Reply Brief — PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

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No. 89-1079 !

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

PETITIONER’S REPLY MEMORANDUM

*ROBERT BRAGER

SHELLEY V. LUCAS

BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C.

1350 I Street, N.W., Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 789-6000

MADELYN A. REILLY

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.

One PPG Place

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15272

(412) 434-2430

Counsel for Petitioner

PPG Industries, Inc.

*Counsel of Record

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY UPHELD

LIMITATIONS THAT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED

EVEN WITH USE OF THE EPA-DESIG-

NATED TECHNOLOGY ...........ccccccccccssccecrseees 1

A. EPA’s Brief Provides No Support for the

Fifth Circuit’s Novel Construction of the

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: B. The Fifth Circuit’s Opinion Creates a

} Conflict Among the Circuits .................. 4

C. The Court Below Improperly Relieved

EPA of Its Burden of Proof. ................. 5

| D. The Case Law Upholding Averaging Is

Inapposite Because PPG Does Not Chal-

lenge EPA’s Methodology .................0000 7

II]. ALL OCPSF PLANTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO

EXCEED THE OCPSF LIMITATIONS AS A RE-

SULT OF UNAVOIDABLE VARIABILITY ...... 7

TEE « sensnenssixinsecvivonsvevinientbunacnesnpetnutsbeiensetee 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th

CAP, REID cccsncsiniencsioiicitesensisuauuiinatiianiamnmatialias 2

American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 661 F.2d 340

GO CA... TRIED cocoscacsonnenstenntieeaiainaenaines. 2

American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540 F.2d

1023 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.

ee | ne 5 he =

Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d

Fe GU GAP, TO UD viccicccriccemminuinsdniilaliniens 2,4,5

BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st

AIR. RAPID covcisicessiies socevinencipvalanaaaeneaamnaianaen naa 7

CPC International, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329

(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966

CRUG) ccnnvcosssenonenssisenimapesaniemniidainiilitataat dada 4

FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir.

BOOED. vesnnnsvsninniiciisdaminlabaieeaiageaeni nis 8,9

Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537

FG GRO CRN CIP. FU tecntssemsetigicecine 7

Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.

DOES) cnicsnsrsecosesnnsnivcatiiniammmmianiiedadaama madd as 8,9

National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C.

Gl... UD visesciucsnniasiciiigtiinisasaaanaeimnuie passim

Tanners’ Council of America v. Train, 540 F.2d

et ae ee en passim

United States v. Amoco Oil Co., 580 F. Supp. 1042

EEF Se TIED sxncsinssnencsentaciuainioaieanan anaes 3

STATUTES:

RE fF Ree er eA Rs 2

BF Ee Te IED snictiechnenesisiminasniniiauiebadadaameatitanaeses 2,4

a eae I sucscsninsnsencetetinadidaniadeaatintinieineiadas 2,4,5

DS UBS. GPRD corenteniesteniscnenmadadeentsinantadduadien 5

=——

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Table of Authorities (Continued)

REGULATIONS:

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ON \

52 Fed. Reg. 42,522, 42,540 (1987) ....cccccccsccsssseeees

MISCELLANEOUS:

EPA Response to Comments. .................:::ssseseeeeeees

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

No. 89-1079

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC,

Petitioner,

We

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

The United States Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA” or “‘Agency”’) has filed an unnecessarily convo-

luted brief (“EPA Br.”’) that both gives the appearance

of a record dispute and obfuscates the legal issues before

the Court. This reply is submitted to clarify the important

legal issues presented by PPG Industries, Inc.’s Petition

(‘‘Pet.”’).

I. THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY UPHELD LIMI-

TATIONS THAT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED EVEN WITH

USE OF THE EPA-DESIGNATED TECHNOLOGY.

A. EPA’s Brief Provides No Support for the Fifth Cir-

cuit’s Novel Construction of the Clean Water Act.

Conspicuously absent from EPA’s brief is any discussion

of the basic statutory standard upon which the validity of

effluent limitations must be evaluated. The Clean Water

Act (““CWA” or “‘Act’’) specifically requires that ‘effluent

limitations for categories and classes of point sources’ be

“achievable for such category or class.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(bX2XA). In establishing ‘‘effluent limitations guide-

lines,” EPA must identify both the best available tech-

nology (“BAT’’) and “the degree of effluent reduction

attainable” with BAT. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(bX2)A). Courts

determine the validity of technology-based limitations (i.e.

those based on BAT and those based on the best practic-

able technology (‘‘BPT’’)) by analyzing whether those lim-

itations can be achieved by the regulated plants through

use of the EPA-designated technology. See, e.g., Associa-

tion of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 817-19 (9th

Cir. 1980); Tanners’ Council of America v. Train, 540 F.2d

1188, 1190-92 (4th Cir. 1976).

Because the Act requires that plants comply with the

limitations all of the time, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.41(a), and because ‘‘[pJlant owners should not be sub-

ject to sanctions when they are operating a proper treat-

ment facility,”? EPA must promulgate limitations that can

be consistently achieved by plants that properly use the

EPA-designated technology.? For this reason, when limi-

1 American Petroleum Institute v. EPA (‘API II’), 661 F.2d 340,

352 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 986

(4th Cir. 1976)).

*The implication in EPA’s brief at 13 n.15, that EPA need not

demonstrate that 100% compliance with the limitations is possible, is

unsupported by any case law, including the two cases upon which the

Agency relies, American Petroleum Institute v. EPA (“API I’), 540

F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977), and

American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975). In API

I, the court upheld the limitations despite the 90%, 80% and 70%

compliance rates of the plants in the record because “EPA concluded

that any failures to meet the limitations were due to improperly op-

erated filters or use of filters beyond design capacity.” 540 F.2d at

1034. In American Meat, the court upheld the limits despite less-than-

100% compliance from the four plants in the data base because those

plants had not yet installed the EPA-designated technology, two such

tations for numerous compounds in the affected plants’

wastestreams are based on use of a single technology, that

technology must be able to reduce simultaneously all of

the regulated compounds to or below the levels established

by the Agency.

Unfortunately, the court below did not address whether

any one plant (much less all plants in the OCPSF industry)

could comply with the entire set of steam stripping limi-

tations, deeming this factor “‘irrelevant.’’ Had the court

below conducted the required analysis, it would have re-

manded the steam stripping limitations, because no plant—

not even the two “best” plants on whose performance the

limitations are based—can comply with those limitations.*®

As EPA admits, EPA Br. at 14-16, the court instead de-

termined the validity of the steam stripping limitations

based on the performance of different plants treating dif-

ferent compounds.

plants complied much of the time without the EPA-designated tech-

nology, and two others “‘could apparently meet the standards easily by

adding the [EPA-designated technology].’”’ 526 F.2d at 458. The facts

upon which API I and American Meat were based undisputedly are

absent here; EPA has unequivocally stated that both PPG Plant 913

and Dow Plant 415 ‘‘us{ed] best available technology appropriately.”’

Pet. App. at 259a.

* EPA tries to minimize the significance of the exceedances at PPG

Plant 913 and Dow Plant 415 by characterizing them as slight, even

though the CWA does not provide an exception for \“‘slight’’ exceed-

ances. EPA also tries to minimize the relevance of these exceedances

by describing them as only 2 out of 308 data points. EPA Br. at 8-9

& n.11. However, the 3%8 data points were for all 12 compounds in

the wastestreams at both plants. Dow Plant 415 had but 15 data points

for trichloroethylene (‘“‘TCE’’) of which 1 (or 7%) exceeded the limi-

tations. PPG Plant 913 had but one data point reflecting that plant’s

chloroform average, and this data point exceeded the chloroform monthly

average limitation, reflecting 100% noncompliance. See United States

v. Amoco Oil Co., 580 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (violation

of a pollutant’s monthly average limitation held to constitute a violation

for every day in the month). The remaining 292 data points are ir-

relevant in determining the achievability of the TCE and chloroform

limitations.

In essence, the court found that, as a matter of law,

as long as some of the plants in the industry can suc-

cessfully treat some of the compounds, then 4 fortiorari

all of the plants can successfully treat all of the com-

pounds. Neither the court below nor EPA in its brief pro-

vided any statutory analysis in support of this illogical

conclusion. Indeed, EPA does not deny that, as PPG set

forth in its Petition at 11 n.3, the court’s statutory inter-

pretation was based exclusively on a post hoc rationali-

zation asserted by the Department of Justice at oral

argument, and thus is entitled no deference.

B. The Fifth Circuit’s Opinion Creates a Conflict

Among the Circuits.

Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit’s explicit recognition

that its decision conflicted with the Fourth Circuit’s de-

cision in Tanners’ Council, EPA claims that Tanners’

Council can be distinguished because it involved BPT

rather than BAT limitations and because it involved data

transfer issues not present here. EPA Br. at 16-17. The

first distinction is immaterial; both BPT and BAT limi-

tations must be achievable by the affected plants through

use of the EPA-designated technology. Cf 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(bK1XAH 2K A) with 33 U.S.C. § 1314(bX1)}(2). Data

transfer and other methodological issues similarly are ir-

relevant. As the court in Tanners’ Council held, 540 F.2d

at 1192, “[w]hatever methodological route is followed, the

Administrator must nevertheless establish that the levels

are achievable by the affected plants.’’ This Court is faced

with—and should resolve here—a clear conflict between the

Fourth and Fifth Circuits.

Also unavailing is EPA’s attempt to distinguish Asso-

ciation of Pacific Fisheries and CPC International, Inc. v.

Train, 540 F.2d 1829 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430

U.S. 966 (1977). EPA Br. at 17-18. A fair reading of those

cases indicates that, like the court in Tanners’ Council

the courts in Association of Pacific Fisheries and CPC

International would not have upheld limitations where, as

here, no plant using the EPA-designated technology can

achieve all of the limitations. The decision of the court

below is a substantial deviation from settled case law un-

der the Clean Water Act, and should be reversed by this

Court.

C. The Court Below Improperly Relieved EPA of Its

Burden of Proof.

EPA does not deny that the Agency bears the burden

of demonstrating that the limitations at issue here are

achievable. See, e.g., Association of Pacific Fisheries, 615

F.2d at 817; Tanners’ Council, 540 F.2d at 1192. The court

below impermissibly relieved EPA of this burden, however,

by adopting a legal “‘interpretation’”’ of the Act that upheld

limitations as achievable without requiring EPA to proffer

either record evidence that the best plants can attain the

limitations or the reasons why they cannot do so. For this

reason, the decision of the Court below directly contradicts

the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in National Lime

Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).4 If allowed

to stand, the decision of the court below would relieve

EPA of the burden of demonstrating that effluent limi-

tations are achievable.°

‘EPA attempts to distinguish National Lime from the instant case

on the ground that the limitations at issue in National Lime were

promulgated under Clean Air Act § 111. EPA Br. at 18 n.22. In fact,

however, the standard for limitations promulgated under Clean Air Act

§ 111 is virtually identical to that for limitations promulgated under

Clean Water Act § 304. Cf. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(aX1) (‘‘a

standard of performance shall reflect the degree of emission limitation

and the percentage reduction achievable through application of the best

technological system of continuous emission reduction . . .’’) with Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(bX2XA) (“such regulations shall iden-

tify ... the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the appli-

cation of the best control measures and practices achievable .. .’’).

‘EPA's brief at 15 states that where one technology is chosen as

the best treatment technology for more than one pollutant, ‘‘there is . . .

Instead of attempting to defend the court’s legal error,

the Agency characterizes this Petition as a narrow factual

attack on the record. EPA Br. at 12. The record itself is

not in dispute, however. EPA’s brief does not direct the

Court to any record evidence indicating that any plant,

much less both “best” plants or all affected plants, can

comply with all of the steam stripping limitations through

use of the EPA-designated technology, and, indeed, no

such evidence exists. As noted in the Petition at 8 and

uncontested in EPA’s brief, the record fails to explain why

PPG Plant 913 cannot comply with the chloroform limi-

tation or how that plant can do so. Likewise, as noted in

the Petition at 8-9 & n.2 and uncontested in EPA’s brief,

the record neither states why the TCE exceedance at Dow

Plant 415 occurred nor contains a finding that the TCE

exceedance was the result of either an upset or quality

control problem.® To satisfy its burden of proof, EPA has

an obligation to address these phenomena in the record.

National Lime, 627 F.2d at 444. The baseless speculations

of the Department of Justice and of the court below do

not give rise to disputed issues of fact. Rather, they dem-

onstrate that the court below impermissibly relieved EPA

of its burden of proof.

no reason why EPA should be required to identify a single plant as

the best performer for both pollutants... .’’ PPG agrees. Consistent

with National Lime, however, in a case such as this one, where both

“best’’ plants properly use the model technology, either both ‘“‘best’’

plants must be able to achieve the limitations ur the record must dem-

onstrate why they cannot do so.

* Indeed, as EPA knows, a steam stripper upset or quality contro!

problem would necessarily have affected stripping performance for al!

compounds in the wastestream. Given Dow’s excellent performance re-

moving the seven other, far more prevalent compounds in its wastes-

tream on the day in question (six compounds were stripped to below

detection limits and the seventh to 20% of the OCPSF allowance for

that pollutant), the TCE exceedance could not possibly have resulted

from an operational problem or an upset.

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D. The Case Law Upholding Averaging Is Inapposite

Because PPG Does Not Challenge EPA’s Meth-

odology.

EPA’s brief at pp. 13-14 claims that PPG asserts that

it was inappropriate for EPA to average the data of the

data base plants. A review of the Petition shows that PPG

has not lodged any objection to data averaging or to any

other methodology EPA employed to establish the OCPSF

limitations. PPG challenges the result of EPA’s rulemak-

ing—unachievable steam stripping limitations—not the

process by which the limitations were developed.’

II. ALL OCPSF PLANTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXCEED

THE OCPSF LIMITATIONS AS A RESULT OF UNA-

VOIDABLE VARIABILITY.

Every circuit addressing the issue has held that, when

EPA uses less-than-100% (1.e., 99% and 95%) variability

factors to establish effluent limitations, corresponding (7.e.,

1% and 5%) instances of unavoidable noncompliance are

inevitable. See Pet. at 16 and citations therein. Contrary

to the implication in EPA’s brief at 19-20 & n.23, PPG

7 Neither BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir.

1979) nor Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620

(2d Cir. 1976), stand for the proposition that EPA may use data av-

eraging to promulgate unachievable limitations. See EPA Br. at 13-14.

In Wyandotte, the court rejected a challenge to the Agency’s decision

to average data after finding that the limits were achievable by seven

plants in the Wyandotte data base and that the remaining three plants

operated their pollution control systems in a “‘substandard’’ manner.

598 F.2d at 652. In Hooker, the court permitted EPA to average data

from the “best existing’’ plants to set a BPT standard, but found that

the best existing plants did not use BPT and that one plant in the

data base in fact achieved the limitations. 537 F.2d at 632-33. In con-

trast, EPA here found that both PPG Plant 913 and Dow Plant 415

not only use BAT, but use it effectively, and neither plant—and thus

no plant in the record—can comply with the steam stripping limitations.

Whether EPA has averaged data or used some other methodology is

irrelevant; EPA must nevertheless demonstrate that the limitations are

“achievable by the affected plants.”’ Tanners’ Council, 540 F.2d at 1192.

does not claim that this result precludes EPA from using

less-than-100% variability factors to establish effluent lim-

itations. However, if EPA chooses to use less-than-100%

variability factors, the Agency is required to provide an

affirmative defense or otherwise account for the corre-

sponding instances of noncompliance. See Marathon Oil Co.

v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); FMC Corp. v.

Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976).*

EPA does not seriously dispute this obligation; instead,

the Agency offers several arguments, each meritless, that

purport to explain how the obligation is satisfied by the

upset defense. EPA first asserts that the Agency could

not distinguish upsets from non-upsets, and that the

Agency did not edit data representing upsets from the

data base. EPA Br. at 22 & n.28. These assertions are

flatly contradicted by the record, which plainly and re-

peatedly states that EPA both identified upsets and de-

leted the corresponding data. See, e.g., EPA’s Responses

to Comments, Pet. App. at 259a; 52 Fed. Reg. 42,522,

42,540 (1987). For example, as PPG’s Petition explains,

EPA conducted a careful, month-long study at Dow Plant

* EPA argues that FMC Corp. and Marathon Oil are not inconsistent

with the court’s decision below, because those cases required only the

creation of the upset defense. However, where, as here, EPA has

expunged upsets from the data base prior to applying the variability

factors, the upset defense will not apply to the data that fell above

the 99 and 95 percentiles of the remaining data. See Pet. at 18. There-

fore, the limitations at issue in this case suffer from the same malady

that afflicted the limitations in FMC Corp. and Marathon Oil, an in-

firmity the upset defense cannot remedy. EPA’s brief alternately sug-

gests that the 1% and 5% instances of noncompliance represent

“extreme” discharges, ‘‘poor performance,” or ‘‘quality control prob-

lems” for which no defense is required. EPA Br. at 19, 20. However,

as with upsets, EPA edited from the data base data reflecting quality

control problems prior to the application of the variability factors.

Therefore, just as the data that fel] above the 99 and 95 percentiles

could not have reflected upsets, that data could not have reflected

improper operation.

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415 in which the Agency monitored plant operations and

collected all data. Similar studies were performed by EPA

on numerous other plants. Although EPA excluded data

from other plants, none of the Dow (or PPG) data were

excluded. See Pet. at 8 n.2. EPA’s attempt to discredit

itself by denying in its brief what the Agency asserted in

the record represents an unseemly effort to create a fac-

tual dispute where none exists.

Finally, EPA asserts that the upset defense applies to

all exceedances beyond the control of the facility. EPA

Br. at 23. By its very terms, however, that defense applies

only to noncompliance caused by “exceptional incidents.”’

40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n\1). Exceedances caused by EPA’s use

of less-than-100% variability factors will not result from

“exceptional incidents,’”’ because EPA set the limitations

using data reflecting only good, nonexceptional operation.

See Pet. at 18. Therefore, the upset defense will not apply

to the 1% and 5% unavoidable exceedances that result

from EPA’s use of the 99% and 95% percent variability

factors.

CONCLUSION

The issues raised by this Petition are neither ‘‘narrow’’

nor “technical.”” EPA Br. at 12. Rather, this Petition was

filed because the court below rejected Tanners’ Council

and found that a set of effluent limitations could be con-

sidered achievable even though no plant could achieve al!

of them; disregarded National Lime and relieved EPA of

its obligation to either demonstrate that the best plants

in the industry could achieve the limitations or explain

why they could not do so; and ignored Marathon Oil and

FMC Corp. and permitted EPA to base limitations on 99%

and 95% variability factors without providing an affirm-

ative defense or otherwise accounting for the correspond-

ing 1% and 5% instances of unavoidable noncompliance.

PPG’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted

to resolve the conflict among the circuits and to correct

10

the fundamental legal errors committed by the court be-

low.

Respectfully submitted,

*ROBERT BRAGER

SHELLEY V. LUCAS

BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C.

1350 I Street, N.W., Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 789-6000

MADELYN A. REILLY

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.

One PPG Place

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15272

(412) 434-2451

Counsel for Petitioner

PPG Industries, Inc.

*Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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