Reply Brief — Clardy v. Sanders

IN THE

Supreme Court of the a

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

DEBBY CLARDY, as Executrix of the Estate of

Eugene Clardy, deceased, and CLARDY REALTY, INC.,

Petitioners,

MARTHA HOFFMAN SANDERS,

Respondent.

REPLY MEMORANDUM

Of Counsel:

MICHAEL B. BEERS

BEERS, ANDERSON, JACKSON

& Situ, P.C.

272 Commerce Street

Montgomery, AL 36104

JULIAN P. HARDY

PRITCHARD, MCCALL & JONES

1700 Financial Center

Birmingham, AL 35203

DEBORAH ALLEY SMITH

RIves & PETERSON

1700 Financial Center

Birmingham, AL 35203

THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER

1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036-5303

*THEODORE B. OLSON

LARRY L. SIMMS

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER

1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036-5303

(202) 955-8500

KARON O. BOWDRE

RIvEs & PETERSON

1700 Financial Center

Birmingham, AL 35203

Attorneys for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203 —

+ 7a

- y,

a

é ’

—

f *

>

a

.

_

.

* * ‘ »*

i - eee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

3

4

ii

—_

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Aetna Life Insurance Co. y. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813

CEIIIIOD sdcleticinsticicnnicsqctasninetntasaiesiiaiedaneiaaaianiaaamaati

Alabama Power Co. v. Capps, 519 So. 2d 1328

(Ala.), app. dism’d, 108 S. Ct. 1723 (1988) ...

American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Sandlin, 470 So.

Oe Br GE EE bili icnicijctaiacennen.

Best Plant Food Products v. Cagle, 510 So. 2d 229

IN IIE D: setiiceoncacstinnsschansiglendleiniegadiananinaidneainaneaiinenes

Blackbelt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So. 2d 1249

Ss. IE wisiasiinseinevvhenienseanuiieneetebneneiinnmiaiins

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Goodin, 585 So. 2d

Be i I eccicns-snannstacehnedpnaiiuaniananessiieaniatbese

City Bank of Alabama v. Eskridge, 521 So. 2d 931

GIR EEE yecitrciinccscnuesssecvoretiepplaieinianiabinonnateatt

Consolidated Freightways v. Pacheco-Rivera, 524 So.

Fe Re ee ie eee

Ensor v. Wilson, 519 So. 2d 1244 (Ala. 1987) .....

Fruehauf Corp. v. Welch, 519 So. 2d 502 (Ala.

BIIIID snessscsinnsstahinpianecinnnetpteeicheeemebieiiniminatenalne

Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) .......

Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374

EIEIO inistsiecnnostsncaivennisnessanitlinnnitebueiaeenensieliimeniae=

Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Toomey, 521 So. 2d 971

EAE SION sonnseosicnipnssassinsipppunnesespaiipbniacaibbaasinestiniaonen

Harmon v. Motors Insurance Corp., 525 So. 2d 411

CA TEED <cossnceiciacenshssccsqusmbediindak tepibaminettinnenen

Hayes v. Payne, 523 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 1987) .........

John Hancock Variable Life Insurance Co. v. Prerce,

ee By 2) aero

Kabel v. Brady, 519 So. 2d 912 (Ala. 1987) .........

L.W. Johnson & Associates v. Rivers Construction

Co., 582 So. Bd S1S CAM. TOES) ..cosecrcccecescsess

-_ j i, as

iil

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

National Security Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bowen,

447 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 19838) ...................cc.00000. 4

Rubi v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 131 Ariz.

403, 641 P.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1981)... 8

State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Lynn,

516 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. 1987) ...............cccccscc000. 3

Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So. 2d 1042 (Ala.

RR enna ti ieshalseedacentoedcphnpisaanovasounnene 8

United American Ins. Co. v. Brumley, 542 So. 2d

a canubnicctes 3

Waterworks and Sewer Board of City of Ardmore

v. Wales, 533 So. 2d 212 (Ala. 1988) ............ 3

Federal Constitutional Provisions:

Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) ...... passim

REPLY MEMORANDUM

Respondent advances a series of arguments against re-

view of the concededly important questions raised by

petitioners. On close analysis, however, respondent’s ar-

guments demonstrate that this case is an ideal vehicle for

consideration of the questions presented.

1. The ‘‘Sui Generis” Argument. The principal thrust of

respondent’s argument is that this case is somehow ‘“‘sui

generis” or “unique.’”’ Br. in Opp., at 6-17. The points

made by respondent, however, do not justify either these

labels or the conclusion respondent draws from them.

At bottom, respondent’s argument is that the size of

the punitive damage award at issue in this case is the

product of such a carefully crafted system of restraints

on jury discretion to administer punishment that this award

could not possibly violate petitioners’ due process rights.

This is, of course, little more than an argument on the

merits that should appropriately be saved for plenary con-

sideration of this case by the Court.

Respondent’s argument, however, is relevant at the

certiorari stage in a manner that respondent does not fully

appreciate. In this Court’s selection of a case as a vehicle

to consider the due process implications of punitive dam-

ages, the Court would presumably want to consider a judg-

ment that is the end-product of what are arguably the

most exacting state-law controls over jury discretion, con-

trols that have been considered and developed by a par-

ticular State’s highest court and legislature in light of this

Court’s expressed concerns regarding the punitive damage

system. In such a case, the Court would have the oppor-

tunity to take the measure of the best efforts of a juris-

diction in which large punitive damage awards have become

commonplace and, if those efforts fall short, to articulate

for all jurisdictions the additional requirements imposed by

due process. This is that case.

Furthermore, a cursory examination of how Alabama’s

assertedly comprehensive mechanisms for ensuring “fair

and reasonable’ punitive damage awards, Br. in Opp., at

8, function in practice demonstrates the flaw in

respondent’s conclusion that this case or the Alabama pu-

nitive damage system is ‘‘unique.”” The “searching . . . post-

trial review,” id., of the award at issue produced two

opinions. First, the trial court, purporting to apply a long

list of ‘factors’ set out at length by respondent in her

brief, at 9, issued a so-called “Hammond” order’ that

respondent quotes in a truncated fashion in her Statement

of the Case, id., at 3, but then virtually ignores thereafter.

The full text of that “‘Hammond”’ order is set forth in the

petition, at 1la-12a and 15a-16a; what follows is the par-

agraph from that order that respondent deleted from her

quote:

Even though the award of 2.75 million dollars

for the Plaintiff is a large sum of money, it is

not excessive as a matter of law. The Alabama

Supreme Court has recently upheld an award of

3.5 million dollars in a wrongful death action

where the combined culpability of the defendants

appears to be less than in the instant case. Black-

belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So. 2d 1249 (Ala.

1986).

The practice in Alabama, as illustrated by the foregoing

quotation, does not differ materially from the practice in

other jurisdictions. Trial judges in Alabama do not even

seriously entertain motions to overturn punitive damage

awards as excessive unless, in their subjective judgment,

the “‘culpability” of the defendants before them “‘appears’’

to be “less” than the culpability of a defendant in another

case in which the Supreme Court of Alabama has affirmed

an even larger punitive damage award. How much “‘less’’

is not, of course, evident. What is evident is that all of

1 See Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986).

the “factors” to which the Alabama trial judges are re-

quired to pay lip service under the Hammond case are

similar to the incantations employed in other jurisdictions.

In the final analysis, those incantations have very little,

if anything, to do with the ultimate determination of ‘“‘ex-

cessiveness.””’

This is, however, not the end of it, because respondent

asserts that, in Alabama, punitive damage awards are also

subject to “searching” appellate review to ensure that pun-

ishments are not excessive. The appellate review in this

case is typical of both Alabama and other jurisdictions. In

considering petitioners’ excessiveness arguments, the court

below—as it has come to do in most cases before it?—

quoted verbatim in its opinion the “Hammond” order is-

sued by the trial court and, citing several of its prior cases

(including Blackbelt Wood Co. v. Sessions, supra) found ‘‘no

basis for reversal.”” Pet. for Cert., at lla-13a.

* In what has become an unmistakable pattern, the court below dis-

poses of the many claims of excessiveness coming before it by quoting

in full the text of the Hammond order issued by the trial court and

then rubber-stamping that order with virtually no discussion. See, e.g.,

United American Ins. Co. v. Brumley, 542 So. 2d 1231, 1237 (Ala.

1989); Alabama Power Co. v. Capps, 519 So. 2d 1328, 1829 (Ala.), app.

dism’d, 108 S. Ct. 1723 (1988); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Goodin,

535 So. 2d 98, 104 (Ala. 1988); City Bank of Alabama v. Eskridge,

521 So. 2d 931, 933 (Ala. 1988); Consolidated Freightways v. Pacheco-

Rivera, 524 So. 2d 346, 351 (Ala. 1988); Fruehauf Corp. v. Welch, 519

So. 2d 502, 506 (Ala. 1988); Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Toomey, 521 So.

2d 971, 975 (Ala. 1988); L.W. Johnson & Associates v. Rivers Con-

struction Co., 532 So. 2d 618, 625 (Ala. 1988); Waterworks and Sewer

Board of City of Ardmore v. Wales, 533 So. 2d 212, 215 (Ala. 1988);

Best Plant Food-Products v. Cagle, 510 So. 2d 229, 232 (Ala. 1987);

Ensor v. Wilson, 519 So. 2d 1244, 1274 (Ala. 1987); Harmon v. Motors

Insurance Corp., 525 So. 2d 411 (Ala. 1987); Hayes v. Payne, 523 So.

2d 333, 336 (Ala. 1987); John Hancock Variable Life Insurance Co. v.

Pierce, 530 So. 2d 719, 725 (Ala. 1987); Kabel v. Brady, 519 So. 2d

912, 920 (Ala. 1987); State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Lynn,

516 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Ala. 1987); Blackbelt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514

So. 2d 1249, 1265 (Ala. 1986).

Thus, the “‘searching”’ appellate review of punitive dam-

age awards in Alabama involves a circular inquiry in which

the trial courts look to the punishments the Supreme Court

of Alabama has been willing to affirm, while the latter

court defers to the judgment of the trial courts and its

own prior precedents—including cases pre-dating Ham-

mond—in which that court has affirmed large punitive

damage awards in cases involving conduct that often bears

no resemblance to the conduct at issue in the case before

it.

It may be that this Court would hold, after full briefing

and argument, that the summary application by the Ala-

bama courts of the elastic “standards” promulgated by the

court below in the Hammond case provides all of the pro-

tections from excessive punishments that are due to

defendants in civil punitive damage actions. Such a holding

might well validate the punitive damage regimes in other

jurisdictions. It may also be, however, that the Court would

determine that the Due Process Clause requires more, that

courts and juries alike must render their inevitably sub-

jective judgments within a framework of legislatively es-

tablished ranges of punishment. The Court might also

decide that even if no maximum punishment must be es-

tablished in advance, due process forbids punishment out

of proportion to the punishments prescribed by the leg-

islature for similar conduct. These are, however, the merits

* For example, in ratifying the trial court’s Hammond order in the

case at bar, the court below cited, inter alia, American Pioneer Life

Ins. Co. v. Sandlin, 470 So. 2d 657 (Ala. 1985), and National Security

Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 447 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1983). Sandlin

involved the affirmance of a $3,000,000 punitive damage award in an

insurance fraud case; Bowen involved the affirmance of a $1,500,000

punitive damage award against an insurance company on claims of

malicious prosecution and outrageous conduct. The apparent message

being sent by the court below by its citation to these two cases is that

because it has affirmed such large awards in these .ypes of cases, there

is virtually no punishment it would not sanction in a wrongful death

case.

of the questions presented by this petition, and there is

simply no credible argument that these questions are either

insubstantial or that this case does not present them clearly

and in a setting that is entirely appropriate for their res-

olution.

Respondent also argues that this case is “sui generis”

because in the absence of a compensatory award, there is

no basis for measuring the disproportionality between the

punishment meted out by the Alabama courts and the

actua! injury inflicted by Mr. Clardy. Alabama, of course,

had the right to fashion an action for wrongful death in

which compensation for economic losses is not provided.

That Alabama has chosen to do so, however, can hardly

serve as a basis for freeing its wrongful death actions

from the constraints of the Constitution. If, as respondent

Suggests, the gross disproportionality between the com-

pensatory and punitive damage awards in a particular case

raises a serious due process concern, it would appear to

be a fortiori that the imposition of a large punitive damage

award in the total absence of any ascertained compensa-

tory damages would be of even greater concern under the

Due Process Clause.

-Furthermore, respondent’s argument assumes what

respondent herself denies, Br. in Opp., at 16 n.17—that

the relationship between the compensatory and punitive

awards in a particular case should be regarded as an ap-

propriate test of the constitutionality of a punitive award.

In any event, if the Court were to fashion such a test, its

application to this case would presumably require Alabama

to refashion its wrongful death actions to provide for some

calculation of actual injury, whether or not recoverable, in

each case. The rule itself could be applied to all punitive

damage cases, including this case after appropriate pro-

ceedings on remand.

2. The “Impossibility” Argument. In an attempt to con-

vince the Court that review of this case would be futile

because there is assertedly no workable constitutional rule

that could be fashioned to deal with petitioners’ complaint,

respondent contends that “it would be impossible for a

legislature to devise standards that would specify an in-

dividually appropriate punishment for every conceivable

case in which punitive damages could be awarded.” Br. in

Opp., at 12. Respondent’s argument is a red herring for

several reasons.

First, respondent’s argument assumes that petitioners

espouse a rule under which legislatures would be required

to enact limits on punitive damage awards that are “‘in-

dividually appropriate ... for every conceivable case... .”’

That is not, however, petitioners’ position. Rather,

petitioners believe that due process requires that a clearly

articulated range of potential punishments be established

in advance for thé, various types of conduct for which

punitive damages may be imposed.‘ As respondent herself

points out, the Alabama legislature has enacted a number

of statutes with legislatively established ranges of punish-

ment under which the conduct of Mr. Clardy—had he

lived—and Mr. Kervin could have been evaluated by the

State of Alabama. Br. in Opp., at 17 n.19. As these stat-

utes demonstrate, the Alabama legislature is capable of

performing this classic legislative function. The threshold

problem in the case at bar is that the Alabama legislature,

like most other legislatures, has abdicated this area of

‘As respondent correctly observes, Br. ix. Opp., at 18-19 n.24, this

Court has recognized the distinction between standardless jury discre-

tion to punish and “the settled practice of many States to leave to

juries finding defendants guilty of a crime the power to fix punishment

within legally prescribed limits.” Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.

399, 405 n.8 (1966) (emphasis added). What respondent fails to ac-

knowledge is that there were and are no ascertainable, “legally pre-

scribed limits” on the amount of punishment that could’ be inflicted on

petitioners in this case or the punishments that may be inflicted on

the vast majority of other defendants exposed to punitive damage

awards in Alabama and other jurisdictions.

legislative decisionmaking to the ad hoc decisionmaking of

juries and judges. i

Second, the problem alluded to by respondent—how pre-

cise must state legislatures be in establishing ranges of

punishment for particular types of conduct—is not raised

directly by this case. Alabama’s recent legislative decision

to place no limit on punitive damages in this and other

classes of cases renders this case representative of the

punitive damage systems in force in most States in which

the recent flurry of legislative activity has produced but

a single, unqualified limit on punitive damages.*

Third, respondent’s argument does not recognize that

this Court could well announce a constitutional rule in this

case under which punitive damage awards could not exceed

or be disproportional to punishments already prescribed by

the Alabama legislature for similar conduct. Indeed, it is

noteworthy that the sum of the monetary punishments that

could have been imposed on Mr. Clardy upon his conviction

for every one of the offenses respondent views as appli-

cable to his conduct in footnote 19 of her brief is $33,100.¢

The punishment imposed by the Alabama courts without

observance of the many procedural rights that would have

been enjoyed by Mr. Clardy in those judicial proceedings

is more than 83 times the aggregate monetary punishment

expressly prescribed by the Alabama legislature for that

conduct.

* As amicus curiae Golden Rule Insurance Company documents in its

brief filed in this Court in support of petitioners, only one jurisdiction

in this country—Virginia—has established a maximum, ascertainable dol-

lar limit on the amount of punitive damages that may be imposed in

all cases in which punitive damages are available. See Br. Amicus Curiae

of Golden Rule Insurance Company, at 8-9.

* A chart detailing the punishments available under the Alabama stat-

utes cited by respondent is contained in the Appendix, infra. The

$33,100 figure given in the text above assumes that Mr. Clardy would

have been a first-time offender.

8

3. Joint Liability for Punitive Damages. Respondent

does not suggest what rational state policy might be served

by placing, as do Alabama and seven other States, com-

plete discretion in successful punitive damage plaintiffs to

enforce their punitive judgments against any one of mul-

tiple defendants. Respondent instead argues that this is

simply an area of the law that should be left to the States

which are, the Court is told, “involved in a salutary com-

mon-law search for appropriate solutions to the issue of

multiple liability for punitive damages.” Br. in Opp., at

24-25. But respondent offers no evidence—nor could she—

that Alabama or any of the other States subscribing to

this irrational ‘policy’ are likely to bring themselves into

conformity with the practice in at least ten other States

in which apportionment of punitive damages is the rule.’

As petitioners demonstrate in the petition, at 22, the court

below has expressly acknowledged that its prior cases up--

holding joint liability may have been “incorrectly decided,”’

but that court has simply “resolutely refused” to change

the Alabama rule. Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So. 2d

1042, 1043 (Ala. 1988). That attitude disposes of

* Respondent purports to draw a distinction between States in which

cases ‘‘permit” apportionment and States in which apportionment is

“required.”’ Br. in Opp., at 24. What relevance such a distinction might

have is obscure; the actual practice in the States is the relevant con-

sideration, not the precise choice of words by which the pertinent state

courts adopted that practice.

Respondent also mischaracterizes, Br. in Opp., at 23 n.30, the ratio

decidendi of cases such as Rubi v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 131

Ariz. 403, 641 P.2d 891, 893 (Ct. App. 1981), in which the appellate

court affirmed the decision of the trial court that the codefendant

employer of the defendant upon whom punitive damages had been

imposed should not also have punitive damages imposed upon it because

no punishment was warranted—even though the employer was jointly

and severally liable for -the compensatory part of the verdict. Rubi

squarely supports the rationale that petitioners ask this Court to adopt

as a constitutional imperative.

respondent’s defense of the alleged “salutary search for

. solutions” to this palpably unjust practice.

Respondent also argues that this case is not an appro-

priate vehicle for the Court’s consideration of this question

because Mr. Clardy’s widow is not in a position, according

to respondent, to argue that her husband’s conduct was

“less culpable’ than that of James Kervin. That factual

contention is, however, not established by the record in

this case because Alabama law does not permit the ap-

portionment of liability for punitive damages and therefore

does not authorize the jury to ascertain relative culpability

among several defendants.*®

Furthermore, petitioners’ contention is not, as

respondent assumes, based solely upon the notion of rel-

ative culpability. Regardless of the degrees of culpability

of the individual defendants, the failure to apportion a

punitive damage award levied against multiple defendants

unavoidably results in the arbitrary punishment of one

defendant for the misconduct of another. By respondent’s

own assertions, James Kervin was one of two “drunken

defendants” who himself had received five speeding tickets

during the two years preceding the accident. Br. in Opp.,

at 1 & 2 n.2. By respondent’s own statement, punitive

damages “should be individually tailored to the circum-

stances of each case ....” IJd., at 12. Yet on September

22, 1989, respondent sent a letter to petitioners demanding

* Respondent twice asserts that the jury “found” that Mr. Clardy

‘“‘was more culpable” than James Kervin, Br. in Opp., at 5 & 26. Indeed,

respondent goes so far as to assert that the “jury found Clardy grossly

negligent and the codefendant [James Kervin] negligent.” Br. in Opp.,

at 26 n.34. Respondent apparently bases this assertion on the notations

by the jury on the verdict form in which the word “(GROSS)” appeared

after the name of petitioner Clardy while the word (“simple)”’ appeared

after the name of James Kervin. However, the jury was never in-

structed to determine the relative culpability of any of the defendants

or how it might go about doing so, and these notations have not

otherwise been explained. —

10

payment of the entire judgment, including interest.® That

payment would have been required but for the stays

granted to petitioners first by Justice Stevens and then

by the Court. Mr. Clardy could never be punished or de-

terred because he died almost instantly in the accident.

Even if it were rational to punish Mr. Clardy’s innocent

estate by imposing some portion of a punitive damage

award on it, placing the power to decide, as respondent

has done, that James Kervin shall never be punished or

deterred by having to pay any portion of the $2,750,000

punitive fine advances no discernible state purpose and

unjustifiably punishes petitioners for the acts of Mr. Ker-

vin.

4. Conclusion. The record in this case presents the ques-

tions tendered by petitioners as fully and as clearly as any

case likely to come before the Court. The Alabama courts

and legislature have recently determined to preserve and

perpetuate that State’s arbitrary and capricious punitive

damage system in most of its particulars notwithstanding

this Court’s expressed concerns that originated over three

years ago in another Alabama case, Aetna Life Insurance

Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). Certiorari should be

granted and this case set for plenary consideration.

* A copy of that letter was lodged by petitioners with the Clerk of

this Court on September 25, 1989, in connection with petitioners’ stay

application.

October 18, 1989

Of Counsel:

MICHAEL B. BEERS

BEERS, ANDERSON, JACKSON

& Situ, P.C.

272 Commerce Street

Montgomery, AL 36104

JULIAN P. Harpy

PRITCHARD, MCCALL & JONES

1700 Financial Center

Birmingham, AL 35203

DEBORAH ALLEY SMITH

RIVES & PETERSON

1700 Financial Center

Birmingham, AL 35203

THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, Jr.

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER

1050 Connecticut Averue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036-5303

Respectfully submitted,

“THEODORE B. OLSON

LARRY L. Simms

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER

1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036-5303

(202) 955-8500

KARON O. BOWDRE

RIVES & PETERSON

1700 Financial Center

Birmingham, AL 35203

Attorneys for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

FINES AND IMPRISONMENT FOR SPECIFIC

VIOLATIONS OF THE ALABAMA CODE

Code § Offense Imprisonment Fine

13A-6-2(A) Murder Life, or 10-99 years NTE $20,000

Class A Felony

with lethal weapon 20-99 years

habitual/repeat

- offender 15-20 years

13A-6-(3) Manslaughter 2-20 years NTE $10,000

Class B Felony

with lethal weapon 10-20 years

habitual/repeat

offender see Class A Felony

13A-6-5 Negligent homicide NTE 1 year NTE $1,000

Class A Misdemeanor

32-5A-190 Reckless driving 5-99 days $25-$500

2nd conviction ° 10 days-6 mos. $50-$500

32-54-84 Overtaking on left Ist offense: NTE 10 days NTE $100

(misdemeanor) 2nd/lyr.: 30 days $200

3rd/lyr.: 3 mos. $500 or both

32-5A-191 DUI Ist offense: NTE 1 year $250-$1,000

2nd/5yrs.: NTE lyr

(and fine) $500-$2,500

3d/5yrs.: 60 days-1 yr.

(60 days (manda-

tory) and hard $1,000-$5,000

labor and fine)

32-5A-178 Drag-racing Ist offense: 5-90 days $25-$500

2nd/lyr.: 10 days to

6 mos. $50-$500