry or allocation contained in a report previously filed or

submitted shall be considered a refiling or resubmission. . .

and will not be given force or effect absent compliance with

the provisions of this paragraph.

(2) Exceptions Notwithstanding the provisions of

subparagraph (d)(1) of this section, a refiner may resubmit or

refile reports... where DOE grants written permission to

resubmit or rcfile for good cause shown.

ARCO did make R factor refilings. ARCO points to three aspects

of the R factor revisions to imply it resolved its volumctric

apportionment problems with DOE. In a Proposed Remedial Order,

ERA No. RARHO00204, September 30, 1983, DOE challenged

ARCO’s R factor adjustments for March 1979 through December

1980. ARCO claims that the PRO specifically declined to challenge or

criticize the refincr’s V factor adjustment. Actually, the PRO directs

nothing to the V factor in the face of the Order. Absence of a

discussion does not carry any significance.

ARCO further relics on another inapplicable document. When

ARCO applied for the R factor refilings, DOE wrote a response brief.

Response of Economic Regulatory Administration to Statement of

Objections of Atlantic Richfield Company, No. HRO-0223. At

footnote 79, the Response noted that DOE did not challenge the

propricty of allocuting exempt product costs to all covered products

before February 1, 1976. But that remark clearly refers to the TECA

24a

rulings in Mobil, not to any such requests specifically made by

ARCO. ARCO Icaves this distinction out.

Finally, ARCO relies on another footnote, number 77, in the same

Response. The DOE noted that, with respect to ARCO’s refilings in

August 1981, it did not object to “ legitimate costs incurred” if ARCO

accurately reported them consistent with the regulations. It is clear that

DOE is agreeing to nothing more than what ARCO was entitled to by

law. This footnote does not take the place of written acceptance of a

refiling as required by the statutes. Indeed, as counsel for DOE

commented at oral argument, a footnote in a brief could not imply the

DOE's acceptance of a refiling.'*

Il. DAMAGES

In 1985, ARCO and DOE settled a number of pending

administrative proceedings pursuant to § 211 of the ESA. See

50 Fed. Reg. 8366, 8368 (March 1, 1985). As described in the

Notice of Proposed Consent Order, upon execution of the settlement:

ARCO deposited $65.7 million in an interest bearing escrow

account pending public consideration of the settlement. If the

Consent Order is made final, ERA will petition the Office of

Hearings and Appeals (OHA) to implement a Special Refund

Proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Pant 206, Subpan V. In

that proceeding, any person who claims to have suffered

injury from ARCO’s alleged overcharges would have the

opponunity to submit a refund claim to OHA.

'S In supplemental information, ARCO brings up an attempt it made at

rcfiling on March 24, 1982. Apparently, DOE ignored this submission

because it was made after the regulations expired and during settlement

negouiauions in DOE cnforcement proceedings. Thus, this too lacks the

permission required and lacks “force or effect.”

25a

Id. at 8366. Plaintiff class contends that money paid to its members

from the Consent Order fund is “ collateral” to the treble damages

awardable under the class’s own private cause of action under § 210.

The class also argues that the Consent Order fund is attributable to

overcharges which are not currently recoverable in this action. As

explained below, such a ruling would permit an excess of recovery to

the class members.

First, the DOE scituement pertains to alleged overcharges related to

ARCO’s compliance with the Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations

during the period of January 1973 through January 1981. The escrow

fund is intended to provide restitution to purchasers of ARCO’s

refined petroleum products during this time. 50 Fed. Reg. at 8371.

The Consent Order clearly covers damages claimed in plaintiffs’

private cause of action. Indeed, earlier this year, parties signed a

setticment agreement regarding the class’s § 210 claims with moncy

that would have come from the Consent Order fund.

Second, the collateral source rule provides that “ if an injured pany

received some compensation from a source wholly independent of the

tortfcasor, such payments should not be deducted from the damages

which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tonfeasor.”

Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 725, 729 (1971). Plaintiff class

uses this rule to assent that DOE's actions are remedial and therefore

have no beanng on any award made in this case. The class cites to

Bulzan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 620 F.2d 278 (TECA 1980). It is

correct insolar as the DOE's administrative enforcement acuion docs

not affect the class's nght to file and maintain a privaic cause of

action under § 210. However, Bulzan docs not stand for the

proposition that the class may collect twice from ARCO. Other cases

support this conclusion. The coun in U.S. Oil Co., Inc. v. Koch

Refining Co., 518 F. Supp. 957, 962 (E.D. Wis. 1981), recognized

that administrative enforcement actions and separaic pnvaie actions

could expose a deicndant to double liability. The coun went on to

note that this probicm is climinated if courts * reduce any poicntial

exposure by offsetiing any amount a particular plaintiff might recover

26a

by way of DOE’s actions against any recovery for a private suit. DOE

could also offset recoveries in private suits against any restitution

order.” See also Martin Oil Service, Inc. v. Koch Refining Co.,

No. C 81-1844, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 1982) (where the

court suggested the offset problem may be minimized if a defendant

who has already paid restitution on a private action may assert this as a

defense to an enforcement action by DOE).

The count does agree with the plaintiff class in that the offset should

be subtracted from the total amount of damages after trebling. In

actions like this where treble damages are available, the plaintiff is

entitled to full satisfaction of the claim for harm done. The amount

awarded as damages is then trebled as punishment to the defendant. If

the offset were subtracted from the initial damage award, the class

members would be denied the full satisfaction of their claim.

CONCLUSION

This court has held that ARCO’s attempts to alter its banked costs

constitute an improper retroactive reallocation of its exempt product

costs. Accordingly, it grants partial summary judgment to the plaintiff

class represented by Don Van Vranken on this issue. ARCO may

offset moncy that would go to these class members from the DOE

Consent Order fund against any amount of damages due the members

under their privaic cause of action. The offset will be made after

damages are trebied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 9-26-88

Ls/_

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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APPENDIX C

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 9-101

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,

Appellant,

Vv.

DON VAN VRANKEN, on behalf of himself

and all others similarly situated,

and LEW & TED’S SERVICE, INC., ‘

Appellees.

Before: BECKER, WEIGEL and THORNBERRY, Judges.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing en banc, it is

ORDERED that said petition for rehearing is DENIED.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the suggestion for rehearing en

banc is DENIED. The Court’s mandate shall issue seven days from

the date of this order - Monday, November 27, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/

Cynthia A. Dykes

Clerk

November 20, 1989

28a

APPENDIX D

Cost Allocation Regulation,

10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c)(2)

(c) Allocation of increased costs

(2) General Formulae. (i) For special products (i=1 and i=2):

(ii) For covered products other than special products (i=3):

pit = al vilyv") + Bib + Gié +H”

Where for (i) and (i1):

Vv" = The total volume of all covered products sold

in the period “‘n” (the consecutive three-month period

of the preceding year such that the middle month of

the period corresponds to the current month “u’”’).

(39 Fed. Reg. 1955 (Jan. 15, 1974).)

29a

Invalid Amendment to Cost Allocation Regulation,

10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c)(2)

Section 212.83(c)(2) is amended in the definition of ““V”’ to read as

follows:

~ § 212.83

(C)

(2)

Allocation of refiner’s increased product costs.

Allocation of increased costs.

General Formulae...

V"= The total volume of all covered products and

all products refined from crude petroleum other than

covered products sold in the period “n” (the

consecutive three-month period of the preceding year

such that the middle month of the period corresponds

to the current month ‘“‘u’’)

(39 Fed. Reg. 15139 (May 1, 1974).)

30a

APPENDIX E

Refiling Regulation, 10 C.F.R. § 212.126(d)

(d) (1) Resubmissions and refiling of reports by

refiners. A refiner shall exercise due care and diligence in the

preparation of cost allocation reports filed pursuant to this section.

DOE will routinely accept resubmissions or refiling of such reports

only within one year after the orginal filing or submission. Any entry

contained in an otherwise timely report which purports to change or

adjust retroactively an entry or allocation contained in a report

previously filed or submitted shall be considered a refiling or

resubmission for purposes of this paragraph and will not be given

force or effect absent compliance with the provisions of this

paragraph.

(2) Exceptions. Notwithstanding the provisions of

subparagraph (d)(1) of this section, a refiner may resubmit or refile

reports until June 1, 1979, for months of measurement beginning

with September 1973; where expressly authorized by DOE regulation

or order, or where DOE grants written permission to resubmit or refile

for good cause shown.

(3) Applications to resubmit or refile. In any

application for permission to resubmit or refile a report pursuant to

subparagraph (d)(2), DOE will not make a finding of good cause

routincly. Where it appears that such a finding may adversely affect

the interest of the consuming public, a firm must demonstrate in its

application, at a minimum, that the claimed errors or omissions in the

report or reports which the firm secks to replace or modify did not

result from a failure to exercise due care and diligence. Firms must

apply for permission pursuant to subparagraph (d)(2), in writing, to

the DOE office of Special Counsel for Compliance or Office of

Enforcement, as appropriate. Applications to resubmit or refile must

be accompanicd by a wrilicn statement completely describing the

proposed adjustments and the reasons therefor, and a numerical

3la

schedule which reflects both the previously submitted figures and the

proposed adjusted figures. The appropriate DOE Office will dispose of

each application in writing, with a concise statement of the reasons for

granting or denying the application. The disposition of such an

application shall be subject to appeal as an order, under Subpart H of

Part 205.

(44 Fed. Reg. 14536 (March 13, 1979).)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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