Amicus Curiae Brief — Chrysler Corp. v. Smolarek

Xie * Supreme Court, U.S. . ‘

| FILED

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Neca ai

| NOV 1989

No. 89-568 i] v

+ —tOGieth& SPANIOL, JR,

CLERK ;

IN THE

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Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1989

CHRYSLER CORPORATION, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

STANLEY SMOLAREK and RALPH FLEMING,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United

States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION

OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.,

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

WILLIAM H. CRABTREE JAMES D. HOLZHAUER *

Motor VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO

ASSOCIATION ” RICHARD A. SALOMON

7430 Second Avenue Mayer, Brown & P tatt

Suite 300 190 South LaSalle Street

Detroit, Michigan 48202 Chicago, Illinois 60603

(313) 872-4311 (312) 782-0600 -

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

* Counsel of Record

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60611, (312) 321-0220

et Ce lh er ea Se peat ee ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............--. ii

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE .....

i ei

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..

A. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Conflicts

With This Court’s Repeated Holding That

Disputes Dependent On The Terms Of

Collective Bargaining Agreements Must

Be Resolved Solely Under Federal Law . 9

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Holding That

Chrysler’s Motivation Presented An Issue

Independent From The Terms Of The

Union Contract Conflicts With This Court’s

Decision In Lueck And With The Decisions

Of Several Other Courts of Appeals .. 16

be | errr rere reer rey ToL eS 20

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: ‘PAGE

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) .

TTTST TTT TTT TTT ee passim

Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389

Ro 8 8: ere ry, ne 3, 13

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) . 7

Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502

GREE. 5 SRAR As CNSR Rae eek eet 10

Cuffe v. General Motors Corp., __. N.W.2d ___

oe ee: ere 9

Douglas v. American Information Technologies

Corp., 877 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1989) ........ 18, 19

Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) . 11

Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co., 881 F.2d

See We A I nib oc cbvae swat edamnenes 18

Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620

ee: Gal. SY Aa bases baba Veneta eens 18

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 108

ee FO er eee passim

Machinists Local 437 v. United States Can Co.,

150 Wisc. 2d 479, 441 N.W.2d 710 (Wisc. 1989) . 9

Metro v. Ford Motor Co., __. N.W.2d _____ (Mich.

BE, ST GD ohne dannwevetencareys 9

Nash v. AT & T Nassau Metals, 381 S.E.2d 206

Se EE. Wa sie sant keksds vie encases ene 18, 19

Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass’n, 854 F.2d 1142

Ge A SD 6k ds be rab bdseuwcundeoraeeees 18

Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) . 10

iii

STATUTES:

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations

EE, ED css cbavccedccdeees es passim

Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.

errr rire a ceeoks passim

ree

No. 89-568

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1989

CHRYSLER CORPORATION, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

STANLEY SMOLAREK and RALPH FLEMING,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United

States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

/

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION

OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.,

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the

United States, Inc. (““MVMA’’) respectfully submits this

brief as amicus curiae in support of the petition for a writ -

of certiorari filed by Chrysler Corporation. ¥

1 The written consents of the parties to the filing of this brief

have been filed with the Clerk.

indian

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

MVMaA is a trade organization whose member companies

build 98% of all motor vehicles produced in the United

States and numerous other products. MVMA members in-

clude Chrysler Corporation; Ford Motor Company; Gen-

eral Motors Corporation; Honda of America Manufactur-

ing, Inz.; Navistar International Transportation Corp.;

PACCAR, ,Inc.; and Volvo North American Corporation.

The MVMA member companies employ over i.2 million

workers; a substantial proportion of those employees are

represented by unions and covered by collective bargain-

ing agreements. The collective bargaining agreements

covering most of these employees are the product of in-

dustry-wide “pattern bargaining.” As a result, the employ-

ment of most of the employees of MVMA members is gov-

erned by agreements containing handicap discrimination

clauses and grievance procedures that are virtually iden-

tical to those involved in this case.

This case presents an issue of great importance to MVMA

members and to other employers throughout the country

whose employees are covered by collective bargaining

agreements. The court of appeals held that the handi-

cap discrimination claims of two Chrysler employees were

not pr¢-erapted by Section 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act even though those claims were based on

rights conferred under a collective bargaining agreement

and ultimately would require interpretation of that agree-

ment. The decision conflicts with the important federal

policies favoring resolution of labor disputes by arbitra-

tion and application of a uniform body of federal law

to claims based on collective bargaining agreements. As

such, the court of appeals’ decision threatens to disrupt

the labor relations of MVMA members and other em-

clic

ployers and to deprive employers and unions-of the full

benefit of their agreements to resolve all contractual

disputes through contractual procedures culminating in

final and binding arbitration.

STATEMENT

As the court Of “appeals held (Pet. App. 2a), ‘[t]hese

combined cases present close and difficult questions regard-

ing whether §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

pre-empts plaintiffs’ actions claiming violations of Mich-

igan’s Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act ((HCRA’) * * *.”

Two Chrysler employees, Stanley Smolarek and Ralph

Fleming, sued Chrysler claiming that the company’s fail-

ure to place them in positions consistent with their medi-

cal restrictions violated HCRA. It is beyond dispute that

HCRA does not require accommodation of job-related handi-

caps (i.e., handicaps related to the employee’s ability to

perform his job). Carr v. General Motors Corp., 425 Mich.

313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986). It is also beyond dispute that

the collective bargaining agreement between Chrysler and

the United Automobile Workers (‘““UAW’’) does require

some accommodation of job-related handicaps. Pet. 3. Yet

Smolarek and Fleming contend that Chrysler’s alieged fail-

ure to accommodate their job-related handicaps (as required

only by the collective bargaining agreement) violated

HCRA (which itself does not require such accommodation).

Reversing the district court decision in each case by an

8 to 7 vote, the court of appeals held that the HCRA

claims were not pre-empted by §301. That conclusion is

directly contrary to this Court’s unanimous decision in

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985), and

conflicts with the decisions of other circuits and with the

important federal policies favoring resolution of labor dis-

ssnilian

putes through arbitration and requiring application of a

uniform body of federal law to such claims.

1. Stanley Smolarek, a Chrysler employee since 1953

and a UAW member, has suffered from a seizure disorder

for over thirty years. Over those years, certain medical

restrictions were placed on his on-the-job activities.

Chrysler continued to employ him despite those restric-

tions. In October 1984, Smolarek suffered a seizure while

at work. He was absent from work for two weeks and,

upon his return, was told that there were no jobs avail-

able consistent witn his medical restrictions. Pet. App.

2a-3a.

Rather than file a grievance claiming violation of the

provisions of the collective bargaining agreement requir-

ing ‘‘reasonable accommodation [of] an employee’s handi-

cap” (Pet. 3), Smolarek filed suit in state court claiming

that Chrysler violated HCRA by failing to reinstate him

to “his former position or another position consistent with

his medical restrictions.” Pet. App. 20a. Smolarek’s prayer

for relief asked the court to require Chrysler to ‘“‘accom-

modate plaintiff's handicap by providing him with work

which would fit his particular needs or handicap and other-

wise accommodate plaintiff so that he can remain in the

active employ of defendant.” Pet. App. 45a.

Chrysler removed the suit to federal court on the ground

that Smolarek’s complaint presented a federal question

under §301. Denying Smolarek’s motion to remand, the

district court held that Smolarek’s HCRA claims were

pre-empted by §301 and dismissed the suit for failure to

exhaust the contractual remedies. Pet. App. 3a.

2. Ralph Fleming began working at Chrysler in 1976.

Like Smolarek, he was a member of the UAW and was

represented by that union for collective bargaining pur-

poses. In 1983, Fleming suffered ‘‘severe and permanent

= =

injuries” in an automobile accident. He returned to work

at Chrysler after a year of disability leave, but he re-

injured himself as he was leaving work in August 1984.

He suffered from “loss of balance, severe headaches,

muscle spasms in his back, and nausea.” Pet. App. 3a.

He returned to work again after an additional period of

leave, but his “physical condition * * * precluded him

from performing his assigned duties.” Pet. App. 48a. He

requested that his union attempt to secure an accommoda-

tion of his handicap but before that was accomplished he

was placed on indefinite layoff as part of a reduction in

force at the Chrysler plant where he worked. Pet. App.

49a.

Fleming claimed that he was not really laid off, but was

actually improperly discharged. The UAW filed a griev-

ance on his behalf which was pending when Fleming vol-

untarily quit his employment as part of a settlement of

his workers’ compensation claim against Chrysler. Pet.

App. 49a. Fleming then brought this suit in state court,

claiming that Chrysler violated HCRA by “flailing to sug-

gest and/or implement reasonable accommodations so as

to allow [him] te work despite his physical determinable

handicap * * *,” Pet. App. 22a. Chrysler removed the

case to federal court and the court granted Chrysler’s

motion for summary judgment, holding that Fleming’s

HCRA claims were pre-empted by Section 301 and that

Fleming had failed to exhaust his contractual remedies.

3. The two cases were consolidated on appeal. The

court of appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the district

2 In addition to the HCRA claim, Fleming’s complaint alleged

three other state law causes of action. The district court denied

Fleming’s motion to remand on the ground that two of those other

claims stated federal questions. Fleming did not appeal the dis-

missal of those two claims, so the propriety of the removal of

Fleming’s action was not at issue in the court of appeals and is

not before this Court.

=

court’s pre-emption holdings, with seven of the fifteen

judges dissenting.* The court characterized this Court’s

decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,

108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988), as approving “the Seventh Cir-

cuit’s recognition that ‘$301 does not pre-empt state anti-

discrimination laws, * * *.’” Pet. App. lla. Starting from

that broad reading of Lingle, the court of appeals

separately examined Smolarek’s and Fleming’s claims to

determine whether they presented any special circum-

stances justifying a departure from the “rule’’. The court

acknowledged at the outset that under settled Michigan

law, “a plaintiff who concededly cannot perform the duties

of a particular job and who claims that his employer must

accommodate him does not state a claim under HCRA.”

Pet. App. lla.

Smolarek based his claim in substantial part on Chrysler’s

failure to ‘accommodate [his] handicap” and to reinstate

him “to his former position or another position consistent

with his medical conditions.” Although it was undisputed

that he could only work subject to medical restrictions,

the court of appeals held that because an employee could

make out a prima facie case under HCRA without relying

on rights under the collective bargaining agreement (if he

could show that he was capable of working at his former

job), Smolarek’s claim was not pre-empted (Pet. App. 14a):

Smolarek’s complaint makes reference to his report-

ing to work “to his former position,” and that “defen-

dant has refused to return plaintiff to his former posi-

tion” in violation of HCRA. * * * Only if found not

capable of working at this former job would the court

be concerned with Smolarek’s alternative contention

that he be placed in “another position consistent with

his medical restrictions.” That Chrysler may defend

this latter alternative claim by reference to its re-

3 An earlier panel opinion was vacated ‘ the court’s order grant-

ing the motion for rehearing en banc. Pet. App. 28a.

= oe

sponsibilities under the collective bargaining agree-

ment in respect to reasonable accommodation of Smo-

larek’s “medical restrictions” is, in our view, no basis

to hold that §301 preemption is mandated under these

circumstances.

Smolarek’s complaint on its face alleged that Chrysler was

required to accommodate his job-related handicap, and it

is clear that accommodation of such handicaps is not re-

quired by the HCRA but may be required by the union

contract. But the court held that the issue of accommoda-

tion under the collective bargaining agreement would arise

only as a defense to Smolarek’s claim. Relying on Cater-

pillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), the court held

that even if it is governed by §301, under the “well-

pleaded complaint” doctrine a contract claimed raised as

a defense does not warrant removal of a state case to

federal court.4

Turning to Fleming’s claims, the court of appeals ac-

knowledged that Fleming was seeking an accommodation

of his job-related handicap (i.e., “work consistent with his

medical restrictions”; Pet. App. 15a), but held that Flem-

ing could make out a prima facie case under HCRA if

he showed that Chrysler’s actions were discriminatorily

motivated. Even though HCRA does not require such ac-

commodation, the court held that Fleming could establish

liability under the statute if he could show that “Chrysler

took adverse actions against him and * * * that the ac-

tions were motivated by his handicap.” bid. “It is not

necessary to decide at the outset whether or not Chrysler’s

4 Because it held that it was raised as a defense, the court did

not address the merits of Chrysler’s argument that Smolarek’s ac-

commodation claim was pre-empted by §301. But it indicated that

if it did reach that issue it would apply the same analysis it used

in holding that Fleming’s claim was not pre-empted. Pet. App. 14a-

l5a & n.3.

”

interpretation of the agreement is correct as a matter of

federal labor law. The question is a factual one: what was

Chrysler’s motivation?” Pet. App. 16a. In the court of ap-

peals’ view, that question did not require contract inter-

pretation and was “sufficiently ‘independent’ of the col-

lective bargaining agreement to escape §301 pre-emption.”

Ibid.

4. Seven of the fifteen circuit judges dissented and joined

an opinion by Judge Kennedy. The dissenting judges criti-

cized the majority for failing to look beyond the pleadings

to the reality of the respondents’ claims. Pet. App. 19a.

They would have held that Smolarek’s claim was pre-

empted insofar as it sought accommodation of his job-

related handicap (Pet. App. 20a-21a):

At the time of removal, Smolarek claimed a right

to reinstatement to “his former position or another

position consistent with his medical restrictions. * * *”

To the extent that Smolarek asks for reinstatement

to another position, his claim is clearly preempted.

There is no right independent of the collective bar-

gaining agreement to be reinstated to another job

consistent with one’s medical disability under HCRA.

Similarly, to the extent that Fleming “claim[ed] a right

to reinstatement to another position,” the dissenting

judges believed his claim was also pre-empted. Pet. App.

22a. “‘The only source of Chrysler’s duty to [accommodate

Fleming] is the collective bargaining agreement.” [bid.

oe

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The court of appeals’ decision in this case, much like

the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Allis-Chalmers

Corp. v. Lueck, would allow state court judges, applying

state law, to resolve disputes over collective bargaining

agreement provisions that should be resolved by arbitra-

tors applying uniform federal law and the “law of the

shop.”’ As the sharp division among the circuit judges in

this case demonstrates, the courts have had considerable

difficulty applying Lingle and have reached conflicting

results. See also, Machinists Local 437 v. United States

Can Co., 150 Wisc. 2d 479, 441 N.W.2d 710 (Wisc. 1989)

(a 4-3 decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court); Cuffe

v. General Motors Corp., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Mich. App.

Oct. 2, 1989) (holding that an HCRA claim was pre-empted

by §301); Metro v. Ford Motor Co., __. N.W.2d ___

(Mich. App. Aug. 25, 1989) (expressly rejecting the Sixth

Circuit’s holding in this case). In Cuffe and Metro, the

Michigan Court of Appeals held that handicap discrimina-

tion claims that were virtually identical to those raised

in this case were pre-empted. This Court should grant the

petition to clarify the proper scope of Lingle and to re-

affirm that §301 pre-empts state law actions relating to

rights grounded in collective bargaining agreements.

A. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Conflicts With This

Court’s Repeated Holding That Disputes Dependent On

The Terms Of Collective Bargaining Agreements Must

Be Resolved Solely Under Federal Law.

1. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,

29 U.S.C. §185(a), provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization representing employees in

=

an industry affecting commerce * * * may be brought

in any district court of the United States having

jurisdiction of the parties.

Although state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over

§301 suits, Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.

502 (1962), the “dimensions of §301 require * * * that sub-

stantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount

in the area covered by the statute [so that] issues raised

in [$301] suits * * * [are] decided according to the precepts

of federal labor policy.”” Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,

369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).

Federal labor policy requires that ‘‘doctrines of federal

labor law uniformly * * * prevail over inconsistent local

rules.” Id., at 104. The Court explained the reason for

this rule as follows (id., at 103-104):

[T]he subject matter of §301(a) ‘is peculiarly one that

calls for uniform law.’ * * * The possibility that indi-

vidual contract terms might have different meanings

under state and federal law would inevitably exert

a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and

administration of collective agreements. Because

neither party could be certain of the rights which it

had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating

an agreement would be made immeasurably more dif-

ficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract

provisions in such a way as to contain the same

meaning under two or more systems of law which

might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract.

Once the collective bargain was made, the possibil

ity of conflicting substantive interpretation under

competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and

prolong disputes as to its interpretation * * * [and]

might substantially impede the parties’ willingness to

agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral

or judicial resolution of disputes.

The Couri therefore held that suits alleging violations of

collective bargaining agreements must be examined under

TT Oe

uniform federal law developed under §301 and that state

lawsuits dependent on the terms of such agreement are

pre-empted.

More recently, in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471

U.S. at 210, the Court held that ‘ilf the policies that

animate §301 are to be given their proper range * * *

the pre-emptive effect of §301 must extend beyond suits

alleging contract violations.” In order to serve “(t]he inter-

ests in interpretive uniformity and predictability * * *,

questions relating to what the parties to a labor agree-

ment agreed, and what legal consequences were intended

to flow from that agreement, must be resolved by refer-

ence to uniform federal law * * *.” Jd., at 211. Federal

law must be applied unless the state cause of action is

independent of the rights established by the collective

bargaining agreement:

[S]tate-law rights and obligations that do not exist

independently of private agreements, and that as a

result can be waived or altered by agreement of pri-

vate parties, are pre-empted by those agreements.

Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the [state

cause of action] as applied here confers nonnegotiable

state-law rights on employers or employees indepen-

dent of any right established by contract, or, instead,

whether evaluation of the [state] claim is inextricably

intertwined with consideration of the terms of the

labor contract. If the state * * * law purports to

define the meaning of the contract relationship, that

law is pre-empted.

Id. at 213 (footnote and citation omitted).

The Court reiterated these concerns yet again in Elec-

trical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987), and in

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. In Hechler,

the plaintiff alleged that her union was negligent in fulfill-

ing its duty to ensure a safe workplace. Although her ac-

tion for negligence was purely a state law cause of action,

the Court held that it was pre-empted by §301:

Respondent’s allegations of negligence assume sig-

nificance if—and only if—the Union, in fact, had as-

sumed the duty of care that the complaint alleges the

Union breached. * * * In order to determine the Union’s

tort liability * * * a court would have to ascertain,

first, whether the collective-bargaining agreement in

fact placed an implied duty of care on the Union to

ensure that Hechler was provided a safe workplace,

and, second, the nature and scope of that duty, that

is, whether, and to what extent, the Union’s duty

extended to the particular responsibilities alleged by

respondent in her complaint. Thus, in this case, as

in Allis-Chalmers, it is clear that ‘questions of con-

tract interpretation . . . underlie any finding of tort

liability.” 471 U.S., at 218. The need for federal uni-

formity in the interpretation of contract terms there-

fore mandates that here, as in Allis-Chalmers, re-

spondent is precluded from evading the pre-emptive

force of §301 by casting her claim as a state-law tort

action. :

In Lingle, the Court held that the plaintiff’s state law

claim that she had been discharged in retaliation for filing

a workers’ compensation claim was not pre-empted by

§301 because that claim was not at all related to or depen-

dent upon the collective bargaining agreement. Although

the plaintiff could have challenged her termination under

the just cause provision of the union contract, the state

law claim and the contract claim operated in parallel, and

the state law claim was not at all dependent on any pro-

vision of the contract. 108 S. Ct. at 1883. The Court re-

peated the settled rule “‘that interpretation of collective-

bargaining agreements remains firmly in the arbitral

realm; judges can determine questions of state law involv-

ing labor-management relations only if such questions do

not require construing collective-bargaining agreements.”

Id. at 1884.

2. The court of appeals’ decision in this case is con-

trary to those longstanding principles. The court gave dif-

=

ferent reasons for concluding that the claims of Smolarek

and those of Fleming were not pre-empted. As to Smo-

larek, the court held that his claim “that Chrysler violated

its duties under HCRA by refusing to return him ‘to his

former position or another position consistent with his

medical restrictions’ ”’ (Pet. App. 1la) was not pre-empted

because it included a claim that he be restored to his

former position, and not solely a claim that his handicap

be accommodated by placing him in “another position con-

sistent with his medical restrictions.” In the court’s words,

“{olnly if found not capable of working at his former job

would the court be concerned with Smolarek’s alternative

contention that he be placed in ‘another position * * *.’”

Id., at 14a.

The court’s conclusion misses the mark. Smolarek’s

claim that he should be given “another position” may be

pleaded in the alternative, but it is nonetheless an alter-

native claim that is pre-empted by §301 and the court

should have so held. It is beyond dispute that HCRA does

not require an employer to accommodate an employee’s

handicap by placing him in “another position consistent

with his medical restrictions.”’ Carr v. General Motors

Corp., 425 Mich. 318, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986). Any right

to such accommodation Smolarek may have had stems not

from the HCRA, but from the collective bargaining agree-

ment and therefore must be examined under §301. As the

seven dissenting circuit judges pointed out, ‘[t]here is no

right independent of the collective bargaining agreement

to be reinstated to another job consistent with one’s medi-

cal disability under the HCRA.” Pet. App. 21. Although

the eight circuit judges in the majority acknowledged that

there was no right to such accommodation under HCRA

(Pet. App. 1la), they nevertheless incorrectly held that

the state law claims could go forward.

Moreover, Smolarek was undeniably seeking special ac-

commodation of his medical restrictions even if he were

~~

returned to his former job. Smolarek claimed that Chrysler

had previously accommodated his medical restrictions and

should do so again. Pet. App. 2a-8a. He asked the court

to order Chrysler to ‘accommodate [his] handicap by pro-

viding him with work which would fit his particular needs

or handicap and otherwise accommodate [him] so that he

can remain in the active employ of [Chrysler].” Pet. App.

45a. Again, such an accommodation of a job-related handi-

cap could be required only by the union contract, not by

state law.

In these circumstances, it is clear that Smolarek’s claim

is not truly independent of the collective bargaining agree-

ment. Chrysler and Smolarek disagree as to the “legal

consequences [that] flow from * * * that agreement.” Such

a disagreement “must be resolved by reference to uniform

federal law * * *.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211.

3. As to respondent Fleming, the court of appeals based

its holding that the HCRA claim was not pre-empted on

what the dissent characterized (Pet. App. 24a) as a “floor

of rights” theory which turned solely on motivation:

Under this theory, [respondents] posit that although

an employer need not provide for a right to reinstate-

ment following a disability, if it does provide that

right—either through the collective bargaining agree-

ment or voluntarily—it must not discriminate in giv-

ing that right to all groups.

Thus the majority opinion (Pet. App. 15a-16a) held that the

success of respondent’s claim depends on whether Chrysler

was “motivated by his handicap” and that “Chrysler must

show that its actions were motivated by some factor other

than [respondent’s] handicap”. Under the court’s theory,

even though HCRA does not require accommodation,

Chrysler would violate the statute if it based its decision

not to accommodate on the respondents’ handicaps, and

—15—

that violation would be independent of any contractual

right.5

This “floor of rights” theory has some superficial ap-

peal. It is commonly accepted that certain actions an em-

ployer might ordinarily have every right to take become

unlawful if they are taken because of such prohibited con-

siderations as race, or sex, or union activity. But on closer

examination, the theory does not hold up in this context.

By requiring only that employers not discriminate against

handicapped workers when the handicap is “unrelated to

the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particu-

lar job or position,”’ and thus by not requiring accommoda-

tion of job-related handicaps, HCRA permits employers

to “discriminate” on the basis of handicap when that

handicap is related to job ability. In these circumstances,

it makes absolutely no sense to say that “Chrysler must

show that its actions [i.e., its failure to accommodate] were

motivated by some factor other than [the respondents’]

handicap[s].”” Chrysler had every right under HCRA to

base its refusal to accommodate on respondents’ handi-

caps. The only right respondents might have had to ac-

commodation of their job-related handicaps was a right

under the union contract. And that right can be addressed

only under §301.

Moreover, it is clear that the question of discriminatory

motivation is not independent of the collective bargaining

agreement and would require interpretation of that agree-

ment. To determine whether Chrysler discriminated against

Fleming by not affording him the same contractual rights

as it would give to non-handicapped workers, the court

must examine the scope of those contractual rights. But

5 The court indicated that it would apply the same analysis to

Smolarek’s claim if it were required to reach the merits of Chrysler’s

pre-emption “defense.” Pet. App. 14a-l5a & n.3.

—16—

such an inquiry would require interpretation of the ex-

press and implied rights under the collective bargaining

agreement and would directly contravene the fundamental

federal policies underlying §301 and this Court’s long-

standing pre-emption decisions. It is also clear that the

claimed right to accommodation of job-related handicaps

“can be waived or altered by agreement of [the] parties.”

Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213. Such rights are not independent

of labor contracts and can be pursued only under §301.

The court of appeals’ decision would thus allow state

courts and juries to interpret the provisions of collective

bargaining agreements and it would permit them to do

so with reference to state rather than federal law. The

decision thus substantially undermines the important fed-

eral policy requiring application of a uniform, nationwide

body of law to cases dependent on the terms of union con-

tracts. It also contravenes the federal policy favoring

resolution of labor contract disputes through contractual

grievance procedures culminating in final and binding arbi-

tration. This Court should grant the petition to protect

the important federal interests reflected in those policies.

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Holding That Chrysler’s Motiva-

tion Presented An Issue Independent From The Terms

Of The Union Contract Conflicts With This Court’s

Decision In Lueck And With The Decisions Of Several

Other Courts Of Appeals.

As this Court has repeatedly held, in cases like this one

federal labor relations policy “mandate[s] resort to federal

rules of law in order to ensure uniform interpretation of

collective-bargaining agreements, and thus to promote the

peaceable, consistent resolution of labor-management dis-

putes.” Lingle, 108 S. Ct. av 1880. Consequently, the

Court has required application of federal law not only

when the asserted claim directly requires interpretation

of a collective bargaining agreement, but also where state

- =

claims are intertwined with contract issues and are not

truly independent of those issues. Lueck, 471 U.S. at

210-211. When contract issues are involved, the dispute

must be resolved under §301. Ibid.

The court of appeals in this case, by ‘“‘wear{ing] blinders”

(Pet. App. 28a) and ignoring the true nature of respon-

dents’ claims, has demonstrated how easily a court might

misinterpret Lingle to permit encroachment of state law

on necessarily federal issues. In Lingle this Court decided

that the state claim was not pre-empted because it could

be raised even in the absence of.-a collective bargaining

agreement. The fact that there may have been parallel

rights under the agreement did not diminish the fact that

the state claim was fully inu pendent of any contractual

rights. Similarly, the Michigan Handicapper’s Civil Rights

Act might confer rights that are fully independent of con-

tractual rights in other cases. But in this case, the right

to accommodation sought by respondents was not indepen-

dent of the union contract. In fact, it was a right that

was available, if at all, only under the collective bargain-

ing agreement. And the court of appeals cannot negate

that fact by focusing on Chrysler’s motivation.

The court of appeals reasoned that the critical question

at least as to Fleming’s claim was “({wJhat was Chrysler’s

motivation?” Pet. App. 16a.* Even if the right to accom-

modation was based solely on the collective bargaining

agreement, under the court’s theory it would not be

necessary to interpret that contract. The court would be

presented with “‘ ‘purely factual questions’ relating to the _

conduct and motivation of the employer.” Jd., at 15a. And

those questions would be “sufficiently ‘independent’ of the

8 The same reasoning would apparently apply to Smolarek’s ac-

commodation claim if the court were required to decide whether

that claim was pre-empted by §301. Pet. App. 14a-l5a & n.3.

allies

collective bargaiming agreement to escape §301 pre-

emption.” Jd., at 16a.

That is exactly the kind of reasoning that this Court

unanimously rejected in Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Lweck. The

plaintiff in Lweck claimed that her employer had acted

in bad faith in handling her claim for disability benefits

provided by the union contract. The Wisconsin Supreme

Court—much like the court of appeals in this case—‘‘held

that the ‘specific violation of the labor contract, if there

was one, is irrelevant to the issue of whether the defen-

dants exercised bad faith in the manner in which they

handled Lueck’s claim.’ ”’ 471 U.S. at 214. In this case,

the court reasoned that the critical question would “re-

lat{e] to the conduct and motivation of the employer” (Pet.

App. 18a), and not to whether the contract had been vio-

lated.

This Court unanimously rejected that reasoning in

Iueck, and the court of appeals should have followed that

precedent in this case. Because the right to disability

benefits—like the right to accommodation of job-related

handicaps in this case—derived from the collective bargain-

ing agreement, questions as to the employer’s conduct and

motivation were not sufficiently independent of the con-

tract to avoid §301 pre-emption.

Several other courts have considered the impact of

Lueck and Lingle on state law claims relating to the

motivation or state of mind with which employers or

unions dealt with matters derived from collective bargain-

ing agreements. See, e.g., Jackson v. Southern California

Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 645-646 (9th Cir. 1989); Douglas

v. American Information Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d

565, 570-573 (7th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Anheuser Busch,

Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1989); Newberry v. Pacific

Racing Ass’n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1148-1150 (9th Cir. 1988);

Nash v. AT & T Nassau Metals, 581 S.E.2d 206, 208-210

ait.

(S.C. 1989). All of these cases held that claims alleging

that an employer’s conduct was outrageous or amounted

to intentional infliction of emotional distress were pre-

empted by §301. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in

Douglas (877 F.2d 571-572) is typical:

While the “extreme and outrageous” character of

certain sorts of employer conduct may be evident

without reference to the terms of a collective b

ing agreement, * * * the conduct that [the plaintiff]

must prove to be “extreme and outrageous” in order

to assert successfully her claim concerns directly the

terms and conditions of employment. * * * [S]uch

matters are governed by the collective bargaining

agreement.

See also Nash v. AT & T Nassau Metals, 381 S.E.2d at

209-210 (“The crux of Nash’s claim for outrageous eonduct

stems from an allegation that [his employer] deliberately

and willfully set about a course of conduct to deprive him

of his benefits and terminate his employment. * * * Be-

cause [the employer’s] conduct in carrying out the agree-

ment constitutes the core of this action, we do not believe

a court can interpret the possible outrageousness of [the

employer’s] actions without examining the collective bar-

gaining agreement’’).

Similarly, in this case Chrysler’s state of mind (i.e., its

motivation) cannot be interpreted without examining the

UAW contract. The court of appeals’ conclusion that

Chrysler’s state of mind is an independent issue and is

thus not pre-empted by §301 directly conflicts with the de-

cisions of the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits and the

South Carolina Supreme Court that claims relating to an

employer’s state of mind in dealing with matters ultimate-

ly grounded in a union ec tract are pre-empted. This

Court should grant the petition to resolve that conflict

and to make it clear, as it held in Lueck, that such ques-

tions of motivation must be resolved under §301.

i

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM H. CRABTREE JAMES D. HOLZHAUER *

Motor VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO

ASSOCIATION RICHARD A. SALOMON

7430 Second Avenue Mayer, Brown & P att

Suite 300 190 South LaSalle Street

Detroit, Michigan 48202 Chicago, Illinois 60603

(313) 872-4311 (312) 782-0600

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

* Counsel of Record

November 1989