Opposition Brief — American Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil

Supreme Court brief1990

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 89-843

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1989

a

AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPAS

AND ROHM & HAAS COMP

JAMES E. O'’NEIL, IN: HIS ¢

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR

RHODE ISLAND

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIRST CIRCUIT

.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSTEION

() 1d

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Court should review the decision of

the Court below holding the Petitioners jointly and sever-

ally liable for the State’s indivisible and unapportionable

hazardous waste clean up cost pursuant to the Compre-

hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-

bility Act (“CERCLA” or “Superfund Law”), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 9601 et seq.

2. Whether the Court should review the decision of

the Court below which requires that the Petitioners bear

the burden of proving their claim that their joint and

several liability for the State’s hazardous waste clean up

costs is divisible and apportionable among the liable

parties.

3. Whether the Court should review the finding of

fact by the Court below that the haphazard commingling

of various unidentified toxic wastes in undeterminable

quantities caused indivisible environmental harm at the

subject hazard waste dump site.

4. Whether the Court below by its decision to

implement the Superfund Law consistent with the deci-

sions of this Honorable Court and the law as expressed

by other circuits, violated the Ex Post Facto and Due

Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......csscasccssassuasssct i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......cccssncscesscssses iii

STATEMENT OF CASE ........seeccsesncassssnsees 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT...........-. 8

I. Review of the alleged inequities of CERCLA would

be premature at this time. ...........005500055 8

Il. The sole Constitutional issue which the Petitioners

present for review is limited to the question of the

constitutionality of the State's efforts to recover

hazardous waste site clean up costs incurred prior

to the enactment of the Superfund Law in 1980

and, thus, is not an issue which is an important

and recurring problem. ...........000000eeeees 12

III. The decision of the Court below is consistent with the

law as expressed by other courts of appeals........ 15

CONCLUSION ........0500005056 05 0N nnn 18

APPENDICES

Appendix RA: Consent Agreement of The State of Rhode

Island and the United States with Rutgers,

The State University of New Jersey... ..RA-1

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

American Cyanamid v. King Industries, C.A. No.

Ne ee Capac eee casancscscccescs 11

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S.

EE OP TETTCL UTE ETE TEET TET TEE 17

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,

EE 13, 14

Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)............. 17

United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802

6 Mn a Seas aa cacasscansasaccess 8, 15

United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.

ne 17

United States v. Medley, 25 ERC 1315 (D.S.C. 1986) .... 16

United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.

1988), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 109 S.Ct. 3156

EE CECE A nec dccandacccsavacces 13, 15, 16, 17

United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &

Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 108 S.Ct. 146 (1987)....... 13, 14

United States v. Tyson, 25 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA)

Ee eee 17

Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Company 428 US. 1

EMER EMG D ks Ss cas0ascasesecccccecese 13, 14

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)................ 17

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page

STATUTES

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation and Liability Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et

Seer errr rr er rrrrer rrr errr Try oe passim

Ge RR. I Kio civic cecnccdsntscinciicgune 7, 8, 14

GE TAA, Be hoki c co ncanncccccacccceceuaaciesnss 8

GB ULB, © FRI a nse cc ccccnconsccncencaseusccesens 6

git i ott Go PPEETETeCOTeTIvTr eric TT or 11

GE UE, BTR 66 kn vnc caciccecncccecctucebaces 9

G2 UGA. © SED «on nn cccccccnccevcwnscvecaspaneaes 4

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

(“SARA”), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)..............5-008. 8

Diath CER <x vn ve acecdcndgnceevectutrenantahaks 9

CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL

131 Cong. Rec. $11586 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1986)...... 9

131 Cong. Rec. $12021 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1986)..... 11

132 Cong. Rec. H9563 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986)........ 9

132 Cong. Rec. H9624 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986)........ 9

S. Rep. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess...............+- 14

H.R. Rep. 99-253, 99th Cong. Ist Sess., Part 3....... 10

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A (1965) ........ 15

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(B)({2) (1965)..... 15

No. 89-843

.

» 2

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1989

,

—_

AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY AND ROHM &

HAAS COMPANY,

Petitioners,

JAMES E. O’NEIL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY

GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,

Respondent.

,*%

4

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

.

—

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

a.

-

Respondent James E. O’Neil in his capacity as Attor-

ney General for the State of Rhode Island hereby objects

to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari presented by Ameri-

can Cyanamid and Rohm & Haas Company and prays

that the Writ be denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts of the case are stated fully in the opinion of

the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit (Petitioners’

Appendix A) which is reported at 883 F.2d 176 and the

opinion of the District Court for the District of Rhode

Island (Petitioners’ Appendix B) which is reported at 682

F.Supp. 706. Nevertheless, the State feels compelled to

correct certain portions of the statement of the case as set

forth in the Petition.

The Petitioners correctly point out that a number of

settlements were reached prior to trial on this matter.

Petition at 7. The Petitioners’ description of these settle-

ments, however, tends to create a misimpression. Peti-

tioners dwell on the settlement which was reached with

the Capuano defendants whom the State believed could

have been shown to be liable for damages as transporters

of some of the hazardous materials to the Picillo Site.

That settlement required payment of Two Million

($2,000,000.00) Dollars to both the State and the Federal

Governments by the Capuanos.

Although the Capuano settlement was the largest

cash settlement, the most substantial settlement agree-

ment was dismissed by the Petitioners with a curt refer-

ence to “an agreement by jsettlors) to undertake soil

removal activities at the site”. Petition at 7. The agree-

ment to which the Petitioners are referring was part of a

settlement entered into by four defendants who, like the

Petitioners, generated hazardous waste materials which

were linked to the Picillo Site. The four settling genera-

tors agreed to accomplish, under governmental supervi-

sion, the remaining surface clean up at the site. The

government estimated the cost of this undertaking by the

settlors to be at least Three Million Five Hundred Thou-

sand ($3,500,000.00) Dollars. The four generators, General

Electric Company, Ashland Chemical Company, GAF

Corporation, and Monsanto Company, were also required

to pay an additional One Hundred Thousand

($100,000.00) Dollars to the governments as part of the

settlement. Thus, pre-trial settlements totalled Five Mil-

lion Eight Hundred Thousand ($5,800,000.00) Dollars-

Two Million Three Hundred Thousand ($2,300,00.00) Dol-

lars in cash for past costs incurred by the state and

federal governments, and Three Million Five Hundred

Thousand ($3,500,000.00) Dollars in services.

The Petitioners observe that “[sleveral of the genera-

tors who settled were not de minimis parties ... .” Id. In

fact, only one defendant in this action was determined to

have de minimis status pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §9622(g).

That party, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey,

settled for a cash payment to the state and the federal

governments of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars.

Respondent's Appendix (RA). Rutgers was the only

defendant to settle as a de minimis party; it contributed

only one container of hazardous material to the site and

that material had been placed in a larger container and

both containers were found intact. Thus, the amount of

hazardous substances contributed to the Site by Rutgers

and the toxic or hazardous effects of the hazardous subs-

tance contributed to the Site by Rutgers are minimal.

RA-3.

Petitioners inaccurately described themselves as de

minimis contributors to the Picillo Site. Petition at i, 9,

10-12, and 16-17. De minimis status is conferred upon

i

parties only by a determination by the President through

the Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency. 42 U.S.C. §9622(g). As to the Petitioners, there

could be no finding of de minimis status. A determination

as to de minimis status is made by weighing the cumula-

tive effect of a defendant's contribution to the hazardous

waste facility. Each defendant's contribution is consid-

ered in light of the other hazardous substances at the site.

It is common sense that even though materials may be

hazardous independently, combining them may cause a

substantially different environmental impact.

At the Picillo Site, there was a commingling of

numerous, unidentified toxic materials. The Petitioners

contributed experimental herbicides, insecticides, and

pesticides produced by their research laboratories It

would be technologically impossible to determine each

party’s individual share of the cumulative harm caused

by the haphazard disposal of various toxic quantities

given the synergistic effects which these materials

undergo. In addition, we must further complicate our

calculations of individual contributions by extrapolating

what effect might be caused by the extreme heat which

was generated by the huge conflagration which burned

out of control for days in one of the chemical lagoons at

the site.

Finally, the volumetric contributions which Peti-

tioners brandish are only those barrels which were “pos-

itively attributed” to them. App. 11a; 883 Fed.2d at 182.

The Court below noted that the Petitioners each gener-

ated more than Two Thousand (2,000) barrels of wastes

and each Petitioner had consigned all of its hazardous

. | | ee

material to a single transporter. “Under these circum-

stances where [Petitioners were] entrusting a substantial

amount of waste to a single transporter who ultimately

proved unreliable, we simply cannot conclude absent

evidence to the contrary, that only a handful of the 2,000

or more barrels reached the Site.” App. 13a; 883 F.2d at

182-183. Under these circumstances, the United States

was not as brazen as the Petitioners to blindly proclaim

the effect of Petitioners’ contribution to the Site to be de

minimis.

Petitioners also attempt to win the sympathy of the

Court by a partial recitation of select portions of the

findings of fact by the trial court as to Petitioners’ role in

generating the subject toxic materials. Petition at 3.

For example, they fail to include the trial court's

finding that “it is not at all clear that American Cyanamid

was as vigilant as it contends.” App. 29a; 682 F.Supp. at

723. “American Cyanamid”, the trial court found,

had an exclusive contract with the Chemical

Control Facility to handle all of its hazardous

waste, including its PCB waste. It continued to

utilize the services of this organization despite

the oe of an excessive number of drums

on the Chemical Corporation site, which in the

words of Ralph Wainwright who, as an Ameri-

can Cyanamid Company’s supervisor of indus-

trial hygiene and safety, was responsible for

dis 1 of waste, “bothered everybody.” In

addition, American Cyanamid Company made

no further inquiries concerning Chemical Con-

trol despite the fact that Mr. Wainwright was

aware of an incident in which Chemical Control

was linked to barrels of waste which had been

ey disposed of on a vacant lot in New-

ark, New Jersey. App. 49a; 682 F.Supp. at 723.

i

Additionally, Petitioner Rohm & Haas has failed to

note that in uncontradicted testimony before the trial

court, the State established that although Rohm & Haas

attempted to remove some of its barrels from the Site, it

did not remove all of its hazardous materials, allowing

some of its waste to leak into the soil and commingle with

other waste. App. 45a; 682 F.Supp. at 721.

The Respondent must also contest the Petitioners’

claim that “neither Rohm & Haas nor American Cya-

namid consigned any waste materials from their research

facilities to the Picillo property for disposal either directly

or indirectly.” Petition at 3. This precise claim was raised

by the Petitioners before the trial court. A party may

escape liability under the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA” or —

“Superfund Law”), 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq., by demonstrat-

ing that the act or omission linking the party to a hazard-

ous waste site was “caused solely” by the act or omission

of a third-party with whom the defendant does not have

“a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly.”

42 U.S.C. §9607(b) (emphasis added). The trial court spe-

cifically addressed this claim by the Petitioners and

found that the third-party defense was unavailable to

them because: :

The simple fact is that during the time the

defendants consigned their waste to licensed

disposers, some of that waste, in identifiable

containers, came to rest at the Picillo site. The

defendants’ argument that there was no evi-

dence linking the disposers to the site or that the

defendants had any relationship with whomever

actually deposited the waste there simply con-

fuses the nature of its burden under the third-

party defense. App. 60a; 682 F.Supp. at 728.

The third-party defense is an affirmative defense in

support of which the Petitioners offered no evidence.

“Absent any evidence along these lines,” the trial court

concluded “. . . . it is equally likely that either the

licensed disposers or a subcontractor of the disposers

deposited the waste at the site.” Id. There is no support in

the record for the Petitioners’ assertion of the absence of

their direct or indirect responsibility for the disposal of

their hazardous waste at the Picillo Site.

Similarly, Respondent takes exception to the Peti-

tioners’ characterization of that portion of the judgment

of the Court below that imposes liability on the Peti-

tioners for response costs for the clean up of groundwater

which may be required at the Site. Contrary to Peti-

tioners’ representation, the judgment does not make

“Petitioners liable for a blank check on the basis of no

evidence”. Petition at 22.

As the United States Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit noted in response to Petitioners’ claim:

If after conducting the necessary tests, the gov-

ernment concludes that there was in fact no

harm to the area’s groundwater, then appellants

will have nothing to worry about. Moreover, the

district court ruled that under Section 107 of the

Act [42 U.S.C. § 9607], the State may take only

such measures as are cost-efficient. Appellants,

therefore, will have an opportunity to challenge

the State’s chosen remedial measures at the

appropriate time. App. 14a; 883 F.2d at 183.

Such a judgment can hardly be called a “blank

check”.

os

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. Review of the alleged inequities of CERCLA

would be premature at this time.

“[T]he legislative history,” the Court observed in

United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802, 808

(S.D. Ohio 1983), “evinces the intent that the scope of

liability under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9607, be determined

from traditional and evolving principles of common law

....” The Chem-Dyne court and numerous lower courts

have found that those principles support the imposition

of joint and several liability upon defendants found liable

under 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) where the harm or threat of

harm to which the government responses, is “indivis-

ible”. 572 FSupp. at 810. Chem-Dyne also held that:

if a party seeks to limit the scope of liability by a

claim that the harm is apportionable, the burden

of proof rests with those defendants. Id.

Interestingly, the Chem-Dyne decision observes that “the

volume of waste of a particular generator is not an accu-

rate predictor of the risk associated with the waste

because the toxicity or migratory potential of a partic-

ularly hazardous substance generally varies indepen-

dently with the volume of the waste.” Id. at 811.

In 1986, when it considered the Superfund Amend-

ments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”), 100 Stat. 1613,

Congress had the opportunity to reexamine the liability

scheme established, and the possible inequities created,

with the enactment of CERCLA in 1980. Congressman

Eckart, one of the key sponsors of SARA, proclaimed that

SARA “maintains the strict, joint and several standards of

current law as enumerated in the leading case, United

ot De ai decal |

States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation”. 132 Cong. Rec. H9624

(daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). Similarly, Congressman Dingell,

the primary draftsman of SARA in the House of Repre-

sentatives announced that the intent of SARA was “main-

taining the liability of the 1980 act as it has been

interpreted by the federal court.” 132 Cong. Rec. H9563

(daily ed. October 8, 1986).

Congress considered the possible inequities which

might arise from the imposition of joint and several lia-

bility. Significantly, Congress rejected efforts to institute a

mandatory apportionment scheme that would have pre-

vented joint and several liability on the basis of consider-

ations like waste volume. Senator Mitchell explained:

One proposed change to this law is a mandatory

apportionment scheme under which the burden

of proof would fall on the Government to estab-

lish the portion of the harm for which each

party is responsible, and apportion the cleanup

costs accordingly. While this may have a surface

appeal, the impacts of such a change on the

Superfund Enforcement Program would be far-

reaching. 131 Cong. Rec. S11586 (daily ed. Sept.

17, 1985).

The Senator opined that a mandatory apportionment

scheme “would delay cleanups and increase costs.” Id.

SARA explicitly provides a potentially liable party

with the right to institute a contribution action to allevi-

ate disproportionate imposition of costs by obtaining con-

tribution from other liable parties.

Section 113(f)(i) of SARA (42 U.S.C. §9613(F)(i)),

provides:

POS CE MISA aS OY

10

Any person may seek contribution from any

other person who is liable or potentially liable

under section 9607(a) of this title, during or

following any civil action under section 9606 of

this title or under section 9607(a) of this title.

Such claims shall be brought in accordance with

this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure and shall be governed by Federal Law. In

resolving contribution claims, the court may

allocate response costs among liable parties

using such equitable factors as the court deter-

mines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsec-

tion shall diminish the right of any person to

bring an action for contribution in the absence

of a civil action under section 9060 of this title or

section 9607 of this title.

The legislative history clearly establishes Congres-

sional intent to allow such factors as the volume of the

waste to be considered in post-liability contribution

actions. However, volume was not to be employed in the

determination of liability. The Report of the House Judici-

ary Committee made clear that, “after all questions of

liability and remedy have been resolved, courts may con-

sider any criteria relevant to determining whether there

should be apportionment.” H.R. Rep. 99-253, 99th Cong.,

1st Sess., Part 3 at 19 (1985). Allocation criteria suggested

by the Committee for use in contribution actions included

“the amount of hazardous substances involved,” as well

as degree of toxicity, degree of involvement by the par-

ties, and other equitable factors. Id. However, the report

made explicit that such factors were to be employed in

contribution actions but not in the determination of joint

and several liability. Indeed, to avoid confusion between

the possible “apportionment” of a divisible injury (which

would make the imposition of joint and several liability

11

inappropriate) and the possible “allocation” of costs in a

contribution action, Congress carefully chose to employ

the word “allocate” rather than “apportion” in 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(f). Senator Stafford stated that:

The amendment does not diminish the liability

of any person under CERCLA nor does it sug-

gest that anything other than the standard of

liability which has been held by the courts to

apply, continue to be applied. Indeed, as origi-

nally drafted, the Senator’s amendment con-

tained the word “apportion” for which we

agreed to substitute “allocate” in order to avoid

any possible confusion on this point. 131 Cong.

Rec. $12021 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985).

The questions presented for review do not question

the finding by the Court below that the Petitioners are

liable for the clean up of the hazardous waste site at the

Picillo Pig Farm pursuant to the Superfund Law. 42

U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. Rather, the Petitioners seek review

in order to challenge the extent of that liability and the

alleged inequities created by the imposition of joint and

several liability. Even if the Petitioners are victims of the

inequities alleged in their petition, the Petitioners possess

the statutory mechanism to ensure that their financial

burden will be shared by others whom the Petitioners

believe are also at fault. Such a contribution action, styled

American Cyanamid v. King Industries, C.A. No. 87-0110, in

which the Petitioners have named seventeen (17) parties

as defendants, is currently pending in the United States

District Court for the District of Rhode Island before

Senior Judge Raymond J. Pettine who served as the triai

judge in the instant action.

12

The State respectfully submits that the granting of

review by writ of certiorari at this time is premature. The

Court would be in a better position to gauge the alleged

“inequities” of the Congressionally established Compre-

hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-

bility System if the system were allowed to proceed

through to conclusion in the manner intended by

Congress.

II. The sole Constitutional issue which the Peti-

tioners present for review is limited to the

question of the constitutionality of the State’s

efforts to recover hazardous waste site clean up

costs incurred prior to the enactment of the

Superfund Law in 1980 and, thus, is not an

issue which is an important and recurring

problem.

The Petitioners seek to obtain review of the decision

of the Court below allowing the government to recover

its pre-enactment response costs. The Petitioners’ focus is

very narrow. The Petitioners have conceded, as they

must, the constitutionality of the imposition of liability

for response costs incurred after CERCLA’s enactment

but caused by pre-enactment conduct.

The Petitioners only seek review of the decision of

the Court below allowing recovery of response costs

incurred prior to the enactment of the Superfund Law.

CERCLA was signed into law in 1980. The State submits

that the number of cases involving an effort to recover

response costs incurred prior to 1980 is insignificant and

will be decreasing.

13

Additionally, there is no conflict in the law as

expressed by the courts of appeal which have addressed

the issue of the imposition of liability for pre-enactment

costs. United States v. Monsanto Company, 858 F.2d 160, 173

(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 109 S.Ct. 3156

(1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &

Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986) cert. denied,

__._; U.S. __, 108 S.Ct. 146, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987).

The decision of the Court below, and the opinions of

the Fourth Circuit in Monsanto and the Eight Circuit in

Northeastern Pharmaceutical relied upon the Court’s semi-

nal decision on retroactivity in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn

Mining Company, 428 U.S. 1 (1976). “The retroactive

aspect of legislation,” the Court held in Turner Elkhorn,

“as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of

due process, and the justification for the latter may not

suffice for the former”. Id. at 16-17. Applying the reason-

ing of Turner Elkhorn in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-

tion v. R.A. Gray & Company, 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984), the

Court ruled that “that burden is met simply by showing

that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself

justified by a rational legislative purpose.”

CERCLA was intended to distribute the cost of the

clean up of hazardous waste sites. Thus, Turner Elkhorn is

particularly instructive:

It is by now well established that legislative

Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of eco-

nomic life come to the Court with a presump-

tion of constitutionality, and that the burden is

on one complaining of a due process violation to

establish that the legislature has acted in an

14

arbitrary and irrational way. 429 U.S. at 15.

(Citation omitted.)

Amplifying upon Turner Elkhorn in Pension Guaranty,

the Court stated that:

[In Turner Elkhorn, the Court held] that the

strong deference accorded legislation in the field

of national economic policy is no less applicable

when that legislation is applied retroactively.

Provided that the retroactive application of a

statute is supported by a legitimate legislative

purpose furthered by rational means, judgment

about the wisdom of such legislation remains

within the exclusive province of the legislative

and executive branches. 467 U.S. at 729.

Congressional intent to have CERCLA apply retroac-

tively is clear. As pointed out in United States v. North-

eastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Company, 810 F.2d 726,

733 (8th Cir. 1986), “[t]he language used in the key lia-

bility provision, CERCLA 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, refers to

actions and conditions in the past tense. . . . Further the

statutory scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and

retroactive.” Additional support may be found in S. Rep.

96-848, 96th Congress, 2nd Sess., p. 13 [1980] (“society

should not bear the costs of protecting the public from

hazards produced in the past by a generator. . . ”).

It is eminently rational for Congress to have con-

cluded that the manufacturers who generated toxic waste

which was improperly disposed of should bear the cost

for cleaning it up.

The State, therefore, suggests that the question of the

constitutionality of the imposition of liability for pre-

enactment costs is not an important and recurring prob-

lem which is worthy of the Court’s review.

15

III. The Decision of the Court Below is Consistent

With The Law As Expressed by Other Courts

Of Appeals. «

Section 433(B)(2) of the Restatement of Torts provides:

Where the tortious conduct of two or more

actors have combined to bring about harm to

Plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to

limit his liability on the ground that the harm is

capable of apportionment among them, the bur-

den of proof as to the apportionment is upon

each such actor. Restatement (Second) of Tort

§ 433(B)(2) (1965). .

y Consistent with the Restatement, the Defendants in

Monsanto and Chem-Dyne, 572 FSupp. at 810, and the

Petitioners in the Court below were required to bear the

burden of establishing a reasonable basis for dividing

harm and apportioning liability among responsible

parties.

The parameters of that responsibility are set out in

Section 433A of the Restatement which provides:

(1) Damages for harm are to be appor-

tioned among two or more causes where

A (a) There are distinct harms, or

3 (b) There is a reasonable basis for deter-

mining the contribution of each cause to a

single harm.

(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be

apportioned among two or more causes.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433A.

As the Petitioners indicate on page 2 of their Petition,

the Picillo dump site was a “classic ‘midnight dump’

site”. It was an illegal dump site at which some toxic

16

wastes were emptied from barrels into unlined lagoons

and other hazardous substances were buried in the earth

while still in their barrels which were indiscriminately

stacked upon other barrels. These barrels were crushed

and allowed to corrode causing their vile contents to ooze

out and commingle. The State only learned of the exis-

tence of the facility when an explosion ignited a fire in

one of the lagoons that burned out of control for days.

The true extent of the disposal operation did mot become

apparent until after the excavation and removal of the

barrels began. Obviously, no shipping manifests provid-

ing the State with information concerning the origin,

chemical composition or volume of material at the Site

were available.

The hazardous waste “facility” on the Picillo Pig

Farm was primitive and remarkably similar to the two

hazardous waste facilities which were considered by the

courts in United States v. Monsanto Co., and United States v.

Medley, 25 ERC 1315 (D.S.C. 1986) to present indivisible

and unapportionable damage warranting the imposition

of joint and several liability. Both the Appellants in Mon-

santo and the Petitioners in the case at bar claimed appor-

tionability of the harm but:

presented no evidence however showing a rela-

tionship between waste volume, the release of

hazardous substances, and the harm at the site.

Further, in light of the commingling of hazard-

ous substances, the district court could not have

reasonable apportioned liability without some

evidence disclosing the individual and interac-

tive qualities of the substances deposited there.

Common sense counsels that a million gallons of

certain substances could be mixed together

without significant consequences, whereas a few

17

pints of others improperly mixed could result in

disaster consequences. 858 F.2d at 172 (footnotes

omitted).

The Fourth Circuit in Monsanto also had the oppor-

tunity to pass upon a panoply of constitutional challenges

which went to the core of the Superfund Law, and found

that the Act passed Constitutional muster on each

challenge:

Nor does the imposition of strict, joint and sev-

' eral liability convert CERCLA into a bill of

attainder or an ex post facto law. United States v.

Conservation Chemical Co., 619 FSupp. 162, 214

(W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Tyson, 25 Env’t.

Rep.Cas. (BNA) 1897 (E.D.Pa. 1986) [available

on WESTLAW, 1986 WL 9250]. The infliction of

punishment, either legislatively or retrospec-

tively, is a sine qua non of legislation that runs

afoul of these constitutional prohibitions. See

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433

U.S. 425, 473-84, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2805-11, 53

L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) (bill of attainder analysis);

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-30, 101 S.Ct.

960, 963-65, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (ex post facto

law analysis). CERCLA does not exact punish-

\ ment. Rather it creates a reimbursement obliga-

tion on any person judicially determined

responsible for the costs of remedying hazard-

’ ous conditions at a waste disposal facility. The

restitution of cleanup costs was not intended to

operexe, nor does it operate in fact, as a criminal

serene or a punitive deterrent. Cf. Tull v. United

tates, 481 US. 412, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 1838, 95

L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (distinguishing civil penalties

under Clean Water Act from equitable remedy

of restitution). Moreover, as this case amply

demonstrates, Congress did not impose that

obligation automatically on a legislatively

defined class of persons. Id. 858 F.2d at 175.

iia

18

The State would suggest that the concerns raised by

the Petitioners were raised in the Court below and were

fairly and accurately ruled upon. Further, the whole of

the CERCLA system has been reviewed in detail and the

decision of the Court below is consistent with the law as

expressed by other Courts of Appeals.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Respondent James E. O'Neil,

in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Rhode

Island, respectfully requests that the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

James E. O’Nen,

Attorney General for the

State of Rhode Island,

By: Gary E. Powers

Powers, Davis & Terry

1570 Westminster Street

Providence, Rhode Island 02909

(401) 861-0190

Counsel for Respondent

RA-1

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

James E. O'Neil, in his

capacity as Attorney

General for the STATE

OF RHODE ISLAND

Plaintiff,

Vv.

Warren V. Picillo,

Sr., Rutgers,

the State University of

New Jersey,

Defendants.

ee eee ee

UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v.

Rutgers, the State

University of

New Jersey,

Defendants,

ee ee ee ee ee oe ee ee

Civil Action No. 83-0787 P

CA 89-0123

Civil Action No.

CONSENT DECREE

WHEREAS, the United States of America, on behalf

of the Administrator of the United States Environmental!

Protection Agency (“Plaintiff” or “United States”) filed a

complaint against Rutgers, the State University of New

RA-2

Jersey (“Rutgers”), pursuant to Sections 106 and 107(a) of

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-

tion and Liability Act of 1980 as amended by the Super-

fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub.

L. No. 99-499, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 and 9607(a) (“CERCLA”),

and Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act, (“RCRA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 6973,

seeking injunctive relief regarding the cleanup of the

Picillo site in Coventry, Rhode Island (the “Site”) and

recovery of costs incurred and to be incurred in respond-

ing tc the release or threat of release of hazardous sub-

stances at or in connection with the Site;

WHEREAS, there is also pending an action entitled

O’Neil-v. Picillo, et al., designated C.A. No. 83-0787P in the

Federal District Court for the District of Rhode Island

against Rutgers and certain other companies and persons

seeking relief under Section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a), and Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1321, relating to the disposal of waste and other

activities at the Site (the “Federal Court Action”);

WHEREAS, there is pending an action entitled Bend-

ick, et al. v. Picillo, et al., designated C.A. No. 77-3161 in

the Superior Court for the State of Rhode Island, Provi-

dence County, against Rutgers and certain other com-

panies and persons asserting claims and seeking relief

under the statutory and common law of the State of

Rhode Island relating to the disposal of waste and other

activities at the Site (the “State Court Action”);

a Me AF eee te

RA-3

WHEREAS, the United States and the State have

incurred and continue to incur response costs in respond-

ing to the release or threat of release of hazardous sub-

stances at or in connection with the Site;

WHEREAS, the United States and the Attorney Gen-

eral for the State of Rhode Island have determined that

prompt settlement of this case is practicable and in the

public interest;

WHEREAS, this settlement involves only a minor

portion of the response costs at the Site with respect to

Rutgers;

WHEREAS, the United States and the State have

determined that the amount of the hazardous substances

contributed to the Site by Rutgers and the toxic or haz-

ardous effects of the hazardous substance contributed to

the Site by Rutgers are minimal in comparison to other

hazardous substances at the Site;

WHEREAS, the United States, the State and Rutgers

agree that settlement of this case without further litiga-

tion and without the admission or adjudication of any

issue of fact or law is the most appropriate means of

resolving this action;

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED as follows:

I. JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and

the parties to this action. The parties agree to be bound

by the terms of this Consent Decree and not to contest its

RA-4

validity in any subsequent proceeding to implement or

enforce its terms.

II. PARTIES BOUND

This Consent Decree shall apply to and be binding upon

the United States and the State and shall apply to and be

binding upon Rutgers, its directors, officers, employees,

agents, successors and assigns. Each signatory to this

Consent Decree represents that he or she is fully autho-

rized to enter into the terms and conditions of this Con-

sent Decree and to legally bind the Party represented by

him or her.

III. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of Rutgers entering into this Consent Decree

is to: (1) provide partial reimbursement for Plaintiffs’

Response Costs; and (2) settle any and all claims asserted

by Plaintiffs as to Rutgers in the Complaint filed in this

matter, as well as Plaintiffs’ potential claims for natural

resource damages under CERCLA, with the exception of

Plaintiffs’ claims specifically reserved in this Decree.

IV. PAYMENT

1. On or before the 30th day following entry of this

Consent Decree, Rutgers shall send a certified check to

the United States in the amount of $37,500. Payment shall

be made by a certified check payable to the “Enviornmen-

tal Protection Agency, Hazardous Substance Superfund”.

2. The check shall reference Rutgers, the Site name, and

the civil action number of this case, and shall be sent to:

RA-5

EPA Superfund

P.O. Box 371003M

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15251

3. Rutgers shall simultaneously send a copy of its check

to:

Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section

Land and Natural Resources Division

United States Department of Justice

9th and Pennsylvania Avenues, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

Attn: DOJ No. 90-11-2-131

and

Regional Administrator

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

J.F.K. Federal Building

Government Center

Boston, MA 02203

Attn: Picillo Settlement

A copy shall also be sent to:

State of Rhode Island

Department of Environmental Management

9 Hayes Street

Second Floor

Providence, Rhode Island 02908

and

Attention: Gary Powers

State of Rhode Island

Department of Attorney General

72 Pine Street

Providence, RI 02903

4. On or before the 30th day following entry of this

Consent Decree, Rutgers shall send payment in the

amount of $12,500 to the State of Rhode Island by certi-

fied check, payable to “Treasurer, State of Rhode Island,

for Deposit in the Environmental Response Fund.” Pay-

ment shall be mailed to:

RA-6

Department of Environmental Management

9 Hayes Street, 2nd floor

Providence, Rhode Island 02908

A copy shall also be sent to:

Attention: Gary Powers

State of Rhode Island

Department of Attorney General

72 Pine Street

Providence, RI 02903

5. The payments described above are partial reimburse-

ment for Plaintiffs’ response costs and are not a penalty

or fine.

V. CIVIL PENALTIES

In addition to any other available remedies or sanctions,

should Rutgers fail or refuse to comply with any term or

condition of this Consent Decree, it shall be subject to a

civil penalty of up to $25,000 per day of such failure or

refusal pursuant to Section 122(1) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.

9622(1). .

VI. CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANTS

Rutgers certifies that to the best of its knowledge and

belief, it has provided to the United States and the State

all information currently in its possession, or in the pos-

sessiou of its officers, directors, employees, contractors,

agents or assigns, which relates in any way to the genera-

tion, treatment, transportation, storage or disposal of haz-

ardous substances at or in connection with the Site.

RA-7

VII. COVENANT NOT TO SUE

1. Subject to the reservation of rights in Section VIII of

this Consent Decree, the United States and the State

covenant not to sue or take any other civil or administra-

tive action against Rutgers for “Covered Matters.” “Cov-

ered Matters” shall include any and all civil liability

including future liability, for reimbursement of response

costs or for injunctive relief pursuant to Sections 106 or

107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 or 9607(a), Section

311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.7@. § 1321, and Section

7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973, with regard to the Site.

“Covered Matters” shall also include all past or future

damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural

resources, including the costs of assessing such injury,

destruction, or loss.

2. In consideration of the United States’ and the State’s

covenant not to sue in Paragraph 1 of this Section,

Rutgers agrees not to assert any claims or causes of action

against the United States, the State, or the Hazardous

Substance Superfund arising out of the Covered Matters,

or to seek any other costs, damages, or attorneys’ fees

arising out of response activities at the Site.

3. The State hereby agrees to file a motion seeking the

dismissal with prejudice of O’Neil v. Picillo and Bendick v.

Picillo as to Rutgers. The State and Rutgers further agree

that this dismissal is a final disposition of all claims

raised in those actions against Rutgers with the exception

of those claims set forth in the reservation of rights in

Section VIII, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Consent Decree.

RA-8

VIII. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

1. Nothing in this Consent Decree is intended to be nor

shall it be construed as a release or covenant not to sue

for any claim or cause of action, administrative or judi-

cial, past or future, in law or in equity, which the United

States and/or the State may have against Rutgers for:

(a) any continuing liability as a result of failure to

make the payments required by Section IV, Para-

graphs 1 and 4, of this Consent Decree, or

(b) any matter not expressly included in Covered

Matters.

Nothing in this Consent Decree is intended to be nor

shall be construed as a release of criminal liability.

2. Nothing in this Consent Decree constitutes a cove-

nant not to sue or to take action or otherwise limit the

ability of the United States and/or the State to seek or

obtain further relief from Rutgers, and the covenant not

to sue in Section VII, Paragraph 1, of this Consent Decree

is null and void, if information not currently known or

made available to the United States and/or the State is

discovered which indicates that Rutgers contributed haz-

ardous substances to the Site in such greater amount or to

such greater toxic or other hazardous effect that the

Rutgers no longer qualifies as a de minimis party at the

Site because it contributed disproportionately to the

cumulative toxic or other hazardous effects of the hazard-

ous substances at the Site.

3. Nothing in this Consent Decree is intended as a

release or covenant not to sue for any claim or cause of

action, administrative or judicial, past or future, in law or

in ‘equity, which the United States and/or the State may

RA-9

have against any person, firm, corporation or other entity

who is not a signatory to this Consent Decree.

4. The United States, the State, and Rutgers agree that

the actions undertaken by Rutgers in accordance with

this Consent Decree do not constitute an admission of

any liability by Rutgers.

IX. CONTRIBUTION PROTECTION

Subject to the reservation of rights in Section IX of this

Consent Decree, the United States and the State agree

that by entering into and carrying out the terms of the

Consent Decree, Rutgers will have resolved its liability to

the United States and the State for Covered Matters pur-

suant to Section 122(g)(5) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2622(g)(5), and shall not be liable for claims for contri-

bution for Covered Matters.

X. PUBLIC COMMENT

This Consent Decree shall be subject to a thirty-day pub-

lic comment period. The United States or the State may

withdraw its consent to this Consent Decree if comments

received disclose facts or considerations which indicate

that this Consent Decree is inappropriate, improper, 0:

inadequate.

XI. EFFECTIVE DATE

The effective date of this Consent Decree shall be the date

of entry by this Court, following public comment pur-

suant to Section X of this Consent Decree.

RA-10

ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 1989.

/s/ Raymond J. Pettine

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

FOR THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA

/s/ Donald Carr

DONALD A. CARR

Acting Assistant Attor-

ney General Land and

Natural Resources Divi-

sion United States

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C

20530

LINCOLN C. ALMOND

United States Attorney

District of Rhode Island

By:/s/ Everett Sammartino

EVERETT SAMMARTINO

Assistant United States

Attorney

224 Federal Building and

Courthouse

Kennedy Plaza

Providence, Rhode Island

02903

/s/ Carrick Brooke-Davidson

CARRICK BROOKE-DAVID-

SON, Attorney

Environmental Enforcement

Section United

States Department of Justice

P.O. Box 7611

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, D.C. 20044

RA-11

/s/

/s/

/s/

/s/

Thomas L. Adams, Jr.

THOMAS L. ADAMS, JR.

Assistant Administrator for

Enforcement

and Compliance Monitoring

United States Environmental

Protection Agency

401 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

Michael R. Deland

MICHAEL R. DELAND ©

Regional Administrator,

Region I

United States Environmental

Protection Agency

JFK Federal Building

Boston, MA 02203

Jon Fleuchaus 5/24/88

JON FLEUCHAUS

Attorney-Adviser

Office of Enforcement and

Compliance Monitoring

United States Environmental

Protection Agency

401 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

Susana Cortina de Cardenas

SUSANA CORTINA de

CARDENAS

Assistant Regional Counsel

Office of Regional Counsel

United States Environmental

Protection Agency

JFK Federal Building

Boston, MA 02203 *

RA-12

FOR THE STATE OF

RHODE ISLAND

/s/ James E. O'Neil

JAMES E. O’NEIL, in his

capacity as Attorney General

for the State of Rhode Island

By His Attorney,

JAMES E. O’NBIL

ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:/s/ Gary Powers

GARY POWERS

Special Assistant

Attorney General

72 Pine Street

Providence, RI 02903

(401) 274-4400

FOR RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

/s/ Joseph P. Whiteside

joseph P. Whiteside

Senior vice President ©

and Treasurer

/s/ Thomas Terp

Thomas T

TAFT, NIUS &

HOLLISTER

1800 First National

Bank Center

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.