Opposition Brief — Alabama Power Co. v. Environmental Defense Fund

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No. 89-373 (3) Supreme Court, U.S.

t FItLED

| IN THE i} WwW 3 q

Supreme Court of the United Spates

October Term, 1989 een.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, et al,

pe

against

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, ef al,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

ROBERT ABRAMS

Attorney General of New York

O. PETER SHERWOOD*

Solicitor General

PETER H. SCHIFF

Deputy Solicitor General

DAviD R. WOOLEY

DouGLas H. WARD

JOAN LEARY MATTHEWS

Assistant Attorneys General

New York State Department of Law

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

(518) 474-4819

ROBERT E. YUHNKE

JAMES T. B. TRIPP

Attorneys for Environmental

Defense Fund

*Counsel of Record

DAVID HAWKINS

. Attorney for Natural Resources

Defense Council

JOHN P. ARNOLD

Attorney General of New Hampshire

JEFFREY L. AMESTOY

Attorney General of Vermont

CLARINE NARDI RIDDLE —

Acting Attorney General of Connecticut

JAMES M. SHANNON

Attorney General of Massachusetts

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III

Attorney General of Minnesota

HOWARD Fox

Attorney for Sierra Club and the

National Parks and Conservation

heneieel

THE REPORTER COMPANY, INC., Walton, NY 13856—800 252-7181—1989

(3393)

i

ee Questions Presented

1. Whether the court below exceeded its jurisdiction

under § 304 of the Clean Air Act by ordering the Agency to

make a decision on whether to revise a national air quality

standard in accordance with a statutory requirement that it

do so at five year intervals.

2. Whether the court below imposed procedures

beyond those required by statute where, in advance of the

court’s ruling, the Agency voluntarily undertook notice and

comment procedures.

ii

Table of Contents

Page

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ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE SECOND CIR-

CUIT DOES NOT CREATE A CONFLICT

WITH ANY DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

OR OTHER CIRCUITS...................

A. There Is No Conflict with Vermont Yankee

Because the Court Below Did Not Impose Pro-

cedures on the Administrator...............

B. Unlike the Situation in Oljato, This Case

Involves EPA’s Failure to Perform a Non-Dis-

cretionary Duty Under the Clean Air Act ....

C. The TRAC Decision Is Inapplicable Here

Because the Clean Air Act Contains a Citizen

Suit Provision Which Specifically Assigns Dis-

trict Court Jurisdiction To Enforce EPA’s Statu-

WF SD oun ov cvaaseutdepeenbuse ts

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d

| 10

Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, No. 85-

CV-9507, S.D.N.Y. (April 19, 1988)......... 7

Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F.2d

CL Ee 7

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, D.C.

oS ee 6

Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d

le > | 9,11, 12

Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 12

State of New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472

(D.D.C. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 802

F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482

ee cnc d ean hececevcwseeves 14

Telecommunications Research and Action Center v.

FCC, 720 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984)........ 9,12

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S.

GES ESE Se 2

Union Electric Co. v. Environmenta! Protection

Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) .............. 2

iv.

Page

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519

PGR GUSccubasbe Vicks vee bavconndedeee 9

FEDERAL STATUTES

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NS os. canivnkiaeisxooksnas Passim

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I kk 5 iN nidek aa daacaccuuens 11

org edi, cosine Bw aewai 4

ti cei cnnans cavdbantenee Passim

tir. cc cava voksigeennek 6, 10, 13

s7USC 60 W............. 7 PERO NOE or 13

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

ie ES Seu eakedpeadaneest 3

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‘

M

7

5

:

Page

MISCELLANEOUS

8 A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amend-

2 og. err 3

36 Fed. Reg. 1502 (January 30, 1971)............. 5

38 Fed. Reg. 25679 (September 6, 1973) .......... 5

52 Fed. Reg. 24646 (July 1, 1987)................ 6

53 Fed. Reg. 14926 (April 26, 1988).............. 8

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 124,

reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

| £ Sre eon erer er reer re +

H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 10, reprinted

in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1088

H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2,

reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

PE hi: -hn Shc dns daep ada paabecss 3

S. Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, reprinted in

Congressional Research Service, A Legislative

History of the Clean Air Act Amnntmante of

ST es MOE 6 6555.5 00n caeavaeassees 4

S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).... 2,3

No. 89-373

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, et al,

Petitioners,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, et al,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

Statement of the Case

This case arises under §§ 109 and 304 of the federal

Clean Air Act (“Act”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7604. Seven

states and four national citizen groups (“respondents”) filed

a § 304 “citizen suit” against the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), seeking an

order requiring him to revise the secondary National Ambi-

ent Air Quality Standard (“standard” or “NAAQS”) for the

2

pollutant sulfur oxides (“SO_”) or promulgate a new stand-

ard for the pollutant sulfate (which is one of the oxides of

sulfur), or, in the alternative, require the Administrator to

conduct a rulemaking to determine whether the NAAQS

should be revised.

Respondents sought to enforce non-discretionary duties

imposed on the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency by § 109. Subsections 109(b)(1) and (2)

direct that NAAQS be set at the levels requisite to protect

public health with an ample margin of safety and to protect

the environment from all adverse effects of sulfur oxide

emissions.

The statutory provisions at issue were enacted in 1970

and amended in 1977. In 1970, Congress completely over-

hauled the nation’s Clean Air Act legislation, “to provide a .

much more intensive and comprehensive attack on air pol- ~

lution,” which it acknowledged as a “critical and growing ©

national problem.” S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4

(1970) (hereinafter “1970 Senate Report”). One purpose of

the legislation was to “sharply increase federal authority

and responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air

pollution.” Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421

U.S. 60, 63-64 (1976). The 1970 amendments reflected

Congress’ dissatisfaction with progress under pre-existing

air pollution laws and were a “drastic remedy” to what was

perceived as a “serious and otherwise uncheckable prob-

lem.” Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 249, 256 (1976).

An additional purpose of the 1970 Act was to “expedite

the establishment and implementation of air quality stand-

3

rds,” which prior law had failed to accomplish. 1970

Senate Report at 1, 10.1

Once the Administrator determines that an air pollutant

(or class of pollutants) “may reasonably be anticipated to

endanger public health or welfare,” the Act requires him to

place it on a list of regulated pollutants and to develop Air

Quality Criteria (“Criteria”). 42 U.S.C. § 7408(aX(1 A).

The listing of the pollutant and the development of the

Criteria are the first steps leading to establishment of

National Ambient-Air Quality Standards for that pollutant.

42 U.S.C. § 7408(aX(2). The Air Quality Criteria must

“reflect the latest scientific knowledge” and “all identifia-

ble effects on public health and welfare” from the pollutant.

Id. The national standards are required to be “based on” the

Criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).3

1Before 1970, the states had responsibility to set air quality stand-

ards “on the basis of criteria set forth by the secretary [HEW].” H.R.

Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code

Cong. and Admin. News 5356-57. With the passage of the 1970

amendments, Congress imposed upon the Administrator the duty to set

the national standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a).

2The NAAQS are variously described as the “heart” or “cor-

nerstone” of the Act. Train v. NRDC, supra, 421 U.S. at 66: testimony of

Administrator Russell Train to the Subcommittee on Health and Envi-

ronment, March, 1975, reprinted in 8 A Legislative History of the Clean

Air Act Amendments of 1977, at 7190 (1979). The standards are

expressed as a limitation on the concentration of a pollutant or pollutant

class in the ambient air. See, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.4, 50.5. The setting of a

national standard triggers obligations upon the states to develop and

implement air pollution control plans designed to achieve the standards.

42 U.S.C. § 7410(aX(2)

3Section 109(a\(1) of the 1970 Act directed EPA to publish pro-

posed regulations prescribing national “primary” and “secondary”

ambient air quality standards for each pollutant for which Air Quality

Criteria has been issued under prior law. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a(1). At

issue in this appeal is the National Secondary Ambient Air Quality

Standard relating to the pollutant class known an sulfur oxides, for

which EPA first issued Air Quality Criteria in 1969, and revised

Criteria in 1982 and 1984.

4

The Act states that in establishing any secondary stand-

ard the EPA Administrator:

... Shall specify a level of air quality the attain-

ment and maintenance of which in the judgment of

the administrator, based on such criteria, is requisite

to protect the public welfare from any known or

anticipated adverse affects associated with the pres-

ence of such air pollution in the ambient air. ~

42 U.S.C. § 7409(bX2) (emphasis added). The Act defines

the term “welfare” to include all conceivable effects of a

pollutant on the natural and manmade environments. 42

U.S.C. § 7602(h).

The 1970 Act did not impose a schedule for revision of

the standards to account for improved knowledge of the

effects of the pollutant. It did, however, require EPA to

revise the Criteria from time to time, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(c).

The absence of a regular schedule for reviewing, and if _

appropriate, revising the standards was recognized as a

defect at the time of the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments.*

Consequently, § 109(d)(1) was added. This subsection

requires review and revision of the standards every five

years.

Not later than December 31, 1980, and at five

year intervals thereafter the Administrator shall

complete the thorough review of the criteria pub-

lished under § 7408 of this title and the national

4H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 10, 182, 338-339,

reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 1088, 1261,

2805-6; Senate Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 16, reprinted in

Congressional Research Service, A Legislative History of the Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1977, Vol. 3 at 1390; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564,

95th Cong., Ist Sess., 124 reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News at 1505.

En On a ee onties

5

ambient air quality standards promulgated under

this section and shall make such revisions in such

criteria and standards and promulgate such new

standards as may be appropriate in accordance with

section 7408 of this title and subsection (b) of this

section. The administrator may review and revise

criteria or promulgate new standards earlier or more

frequently than required under this paragraph.

42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (emphasis added).

EPA established the national standards for sulfur oxides

in 1971 and has not revised them since then, except to

delete the secondary standard in 1973.5 See, opinion of the

Court of Appeals, reprinted in the Appendix, at 6a (here-

inafter referred to as “App. ___”). App. 4a, 6a, 7a. The

1971 standards expressly were not established to protect

against the acid rain and regional, haze effects of sulfur

oxides. App. 4a, 6a-7a.

To comply with the 1977 amendments to § 109, EPA

should have completed review and made a decision on

whether to revise the sulfur oxides standards in 1980 and

1985 and be preparing for a third round in 1990. Contrary

to the statements in the petition, EPA has never made any

formal decision on whether to revise the standards. EPA did

not complete first review of the sulfur oxide standards-until

1982 when it published its revised criteria documents.

>Sulfur oxides were the subject of a Criteria document issued by

the Secretary of HEW (the predecessor of the Administrator) in 1969.

At the direction of Congress in § 109(a1), EPA set National Ambient

Air Quality Standards for sulfur oxides in 1971, which were thereafter

revised in 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(aX(1); 36 Fed. Reg. 1502 Ganuary

30, 1971); 38 Fed. Reg. 25679 (September 6, 1973).

The Administrator revised the air quality Criteria for sulfur oxides

in 1982 and again in 1984. He did not, however, publish any proposed

action with regard to the sulfur oxides national standards at that ti:ne.

See, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(aX(2). Thus, the national standards for sulfur

oxides have not been revised for sixteen years.

6

Those documents identified acid rain and regional haze

conditions as adverse environmental effects of sulfur oxide

emissions. Nevertheless, EPA failed to revise the standards

to address these effects.®

Since 1970, Congress has empowered district courts

(upon commencement of the civil action by any person) to

order the Administrator to “perform any act or duty under

this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administra-

tor...” 42 U.S.C. § 7604. The right to bring a citizen suit in

district court to compel EPA action under § 304 is distinct

from the right to seek judicial review of agency action. The

right of judicial review is provided in § 307 which grants to

the Court of Appeals power to review

... promulgation of any national primary or sec-

ondary air quality standard . . . or any other nation-

ally applicable regulations promulgated, or final

action taken, by the Administrator under this chap-

CE i.e

42 U.S.C. § 7607(bX1). This case seeks performance of the

Administrator’s duty to set a secondary standard to protect

against adverse effects on the environment not previously

addressed by the Administrator under the Act. Plaintiffs

®In its review of the pafticulate matter standard, EPA specifically

identified visibility impairment and acid rain as adverse effects of sulfur

dioxide and its chemical derivative, sulfate particles. 52 Fed. Reg.

24646, 24670 (July 1, 1987). The statement to the contrary in the

petition is flatly wrong. See, Alabama Power petition at 6, note 16.

EPA's refusal to set a standard for these effects-in that rulemaking was

not based on an inability to decide whether visibility was an adverse

effect of sulfur oxide emissions. Rather, it was based on the Agency’s

choice of regulatory timing in dealing with visibility effects and on an

alleged inability to devise a standard to address acid rain. An appeal of

that final EPA decision is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

D.C. Circuit in NRDC v. Thomas, Case No. 87-1438 (oral argument

scheduled for December 14, 1989).

7

nnd \

- below did not seek review of any final agency action since

the Administrator had not taken any action with regard to

these adverse effects.

Decisions Below

On April 19, 1988 the district court (Edelstein, J.) dis-

: missed the action (on cross motions for summary judg-

ment) finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction

because the Administrator had no non-discretionary duty

under § 109 to revise the national standard for sulfur oxides

| to protect the environment. Environmental Defense Fund v.

Thomas, No. 85-CV-9507 (S.D.N.Y., April 19, 1988).

Judge Edelstein ruled that § 109 imposes a non-discre-

tionary duty on the Administrator to “review” the stand-

ards at five year intervals—but no duty to revise them

“even if the EPA had found the existing standards inade-

quate,” because revision of the standards involves an exer-

cise of discretion and expert judgment. App. 38a. The court

concluded that, pursuant to § 307, any challenge to the

failure of the Administrator to set national standards must

be presented to the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit. App. 38a.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed in part and

affirmed in part. Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,

870 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1989). The court rejected EPA’s

argument and the holding of the district court that EPA

may “stand pat, deciding neither to revise the NAAQS or to

make a public decision that revision is necessary.” App. 9a.

In reversing the district court, it held that § 109(d) imposed

a nondiscretionary duty upon the EPA Administrator to

make some decision regarding revision of the NAAQS.”

App. 9a, 18a (emphasis in original). The court further held

aerneeeeemenetrenmetll

8

that enforcement of that non-discretionary duty lies in the

district court under § 304.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to

order EPA specifically to revise the national standard for

sulfur oxides to protect against acid rain and visibility

effects. It held that, “The substance of the Administrator’s

decision is beyond the power of the district court, . . . its

authority being limited to ordering the Administrator to

make a formal decision.” App. 9a.

Central to the court’s holding that EPA has a nondiscre-

tionary duty to make some decision are the “shall” lan-

guage and deadlines imposed upon the Administrator in

§ 109(d). App. 6a, 17a. The Second Circuit found that the

Congressional intent on this matter was “clear.” App. 17a.

To hold that this claim did not fall within the citizen suit

provision of § 304 would, the court said, “[leave] the matter

in bureaucratic limbo subject neither to review in the Dis-

trict of Columbia Circuit nor to challenge in the district

court.” App. 17a. Such a result, the court reasoned, could

not be countenanced:

No discernible congressional purpose is served by

creating such a bureaucratic twilight zone, in which

many of the Act’s purposes might become subject to

evasion.

App. 17a. Thus, the Second Circuit ordered the: Adminis-

trator to complete the notice and comment procedures he

voluntarily undertook nearly a year before the Court of

Appeals decision. See, 53 Fed. Reg. 14926 (April 26,

1988). The Second Circuit recognized that without such an

order there would be no assurance that the Administrator

would reach a finai decision, thereby frustrating the Con-

gressional purpose to protect public health and welfare

from air pollution.

’ daa aes

ARGUMENT

THE DECISION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT DOES

NOT CREATE A CONFLICT WITH ANY DECISIONS

OF THIS COURT OR OTHER CIRCUITS.

Petitioners claim that the decision of the court below is in

conflict with this Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee Power

Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519

(1978), and the decisions of the D.C. Circuit in Oljato

Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C.

Cir. 1975), and Telecommunications Research and Action

Center v. FCC, (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

These claims are meritless.

A. There Is No Conflict With Vermont Yankee Because the

Court Below Did Not Impose Procedures On the

Administrator.

Petitioners complain that the court below ordered the

Administrator to undertake rulemaking procedures in ful-

filling his obligation to take some formal action regarding

the NAAQS for SO_. Petitioners claim that this “imposi-

tion” runs afoul of this court’s decision in Vermont Yankee

which prohibits courts from imposing procedural require-

ments on an agency in excess of those imposed by statute.

435 U.S. at 547-548. Petitioners’ claim is based on a fac-

tual misstatement.

In this case, it was the Administrator, not the Second

Circuit, who determined that notice and comment

rulemaking procedures were appropriate. One week fol-

lowing the district court’s decision dismissing the plaintiff's

action (Edelstein, J.) the EPA Administrator published a

“Proposed Decision Not to Revise the National Ambient

Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Dioxide)”

10

in the Federal Register (53 Fed Reg 14926 [April 26,

1988]) and invited comments on the proposal from the

public.

Furthermore, § 307 of the Clean Air Act specifically

empowers EPA to adopt notice and comment procedures

for this type of decision. The rulemaking procedures of

§ 307 apply to “the promulgation or revision of any

national ambient air quality standard under section 109

...” and “such other actions as the Administrator may

determine.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d\(1\A) and (N). The

Administrator chose to publish his proposed decision in an

informal rulemaking proceeding either because he felt that

§ 307(d)(1 XA) required it, or because he determined that it

was appropriate to proceed in that fashion pursuant to

§ 307(dX(1(N). The Second Circuit merely ordered the

Administrator to make a final decision in the administra-

tive process which he voluntarily commenced. Therefore,

the decision of the Second Circuit decision is not inconsist-

ent with Vermont Yankee.”

Alabama Power makes the absurd claim that the Second

Circuit decision requires agencies to engage in a contin-

uous “multitude” of rulemaking proceedings as it reviews

evolving scientific information. Petition at 11, 14, 23. The

Second Circuit determination does not have this effect. It

merely enforces the § 109 requirement that EPA make a

7Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, a final decision not to revise a

NAAQS falls within the definition of a “rule” under the Administrative

Procedures Act and can only be determined by way of rulemaking

procedures. The decision not to revise the obsolete 1971 standards

“jeopardizes the rights and interests” of the members of the public.

Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir.

1983). Retention of the existing standards has “general” and “particu-

lar applicability and future effect” because it guides the behavior of

EPA and thousands of industrial air pollution sources for up to five

years. Thus, it is a rule under 5 U.S.C. §551(4). But this issue was not

before the Second Circuit. Nor is it properly before this Court, since

EPA has already chosen to publish the proposed decision as a rule.

11

formal decision on whether to revise the standards, every

five years. The Second Circuit did not usurp the Adminis-

trator’s discretion by dictating when EPA should issue such

decisions. Rather, Congress set the schedule in § 109 and

empowered district courts to enforce it in § 304. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7409, 7604.

B. Unlike the Situation in Oljato, This Case Involves EPA’s

Failure To Perform a Non-Discretionary Duty Under the

Clean Air Act.

Petitioners contend that the decision below conflicts with

the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Oljato Chapter of the

Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

Specifically, petitioners argue that respondents should have

petitioned the agency for rulemaking to revise the NAAQS

for sO, , thereby resulting in the establishment of an admin-

istrative record for subsequent review by the D.C. Circuit.

Petitioners’ assertion, as the Second Circuit properly found,

ignores the fundamental difference between the Agency’s

statutory duties in Ofjato and the instant case. App. 10a,

App. 1 la.

The plaintiffs in Oljato sought review of whether EPA

should exercise discretionary powers under § 111(b) of the

Clean Air Act, which provided that EPA “may, from time

to time, revise” the performance standards at issue there. 42

U.S.C. § 7411(b); App. 10a. Pursuant to § 307 of the Clean

Air Act, such discretionary duties may only be reviewed by

the D.C. Circuit following the Agency’s action upon a

petition for rulemaking. By contrast, in the instant case,

plaintiffs sought relief under § 109(d) of the Clean Air Act

which provides that the Administrator “shall” review and

revise (at five year intervals) the criteria and standards

published under §§ 108 and 109. 42 U.S.C. 7409(d). Pur-

suant to Clean Air Act § 304, a citizen suit to compel this

12

non-discretionary duty is expressly available in the district

courts.

Thus, the outcome in Oljato was dictated by the fact that

the statute did not impose a non-discretionary duty. It was

the absence of such a duty which deprived the district court

of jurisdiction under § 304: Moreover, as the court below

found,

Since Oljato, . . . the District of Columbia Court has

distinguished between those revision provisions in

the Act that include stated deadlines and those that

do not, holding that revision provisions that do

include stated deadlines should, as a rule, be con-

strued as creating non-discretionary duties. Sierra

Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

App. 10a. Since Oljato has no application to this case, there

is no conflict between the two circuits which would warrant

review by this Court.

C. The TRAC Decision is Inapplicable Here Because the Clean

Air Act Contains a Citizen Suit Provision Which Specifi-

cally Assigns District Court Jurisdiction To Enforce EPA’s

Statutory Obligations.

Petitioners argue that the decision below conflicts with

yet another decision of the D.C. Circuit, Telecommunica-

tions Research and Action Cenier v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750

F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which held that “any suit seeking

relief that might affect the Circuit Court’s future jurisdic-

tion [to review agency actions] is subject to the exclusive

review of the court of appeals.” This purported conflict is

not present here because the statutory schemes in TRAC

and the instant case are markedly different.

13

In TRAC, petitioners sought review directly in the D.C.

Circuit to compel FCC action on an administrative petition

which the FCC failed to rule on after a five year delay. The

statute before the court of appeals in TRAC, however, spe-

cifically gave the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction as

to final orders of the FCC, but did not address what court

had jurisdiction over Agency delay or failure to take action

required by law. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); 47 U.S.C.

§ 402(a). The D.C. Circuit held that it alone had jurisdic-

tion over “claims of unreasonable Commission delay.” 750

F.2d at 76. -

In stark contrast, the Clean Air Act provides for a bifur-

cated system of judicial review. The forum varies between

the district court and the court of appeals depending upon

whether the statute makes EPA action discretionary or non-

discretionary. Under § 304 of the Clean Air Act, Congress

expressly gave the district courts jurisdiction to issue orders

compelling the EPA Administrator to perform mandatory

duties.

The Clean Air Act gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction

to review final orders and regulations issued by EPA

Administrator. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1982). This authorizes

judicial review of virtually all final action that the Adminis-

trator has a mandatory duty to undertake. But, where the

Agency has failed to act, enforcement of EPA’s mandatory

duties in the first instance is left exclusively to the district

courts, by the plain terms of § 304(a)(2).

Consequently, the reasoning employed in TRAC—that

Congress had “manifested an intent” that the courts of

appeals should have exclusive jurisdiction over all suits to

compel agency action—is inapplicable to a statute such as

the Clean Air Act which carves out a distinct jurisdictional

function for the district court. Under the Clean Air Act,

sheen

14

Congress has clearly manifested an intent that the district

courts have jurisdiction over suits seeking to compel the

Administrator of EPA to perform a mandatory duty. App.

8a, 16a-17a.

Finally, the Environmental Protection Agency agrees

with this interpretation of § 304 and the TRAC decision. In

a brief filed in other litigation, EPA rejected a similar

argument advanced by the same parties who filed the peti-

tion in this proceeding. The District Court there agreed.

The review of the failure to perform a nondiscre-

tionary act [under the Clean Air Act] is vested in the

district court under §-304. The EPA, which argues

contrary to intervenors with respect to this issue,

argues in its surreply that intervenors ‘can only read

TRAC into this case by reading § 304 out of the

Clean Act.’

State of New York v. Thomas, 613 F. 2d 1472, 1478 (D.D.C.

1985), rev'd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.

1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987). The same is true

in this case, and petitioners’ once failed TRAC claim should

again be rejected.

15

CONCLUSION.

The Writ should be denied.

Dated: October 5, 1989

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT ABRAMS

Attorney General of the

State of New York

O. PETER SHERWOOD

Solicitor-General

PETER H. SCHIFF

Deputy Solicitor General

DAVID R. WOOLEY

DOUGLAS H. WARD

JOAN LEARY MATTHEWS

Assistant Attorneys General

New York State Department

of Law

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

(518) 474-4819

ROBERT E. YUHNKE

Environmental Defense Fund

1405 Arapahoe Avenue

Boulder, Colorado 80302

(303) 449-4901

16

JAMES T.B. TRIPP

Environmental Defense Fund

257 Park Avenue South

New York, New York 10010

(212) 505-2100

Counsel for Environmental

Defense Fund

CLARINE NARDI RIDDLE

Acting Attorney General of the

State of Connecticut

BRIAN COMERFORD

Assistant Attorney General

State of Connecticut

State Office Building

Room 147

Hartford, Connecticut 06106

(203) 566-7213

JOHN P. ARNOLD

Attorney General of the State

of New Hampshire

GEORGE DANABISBEE

CHARLES B. HOLTMAN

Assistant Attorneys General

Environmental Protegtion

Division

State of New Hampshire

State House Annex

25 Capitol Street

Concord, New Hampshire 03301

(603) 271-3679

17

JAMES M. SHANNON

Attorney General of the State

of Massachusetts

ALLAN FIERCE

Assistant Attorney General

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

(617) 727-2265

JEFFREY L. AMESTOY

Attorney General of the State

of Vermont

J. WALLACE MALLEY, JR.

Assistant Attorney General

State of Vermont

Office of the Attorney General

109 State Street

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

(802) 828-3171

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III

Attorney General of the State

of Minnesota

ELDON G. KAUL

ANN SEHA ae :

Special Assistant Attorneys

General

520 Lafayette Road

Suite 200

St. Paul, Minnesota 55155

(612) 297-1075

18

DAVID HAWKINS

Natural Resources Defense

Council

1350 New York Avenue, N. W.

Suite 300 i

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 783-7800

HOWARD FOX

Attorney for Respondents ~

Sierra Club and National

Parks and Conservation

Association

Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund

1516 P Street, N. W.

Suite 300

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 667-4500

November 6, 1989

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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