Opposition Brief — New Hampshire v. Dedrick

me Court

No. 89-888

In the

December Term,

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Supreme Court, U...

FILED

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JOSO OR FL Seta

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of the United States

1989

State of New Hampshire

Petitioner

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Robert D.

Respondent

Dedrick

On Petition for

a Writ of Certiorari

to the Suprene Court of New Hampshire

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

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OPPOSITION

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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEA

1. Did both the Superior -court judge and the New

Hampshire Supreme Court err in finding that the respondent was

in custody for Miranda Purposes where the respondent was

interrogated simultaneously by two detectives in a windowless

room and after persistent denials of guilt over a forty minute

period asserted his right to confer with a lawyer?

Question Presented for

Table of Contents .

Table of Authorities

Review

OF CONTENTS

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iii

TABLE OF AJTHORITIES

Page

Cases: a

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,

104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1964) - . .. 6, 8

California v. Behelmer, 463 U.S. 1121,

103 S.Ct. J5a7, 77 L.Ed. 20 1275 C2983) « . . t,. 7

Graver Mfg. Co. v. Lind Co., 336 U.S. 271 :

69 S.Ct. 535, 93 L.Ed. 672, (1949) ....-. 5

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,

97 S.Ct. Fil, SO 4.80.28 Fis C2979). x &-% 6, 7

United States v. Beraun-Panez,

812 F.2d 578 (9th Cir.), modified,

S20. 0.20. 137: (290725 sc Se a eee kk ea 5

United States v. Ceccolini,

433 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054,

as & Bay 20 260 tiSre) < ss sek oe erate & 5

-iii-

No. 89-888

Suprene Court

In the

of the United States

December Term, 1989

State of New Hampshire

Petitioner

V .

Robert D. Dedrick

Respondent

On Petition for

a Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of New Hampsnire

The respondent, Robert D

that this Court deny the petit

- Dedrick, respectfully requests

ion for writ of certiorari seeking

review of the New Hampshire Supreme Court's opinion in this

case. That opinion is reported at 132 N.H.

(1989),

, 3964 A.2a 423

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As part of the investigation into the stabbing death of

Luis Rameriz, lManchester Police S2=rgeant James Stewart received

information that the respondent, Robert D. Dedrick, had been at

Rameriz' apartment about eight hours before the discovery of the

body. (T. 9)*. Dedrick learned the police were looking for him

and telephoned the police station. (T. 11). Dedrick agreed to

go to the station if the police would pick him up. They did so.

(T.. £2F%

At the station, Sergeant Stewart brought Dedrick into a

windowless interview room in the detective division at 9:49 a.m.

(T. 17, 19). After Sergeant Stewart took a brief personal

history, Dedrick asked to use the bathroom, (T. 21). Stewart

said Dedrick could. Dedrick went unescorted to the bathroom and

returned to the interview room. (T. 24).

There, Sergeant Stewart and Lieutenant Bovaird told

Dedrick they wanted to talk about Dedrick's “activity on May

30th", (T. 24). Bovaird told Dedrick he was not under arrest.

(T. 25). Dedrick gave an account of his activities that day

that included two visits to Luis Rameriz apartment but no

mention of whether or how Rameriz had been stabbed. (T. 26-27).

*"T," refers to the volume of the Motion to Suppress transcript

dated September 15, 1987.

At this meine the two detectives went outside the

interview room leaving Dedrick inside behind the closed door.

(T. 28). The detectives discussed Dedrick's explanation,

concluded it was inconsistent with other evidence, that Dedrick

waS a prime suspect and not telling the truth. (T. 29, 149).

Upon re-entering the interview room at 10:00 a.m. Bovaird

told Dedrick he was not under arrest. (T. 127). At no point did

he tell Dedrick he was free to leave (T. 142, 147). Bovaird

advised Dedrick of his rights. (T. 125). Dedrick stated he

understood his rights and waived them. (T. 125-126).

Over the next forty minutes, the two detectives

interrogated Dedrick. They started by telling Dedrick that

Rameriz was dead (T. 32) and that they “didn't believe him". (T.

152). They questioned Dedrick about whether he had been wearing

sneakers that day. Dedrick "at first" denied he owned sneakers

then "eventually" said he owned some but was not wearing them

that day. (T. 33). Dedrick then “initially” denied that he owed

Rameriz money for cocaine but later admitted_he did but it was

"patched up". (T. 34). The detectives "turned up the heat a

little" by telling Dedrick that his fingerprints and sneaker

prints would probably be found in Rameriz's apartment. (T.

154). The detectives suggested to Dedrick that he had killed

Rameriz in self-defense and that he was lying. (T. 153-154).

Dedrick denied that that he had killed Rameriz. However, his

denials which at first were negative responses became

explanations. (T. 34-35). Then "“[a]fter a lengthy discussion"

{

about cocaine dealing and further suggestion that Rameriz was

killed in a fight over a cocaine debt, Dedrick stated "that he

would like to speak to a lawyer." (T. 36).

At this point Sergeant Stewart stood up, picked up his

notes and said, "You want a lawyer, that's fine with us but

we'll never know whether Luis came at you with a knife." (T.

41).

Dedrick responded, "That's how it happened". (T. 37).

Dedrick then stated that Rameriz had come after him with a knife

and that he had defended himself by striking Raneriz with his

Fist disarming Rameriz. (T. 41). Dedrick showed the detective a

cut on his arm. (T. 41). The time was 10:40 a.m.

In response to further interrogation, Dedrick gave a

detailed account of what happened and told the detectives where

he had thrown the knife. (T. 45). Dedrick then again stated he

wanred to talk with a lawyer. (T. 46). At this point, the

interrogation ended. Dedrick was arrested for murder and placed

in a holding cell. (T. 46).

REASONS FOR DEWYING THE WRIT

i The factual determination by the two lower courts

that respondent was in custody was not contrary to

the manifest weight of the evidence.

Petitioner argues that tne two lower courts erred in

finding that respondent was in custody because there were no

"objective manifestations of restraint on Dedrick's freedon of

movement .. . and... the police did nothing to indicate to

him that he was free to leave". Pet. for Cert. 7-8.

Petitioner fails to acknowledge that appellate review of

custody is extremely limited. Custody is a factual

determination. To reverse this determination by the two lower

courts, petitioner must show that the finding was contrary to

the manifest weight of evidence. United States v. Beraun-Panez,

812 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir.), modified, 830 F.2d 127 (1987).

Moreover, under this Court's "two-court rule” a factual

determination nade by the two lower courts should not be

reviewed "in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional

showing of error”. Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271,

275 (1949); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273

(1978).

No such error was made in the case at bar. Indeed, the

record and findings in this case are inconsistent with

petitioner's claim that the police "did nothing” to objectively

communicate to Dedrick that he was in custody. The New

Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's findings

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concerning "the nature of the roon in which Dedrick was

questioned, the number and positioning of the officers, and the

length and character of tne interview". App. Pet. for Cert 8a.

The court placed particular enphasis on this latter factor

noting that when the two detectives re-entered the interrogation

room "the intensity of the interview escalated". Id. The court

carefully reviewed what happened during the "forty minutes of

neated questioning” and concluded that "such a change would

have signaled a reasonable man in the same circumstances that

the freedom officers had accorded him earlier was no longer

available and that, as often as he made denials, they would

renew their accusations until, in the end, he either confessed

Or asked, as Dedrick in fact did, to speak with an attorney."

Id. In short, far from there being no "onjective manifesta-

tions” of custody, the facts "anply support ...the...

custody determination". Id.

2. The New Hanpshire Supreme Court correctly applied an

onjective standard for custody as mandated by this

Court's decisions.

The petitioner argues that the decision of the New

-Hampshire Supreme Court conflicts with California v. Beheler,

463 U.S. 1121 (1983), Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)

and misinterprets the definition of custody in Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). The petitioner concludes that the

New Hampshire Supreme Court “has created a confusing, almost

subjective, test for determining ‘in custody' for Miranda

purposes", Pet. for Cert. 19.

In fact, the New Hainnpshire Supreme Court went to great

lengths to spell out that the test for custody is oojective, not

subjective, and that certain objective factors are to 5e

examined. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a-/7a. The court

"Contrary to the State's argument, the superior court properly

based its custody determination on objective rather tran

subjective criteria." App. Pet. for Cert. 7a. The court thus

did not apply a “confusing, almost subjective test" bat applied

the correct standard.

Nor was the court's decision inconsistent witn ei 77e7

Beheler or-Mathiason. In Beheler the lower cour

by

finding custody simply because the questioning took place

police station and the police had already identified Beneler as

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a suspect. Id. at 1123, 1125. In Mathias

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erred by finding custody because "the interrogation took Dlace

in a ‘coercive environment'". Id. at 492.

The New Hainpshire Supreme Court did not commit similar

error. The court specifically noted

that the superior court

did not conclude that Dedrick was in custody merely because he

was a suspect or because he found himself in @ coercive

environment." App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a. The court correctly

cited and applied the objective standard of Beheler ("formal

arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree

associated with formal arrest". Id. at 1125). See App. to Pet.

for Cert. 6a. And, the court applied this standard, as

instructed by Berkemer v. McCarty, "by considering ‘how a

reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood

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