Appendix — Woods v. Hudak, 110 S. Ct. 501 (1989) (No. 89-517)

FILED

sep 25 was

JR.

J08 CLERK

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

ROBERT WOODS,

Petitioner,

vs.

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

Respondent.

Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

VOLUME II

JOHN M. SILVESTRI, ESQ.

Attorney for Petitioner

828 Frick Building

437 Grant Street

Pittsburgh, PA 15219-6002

(412) 391-0958

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Page

Volume I

Opinion Of The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Third

Circuit, Per Higginbotham,

Stapleton And Rosenn, JJ... . A-1

Memorandum Opinion Of The United

States District Court For The

Western District Of

Pennsylvania Dated

October 1, 1987, Per

ROGONMDOFG, Je «© « © © © © « © « Aw55

Memorandum Opinion Of The United

States District Court For The

Western District Of -

Pennsylvania Dated

October 21, 1988, Per

Rosenberg, J. « « « «© « © « « « Aw~64

Opinion Of The United States

District Court For The Western

District of Pennsylvania

Dated December 22, 1988, Per

Rosenberg, J. « « © « © e-« « « A=/9

Volume II

Memorandum Opinion Of The United

States District Court For The

Western District Of

Pennsylvania Dated

January 9, 1989, Per

Rosenberg, J. . « « « © « « « « A=188

Ex Parte Motion For A Temporary

Restraining Order ...... . A-192

Stipulation for "Consent Order"

dated September 30, 1987

(Paragraphs 1-4 & 11-17). .. . A-203

- ja -

(Appendix - Continued) Page

Order Of The District Court Dated

Doewmer by Teer « 6 « « «© ec wl tw AHWHZO08

Dismissal Of The Bankruptcy Case

Dated November 30, 1987 . .. . A-210

Motion For Contempt Of March 31, ~

1988 (Paragraphs 1-64). ... . A-212

Motion For Contempt Of April 7,

1988. . * . + ° . . * e ° . . A-241

Motion To Dismiss Contempt

Proceedings ° ° . 7 . . . . . . A-247

Order Of The District Court Dated

October 21, 1988 Denying

Motion To Dismiss Contempt

Pemeeeeamee « «© + « 0 © «© « « Am254

Order Of The District Court Dated

December 22, 1988 Adjudicating

Contempt And Imposing

Additional Conditions On The

DO Sk sos « 6 «© « « « « « Aw25§

Order Of The District Court Dated

January 9, 1989 Disposing Of

Post-Trial Motions. ..... . A-269

Judgment Of The Court Of Appeals

Dated June 28, 1989 Affirming

The District Court With

ee ee ee ee ee Se 2A

Order Of The Court Of Appeals

Dated June 30, 1989

Amending The Judgment Of

wae mee CPE fe te le ltl el ltl wl wl ew AMR|73

NOTE: The misspellings of the district

court opinions are not corrected

herein.

she did not know a lot of things about

the business or the way to handle things

that have to be done; and that she lets

Woods handle it and she accepts wnat he

does (Id. at 73, 74, 108, 109).

Throughout her testimony, she was a

little less bitter towards her daughter,

Sharon, than towards her then son-

inlaw, the plaintiff. Her acrimony,

nevertheless, showed plainly her

innermost feelings. |

The evidence of Geraldine Woods,

sometimes known as G. Woods, is striking

because of her actual testimony and of

the manner in which she spoke and acted

on the witness stand, and specifically on

one occasion when she contemptuously

addressed this court’s deputy after my

court deputy instructed her to stay in

“the witness stand, as she tried to leave,

because she was stiil a sworn witness and

A - 139

cities

had not been excused by the court. The

deputy, Miss Paula Templeton, has been a

deputy in this court for many years and

is highly respected for her honesty and

honor. On one occasion, Miss Templeton

suddenly stood up, faced me on the bench

and excitedly said, "She just called me a

bitch." I then excused the witness, Mrs.

Woods, and after swearing Miss Templeton,

requested her to testify to the this

interrupting event. |

In defense, Mrs. Woods’ counsel

questioned her on the stand and she

testified that she only called the deputy

a witch. I do believe Miss Templeton and

I do not believe Mrs. Woods because of

her general demeanor and testimony while

on the stand; but even if she called Miss

Templeton a witch, it would still be

disrespectful and contemptuous to so

address a court official while doing her

A - 140

duty. It shows the manner of person Mrs.

Woods is when she used such antics in a

courtroom. Calling Miss Templeton either

a bitch or a witch made no difference

since either term was insulting and

contemptuous of her official authority by

a witness on the stand. It was this

attitude and demeanor which, expressed in

her own words, deteriorated her

credibility to the point of almost

collapse, except for the important

statements of actually testifying

against herself and her husband, such as

when she said she did not know anything

about her husband’s business and she

admitted that she and her husband

committed various acts against their

Gaughter due to her association with

Hudak (Id. at 12-15, 100-103).

Whether her ignorance in this

connection was feigned or real is

A- 141

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indicative of the fact that her husband,

Robert Woods, instead of being just the

manager of the business, as stated, was

in fact the owner and had control over

the assets in his wife’s name, or other

veiled names. While it seemed an

admission against interest - her interest

~- it was also a revelation of her wifely

functioning for her husband to conceal

his assets. This conclusion I have made

from her testimony as a whole and from

all the other evidence in the case

whereas here and there we find specimens

or volcanic outpourings such as already

indicated in the "bitch/witch" quote.

Thus while Mrs. Woods was, strictly

speaking, the plaintiff’s witness

because he called her, her testimony was

- neither in her nor her husband’s favor.

The defendant produced, as a part

of their defense, attorney John M.

A- 142

Silvestri, who testified to a scuffle

which occurred in the corridor outside a

Common Pleas’ courtroom after a judge had

held Hudak not guilty in a Wood’s

criminal prosecution used as an attack by

Woods. Silvestri was not a defendant in

the injunction, but was named as a party

in the contempt proceeding. Two

different versions were given, one by

Silvestri that he stood two feet away

from Woods and Hudak; that Hudak was the

aggressor and came towards Woods, and

made the assertion that Hudak had sexual

relations with Woods’ wife and Woods’

secretary, Heather; and that it appeared

that Woods spit in Hudak’s face.

Hudak’s recital is that when he

came out of the courtroom into the

corridor, he addressed Silvestri, Woods’

lawyer, out of the presence of Woods to

intercede for a reconciliation, but that

A - 143

Woods came up to him and called him a

"fucking pig face," and then when Hudak

allegedly returned a slurring remark,

Woods spit in Hudak’s face. Thereupon,

Hudak struck Woods defending himself

presumably, as any man would. After

Woods grappled with Hudak, they both fell

to the floor, and the sheriff separated

them both. There was no question that

Woods spit in Hudak’s face from testimony

by both Woods and Hudak witnesses, and

that Hudak then struck Woods.

The question of credibility

exists here between an out-of-court party

defendant-retained lawyer for Woods and

the plaintiff Hudak for the court to

consider and decide. This court studied

Silvestri’s demeanor and testimony on the

stand. Silvestri was an accommodating

lawyer turned witness. Through the short

period while on the stand and while he

A-~ 144 »

|

was not under heavy questioning, he

seemed to take pleasure in testifying

against Hudak. He sometimes said he did

not remember or his attitude seemed

evasive.

The plaintiff Hudak, on the other

hand, is a simple, highly emotionally

involved individual in this case, acting

as his own attorney. He has resen through

much and on frequent occasions, as of the

time of the altercation in the Common

Pleas’ corridor, was, it seemed to me,

attempting to get a clan of bears off his

back. It appears that was how he

addressed Mr. Silvestri. What followed

afterwards came from Hudak with an effort

to get even with Woods. When Woods

became irate and spit into Hudak’s face,

the striking afterwards was probably a

very human act even from an individual

A - 145

who had just been trying to bring about

peace. |

With this detailed resume of the

charges, defenses and all of the evidence

before me as a whole, I find and make

the following Findings of Fact:

that with some repetition of what

was contained in the previous opinion

that Robert Woods, the defendant, made

connection with Joseph E. Hudak who

recently had been admitted to the Bar and

made an agreement with him by which he

advanced him not $30,000 or $50,000 as

previously though but $80,000 as was late

revealed at this second hearing, for the

purpose of setting up a legal firm under

the name of Joseph E. Hudak;

that advertising would be used to

invite divorce and bankruptcy cases; that

over a period of a year, approximately

A - 146

1,000 divorce and bankruptcy cases were

procured by the advertising;

that Woods became a part and

parcel of the firm and engaged in his own

bankruptcy business of some sort and used

a part of the law premises as his office;

that Woods had free access to the files

and records of the law firm and exercised

as well some unrevealed participation in

the management of the Hudak law firm;

that the firm hired on Michael Ss.

Geisler as a lawyer to perform legal

duties in both bankruptcy and divorce

cases;

that Geisler received a basic

weekly amount plus a 10% commission;

that Geisler also brought cases

with him into the Hudak law firm and

continued to practice law °s an

individual and handled his own separate

bankruptcy and divorce cases with or

A - 147

without the knowledge of Hudak and

processed these in his own name from the

Hudak law office;

that Woods chose Hudak without

coercion and presumably fully

knowledgeable of his reputation,

character and characteristics as his

advertising divorce and bankruptcy

associated to whom he eventually

voluntarily turned over $80,000, without

visible security; |

that Woods exhibited, initially,

total friendship with no signs of ili

feelings or bitterness towards Hudak;

that during these many months,

approximately 1,000 bankruptcy and

divorce cases were acquired;

that the Hudak association hired

Attorney Geisler and others to process

these Hudak advertisingly procured cases;

A - 148

overlook the functioning of these

attorneys before the court in relation to

their clients in an adequate, proficient

and ethical manner. This action is one

of equity for federal court functioning

and for its judicial concern, as

presenting cause for the granting of

controlled injunctive relief.

As a prerequisite to the issuance

of a preliminary injunction, the

plaintiff must demonstrate "a reasonable

probability of eventual success on the

merits, "Continental Group, Inc. vy. Amoco

Chemical Corp., 614.F.2d 351, 36-357,

C.A.3, 1980; Delaware River Port

Authority v. Transamerica Trailer

Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, C.A.3,

1974; and “that it will be irreparably

injured pendente lite if relief is not

granted to prevent a change in the status

A - 60

Pictures Industries, Inc., 440 F.2d 761,

763, C.A.3, 1971. In addition, the

possibility of harm to other interested

parties resulting for the grant or denial

or preliminary relief, as well as the

public interest in general should be

taken into account. Delaware River Port

Auth., supra, at 920; Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania ex rel. Creamer v. U.S.

Dept. of Agriculture, 469 F.2d 1387, C.A.

3, 1972.

The standard for granting an

injunction involves a three-stage

inquiry. The initial question is whether

the plaintiffs have succeeded on the

merits of their claim. Beyond that, the

court must look to whether the balance of

equities favors the granting of

injunctive relief and what form the

injunctive remedy should take.

A - 61

wad sacle

Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org’n, v.

Q’Bannon, 525 F.Supp 1055, 1057 (E.D.

Pa., 1981); Prohorsky v. Prudential Ins.

Co. of America, 548 F. Supp. 1337

(N.D.Ind., 1984).

I find that irreparable harm has

already resulted to Hudak and his

clients, to the profession of lawyers,

and to the public at large; and that the

movant and plaintiff has no remedy at

law. I find that the plaintiff has a

more than reasonable probability of

eventual success on the outcome of the

case, on the basis of merit.

Accordingly, the stipulation and request

for a preliminary injunction by this

court will be granted.

The Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law as required by Rule 52

are contained herein in addition to the

A- 62

Cap

stipulation of facts filed by the parties

in this Memorandum. (1)

(1) Rule 52. Findings by the Court

"(a) Effect. In all actions tried

upon the facts without jury... the

court shall find the facts specially and

state separately the conclusions of law

thereon ... . If an opinion or

memorandum of decision is filed, it will

be sufficient if the findings and

conclusions of law appear therein."

A - 63

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

— he eee ee

Plaintiff,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. GEISLER )

and RICHARD O’ BRIAN )

)

Defendants. ) |

MEMORANDUM OPINION |

ROSENBERG, DISTRICT JUDGE

The defendant filed a Motion to

Dismiss this action and to dissolve an

injunction previously entered for the

following reasons: 1) that the plaintiff

failed to file briefs as the defendants

indicate were mandated by the court; 2)

that in part, the action is merely a

relitigation of a matter which was the

subject or a criminal prosecution in the

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas;

A - 64

and 3) that this court lacks jurisdiction

over this matter because it is grounded

in the pendency of a bankruptcy petition

which has since been dismissed.

As to the first contention that

the plaintiff failed to file briefs, the

defendant evidently is not cognizant of

the fact that briefs are not a matter of

record, but are only documents usually

requested by the court to aid the court

in defining facts and in presenting

authority which the court might desire.

In this case, the court actually saw no

need for briefs because it merely

suggested that if the parties wished to

file briefs, they could do so within

certain periods of time. That did not

make it mandatory for anyone to file

briefs and therefore, this contention is

without merit.

i i i i atl ie

As for the defendants’ contention

that this is now relitigation of what

occurred in the Common Pleas Court, that —

too is made to actions in the Court of

Common Pleas which involved the

plaintiff as brought by the defendant

Woods, there was nothing in the instant

case which relitigated anything which

occurred there. So, this contention

lacks merit.

As for the third contention that

this court has no jurisdiction for the

reasons which they set forth, the movants

again show a lack of knowledge of the

processes in which this case has arrived

in this court. The bankruptcy case was

originally filed in that court,

Bankruptcy No. 87-1851, as an

involuntary action brought by counsel,

Yaier YY. Lehrer, presenting the

invcluntary bankruptcy petition. The

A - 66

second matter in this action was the

bankruptcy adversary proceeding docket at

87-00356. The adversary proceeding was

brought before this court, as the docket

entries show, on September 16, 1987 as

motion for temporary restraining order

and this court withdrew the matter form

bankruptcy court and assigned to the

United States District court this

adversary proceeding. It stated "this

withdrawal is for the purpose of

correcting and modifying the same as an

appropriate action for a preliminary

injunction, Civil Action No. 87-1999,"

and was assigned to this judge in this

court. Jurisdiction was accepted,

received, retained by the court on

September 22, 1987, and still exists in

this court.

When the defendants in their

motion to dismiss set forth the fact that

A - 67

"this court lacks jurisdiction over this

matter in as much as the court’s original

jurisdiction was grounded on the pendency

of a bankruptcy petition which has long

since been dismissed" (Def. Motion to

Dismiss, p. 2 (11), they refer to Item 24

in the bankruptcy proceeding 87-1851

dated November 30, 1987, the stipulation

for the withdrawal of the bankruptcy

petition on behalf of Woods, signed on

November 30, 1987 modified December 2,

1987 and certified that "all creditors

had been advised of this motion to

dismiss." the case was dismissed and the

case is closed.

This court was not notified of

this action. It appears, given the

complicated nature of this case, that

perhaps all creditors of the Hudak law

firm were not properly notified in this

case and general averment or

A - 68

certification to this effect is

insufficient for this court.

The matter before me now involves

the alleged contempt of a preliminary

induneten entered by this court on

September 30, 1987. This court’s powers

of contempt are not’ limited by the

dismissal of the underlying action. The

District Court’s power to punish for |

contempt is inherent and includes the

bankruptcy courts. Preferred Surfacing,

Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 400

F.Supp 280 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Additionally, the defendant omits at

least one important fact evident to this

court upon inspection of the bankruptcy

records. The underlying bankruptcy

matter (87-1851) was not merely

dismissed; it was dismissed pursuant to

the stipulation for withdrawal of

bankruptcy petition on hehalf of G. Woods

A - 69

dated November 30, 1987. It would

certainly, in the least, be inequitable

for this court to allow any party to

attempt to defeat the provisions of a

preliminary injunction and avoid conterpt

by stipulation to a dismissal of another

matter.

“This court was not notified that

the parties stipulated to the withdrawal

of the related bankruptcy matter. It is

the belief of this court that the parties

may have consented to the withdrawal of

the underiying bankruptcy matter

illegally and may have perpetrated fraud

on this court by failure to notify this

court of its intention when all parties

~ had actual knowledge that this court had

taken jurisdiction of the adversary

matter relating to the bankruptcy.

When this court accepted this

case and acted in the issuance of a

A =- 70

temporary restraining order, it did so

also as a court of equity. With the aid

of the parties, the temporary

restraining order was eventually

converted into a preliminary injunction,

and thereafter, on October 1, 1988 into a

permanent injunction. Under these

circumstances, this court acted within

the jurisdiction granted in bankruptcy

statutes because the jurisdiction did not

supplant the statute providing that the

district curt of all civil actions

arising under the laws of the United

States, but merely supplemented that

statute; therefore, the statute

conferring upon the district court

original jurisdiction of all civil

actions arising under the laws of the

United States provides an additional,

independent basis for federal district

court’s jurisdiction in bankruptcy

A - 71

cases. A general order revesting :

original bankruptcy jurisdiction in the

district court, as was done in this case,

vest jurisdiction in the district judges

as district judges. (emphasis added.)

UNRB Industries. Inc., 725 F.2d 1111 (Ill.

1984). In any event, even if this action

has been precipitously processed before

an uninformed member of the bankruptcy ;

court as did occur, the dismissal of the

bankruptcy case does not mandate the

dismissal of all pending adversary

proceedings. Stardust Inn, Inc. vy. ‘

Doshi, 70 B.R. 888 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa.

1987). Further, even if the dismissal as

averred exists as indicated in the docket

of the bankruptcy proceeding, it would

matter little because the jurisdiction

granted to the bankruptcy court is broad

and nothing in the statute governing

jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court

A- 72

prohibits continuance of jurisdiction

over an adversary proceeding, which arose

in or was related to a bankruptcy case,

following dismissal of the underlying

bankruptcy case. in_re Pocklington, 21

B.R. 199 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal 1982). The

defendants by their motion to dismiss

attempt to sidetrack this case.

If the bankruptcy judge who

signed the dismissal order had been fully

informed and had known that the district

court had transferred and removed to that

court the adversary proceeding involving

the injunctive processes and hearings and

the work and time that the district court

had expended, it is doubtful that the

judge would have allowed withdrawal of

the bankruptcy case itself. Whether he

did or did not have knowledge, the

bankruptcy judge did not have

jurisdiction to overrule or take over

A= 73

itself any matter which a district court

judge was actively engaged in performing.

A bankruptcy court does not have such a

power and this court neither approved the

withdrawal of the bankruptcy action not

received notification of its removal, and

it would not have agreed to relinquish

its jurisdiction after the time involved

and the serious consequences that could

occur by an unthinkable action. To do

so, would be a waste of the time and

money for all involved in the injunctive

proceeding and the contempt hearings

which followed and would be an enormous

injustice to the plaintiff in this case

and to all related individuals who have

suffered immensely because they would

have been left in the same position as if

the injunctive proceeding had never been

brought, The hundreds of worried and

helpless divorce and bankruptcy cases

A- 74

would still be stranded by such an

insensitive and preposterous action.

Furthermore, it would only open the gates

to additional litigation in many ways by

many people including that of the

plaintiff himself.

Assuming, nevertheless, as a

matter of consideration, of which this

court does not approve, that the

withdrawal of the bankruptcy proceeding

on November 30, 1987, in the bankruptcy

court ended the dependent action of the

adversary matter taken over by this court

on October 1, 1987 when it issued a

permanent injunction, the defendant would

not be helped even by the bankruptcy

judges themselves. Even in the most

controversial of cases, In re

Pocklington, Supra, where a statement was

made that as a general rule dismissal of

a bankruptcy case results in the

A - 75

dismissal of all adversary proceedings

filed in that case, the Pocklington court

said that it did not follow that rule,

but instead retained jurisdiction over an

adversary proceeding without that

bankruptcy court, even though the

underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed.

That judge also noted that Section 349 of

the Bankruptcy Code clearly contemplates

continuation of jurisdiction in

appropriate circumstances. In another

case, In re Rush, 49 B.R. 158 (N.D. Ala.

1985), which held with the thinking of

the judge in Pocklington, the judge in

this case held that there was authority

that an adversary proceeding may have an

individual life after the closing of the

main bankruptcy case.

The majority of all the

bankruptcy cases hold as did the judge in

Stardust Inn. Inc., Supra, that "the

A - 76

court could retain jurisdiction over an

adversary proceeding although the main

bankruptcy case had been dismissed."

Since this court had informed and made

public as a matter of record that it

accepted jurisdiction in this adversary

proceeding, that it continues to act in

its regard and expended a large amount of

court time and research time, that it had

two hearings on it and did not reject or

deny its jurisdiction, but continues to

perform arduously the burden which it has

assumed in this injunctive proceeding as

an adversary bankruptcy matter, I cannot

permit it to be said than an uninformed

bankruptcy judge could possibly deprive

it of its jurisdiction. Accordingly,

this third basis for the dismissal of

this action before this court is

completely without merit.

A - 77

For all of the aforementioned

reasons, the motion of the defendants

will be denied.

A - 78

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

~~ ee ee ee

Plaintiff,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. )

GEISLER, and RICHARD )

O’ BRIAN )

Defendants. )

OPINION

ROSENBERG, DISTRICT JUDGE

This action came to me as acting

Miscellaneous judge while the members of

the District Court and Bankruptcy Court

attended a judicial conference in

Philadelphia, It came as an adversary

proceeding related to a bankruptcy case

which had been initiated on July 15, 1987

by Yaier Y. Lehrer, Esq. on behalf of

creditors, against Joseph E. Hudak, an

attorney.

A- 79

er

When I saw that possible harm was

being done not only to the plaintiff, but

to a multitude of innocent clients who

had paid money to have bankruptcy and

divorce cases filed and processed, and

with possible disrepute and harm to the

legal profession and the courts, I

accepted the matter as a district court

action with equitable concerns and powers

and accepted jurisdiction of the case for

the purpose of seeing that public justice

was done.

The instant determination which I

am called upon to adjudicate and enforce

is required because of a series of

motions, two emotion-filled and

unmethodical hearings, the first of which

produced an unproductive set of

stipulations between the parties which

enabled me to arrive at an injunctive

Order of Court, the basis for the charges

A - 80

of contempt and the foundation for this

court’s present jurisdiction and

authoritative actions.

This instant matter is presently

before me for civil contempt, after the

injunctive order dated october 1, 1987

and after a series of petitions or

motions by the plaintiff complaining of

violations of the injunctive Order, and

then after a hearing thereon for the

purpose of determining whether the

enjoined parties were recalcitrant and in

contempt of the Order of Court dated

October 1, 1987.

During the first hearing, partial

evidence was presented, but the parties

through their counsel stipulated to an

accepted injunction. Some skirmish and

delay of time was caused by one of the

attorneys for Woods, but eventually

through in-chamber conferences and

A - 61

outside agreements, the parties submitted

a proposed stipulation for approval by

this court. When eventually the matter

was presented to me, I approved the

September 30, 1987, stipulation with the

Clarifications by Order of Court dated

October 1, 1987.

The Injunctive Order appeared to

quiet the scene and to conciliate the

parties by their own peacemaking. On

March 31, 1988 and again on April 8,

1988, the plaintiff filed motions for

contempt of court for the failure of the

defendants and others to obey the

stipulated and injunctive command of

October 1, 1987. The petition was filed

to compel recalcitrant prime parties and

others to cease and desist their harmful

action against the plaintiff, Joseph E.

Hudak, his wife and children and to stop

them from interfering with his business

A - 82

and personal life, by enforcing the

performance ot the undertakings to which

they agreed in the stipulated series of

understandings incorporated into the

Injunctive Order of Court dated October

1, 1987, and to stop all harassment and

free the plaintiff and others related to

him from punishing and harmful

annoyances.

All litigation with few

exceptions can ever be said to be devoid

of some sort of emotion and antipathy

between the parties or witnesses.

However, the character of this case

requires more details than does the

ordinary action, because of the almost

dramatic theme which it portrays and

projects. Accordingly, the required

recital of details seems to make this

opinion over-long. It should, however,

present a panoramic understanding upon

A - 83

which credibility and factfinding have

been more reliably ascertained.

The plaintiff Hudak did not

originally seek damages, but only that

the defendants perform civilly in

accordance with their original

undertakings. This instant matter is now

before me not for the purpose of

\

vindicating the court’s authority. G& Cc.

Merriam Co. vy. Webster Dictionary Co.,

inca, . 639 F.2d 29 (lst Cir. 1980).

Civil contempt sanctions are remedial.

Id. The parties themselves stipulated to

the injunction, and the purpose of civil

contempt is to compel obedience to

enforce the rights of parties to the

action. In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027 (2nd

Cir. 1979), cert. den., Dibapi v.

Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). There are

two forms of civil contempt sanctions.

The first is a coercive contempt sanction

A- 84

which looks to the future and is designed

to aid the plaintiff by bringing a

defiant party into compliance with a

court order. The second is a

compensatory sanction which seeks to

compensate the plaintiff through payment

of money for damages cause by past acts

of disobedience. U.S. v. Basil Inv.

Corp., 528 F. Supp 1225 (Ed PA 1981). It

is clear that it is the first form of

civil contempt with which the plaintiff

is concerned, but this court must also

determine, not that the plaintiff be

compensated, but that others be protected

compensatorily, if only in procuring the

results contemplated by the injunctive

Order of Court.

The plaintiff in this case,

Joseph E. Hudak, newly admitted to the

Bar, was immediately drawn into an

_ association with one Robert Woods, one of —

A- 85

the defendants. While the events in the

case first showed an unsecured "loan" of

$30,000 or $50,000 to Hudak by Woods, it

later appears that the sum total was

actualiy $80,000. The purpose of the

loan was to establish an advertising

attorneys’ office for procuring divorce

and bankruptcy cases on a high-volume

scale. The advertising was successful,

not only in Allegheny County, but in

other counties of the Commonwealth, with

the filing of divorce cases in Cameron

County.

Approximately 1,000 cases were

received by the Hudak law association and

Hudak hired an attorney, one Michael S.

Geisler, a defendant in this case, and

another individual, William C. Bartley,

was named as the office manager.

Previously, Bartley had resigned from the

bar of Pennsylvania because of his

A - 86

ai lal

involvement in a felony. in the

association with Hudak in The Bigelow,

Woods had an office in the Hudak law

association and personally and actively

engaged in a mortgage business of some

kind, in the Hudak set-up. Woods also

had total access to all records of the

office and was obviously a meaningful

participant in the newly created law

office in Hudak’s name. It is not known

exactly how active Woods was from the

evidence: before me, but sufficient

evidence that he was active kept coming

in piecemeal.

The business, however did go well

because the number of cases which came in

was beyond the capacity of the members

of the organization. Hudak, himself, was

stated to be the one in control, but it

is apparent that he was a newly admitted

attorney with no experience. He knew

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very little about law and legal

procedure, especially, in divorce

procedure and bankruptcy.

By Geisler’s own testimony, it

appears that he was the one who knew more

about procedure because he had carried on

his own business before coming into the -

Hudak organization and continued with his

own business while in the Hudak

organization. However, he participated

in a share of the Hudak organizations’

proceeds. Geisler was hired on a

commission basis and was to receive a

base salary of $375.00 per week, plus a

10% commission of income from all cases

(TR of 6-14-88 Hearing, DC #44, p. 234-

235). The evidence is clear by his own

testimony that he was a personally,

money~interested associate in this law

combination.

A- 88

For approximately one year, the

relationship between Woods and Hudak was

unassailable. Where amity and close

business relationships existed, problems

began and Hudak threw Woods out of their

shared offices. As a result, Woods

became so displeased that in August,

1987, he started a systematic avalanche

upon Hudak’s activities intended to

destroy Hudak, his law business, his

clients and all who associated with him;

and Woods even began to inflict suffering

and obstructions to his own daughter and

grandchildren. At first, Woods withdrew

files of cases by the aid of Geisler and

others. Woods began a campaign of

communicating with the clients concerning

the disreputability and criminality of

Hudak, and creating dissatisfactions by

clients, creditors and business

associates, and causing sufficient

A- 89

provocations in them to make grievance

charges to the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court’s Grievance Commission, as well, on

a wholesale scale.

Woods either directly or

indirectly made charges to the

Disciplinary Board in a series of

complaints. In essence, these were

created personally and by the instigation

of Woods through the actions of others to

cause a collapse of the Hudak law firm

and of the cases taken in by Hudak, Woois

and Geisler, while they were in

association. Edward Burkhardt, an

assistant disciplinary counsel at the

Disciplinary Board, was invoked by the

defendants or some of them to act as

their investigator by furnishing him with

targeted information regarding Hudak’s

personal and business activities and

spurring Burkhardt to the point where he

A - 90

became an acting personal prosecutor

against Hudak.

Hudak charged that Woods filed

four "meritless" lawsuits against him;

that Woods filed four "meritless" actions

against his then, to-be-wife, Sharon

Lavelle; that Woods filed charges, and

made telephonic communication to his

daughter, Sharon; that he made constant

telephonic harassments to Hudak |

directly; that Woods brought charges

against Hudak for drunken stuper and

terroristic threats, felonies, thefts and

rape; that in early 1988, Woods called

‘various clients of the plaintiff and

advised them to make criminal charges

against Hudak before both the Allegheny

. County District Attorney and the Attorney

General; that Woods telephoned known

creditors and gave them Hudak’s and

Sharon’s private home telephone numbers

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and urged them to telephone and write

Hudak at Sharon’s home where they

received numerous communications; that

Woods provided creditors with the

telephone number of Anthony Guida, an

attorney at Buchanan Ingersoll, who was

working on a case against Hudak and

advised creditors to make contact with

Guida regarding Hudak; that Woods and his

agents or associates telephoned creditors

| to make calls to Robert O. Lampl who was

the attorney for Hudak; that Woods

continued to contact creditors informing

them of telephone numbers for the office

and the home of Hudak to have them make

telephonic approaches; that on several

occasions, Woods spat in Hudak’s face,

once across counsel table in a |

magistrate’s office and once in the

corridor of the Common Pleas court; that

Woods procured his employee, Richard

A= 92

O’Brian to make telephone calls to Hudak

and pretend to be clients making the

telephone calls; that both Woods and

O’Brian called Hudak on the telephone and

shouted obscenities at him on

approximately 20 occasions from December,

1987 to January, 1988; that in February,

1988, Woods’ employee O'Brian, followed

Hudak in the Common Pleas’ corridor

behind him and muttered obscenities as he

followed him; that at times during this

period, Woods when he saw Hudak would

follow him and yell obscenities drawing

the attention of those surrounding Hudak;

that Woods interfered with Sharon’s

domestic life by telephoning her

grandmother who is Woods’ mother-in-law

to stop her from babysitting Sharon’s

children; that Woods threatened the

younger sister of Sharon with the >

withdrawal of funds to attend school if

A= 93

she associated with Sharon; that Woods

also disowned another sister because she

associated with Hudak; that Woods

communicated with the headmaster at the

school where Sharon’s children’s

attended and made vile, disparaging

remarks against the children’s mother,

Sharon Lavelle, in November and December,

‘1987, and that Woods caused O’Brian to

shadow Sharon and her young children.

The plaintiff charges Michael S.

Geisler with aiding Woods in filing false

and baseless disciplinary charges; that

he represented Woods in actions against

Hudak in the Pennsylvania Superior and

Supreme Courts and the United States

District Court in the Southern District

of New York by submitting documents and

evidence which were blatantly false;

that Geisler procured fees to which Hudak

was entitled for cases which Hudak had

A- 94

already paid Geisler; that Geisler

procured various clients of Hudak and

induced them to demand their fees back

from Hudak and hire Geisler and pay those

fees to Geisler; that in procuring

another association of attorneys with

himself, the disbarred William C. Bartley

and Woods, Woods commenced a new

advertising legal association and

undercut Hudak to make him unable to

function as a lawyer; that Geisler used

Burkhardt in combination with Geisler to

procure various witch-hunts against Hudak

for the purpose of discrediting him as a

lawyer; that in this combination of

Geisler and Burkhardt, Geisler fabricated

certain information which Burkhardt used

against Hudak; that he expended certain

Hudak trust funds for personal use

instead of for their original use of

paying costs for continuing the Hudak

A- 95

eT a a

cases; that Geisler misused a number of

funds paid to him by Hudak pursuant to

the injunctive order for use of payment

of costs for the cases which Hudak had

turned over to him for Hudak business,

and expended this for his own business;

that Geisler never kept a trust fund in

which to pay or account for funds given

to him as he should have done, and

especially in making monthly reports as

required by the injunctive Order; that

Woods through his attorney filed a

petition in bankruptcy -in order to avoid

responsibility in paying incurred

obligations for which Hudak had turned

over funds; that Geisler failed to

prosecute over 300 cases pursuant to the

Order of Court and for which Hudak paid

him costs; and the Geisler failed to give

Hudak progress reports of work done as

provided by the Order of Court.

A- 96

_~

The charges against Edward A.

Burkhardt are that Burkhardt, while he

was not an original defendant, associated

himself with Woods, knew what the

injunction restrained and was familiar

with all the money matters relating to

Hudak, but nevertheless, he was used by

Woods as an investigator for state

matters and to fabricate evidence against

Hudak; that he worked in concert with

Geisler in procuring fabricated evidence

against Hudak; and that while acting with

Woods, Burkhart performed various times

in violation of the injunction.

Hudak charges that William Cc.

Bartley knew about the injunctive

conditions enacted by this court, but

nevertheless, acted in concert with Woods

and Geisler, as a contact and aided them

in violations charged by Hudak.

A- 97

Yaier Y. Lehrer,.as a defendant

attorney, is charged by Hudak as a

conspirator with Woods and others rather

than just acting as counsel for Woods in

filing barratrous actions and other

matters to harass Hudak; and that he also

acted to aid Woods in foreclosing

coercively on Sharon’s home on Beechwood

Boulevard in Pittsburgh.

The plaintiff charges that John

M. Silvestri, one of the defense

attorneys, had full notice of this

court’s Order of Court in the injunctive

proceeding and was Woods’ attorney in

filing barratrous lawsuits including a

replevin; that he wrote letters for Woods

who made them available to the

Disciplinary Board, the District

Attorney’s office and his daughter,

Sharon; and that in the replevin pro-

ceedings, he threatened former a Hudak

A- 98

secretary with jail to coerce her into

testifying.

This is a brief summation of the

charges contained in the Motion for

Contempt and is not presented here for

the purpose of assuming they are factual

since only some were proven. Rather,

they are entiinnes nace ten the purpose

of showing the scenic and emotional

background which prevailed during a

period of time beginning in August, 1987

and still prevailing at the present time.

With the large number of averments by the

plaintiff in the pleadings and the wide

array of charges, to prove them all would

require a host of witnesses and exhibits.

All that this court required was to have

sufficient evidence to Convince it that

credible evidence has been presented to

make out a case of the plaintiff’s right

to a remedy. The plaintiff here

A = 99

attempted to bring in proof by his

questioning of the adverse witnesses. To

a large degree, he did succeed in

producing basic proof through these

witnesses because of their unrestrained

show of hostility towards the plaintiff.

While he fell short of producing proof of

all his averments, he did show sufficient

proof for a valid and solid base from

which the court has ample credible

evidence for making necessary findings of

fact that the stipulated injunctive order

of court of October 1, 1987 was

disregarded and violated, by whom and to

what extent, as to be in contempt of this

court.

Some charges were proven

evidentially by witnesses and to a large

extent by the defendants themselves and

their witnesses. Uncommon attraction was

drawn by the defendant Woods when he

A - 100

testified loudly and volumously in the

injunction hearing. He did not, however,

testify or deny any of the evidentiary

statements made by Hudak or the other

witnesses since he did not testify at all

at the second contempt hearing, although

he was highly observable by his unsettled

actions in the courtroom, hopping from

chair to chair at the rear of the

counsel table and to the rear of the

courtroom when any of his attorneys move

back to talk to someone. His facial

contortions were undoubtedly intended to

show his feelings and he did not

hesitate to make at the counsel table

audible vocal retorts reflecting his

thoughts or feelings. On one occurrence,

at the contempt hearing, while Woods’

wife, Geraldine Woods, was on the stand

and Hudak was questioning her, my law

clerk jumped to the bench and exclaimed

A- 101

that she heard Woods call Hudak a goof.

I immediately stopped the questioning of

the witness and excused her and had my

law clerk sworn to testify. I

questioned her and she made the statement

that she had overheard Woods direct the

name "goof" at Hudak when he was in the

front of the bar. She testified that

Woods was looking in the direction of

Hudak, and uttered only one word: "Goof"

(TR of 06-16-88 Hearing, DC #34, pp 89-

_ 93). Woods made no sworn denial. So, I

permitted his counsel to contradict or

correct the testimony of my law clerk.

Their defense was that Woods was talking

to his counsel only, and any remarks he

made at the counsel table were only for

counsel’s ears (TR of 06-16-88 Hearing,

DC #34, pp 89-93). Woods made no sworn

denial. So, I permitted his counsel to

contradict or correct the testimony of my

A - 102

ae ee

law clerk. Their defense was that Woods

was talking to his counsel only, and any

remarks he made at the counsel table were

only for counsel’s ears (TR of 06-16-88

Hearing, DC #35, pp 2-9). The

unfortunate thing was that the remark did

not go only to counsel’s ears, but it

went farther so that his remark from the

back of the counsel table went to the bar

of the court. It was heard by my alert

law clerk. I have no hesitancy in giving

her full credibility for her testimony.

Prior to this, Woods was specifically

warned that his behavior was unacceptable

(TR of 6-9-88 Hearing, DC #36, p. 74-78).

Thereupon, I held Woods in civil

contempt of court and stated that the

imposition of sanctions would be dealt

with at a later time. The case resumed

after that. This incident is recited

here only for the purpose of showing some

A - 103

of the characteristic behavior of the

defendant Woods in the courtroom while

the case was in progress.

It is interesting to note that

Wood’s attorney, Lehrer, in his

testimony, did admit that "well, I have

heard Mr. Woods say to me that Mr. Hudak

is a pigface" (Id. at 6). This court

considers this evidence, not for the

purpose of showing the truth of this

utterance, but rather to show Woods’

attitude toward Hudak. See Hunter v.

Alles Chalmers Corporation, 797 F.2d

1417 (7th Cir. 1986).

To determine credibility, this

court observed all actions occurring

during testimony and scrutinized the

demeanor of all the witnesses. This was

necessary in order to make Findings of

Fact about the things which occurred as

testified to by the witnesses. Because

A - 104

of this, I deem it appropriate to

elaborate upon the appearance and

findings which I have made from the

evidence as a whole.

This is once case which in all

the years I have presided in many

thousands of federally processed matters

that intrigued me by the very air which

pervaded the case. There were many

witnesses who were forthrightly honest

and I believed what they recited, but

some were knowingly or unknowingly

contaminated by the influence, either

Girectly or indirectly, of the defendant

Woods or his agents.

The first witness called by the

plaintiff, Anita Henry, was gospelly

honest. She was a young lady who had no

acquaintance with any of the parties or

witnesses and was employed as an inside

sales telemarketing representative for a

A - 105

management consulting company, GMW

Technologies, Suite 200, Lawyers

Building. Her testimony was simple and

to the point. She testified that she

happened to be in the closed, moving

upward elevator going to work when Woods

physically attacked Hudak without cause.

Anita Henry testified that she was

employed in an office located in the

Lawyers Building on Forbes Avenue in

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On April 7,

1987, she stepped into the elevator where

Hudak was already present. She said that

Woods also came onto the elevator and

initially she assumed they knew each

other since it seemed that Woods was

joking around with Hudak when he grabbed

Hudak’s nose. Prior to her exiting the

elevator on the second floor, she stated

that Woods started calling Hudak a

rapist. She then stepped off the

A - 106

elevator to go to her office and that

both Woods and Hudak came "barrelling"

after her (TR of 6-14~88 Hearing, DC

#39, p 22) into her office suite. She

asked both Woods and Hudak to leave when

they followed her into the suite. At

this point, Woods kept insisting that

Hudak was a rapist and that she should be

aware of this fact. At that point, she

asked the secretary to cali security and

Hudak then called "911" (Police

Emergency Number). She further testified

that Hudak was pushed into her by Woods

and she went through the door, presumably

her office door. Henry testified that

Woods repeatedly called Hudak a rapist

and that Hudak’s nose was bleeding as a

result of Woods grabbing him by the ose

(Id. at 24). The witness testified that

she had never seen either Hudak or Woods

prior to this incident and she learned of

A - 107

eect

Hudak’s name only because she was there

when the police report was made.

Her testimony reaffirmed the

volatile nature of the defendant Woods,

as this court saw and heard him in action

when he volcanically exploded in court at

the injunctive hearing on September 21,

1987, while on the witness stand. That

was an uncommon demonstration of temper

and acrimony towards the plaintiff,

Hudak. Examples of what he said in his

testimony show how deeply set was his

antagonism toward the plaintiff. In

answer to a direct question by Hudak,

Woods replied, "I told Bonnie you (Hudak)

are nuts and I’m apraid for her insanity.

And I said, if you don’t believe me, ask

anyone who’s associated with him, except

my daughter, that you are, that you are

nuts. And you are nuts even making that

statement. You’re crazier that I thought

A - 108

that this association hired

office help and set up an office with

furnishings in The Bigelow building in

downtown Pittsburgh;

that due to business differences

and inappropriate behavior on the part of

Woods, Hudak ousted Woods from the

office;

that, thereupon, Woods began a

systematic method of undermining Hudak;

that Hudak and Woods’ daughter,

Sharon Lavelle, had become personally

interested in each other and eventually

were married;

that Hudak moved into a home

owned by his wife Sharon on Beechwood

Boulevard in Pittsburgh;

that Sharon is a Registered Nurse

and regularly employed;

that Woods had previously helped

A - 149

Sharon to make the monthly mortgage

payments on her home;

that Woods has also paid tuition

for Sharon’s children at a private

school ;

that Woods enticed Geisler from

the Hudak firm and helped Geisler create

a new advertising law firm in competition

with Hudak;

that Geisler extracted a large

number of case files from Hudak’s file

room during the period when the new

Geisler firm was being set up in friendly

relationship with Woods; that Woods

systematically began to attack the Hudak

law firm to disintegrate it, and to

destroy Hudak’s ability to function

legally or personally;

that Woods systematically began

to attack his own daughter, Sharon, as a

part of his plan to undermine Hudak;

A - 150

that during the course of the

entire bombardment, Woods aided by

Geisler, O’Brien and others incessantly

notified clients of Hudak’s failure to

perform, but not of Woods own

contributions in causing Hudak’s failure

to perform;

that Woods and Geisler notified

officers of the Pennsylvania Disciplinary

Board of the mass failure of Hudak to

perform his duties towards his clients ‘

which were acquired while advertising

with Geisler’s and Woods’ aid;

that Woods and Geisler notified

creditors of Hudak’s inability to pay

them;

that Woods, Geisler and O’Brien

sought to variously disable Hudak from

performing legal business or any other

business, or from seeing clients;

A- i351

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that Woods sought to bring

disrepute to Hudak when he procured

intermediate employment; ;

that Woods instigated the

mortgagee of his daughter’s home on

Beechwood Boulevard to foreclosure

proceedings to make it more difficult for

her with her income as a registered nurse

to keep up the payments on the Beechwood

Boulevard home;

that Woods alienated the

affections of a sister of Sharon and

another of his daughters, and coerced

Sharon’s grandmother to stop babysitting

for Sharon as she had previously done;

that Woods stopped tuition

payments for and attempted to discredit

the standing of Sharon’s children at

their school by making certain

deleterious reports to the neadeaster of

the children’s school;

A - 152

+ RE SD a

WP me

that Woods had placed telephone

calls to Sharon at work to harass her and

also place numerous telephone calls to

her home, where there was a private,

unlisted telephone number; and that this

bombardment by Woods and Geisler has

stopped case processing and that, as

such, Woods and Geisler have interferred

with the lives of hundreds of innocent

and worried bankruptcy and divorce

litigants.

I find specifically that the

injunctive Order of Court dated October

1, 1987 has been intentionally and ™ :

contemptuously breached by the defendant

Woods, the defendant Geisler, and the

defendant O’Brien and also by others to a

much lesser comparative degree.

Therefore, it is incumbent upon this

court to hold them guilty of contempt of

A - 153

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court and to deal with them as contemnors

according to the requirements of law.

It is observable that on one

side, Woods’ associates contains a number

of lawyers, one of whon, acieler, has had

business connections with him before and

since his withdrawal from Hudak with a

large number of Hudak’s divorce and

bankruptcy files, and others in legal

representative capacities. On the other

side, was Hudak, his wife and children,

with even Hudak’s attorney, Lampl,

abandoning him while the trial was in

process. It is observable that no

bombardment has been instituted against

any of the defendants. The avalanche of

persecution is in one direction from the

defedant Woods towards Hudak, his wife

and their children. It has been that way

since approximately August 1987, and

continued without letup in defiance of

A - 154

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aes cA a AA be * te ee halk RS Hide tall BE Sp

the stipulated injunctive Order of Court

of October 1, 1987.

= The contemnors cannot challenge

the injunction because it is of their own

making and they have neither respected

nor honored it. Instead, the defendants

Woods and Geisler openly led the others

into a gross defiance of its existence

and so mocked this court’s authority.

This defiance was plainly shown by Woods

in the courtroom at both hearings, on and

off the witness stand. Especially this

was displayed when he was adjudged guilty

of a specific civil contemptuous action

while this court was in the process of

hearing a sworn witness in the midst of

her testifying while on the witness

stand. Thus, they continue their

contemptuous actions and attitudes up to

present time.

A - 155

Wo Bele a Gi it tee i ile SP,

wo tanto eS

are

Cheek dist incl: Ko

The quality of the contempts of

the defendants differs. The attorneys

retained by Woods are performing

legally. It is not for me to decide

whether they are performing ethically.

That duty belongs to a special part of

the Commonwealth Judicial Branch and I

must leave it there.

I find these facts in the main

and while there are additional findings

which may be made, what I find here is

overly sufficient for me to make a

determination in this case.

From all the testimony as a

whole, it is not often that intra-

familial enmity and hostility occur to

the point where sometimes members of a

family become desirous of destroying

those with whom they have broken.

Fortunately, this does not occur very

often, but when it does, it is a sad

A - 156

iii ee Se Rn bute igd eA Cee ae

occurrence that human beings can be so

vituperative and destructive. It is not

the duty of this court here to be

concerned about cementing family

relationships. It is an element in this

case which aids the court in seeing where

credibility or lack of credibility lies

and in arriving at Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law consistent will all

_the evidence in the case as a whole, from

what has occurred in the courtroom and of

the demeanor of the parties including the

lawyers in the processing of the case.

After the contempt hearing, the

plaintiff Hudak filed on September 1,

1988 another motion for the procurement

of a citation of contempt against Robert

Woods, Michael Geisler and Richard

O’Brian.: In this motion, the plaintiff

cites the following charges: 1) that

Woods brought wrongful criminal charges

a ~ 357

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i

.

}

against Hudak before Judge Manning in

Common Pleas Court causing him much

embarrassment and annoyance after which

Hudak was found not guilty; 2) that Woods

instigated calls to a former client to

malign Hudak; 3) that Woods continued to

malign Hudak to Hudak’s new employer

after Hudak procured a position with

another law firm; 4) that at the behest

of Woods, O’Brian filed a lawsuit

charging Sharon Lavelle Hudak with

Slander; 5) that Woods filed another

four-count lawsuit against Hudak for

malpractice; and 6) that Woods procured

an attorney to deliver to Hudak’s wife,

Sharon, and her sister Kathy a letter

stating that "they and their issue would

be specifically disinherited."

On September 7, 1988, Hudak filed

still another motion for contempt and

charged that: 1) Michael Geisler sent a

A - 158

—— eo ee ee eee ee

letter of annoyance to cause trouble for

a member of the law firm where Hudak was

employed; 2) the law firm where Hudak was

employed receiving annoying telephone

calls from two former clients of Hudak

who stated that they received an

anonymous telephone call telling them to

place the calis to anhe complaints about

Hudak; and 3) the law firm where Hudak is

employed received telephone calls from

persons who refused to identify

themselves uttering obscenities toward

Hudak.

Another motion for contempt was

filed by Hudak on October 5, 1988. In

this motion, the plaintiff avers that the

defendants totally destroyed the public

image of the plaintiff and that this was

shown by Channel 11, a Pittsburgh

television station, on September 20, 1988

broadcasting sensationalized and

A - 159

incorrect facts castigating the plaintiff

for failure to complete hundreds of

divorce cases. The plaintiff Hudak avers

that the defendant fomented the

television stations interests; that

Geisler still has not provided Hudak with

a report of the progress of the cases he

was required to process; that Woods and

persons working for Woods are interfering

with the personal lives of Hudak, his

wife and their children and further

“caused enormous harm to the public and

continues to do so in violation of this

injunctive Court Order."

The next motion was filed on

October 13, 1988 and avers that an

incident occurred in which insults and

obsencenities were shouted across the

street at the plaintiff while he was

antering the City-County Building to

represent a client and that in this

A - 160

a

seneesu 52 meme iced stadia aia

disturbance on the heavily populated

street, Woods rushed across the street

shouting all sorts of obscenities that

Hudak is a "rapist," "scum" and

“pigface;" that Woods continued to do so

within the building itself; and that this

interfering with Hudak’s business

violates the Order of this court dated

October 1, 1987.

The most recent motion filed by

Hudak was on December 6, 1988 and he

charges that: 1) the defendants started a

mass mailing of letters to Hudak clients

causing these clients to complain about

Hudak to the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia

offices of Hyatt Legal Services which

employs Hudak; 2) about November 14,

1988, the defendants resuscitated a

telephone campaign of the creditors of

the Hudak law firm to pursue Hudak at his

place of employment; 3) that defendant

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Dette ea oe Bd

O’Brien is pursuing a baseless defamation

case against Hudak’s wife, Sharon; 4)

that Woods using Geisler as his attorney

filed two complaints in Common Pleas

court charging that Hudak violated a

lawyer’s obligation to treat client files

and papers confidentially and that he

failed to return certain documents and

business records to Woods; 5) that Hudak

alleges "barratrous motions practice"

for the purpose of harassing Hudak; 6)

that Geisler presented a motion for

sanctions against Hudak because Hudak

falsely billed Woods $150/hr.; 7) that

Geisler filed a motion that Hudak had 100

suits filed against him and that Hudak

evaded these suits by avoiding service of

process by setting up a post office box

and refusing to take the certified mail.

At this point, Hudak questions how

Geisler knew about these suits, even if

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it were true, which Hudak denies, unless

Geisler had contacted these people; and

8) Geisler has made false blatant

accusations.

These follow-up motions also

repeat some of the averments made in the

original motion for contempt. After

examining them, I am struck with the

absurdity of such matters as are raised

in these motions and conclude that no

hearings are necessary to give plaintiff

the opportunity to prove them or the

defendant the opportunity to disprove

them. The charges being made in all of

these motions are in themselves evidence

that all is not going well between those

who entered into an agreement and a

stipulated injunctive order which this

court adopted accordingly on October 1,

1987. Even as a matter of surmising, I

cannot take them as factual, but I am

A - 163

struck with the knowledge that as things

are going, they could inferentially

continue as I heard them at both hearings

of this case to demoralize Hudak and

Hudak’s wife, Sharon.

The incidents as averred in these

additional motions are not much more or

different than what had already been

averred and heard before this court

during the original injunctive hearing

and the subsequent contempt hearing.

Therefore, it is not necessary for this

court to hold any further hearings on

these subsequent motions because of the

similarity of the averments of the

incidents and circumstances.

This action is being tried by the

parties with such dynamic force as to

show a conspiracy led by Robert Woods,

and joined with Michael Geisler and

Richard O’Brian, they have been able to

A - 164

procure the aid of lawyers and others to

form a lop-sided attack against a young

inexperienced lawyer, who did not use

good common sense variously in his

dealings with the defendants, especially

with the defendant Woods. It was this

lack of experience which helped to place

him in this inextricable predicament of

being the object who will continue to be

persecuted until he is either driven from

the earth or to unknown places with his

wife and children.

Because Hudak was inexperienced

and permitted himself to be placed in the

predicament in which he finds himself, it

does not mean that he must be left there

by the courts. When he comes to the

courts, as he does in this particular

instance, he should not be turned away.

The fact that he is foolishly to blame

for certain minor matters does not mean

A - 165

ro

7. eee es oe se

that others who are to blame should not

be held accountable. That is a fact and

I so find. Hudak did not breach the

injunction Order of Court of October 1,

1987. The defendants, Woods, Geisler and

O’Brien, I find, did breach it, and

therefore, they are the culprits with

whom this court must deal. There are

other reasons why this court must act for

a just and final termination. The set of

circumstances presented to this court,

if left alone will continue unjustly

against many people. The many hundreds

of litigants, completely blameless,

continue to be left stranded if this

court does not act. Another reason is

that the reputation of the federal courts

and to a large extent, lawyers, should

not be left in a questionably creditable

state.

A - 166

»

Hundreds of anxiously waiting

divorce and bankruptcy litigants were

side-tracked from their remedies for

which they paid the Hudak law firm and

perhaps, inferentially, even to Geisler.

These clients were used a pawns by Woods

as aided by Geisler when after agreeing

to perform according to a stipulation

this case in accordance with the

conditions of the injunction contained in

the Order of Court dated October 1,

1987, they defied this court. Thus, they

continue to defy this court’s

jurisdiction, and Woods has inaugurated

and continues a campaign of harassment

without let up against the plaintiff.

Since Woods has persisted in a series of

coercements against his own daughter

resulting in harm to her and his own

grandchiliren, and since Woods was the

total cause of this very unfortunate and

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unnecessary action and its ramifications

in this court, and since Woods continues

to flaunt the Order of Court and its

jurisdiction, I find the defendant Woods

guilty as a contemnor in this action for

civil contempt. He will be required to

cooperate with all the parties and terms

required of them. He will be permitted

vahentiiet ie to remedy as much as

possible the turmoil and trouble he has

brought about and tu pay the designated

costs with certain exceptions which shall

be hereafter enumerated. I also find

Geisler guilty of contempt.

Geisler and O’Brien, too, will be

permitted the opportunity of purging and

redeeming himself, with defendant Woods,

as best as possible, by rectifying,

within a prescribed period of time, the

harm he has produced by acting as an

abettor to Woods. Upon failure to comply

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with this purging and redemption

opportunity in all its facets, the

defendants Woods, Geisler and O’Brien

will be subject to instant specified

incarceration based upon the number and

extent of their further contemptuous

actions.

I am also finding that the

defendant Woods has been and is possessed

of ample funds from the evidence in this

case. |

First, he has turned over $80,000

of funds, without visible security, to

the Hudak law firm and to Hudak for legal

or other purposes either directly by

Hudak or through Hudak. Second, he has

paid the mortgage payments on his

daughter, Sharon’s property on Beechwood

Boulevard for an undetermined period of

time. Third, he has paid the tuition for

his grandchildre, at a private school. .

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He has spoken also of other outlays or

requested outlays of funds for various

substantial business transactions.

In determining how justice might

be done for the plaintiff, and

coincidentally, the hundreds of divorce

and bankruptcy litigants who have been

mercilessly stranded by the activities of

Woods, Geisler and O’Brien, this court

has examined the evidence very carefully

and has determined that Woods and Geisler

should bear the almost exclusive burden

of rectifying this phase of the damages

which were caused with the Hudak law firm

disruption. As stated before, defendant

Woods has supplied overwhelming evidence

himself indicating that he is in control

and possession of sufficient funds to

finance the corrective process in the

payment of costs and expenses necessary

for the satisfaction of the various

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disappointed clients and that Geisler is

in control and possesses or should be in

control or possession of funds which

should be allocated to the processing of

these cases. He, as well, is obligated

to nerGeen the functions of the attorney

in these cases which he had undertaken bo

do in the injunctive proceeding and

concerning which he now stands as a

contemptor for failing to do what he

agreed and was mandated to do by the

Order of Court dated October 1, 1987.

Thus, Woods, Geisler and O’Brien are

guilty of civil contempt and may now

redeem themselves in order to avoid

punitive consequences for failure to do

so.

Civil contempt proceedings

involve three stages: 1) the issuance of

a court order (followed by failure to

comply with that court order); 2) after

A- 171

disobedience of the order, the issuance

by the court of a conditional order

finding the disobedient party in contempt

including a threatened imposition of

penalty if the disobedient party fails to

purge himself by complying with court’s

prescribed purgation conditions; and 3)

execution of the threatened penalty if

the disobedient party fails to purge

himself by meeting the conditions set

down by the court. NLRB v. Blevin Popcorn

Company, 659 F.2d 1173 (DC Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, we are in the second

stage of this procedure. The matter

before me is a civil contempt matter and

is distinguished from criminal contempt.

The purpose of criminal contempt is to

punish intentional misconduct. Civil

contempt is a sanction to force

compliance with a prior court order or to

compensate for damages that ar» a result

a - 372

of non-compliance with the order. The

elements of civil contempt are knowledge

of a court’s order and the ability to

comply with that order. Shillitani vy.

United States, 384 U.S. 364, (1966).

Consent decrees are judgments

which have the force of res judicata and

may be enforced by judicial sanctions

including a citation for contempt.

S.E.C.v, Randolph, 736 F.2d 525 (9th

Cir. 1984). At this stage of the

contempt proceeding, the court offers the

defendants an opportunity to purge

themselves of the contempt. The purpose

of this purging is not to punish the

conduct of the defendants, but rather to

give them an opportunity to comply with

the court’s order and to remedy any harm

which might have been caused by the

Defendants’ prior failure to comply with

the court order. See Oil, Chemica] and

A - 173

Atomic Workers, Supra. International

Union, AFL-CIO v, NLRB, 547 F.2d 575 (DC

1976). Lack of willfulness, good faith,

or reliance on advice of counsel or

others does not relieve an individual of

liability for civil contempt. United

States v. Snyder, 428 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.)

Cert. den. 400 U.S. 903, (1970), Fortin

vy. Commissioner of Massachusetts Dept. of

Public Welfare, 692 F.2d 790 (ast Cir

1982), TWM Manufacturing Company, Inc. v.

Dura Corporation, 722 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.

1983).

It is necessary for this court to

determine what standard of proof is

necessary in this type of proceeding.

This proceeding for contempt is civil and

remedial in nature. The intent of the

respondents is irrelevant in determining

violation of a court order for contempt

purposes. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper

A - 174

COmpany, 336 U.S. 187 (1949). Because

the intent is irrelevant, the proper

standard for this court to apply in this

proceeding is the evidentiary standard of

clear and convincing evidence. NLRB vy.

Decaturville Sportswear Company, Inc. ,

518 F.2d 788, 790 (6th Cir.) cert. den.

423 U.S. 913 (1975). In this stage of

the contempt proceeding, it is proper for

the court to put the disobedient parties

on notice that unless they purge

themselves of their contempt by obeying

the court’s decree, they will be fined or

face other sanctions. If the conditions

of purgation are met, the contemnor can

avoid the threatened penalty. Blevin

popcorn company, Supra., at 1185.

The defendants have not raised

defenses of substantial compliance or

inability to comply as defenses in this

contempt proceeding, however, this court

A - i75

finds there has not been substantial

compliance or inability to comply on the

part of either defendant. This court

finds that Geisler, Woods and O’Brien

knew well what they were doing. They

entered into the stipulation freely and

with the advice of counsel. this court

is convinced that together they

masterminded a plan to intentionally hurt

Hudak and his clients. Counsel would

have this court believe that the

activities of these defendants were de

minimus or not specifically enjoined, and

therefore, their activities should not be

held as contemptuous. The Supreme Court

could have been writing about Woods,

Geisler and O’Brien when they made the

following statement regarding an appeal

from a contempt proceeding:

It does not lie in their mouths to

say that they have an immunity from

civil contempt because the plan or

scheme which they adopted was not

A - 176

"or le

specifically enjoined. Such a rule

would give tremendous impetous to

the program of experimentation with

disobedience of the law which we

condemned in y

Supra, at 69. The instant case is

an excellent illustration of how it

could operate to prevent

accountability for persistent

contumacy. Civil contempt is

avoided today by showing that the

specific plan adopted by

respondents was not enjoined,

Hence, & new decree is entered

enjoining that particular plan.

Thereafter, the defendants work our

a plan that was not specifically

enjoined. Immunity is once more

obtained because the new plan was

not specifically enjoined. And so,

a whole series of wrorgs is

perpetrated and a degree of

enforcement goes for naught.

McComb, Supra ., at 192.

Even though, the respondents

specifically agreed in writing to the

stipulation prepared by their counsel, if

they were unable to comply with its

terms, they could have petitioned this

court for relief. But, Woods, Geisler

and O’Brien chose not to do this. At

their own peril, they decided what course

A - 177

of operation they intended to take and

carried it out: systematically heaping

the fruits of their contempt upon the

heads of Hudak, his family and on the

unserviced clients. Again, the Supreme

Court could have been speaking of Woods,

Geisler and O’Brien when it said:

they took a calculated risk when

under the threat of contempt, they

adopted measures designed to avoid

the legal consequences (of the

Act). Respondents are not unwitting

victims of the law. Having been

caught in its toils, they were

endeavoring to extricate

themselves. They knew full well

the risk of crossing the forbidden

line. Accordingly, where as here

the aim is remedial and not

punitive, there can be no

complaint that the burden of any

uncertainty in the degree is on the

respondent’s shoulder. Id. at 193.

The three defendants, Woods,

Geisler and O’Brien, are being notified

that this court has, therefore, found

them to be contemptuous, in and out of

A - 178

the courtroom, and for the breaches and

violations of the injunctive Order of

Court dated October 1, 1987, and

accordingly, within ten (10) days from

the date of the filing of this opinion,

if they fail to heed the warning given

them, they will be dealt with as

contemnors who flout this court in its

authority. IRS v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767

(3rd Cir. 1983).

To aid them in knowing what

actions they are flouting, it is being

set forth for their full understanding

and knowledge. |

NOTICE OF BASIS FOR FULFILLMENT OF

REDEMPTION:

1) All the defendants will be

required to cease and desist from

molesting in every possible way the

plaintiff, Joseph E. Hudak:

A - 179

é

ee —

2) All the defendants will be

required to withhold the transmittal of

any statements, mouthings, gossip and

references regarding Hudak to any and all

persons except by special permission of

this court;

3) Within five days of the 10-

day period, Woods will deposit the sum of

$10,000 with the official designated by

this court as the mester, for the purpose

of providing costs and expenses for the

payment of cases requiring filing costs

and other litigation expenses and he

shall provide funds on a weekly basis to

keep the $10,000 cost fund replenished

and adequate;

4) Woods shall provide all the

funds necessary except for those which

Geisler shall be directed to provide for

furthering. all the divorce and bankruptcy

cases to their completion. The

A - 180

defendants are being given the privilege

to show their earnestness to rectify such

contemptuous activities by ceasing the

forbidden conduct and performing all the

mandatory orders of the injunction.

5) Geisler will be required

within a 10-day period to present a

complete accounting of all divorce and

bankruptcy case files which he removed

from the Hudak offices, and with each

case a summation of its status, to the

official master designated in charge of

supervision; neh

6) the defendants, Woods,

Geisler and O’Brien, will separate

themselves completely, under the

supervision of the authorized official

Master in charge, from all personal

matters and business, except as permitted

by the delegated official master

supervising this matter;

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7) Geisler will be required to |

act as counsel on all Hudak bankruptcy

and divorce cases assigned to him by the

official master appointed by the court

for the purpose of supervision, except

for those for which he shall have been

relieved, and for which other cc unsel

shall be appointed to do so and for which

the forbidden by law. They are being

first warned here so that within cost

fund secured by Woods shall be

responsible;

8) Woods will file within an

allotted time a list of his personal

holdings and those which he holds jointly

with any other person or corporation and

to what extent, and other holdings under

veil or pseudonym names;

9) Geisler will be required to

provide monthly reports on the

circumstances and financial status of

A - 182

bi Pee eS S.C * es

each case he processes to the official

Master designated in charge of

supervision;

10) Geisler shall also provide

immediate and specified funds designated

by the official master delegated in

charge by this court for supervising all

its functions which the court requires to

be done by the defendants for the purpose

of permitting them the privilege of

redeeming themselves; and

11) As for the plaintiff, Joseph

E. Hudak, he will be left to pursue the

right to a livelihood for the support of

himself and his family. This court is

taking into consideration the fact that

the plaintiff himself, who is not guilty

of any violations of the injunction, did

use misjudgment and human error in his

conduct in this case as a whole so as to

be lacking in merit of any compensatory

A - 183

aids by the court other than that of

protecting his constitutional rights as a

human being and an American citizen.

Therefore, while I cannot find that Hudak

was a guilty party in this proceeding,

since he violated neither the injunction

nor the contempt court orders, he is not

being allowed any compensation or

benefits other than those specified upon

the performance of the obligations as

required of the defendants, Woods,

Geisler and O’Brien.

As for Mrs. Sharon Lavelle Hudak,

she is not a party, but so closely

related to both sides as to make it

necessary to express a certain amount of

sympathy for her because of the

predicament in which she and her children

now exist. But, it will be remembered

that this was her choice and she must

live by it and by the aid this court can

A- 184

give so that she and her children with |

her husband can live free and clear of

all persecution from the defendants.

As for the lawyers in this case,

Hudak has named several as being

participants in the activities of both

Woods and Geisler expecting this court to

hold them as guilty defendants, This

contention of the plaintiff cannot be

supported. The attorneys, without

further naming them, are members of the

Bar of Allegheny County, of the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania and of this court.

It is their function to perform their

duties to the best of their abilities,

honestly and forcefully, on behaif of

their clients. It is not the function of

this court to determine here whether the

defendants so represented their clients.

As I stated before, the judicial system

is so set up that members of the various

A- i185

tte O. \@ ow oll

wet set Naren ae 6B eS eee

|

:

:

8

:

;

bars are governed by codes of ethics and

may be disciplined, as some are

constantly being disciplined, for

violation of the codes of ethics. it is

not for this court to say that these

attorneys have violated any code, but it

is for the proper judicial tribunal to so

decide, if required, and it will be left

there.

As for the other defendants,

while they were participants with Woods

in various matters and activities, these

are inconsequential compared to those

transgressions of Woods, Geisler and

O’Brien, and properly dealing with both

Woods, Geisler and O’Brien will satisfy

the demands of justice in this case.

Therefore, no judgment is being

pronounced against then.

The Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law are incorporated in

A - 186

this Opinion in accordance with Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 52. (1)

(1) Rule 52. Finding by the Court

"(a) Effect. In all actions tried

upon the facts without a jury ... the

court shall find the facts specially and

state separately the conclusions of law

thereon .... If an opinion or memorandum

of decision is filed, it will be

sufficient if the findings and

conclusions of law appear therein."

A - 187

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

Vv. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. GEISLER

)

and RICHARD O’BRIAN )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROSENBERG, DISTRICT JUDGE

The defendant, Robert Woods, has

filed two separate motions dated January

3, 1989. The first motion is a Motion to

Reconsider or Stay the Requirements Set

Forth in the Order of December 22, 1988

and the second is a Motion for a New

Trial, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

and Motion to Amend Findings. The first

motion was entered by attorney Charles F.

Scarlata representing defendant Woods and

the second was entered by attorney John

A - 188

M. Silvestri who entered his appearance

as co-counsel for defendant Woods on

January 3, 1989. After thorough

examination of both motions, it is

obvious that the attack is being made

from two sides and averments are made in

each which are unsupported when one

examines the opinions filed in this

case,: the first on October 1, 1987 and

the second on December 22, 1988, the

transcript of testimony, and the record

as a whole. It is from all of this that

this court has spared neither the

plaintiff nor the defendants and has

called spades as spades whether they

applied to the defendant or to the

plaintiff. From all of the evidence as a

whole, there is an abundant foundation to

base the Findings of Fact and Conclusion

of Law that were made in the opinion

dated December 22, 1988-and in the Order

A - 189

of Court which follows it. It will be

seen that a thorough examination of all

of the witnesses was made and was

explained upon which the court had the

ability and authority to make findings

based upon credibility and that this was

the duty of this court and that this

court meticulously carried out that duty.

The complaint of these motions is

that the Order of Court denies the

defendant Woods his rights of free speech

and association. But this court’s

December 22, 1988 Order prevents the

defendants from bombardment of the

plaintiff as they were doing when stopped

by this court which is no different that

one who yells fire in a crowded church or

theatre and is not protected by the '

Constitiution. The Constitution has no

place to protect miscreants such as the

A - 190

defendants Woods, Geisler and O’Brian who

must be stopped from their actions

against the plaintiff, and forced, in the

process, to make others whom they have

harmed whole.

The conclusions in these motions

are so lacking in support upon reading of

the record as a whole, both motions

will, therefore, be denied.

A - 191

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re )

Case No. 87-1851

INVOLUNTARY

JOSEPH E. HUDAK )

INVOLUNTARY )

EX PARTE MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

COMES NOW Joseph E. Hudak, pro

se, and makes this EX PARTE MOTION FOR A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, in support

of which he represents as follows:

1. Michael S. Geisler was one of

the attorneys of the law firm Joseph E.

Hudak & Associates. Geisler acted as

counsel to Hudak on the involuntary

bankruptcy filed against Hudak at the

above number and discussed with Hudak all

matters related to the case and advised

Hudak on the case.

A- 192

2. Michael S. Geisler also

handled a large number of cases for the

‘Hudak law firm and had access to all

client files of the Hudak law firn.

3. Michael S. Geisler also

handled all of the accounts payable for.

the Hudak law firm.

ag 4. Contractually and ethically,

Michae) S. Geisler is bound to maintain

the confidentiality of all of the above

matters.

5. On or about Sunday August 9,

1987, Michael S. Geisler entered the

Hudak law firm offices and removed his

belongings and many of the files for

which he was responsible. On information

and belief, Geisler also removed complete

~~

A- i93

lists of all Hudak clients and

confidential details of clients files.

6. Geisler gave to Hudak no

notice that he was to defect from the

Hudak law firm; on the contrary, even on

Saturday August 8, 1987, the day before

he was to datect, Geisler met with Hudak,

discussed confidential matters with

Hudak, and caused Hudak to rely on

Geisler’s continued protection of

confidences and Geisler’s continued

services.

7. Sometime thereafter, Michaei

S. Geisler began working for the Robert

Woods, the husband of petitioner in this

case.

8. On information and belief,

Michael S. Geisler has revealed to Robert

A- 194

el

Woods all or many of the confidences of

Hudak related to this case, including

Geisler/Hudak legal analyses of the case

and facts related to the case which are

protected by the attorney-client

relationship as well as by contract.

9. On information and belief,

Michael S. Geisler has revealed to Robert

Woods client lists and-particulars of

Client files, including unlisted

telephone numbers of clients, of the

Hudak law firm.

10. On Saturday, September 12,

1987, Robert Woods himself telephoned a

client of the Hudak law firm for whose

case Michael S. Geisler had been solely

responsible. Robert Woods also

telephoned the client’s mother, sister-

in-law, and brother. Robert Woods

A - 195

revealed to all of these people

confidential matters from the client’s

file which the client herself did not

wish her relatives to know. Robert Woods

further stated to the client herself that

Joseph E. Hudak was a fraud, that Hudak

had embezzled money, and that the woman’s

case would never be filed.

11. On information and belief,

Robert Woods himself telephoned numerous

other clients of the Hudak law firm and

engaged in similar conduct.

12. On Monday, September 14,

1987, an individual identifying himself

as a "Richard O’Brien" or a "Richard

Bryant" and giving a return telephone

number of 381-1194 began . ystematically

telephoning all of the clients of the

Hudak law firm. Some of these clients

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have unlisted telephone numbers that

could have been obtained only even the

confidential files of the Hudak law firn.

Many of the clients have become

extremely upset and some have stated that

the person calling has revealed to them

knowledge of confidential matters

contained in their legal files.

13. The above individual i.

further stating that he is taking a

survey of clients of the Hudak law firn,

and, both directly and by innuendo,

suggesting impropriety and illegitimacy

in the Hudak law firm and suggesting that

the Hudak law firm clients should file

disciplinary complaints against Joseph E.

Hudak.

14. On information and belief,

this systematic harrassment and slander

A- 197

PRR OR LE PRL OTR TRA I EI ET NEST

of Hudak is a scheme controlled by

Robert Woods and Michael S. Geisler.

15. On Tuesday, September 15,

1987, the petitioner in this case,

Géraldine Woods, stated to her daughter,

the fiance of Hudak, that indeed her

husband, Robert Woods, and Michael S.

Geisler were engaged in activity designed

to result in Hudak being disbarred as an

attorney.

16. Further, on August 18, 1987,

Robert Woods committed an assault and

battery on Hudak and on August 23 1987,

attempted yet another assault and battery

on Hudak. Criminal charges have been

filed and accepted by the District

Attorney’s Office.

A - 198

17. Further still, on September

9, 1987, Robert Woods committed another

assault and battery, this time on a

deputy constable employed by Hudak to

subpoena Robert Woods and Geraldine Woods

for the September 11, 1987 hearing on

Hudak’s motion to dismiss. Criminal

charges have been filed and accepted by

the District Attorney’s Office. Robert

Woods, however, has filed a report with

the Pittsburgh Police in which he states

that the deputy constable was attempting

@ sexual assault on his wife and that he,

Woods, has seen the deputy constable

loitering about the Shadyside district of

Pittsburgh and he, Woods, believes that

the deputy constable might be the

"Shadyside rapist." Finally on this, the

deputy constable states that through a

third party Robert Woods has sent a

message that serious physical harm will

A - 199

result if the deputy constable again

attempts to subpoena G. Woods, the

petitioner in this case.

18. Robert Woods has committed

further acts of harrassment ageinst

Hudak, Hudak’s mother and brother, and

Hudak’s fiance, Wood’s daughter. These

include obscene telephone calls, threats

of lawsuits, interference with

employment, and slanderous statements

against Hudak.

19. Continuation of any of the

above described activities will cause

immediate, irreparable, and unjustified

harm.

WHEREFORE, Joseph E. Hudak,

prose,- requests that the Court issue ex

A - 200

parte a temporary restraining order 1)

to prevent Michael S. Geisler from

revealing, directly or indirectly, any

further information related to the

involuntary bankruptcy petition filed

against Hudak; 2) to prevent Michael Ss.

Geisler from revealing any further

information about Hudak’s business, his

clients, his client files, or other facts

of any kind obtained from his employment

with the Hudak law firm; 3) to prevent

Robert Woods, Michael S. Geisler, and any

persons working therefor from the above

described acts and other acts designed to

harrass, interfere with, or injure Hudak

and parties associated or related to

Hudak.

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph E. Hudak

A~- 201

OIE OME CFS Ss all pp:

VERIFICATION

_—

I, JOSEPH E. HUDAK, have read the

foregoing EXPARTE MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER.

This statements contained therein are

true anc correct to the best of my

knowledge, information and belief.

JOSEPH E. HUDAK

DATE

A - 202

MALALMEDE LCT AON LR NC pe ©

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK )

vs. Civil Action No: 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S.

)

GEISLER and RICHARD )

O’ BRIAN )

CONSENT ORDER

AND NOW COME Joseph E. Hudak,

Esquire, pro se, and Robert Woods,

Michael S. Geisler, and Richard O’Brian,

by their attorney, Yaier Y. Lehrer,

Esquire, and stipulate as follows:

1. On September 18, 1987, nunc

pro tunc September 16, 1987 by Order of

Judge Louis Rosenberg, in The United

States Bankruptcy Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania, at Case no. 87~

1851 INVOLUNTARY, Joseph E. Hudak filed

A - 203

and Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order against Robert Woods,

Michael S. Geisler, and Richard O’Brian.

2. The parties have agreed and

do stipulate that the Motion for a

Temporary Restraining Order presently

being conducted before the Honorable

Louis Rosenberg, Judge of the United

States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania, shail be

withdrawn from the United states

Bankruptcy Court for the Western District

of Pennsylvania and converted to a Motion.

for a Preliminary Injunction with

continuing jurisdiction before Judge

Rosenberg in accordance with the law of

injunction and the facts of the case.

3. The parties agree that the

evidence presented before Judge Rosenberg

A - 204

: s ‘ o gs mes mg Pt NG FLEA FORE aIN HE HCE PERE NS BI FEET RETIREE AN PERRET MERIT ADH NE" SHS A RL EO IES OST LETRA CLE yt FY LANES OER MRTOTES ae mie 3

in the Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order is evidence upon which

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

may be based in spite of the fact that

the evidence was not closed and that

there was additional testimony which the

parties could present and the Court did

<

not hear.

4. The parties have agreed and

do consent to an Order directing the

following. ..

11. Woods and O’Brian, and

agents, servants, employees or associates

thereof, shall have no further contact

whatsoever with the clients of Hudak for

the purpose of those clients’ legal

matters and shall in no way engage in the

practice of law or otherwise interfere

with the business of Hudak.

A - 205

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12. Hudak, and agents, servants,

employees or associates thereof, shall

have no further contact with Woods,

Woods or the wife of Woods. Hudak,

however, may contact Attorney yaier Y.

Lehrer to present bills owed Hudak by

Woods or to discuss with Lehrer matters

related to cases or problems between

Hudak and Woods.

13. Woods, and agents, servants,

employees or associates thereof, shall

have no further contact with Hudak,

except to discuss legal matters which

Hudak has handled for Woods or the wife

of Woods.

14. No bond shall be required of

any party and each party waives the

A - 206

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requirement of a bond from each other

party.

15. Nothing in the Order shall

prohibit any party from pursuing any

legal remedy for which he is entitled

under the law.

16. The prohibition against

contact between Woods and Hudak shall

take place for three years.

17. This stipulation shall

become effective as of the filing of

this stipulation from Order of Court

Consent:

Yaier Y. Lehrer 9/30/87

Joseph E. Hudak 9-30-87

A - 207

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

Vv. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S.

GEISLER, and RICHARD

O’ BRIAN,

Defendant.

ORDER

AND NOW, to-wit, this lst day of

October, 1987 in accordance with the

Stipulation for an Order of Court

accepted by the parties and previously

filed in this case, it is hereby ordered

and directed that the agreement with its

detailed acceptance of obligations and

restrictions as contained therein shall

govern the parties accordingly to its

tenor and shall be binding upon the

parties in this action pursuant thereto,

their agents, representatives and

A - 208

7 - ae PLDI R IO! WAI AGL OS ROI SD EN LEB

assignees and upon all persons in active

concert or participation with them who

receive actual notice of this order of

court by personal service or otherwise;

and shall commence until the purposes of

the Stipulation and this injunction have

been fulfilled; and it shall not be

necessary for any of the parties to file

a bond unless in the future by resort to

this court of violation of this order

when demands for bonds may be made by a

complaining party or by any other person

or persons responsible for any injury or

harm caused by a violation of the

injunctive mandate or its restrictions;

and the costs of the case shall be borne

equally by the parties of this action.

BY THE COURT:

ROSENBERG, J.

A - 209

Ci aed alee nah ae

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: JOSEPH HUDAK 87-1851

STIPULATION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF BANKRUPTCY

PETITION

AND NOW, come G. Woods, Petitioning

Creditor in the above matter, by and

through her attorney, YAIER Y. LEHRER,

Esquire, and JOSEPH HUDAK, Respondent, by

and through his attorney ROBERT 0. LAMPL,

Esquire, and respectfully file the

following stipulation for withdrawal of

Bankruptcy Petition:

IT IS STIPULATED AS FOLLOWS:

1. The Bankruptcy Petition is hereby

withdrawn by the Petitioning Creditor.

2. JOSEPH HUDAK forever releases G.

WOODS, Petitioning Creditor, her agents,

A - 210

servants and/or employees from any

liability for damages under Section 303

of the Bankruptcy Code.

Robert O. Lampl, Esquire

Attorney for Joseph Hudak

Yaier Y. Lehrer, Esquire

Attorney for G. Woods

APPROVED BY THE COURT

Bankruptcy Judge

A- 211

*Reiciee. SEEGER ATE LE POP LORE EIT LAINE LIMITED BF ee PE TERIOR LOR SOT EWS Se ER RFR et . . . vOAre » PPE RSA REED REMY STE I G

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

Plaintiff

~~ er ee ee

Vv. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. )

GEISLER and RICHARD )

O’ BRIAN )

)

Defendants )

)

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

The plaintiff, Joseph E. Hudak, an

attorney acting on his own behalf, files

this motion for contempt, in support of

which he represents as follows:

1. On October 1, 1987, this Court

entered an order that the stipulation for

an order of curt accepted by the parties

and previously filed in this case was

binding on the parties, their agents,

A - 212

gra ERE

oes ae RN cia a Rta ate, ae Sie ae ak ae ae ee ee aed ey ne oF YR Ce RET CEN RED Oy ce were) ye ¢ i PMO AS

representatives and assignees, and upon

all persons in active concert or

participation with the parties who

received actual notice of the order by

personal service or otherwise.

2. Since that date, defendants Robert

Woods, Michael S. Geisler and Richard

O'Brian have nearly destroyed the life,

business and career of plaintiff, and

have caused enormous harm to the public.

3. Also, in active concert or

participation with the parties or as

agents or representatives of the parties,

William C. Bartley, Edward A. Burkardt,

Yaier Y. Lehrer and John M. Silvestri

have violated the order on an incessant,

habitual and systematic basis, have

nearly destroyed the life, business and

aA © 333

career of plaintiff, and have caused

enormous harm to the public.

4. All of the persons named in

paragraph 3 above have received actual

notice of the stipulation and order by

personal service.

COUNTS AGAINST ROBERT WOODS

1. Filing and pursuing of False

Disciplinary Board Charges in Violation

of Paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and

Order of Court '

5. Robert Woods has filed and is

still pursuing against Hudak at least

four (4) false complaints to the

Pennsylvania attorneys’ disciplinary

board.

6. The first complaint alleges that

Woods or Woods’s wife delivered to Hudak

A- 214

FR x a a edulis sated mee ~

a $30,000 check under the condition that

the money was to be held in trust and

that Hudak then used the money for other

purposes. This is a blatant false

accusation but it nontheless has taken

greatly from Hudak’s time and has

severely damaged and continues to damage

Hudak’s reputation with the disciplinary

board and others.

7. The second complaint alleges that

Hudak delayed delivery of and attempted

to seal a $16,000 cashier’s check made

payable to a person from whom Woods had

purchased a mortgage. This too is a

blatantiy false accusation but has

nonetheless taken greatly from Hudak’s

time and severely damaged Hudak’s

reputation.

A=- 215

Pah 4 IES PERE

8. The third complaint involves the

Wesley Fox trust account matter which was

repeatedly discussed at the September,

1987, hearing before Judge Rosenberg in

the present case. Pursuant toc an escrow

agreement signed by Fox and Woods, ‘and

with Hudak as escrow agent, $2,1000 was

to be deposited in trust. If Fox later

paid the property taxes on certain real

estate, the money was to be paid to Fox;

at any time, however, Woods could elect

to pay the property taxes himself, in

which case the money was to be paid to

Woods. In early June, 1987, Hudak was to

join Woods and Wood’s family, who were

vacationing at Disneyworld. Hudak

removed the money as directed. Later,

after the dispute between Woods and Hudak

began, Woods worked vigorously,

attempting to induce Fox to file a

disciplinary board complaint against

A - 216

Hudak. When Woods discovered, however,

that Hudak had in fact paid Fox the

$2,100 plus interest, and when Fox

refused to file a disciplinary board

complaint against Hudak, Woods filed his

own complaint alleging that he had not

directed Hudak to remove the money. This

is another blatant lie on the part of

Woods, but the disciplinary board has

elected to prosecute Woods’s allegations

of wrongdoing as to both Fox and Woods.

9. Woods’s fourth complaint alleges

that Hudak faiied to pursue at least

three legal matters entrusted to Hudak by

Woods. One of these, Woods vy. Edgar, was

an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior

Court which Hudak told Woods he would not

pursue because it was utterly abusive and

without merit. Another, Greenapple v.

Woods, was a Federal Court matter which

A - 217

from the very beginning Hudak refused to

handle and in which Woods defaulted and

now needs an excuse to justify the

default. The third, Craig Coal Co. v.

Romani, was a case on which Woods

explicitly fired Hudak but in which

Woods against missed a deadline and needs

an excuse. Wood’s allegations of neglect

on the part of Hudak in regard to these

cases are blatant lies but nonetheless

have taken greatly from Hudak’s time and

severely damaged Hudak’s reputation.

10. Woods has also made and continues

to make countless informal accusations

against Hudak to the disciplinary board.

These include statements that Hudak has

committed all sorts of crimes, that Hudak

has stolen money and property, that Hudak

is a rapist, that Hudak is a drug dealer,

a drug addict, an alcoholic, and mentally

A - 218

ill, that Hudak attempted to arrange the

murder of a common pleas court judge, and

that Hudak is attempting to arrange the

murders of Woods, Woods’s family,

various local lawyers, and a member of

the disciplinary board. Ludicrous as

these accusations are, Woods has induced

various persons to corroborate his false

charges.

11. The activities of Woods described

in paragraphs 5 through 10 above

constitute an interference with the

business of Hudak and thus violate

paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and

Order of Court.

12. Woods’s activities of filing

false charges and making false statements

and accusations are not legal remedies

for which Woods is entitied under the law

A- 219

and thus are not permitted by paragraph

15 of the Stipulation and Order of

Court.

II. Practicing Law in Violation of

Paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and Order

of Court.

13. Since October 1, 1987, Robert

Woods has maintained steady contact with

one Edward A. Burkardt, an assistant

disciplinary counsel at the disciplinary

board.

14. Woods has acted virtually as an

investigator for Burkardt, investigating

every of Hudak’s business and personal

life, and providing Burkardt with the

fruit of his “investigation."

15. In many instances, Woods has

supplied Burkardt with false information,

A - 220

pT

ambiguous information used to

substantiate erroneous conclusions, and

actual false, fabricated "evidence."

16. Three attorneys employed by

Woods, Michael S. Geisler, Yaier Y.

Lehrer, and John M. Silvestri, have

actively aided Woods in the activity

described in paragraphs 13 through 15

above.

17. Woods has not only acted as an

investigator for Burkardt and fabricated

evidence at the request of Burkardt, but

has also instigated and encouraged

Burkardt.

18. The activities described in

paragraphs 13 through 15 and paragraph 17

above constitute "practicing law" by

A- 221

PRED RR re

“on ihe 35 iy F3

Woods and thus violate paragraph II of

the Stipulation and Order of Court.

III. Filing of Abusive, Meritless

Lawsuits in Violation of Paragraph 11 of

the Stipulation and Order of Court

19. SInce October, 1987, Robert Woods

has filed at least four (4) abusive,

meritless lawsuits against Hudak, all

based on false swearing and perjury of

Woods. The lawsuits are designed only to

harrass and annoy Hudak and do not pursue

legal remedies for which Woods is

entitled under the law.

20. In one of the above described

lawsuits, Woods has named as additional

defendants various friends and business

associates of Hudak. Woods’s claims

against theses additional defendants are

false swearing and perjury of Woods, are

A - 222

designed only to harrass and annoy the

friends and business associates of Hudak,

and do not pursue legal remedies for

which Woods is entitled under the law.

21. In addition to the above

described barratrous lawsuits woods has

filed against Hudak, woods has filed at

least four (4) more abusive, meritless

lawsuits against Woods’s daughter, Sharon

Lavelle, who is soon to be married to

Hudak.

22. Woods’s lawsuits against Sharon

Lavelle are based on false swearing and

perjury of Woods, are designed only to

harrass and annoy, and do not pursue

legal remedies for which Woods is

entitled under the law. Moreover, the

lawsuits against Sharon Lavelle are

designed to damage the happiness and

A - 223

marriage of Sharon Lavelle to Hudak and

thus to harm Hudak.

23. Three attorneys employed by

Woods, Michael S. Geisler, Yaier Y.

Lehrer, and John M. Silvestri, have

actively aided Woods in the activity

described in paragraphs 19 through 22

above, including the false swearing,

perjury, barratry, and harrassment.

24. The activities described in

paragraphs 19 through 22 above constitute

an interference with the business of

Hudak and thus violate paragraph 11 of

the Stipulation and Order of Court.

IV. Filing of False Criminal Charges

in Violation of Paragraph 11 of the

Stipulation and Order of Court

A - 224

25. Since October, 1987, Robert Woods

has made scores of obscene, harrassing

telephone calls to his daughter, Sharon

Lavelle, Hudak fiance. Some of these

calls were to Sharon’s home and in these

Woods used the vilest obscenities and

made the vilest insults. Other calls

were made to Sharon’s place of

employment, where she works as a

registered nurse. In these calls, on

numerous occasions woods spoke to the

director of nursing and other super-

visors and stated that Sharon was a drug

dealer and drug addict, that Sharon was

stealing drugs from the hospital, and

that Sharon had killed patients at her

last place of employment by giving

patients overdoses of drugs. Then

Sharon’s hospital received a barrage of

telephone calls in which the callers

A - 225

stated that they were calling to arrange

drug "pickups" from Sharon Lavelle.

26. Finally, when Woods’s telephone

abuse became unbearable, Sharon filed

telephone harrassment charges against

Woods.

27. Although a magistrate noted the

father-daughter relationship and

ultimately held these charges in

abeyance, Woods retaliated by filing

telephone harrassment, terroristic

threat and felony theft charges against

Hudak.

28. Woods alleged that Hudak had

telephoned Woods and threatened to have

Woods, Woods’s wife, Woods’s lawyers, and

an assistant disciplinary counsel, Edward

A. Burkardt, all murdered.

A - 226

29. Woods also alleged that Hudak had

stolen form Woods over $100,000 in cash,

property and documents.

30. Among the documents Woods alleged

Hudak had stolen was a contract and

security agreement which in fact never

existed but which would be necessary for

Woods to succeed in one of the above

described barratrous civil lawsuits, a

lawsuit seeking, in bad faith, to

replevin Hudak’s office furniture and

equipment.

31. Woods alleged that in the same

(fictitious) telephone conversation in

which Hudak threatened the murders

described in paragraph 28 above, Hudak

admitted the felony thefts described in

paragraphs 29 and 30 above.

A - 227

MRI Sere C+

32. At first, the district attorney’s

office refused to accept the ludicrous,

false criminal charges Woods desired to

file against Hudak.

33. Then, at the insistence of and in

response to the manipulations of one of

Woods’s lawyers, John Silvestri, the

district attorney’s office did accept the

charges.

34. Preliminary hearings were

scheduled before a particular magistrate,

but because in the past Woods had often

bragged of influence with this

magistrate, Hudak petitioned the

director of special courts for a change

of venue.

A~ 228

35. A change a venue was granted, but

John Silvestri and Woods then vigorously

argued to the director of special courts

that the case should be assigned to a

magistrate who was not a lawyer.

36. Through a complicated turn of

events, the preliminary hearings were

assigned back to the magistrate before

whom they were originally scheduled.

37. Woods appeared and committed

blatant perjury, testifying as to the

fictitious murder threats and admissions

of felony theft.

38. Woods’s employee also appeared

and committed blatant perjury, testifying

that he had picked up a telephone

extension and heard the alleged murder

threats and admissions of felony theft.

A - 229

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39. The magistrate held the murder

threat charges in abeyance and postponed

the hearing on the felony theft charges.

40. At the present time, Woods

continues to pursue the above described

false criminal charges against Hudak.

41. The activities of woods described

in paragraphs 25 through 40 above are not

in any legitimate and are designed only

to harrass and annoy hudak. They have

taken and will continue to take enormous

amounts of time f:rom Hudak and have

severely damaged and will continue

severely to damage Hudak’s reputation and

ability to enjoy life and effectively

pursue his responsibilities.

A - 230

oh

i

42. Attorney John M. Silvestri, who

is employed by Woods, has actively aided

Woods in the activity described in

paragraphs 25 through 40 above, including

the false swearing, perjury, manipulation

of public officials, barratry, and

harrassment.

43. The activities of Woods described

in paragraphs 25 through 40 above, in

particular the filing of false criminal

charges and perjury and subornation of

perjury, are not Lees) renetiac for which

Woods is entitled under the law.

44. The activities of Woods described

in paragraphs 25 through 40 above

constitute an interference with the

business of Hudak and thus violate

paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and

Order of Court.

A= 231

=

V. Contact with Clients of Hudak for

the Purpose of Those Clients’ Legal

Matters in Violation of Paragraph 11 of

the Stipulation and Order of Court

45. During February and March, 1988,

Robert Woods or agents, associates or

employees of Robert Woods telephoned

many clients of Hudak and advised these

clients to file criminal complaints

against Hudak with the Allegheny County

District Attorney’s Office and the

Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office.

46. The activity described in

paragraph 45 above violates all of the

restrictions of paragraph 11 of the

Stipulation and Order of Court.

VI. Contact with Creditors of Hudak

for the Purpose of Interfering with the

Business of Hudak in Violation of Para-

graph 11 of the Stipulation and Order of

Court.

A - 232

47. Throughout November, 1987, Robert

Woods, or agents, associates or employees

of Robert Woods, telephoned scores of

creditors of Hudak, provided the home

telephone number of Sharon Lavelle, and

advised and encouraged these creditors to

telephone and write Hudak at the home of

Sharon Lavelle.

48. In early December, 1987, Robert

Woods, or agents, associates or employees

of Robert Woods, telephoned scores of

creditors of Hudak, provided the office

telephone number of one Anthony Guida, an

attorney at Buchanan Ingersoll who was

working on a case against Hudak, and

advised and encouraged these creditors to

telephone Anthony Guida regarding Hudak.

A - 233

/

49. Throughout December, 1987, Robert

Woods, or agents, associates or employees

of Robert Woods, telephoned scores of

creditors of Hudak, provided the

telephone number of the law offices of

Robert O. Lampl, an attorney who had

represented Hudak, and advised and

encouraged these creditors to Lampl’s

offices.

50. Throughout December, 1987,

robert Woods, or agents, associates or

employees of Robert Woods, telephoned

scores of creditors of Hudak, provided

Hudak’s new office telephone number and

Hudak’s new office address, and advised

and encouraged these creditors to

telephone and write to Hudak at Hudak’s

new offices.

A- 234

51. The activities of Woods described

in paragraphs 47 through 50 above

constitute an interference with the

business of Hudak and thus violate

paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and

Order of Court.

VII. Contact with Hudak and Harrass-

ment of Hudak in Violation of Paragraphs

11 and 13 of the Stipulation and Order of

Court.

52. On or about November 16, 1987,

Hudak appeared for a deposition on oral

examination conducted for Woods by Yaier

Y. Lehrer. At the conclusion of the

deposition, after most of Woods’ inane

accusations had been Clarified by Hudak,

Woods attempted physically to attack

Hudak and had to be restrained by

Lehrer. From across the conference

table, woods then physically spat in

Hudak’s face.

A= 235

53. Throughout December, 1987, and

January, 1987, Woods and Woods’s

employee, Richard O’Brian repeatedly

telephoned Hudak at Hudak’s offices,

purported to be clients of Hudak, and

left names and messages under fictitious

names. ~~

54. On at least 20 occasions during

December, 1987, and January, 1988, Woods

and Woods’s employee, Richard O’Brian,

telephoned Hudak and shouted obscenities

and other harrassment at Hudak.

55. On four occasions between

December, 1987, and February, 1988,

Woods’s employee, Richard O’Brian

"shadowed" Hudak, muttering obscenities

and the vilest insults at Hudak as Hudak

walked through the Pittsburgh City-County 3

A - 236

Building or Courthouse on his way to

court appearances.

56. Since October, 1987, at virtually

every appearance Hudak has made in

matters involving Woods, Woods has

“shouted obscenities and insults |

throughout the courthouse corridors and j

created public disturbance.

57. In February, 1987, as Hudak left

a courtroom after an appearance in a case

involving Woods, Woods rushed towards

Hudak, pulled back his fist as if about

to strike Hudak, then physically spat

again in Hudak’s face.

58. Since October, 1987, Woods has

threatened the 77 year old grandmother of

Sharon Lavelle, Woods’s mother-in-law,

that he will "throw her out" cf the home

A - 237

she occupies if she ever again babysits

for the children of Sharon Lavelle.

Here, Woods’s design is to violate the

happiness and interfere with the nearing

marriage of Sharon to Hudak and thus to

harm Hudak.

59. Since october, 1987, Woods has

threatened the youngest sister of Sharon’

Lavelle that he will refuse to pay her

college tuition if she has any contact

with Sharon. Here again, Woods’s design

is to viclate the happiness and

interfere with the nearing marriage of

Sharon to Hudak.

60. Since October, 1987, Woods has

harassed, threatened, and disowned the

closest-in-age sister of Sharon Lavelle

because she refuses to disassociate

herself from Sharon. Yet again, Woods’s

A - 238

—

design is to interfere with the happiness

shared by Sharon and Hudak.

61. In November and then again in

December, 1987, Woods harassed and

abused the headmaster of the grade school

of Sharon Lavelle’s youno children and

made the vilest disparaging remarks

against Sharon to the headmaster. This

was done to violate the happiness shared

by Sharon and Hudak.

62. On numerous occasions, Wood’s

employee, richard O’Brian, has "shadowed"

or followed Sharon and Sharon’s

children. This is done at the direction

of Woods to violate the happiness shared

by Sharon, her children, and Hudak.

63. The activity described in

paragraphs 52 through 62 above is

A - 239

personal harrassment which interferes so

severely with Hudak’s time and Hudak’s

ability to handle his suapentthe ities

in that it constitutes an interference

with Hudak’s business and thus violates

paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and Order

of Court.

64. The activity described in

paragraphs 52 through 57 above is

prohibited contact with Hudak and

violates paragraph 13 of the Stipulation

and Order of Court.

A - 240

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

Plaintiff

ee ee ee ee

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. )

GEISLER and RICHARD OBRIAN, )

)

Defendants )

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

The plaintiff, Joseph E. Hudak, an

attorney acting on his own behalf, files

this motion for contempt, in support of

which he represents as follows:

1. On October 1, 1987, this Court

entered an order which among vther

things prohibits Robert Woods from

contact with plaintiff and prohibits

Robert Woods from interference with the

business of plaintiff.

A- 241

2. On April 7, 1988, Robert Woods lay

in wait in the lobby of a building Woods

had discovered Hudak would enter and,

upon the arrival of Hudak, physically

attacked Hudak.

3. On that same day, April 7, 1988,

Robert Woods made at least five (5)

telephone calls to a company for which

Hudak was working on a project and

falsely stated that Hudak is a rapist.

4. During the last week, Woods or

agents of Woods, have resuscitated

preliminary hearings on criminal charges -

Woods has filed falsely against Hudak.

5. The activities of Woods described

in paragraphs 2 through 4 above

constitute prohibited contact with Hudak

and prohibited interference with the

a 4

A- 242

a

business of Hudak and thus violated

paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and Order

of Court.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that

this Court hold Robert Woods in contempt.

Joseph E. Hudak

= A - 243

pt = 7

VERIFICATION

I, Joseph E. Hudak, plaintiff, have

written the foregoing Motion for

Contempt. The statements contained

therein are true and correct to the best

of my knowledge, information, and

belief.

This statement and verification is

made subject to law providing for

criminal penalties if I make false

statements to authorities.

Joseph E. Hudak

N A- 244

I, Joseph E. Hudak, certify that I

have served true and correct copies of

the foregoing Motion for Contempt upon

the following:

BY HAND DELIVERY

Charles Scarlata

Koppers Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

BY MAIL

Robert Woods

413 "The Bigelow" 413

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Richard O’Brien

413 "The Bigelow"

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Michael S. Geisler

500 Penn Center Boulevard

Suite 101

Pittsburgh, PA 15235

Edward A. Burkardt

1010 Manor Complex

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Yaier Y. Lehrer

140 Gateway Towers

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

William C. Bartley

A- 245

ee

136 Longvue Drive

Pittsburgh, PA 15237

John. M. Silvestri

828 Frick Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Joseph E. Hudak

4-7-87

A - 246

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

Plaintiff,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS,

MICHAEL S. GEISLER, and

RICHARD O’BRIEN,

Defendants.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Now Comes the defendant, Robert

Woods, by and through his counsel,

CHARLES F. SCARLATA, ESQUIRE, and moves

the Court to enter an ORDER dismissing

the captioned matter. In support

thereof, it is respectfully submitted:

1. On or about September 30,

1987, this Court entered an ORDER

confirming a Consent Agreement that had

been entered into by the parties

A- 247

i

enjoining them from engaging in certain

conduct.

2. On or about March 31 and

April 5, 1988, Plaintiff filed Motions

for Contempt.

3. On or about May 11, 1988,

this Court entered and ORDER setting a

date for a Hearing on the Motions for

Contempt and requiring that the moving

party file a Brief on or before May 18,

1988. No such Brief was ever filed.

4. Thereafter, the Court held a

Hearing on the Motions for Contempt.

That Hearing concluded on or about June

16, 1988.

_ 5. At the conclusion of the

Hearing, this Court directed the Movant

to file a Brief, in support of his 7

position, within fifteen (15) days of the

filing of the Transcript in the captioned

matter. (see Transcript of Proceedings

A- 248

on June 16, 1988, at pages 44, 45, and

46). | 7

6. The final portion of the

Transcript of this Hearing was filed on

or about September 2, 1988.

7. To date, no Brief on behalf

of Movant has been filed.

8. It is respectfully suggested

that no Brief will be forthcoming because

there is no basis upon which Movant’s

claims can be supported. Fi

9. Rather than file a Brief, on

or about September 1, 1988, and September

6, 1988, the Movant filed two (2)

additional Motions for Contempt.

10. These Motions, in large

part, seek to re-litigate a matter that

was the subject of a criminal

prosecution in the Allegheny County Court

of Common Pleas and contain matters that

A - 249

could have and/or should have been raised

in any of the prior filed by the Movant.

11. In addition, it is

respectfully submitted that this Court

lacks jurisdiction over this matter

inasmuch as the Court’s original

jurisdiction was grounded on the

pendency of a Bankruptcy Petition which

has long since been dismissed.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing

reasons, it is respectfully requested

that the Court enter an ORDER dismissing

the Movant’s Motions for Contempt for

failure to comply with the Court’s Order

or because of the lack of jurisdiction,

and further that the Court dissolve the

Injunction previously entered.

Respectfully submitted,

A - 250

CHARLES F. SCARLATA, ESQUIRE

Counsel for Defendant,

Robert Woods

A- 251

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPE E. HUDAK,

Plaintiff,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS,

MICHAEL S. GEISLER and

RICHARD O’BRIEN,

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 23rd

day of September, 1988, a true and

correct copy of the within Motion to

Dismiss was served, by first-class mail,

postage prepaid, upon the following:

Joseph E. Hudak, Esquire

Post Office Box 23423

4th Avenue Station

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

Norma Chase, Esquire

239 Fourth Avenue

Investment Building

Suite 721

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

A - 252

Yaier Y. Lehrer, Esquire

140 Gateway Towers

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Edward A. Burkardt, Esquire

1010 Manor Complex

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

CHARLES F. SCARLATA,

ESQUIRE

A - 253

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK, )

)

)

Pleintiff,

Vv. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. GEISLFR )

and RICHARD O’BRIAN )

Defendants.

ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, TO-WIT, this 2ist day

of October, 1988, it is hereby ordered

that the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

dated September 26, 1988 is hereby

denied.

Louls Rosenberg District

Judge

cc:

Counsel

A- 254

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK, )

)

)

Plaintiff,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. GEISLER, )

and RICHARD O’BRIAN )

Defendants.

ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, TO-WIT, this 22nd day of

December, 1988, in order to facilitate

the compliance of the parties with this

court’s prior and current orders, it is

hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that

Robert L. Federline, Esquire be and

hereby is appointed as a Master by this

court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure No. 53. Such Master shall have

the authority and duty of supervising

compliance with this order and reporting

a - 235

EL a ee

“on compliance with the following order to

this court.

It is further ORDERED that:

1. The defendants shall cease

and desist from molesting in every

possible way the plaintiff, Joseph E.

Hudak, directly or indirectly.

2. The defendants are required

to withhold the transmittal of any |

communications, statements, mouthings,

gossip or references regarding Hudak to

any and all persons except by special

permission of this court.

3. The defendants, Woods Geisler

and O’Brien, and any of their agents,

servants or employees, shall cooperate

with the Master and shall immediately

separate themselves completely, under the

supervision of the Master, from all

business matters except as otherwise

permitted by the Master.

A - 256

4. Hudak shall immediately

provide to the Master a complete

accounting of all cases and monies turned

over to Geisler pursuant to the Order of

Court dated October 1, 1987, and Geisler

shall be and hereby is required and

ordered to present to the Master, within

10 days of the date of this Order, a

coupilete accounting of all divorce and

bankruptcy files which he removed from

the Hudak offices and those cases turned

over to him for completion pursuant to

the injunctive order, specifying for each

case: 5

a. The name of the client;

b. The matter being handled on

behalf of the client;

c. The date that the case was

accepted for the client;

d. The complete itemization of

a =- 4257

OO ae

all steps already taken on behalf of such

client;

@. A complete specification of

all work remaining in such case to

prosecute it to completion;

f. A complete accounting of any

and all monies received from any and ail

sources by Geisler;

a. <A complete accounting by

Geisler of all monies received by him

from bankruptcy proceedings; and

h. A complete accounting of any

and all monies disbursed by hin.

| 5. Geisler shall thereafter

provide monthly reports to the Master of

the circumstances and financial status of

each such case until its final conclusion

or until such time when he is relieved of

such a case by this court or the Master.

6. Geisler shall and is required

to act as counsel on all Hudak bankruptcy

A - 258

and divorce cases turned over to him

pursuant to the injunctive order, and

those which he personally procured or

which may be assigned to him by the

Master, excepting only those cases for

which he may be relieved by this court.

7. Woods shall file, within 10

Gays of the date of this Order, a

complete listing of all of his assets

which he holds either personally or

jointly with any other person or

corporation, showing for each such asset

the nature and extent of his holding,

including, but not limited to, all

holding under veil or pseudonym names.

8. Within 15 days of the date of

this order Woods shall deposit with the

Clerk of Court the sum of $10,000, in

cash or certified funds. This fund shall

be used for the purposes of providing

costs and expenses for those cases

a - 259

requiring filing costs and other

litigation expenses as well as for the

payment of the costs and fees of any

substitute counsel appointed by the court

or the Master on any of the Hudak

bankruptcy or divorce cases and for the

payment of the Master’s fees and

expenses. Woods shall provide necessary

funds to maintain or replenish this

account to the level of $10,000 at all

times by supplying such funds to the

Clerk of Courts in cash or certified form

within 24 hours of any notice of any

court or Master, approved expenditure

from the said fund, but this shall not

relieve Woods of any obligation to

independently assess the fund and keep

it replenished to the level of $10,000.

9. Woods shall provide all the

funds necessary except for those witch

Geisler shall be directed to provide for

A - 260

furthering all the divorce and bankruptcy

cases to their completion. Such amounts

shall be presented for payment of such

expenses through the Clerk of Court and

shall be paid only upon approval of this

court after recommendation of the Master.

10. Geisler shall also provide

immediate and specified funds as required

by the Master in his discretion as such

funds may be necessary for the completion

of the bankruptcy and divorce matters.

Since the payments of money to Geisler

and the receipt of money by Geisler is in

a confused state because Geisler never

filed monthly accounts as he was

required to do in the injunctive Order

and because of the confusion of cases

which he processed for himself and which

he was required to process for Hudak in

accordance with the injunctive Order, no

amount has been fixed here for Geisler to

A - 261

provide, but he shall be at all times

liable to damages in the making of

payments as circumstances arise by which

he is performing the duties he will be

attempting to do in processing the cases

in order to redeem himself. If the

amount of a fund can be ascertained at

any time hereafter, then one shall be

fixed according to the circumstances

which provide sufficient information to

do so as may be reported by the Master.

If it should come to the attention of the

Master that Geisler has received funds by

charging or overcharging clients who were

former clients of Hudak, the court or the

Master may take this into consideration

for further processing and determination.

11. If, at any time, any party

reasonably believes that there has been a

failure to comply with, or contempt of,

this Order of Court, such party shall

A - 262

oo

\

submit, in writing and in detail, his

reasons in support of such allegations of

failure tc comply or contempt, to the

Master. All communications with the

Master by the parties shall be in

writing.

12. Upon consideration of any

reports or complaints made to him |

hereunder, by any of the parties

hereunder, the Master may file a report:

a. Recommending that any party

be held in contempt, and the reasons

therefore,

; b. Specifying recommendations

for appropriate relief as a result of any

failure to comply with this order or any

actions taken in contempt of this order,

c. Recommending the removal of

counsel or substitution of counsel on any

of the bankruptcy or divorce matters

under the supervision of the Master.

A - 263

13. For the purpose of making

such recommendation, the Master may, at

his discretion or upon request of a

party, hold any evidentiary hearing

necessary for the preparation of any of

his reports in this matter. The Master

may require the production before him of

evidence upon all matters embraced in

this order of reference, including, but

not limited to, the production of all

books, papers, vouchers, documents and

writings applicable thereto. The Master

may rule upon the admissibility of any

evidence before him and shall have the

authority to put witnesses under oath and

may examine them and shall have the power

to summon or subpoena the parties to the

action and examine them after putting

them under oath. When a party so

requests, the Master shall make a record

of the evidence offered and excluded in

A - 264

a aaa a ce

the same manner and subject to the same

limitations as provided in the Federal

Rules of Evidence for a court sitting

without a jury.

14. The Master shall file a

report with this court indicating the

compliance, or lack thereof, of the

parties with this-court’s order, and the

recommendations, if any, of the Master

pursuant to paragraph 12 hereof.

Thereafter, the Master shall file

subsequent reports for the purpose of

updating the court on the status of these

matters, which reports shall be filed not

- more than 60 days following the

immediately preceding report.

15. The rate of compensation for

the Master appointed hereunder shall be

$95.00 per hour. such compensation shall

be payable only upon approval of this

court after application of the Master

A - 265

duly filed, such application not being

filed more frequently than once every 45

days. This application shall include:

a. A chronological listing of

time and services performed by the

Master;

b. The total amount of

compensation requested;

c. The time period involved; and

ad. The - ite and amount of

previous compensation paid to the Master,

if any.

16. As a part of each report,

whether the initial report, any interim

report, or the final report cf the

Master, he shall also show an accounting

of all trust funds held by the Clerk of

Courts throughout such period, itemizing

all expenditures and receipts.

17. In the event the Master is

required to expend any sums for the

A —- 266

purpose of compelling attendance of

witnesses at hearings, for payment of

court reporter expenses or otherwise

directly related to his duties as a

Master hereunder, he is authorized to

expend such funds directly from the trust

fund created herein without first seeking

approval of this court. 7

It is further ORDERED that Robert

L. Federline, Esquire be hereby appointed

as the Master by the court with all the

powers and authority which the duties of

office and in accordance with the Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure No. 53 shall

require-of him as a matter of law, and as

delegated by this court to perform, and

shall be properly sworn by the court to

perform such duties with the grant of

powers necessary for their completion and

further that he shall receive as

compensation for such services $95.00 per

A - 267

erent

EOE EEE EE eaeSE—eeeeeO

hour as herein stated in accordance with

a sworn report submitted by him to the

court of the hours and details.

Louis Rosenberg

District Judge

cc:

Counsel of Record

A - 268

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

Plaintiff,

~~ See “ee

Vv. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. GEISLER

and RICHARD O'BRIAN

)

)

Defendants. )

ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, TO-WIT, this 9th day of

January, 1989, the Defendant’s Motion for

Stay is hereby denied.

Louis Rosenberg, District Judge

cc:

Counsel of Record

A - 269

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NOS. 89-3030, 89-3043, 89-3069, 89-3070

JOSEPH E. HUDAK

vs.

ROBERT WOODS,

MICHAEL S. GEISLER

RICHARD O’ BRIAN

Robert Woods, -

Appellant in Nos. 89-

3030 and 89-3070

JOSEPH E. HUDAK

vs.

ROBERT WOODS,

MICHAEL S. GEISLER

RICHARD O’ BRIAN

Michael S. Geisler,

Appellant in No. 89-

3043

JOSEPH E. HUDAK

vs.

A - 270

ROBERT WOODS,

MICHAEL S. GEISLER

RICHARD O’BRIAN

Richard O’Brian,

Appellant in No. 89-

3069

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

(D. C. Civil No. 87-1999)

Present: Higginbotham, Stapleton, and

Rosenn, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the

record from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania and was argued by counsel

April 11, 1989.

On consideration whereof, it is now

here ordered and adjudged by this Court

that the order of the said District Court

entered December 23, 1988, be, and the

same is hereby affirmed. It is further

A -~ 427i

ordered and adjudged that on remand the

said order should be modified in

accordance with the appendix to the

opinion of this Court. It is further

ordered that the mandate of this Court

shall issue forthwith. Costs taxed

against the appellee. All of the above

in accordance with the opinion of this

Court.

ATTEST:

Sally Mrvos

Clerk

June 28, 1989

a - 200

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NOS. 89-3030, 89-3043, 89-3069, 89-3070

JOSEPH E. HUDAK

vs.

ROBERT WOODS,

MICHAEL S. GEISLER

RICHARD O’ BRIAN

Robert Woods,

Appellant in Nos. 89-

3030 and 89-3070

JOSEPH E. HUDAK

vs.

ROBERT WOODS,

MICHAEL S. GEISLER

RICHARD O’BRIAN

Michael S. Geisler,

Appellant in No. 89-

3043

JOSEPH E. HUDAK

vs.

a = g@g7a

ROBERT WOODS,

MICHAEL S. GEISLER

RICHARD O’ BRIAN

Richard O’Brian,

Appellant in No. 89-

3069

(D. C. Civil No. 87-1999)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Present: Higginbotham, Stapleton, and

Rosenn, Circuit Judges

ORDER

It appearing that due to a

Clerical error in preparing the judgment

in the above-entitled appeals costs were

erroneously taxed against the appellee

when costs should have been taxed against

the appellants, See Rule 39(a), Fed. R.

App. P.,

It is hereby ORDERED that this

Court’s judgment and certified judgment

in lieu of formal mandate are amended to

A - 274

2 eeeeeeooeererrrrrrererrreeererrreeororeeeee

substitute the word "appellants" for the

word "appellee" in the fourth sentence of

the second paragraph of the said judgment

and certified judgment in lieu of formal

mandate

For the Court,

Sally Mrvos, Clerk

“June 30, 1989

A- 2i5