Opposition Brief — Barancik v. County of Marin

Supreme Court, U.S.

89-318 | wired

\ SEP Md 1988

JOS@PH F. SPANIOL, JR,

CLERK

ay

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

No. 89-

RICHARD M. BARANCIK,

Petitioner,

V.

COUNTY OF MARIN, CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

es

OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DOUGLAS J. MALONEY,

County Counsel*

ROBERT H. SAN CHEz,

Senior Deputy

Suite 342, Civic Center

San Rafael, California 94903

(415) 499-6128

Attorneys for Respondent

County of Marin

* Counsel of Record

BOWNE OF GAN FRANCISCO, INC. + 190 NINTH ST. + S.F.. CA 84103 + (415) 6642300

QUESTION PRESENTED

The following additional question is presented:

Should the United States Supreme Court grant Certiorari to

decide a question which will have absolutely no effect on the

outcome of this litigation?

1.

y A

3.

4.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Teen FU x5 00 6085d08seenaseeee lee

The 1972 Agricultural Zoning And 1973 General

WO «on a sp 0a sansdeceee eee

The 1979 Local Plan And Rezoning.............

The 1980 Purchase Of The Property By Petitioner

Reasons For Denying The Writ ............2.ccccc00-

A.

B.

C.

D.

The Petition Does Not Satisfy The Requirements

Of Supreme Court Rule 17.......ccccccccccccs

The Question Posed By The Petition Is Academic . .

The Issues In This Case Narrowly Apply To Its

SAO PONS . oo 6nndnsvgeendnnaendeveaenens

> kf» W WW

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834, 836 (9th Cir.

ee bah ees sa eds enckec’s iy eS

Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir.

NE OR SS ae Pee ee Te eee ee ee Tee ee 6

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.

County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) ......... 6

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825

ey eet Uh eh aged ener eknek neneeees 6

Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143

ccc asceeeseseescess pebaeseeseach 5

Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70,

ee Cie en cna e eh bbb ese encenceeesee 6

The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180

GT aoe eo a Re ree 6

Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981) ..... 7

Federal Statute

CR 8

Supreme Court Rules

EOP TC ETE CTT EETEEEET TEE Te 4,5

State Statutes

California Government Code Section 65008 ............. 7

California Government Code Section 65009 ............. 8

California Government Code Section 65588 .......... fee

California Government Code Section 65751 ............. 8

No. 89-

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

RICHARD M. BARANCIK,

Petitioner,

7

COUNTY OF MARIN, CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner instituted an action in the Federal District Court

“For Damages and Declaratory Relief Under the Constitution of

the United States and Federal Civil Rights Act” because Respon-

dent denied his application to upzone his property to three times

the designated residential density.

The District Court granted the Respondent’s motion for sum-

mary judgment in an unpublished decision (Appendix C to

Petition for Certiorari). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision

of the District Court in an opinion reported at 872 F.2d 834

(Appendix B to Petition). It denied a Petition for Rehearing and

Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc (Appendix A to Petition).

2

It is impossible to improve on the cogent statement of facts

contained in the Circuit Court’s opinion commencing at 872 F.2d

835. However, inasmuch as Petitioner’s recitation of facts is

misleading and inaccurate in a number of particulars, the follow-

ing information may be of assistance.

1. The Property

Petitioner’s ranch is in a predominantly agricultural area with

access via a winding, steep, narrow, unpaved fire road through an

adjacent ranch, over 6000 feet from the nearest County road.’

(CR 3:Ex.G:6; CR 103:Ex.14) The 561 acre property consists of

a steeply sloping basin bounded on three sides by a ridge domi-

nated by Loma Alta Peak, one of the County’s highest, most

visual and scenic peaks, after which the Ranch is named. (CR

3:Ex.G:6; CR 103:Ex.14.) There are no residences or other

buildings on the property which has been used for cattle grazing

for over 100 years. (CR 3:Ex.G:7.)

2. The 1972 Agricultural Zoning and 1973 General Plan

In 1972, the County rezoned most of the land in this area,

including Loma Alta Ranch, to A-60, (Agricultural, one residen-

tial unit per 60 acres) without complaint from the owner. (Ordi-

nance 1939, County Addendum 2; CR 103:Ex.8; CR 109: Para.

15; CR 166:2.)

The Marin Countywide plan or general plan was adopted in

1973. It divides the County into three environmental corridors.

The eastern portion is designated the “City-Centered Corridor,”

the central portion is designated the “Inland Rural Corridor,” and

the Coastal areas are designated as the “Coastal Recreation

Corridor.” (CR 3:Ex.C:2-1; CR 107:Ex.A.) The Countywide

Plan concentrates urban development in the City-Centered Corri-

' This remote location is characterized by Petitioner as “immediately

across Lucas Valley Road from the ‘Skywalker Ranch.’” In fact, Loma

Alta Ranch is actually two miles down the road and more than a mile

inland from the Skywalker Ranch (CR 109: Para. 20). Moreover, the

Skywalker property is not, as Petitioner claims, a “movie studio” and

most certainly does not -contain “a large number of dwelling units.”

(Petition, p. 3).

3

dor “so that the rest of the County can remain as open as

possible.” (CR 3:Ex.C:2-1 through 2-3, 5-28.) The Plan also

endeavors to preserve agriculture and discourages premature

subdivision and conversion of vital agricultural lands in the inland

rural corridor which contains Petitioner’s ranch. (CR 3:Ex.C:2-

11; CR 166:1).

3. The 1979 Local Plan and Rezoning

The Nicasio Valley Community Plan (hererafter “NVCP”)

was adopted in 1979 as part of the County’s general plan and

includes the area in which Petitioner's Loma Alta Ranch is

located. (CR 3:Ex.D; CR 103:Ex.2.3.) One of the fundamental

goals of the NVCP is:

“To encourage the preservation of agricultural land and

activities; preserving the best agricultural land in the Valley

in parcels large enough to permit the continuation of existing

and the possibility of future agricultural activities.” (CR

3:Ex.D:5.)

The NVCP specifically addresses Petitioners Loma Alta

Ranch and the four other large properties in the vicinity. (County

Addendum 3; CR 3:Ex.D.27.) The NVCP estimates the maxi-

mum number of units possible for each property. A maximum of

112 residential units is permissible on these five properties. Jd.

The maximum number of residential units allocated to Peti-

tioner’s ranch is nine.” Jd. The NVCP recommended rezoning

Loma Alta from the A-60 (Agricultural, one unit per 60 acres)

designation established in 1972 to ARP-60 (Agricultural-Resi-

dential-Planned, one unit per 60 acres). (CR 3:Ex.D:47.)

The new ARP zoning designation encouraged clustered devei-

opment concentrated on a small portion of a property to enhance

preservation of open space and agricultural land but did not

increase or decrease the number of allowable units on Petitioner’s

property. (CR 3:Ex.D:42-43.) Petitioner’s Loma Alta Ranch was

rezoned from A-60 to ARP-60 in 1979 pursuant to the NVCP.

24 number of other alternative uses are allowed on Petitioner’s

property including the conference center he proposed at one point. (See

District Court Opinion [Appendix C to Petition, pp. C3 and C4}).

4

The other adjacent properties were also rezoned to the same or a

reduced density than had previously existed in accordance with

the Community Plan. (Ordinance 2418, County Addendum 5;

CR 103:Ex. 12.)

4. The 1980 Purchase of the Property by Petitioner

Petitioner Barancik, a Chicago architect/developer, purchased

the Loma Alta Ranch on January 16, 1980. (CR 39:4, 14.)

Petitioner knew, at the time he purchased the property, the

County’s agricultural preservation policies and was aware that the

property was zoned ARP-60 which permitted only nine residential

units. (CR 39:4, 15-16; CR 103:Exs. 22, 23; CR 166:2.) The

modest price of approximately $650,000 or $1,160 per acre (CR

39:4:14) was based on the residential density limits imposed by

the County’s agricultural zoning since 1972.

Despite repeated warnings from County officials and his own

consultants that the County wouid not abandon its agricultural

zoning in deference to a suburban type residential development at

Loma Alta (CR 166:2; CR 39:2-16), Petitioner nevertheless

embarked on a dogged campaign to triple the residential density

specified for the property. (CR 103: Exs. 24, 26, 27, 16, 2: CR

166:2.) The County declined to accommodate him and this

litigation ensued in 1985.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Certiorari should not be granted because:

A. The Petition does not engender any of the “special and

important” reasons required for issuance of a writ by Supreme

Court Rule 17.

B. The question posed by the Petition is academic because

both the District and Circuit Courts have ruled that Petitioner’s

action is devoid of merit, irrespective of the statute of limitations

issue.

C. The issues in this case narrowly apply to its unique facts.

D. The decision of the Ninth Circuit is plainly correct.

5

A. The Petition Does Not Satisfy The Requirements Of Su- a

preme Court Rule 17

Petitioner is silent as to which of the “special and important

reasons” set forth in Supreme Court Rule 17 he seeks to invoke.

The Petition cites no decisions of the Supreme Court with which

the Circuit Court decision conflicts, other than the claim, on page

14 of the Petition, that the decision is “adverse” to the ripeness

doctrine. This contention is critically undermined by the fact that

the Circuit Court actually ruled that “Barancik’s petition is ripe

for review.” Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834, 836 (9th

Cir. 1989); Appendix B to Petition, pp. B-3, B-8. Moreover, the

asserted adversity, if it exists at all, is obviously a question of

reconciliation, rather than a patent conflict.

The only other possible decisional conflict cited by Petitioner is

another Ninth Circuit case, Norco Construction, Inc. v. King

County, 801 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1986) which is entirely consis-

tent with the decision in this case. In Norco, the Court stated:

“We conclude that under federal law the general rule is that

claims for inverse taking, and for alleged related injuries

from denial of equal protection or denial of due process by

unreasonable delay or failure to act under mandated time

periods, are not matured claims until planning authorities

and state review entities make a final determination on the

status of the property.” Jd. at p. 1145.

Here the final determination as to the use of the property was

made by the County in 1979 and the statute of limitations then

began to run, exactly in accordance with Norco.

B. The Question Posed By The Petition Is Academic

Petitioner urges this Court to determine whether the Circuit

Court correctly applied the applicable statute of limitations. This

is an exercise in sophistry because both the District Court and the

Circuit Court found that the Petitioner’s claims had no merit

whatsoever. As the concurring opinion succinctly stated:

“On the basis of the undisputed facts in the record, appellant

could not prevail on any of his challenges to the county’s

original zoning, or to the county’s rejection of plaintiff's

OO

6

request to treble the density permitted under that zoning.”

872 F.2d 834 at 837; Appendix B to Petition, p. B-10.

Petitioner has not challenged the Court’s determination that his

claims have no merit. He has essentially abandoned these issues.

Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1988).

Thus, even if the Supreme Court accepted Petitioner’s hypothesis

concerning the application of the statute of limitations, the case

would still be dismissed.

As the Court stated in Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park

Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955):

“A federal question raised by a petitioner may be ‘of sub-

stance’ in the sense that, abstractly considered, it may

present an intellectually interesting and solid problem. But

this Court does not sit to satisfy a scholarly interest in such

issues.”

To the same effect, in The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export,

Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959), the Court observed:

“While this Court decides questions of public importance, it

decides them in the context of meaningful litigation. Its

function in resolving conflicts among the Courts of Appeals

is judicial, not simply administrative or managerial.”

C. The Issues In This Case Narrowly Apply To Its Unique

Facts

A common denominator in most federal land use challenges, to

the extent one can be ascertained, is an overt action by a

regulatory agency which limits or circumscribes the existing

rights of a property owner, ¢.g., First English Evangelical Lu-

theran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.

304 (1987) and Nollan v. Califernia Coastal Commission, 483

U.S. 825 (1987).

In this instance, the local government has not initiated any

action whatsoever. Petitioner purchased the property at a bargain

price based on long standing zoning. The County only declined to

support his quest to triple his investment by tripling the density of

the property.

7

Petitioner’s extraordinary assertion that the County is obliged

to facilitate speculative aspirations is so far outside the main-

stream of land use and planning jurisprudence that it is, by

definition, sui generis.

D. The Decision Of The Ninth Circuit Is Plainly Correct

A precise delineation of the “continuing wrong doctrine” is

contained in Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981)

wherein the Court observed:

“Ward’s reasoning is incorrect. A continuing violation is

occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill

effects for an original violation.”

The density of Petitioner’s property was established in 1972. In

1979, tae master plan and clustering requirements were superim-

posed on tie property but the density, about which Petitioner

complains, remained unchanged. There is absolutely no evidence

of a continuing course of unlawful acts by Respondent County.

Since Petitione’’s purchase of the property in 1980, the County’s

role has been passive throughout.

Petitioner also contends that the continuing wrong doctrine

should be applied because of the special equities of this case.

(Petition, pp. 12-13.) Simply stated, the equities involve balanc-

ing Petitioner’s attempt to triple his investment against the efforts

of the County of Marin to protect irreplaceable agricultural lands

from invidious urban encroachment. This is hardly an equitable

mandate which compels suspension of the applicable statute of

The paucity of Petitioner's argument is further evident from his

hypothetical (Petition, p.6) that a Black person could not, after

the limitations period, challenge a zoning ordinance which ex-

cluded Black people from a neighborhood. This superficial argu-

ment is oblivious to the provisions of California Government

Code “ection 65008 (Appendix A) which provides, in pertinent

part:

“Any action pursuant to this title by any city, county, or city

and county in this state which denies to any individual or

group of individuals the enjoyment of residence, land owner-

8

ship, tenancy, or any other land use in this state because of

religious or ethnic reasons is null and void.”

Petitioner’s argument also ignores the extensive procedures

California has enacted which allow property owners to challenge

zoning decisions (California Government Code Section 65009,

Appendix A) and which require periodic review of the housing

element in a County’s Master Plan, at intervals of not less than

five years (California Government Code Section 65588, Appen-

dix A) and which afford individuals the right to challenge the

General Plan or any elements thereof (California Government

Code Section 65751, Appendix A).

Thus, while the statute of limitations may, as it is properly

intended to do, limit the time within which a landowner may sue

under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, landowners in California nonethe-

less enjoy an extensive arsenal of state remedies which satisfy the

theoretical concerns propounded by Petitioner.

The contention (Petition, p.8) that the Circuit Court’s decision

will generate burdensome litigation is manifestly spurious. Quite

the opposite is true. Fundamentally, Petitioner claims that zoning

ordinances never become final but are eternally vulnerable to legal

challenge every time ownership is transferred or a rezoning is

sought. This concept is essentially a complete abrogation of any

statute of limitations and would encourage incessant litigation

over matters long since decided.

9

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Certiorari should be

denied.

Dated: September 8, 1989

Respectfully submitted,

DOUGLAS J. MALONEY

County Counsel

Counsel of Record

ROBERT H. SAN CuEZz

Senior Deputy County Counsel

Attorneys for Respondent,

County of Marin

——_-

APPENDIX A

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE

SECTIONS

A-2

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 65008:

§ 65008. Discrimination; prohibition

(a) Any action pursuant to this title by any city, county, or city

and county in this state which denies to any individual or group of

individuals the enjoyment of residence, land ownership, tenancy,

or any other land use in this state because of religious or ethnic

reasons is null and void.

(b) No city, county, or city and county shall, in the enactment

or administration of ordinances pursuant to this title, prohibit or

discriminate against any residential development or emergency

shelter because of the method of financing or the race, sex, color,

religion, national origin, ancestry, lawful occupation, or age of the

owners or intended occupants of the residential development or

emergency shelter.

(c) No city, county, or city and county shall, in the enactment

or administration of ordinances pursuant to this title, prohibit or

discriminate against a residential development or emergency

shelter because the development or shelter is intended for occu-

pancy by persons and families of low and moderate income, as

defined in Section 50093 of the Health and Safety Code, or

persons and families of middle income.

For the purposes of this section, “persons and families of

middle income” means personas and families whose income does

not exceed 150 percent of the median income for the county in

which the persons or families reside.

(d) No city, county, or city and county may impose different

requirements on a residential development or emergency shelter

which is subsidized, financed, insured, or otherwise assisted by the

federal or state governments or by a local public entity, as defined

in Section 50079 of the Health and Safety Code, than those

imposed on nonassisted developments, except as provided in

subdivision (¢).

(e) Nothing in this title shall be construed to prohibit a city,

county, or city and county from extending preferential treatment

to residential developments or emergency shelters assisted by the

A-3

federal or state governments or by a local public entity, as defined

in Section 50079 of the Health and Safety Code, or other

residential developments or emergency shelters intended for occu-

pancy by p~.sons and families of low and moderate income, as

defined in Section 50093 of the Health and Safety Code, or

persons and families of middle income. This preferential treat-

ment may include, but need not be limited to, reduction or waiver

of fees or changes in architectural requirements, site development

and property line requirements, building setback requirements, or

vehicle parking requirements which reduce development costs of

these developments.

(f) “Residential development,” as used in this section, means

a single family residence or a multifamily residence.

(g) This section shall apply to chartered cities.

The Legislature finds and declares that discriminatory practices

which inhibit the development of housing for persons and families

of low, moderate, and middle income, or emergency shelters for

the homeless, are a matter of statewide concern.

A-4

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 65009:

§ 65009. Actions challenging local zoning and planning deci-

sions; legislative findings; limitation of issues; time limitations;

application of section

(a) (1) The Legislature finds and declares that there cur-

rently is a housing crisis in California and it is essential to reduce

delays and restraints upon expeditiously completing housing

projects.

(2) Legislature further finds and declares that a legal action

challenging a decision of a city, county, or city and county has a

chilling effect on the confidence with which property owners and

local governments can proceed with projects. Legal actions filed

to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul a decision of a city,

county, or city and county pursuant to this division can prevent

the completion of needed developments even though the projects

have received required governmental approvals.

(3) The purpose of this section is to provide certainty for

property owners and local governments regarding decisions made

pursuant to this division.

(b) (1) In an action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside,

void, or annul a finding, determination, or decision of a public

agency made pursuant to this title at a properly noticed public

hearing, the issues raised shall be limited to those raised in the

public hearing or in written correspondence delivered to the

public agency prior to, or at, the public hearing, except where the

court finds either of the following:

(A) The issue could not have been raised at the public hearing

by persons exercising reasonable diligence.

(B) The body conducting the public hearing prevented the

issue from being raised at the public hearing.

(2) Ifa public agency desires the provisions of this subdivision

to apply to a matter, it shall inciude in any public notice issued

pursuant to this title a notice substantially stating all of the

following: “If you challenge the (nature of the proposed action)

in court, you may be limited to raising only those issues you or

Re .

A-5

someone else raised at the public hearing described in this notice,

or in written correspondence delivered to the (public entity

conducting the hearing) at, or prior to, the public hearing.”

(3) The application of this subdivision to causes of action

brought pursuant to subdivision (d) applies only to the final

action taken in response to the notice to the city or county clerk.

If no final action is taken, then the issue raised in the cause of

action brought pursuant to subdivision (d) shall be limited to

those matters presented at a properly noticed public hearing or to

those matters specified in the notice given to the city or county

clerk pursuant to subdivision (d), or both.

(c) Except as provided in subdivision (d), no action or pro-

ceeding shall be maintained in any of the following cases by any

person unless the action or proceeding is commenced and service

is made on the legislative body within 120 days after the legisla-

tive body’s decision:

(1) To attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a

legislative body to adopt or amend a general or specific plan. This

paragraph does not apply where an action is brought based upon

the complete absence of a general plan or a mandatory eiement

thereof, but does apply to an action attacking a general plan or

mandatory element thereof on the basis that it is inadequate.

(2) To attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a

legislative body to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance.

(3) To determine the reasonableness, legality, or validity of

any decision to adopt or amend any regulation attached to a

specific plan.

(4) Concerning any of the proceedings, acts, or determinations

taken, done, or made prior to any of the decisions listed in

paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).

(d) An action or proceeding shall be commenced and the

legislative body served within two years after the accrual of the

cause of action as provided in this subdivision, if the action or

proceeding meets both of the following requirements:

A-6

(1) It is brought in support of the development of housing

projects which meet the requirements for housing for persons and

families with low or moderate incomes set forth in Section 65915.

(2) It is brought with respect to actions taken pursuant to

Article 10.6 (commencing with Section 65580) of Chapter 3 of

this division, pursuant to Section 65589.5, 65863.6, 65915, or

66474.2 or pursuant to Chapter 4.2 (commencing with

Section 65913).

A cause of action brought pursuant to this subdivision shall not

be maintained until 60 days have expired following notice to the

city or county clerk by the party bringing the cause of action, or

his or her representative, specifying the deficiencies of the general

plan, specific plan, or zoning ordinance. A cause of action brought

pursuant to this subdivision shall accrue 60 days after notice is

filed or the legislative body takes a final action in response to the

uotice, whichever occurs first. A notice or cause of action brought

by one party pursuant to this subdivision shall not bar filing of a

notice and initiation of a cause of action by any other party.

(ce) Upon the expiration of the time limits provided for in this

section, all persons are barred from any further action or

proceeding.

(f) Notwithstanding Section 65700, this section shall apply to

charter cities.

(g) Except as provided in subdivision (d), this section shall

not affect any law prescribing or authorizing a shorter period of

limitation than that specified herein.

(h) This section shall be applicable to those decisions of the

legislative body of a city, county, or city and county made

pursuant to this division on or after January 1, 1984.

A-7

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 65588:

§ 65588. Review and revision

(a) Each local government shall review its housing clement as

frequently as appropriate to evaluate all of the following:

(1) The appropriateness of the housing goals, objectives, and

policies in contributing to the attainment of the state housing

goal.

(2) The effectiveness of the housing element in attainment of

the community’s housing goals and objectives.

(3) The progress of the city, county, or city and county in

implementation of the housing element.

(b) The housing element shall be revised as appropriate, but

not less than every five years, to reflect the results of this periodic

review.

In order to /acilitate review by the department of housing

elements, local governments following shall prepare and adopt the

first two revisions of their housing elements no later than the dates

specified in the following schedule, notwithstanding the date of

adoption of the housing elements in existence on the effective

date of the act which amended this section during the 1983-84

session of the Legislature.

(1) Local governments within the regional jurisdiction of the

Southern California Association of Governments: July 1, 1984,

for the first revision and July 1, 1989, for the second revision.

(2) Local governments within the regional jurisdiction of the

Association of Bay Area Governments: January 1, 1985, for the

first revision, and July 1, 1990, for the second revision.

(3) Local governments within the regional jurisdiction of the

San Diego Association of Governments, the Council of Fresno

County Governments, the Kern County Council of Governments,

the Sacramento Council of Governments, and the Association of

Monterey Bay Area Governments: July 1, 1985, for the first

revision, and July 1, 1991, for the second revision.

A-8

(4) All other local governments: January 1, 1986, for the first

revision, and July 1, 1992, for the second revision.

(5) Subsequent revisions shall be completed not less often

than at five-year intervals following the second revision.

(c) The review and revision of housing elements required by

this section shall take into account any low- or moderate-income

housing which has been provided or required pursuant to

Section 65590.

(d) The review pursuant to sulilivision (c) shall include, but

need not be limited to, the following:

(1) The number of new housing units approved for construc-

tion within the coastal zone after January 1, 1982.

(2) The number of housing units for persons and families of

low or moderate income, as defined in Section 50093 of the

Health and Safety Code, required to be provided in new housing

developments either within the coastal zone or within three miles

of the coastal zone pursuant to Section 65590.

(3) The number of existing residential dwelling units occupied

by persons and families of low or moderate income, as defined in

Section 50093 of the Health and Safety Code, that have been

authorized to be demolished or converted since January 1, 1982,

in the coastal zone.

(4) The number of residential dwelling units for persons and

families of low or moderate income, as defined in Section 50093

of the Health and Safety Code, that have been required for

replacement or authorized to be converted or demolished as

identified in paragraph (3). The location of the replacement units,

either onsite, elsewhere within the locality’s jurisdiction within

the coastal zone, or within three miles of the coastal zone within

the locality’s jurisdiction, shall be designated in the review.

A-9

CALIFORNIA. GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 65751:

§ 65751. Writ of mandate

Any action to challenge a general plan or any element thereof

on the grounds that such plan or element does not substantially

comply with the requirements of Article 5 (commencing with

Section 65300) shall be brought pursuant to Section 1085 of the

Code of Civil Procedure.