Reply Brief — PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
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No. 89-1079 !
—
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1989
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
PETITIONER’S REPLY MEMORANDUM
*ROBERT BRAGER
SHELLEY V. LUCAS
BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C.
1350 I Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 789-6000
MADELYN A. REILLY
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.
One PPG Place
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15272
(412) 434-2430
Counsel for Petitioner
PPG Industries, Inc.
*Counsel of Record
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY UPHELD
LIMITATIONS THAT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED
EVEN WITH USE OF THE EPA-DESIG-
NATED TECHNOLOGY ...........ccccccccccssccecrseees 1
A. EPA’s Brief Provides No Support for the
Fifth Circuit’s Novel Construction of the
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: B. The Fifth Circuit’s Opinion Creates a
} Conflict Among the Circuits .................. 4
C. The Court Below Improperly Relieved
EPA of Its Burden of Proof. ................. 5
| D. The Case Law Upholding Averaging Is
Inapposite Because PPG Does Not Chal-
lenge EPA’s Methodology .................0000 7
II]. ALL OCPSF PLANTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO
EXCEED THE OCPSF LIMITATIONS AS A RE-
SULT OF UNAVOIDABLE VARIABILITY ...... 7
TEE « sensnenssixinsecvivonsvevinientbunacnesnpetnutsbeiensetee 9
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th
CAP, REID cccsncsiniencsioiicitesensisuauuiinatiianiamnmatialias 2
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 661 F.2d 340
GO CA... TRIED cocoscacsonnenstenntieeaiainaenaines. 2
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540 F.2d
1023 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
ee | ne 5 he =
Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d
Fe GU GAP, TO UD viccicccriccemminuinsdniilaliniens 2,4,5
BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st
AIR. RAPID covcisicessiies socevinencipvalanaaaeneaamnaianaen naa 7
CPC International, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966
CRUG) ccnnvcosssenonenssisenimapesaniemniidainiilitataat dada 4
FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir.
BOOED. vesnnnsvsninniiciisdaminlabaieeaiageaeni nis 8,9
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537
FG GRO CRN CIP. FU tecntssemsetigicecine 7
Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.
DOES) cnicsnsrsecosesnnsnivcatiiniammmmianiiedadaama madd as 8,9
National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C.
Gl... UD visesciucsnniasiciiigtiinisasaaanaeimnuie passim
Tanners’ Council of America v. Train, 540 F.2d
et ae ee en passim
United States v. Amoco Oil Co., 580 F. Supp. 1042
EEF Se TIED sxncsinssnencsentaciuainioaieanan anaes 3
STATUTES:
RE fF Ree er eA Rs 2
BF Ee Te IED snictiechnenesisiminasniniiauiebadadaameatitanaeses 2,4
a eae I sucscsninsnsencetetinadidaniadeaatintinieineiadas 2,4,5
DS UBS. GPRD corenteniesteniscnenmadadeentsinantadduadien 5
=——
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Table of Authorities (Continued)
REGULATIONS:
ME MND cc ncnccescccssasoesceseceseeseroeens
ON \
52 Fed. Reg. 42,522, 42,540 (1987) ....cccccccsccsssseeees
MISCELLANEOUS:
EPA Response to Comments. .................:::ssseseeeeeees
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1989
No. 89-1079
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC,
Petitioner,
We
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
The United States Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA” or “‘Agency”’) has filed an unnecessarily convo-
luted brief (“EPA Br.”’) that both gives the appearance
of a record dispute and obfuscates the legal issues before
the Court. This reply is submitted to clarify the important
legal issues presented by PPG Industries, Inc.’s Petition
(‘‘Pet.”’).
I. THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY UPHELD LIMI-
TATIONS THAT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED EVEN WITH
USE OF THE EPA-DESIGNATED TECHNOLOGY.
A. EPA’s Brief Provides No Support for the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s Novel Construction of the Clean Water Act.
Conspicuously absent from EPA’s brief is any discussion
of the basic statutory standard upon which the validity of
effluent limitations must be evaluated. The Clean Water
Act (““CWA” or “‘Act’’) specifically requires that ‘effluent
limitations for categories and classes of point sources’ be
“achievable for such category or class.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(bX2XA). In establishing ‘‘effluent limitations guide-
lines,” EPA must identify both the best available tech-
nology (“BAT’’) and “the degree of effluent reduction
attainable” with BAT. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(bX2)A). Courts
determine the validity of technology-based limitations (i.e.
those based on BAT and those based on the best practic-
able technology (‘‘BPT’’)) by analyzing whether those lim-
itations can be achieved by the regulated plants through
use of the EPA-designated technology. See, e.g., Associa-
tion of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 817-19 (9th
Cir. 1980); Tanners’ Council of America v. Train, 540 F.2d
1188, 1190-92 (4th Cir. 1976).
Because the Act requires that plants comply with the
limitations all of the time, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.41(a), and because ‘‘[pJlant owners should not be sub-
ject to sanctions when they are operating a proper treat-
ment facility,”? EPA must promulgate limitations that can
be consistently achieved by plants that properly use the
EPA-designated technology.? For this reason, when limi-
1 American Petroleum Institute v. EPA (‘API II’), 661 F.2d 340,
352 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 986
(4th Cir. 1976)).
*The implication in EPA’s brief at 13 n.15, that EPA need not
demonstrate that 100% compliance with the limitations is possible, is
unsupported by any case law, including the two cases upon which the
Agency relies, American Petroleum Institute v. EPA (“API I’), 540
F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977), and
American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975). In API
I, the court upheld the limitations despite the 90%, 80% and 70%
compliance rates of the plants in the record because “EPA concluded
that any failures to meet the limitations were due to improperly op-
erated filters or use of filters beyond design capacity.” 540 F.2d at
1034. In American Meat, the court upheld the limits despite less-than-
100% compliance from the four plants in the data base because those
plants had not yet installed the EPA-designated technology, two such
tations for numerous compounds in the affected plants’
wastestreams are based on use of a single technology, that
technology must be able to reduce simultaneously all of
the regulated compounds to or below the levels established
by the Agency.
Unfortunately, the court below did not address whether
any one plant (much less all plants in the OCPSF industry)
could comply with the entire set of steam stripping limi-
tations, deeming this factor “‘irrelevant.’’ Had the court
below conducted the required analysis, it would have re-
manded the steam stripping limitations, because no plant—
not even the two “best” plants on whose performance the
limitations are based—can comply with those limitations.*®
As EPA admits, EPA Br. at 14-16, the court instead de-
termined the validity of the steam stripping limitations
based on the performance of different plants treating dif-
ferent compounds.
plants complied much of the time without the EPA-designated tech-
nology, and two others “‘could apparently meet the standards easily by
adding the [EPA-designated technology].’”’ 526 F.2d at 458. The facts
upon which API I and American Meat were based undisputedly are
absent here; EPA has unequivocally stated that both PPG Plant 913
and Dow Plant 415 ‘‘us{ed] best available technology appropriately.”’
Pet. App. at 259a.
* EPA tries to minimize the significance of the exceedances at PPG
Plant 913 and Dow Plant 415 by characterizing them as slight, even
though the CWA does not provide an exception for \“‘slight’’ exceed-
ances. EPA also tries to minimize the relevance of these exceedances
by describing them as only 2 out of 308 data points. EPA Br. at 8-9
& n.11. However, the 3%8 data points were for all 12 compounds in
the wastestreams at both plants. Dow Plant 415 had but 15 data points
for trichloroethylene (‘“‘TCE’’) of which 1 (or 7%) exceeded the limi-
tations. PPG Plant 913 had but one data point reflecting that plant’s
chloroform average, and this data point exceeded the chloroform monthly
average limitation, reflecting 100% noncompliance. See United States
v. Amoco Oil Co., 580 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (violation
of a pollutant’s monthly average limitation held to constitute a violation
for every day in the month). The remaining 292 data points are ir-
relevant in determining the achievability of the TCE and chloroform
limitations.
In essence, the court found that, as a matter of law,
as long as some of the plants in the industry can suc-
cessfully treat some of the compounds, then 4 fortiorari
all of the plants can successfully treat all of the com-
pounds. Neither the court below nor EPA in its brief pro-
vided any statutory analysis in support of this illogical
conclusion. Indeed, EPA does not deny that, as PPG set
forth in its Petition at 11 n.3, the court’s statutory inter-
pretation was based exclusively on a post hoc rationali-
zation asserted by the Department of Justice at oral
argument, and thus is entitled no deference.
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Opinion Creates a Conflict
Among the Circuits.
Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit’s explicit recognition
that its decision conflicted with the Fourth Circuit’s de-
cision in Tanners’ Council, EPA claims that Tanners’
Council can be distinguished because it involved BPT
rather than BAT limitations and because it involved data
transfer issues not present here. EPA Br. at 16-17. The
first distinction is immaterial; both BPT and BAT limi-
tations must be achievable by the affected plants through
use of the EPA-designated technology. Cf 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(bK1XAH 2K A) with 33 U.S.C. § 1314(bX1)}(2). Data
transfer and other methodological issues similarly are ir-
relevant. As the court in Tanners’ Council held, 540 F.2d
at 1192, “[w]hatever methodological route is followed, the
Administrator must nevertheless establish that the levels
are achievable by the affected plants.’’ This Court is faced
with—and should resolve here—a clear conflict between the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits.
Also unavailing is EPA’s attempt to distinguish Asso-
ciation of Pacific Fisheries and CPC International, Inc. v.
Train, 540 F.2d 1829 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 966 (1977). EPA Br. at 17-18. A fair reading of those
cases indicates that, like the court in Tanners’ Council
the courts in Association of Pacific Fisheries and CPC
International would not have upheld limitations where, as
here, no plant using the EPA-designated technology can
achieve all of the limitations. The decision of the court
below is a substantial deviation from settled case law un-
der the Clean Water Act, and should be reversed by this
Court.
C. The Court Below Improperly Relieved EPA of Its
Burden of Proof.
EPA does not deny that the Agency bears the burden
of demonstrating that the limitations at issue here are
achievable. See, e.g., Association of Pacific Fisheries, 615
F.2d at 817; Tanners’ Council, 540 F.2d at 1192. The court
below impermissibly relieved EPA of this burden, however,
by adopting a legal “‘interpretation’”’ of the Act that upheld
limitations as achievable without requiring EPA to proffer
either record evidence that the best plants can attain the
limitations or the reasons why they cannot do so. For this
reason, the decision of the Court below directly contradicts
the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in National Lime
Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).4 If allowed
to stand, the decision of the court below would relieve
EPA of the burden of demonstrating that effluent limi-
tations are achievable.°
‘EPA attempts to distinguish National Lime from the instant case
on the ground that the limitations at issue in National Lime were
promulgated under Clean Air Act § 111. EPA Br. at 18 n.22. In fact,
however, the standard for limitations promulgated under Clean Air Act
§ 111 is virtually identical to that for limitations promulgated under
Clean Water Act § 304. Cf. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(aX1) (‘‘a
standard of performance shall reflect the degree of emission limitation
and the percentage reduction achievable through application of the best
technological system of continuous emission reduction . . .’’) with Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(bX2XA) (“such regulations shall iden-
tify ... the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the appli-
cation of the best control measures and practices achievable .. .’’).
‘EPA's brief at 15 states that where one technology is chosen as
the best treatment technology for more than one pollutant, ‘‘there is . . .
Instead of attempting to defend the court’s legal error,
the Agency characterizes this Petition as a narrow factual
attack on the record. EPA Br. at 12. The record itself is
not in dispute, however. EPA’s brief does not direct the
Court to any record evidence indicating that any plant,
much less both “best” plants or all affected plants, can
comply with all of the steam stripping limitations through
use of the EPA-designated technology, and, indeed, no
such evidence exists. As noted in the Petition at 8 and
uncontested in EPA’s brief, the record fails to explain why
PPG Plant 913 cannot comply with the chloroform limi-
tation or how that plant can do so. Likewise, as noted in
the Petition at 8-9 & n.2 and uncontested in EPA’s brief,
the record neither states why the TCE exceedance at Dow
Plant 415 occurred nor contains a finding that the TCE
exceedance was the result of either an upset or quality
control problem.® To satisfy its burden of proof, EPA has
an obligation to address these phenomena in the record.
National Lime, 627 F.2d at 444. The baseless speculations
of the Department of Justice and of the court below do
not give rise to disputed issues of fact. Rather, they dem-
onstrate that the court below impermissibly relieved EPA
of its burden of proof.
no reason why EPA should be required to identify a single plant as
the best performer for both pollutants... .’’ PPG agrees. Consistent
with National Lime, however, in a case such as this one, where both
“best’’ plants properly use the model technology, either both ‘“‘best’’
plants must be able to achieve the limitations ur the record must dem-
onstrate why they cannot do so.
* Indeed, as EPA knows, a steam stripper upset or quality contro!
problem would necessarily have affected stripping performance for al!
compounds in the wastestream. Given Dow’s excellent performance re-
moving the seven other, far more prevalent compounds in its wastes-
tream on the day in question (six compounds were stripped to below
detection limits and the seventh to 20% of the OCPSF allowance for
that pollutant), the TCE exceedance could not possibly have resulted
from an operational problem or an upset.
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D. The Case Law Upholding Averaging Is Inapposite
Because PPG Does Not Challenge EPA’s Meth-
odology.
EPA’s brief at pp. 13-14 claims that PPG asserts that
it was inappropriate for EPA to average the data of the
data base plants. A review of the Petition shows that PPG
has not lodged any objection to data averaging or to any
other methodology EPA employed to establish the OCPSF
limitations. PPG challenges the result of EPA’s rulemak-
ing—unachievable steam stripping limitations—not the
process by which the limitations were developed.’
II. ALL OCPSF PLANTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXCEED
THE OCPSF LIMITATIONS AS A RESULT OF UNA-
VOIDABLE VARIABILITY.
Every circuit addressing the issue has held that, when
EPA uses less-than-100% (1.e., 99% and 95%) variability
factors to establish effluent limitations, corresponding (7.e.,
1% and 5%) instances of unavoidable noncompliance are
inevitable. See Pet. at 16 and citations therein. Contrary
to the implication in EPA’s brief at 19-20 & n.23, PPG
7 Neither BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir.
1979) nor Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620
(2d Cir. 1976), stand for the proposition that EPA may use data av-
eraging to promulgate unachievable limitations. See EPA Br. at 13-14.
In Wyandotte, the court rejected a challenge to the Agency’s decision
to average data after finding that the limits were achievable by seven
plants in the Wyandotte data base and that the remaining three plants
operated their pollution control systems in a “‘substandard’’ manner.
598 F.2d at 652. In Hooker, the court permitted EPA to average data
from the “best existing’’ plants to set a BPT standard, but found that
the best existing plants did not use BPT and that one plant in the
data base in fact achieved the limitations. 537 F.2d at 632-33. In con-
trast, EPA here found that both PPG Plant 913 and Dow Plant 415
not only use BAT, but use it effectively, and neither plant—and thus
no plant in the record—can comply with the steam stripping limitations.
Whether EPA has averaged data or used some other methodology is
irrelevant; EPA must nevertheless demonstrate that the limitations are
“achievable by the affected plants.”’ Tanners’ Council, 540 F.2d at 1192.
does not claim that this result precludes EPA from using
less-than-100% variability factors to establish effluent lim-
itations. However, if EPA chooses to use less-than-100%
variability factors, the Agency is required to provide an
affirmative defense or otherwise account for the corre-
sponding instances of noncompliance. See Marathon Oil Co.
v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); FMC Corp. v.
Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976).*
EPA does not seriously dispute this obligation; instead,
the Agency offers several arguments, each meritless, that
purport to explain how the obligation is satisfied by the
upset defense. EPA first asserts that the Agency could
not distinguish upsets from non-upsets, and that the
Agency did not edit data representing upsets from the
data base. EPA Br. at 22 & n.28. These assertions are
flatly contradicted by the record, which plainly and re-
peatedly states that EPA both identified upsets and de-
leted the corresponding data. See, e.g., EPA’s Responses
to Comments, Pet. App. at 259a; 52 Fed. Reg. 42,522,
42,540 (1987). For example, as PPG’s Petition explains,
EPA conducted a careful, month-long study at Dow Plant
* EPA argues that FMC Corp. and Marathon Oil are not inconsistent
with the court’s decision below, because those cases required only the
creation of the upset defense. However, where, as here, EPA has
expunged upsets from the data base prior to applying the variability
factors, the upset defense will not apply to the data that fell above
the 99 and 95 percentiles of the remaining data. See Pet. at 18. There-
fore, the limitations at issue in this case suffer from the same malady
that afflicted the limitations in FMC Corp. and Marathon Oil, an in-
firmity the upset defense cannot remedy. EPA’s brief alternately sug-
gests that the 1% and 5% instances of noncompliance represent
“extreme” discharges, ‘‘poor performance,” or ‘‘quality control prob-
lems” for which no defense is required. EPA Br. at 19, 20. However,
as with upsets, EPA edited from the data base data reflecting quality
control problems prior to the application of the variability factors.
Therefore, just as the data that fel] above the 99 and 95 percentiles
could not have reflected upsets, that data could not have reflected
improper operation.
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ets eee wes -
415 in which the Agency monitored plant operations and
collected all data. Similar studies were performed by EPA
on numerous other plants. Although EPA excluded data
from other plants, none of the Dow (or PPG) data were
excluded. See Pet. at 8 n.2. EPA’s attempt to discredit
itself by denying in its brief what the Agency asserted in
the record represents an unseemly effort to create a fac-
tual dispute where none exists.
Finally, EPA asserts that the upset defense applies to
all exceedances beyond the control of the facility. EPA
Br. at 23. By its very terms, however, that defense applies
only to noncompliance caused by “exceptional incidents.”’
40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n\1). Exceedances caused by EPA’s use
of less-than-100% variability factors will not result from
“exceptional incidents,’”’ because EPA set the limitations
using data reflecting only good, nonexceptional operation.
See Pet. at 18. Therefore, the upset defense will not apply
to the 1% and 5% unavoidable exceedances that result
from EPA’s use of the 99% and 95% percent variability
factors.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised by this Petition are neither ‘‘narrow’’
nor “technical.”” EPA Br. at 12. Rather, this Petition was
filed because the court below rejected Tanners’ Council
and found that a set of effluent limitations could be con-
sidered achievable even though no plant could achieve al!
of them; disregarded National Lime and relieved EPA of
its obligation to either demonstrate that the best plants
in the industry could achieve the limitations or explain
why they could not do so; and ignored Marathon Oil and
FMC Corp. and permitted EPA to base limitations on 99%
and 95% variability factors without providing an affirm-
ative defense or otherwise accounting for the correspond-
ing 1% and 5% instances of unavoidable noncompliance.
PPG’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted
to resolve the conflict among the circuits and to correct
10
the fundamental legal errors committed by the court be-
low.
Respectfully submitted,
*ROBERT BRAGER
SHELLEY V. LUCAS
BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C.
1350 I Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 789-6000
MADELYN A. REILLY
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.
One PPG Place
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15272
(412) 434-2451
Counsel for Petitioner
PPG Industries, Inc.
*Counsel of Record
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