Appendix — Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue
Supreme Court brief1989
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anite
October Term, 1988
E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,
Petitioner,
-against-
MINDY HYMOWITZ and ROBERT ABRAMS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondents.
E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,
Petitioner,
-against-
ELIZABETH TIGUE, et al.,
| Respondents.
E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,
Petitioner,
-against-
JANE DOLAN and ROBERT ABRAMS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
ALLEN F MAULSBY DAVID A. BARRETT
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE Counsel of Record
One Chase Manhattan Plaza DUKER & BARRETT
New York, N.Y. 10005 90 Broad Street
Banny M. Epstein New York, N.Y. 10004
MARC S. KLEIN (212) oe eree
SILLS CUMMIS ZUCKERMAN RADIN ROBERT L. DICKSON
TISCHMAN EPSTEIN & GROSS DAVID J. FLEMING
450 Park Avenue DICKSON, CARLSON & CAMPILLO
New York, N.Y. 10022 150 Broadway, Suite 1600
New York, N.Y. 10038
August 2, 1989
|
= m\
iF
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Appendix A
Opinion of New York Court of Appeals in
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., Tigue v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., Dolan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
and Hanfling v. Eli Lilly & Co. (April 4,
eg RENE REE IA iii 2 SRE ROE RRS «OD Pe la
Appendix B
Order of Appellate Division, First Department, in
Hymowitz(April 14, 1988)......................065. 35a
Appendix C
Order and Opinion of Appellate Division, First
Department, in Tigue (April 14, 1988) .......... 37a
Appendix D
Order of Appellate Division, First Department, in
I I faba ii sane verde en -veensscrses 42a
Appendix E
Opinion of Supreme Court, New York County, in
FE VOROWES UIGEY FO BOOED anon ve eecceccccccceceeene: 44a
Appendix F
Opinion of Supreme Court, New York County, in
ps i a eee Peer e eee 55a
Appendix G
Order of Supreme Court, New York County, in
Dotan (September 23, 1987) ..................0000. 66a
* This Appendix reproduces the original slip opinions and orders ©
as exactly as possible. Petitioner has not attempted to change
apparent errors in matters of spelling, typography, or form.
Appendix H
Order of Supreme Court, New York County, in
Dotan (Octobe: Be Bi icaks sas one nsvcdscaewcttxie-
Appendix |
Supplemental Order of Supreme Court, New York
County, in Tigue (August 17, 1988)..............
Appendix J
Judgment/Remittitur of New York Court of
Appeals in Hymowitz (April 4, 1989)............
Appendix K
Judgment/ Remittitur of New York Court of
Appeals in Tigue (April 4, 1989)..................
Appendix L
Judgment/ Remittitur of New York Court of
Appeals in Dolan (April 4, 1989) .................
Appendix M
Excerpt from “Brief of Defendant-Appellant E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc.,” filed in New York Court
of Appeals in Tigue (November 8, 1988)........
Appendix N
Excerpt from “Brief of Defendants-Appellants
Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company,
and Merck & Co., Inc.,” filed in New York
Court of Appeals in Tigue (November 8,
GED wv cas sno 0cnginctbense ce aeeeencoa ae
Appendix O
Excerpt from “Brief of Defendant-Appellant of E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc.,” filed in New York Court
of Appeals in Dolan (November 8, 1988) .......
69a
74a
75a
77a
79a
8la
82a
87a
iil
Appendix P
Excerpt from “Brief of Appellant E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc.,” filed in Appellate Division, First
Department in Zigue and Dolan (November
LL dic, devcecetctaccviee ese ove .. 88a
la
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the New York Court of Appeals
(April 4, 1989)
STATE OF NEW YORK
COURT OF APPEALS
l No.
Mindy Hymowitz,
Respondent,
56
v.
Eli Lilly and Company,
et al.,
Appellants,
and Merck & Co., Inc.,
et al.
Defendants,
Attorney General of the
State of New York,
Intervenor-Respondent.
OPINION
This opinion is uncorrected
and subject to revision
before publication in the
New York Reports.
l No.
Jane Dolan, et al.,
Respondents,
58
v.
Eli Lilly & Company, et al.,
Appellants.
(and other actions.)
#151 actions
l No.
Elizabeth Tigue, et al.,
Respondents,
57
v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
et al.
Appellants,
et al.,
Defendants.
l No.
Barbara Hanfling, et al.
Respondents,
59
v.
Eli Lilly and Company,
et al.
Appellants,
et al.,
Defendants.
(56) Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Sanford N. Berland, Susan
A. Winston, NYC, for appellant Lilly.
Robin J. Stout, Jay P.
Mayesh, William A. Rome,
NYC, for appellant Upjohn.
2a
Robert M. Dato, David J. Fleming, Santa Monica,
Barry M. Epstein, Lindsay H. Lew, NYC, for
appellant Squibb.
Karl E. Seib, Jr., Robert D. Wilson, Jr., NYC, for
appellant Abbott.
Paul D. Rheingold, NYC, for respondent
Hymowitz.
Kobert Abrams, Attorney General (Andrea Green,
O. Peter Sherwood of counsel) for intervenor-
respondent.
Herbert Semel, NYC, NY Public Interest Research
Group, et al., amici curiae.
(57) Jay P. Mayesh, Burton N. Lipshie, Robin J. Stout,
William A. Rome, NYC, for appellant Upjohn.
A. Edward Grashof, Thomas F. Clauss, Jr., Sheila
M. Fessler, Paul A. Scrudato, NYC, for appellant
Rexall.
Alexander C. Cordes, Paul K. Stecker, Buffalo;
Marc S. Klein, Lindsay H. Lew, NYC; David
J. Fleming, Robert M. Dato, Santa Monica, for
appellant Squibb.
Charles M. McCaghey, William K. Dodds, NYC,
for appellant Boyle.
John L. McGoldrick, Karl E. Seib, Jr., Theodore
V.H. Mayer, John F. Brenner, NYC, for
appellants Abbott et al.
Paul D. Rheingold, NYC, for respondents.
(58) Sharon E. Jaffe, Joseph A. DiBenedetto, Lisa A.
Schoolman, NYC, for appellant Rorer.
Jay P. Mayesh, Burton N. Lipshie, Robin J. Stout,
Carole W. Nimaroff, NYC, for appellant Upjohn.
Alexander C. Cordes, Paul K. Stecker, Buffalo;
Marc S. Klein, Lindsay H. Lew, NYC, David
J. Fleming, Robert M. Dato, Santa Monica, for
appellant Squibb.
3a
Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Sanford N. Berland, Susan
A. Winston, NYC, for appellant Lilly.
William D. Fireman, NYC, for respondents Dolan
et al.
Perry S. Reich, Sybil Shainwald, Steven M.
Schapiro, NYC, for respondents Murphy.
(59) Karl E. Seib, Jr., Robert D. Wilson, Jr., NYC, for
appellant Abbott.
Robin J. Stout, James T. Conlon, David M. Covey,
Ann L, Wilson, NYC for appellant Upjohn.
W. Burlette Carter, Theodore V.H. Mayer, Charles
Lozow, NYC, for appellant Merck.
Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Kenneth J. King, Charna L.
Gerstenhaber, NYC, for respondent Lilly.
Arthur N. Luxenberg, Morris J. Eisen, Perry Weitz,
NYC, for respondents.
WACHTER, Ch. J.:
Plaintiffs in these appeals allege that they were injured
by the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) ingested by their
mothers during pregnancy. They seek relief against
defendant DES manufacturers. While not class actions,
these cases are representative of nearly 500 similar
actions pending in the courts in this state; the rules
articulated by the Court here, therefore, must do justice
and be administratively feasible in the context of this
mass litigation. With this in mind, we now resolve the
issue twice expressly left open by this Court, and adopt
a market share theory, using a national market, for
determining liability and apportioning damages in DES
cases in which identification of the manufacturer of the
drug that injured the plaintiff is impossible (see,
Kaufman vy Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 456; Bichler v
Lilly & Co., 5S NY2d 571, 580). We also hold that the
Legislature’s revival for one year of actions for injuries
4a
caused by DES that were previously barred by the statute
of limitations (see, L 1986, ch 682, § 4) is constitutional
under the State and Federal Constitutions.
The history of the development of DES and its
marketing in this country has been repeatedly chronicled
(see, e.g., Bichler v Lilly & Co., supra; Martin v Abbott
Labs, 102 Wash2d 581; Sindell v Abbott Labs, 26 Cal3d
588 cert denied 449 US 912; Sheiner, DES and a
Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 Ford L Rev
963). Briefly, DES is a synthetic substance that mimics
the effect of estrogen, the naturally formed female
hormone. It was invented in 1937 by British researchers,
but never patented.
In 1941, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved the New Drug Applications (NDA) of 12
manufacturers to market DES for the treatment of
various maladies, not directly involving pregnancy. In
1947, the FDA began approving the NDAs of manu-
facturers to market DES for the purpose of preventing
human miscarriages; by 1951, the FDA had concluded
that DES was generally safe for pregnatcy use, and
stopped requiring the filing of NDAs when new
manufacturers sought to produce the drug for this
purpose. In 1971, however, the FDA banned the use
of DES as a miscarriage preventative, when studies
established the harmful latent effects of DES upon the
offspring of mothers who took the drug. Specifically,
tests indicated that DES caused vaginal adenocarci-
noma, a form of cancer, and adenosis, a pre- cancerous
vaginal or cervical growth.
Although strong evidence links prenatal DES
exposure to later development of serious medical
problems, plaintiffs seeking relief-in court for their
Sa
injuries faced two formidable and fundamental barriers
to recovery in this State; not only is identification of
the manufacturer of the DES ingested in a particular
case generally impossible, but, due to the latent nature
of DES injuries, many claims were barred by the statute
of limitations before the injury was discovered.
The identification problem has many causes. All DES
was of identical chemical composition. Druggists usually
filled prescriptions from whatever was on hand.
Approximately 300 manufacturers produced the drug,
with companies entering and leaving the market
continuously during the 24 years that DES was sold
for pregnancy use. The long latency period of a DES
injury compounds the identification problem; memories
fade, records are lost or destroyed, and witnesses die.
Thus the pregnant women who took DES generally never
knew who produced the drug they took, and there was
no reason to attempt to discover this fact until many
years after ingestion, at which time the information is
not available.
We recognized this predicament in Bichler v Lilly &
Co. (supra at 579), where the Court stated that in DES
cases it is a “practical impossibility for most victims
[to] pinpoint * * * the manufacturer directly responsible
for their particular injury.” We allowed plaintiff's
recovery in that case, however, notwithstanding the
failure of the plaintiff to identify the manufacturer of
the injurious DES, on the limited basis that “the evidence
was legally sufficient to support the jury verdict for the
plaintiff’ on the law as charged to the jury, and
unobjected to by the defendant (see, Kaufman v_Lilly
& Co., 65 NY2d 449, 456). The question, therefore, of
whether non-identification of the manufacturer pre-
cludes plaintiffs from recovering for DES caused injuries,
remained unresolved after Bichler v Lilly & Co. (supra).
6a
The second barrier to recovery, involving the statutue
of limitations, arose from the longstanding rule in this
State that the limitations period accrued upon exposure
im actions alleging personal injury caused by toxic
substances (Fleishman v Lilly & Co., 62 NY2d 888, cert
denied 469 US 1192). In Fleishman v Lilly & Co. (supra)
it became clear that this exposure rule led to many DES
cases being barred by the statute of limitations before
the discovery of injury; we held, however, that any
change in the accrual date from exposure to discovery
was more properly the prerogative of the Legislature
(id. at 890; see, id. at 891 [Cooke, Ch. J., dissenting]).
Four years after Fleishman v Lilly & Co. the Legislature
addressed the statute of limitations problem, and
instituted a discovery rule for “the latent effects of
exposure to any substance” (L 1986, ch 682, §2). The
Legislature also, for one year, revived causes of action
for exposure to DES that had been time barred (L 1986,
ch 682, § 4).
It is estimated that eventually 800 DES cases will be
brought under the revival portion of this recent statute.
Moreover, as indicated in Bichler v Lilly & Co. (supra),
and as apparent from the record now before the Court,
in the vast majority of these cases identification of the
manufacturer of the DES that injured the plaintiff will
be impossible. The Legislature, however, while reviving
these time-barred actions, did not resolve the identifi-
cation problem.
The present appeals are before the Court in the context
of summary judgment motions. In all of the appeals
defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the
complaints because plaintiffs could not identify the
manufacturer of the drug that allegedly injured them.
In three of the appeals defendants also moved on statute
of limitations grounds, arguing that the revival of the
7a
actions was unconstitutional under the State and Federal
Constitutions, and that the complaints, therefore, are
time barred and should be dismissed. The trial court
denied all of these motions. On the statute of limitations
issue, the trial court also granted plaintiffs’ cross
motions, [sic] dismissing defendants’ affirmative defenses
that the actions were time barred. The Appellate Division
affirmed in all respects and certified to this Court the
questions of whether the orders of the trial court were
properly made. We answer these questions in the
affirmative.
Il.
In a products liability action, identification of the exact
defendant whose product injured the plaintiff is, of
course, generally required (see, e.g., Morrissey v
Conservative Gas Corp., 285 AD 825, affd 1 NY2d 741;
Prosser & Keeton, Torts §103, at 713 [Sth ed]). In DES
cases in which such identification is possible, actions
may proceed under established principles of products
liability (Bichler v Lilly Co. supra at 579). The record
now before us, however, presents the question of whether
a DES plaintiff may recover against a DES manufacturer
when identification of the producer of the specific drug
that caused the injury is impossible.
A. ;
As we noted in Bichler v Lilly Co. (supra at 580,
n5), the accepted tort doctrines of alternative liability
and concerted action are available in some personal
injury cases to permit recovery where the precise
identification of a wrongdoer is impossible. However,
we agree with the near unanimous vies of the high state
courts that have considered the matter that these
doctrines in their unaltered commonlaw forms do rot
permit recovery in DES cases (see, e.g., Sindell v Abbott
8a
Labs, supra; Collins v Lilly & Co., 116 Wis2d 166; Martin
v Abbott Labs, supra; but see, Abel v Lilly & Co., 418
Mich 311 [held that there was a question of fact presented
as to alternative liability and concerted action]).
The paradigm of alternative liability is found in the
case of Summers v Tice (33 Cal2d 80). In Summers
(supra), plaintiff and the two defendants were hunting,
and defendants carried identical shotguns and ammu-
nition. During the hunt, defendants shot simultaneously
at the same bird,and plaintiff was struck by birdshot
from one of the defendants’ guns. The court held that
where two defendants breach a duty to the plaintiff,
but there is uncertainty regarding which one caused the
injury, “the burden is upon such actor to prove that.
he has not caused the harm” (Restatement [Second] of
Torts §433B[3]; Bichler v Lily & Co., supra at 580, n
5; cf, Ravo v Rogatnick, 70 NY2d 305 [successive
tortfeasors may be held jointly and severally liable for
an indivisible injury to the plaintiff]). The central
rationale for shifting the burden of proof in such a
situation is that without this device both defendants will
be silent, and plaintiff will not recover; with alternative
liability, however, defendants will be forced to speak,
and reveal the culpable party, or else be held jointly
and severally liable themselves. Consequently, use of the
alternative liability doctrine generally requires that the
defendants have better access to information than does
the plaintiff, and that all possible tortfeasors be before
the court (see, Summers v Tice, supra at 86; Restatement
[Second] of Torts §433B, comment h). It is also
recognized that alternative liability rests on the notion
that where there: is a smail number of possible
wrongdoers, all of whom breached a duty to the plaintiff,
the likelihood that any of them injured the plaintiff is
9a
relatively high, so that forcing them to exonerate
themselves, or be held liable, is not unfair (Sindell v
Abbott Labs, supra at 139).
in DES cases, however, there is a great number of
possible wrongdoers, who entered and left the market
at different times, and some of whom no longer exist.
Additionally, in DES cases many years elapse between
the ingestion of the drug and injury. Consequently, DES
defendants are not in any better position than are
plaintiffs to identify the manufacturer of the DES
ingested in any given case, nor is there any real prospect
of having all the possible producers before the court.
Finally, while it may be fair to employ alternative liability
in cases involving only a small number of potential
wrongdoers, that fairness disappears with the decreasing
probability that any one of the defendants actually
caused the injury. This is particularly true when applied
to DES where the chance that a particular producer
caused the injury is often very remote (Sindell v Abbot
Labs, supra at 603; Collins v Lilly & Co., supra at 184).
Alternative liability, therefore, provides DES plaintiffs
no relief.
Nor does the theory of concerted action, in its pure
form, supply a basis for recovery. This doctrine, seen
in dragT part of all defendants having an understanding,
express or tacit, to participate in “a common plan or
design to commit a tortious act” (Prosser & Keeton,
Torts §46, at 323 [Sth ed]; see Bichler v Lilly & Co.,
supra at 580-581; De Carvalho v Brunner, 223 NY 284).
As we noted in Bichler v Lilly & Co., and as the present
record reflects, drug companies were engaged in
extensive parallel conduct in developing and marketing
DES (see, id. at 585). There is nothing in the record,
however, beyond this similar conduct to show any
agreement, tacit or otherwise, to market DES for
10a
pregnancy use without taking proper steps to ensure
the drug’s safety. Parallel activity, without more, is
insufficient to establish the agreement element necessary
to maintain a concerted action claim (Sindell v Abbot
Labs, supra at 605; Collins v Lilly & Co., supra at 85;
Martin v Abbott Labs, supra at 599.) Thus this theory
also fails in supporting an action by DES plaintiffs.
In short, extant common law doctrines, unmodified,
provide no relief for the DES plaintiff unable to identify
the manufacturer of the drug that injured her. This is
not a novel conclusion; in the last decade a number
of courts in other jurisdictions also have concluded that
present theories do not support a cause of action in
DES cases. Some courts, upon reaching this conclusion,
have declined to find any judicial remedy for the DES
plaintiffs who cannot identify the particular manufac-
turer of the DES ingested by their mothers (see, Zafft
v Lilly & Co., 67 SW2d 241 [Mo] [en banc]; Mulcahy
v Lilly & Co., 386 NW2d 67 [lowa] [stating that any
change in the law to allow for recovery in non-
identification DES cases should come from the
legislature]). Other courts, however, have found that
some modification of existing doctrine is appropriate
to allow for relief for those injured by DES of unknown
manufacture (e.g., Sindell v Abbot [sic] Labs, supra;
Collins v Lilly & Co., supra; Martin v Abbott Labs,
supra).
We conclude that the present circumstances call for
recognition of a realistic avenue of relief for plaintiffs
injured by DES. These appeals present many of the same
considerations that have prompted this Court in the past
to modify the rules of personal injury liability, in order
“to achieve the ends of justice in a more modern context”
(see, People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 489; Codling V
Paglia, 32 NY2d 330, 341), and we perceive that here
lla
judicial action is again required “to oyercome the
inordinately difficult problems of proof” caused by
contemporary products and marketing techniques (see,
Bichler v Lilly & Co., supra at 579-580 [quoting Caprara
v Chrysler Corp., 52 NY2d 114, 123)).
Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the reasonable
expectations of a modern society to say to these plaintiffs
that because of the insidious nature of an injury that
long remains dormant, and because so many manufac-
turers, each behind a curtain, contributed to the
devastation, the cost of injury should be borne by the
innocent and not the wrongdoers. This is particularly
so where the legislature consciously created these
expectations by reviving hundreds of DES cases.
Consequently, the ever-evolving dictates of justice and
fairness, which are the heart of our common-law system,
require formation of a remedy for injuries caused by
DES (see, Woods v Lancet, 303 NY 349, 355; see, also,
Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate Judging: A
Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern, 73 Cornell L.
Rev. 1004).
We stress, however, that the DES situation is a singular
case, with manufacturers acting in a parallel manner
to produce an identical, generically marketed product,
which causes injury many years later, and which has
evoked a legislative response reviving previously barred
actions. Given this unusual scenario, it is more
appropriate that the loss be borne by those that produced
the drug for use during pregnancy, rather than by those
who were injured by the use, even where the precise
manufacturer of the drug cannot be identified in a
particular action. We turn then to the question of how
to fairly and equitably apportion the loss occasioned
by DES, in a case where the exact manufacturer of the
drug that caused the injury is unknown.
12a
The past decade of DES litigation has produced a
number of alternative approaches to resolve this
question. Thus, in a sense, we are now in an enviable
position; the efforts of other courts provided examples
for contending with this difficult issue, and enough time
has passed so that the actual administration and real
effects of these solutions now can be observed. With
these useful guides in hand, a path may be struck for
our own conclusion.
First, this Court’s opinion in Bichler v Lilly & Co.
(supra) must be considered. There the jury was instructed
on a modified version of concerted action, which, in
effect, substituted the fact of conscious parallel activity
by manufacturers for the usual common law requirement
that there be proof of an actual agreement between actors
to jointly act tortiously (id. at 584). The defendant in
Bichler did not object’ to this instruction, and the
modified concerted action theory became the law
applicable to that particular case (id. at 583- 584).
Now given the opportunity to assess the merits of
this theory, we decline to adopt it as the law of this
State. Parallel behavior, the major justification for
visiting liability caused by the product of one manu-
facturer upon the head of another under this analysis,
is a common occurrence in industry generally. We
believe, therefore, that inferring agreement from the fact
of parallel activity alone improperly expands the concept
of concerted action beyond a rational or fair limit; among
other things, it potentially renders small manufacturers,
in the case of DES and in countless other industries,
jointly liable for all ddmages stemming from the defective
products of an entire industry (accord, Sindell v Abbot
Labs, supra at 605).
13a
A narrower basis for liability, tailored more closely
to the varying culpableness of individual DES producers,
is the market share concept. First judicially articulated
by the California Supreme Court in Sindell v Abbott
Labs (supra), variations upon this theme have been
adopted by other courts (see, Collins v Lilly & Co.,
supra; Martin v Abbott Labs, supra). \n Sindell v Abbott
Labs (supra), the Court synthesized the market share
concept by modifying the Summers v Tice (supra)
aiternative liability rationale in two ways. It first
loosened the requirement that all possible wrongdoers
be before the court, and instead made a “substantial
share” sufficient. The court then held that each defendant
who could not prove that it did not actually injure
plaintiff would be liable according to that manufacturer’s
market share: The court’s central justification for
adopting this approach was its belief that limiting a
defendant’s liability to its market share will result, over
the run of cases, in liability on the part of a defendant
roughly equal to the injuries the defendant actually
caused (id. at 612).
In the recent case of Brown v Superior Court (44
Cal3d 1049), the California Supreme Court resolved
some apparent ambiguity in Sindell v Abbott Labs, and
held that a manufacturer’s liability is several only, and,
in cases in which all manufacturers in the market are
not joined for any reason, liability will still be limited
to market share, resulting in a less than 100% recovery
for a plaintiff. Finally, it is noteworthy that determining
market shares under Sindell v Abbott Labs proved
difficult and engendered years of litigation. After
attempts at using smaller geographical units, it was
eventually determined that the national market provided
the most feasible and fair solution,.and this national
market information was compiled (see, In re Complex
DES Litigation, No. 830/109 Cal Super Ct).
l4a
Four years after Sindell v Abbott Labs, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court followed with Collins v Lilly & Co. (116
Wis2d 166). Deciding the identification issue without
the benefit of the extensive California litigation over
market shares, the Wisconsin court held that it was
prevented from following Sindell due to “the practical
difficulty of defining and proving market share” (id. at
189). Instead of focusing on tying liability closely to
the odds of actual causation, as the Sindell court
attempted, the Collins court took a broader perspective,
and held that each defendant is liable in proportion to
the amount of risk it created that the plaintiff would
be injured by DES. Under the Collins structure, the
“risk” each defendant is liable for is a question of fact
in each case, with market shares being relevant to this
determination (id. at 191, 200). Defendants are allowed,
however, to exculpate themselves by showing that their
product could not have caused the injury to the particular
plaintiff (id. at 198).
The Washington Supreme Court, writing soon after
Collins v Lilly & Co., took yet another approach (see,
Martin v Abbott Labs, 102 Wash2d 581). The Martin
court first rejected the Sindell market share theory due
to the belief (which later proved to be erroneous in Brown
v Superior Court {supra]) that California’s approach
distorted liability by inflating market shares to ensure
plaintiffs of full recovery (id. at 601). The Martin court
instead adopted what it termed “market share alternative
liability,” justified, it concluded, because “[eJach
defendant contributed to the risk of injury to the public,
and consequently, the risk to individual plaintiffs” (id.
at 604).
Under the Washington scheme, defendants are first
allowed to exculpate themselves by proving by the
preponderance of the evidence that they were not the
1Sa
manutacturer of the DES that injured plaintiff.
Unexculpated defendants are presumed to have equal
market shares, totalling 100%. Each defendant then has
the opportunity to rebut this presumption by showing
that its actual market share was less than presumed.
If any defendants succeed in rebutting this presumption,
the liability shares of the remaining defendants who
could not prove their actual market share are inflated,
so that the plaintiff received a 100% recovery (id. at
605-606).' The market shares of defendants is a question
of fact in each case, and the relevant market can be
a particular pharmacy, or county, or state, or even the
country, depending upon the circumstances the case
presents (George v Parke- Davis, supra).
Turning to the structure to be adopted in New York,
we heed both the lessons learned through experience
in other jurisdictions and the realities of the mass
litigation of DES claims in this State. Balancing these
considerations, we are led to the conclusion that a market
share theory, based upon a national market, provides
the best solution. As California discovered, the reliable
'The actual operation of this theory proved more mathematically
compiex when the court was presented with the question of what
to do about unavailable defendants. Recognizing that the possibility
of abuse existed when defendants implead unavailable defendants,
who would then be assumed to have had an equal share of the
market, the court placed the burden upon appearing defendants
to prove the market share of the absent ones (George v Parke-
Davis, 107 Wash2d 584). If this can be proved, the plaintiff simply
cannot recover the amount attributable to the absent defendant,
and thus recovery in the case is less than 100%. If the market
Share of the absent defendant cannot be shown, the remaining
defendants who cannot proved their market shares have their shares
inflated to provide plaintiff with full recovery. Finally, if all
appearing defendants can prove their market shares, their shares
are never inflated, regardless of whether the market share of a
non-appearing defendant can be proved or not: thus, in this
situation, the plaintiff again will not recover her full damages (id.).
l6a
determination of any market smaller-than the national
one likely is not practicable. Moreover, even if it were
possible, of the hundreds of cases in the New York courts,
without a doubt there are many in which the DES that
allegedly caused injury was ingested in another State.
Among the thorny issues this could present, perhaps
the most daunting is the specter that the particular case
could require the establishment of a separate market
share matrix. We feel that this is an unfair, and perhaps
impossible burden to routinely place upon the litigants
in individual cases.
Nor do we believe that the Wisconsin approach of
assessing the “risk” each defendant caused a particular
plaintiff, to be litigated anew as a question of fact in
each case, is the best solution for this State. Applied
on a limited scale this theory may be feasible, and
certainly is the most refined approach by allowing a
more thorough consideration of how each defendant's
actions threatened the plaintiff. We are wary, however,
of setting loose, for application in the hundreds of cases
pending in this State, a theory which requires the
factfinder’s individualized and open-ended assessment
of the relative liabilities of scores of defendants in every
case. Instead, it is our perception that the injustices
arising from delayed recoveries and inconsistent results
which this theory may produce in this State outweigh
arguments calling for its adoption.
Consequently, for essentially practical reasons, we
adopt a market share theory using a national market.
We are aware that that [sic] the adoption of a national
market will likely result in a disproportion between the
liability of individual manufacturers and the actual
injuries each manufacturer caused in this State. Thus
our market share theory cannot be founded upon the
belief that, over the run of cases, liability will
17a
approximate causation in this State (see, Sindell y
Abbott Labs, supra at 612). Nor does the use of a national
market provide a reasonable link between liability and
the risk created by a defendant to a particular plaintiff
(see, Collins v Lilly & Co. supra; Martin v Abbot Labs,
supra). Instead, we choose to apportion liability so as
to correspond to the overall culpability of each
defendant, measured by the amount of risk of injury
each defendant created to the public at large. Use of
a national market is a fair method, we believe, of
apportioning defendants’ liabilities according to their
total culpability in marketing DES for use during
pregnancy. Under the circumstances, this is an equitable
way to provide plaintiffs with the relief they deserve,
while also rationally distributing the responsibility for
piaintiffs’ injuries among defendants.
To be sure, a defendant cannot participate in the
marketing of DES for pregnancy use; if a DES producer
satisfies its burden of proof of showing that it was not
a member of the market of DES sold for pregnancy
use, disallowing exculpation would be unfair and unjust.
Nevertheless, because liability here is based on the overall
risk produced, and not causation in a single case, there
should be no exculpation of a defendant who, although
a member of the market producing DES for pregnancy
use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff's
injury. It is merely a windfall for a producer to escape
liability solely because it manufactured a more
identifiable pill, or sold only to certain drugstores. These
fortuities in no way diminish the culpability of a
defendant for marketing the product, which is the basis
of liability here.?
?Various defendants argue here that although they produced DES,
it was not sold for pregnancy use. If a defendant was not a member
of the national market of DES marketed for pregnancy, it is not
18a
Finally, we hold that the liability of DES producers
is several only, and should not be inflated when all
participants in the market are not before the court in
a particular case. We understand that, as a practical
matter, this will prevent some plaintiffs from recovering
100% of their damages. However, we eschewed
exculpation to prevent the fortuitous avoidance of
liability, and thus, equitably, we decline to unleash the
same forces to increase a defendant’s liability beyond
its fair share of responsibility.3
culpable, and should not be liable. Consequently, if a particular
defendant sold DES in a form unsuitable for use during pregnancy,
or if a defendant establishes that its product was not marketed
for pregnancy use, there should be no liability. From the record
before the Court here, however, the facts are not developed weli
enough to establish that any defendants were not in the national
market of DES sold for pregnancy use. Thus summary judgment
cannot at this time be granted on this issue as to any defendants.
3The dissenter misapprehends the basis for liability here. We have
not by the backdoor adopted a theory of concerted action. We
avoided extending this theory, because its concomitant requirement
of joint and several liability expands the burden on small
manufactuers beyond a rational or fair limit. This result is reached
by the dissent, not by the majority, so that criticism on this front
is misplaced.
We are confronted here with an unprecedented identification
problem, and have provided a solution that rationally apportions
liability. We have heeded the practical lessons learned by other
jurisdictions, resulting in our adoption of a national market theory
with full knowledge that it concedes the lack of a logical link between
liability and causation in a single case. The dissent ignores these
lessons, and, endeavoring to articulate a theory it perceives to be
closer to traditional law, sets out a construct in which liability
is based upon chance, not upon the fair assessment of the acts
of defendants. Under the dissent’s theory, a manufacturer with a
large market share may avoid liability in many cases just because
it manufactured a memorably shaped pill. Conversely, a small
manufacturer can be held jointly liable for the full amount of every
DES injury in this State simply because the shape of its product
19a
The constitutionality of the revival statute remains
to be considered (see, L 1986, ch 682, §4). This section
revives, for the period of one year, actions for damages
caused by the latent effects of DES, tungsten carbide,
asbestos, chlordane, and polyvinylchloride. Defendants
argue that the revival of barred DES claims was
unconstitutional as a denial of both due process and
equa! protection, under the State and Federal Consti-
tutions (see NY Const art 1, §§6, Il; US Const, 14th
Amend, §1). We are concerned here only with the
constitutionality of the statute as it pertains to DES;
there are no producers of the other substances, or
plaintiffs alleging injury therefrom, before the Court on
these appeals. -
The federal due process clause provides very little
barrier to a state legislature’s revival of time-barred
actions (see, Chase Securities Corp v Donaldson, 325
US 304). In Chase, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the revival of a time barred action, stating that
statutes of limitation “represent a public policy about
the privilege to litigate * * * the history of pleas shows
them to be good only by legislative grace and to be
subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control”
(id. at 314). Under state law, the level of review seems
was not remarkable, even though the odds, realistically, are
exceedingly long that the small manufacturer caused the injury
in any one particular case. .
Therefore, although the dissent’s theory based upon a “shifting
the burden of proof” and joint and several liability is facially
reminiscent of prior law, in the case of DES it is nothing more
than advocating that bare fortuity be the test for liability. When
faced with the novel identification problem posed by DES cases,
it is preferable to adopt a new theory that apportions fault rationally,
rather than to contort extant doctrines beyond the point at which
they provide a sound premise for determining liability.
20a
somewhat more stringent. In Gallewski v Hentz (301
NY 164, 174) the Court stated that “the Legislature may
constitutionally revive a personal cause of action where
the circumstances are exceptional and are such as to
satisfy the Court that serious injustice would result to
plaintiffs not guilty of any fault if the intentions of the
Legislature were not effected.” It appears, however, that
we have applied a less strict test in other cases, and
have been satisfied if there was an apparent injustice
which “calls for a remedy,” and which is “reasonable”
and not “arbitrary.” (Robinson v Robbins Dry Dock
& Repair Co., 238 NY 271, 279-280).
We need not light upon a precise test here, however,
because the Legislature’s revival of DES claims meets
the highest standard. For at least 25 years this Court
maintained an exposure rule for toxic substances,
because it was felt that change in this area was the
responsibility of the Legislature (see, e.g., Schwartz v
Heyden Newport, 12 NY2d 212, 220; Fleishman v Lilly
& Co., supra at 890). Indeed, in Fleishman v Lilly &
Co. (supra) the Legislature’s attention was drawn
specifically to DES by the majority, which stated that
any change in the exposure rule was the Legislature’s
role.
The Legislature has now revived DES actions that
were time barred under the exposure rule, while also
instituting a discovery rule for future application (L 1986,
ch 682, §4; CPLR 214-c). The latent nature of DES
injuries is well known, and it is clear that in the past
the exposure rule prevented the bringing of timely actions
for recovery. Thus we believe that exceptional circum-
stances are presented, that an injustice has been rectified,
and that the requirements of Gallewski v Hentz (supra)
have been met.
'
:
2la
Defendants argue further that, even if the statute is
generally valid, it may be unconstitutionally applied in
cases in which the plaintiff could have sued originally,
but did not. It does seem that some plaintiffs may have
known of their injuries a day, or a week, a month, or
perhaps longer, before the original limitations period
ran. Some may have known of their exposure, but did
not develop injuries during the limitations period. Others
may have known of some effect upon them of DES
exposure, which became cancerous only after any action
would have been time barred. Under these circumstances,
the Legislature properly determined that it would be
more fair for all plaintiffs to uniformly now have one
year to bring their actions, rather than for the courts
to begin drawing arbitrary lines transecting this area’s
shades of gray.
Defendants also argue that the revival statute violates
equal protection, because the Legislature designated only
five substances for revival, including DES, while
instituting a prospective only discovery rule for other
substances. Defendants claim that this categorization is
without sufficient basis, and that it is the result of a
“political compromise.” But most, if not all legislation
is the product of some compromise, so that this objection
surely is no basis for finding the revival statute
unconstitutional. Instead, here we must proceed on the
presumption that the law is constitutional, and will hold
otherwise only if it is established that the distinction
drawn has no reasonable basis (Trump v Chu, 62 NY2d
20; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 61). Moreover,
because defendants allege no impairment of a funda-
mental right, the Legislature has substantial leeway in
making classifications in this area of “economics and
social welfare” (see, Montgomery v Daniels, supra,
[quoting Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485}).
22a
As it pertains to DES, surely the revival statute has
a rational basis, and the Legislature acted within its
broad range of discretion in enacting the law. The
number of DES-caused injuries was relatively well
known by the Legislature, which allowed for the
ramifications of revival of DES claims, such as the effect
on insurance interests, and the other costs, to be
reasonably predicted (Record of Proceedings, New York
Assembly [June 24, 1986][statement of Assemblyman
M. H. Miller]). Furthermore, it was also well known,
particularly after Fleishman v Lilly (supra), that DES
victims were prejudiced under current law. This, we
believe, is enough of a basis for the Legislature to revive
DES claims now, and wait as to other substances until
it is felt that these substances present a problem suitable
for resolution. The Legislature does not violate equal
protection by providing a rational piecemeal remedy for
what may be a larger problem ( Williamson v Lee Optical,
348 US 483).
Accordingly, in each case the order of the Appellate
Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified
question answered in the affirmative.
Hymowitz v Eli Lilly - Case No. 56
Tigue v E.R. Squibb - Case No. 57
Dolan v Eli Lilly - Case No. 58
Hanfling v Eli Lilly - Case No. 59
MOLLEN, J. (concurring in Hymowitz and Hanfling;
and dissenting in part in Tigue and Dolan):
The issue presented to the Court in this appeal is to
determine whether the revival statute for DES claims
is constitutional and has properly “opened the window”
to enable injured parties to recover for their injuries
caused by DES and, if so, how to best enable such
plaintiffs to overcome the practical impossibility of
23a
bearing their normal burden of proof of demonstrating
that the defendants caused their injuries. The majority
has selected one approach to meet this issue. However,
I am compelled to concur in part and dissent in part
because I am convinced that another more appropriate
method of approaching this issue is fairer and more just
and equitable to the plaitniffs and to those defendants
who could not have caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and
which is consistent with established principles of tort
law. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the
revival statute is, in all respects, constitutional and may
be relied upon by the plaintiffs herein. I am also in
complete agreement with the majority’s view that the
market share theory of liability, based upon a national
market, is an appropriate means by which to accord
DES plaintiffs an opportunity to seek recovery for their
injuries. However, | respectfully disagree with the
majority’s conclusion that there should be no exculpation
of those defendants who produced and marketed DES
for pregnancy purposes, but who produced and marketed
DES for pregnancy purposes, but who can prove, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that they did not
produce or market the particular pill ingested by the
plaintiff's mother. Moreover, in order to ensure that
these plaintiffs receive full recovery of their damages,
as they are properly entitled to by any fair standard,
I would retain the principle of imposing joint and several
liability upon those defendants which cannot exculpate
themselves.
The emergence of the market share concept ofiability
in the field of products liability reflects a recognition
by several jurisdictions throughout the United States
that due to the incidence of mass production and
marketing of various drugs and fungible goods,
consumers are many times harmed by a product which
24a
is not easiiy traceable to a specific manufacturer,
particularly in those situations where the harm occurred
many years prior to the discovery of the injuries and
the cause thereof. Such is the situation in the DES cases
now before us. Under traditional common law tort
principles, a plaintiff is required to establish the existence
of a causal relationship between the act or omission
of the defendant or defendants and the injury sustained
(see, Morrissey v Conservative Gas Corp., | NY2d 741;
Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 41, at 262). However, given
the reality of the situation in DES cases, including the
lengthy passage of time, the generic form of most DES
pills and the unavailability of pharmaceutical and
physician records, it is, as a practical matter, impossible
’ for most DES plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof
of establishing the traditional tort element of causation.
Moreover, as noted by the majority, the tort doctrines
of alternative liability and concerted action, both of
which provide for recovery in situations where a plaintiff,
through no fault of his or her own, cannot identify the
actual wrongdoer, do not provide appropriate relief to
these DES plaintiffs. Unlike the scenario present in the
DES cases, the principle of alternative liability
presupposes that the number of possible wrongdoers are
few in number, that one of the joined defendants had
to have actually caused the plaintiff’s injury and that
the defendants are in a much better position than the
plaintiff to identify the actual wrongdoer and, therefore,
the burden is shifted to the defendants to prove who
was the actual wrongdoer and who among them are
to be exculpated (see, Summers v Tice, 33 Cal2d 80;
Restatement [Second] of Torts 433B[3]). However, in
view of the difference in the factual circumstances, the
theory of alternative liability does not provide a workable
solution for DES plaintiffs.
25a
The concept of concerted action liability requires, inter
alia, that the plaintiff prove that all of the joined
defendants had an understanding, expressed or implied,
to participate in a common plan or design to commit
a tortious act or to lend assistance to the wrongdoer
(see, Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 46, at 323). Typically,
DES plaintiffs allege that the concerted action of the
DES manufacturers consisted of using one another’s
marketing techniques, relying upon each other’s testing
and encouraging one another to market DES without
performing adequate testing or warnings. The courts,
with few exceptions (see, e.g., Abel v Lilly & Co., 418
Mich. 311), have rejected the applicability of concerted
action liability to DES cases because the plaintiffs cannot
establish the existence of an express or tacit agreement
among DES manufacturers to market or produce DES
without proper testing or warnings (see, e.g., Sindell
v Abbott Labs, 26 Cal3d 588, cert denied 499 US 912;
Mariin v Abbott Labs, 102 Wash2d 581; Collins v Lilly
& Co., 116 Wis2d 166). The parallel or imitative conduct
of DES manufacturers in producing and/or marketing
DES, as the majority expressly notes, is insufficient, in
and of itself, to establish concerted action liability (slip
opinion, p 12).
The principle of market share litigation was first
espoused bv the California Supreme Court in Sindell
v Abbott Labs (supra), as a valid theory of manufac-
turer’s liability based upon each manufacturer’s share
of the market. This approach provides DES plaintiffs
with a means by which to recover damages for their
injuries without the plaintiffs being held to the traditional
tort requirement of identifying the actual wrongdoer.
The public policy underpinnings of the Sindell rationale
is that, from a perspective of fairness and equity, the
DES manufacturers are in a better position than the
26a
innocent plaintiffs who have sustained grievous injuries
to bear the cost of such injuries. Thus, the Sinde/l court
held that once a plaintiff has joined a “substantial share”
of the DES manufacturers of the relevant market in
the action and has established that the sustained injuries
were caused by the ingestion of DES by the plaintiff’s
mother during pregnancy, the burden of proof shifts
to each defendant to demonstrate, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that it did not produce or market the
pill ingested by the plaintiffs mother. Those DES
defendants who could not exculpate themselves, would
then be liable for the proportion of the judgment which
represented its share of the market. The intended result
of the Sindell approach is that, “each manufacturer’s
liability for an [particularly DES] injury would be
approximately equivalent to the damage caused by the
DES it manufactured” (supra, p 613).
The Wisconsin and Washington Supreme Courts
subsequently adopted collective liability theories in DES
cases based upon similar policy considerations; namely,
as between the injured plaintiffs and the negligent
defendants, the latter should bear the cost of injury
(Collins v Lilly Co.[sic], 116 Wis2d 166, supra; Martin
v Abbott Labs, 102 Wash2d 581, supra). Both the Collins
and Martin courts reasoned that since all of the DES
manufacturers and distributors contributed to the risk
of injury to the public and, consequently, the risk of
injury to individual plaintiffs, each defendant shared,
in some measure, a degree of culpability in producing
or marketing DES. In Collins, the Wisconsin Supreme
adopted a “risk contribution” theory of liability, and,
in Martin, the Washington Supreme Court adopted what
it termed a “market share alternative liability” theory.
These two approaches differ from the Sindell theory
primarily in the manner in which the damages are
27a
apportioned. Significantly, both the Supreme Courts of
Wisconsin and Washington in the Collins and Martin
cases, as did the Supreme Court of California in Sindell,
provided that the joined or impleaded defendants may
exculpate themselves from liability if they can establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that they did not
produce or market the particular DES pill taken by the
plaintiffs mother. Notably, in Collins, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court explained that it would not adopt a risk
contribution theory which would have imposed liability
solely upon the DES defendants’ participation in the
creation of the risk of injury even though some of the
defendants could establish that they could not have
actually caused the plaintiff's injury. The Collin’s court
noted, “(w)e still require it be shown that the defendant
drug company reasonably could have centributed in
some way to the actual injury” (supra, p 191, n 10).
In fact, none of the jurisdictions which have adopted
varying theories of collective liability in DES cases, has
refused to permit exculpation of those defendants which
have been able to prove that they could not have
produced cr marketed the pill which caused the
particular plaintiffs injuries, thereby recognizing that
to preclude exculpation would directly and unnecessarily
contravene the established common law tort principles
of causation (see, Sindell v Abbott Labs, supra; Collins
v Lilly & Co., supra; Martin v Abbott Labs, supra; Abel
v Eli Lilly Co., supra; McCormack v Eli Lilly & Co.,
supra; see also, Burnside v Abbott Labs, 351 Pa S 264).
Clearly, the development and underlying purpose of
the various concepts of liability in DES cases has been
to provide a means whereby the plaintiffs, who cannot
identify the actual manufacturer of the pill ingested by
their mother, are alleviated of the traditional burden _
28a
of proof of causation and to shift that burden to the
defendants. The various theories of collective liability
which have been adopted in the several jurisdictions in
an effort to provide plaintiffs with a means to recovery
for their injuries, were not intended to, and did not,
provide DES plaintiffs with an unprecedented strict
liability cause of action. However, the majority herein,
by precluding exculpation of those defendants in DES
cases who produced DES for pregnancy purposes but
who can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that they did not and could not have produced or
marketed the pill which caused the plaintiff’s injuries,
has created such a radical concept and purports to limit
it to DES claims. In the majority’s view, the defendant’s
liability in DES cases is premised upon the overall risk
of injury which they created to the public at large in
producing and marketing DES for pregnancy purpose
and, therefore, exculpation of those defendants who can |
establish that the plaintiff's mother did not ingest their
pill, would be inconsistent with the overall risk theory
of liability. By taking this view, however, the majority
while stating that it is adopting a market share theory
of liability, is. in essence, despite its disclaimer of doing
so, adopting a concerted action theory of liability, but
has eliminated therefrom the requirement that the
plaintiffs establish that the defendants tacitly agreed to
produce and market DES for pregnancy use without
proper testing and without adequate warnings of the
potential dangers involved. Such a result, represents a
radical departure from fundamental tenets of tort law
and is unnecessarily unfair and inequitable to the
defendants who have proven, or can prove, that they
did not produce the pill which caused the injury.
Moreover, this result is directly contrary to the majority's
own statement that it is rejecting the “conscious
29a
parallelism” theory utilized in Bichler v Eli Lilly & Co.
(79 AD2d 317, affd 55 NY2d 571), because, as stated
by the majority herein, “(p)arallel behavior, the major
justification for visiting liability by the product of one
manufacturer upon the head of another under this
analysis, is a common occurrence in industry generally.
We believe, therefore, that inferring agreement from the
act of parallel activity alone improperly expands the
concept of concerted action beyond a rational or fair
limit; among other things, it potentially renders small
manufacturers in the case of DES and in countless other
industries, jointly liable for all the damages stemming
from the defective products of an entire industry” (slip
opinion, p 12).
I fully concur with the above stated position of the
majority and thus, I cannot agree that the imposition
of liability on drug companies, in this case DES
| manufacturers, solely upon their contribution, in some
measure, to the risk of injury by producing and
marketing a defective drug, without any consideration
given to whether the defendant drug companies actually
caused the plaintiff’s injuries, is appropriate or
warranted. Rather, I would adopt a market share theory
| of liability, based upon a national market, which would
provide for the shifting of the burden of proof on the
issue of causation to the defendants and would impose
liability upon all of the defendants who preduced and
marketed DES for pregnancy purposes, except those
who were able to prove that their product could not
have caused the injury. Under this approach, DES
plaintiffs, who are unable to identify the actual
manufacturer of the pill ingested by their mother, would
only be required to establish, (1) that the plaintiff's
mother ingested DES during pregnancy; (2) that the
plaintiff's injuries were caused by DES, and (3) that
30a
the defendant or defendants produced and marketed
DES for pregnancy purposes. Thereafter, the burden
of proof would shift to the defendants to exculpate
themselves by establishing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the plaintiffs mother could not have
ingested their particular pill. Of those defendants who
are unable to exculpate themselves from liability, their
respective share of the plaintiff's damages would be
measured by their share of the national market of DES
produced and marketed for pregnancy purposes during
the period in question.
I would further note that while, on the one hand,
the majority would not permit defendants who produced
DES for pregnancy purposes to exculpate themselves,
the majority at the same time deprives the plaintiffs of
the opportunity to recover fully for their injuries by
limiting the defendants’ liability for the plaintiff's
damages to severai liability. In my view, the liability
for the plaintiff's damages of those defendants who are
unable to exculpate themselves should be joint and
several thereby ensuring that the plaintiffs will receive
full recovery of their damages. In addition to being fair
to the DES plaintiffs, the imposition of joint and several
liability is consistent with that portion of the revival
statute which specifically exempted DES claims from
those provisions which provide, with certain exceptions,
for several liability of joint tortfeasors (see, L. 1986,
ch. 682, § 12; CPLR 1600 er seq.). Moreover, in order
to ease the financial burden on the specific defendants
named in the lawsuit, the defendants would have the
option of seeking contribution from their fellow
defendants for damages in excess of each defendant’s
particular market share, and a defendant should be
permitted leave to implead those DES manufacturers
who the plaintiff has not joined, in order to ensure,
3la
where possible, full contribution (see, e.g., Dole v Dow
Chemical Co., 30 NY2d 143). Admittedly, adherence
to joint and several liability could result in disproportion
between a defendant’s potential liability for the damages
suffered by the plaintiff and defendant’s actual national
market share; however, the opportunity to present
exculpatory evidence reduces the risk of imposing
liability on innocent defendants.
The application of the aforesaid principles, although
somewhat innovative and a modification of traditional
tort law, (i.e., the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to prove proximate causation) would, in view of the
exigent circumstances, be in furtherance of a valid public
policy of imposing the burden of bearing the cost of
severe injuries upon those who are responsible for placing
into the stream of commerce the causative instrumen-
tality of such injuries. Adherence to this principle would
not be too dissimilar from the accepted doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor which provides, in essence, that where an
instrumentality which caused the plaintiff's injuries was
in the exclusive control of the defendant and the accident
which occurred is one which would not ordinarily happen
without negligence, these facts are sufficient to justify
an inference of negligence and to shift the burden upon
the defendant of coming forward with an explanation
(see, e.g., Galbraith v Busch, 267 NY 230, 234;
Richardson, Evidence § 93, p 68 [Prince 10th ed]). Thus,
this approach, unlike that taken by the majority, does
not represent an unnecessary and radical departure from
basic principles of tort iaw. By characterizing this
approach as “nothing more than advocating that bare
fortuity be the test for liability” (slip opinion p 19, n 3)
the majority fails to perceive that this is no more and
no less than a basic principle of tort law; i.e., a plaintiff
may not recover for his injuries from a defendant who
32a
could not have caused those injuries. When the majority
eliminates this fundamental causative factor as a basis
for recovery, it effectively indulges in the act of judicial
legislating. | would further note that if the Legislature
had intended to adopt this radical approach which is
at total variance with traditional tort law, it could readily
have done so when it enacted the revival statute for,
| among others, DES plaintiffs. Its refusal to do so can
certainly not be deemed to be an invitation to this Court
to assume the legislative role.
Judged by the aforesaid standard, I conclude that the
trial courts’ orders in Tigue & Margolies v E.R. Squibb
(Case No. 57) and Dolan v Eli Lilly (Case No. 58), to
the extent that they denied the summary judgment
motions of the defendant The Upjohn Company
(“Upjohn”) in both actions and the defendant Rexall
Drug Company (“Rexall”) in the Tigue action, were
improper. In Tigue, Mrs. Tigue, the plaintiff's mother,
testified that the DES pill she ingested while she was
pregnant with the plaintiff was a white, round tablet
(R 709-710). Similarly, Myrna Margolies’ mother
testified that the DES pill she ingested was a dark red,
hard, round pill (R 224-226). Mr. Margolies, the
plaintiff's father, also recalled that the pills were a reddish
color and Mrs. Margolies’ obstetrician stated that the
DES pill he prescribed to his patients was sot an Upjohn
product. Moreover, in the Dolan, action, Mrs. Dolan,
the plaintiff's mother, stated that the DES pill she took
was a white, round, hard tablet (R 321; 303). This fact
was corroborated by Mr. Dolan’s testimony (R 414; 444).
Finally, it was established that Upjohn’s DES pill which
was produced and marketed for pregnancy purposes,
was in the form of a “perle” which is a pharmaceutical
term for a dose form consisting of a soft elastic capsule
33a
containing a liquid center (R 2182). Based on the
evidence submitted in support of Upjohn’s summary
judgment motions in these two cases, | would conclude
that the plaintiffs have failed to adduce sufficient proof
in admissible form to raise a triable issue of fact as
to whether their mothers ingested an Upjohn DES pill.
Accordingly, Upjohn’s motion for summary judgment
in those actions should have been granted.
Additionally, in Tigue & Margolies v E.R. Squibb
(Case No. 57), Rexall’s motion for summary judgment
should have been granted since the plaintiffs failed to
raise a triable issue of fact as to whether their mothers
could have ingested a Rexall DES product during the
pregnancies in question. The evidence submitted in
support of Rexall’s motion established that until 1978,
Rexall sold its products, including its DES pill,
exclusively to Rexall Drug Stores (R 1934, 22003-04:
2210). The testimony of the plaintiffs’ parents, Mrs.
Tigue and Mr. and Mrs. Margolies established that they
had purchased their DES prescriptions from non-Rexall
pharmacies during the periods of their respective
pregnancies, i.e., 1960 and 1953. Based on this
uncontroverted evidence demonstrating Rexall’s non-
involvement in these plaitniffs’ injuries, Rexall’s motion
for summary judgment should have been granted.
As to those defendants which seek to exculpate
themselves from liability in these various actions based
upon the fact that they produced and marketed DES
solely for non-pregnancy purposes, we agree with the
majority’s conclusion that the record before the Court
is factually insufficient to establish that they were not
in the national market of DES sold for pregnancy use
(see, slip opinion, p 18, n 2). Accordingly, their summary
judgment motions were properly denied.
34a
~“*eeneae exe eee eee Oe Fe
In Case Nos. 56 and 59: Order affirmed, with costs,
and certified question answered in the affirmative.
Opinion by Chief Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander,
Titone and Hancock concur. Judge Mollen concurs in
a separate opinion. Judges Simons, Kaye and Bellacosa
took no part.
In Case Nos. 57 and 58: Order affirmed, with costs,
and certified question answered in the affirmative.
Opinion by Chief Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander,
Tine and Hancock concur. Judge Mollen dissents in part
and votes to modify in an opinion. Judges Simons, Kaye
and Bellacosa took no part.
Decided April 4, 1989
35a
APPENDIX B
Appellate Division Order
(April 14, 1988)
At a term of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court held in and for the First Judicial
Department in the County of New York, on April
14, 1988
Present-Hon. Theordore R. Kupferman, Justice Presiding
Sidney H. Asch
Ernst H. Rosenberger
Betty Weinberg Ellerin
George Bundy Smith, Justices.
Mindy Hymowitz,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-against-
Eli Lilly and Company, Abbott
Laboratories, The Upjohn Company and
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellants. 31981
-and-
Merck & Co., Inc., Ayerst Laboratories, a
division of American Home Products Corp.,
and Winthrop Laboratories, a division of
Sterling Drug, Inc.,
Defendants,
Attorney General of the State of New York,
Intervenor-Respondent
—-POTTETITTEPITTITI LCT TTT eee x
An appeal having been taken to this Court by the
defendants-appellants from an order of the Supreme
Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered
on July 21, 1987,
36a
And said appeal having been argued by Roy G.
Weatherup of counsel for appellant E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., by Russel H. Beatie, Jr. of counsel for appellant
Eli Lilly and Company, by Robin J. Stout of counsel
for appellant The Upjohn Company, by Karl E. Seib,
Jr. of counsel for appellant Abbott Laboratories, by
Paul D. Rheingold of counsel for respondent, by Andrea
Green of counsel for intervenor-respondent, and a brief
as amicus curiae having been submitted by Joseph M.
Costello on behalf of All Putter Company, Inc.; and
due deliberation-having been had thereon,
It is unanimously ordered that the order so appealed
from be and the same hereby is affirmed for the reasons
stated by Ira Gammerman, J., without costs and without
disbursements.
ENTER:
HAROLD J. REYNOLDS
Cierk.
Sere gt ae 6 nm ee
epee ere
Re ee pe ee
37a
APPENDIX C
Appellate Division Order and Opinion
(April 14, 1988)
At a term of the Appellate Division of the ~
Supreme Court held in and for the First Judicial
Department in the County of New York, on April
14, 1988
Fresent-Hon. TheordoreR. Kupferman, Justice Presiding
Sidney H. Asch
Ernst H. Rosenberger
Betty Weinberg Ellerin
George Bundy Smith, Justices.
Elizabeth Tigue, Barbara Tigue, Sayre
Margolies, as Administratrix of the Estate
of Myrna Margolies,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-against-
E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., Abbott Labor-
atories, Boyle & Company Pharmaceut-
icals, Merck Sharp & Dohme, a Division
of Merck & Co., Inc., Rexall Drug 31980
Company, William H. Rorer, Inc. and The
Upjohn Company,
Defendants-Appellants,
Amfre-Grant Inc., a Subsidiary of Ormont
Drug & Chemical Co., Inc., Carnrick
Laboratories, a Division of G.W.Carnrick
Co., Cole Pharmacal Company, Inc.,
Kremers-Urban Company, and Jerome
Schneider, M.D.
Defendants.
An appeal having been taken to this Court by the
defendants-appellants from an order of the Supreme
Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered
a
38a
on July 23, 1987, which denied appellants’ motions,
pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.
And said appeal having been argued by John L.
McGoldrick of counsel for appellant Abbott Labora-
tories, by A.Edward Grashof of counsel for appellant
Rexall Drug Company, by Jay P. Mayesh of counsel
for appellant The Upjohn Company, by William
K.Dodds of counsel for appellant Boyle & Company
Pharmaceuticals, by Joseph DiBenedetto of counsel for
appellant Rorer Pharmaceutical Corp., f/k/a William
H. Rorer, Inc., by Roy G. Weatherup of counsel for
appellant E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., by Theodore V.H.
Mayer of counsel for appellant Merck Sharp & Dohme,
a Division of Merck & Co., Inc., and by Paul D.
Rheingold of counsel for respondents; and due
deliberation having been had thereon, and upon the
memorandum decision of this Court filed herein.
It is unanimously ordered that the order so appealed
from be and the same hereby is affirmed, without costs
and without disbursements.
ENTER:
HAROLD J. REYNOLDS
Clerk.
~
Kupferman, J.P., Asch, Rosengerger, Ellerin, Smith,
JJ.
31980 Elizabeth Tigue, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents, P.D. Rheingold
-against-
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., et al.,
39a
Defendants-Appellants, J.L.McGoldrick
A.E.Grashof
J.P.Mayesh
W.K.Dodds
J.DiBenedetto
R.G.Weatherup
T.V.H.Mayer
Amfre-Grant Inc., etc., et al.,
Defendants.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira
Gammerman, J.), entered July 23, 1987, denying the
motions of defendants Rexall, Upjohn and Abbott,
pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaints, unanimously
affirmed, without costs.
Seven drug manufacturers appeal from a well-
seasoned determination which denied exculpation based
on their claim that they were not the manufacturer of
the drug known as diethlystilbestrol (DES), allegedly
ingested by the mothers of the plaintiffs. The history
of DES is well documented in a previous opinion of
this court, Bichler v Eli Lilly and Co., 79 AD2d 317.
The underlying problem presented is which of the
many manufacturers of this unpatented drug should be
held culpable, where it cannot be definitively determined
which company manufactured the pills ingested by the
plaintiffs’ mothers.
In the 1987 cumulative supplement to his treatise, |
NY Products Liability Sec. § 107, Michael Weinberger
succinctly analyzes the present state of the law under
the heading “Enterprise Liability”:
40a
In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,* the Court of
Appeals affirmed a plaintiff's verdict, which
was based on a concerted action theory.
However, the Court did not decide the validity
of a cause of action based on concerted action
in DES cases. The court stated that because
defendant did not object to the trial court’s
instructions on concerted action, this theory
became the law of the case, and was not
preserved for appellate review. Hence, the court
took no position on the question of whether
New York recognizes a cause of action based
on concerted action.
In a later related DES case, the Court of
Appeals again tock no position on whether the
theory of concerted action (or other related
theories) should be adopted in DES cases. The
court held only that the Bichler jury finding
of concerted action was not entitled to
collateral estoppel effect, because the issue of
concerted action was not actually contested in
the trial judge’s jury charge in the earlier case.**
Therefore, New York still has no position on
whether a cause of action in DES cases can
be based on concerted action.
* 9.50 Bichler v. Eh Lilly & Co., 55 NY2d
571, 450 NYS2d 776, 436 NE2d 182 (1982)
** 9 60 Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co.,65 NY2d
449, 492 N¥S2d 584, 482 NE2d 63 (1985).
4la
As noted by Justice Gammerman, the law in this
Department clearly recognizes the concerted action
theory. Bichler Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 79 AD2d at
328-29. There is, however, still a question of whether
exculpation is available to those drug manufacturers who
can clearly establish that they could not have been the
purveyor of the drug to a particular plaintiff, which
question is also significant in the many other DES cases
presently pending in the courts. For example, it was
testified that hard, small, white tablets were ingested
by Mrs. Tigue. It is contended that because a different
colored pill was marketed, there is no liability. Another
defendant contends that it sold only to its licensed
franchisees and, therefore, inasmuch as the pills in question
were purchased at a specific pharmacy which was not
the one of its franchisees, there should be no liability.
Another defendant postulates that it did not sell in the
East and so could not have been the purveyor to these
plaintiffs. Still another defendant contends that it did not
market DES for pregnancy-related purposes.
Basic to any determination is the question of whether
exculpation should be permitted at a!l. However, in view
of the fact that the Court of Appeals has, in two instances,
left the question of concerted action open, we should
now permit a complete trial record to be developed,
so that when the matter is finally determined, there will
be no question as to the factual details.
Order filed.
42a
APPENDIX D
Appellate Division Order
(April 14, 1988)
At 2 term of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court held in and for the First
Judicial Department in the County of New
York, on April 14, 1988
Present—Hon. Theordore R. Kupferman, Justice Presiding
Sidney H. Asch
Ernst H. Rosenberger
Betty Weinberg Ellerin
George Bundy Smith, Justices.
Jane Dolan, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-against-
Eli Lilly & Company, E.R.Squibb & Sons,
Inc., The Upjohn Company and Winthrop-
Breon Laboratories, 31982
Defendants-Appellants. -83-84
(and other actions)
Appeals having been taken to this Court by the above-
named appellants from an order of the Supreme Court,
New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered on
or about October 14, 1987, an order of said court entered
on or about October 16, 1987, and an order of said
court, entered on September 29, 1987,
And said appeals having been argued by Russel H.
Beatie, Jr. of counsel for appellant Eli Lilly & Company,
43a
by Roy G. Weatherup of counsel for appellant
E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., by Jay P. Mayesh of counsel
for appellant The Upjohn Company, and by Alfred S.
Julien and Herman Schmertz of counsel for respondents;
and due deliberation having been thereon,
It is unanimously ordered that the three orders so
appealed from be and the same hereby are affirmed,
without costs and disbursements
ENTER:
HAROLD J. REYNOLDS
Clerk.
44a
APPENDIX E
Opinion of Supreme Court, New York County
(July 16, 1987)
SUPREME COURT : NEW YORK COUNTY
IAS : PART 27
MINDY HYMOWITZ.
Plaintiffs,
-against-
ELI LILLY and
COMPANY, WINTHROP INDEX NO.
LABORATORIES, a division of 24767-86
STERLING DRUG, INC.,
THE UPJOHN COMPANY,
E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, and AYERST
LABORATORIES, a division of
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS,
CORP., Defendants.
GAMMERMAN, J.:
In this pharmaceutical product liability action,
plaintiff Mindy Hymowitz alleges that she developed
cancer as a result of prenatal exposure to diethylstil-
bestrol (“DES”), a synthetic estrogen taken by her
mother in 1954 during pregnancy to prevent possible
miscarriage.
Plaintiff was born on December I1, 1954. The
cancerous condition for which plaintiff seeks damages
allegedly appeared in 1979. Under the statute of
limitations then applicable (CPLR 208, 214) plaintiff
was barred from commencing suit in December, 1975
(three years after reaching the age of majority). Plaintiff
brings this action, however, under the provisions of 1986
revival statute (L. 1986 ch. 682 §4).
——————EEeEeE—E———
45a
Plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 to strike
affirmative defenses raised by some defendants
challenging the constitutionality of the revival statute
and alleging that the action is time barred under the
statute of limitations otherwise applicable.
; Defendants Eli Lilly and Co. (“Lilly”) [sic] Abbott
Laboratories (“Abbott”) and The Upjohn Company
(“Upjohn”) seek summary judgment and dismissal of
the complaint as barred by the statute of hmitations
absent the availability of the allegedly unconstitutional
revival statute.
Defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons (“Squibb) opposes
the relief sought by plaintiff and contends that before
the issue of the constitutionality of the revival statute
is determined further discovery is required on the issue
of whether such extraordinary circumstances exist in
this case to justify invocation of the statute which Squibb
also contends is unconstitutional. (Squibb further urges
that discovery is needed to determine whether plaintiff
can identify the manufacturer of the DES actually taken
by her mother).
The revival portion of the 1986 tort reform legislation
provides that actions seeking damages for personal
injury, property damage or death caused by the latent
effects of exposure to five substances (DES, asbestos,
tungsten-carbide, chlordane and polyvinyl-chloride) that
were time barred or dismissed, as of the effective date
of the statute, may be instituted “. .within one year
from the effective date of this act.” The statute was passed
on July 1, 1986 and was signed by the Governor on
July 30, 1986.
In addition to the revival provision for the five
specified substances (§4), the new.tort reform legislation
adopted a general discovery based statute of limitations
46a
for injuries caused by latent effects of exposure to any
substance (CPLR 214. c(2)). Under subsection 2, a victim
may assert a cause of action within three years from
the date the injury was or should have been discovered.
The provision for revival of claims (§4) and the
discovery based statute of limitations (2) were intended
by the Legislature to remedy the perceived injustice
caused by the application of CPLR §§214, 208, (the
exposure based statute of limitations) and to provide
legal recourse for injuries caused by latent effects of
toxic substances. Both provisions were enacted to
remedy the failure of the old statute to recognize that
such injuries may not appear until years after exposure,
long after the expiration of the period within which
actions may be instituted.
Legislative history indicates that the five named
substances were distinguished from other toxic
substances (2) as a result of compromise between the
Assembly (which had voted to permit revival for all toxic
substances) and the Senate which wanted to limit revival.
The Legislature ultimately limited revival based upon
the existence of an identifiable group affected and the
resulting ability to predict the future costs of such revival.
The Legislature was apparently concerned that under
a broader revival statute, the large number of unknown
victims would create unpredictabie risks and costs.
Defendants challenge the revival statute on equal
protection and due process grounds, arguing that the
Statute is the result of an arbitrary and irrat’ -nal political
arrangement arrived at without rational guidelines of
scientific certainity or public necessity. Defendants
further argue that the legislative concern for limiting
the number of potential claimants and costs is not related
to the ostensible objective of the legislation, i.e. to allow
47a
victims of latent injuries to maintain actions. Defendants
\ contend that the revival provision must be stricken on
equal protection grounds, as an underinclusive random
penalty without scientific basis, on five arbitrarily chosen
substances and their manufacturers. It is contended that
the prior exposure statute of limitations or the new three
year discovery based provision would be more than
adequate for victims of the five specified substances.
Defendant Lilly urges that generally, chemical injury
claims accrue at the time of exposure (here, in utero).
Under the three year exposure based statute of
limitations (tolled to the age of majority) claimants could
bring suit until age 21. Lilly contends that most DES
patients develop cancer by age 19; and therefore, their
claims would not be time barred before becoming aware
of their injuries.
Defendants also claim a violation of the due process
clause, in that the statute constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of the substantive property right to rely upon
the absence of claims. Defendants assert that dismissal
(or the passage of the applicable time bar) gives rise
to substantive property rights which as a general rule,
may not be abrogated and that the exceptional
circumstances to permit revival are not present (see
Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164).
Based upon the impact upon what-they allege are
substantive or property rights, defendants urge the
applicability of strict scrutiny or an intermediate
standard of review rather than a rational basis
examination.
As a general rule, state statutes of limitation reviving
time barred actions are not violative of due process.
Statutes of limitation represent a public policy statement
with respect to the privilege to litigate. “[T]he history
48a
of pleas of limitations shows them to be good only by
legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large
degree of legislative control” (Chase Securities Corp.
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314). The expiration of
the applicable time period does not eliminate a cause
of action but rather, suspends the court’s power to grant
a remedy (Hulbert v. Clark, 125 N.Y. 295). In other
words, statutes of limitation relate to the availability
of a remedy and not to the destruction of any
fundamental right.
In the past, New York courts have upheld the power
of the state legislature to extend or revive time barred
claims. In Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co. (301 N.Y. 164,
174), the court found that a revival statute is not
necessarily void as a taking of property without due
process. The court stated that “[T]he legislature may
constitutionally revive a personal cause of action where
the circumstances are exceptional and are such as to
satisfy the court that serious injustice would result to
plaintiffs not guilty. of ahy fault if the intention of the
legislature were not effected.”
In McCann v. Walsh Construction Co., (282 A.D.
444, affd, 306 N.Y. 906) the court found that the
legislature acted within the limits of the Constitution
in extending the time period within which victims of
caissons disease could seek redress. The legislature
sought to remedy the injustice caused to victims of a
disease which in many cases did not produce symptoms
until after the period for filing Workmen’s Compensation
claims has passed. The court found that under the
circumstances, the legislature, by extending the time
within which to institute a claim, was merely complying
with the simple demands of justice.
49a
A similar due process challenge was raised by
manufacturers of Agent Orange regarding the consti-
tutionality of the recent statute extending the time within
which victims of dioxin could sue in New York (CPLR
214-b). There, as here, defendants challenged the law
on the round that it permitted commencement of actions
already time barred under the New York statute of
limitations otherwise applicable for injuries caused by
toxic chemicals. In approving the proposed settlement
of the Agent Orange litigation, the Court (Weinstein,
J.) rejected defendants’ federal and state constitutional
challenges to revival of otherwise time barred claims
by the New York legislature (Jn Re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 [E.D.N.Y.
1984]). ;
Here, as in Gallewski, McCann and the Agent Orange
case, the legislature, in reviving time barred causes of
action, expressed the public policy of giving preference
to plaintiff's privilege to litigate over defendants’
protection from stale or time barred claims. The issue
raised is whether there is a reasonable connection
between the revival statute and the promotion of a
legitimate state interest, here, health, safety and welfare
(Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 193). In
examining the constitutionality of statutes generally, the
court must bear in mind the strong presumption that
the legislature investigated the problem it addressed and
discovered the need for the legislation passed (Matter
of Taylor v. Sise, 33 N.Y.2d 357). The court must
determine: (1) whether the legislature was acting in
pursuit of permissible state objectives and, if so; (2) were
the means adopted reasonably related to the accomp-
lishment of those objectives (Montgomery v. Daniels,
38 N.Y.2d 41, 54).
50a
Here, the legislature acted within permissible
objectives relating to health, safety and welfare by
reviving causes of action based upon latent effects of
exposure to toxic substances.
Where a question of what the facts establish is raised,
the court should accept the opinion of the legisature
- Lincoln Bldg. Assoc. v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 415, app
dism 355 U.S. 12, citing Old Dearborne Co. v. Seagram
Corp., 299 U.S. 183, i196). In enacting the challenged
statute, the legislature expressed the view that victims
of the latent effects of certain toxic substances were being
denied legal recourse by the automatic application of
the exposure based statute of limitations often enough
to justify an exception to its general application. A
reasonable relationship exists between the reform and
the objective of remedying the defects or inequities under
the prior statute of limitations. There is considerable
support for the position upon which the legislature acted:
the need fo provide a forum for innocent victims who
might otherwise be time barred before becoming aware
of their injuries. Indeed, this case is illustrative of that
need. That studies or data may refute the legislative
conclusions is not dispositive. As the Court of Appeals
stated:
[t]he judiciary, however is not called on to
weigh the relative worth of data or arguments
which may be marshaled on either side as to
the wisdom of determinations made by the
Legislature in the realm of policy. ‘Whether
the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is
based on sound economic theory, whether it
is the best means to achieve the desired result,
whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be exercised
‘in a particular manner, are matters for the
S5la
judgment of the legislature, and the earnest
conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to
bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance’.
(Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 53, quoting
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR Co. v. McGuire, 219
U.S. 549, 569.)
Given the substantial degree of legislative consider-
ation to the need for the challenged tort reform, it would
be inappropriate to express an opinion regarding the
factual predicate for the statute, its philosophical
justification or the wisdom of its enactment (see
Montgomery v. Daniels, id. at 53). In addition, staleness
of claims based on the loss of evidence over time is
not of significance. Defendants have been litigating
similar non-time barred DES cases for years.
Many of the same concepts relevant to the due process
analysis are applicable to defendants’ equal protection
challenge. Defendants argue that the revival statute is
underinclusive; it arbitrarily, without scientific basis
singies out five substances for the additional burden of
revival while excluding other toxic chemicals which cause
latent injuries; it discriminates against out-of-state
manufacturers; and it denies to defendant the protection
of new Article 16 and the 2 discovery based statute of
limitations.
Equal protection essentially requires that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike ( Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202). As with the due process argument, the
court must determine the appropriate standard of review.
When social legislation relating to the public health is
challenged, as here, the standard of review is rather
narrow. The revival statute, contrary to defendants’
contentions, does not classify on the basis of a suspect
52a
(or quasi-suspect) class or impair a fundamental right
and therefore a strict scrutiny standard is not applicable.
The legislation must be upheld if the challenged
classification (targeting the five substances to the
exclusion of other toxic chemicals causing latent injuries)
is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose
(Western & S. Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 657; Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20, 25).
Under the rational basis analysis, if any conceivable
facts support the classification, there is no violation of
the equal protection clause. A law may not be arbitrary
or irrational and must be reasonably related to some
“manifest evil” which need only be “reasonably
apprehended.” It is only as a last resort that courts will
invalidate legisiation as unconstitutional (Maresca v.._
Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 250). Further, the stated purpose
justifying the statute need not be its primary purpose
(McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276) and the court
may even hypothesize the motives of the legislature to
discern any conceivable legitimate goal furthered by the
provision being attacked {Maresca v. Cuomo, supra, at
251, quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 780).
Defendants’ objection to the distinctions drawn by
the legislature between the five materials and other toxic
substances is based partly upon the different treatment
accorded the two groups under the 1986 tort reform
bill. Defendants point to the traditional burden of revival
and the apparent inapplicability of Article 16 to the
revival section. Examination of the provision (as it relates
to DES cases) and the legislative history, reveals
significant reasons to justify those distinctions, based
upon the perceived realities of the latent effects of
exposure to the five substances, the ability to ascertain
a finite group of potential claimants and consequently
to predict with some accuracy the economic costs of
ee
53a
revival. Given the reasonable basis for the distinctions
drawn by the legislature, the alleged lack of scientific
precision involved in drawing the line for revival may
be disregarded. Here, the statutory classification does
not result in such disparate treatment as to be arbitrary,
irrational or invidiously discriminatory (see Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471; see also Parker 86th Associates
v. City of New York, 93 A.D.2d, 388, 394, aff'd 59 N.Y.2d
986).
The legislation and the challenged classification passes
constitutional muster under a rational basis test or even
under the more demanding intermediate standard
(“somewhere along the sliding scale between strict
scrutiny. . . and rational basis” (Montgomery v. Daniels,
38 N.Y.2d 41, 61)). It cannot be said that the legislature
acted unreasonably in selecting the five substances for
special treatment. The constitution is not offended
merely because the classification is not made with
mathematical or scientific exactitude or because in
practice it results in some inequity (Dandridge v.
Williams, supra at 485; Montgomery v. Daniels, supra,
at 63). In enacting reform legislation, the legislature is
permitted to proceed one step at a time and to address
the part of the problem that appears most serious
(Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489;
Montgomery v. Daniels, supra, at 62).
Seen in its most fundamental light, defendants object
to the fact that the line drawn by the legislature in
enacting tort reform includes them. Whenever the
legislature draws such a line some must be included,
some excluded. As long as the line drawn is reasonable,
the decision as to where to draw it is left to the legislature
and not the judiciary (Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 8; Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41).
OT
54a
Squibb maintains that a theory of liability under which
a claimant may maintain an action without identifying
the particular manufacturer of the DES taken by her
mother is unconstitutional. Squibb contends that under
the separation of powers doctrine such a radical
restructuring of traditional tort law must be left to the
legislature. Based upon a mistaken belief that causation
need noi be shown under the challenged theories, it
argues that absent causation plaintiff lacks standing and
this court is powerless to provide a remedy.
Defendant’s contentions lack merit and wholly fail
to meet the stringent burden to. establish
unconstitutionality.
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to strike the affirma-
tive defenses challenging the revival statute as uncon-
stitutional and alleging that this action is time barred,
is granted.
Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint as barred by the statute of
limitations are denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: July 16, 1987
/S/ IRA GAMMERMAN
J.S.C.
FILED
JUL 21 1987
COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE
NEW YORK
eee eeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeE————e—EeEE
nines i te
55a
APPENDIX F
Opinion of Supreme Court, New York County
(July 16, 1987)
SUPREME COURT : NEW YORK COUNTY
IAS : PART 27
ELIZABETH TIGUE, BARBARA TIGUE,
SAYRE MARGOLIES, as Administratrix
of the Estate of MYRNA MARGOLIES,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., ABBOTT
LABORATORIES; AMFRE-GRANT, INC., a
Subsidiary of ORMONT DRUG & CHEMICAL
CO., INC.; BOYLE & COMPANY
PHARMACEUTICALS; CARNRICK
LABORATORIES,
Division of G. W. CARNRICK CO.:
COLE PHARMACAL COMPANY,
INC.; KREMERS-URBAN COMPANY,
ELI LILLY and COMPANY;
MERCK SHARP & DOHME,
Division of MERCK & CO., INC.;
REXALL DRUG COMPANY; WILLIAM H.
RORER, INC.; THE UPJOHN COMPANY,
and JEROME SCHNEIDER, M.D.
INDEX NO.
3838-76
Defendants.
GAMMERMAN, J::
Defendants Rexall Drug Company (“Rexall”), The
Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”) and Abbott Laboratories,
(“Abbott”) move pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint based upon the
56a
conceded inability of plaintiffs to identify the particular
manufacturer of the drug, diethylstilbestrol, (*DES”) to
which they were allegedly exposed. Defendants contend
that the right to recover on collective, non-identification
or concerted action theories of liability has not been
established in New York and urge the court to reject
adoption of such theories. Defendants further contend
that if concerted action is a viable basis of liability, it
should not be applicable in a DES case. The motions
are consolidated for disposition.
Plaintiffs seek to recover for injuries allegedly
sustained by Elizabeth Tigue and Myrna Margolies (now
deceased) as a resuit of the ingestion of DES by their
mothers. Sayre Margolies proceeds on behalf of her
daughter Myrna who died in 1977 at age 23, from clear
cell adenocarcinoma of the cervix and vagina, a rare
form of cancer in young women, associated with prenatal
exposure to DES. Plaintiff. Elizabeth Tigue was
diagnosed as having vaginal adenosis, a pre-cancerous
condition associated with DES exposure, in which
glandular tissue normally found in the cervix is found
in the vagina. Plaintiffs’ complaints allege breach of
warranty, negligence, strict liability, res ipsa loquitur,
concerted action and aiding and abetting-strict liability.
Historical Background:
DES is a synthetic hormone that duplicates the
function of estrogen, a female sex hormone naturally
present in women and, in lesser amounts, in men.
Estrogen is essential for female sexual development and
reproduction. DES was first synthesized in 1937 by
British medical researchers. The drug was never
patented, and thus, could be produced and marketed
in the United States by any company obtaining Food
S7a
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval of a New
Drug Application (“NDA”).
By 1940 ten drug companies had filed NDAs
requesting approval to produce and market DES for
treatment of menopause, senile vaginitis, gonorrheal
vaginitis and suppression of lactation. None of the
conditions for which this initial approval was sought
related to pregnancy. These filings were rejected by the
FDA, it determining that the review process would be
facilitated by the pooling of clinical data produced by
the drug companies into a master file which would form
the data base for the FDA decision. In 1941, twelve
pharmaceutcial companies formed the “Small Commit-
tee”! to pool this clinical data for submission to the
FDA. The joint clinical data was incorporated in each
company’s resubmitted NDA and in September, 1941,
FDA approval was obtained for the use of DES. The
Small Committee was thereafter disbanded.
In 1947 and 1948 a number of drug manufacturers
filed supplemental NDAs for authorization to market
DES, now for the treatment of certain pregnancy
disorders relating to spontaneous abortion or fetal death.
The dosage proposed for this treatment was many times
stronger than the dosage previously approved in 1941.
The supplemental applications were primarily based
upon studies by two independent researches on the role
of hormones in pregnancy. The researchers reported that
the administration of additional estrogen in certain high
'The twelve companies were: Abbott; Armour Laboratories; Ayerst,
McKenna & Harrison, Ltd.; Geo. A. Breon & Co., Inc.; Charles
E. Frost & Co.; Eli Lilly & Co.; Merck & Co., Inc.; Sharp &
Dohme, Inc.; E.R. Squibb & Sons; Upjohn Winthrop Chemical
Company; and John Wyeth & Brothers, Inc. (Affidavit of Don
Charles Hines, M.D. at p. 8).
tie
58a
risk pregnancies appeared to reduce the risk of
miscarriage. FDA approval for use of the drug in
pregnancy was then given.
Lack of Product Identification:
The fundamental issue raised here (and the major
problem facing these and many other plaintiffs in these
DES cases) is their inability to identify the manufacturer
of the DES taken by the mothers of the injured women
and, thus, to directly connect the injury to a particular
defendant.
The DES taken by pregnant women was produced
under a chemically identical formula and usually
manufactured and prescribed genericaliy. Apparently,
many drug companies cannot locate or have failed to
keep records of their DES market activity. Although
that market was dominated by a small number of
companies, entry and exit from the market was fluid
and it is estimated that between 94 and 300 pharma-
ceutical companies manufactured or marketed DES
from 1947 to 1971.
Injuries caused by prenatal exposure to DES appear
many years later. Over time, the ability of a plaintiff
to identify the manufacturer is, obviously, greatly
reduced. The memories or records of those who couid
assist in identifying the manufacturer (parents,
physicians, pharmacists and drug companies) fade or
disappear.
Prior Holdings:
In this state, the general rule is that a plaintiff has
the burden of proof on product identification ( Morrissey
v. Conservative Gas Corp., 285 A.D. 825 [1955], aff'd
1 N.Y.2d 741 [1956]). However, several non-
— <a Fr eT —
59a
identification or collective liability theories have been
proposed and in some cases adopted, to deal with cases
in which the manufacturer of a product cannot be
identified.
In Bichler v. Lilly & Co., (79 A.D.2d 317 [Ist Dept.
1981], aff'd, SS N.Y.2d 571 [1982]), a theory of concerted
action liability was the basis of recovery even though
the defendant was not identified as the manufacturer
of the particular DES taken by the plaintiff's mother.
Indeed in Bichler, the jury found that the plaintiff had
not established that Lilly manufactured the DES taken
by her mother.
Two theories of concerted action were submitted to
the jury: concerted action by implied agreement and
concerted action by substantial assistance. The jury was
instructed that concerted action by agreement could be
inferred from evidence of consciously parallel actions,
that such consciously parallel action could be the basis
of a finding that the drug companies had impliedly agreed
to market DES for pregnancy use without first testing
the drug on pregnant mice. The trial court’s charge with
respect to concerted action by substantial assistance
permitted the jury to find that the failure to test DES
on pregnant mice by defendant Lilly substantially aided
or encouraged other companies (including, presumably,
the company that marketed the DES taken by plaintiff's
mother) to market without appropriate testing.
The jury found that Lilly had acted in concert, that
the failure to test was wrongful and that the injurious
effects of DES were foreseeable. On appeal to the
Appellate Division, defendant argued that the trial
court’s concerted action charge was erroneous, an
argument that the court addressed on its merits.
60a
The Appellate Division found sufficient evidence to
support the jury's findings and, in effect, adopted the
concerted action theory of liability charged by the trial
court. When Bichler reached the Court of Appeals, a
determination was made that Lilly had failed to properly
except to the trial court’s charge on concerted action
and concerted action liability was applicable only as the
law of the case. The Court concluded that there was
adequate evidence to support concerted action liability
by conscious parallelism or substantial assistance. The
Court of Appeals (unlike the trial court and the Appellate
Division) based its finding solely on events beginning
in 1947 (formation of identical chemical standards,
marketing DES without testing on pregnant mice,
reliance upon the same studies to support supplemental
NDAs) and indicated that the 1941 collaboration to
secure approval for non-pregnancy use, had no bearing
upon concerted action relating to the 1947 supplemental
NDA for pregnancy use (Bichler v. Lilly & Co., 55
N.Y.2d 571, 585, n.7). :
In Kaufman v. Lilly & Co., {65 N.Y.2d 449, 456, [sic]
the court stated: “. .we expressed no view in Bichler
and, express none now, on which the proposed theories-
concerted action, alternative liability, enterprise liability
or market share liability - if any, should be adopted in
this or similar DES cases (see, Bichier v. Lilly & Co.,
supra, at p. 580, n.5). The question is still an open one
in New York.”
Discussion:
Defendants correctly contend that the applicability
of the various “collective liability” theories (including
concerted action) to DES fact patterns has not been
finally ruled upon by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless,
the First Department clearly recognized and expressly
eC SS
6la
adopted the concerted action theory for DES cases
(Bichler v. Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317; Kaufman v.
Lilly & Co., 99 A.D.2d 695; see, Carrao v. Heitler, 117
A.D.2d 308, 313).
Since plaintiffs, at least in this Department, may
proceed on a collective or concerted action liability
theory, the inability to identify the actual manufacturer
of the DES taken by Mrs. Tigue and Mrs. Margolies
is not fatal. Plaintiffs’ factual allegations to support a
finding of concerted action are substantially the same
as those pleaded in Bichler and clearly state a viable
cause of action for concert by agreement or substantial
assistance. |
As in Bichler, plaintiffs contend that a finding of
concert by conscious parallelism or substantial assistance
may be supported based upon the formation of identical
chemcial standards for DES in pregnancy, the marketing
of the drug without prior testing on pregnant mice and
the drug companies’ reliance upon the same studies in
supplemental NDAs. Plaintiffs also rely on defendants’
activities leading to the FDA approval for non-
pregnancy use based upon the contention that their
supplemental NDAs relied upon the earlier filing.
Whether the requests for approval of DES for use in
pregnancy relied upon the earlier filings presents an issue
of fact which cannot be determined on a motion for
summary judgment. Similarly, defendant’s claims that
the actions by the drug companies in gaining FDA
approval of DES (whether for non-pregnancy or
pregnancy use) and their actions with regard to the
manufacture, marketing and distribution of DES for
use in pregnancy constitute concerted action sufficient
to impose liability are questions for the trier of fact.
| ccc aia iii
62a
In addition, plaintiffs apparently seek to impose
industry wide liability based upon wrongful failure to
test and subsequent generic marketing and dispensing
of DES. Plaintiffs’ basic theory is that “but for the
development, manufacture, distribution and sale of DES
by the defendants, plaintiffs would not have suffered
the injuries which they have suffered.”
Plaintiffs contend that under their “but for” analysis,
in addition to concert, they would be permitted to recover
under various non-identification theories: enterprise
liability (Hall v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345
F.Supp. 353 [EDN Y] 1972); alternative liability; market
share liability (Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 607 P. 2d 924) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912;
risk contribution (Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis.
166, 342 N.W.2d 37 cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826).
This Court declines to rule at this time on the
applicability to DES cases of each of the various theories
of liability (in addition to concerted action), which are
not specifically pleaded but are raised in response to
defendants’ motions. The only question raised on the
motions before this court is whether defendants may
be held liable absent product iientification and the
answer is yes.
Claims of Exculpation:
Defendants Rexall and Upjohn contend that under
any collective liability theory, a defendant who can
establish that its product could not have caused plaintiff's
injury may exculpate itself from liability. While
exculpation may be thecretically possible (certainly
under market share liability), even if the product of a
particular manufacturer could be excluded a defendant
may bear legal responsibility based on joint activity,
Sti Mig Pie Ath VB 0d Mia
encouragement or assistance in bringing a harmful
product into the stream of commerce.
Constitutional Attack:
Rexall further contends that any theory of liability
(including judicially established tort doctrines) under
which liability may be imposed without “causation-in-
fact”, presumably product identification, is unconstitu-
tional as an excessive burden on interstate commerce
and violative the due process and equal protection
clauses. Further, it argues, that imposing market share
and enterprise liability frustrate expressed federal
policies regarding the marketing of prescription drugs
and thus violate the supremacy clause.
Defendant - Rexall’s due process challenges are
unpersuasive. Under the various theories discussed
above, the requirement of traditional product identifi-
cation is merely relaxed based on a finding that each
defendant by its tortious behavior caused or contributed
to plaintiff’s injuries. Under these theories, liability may
be premised upon the tortious behavior of each
defendant, whose adherence to a course of conduct
resulting in an unsafe standard, perpetuates the standard.
Fundamentally, imposition of liability absent product
identification is based on policy grounds. As a matter
of equity, the tortfeasor (who is in the best position
to absorb the cost and to take the precautions) rather
than the innocent victim, should bear the cost of injury.
Defendants can be held responsible for wrongful conduct
or omissions that result in placing a generic/fungible
harmful product on the market.
Rexall’s equal protection challenge amounts to no
more than a fairness argument which does not rise to
constitutional proportions. Equal’ protection is not
64a
synonymous with absolute equality (see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471; People v. Parker, 41 N.Y.2d
21; Parker 86th Associates v. City of New York, 93
A.D.2d 388, aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 986).
Rexall’s federal preemption claim also lacks merit.
“The criteria for determining whether there has been
federal preemption are (1) the pervasiveness of the federal
regulation, (2) the dominance of the federal interest, (3)
the federal and state objectives to be obtained, and (4)
the existence of actual conflict between the state and
federal statutes, including whether the state law is an
obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress”
(Pharmaceutical Soc. of State of New York v. Lefkowitz,
586 F.2d 953, 958 [2d Cir., 1978]). Application of these
criteria precludes a finding of federal preemption. the
primary objective of the federal law is controlling
product safety and efficacy (id., p. 958). The objective
of the proposed theories of recovery is basic fairness,
to provide a remedy to the innocent victims of
wrongdoers.
Rexall contends that the imposition of liability without
product identification burdens interstate commerce, by
increasing the cost of products, reducing availability and
limiting sales by discouraging development of new drugs,
and by generally increasing the cost of doing business
thereby precluding entry into the pharmaceutical
business.
In determining whether there is an undue burden on
interstate commerce, the test is whether “. . .the burden
on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits “ (id at 957, quoting Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142). Here, the
local benefit is providing a forum to innocent victims
of alleged wrongdoing by relaxing the traditional
65a
product identification requirement in tort law. Clearly,
a legitimate state interest is furthered. While adoption
of a non-identification theory of liability could
conceivably burden interstate commerce to the extent
that the cost of such increased liability would be passed
on to consumers through higher prices, “. . .[[nJot every
exercise of local power is invalid merely because it affects
in some way the flow the commerce between the States”
(Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Gottreli, 424 U.S.
366, 371). Rexall has failed to demonstrate that the
burden here would be clearly excessive compared to the
benefit. Therefore, the commerce clause challenge also
must fail.
Accordingly, defendants’ motions for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint are denied, and the
matter is set down for trial on September 30, 1987.
Dated: July 16, 1987 /S/
J.S.C.
IRA GAMMERMAN
66a
‘ APPENDIX G
Order of Supreme Court, New York County
(September 23, 1987)
At an individual Assignment
Part 26 of the Supreme Court of
the State of New Ycrk, held in
and for the County of New York,
at 60 Centre Street, New York,
New York on September 23,
1987.
Present
HONORABLE IRA -GAMMERMAN, Justice.
re
JANE DOLAN, Index No.
as gama (Assigned
ELI LILLY & COMPANY, E.R. SQUIBB :
to Justice
& SONS, INC., THE UPJOHN COMPANY,
Gammerman)
and WINTHROP-BREON LABORATORIES,
Defendants. ORDER
Defendant The Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”), having
moved this Court for an Order pursuant to Rule 3212
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules granting Upjohn
summary judgment; and defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc. (“Squibb”) having cross-moved pursuant to Rule
3212%e) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules for an Order
granting partial summary judgment in favor of Squibb;
and the plaintiff, by letter dated April 8, 1987, having
requested leave to amend the complaint to add additional
allegations to the complaint; and plaintiff’s request for
leave to amend the complaint having come before the
67a
Court on June 25, 1986, and the Court having granted
said request at that time,
NOW, upon reading and filing the Notice of Motion
of Upjohn, dated March 2, 1987; the Affidavit of Jay
P. Mayesh, Esq., sworn to March 2, 1987, and the
exhibits thereto, submitted in support of Upjohn’s
motion; the Affirmation of William D. Fireman, Esq.,
dated March 25, 1987, and the Sur-Reply Affirmation
of William D. Fireman, Esq., dated April 1, 1987, both
submitted in opposition to Upjohn’s motion; the Notice
of Cross-Motion of Squibb dated March 23, 1987; the
Affirmation of William D. Fireman, Esq., dated March
31, 1987, submitted in opposition to Squibb’s cross-
motion; the Affidavit of Sanford N. Berland, sworn to
March 16, 1987, and the exhibit thereto, submitted on
behalf of defendant Eli Lilly and Company; the
Affirmation of William D. Fireman, Esq., dated July
6, 1987, and the exhibit thereto, submitted in opposition
to Upjohn’s motion and Squibb’s cross-motion; and the
motion and the cross-motion having duly come before
the Court on July 6, 1987, and plaintiff having appeared
by William D. Fireman, Esq., defendant Squibb by
Charles M. McCaghey, Esq. and Debra E. Pole, Esq.,
defendant Upjohn by Jay P. Mayesh, Esq., and
defendant Eli Lilly by Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Esq.; and
due deliberation having been had thereon, and the Court
having rendered a written decision dated July 16, 1987,
NOW, on motion of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan,
attorneys for defendant The Upjohn Company, and on
cross-motion of Olwine, Connelly, Chase, O’Donnell &
Weyher, former attorneys for defendant E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc., it is
ORDERED that Upjohn’s motion for summary
judgment and Squibb’s cross-motion for partial
68a
summary judgment are denied for the reasons set forth
in the Court’s decision in Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., et al., Index No. 03838/76 (Gammerman, J.), and
Aymowiz+£li Lilh&Company—etal_tndex Neos.
24767 86-and 4848/87 (Gammerman, J.), both dated
July 16, 1987.
ENTER,
: /S/
£a.6.
IRA GAMMERMAN
FILED
SEP 29 1987
COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE
NEW YORK
[*Interlineation by the Court. ]
69a
APPENDIX H
Order of Supreme Court, New York County
(Qctober 16, 1987)
At an individual Assignment
Part 27 of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, held in
and for the County of New York,
at 60 Centre Street, New York,
New York on September 23,
1987.
Present:
HONORABLE IRA GAMMERMAN, Justice.
SPERSSES SOSES EHS SSEHASE SESE OEUVRES SOK CORE OES OD bEEBDDdE x
JANE DOLAN, .
rane, < “ee
: to Justice
be aaenal Gammerman
ELI LILLY & COMPANY, E.R. SQUIBB Index No.
& SONS, INC., THE UPJOHN COMPANY, 23999 / 86
and WINTHROP-BREON LABORATORIES,
Defendants. ORDER
Plaintiff having appeared before this Court on
September 18, 1987, and having appeared at that time
by Alfred S. Julien, Esq.; and defendant ELI LILLY
AND COMPANY having appeared at the aforesaid time
by its attorney, Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Esq.; and defendant
E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. having appeared at the
aforesaid time by its attorney, Barry Epstein, Esq.; and
defendant THE UPJOHN COMPANY having appeared
at the aforesaid time by its attorney, Jay P. Mayesh,
Esq.; and
70a
ee ee
Plaintiff having moved by oral application for an order
granting her partial summary judgment against ELI —
LILLY AND COMPANY, and severing her claims against
it from her claims against THE UPJOHN COMPANY
and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., and having moved
for an order severing her claims against ELI LILLY AND
COMPANY for trial; and
Defendant ELI LILLY AND COMPANY having moved
by oral application on the record staying any trial of
the claims against it; and
Defendants ELI LILLY AND COMPANY and E.R.
SQUIBB & SONS, INC. having moved by oral application
for an order pursuant to Rule 3212 of the Civil Practice
Law and Rules granting summary judgment in their
favor and dismissing the Complaint against them by
the plaintiff on the ground that plaintiff is barred by
the applicable Statute of Limitations; and
Defendants ELI LILLY AND COMPANY and E.R.
SQUIBB & SONS, INC. having moved by oral application
for an order holding L.1986 c.682 §§ 4 and 12
unconstitutional; and
Defendants ELI LILLY AND COMPANY and E.R.
SQUIBB & SONS, INC. having moved by oral application
for summary judgment dismissing said Complaint
against them for plaintiff's failure to allege that ELI
LILLY AND COMPANY or E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.
was the actual manufacturer of the diethylstilbestrol
allegedly ingested; and
Defendant ELI LILLY AND COMPANY having moved
for an order precluding the application of collateral
estoppel against ELI LILLY AND COMPANY; and
The Court having heard Alfred S. Julien, Esq., of
Julier & Schlesinger, P.C., in support of the motion
ee ee
Tla
for partial summary judgment and a severance, and
having heard Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Esq., attorney for
defendant ELI LILLY AND COMPANY in opposition
to said motions and in support of each of the additional
motions enumerated above, and having heard Barry
Epstein, Esq., attorney for defendant E.R. SQUIBB &
SONS, INC. in support of its motion, and the opposition
of Alfred S. Julien, Esq.;
NOW, upon motion of Julien & Schlesinger, P.C.,
it is hereby
ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion for severing the
action against ELI LILLY AND COMPANY so that said
action can proceed against defendant ELI LILLY AND
COMPANY alone is granted; and it is further
ORDERED, that defendant ELI LILLY AND COM-
PANY, as in Kaufman v. Eli Lilly and Co., 65 N.Y.2d
449, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 482 N.E.2d 63 (1985), is precluded
from litigating the following:
“1. Was DES reasonably safe in the treatment
of accidents of pregnancy when it was
allegedly ingested by plaintiff's mother in
1957?
(No)
2. In 1957 when plaintiff's mother allegedly
ingested DES, should the defendant, as
a reasonably prudent drug manufacturer,
have foreseen that DES might cause cancer
in the offspring of pregnant woman who
took it?
(Yes)
3. Foreseeing that DES might cause cancer
in the offspring of pregnant woman who
72a
took it, would a reasonably prudent drug
manufacturer test it on pregnant mice
before marketing it?
(Yes)
4. If DES had been tested on pregnant mice,
would the tests have shown that DES
causes cancer in their offspring?
(Yes)
5. Would a reasonably prudent drug manu-
facturer have marketed DES for use in
treating accidents of pregnancy at the time
it was allegedly ingested by the plaintiff's
mother if it had known that DES causes
cancer in the offspring of pregnant mice?
(No);”
and it is further
ORDERED, that the motions of defendants ELI LILY
AND COMPANY and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. for
summary judgment in their favor dismissing the
Complaint and each cause of action on the ground that
the action is barred by the applicable Statute of
Limitations are denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the motions of defendants ELI LILLY
AND COMPANY and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. for
summary judgment in their favor dismissing the
Complaint and all claims asserted and for an order
declaring L.1986 c.682 §§ 4 and 12 unconstitutional are
denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the motions of defendants ELI LILLY
AND COMPANY and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. for
summary judgment in their favor in this action dismissing
the Complaint against them for plaintiff's failure to allege
73a
that ELI LILLY AND COMPANY or E.R. SQUIBB &
SONS, INC. was the actual manufacturer of the
diethylstilbestrol are denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the motion of defendant ELI LILLY
AND COMPANY for a stay of trial of this action is
denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that defendants ELI LILLY AND COM-
PANY and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. shall have until
October 14, 1987, and plaintiff until October 21, 1987,
to submit such affidavits and other papers as each shall
deem appropriate with respect to their relative positions;
and it is further
ORDERED, that the trial of the action of Dolan v.
Eli Lilly and Company is hereby set down for the Court
for November 2, 1987.
ENTER,
/S/ IRA GAMMERMAN
J.3.C.
FILED
OCT 1987
COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE
NEW YORK
74a
APPENDIX I
Supplemental Order of Supreme Court
New York County
(August 17, 1988)
SUPREME COURT : NEW YORK COUNTY
IAS : Part 27
ELIZABETH TIGUE, et al.,
Plaintiffs, INDEX NO.
-against- 03838 /76
p) SUPPLEMENTAL
E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., et al., ORDER
Defendants.
GAMMERMAN, J.:
In its order and memorandum decision entered July
23, 1987, the Court denied the motions and cross-
motions for summary judgment of defendants Rexall
Drug Company, The Upjohn Company and Abbott
Laboratories. Defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
(“Squibb”) appeared and argued in support of these
motions, but was not formally included in this Court’s
decision. And it appearing that the plaintiff has
consented to this application, it is ordered that defendant
Squibb shall be deemed to have filed a formal cross-
motion for summary judgment on the same grounds
as the other defendants, and the order and memorandum
decision denying defendants’ motions shall be deemed
to deny the motion of Squibb nunc pro tunc.
DATED: August 17, 1988
IRA GAMMERMAN
J.S.C.
75a
APPENDIX J
Judgment/ Remittitur of New York Court of Appeals
(April 4, 1989)
Remittitur
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF NEW YORK
The Hon. Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge, Presiding
l No. 56
_Mindy Hymowitz,
Respondent,
Eli Lilly and Company, et al.,
Appellants,
and Merck & Co., Inc., et al.,
Defendants,
Attorney General of the
State of New York,
Intervenor-Respondent.
The appellants in the above entitled appeal appeared
by the Law Offices of Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Stroock
& Stroock & Lavan, Esqs., Sills Cummis Zuckerman
Radin Tischman Epstein & Gross, P.A., Patterson
Belknap Webb & Tyler, Esqs., Dickson, Carlson &
Campillo, Esqs.; ‘he respendent(s) appeared by
Rheingold & McGowan, P.C.; the Office of the Attorney
General appeared by Andrea Green, Esq.; and the amicus
curiae appeared by New York Lawyers for the Public
Interest, Inc.
The Court, after due deliberation, orders and adjudges
that the order is affirmed, with costs, and certified
question answered in the affirmative. Opinion by Chief
Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander, Titone and Hancock
concur. Judge Mollen concurs in a separate opinion.
Judges Simons, Kaye and Bellacosa took no part.
76a
The Court further orders that the papers required to
be filed and this record of the proceedings in this Court
be remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County,
I certify that the preceding contains a correct record
of the proceedings in this appeal in the Court of Appeals
and that the papers required to be filed are attached.
/S/ DONALD M. SHERAW
es
Donald M. Sheraw, Clerk of the Court
Court of Appeals, Clerk's Office, Albany,. . .April 4, 1989. . .
77a
APPENDIX K
Judgment/ Remittitur of New York Court of Appeals
(April 4, 1989)
Remittitur
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF NEW YORK
The Hon. Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge, Presiding
l No. 57
Elizabeth Tigue, et al.,
Respondents,
v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., et
al.,
Appellants,
et al.,
Defendants.
The appellants in the above entitled appeal appeared
by the Silis Cummis Zuckerman Radin Tischman
Epstein & Gross, P.A., Hughes Hubbard & Reed, Esgqs.,
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, Esqs., McCarter & English,
Esqs., Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler, Esqs., Dickson,
Carlson & Campillo, Esqs.; Phillips Lytle Hitchcock
Blaine & Huber, Esqs., Winthrop Stimson Putnam &
Roberts, Cole & Deitz, Esqs. and Olwine Connelly Chase
O’Donnell & Weyher, Esqs.; the respondent(s) appeared
by Aaron J. Broder, P.C. and Rheingold & McGowan,
P<.
The Court, after due deliberation, orders and adjudges
that the order is affirmed, with costs, and certified
question answered in the affirmative. Opinion by Chief
Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander, Titone and Hancock
concur. Judge Mollen dissents in part and votes to
modify in an opinion. Judges Simons, Kaye and
Bellacosa took no part.
78a
The Court further orders that the papers required to
be filed and this record of the proceedings in this Court
be remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County,
there to be proceeded upon according to law.
I certify that the preceding contains a correct record
of the proceedings in this appeal in the Court of Appeals
and that the papers required to be filed are attached.
/S/ DONALD M. SHERAW
eeocseereeeceeseeereeeseee
—werererurn rie CRUMe RAE OP BEARS YE ae
Donald M. Sheraw, Clerk of the Court
Court of Appeals, Clerk's Office, Albany,. . . April 4, 1989...
79a
APPENDIX L
Judgment/Remittitur of New York Court of
Appeals
(April 4, 1989)
Remittitur
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF NEW YORK
The Hon. Sol Wachiler, Chief Judge, Presiding
l No. 57
Jane Dolan, et al.,
Respondents,
v.
Eli Lilly & Company, et al.,
Appellants,
(and other actions.) #151 actions.
The appellants in the above entitled appeal appeared
by the Law Offices of Russel H. Beatie, Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan, Esqs., Sills Cummis Zuckerman Radin
Tischman Epstein & Gross, P.A., Cole & Deitz, Esqs.,
Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, Esqs.;
the respondent(s) appeared by Julien & Schlesinger, P.C.
and Sybil Shainwald, Esq.
The Court, after due deliberation, orders and adjudges
that the order is affirmed, with costs, and certified
question answered in the affirmative. Opinion by Chief
Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander, Titone and Hancock
concur. Judge Mollen dissents in part and votes to
modify in an opinion. Judges Simons, Kaye and
Bellacosa took no part.
The Court further orders that the papers required to
be filed and this record of the proceedings in this Court
be remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County,
there to be proceeded upon according to law.
80a
I certify that the preceding contains a correct record
of the proceedings in this appeal in the Court of Appeals
and that the papers required to be filed are attached.
/S/ DONALD M. SHERAW
Donald M. Sheraw, Clerk of the Court
Court of Appeals, Clerk's Office, Albany, . . April 4, 1989. . .
8la
APPENDIX M
Excerpt from “Brief of Defendant-Appellant E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc.,” filed November 8, 1988, in New
York Court of Appeals in Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc. (fn. 4, pp. 12-13):
4. The legislature is best able to resolve the issues
of public policy involved in this case. In the joint brief
submitted by defendants Merck, Abbott, and Lilly, it
is forcefully argued that the adoption of any form of
non-identification liability will severely restrict the
availability of pharmaceutical products in the future.
Squibb concurs with the public policy discussion
contained in that brief. Squibb also concurs with, and
hereby adopts, that section of the joint brief which
contends that any form of non-identification liability
is unconstitutional. Defendants’ due process rights are
violated because they will be held liable for injuries
sustained by plaintiffs who were not exposed to their
product. Further, such liability also imposes an
irrebuttable presumption of causation upon defendants.
82a
APPENDIX N
Excerpt from “Brief on Behalf of Defendants- Appellants
Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company and Merck
& Co., Inc.” filed November 8, 1988, in the Ne. ork
Court of Appeals in Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
(pp. 31-34):
D. Any Theory of Non-Identification Liability Would
Violate Defendants’ Due Process Rights.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Section 6 of Article
I of the New York State Constitution prohibit any
deprivation of property without due process of law. The
due process clause affords protection against “arbitrary
action government,” Wolff v. McDonell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974), and its protection extends to arbitrary actions
of judicial as well as legislative bodies. For an action
of a court or a legislature to pass muster under the due
process clause, there must be a rational relation between
a legitimate state interest, and the judicial or legislative
means chosen to further that interest.
By eliminating proof of identification from plaintiff's
case, this Court wouid effectively create a mandatory
presu:mption of causation. That is, a manufacturer would
be presumed to be the cause of plaintiff’s injury even
though it has nothing to do with plaintiff. Indeed, as
a practical matter, this presumption would be irrebut-
table since defendants in many cases will be unable to
prove they did not make the medicine that plaintiffs
claim caused injury. Such a presumption is a violation
of defendants’ due process rights. Viandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 446 (1976);?' Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F.Supp.
2!1A mandatory presumption tells the trier of fact “that he or they
must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least
until the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut
the presumed connec*ion between the two facts.” County Court
of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1978) (emphasis
supplied).
V4 mes Sheed
83a
167, 175 (S. and E.D.N.Y. 1974) (three judge district
court), vacated as moot, 421 U.S. 338 (1975).
In order for such a preseumption to withstand due
process scrutiny, it must be neither unreasonable nor
irrational. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry,
413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973). Such a presumptionTvalid
under the due process clause. Viandis, 412 U.S. at 441.
As a number of courts have recognized in the DES
context, any theory which shifts the burden to defendants
to disprove causation creates an irrational and
unreasonable presumption of liability because there is
no certainty that any one or more of the defendants
joined in an action produced the drug in question. Ryan
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F.Supp. at 1018; Mizell v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 526 F.Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981); Tidler
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 95 F.R.D. 332, 333 (D.D.C. 1982).
There must be a “rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact presumed.” Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6; 32-37 (1969) (presumption irrational unless
it can be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact on which it is made to depend. [sic]”
(emphasis added)); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943). These rules governing presumptions apply not
only to the statutory presumptions at issue in Tot and
Leary, but to judicially created presumptions as well.
Wray v. Folsom, 166 F.Supp. 390, 395 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
Here, the proved fact is that a defendant made
stilbestrol. In most DES cases, there is no proof that
any defendant made the stilbestrol ingested by a
particular plaintiff. Indeed, in some cases, there is
affirmative proof that the defendants did not. With
literally hundreds of possible manufacturers, most of
them not before the Court, the probability that any one
84a
defendant supplied the product which caused the injury
is at best pure conjecture. Any theory which permits
plaintiffs to prevail, then, must depend on a conclusive
presumption that because a defendant sold a product
similar to the one that caused the injury, the defendant’s
conduct caused the injury. Such a theory rests on an
illogical presumption, and fails to satisfy the require-
ments of due process.
E. The First Department’s Rule of Conscious
Parallelism Is A Particularly Egregious Violation
of Defendants’ Due Process Rights.
The First Department’s conscious parallelism theory
is particularly egregious in its disregard for defendants’
constitutional rights. By equating legitimate parallel
business behavior with “concerted action,” conscious
parallelism creates an arbitrary and irrebuttable
presumption which violates the due process clauses of
the fourteenth Amendment and article 1, § 6 of the
Constitution of the State of New York.
~
The constitutional prohibition against such types of
presumptions was best stated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Western & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson,
279 U.S. 639 (1928), when it struck down a statute
establishing a conclusive presumption against a railroad
company for damages to any person or property injured
at a crossing—a presumption rebuttable only if the
company made it clear that it exercised all due care.
The Court said, “[a] statute creating a presumption that
is arbitrary or that operates to deny a fair opportunity
to repel it violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 279 U.S. at 642. The Court
has been consistent in striking down such presumptions.
See, e.g., Viandis, (invalidating Connecticut statute
establishing a presumption of nonresidency against
85a
certain students and requiring them to pay higher tu'tion
rates); Cieveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1973) (striking down mandatory maternity leave
statute on the ground that it established a conclusive
presumption that every teacher who is four or five
months pregnant is physically incapable of continuing
her duties).
Application of conscious parallelism here would also
have the retroactive effect of holding defendants liable
for behavior which was not actionable at the time the
behavior was undertaken some thirty or forty years ago.
Regardless of the fact that the First Department has
now declared consciously parallel behavior actionable
and punishable with joint and several liability,
defendants could riot be fairly said to have had warning
that any nontortious parallel conduct in which they
independently engaged in 1941 or 1947 would someday
be the basis for the imposition of joint and several
liability. This retroactive application of the rule violates
due process. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S.
304 (1945); Valladares v. Valladares, 80 A.D.2d 224,
438 N.Y.S.2d 810 (2d Dept.), modified sub nom., Tucker
v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 378, 434 N.E.2d 1050, 449 N.Y.S.2d
863 (1981) (retroactive application of new legislation may
offend due process clause); cf. Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 191-192 (1977); see also Casillas v. Scully,
769 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that “unfore-
seeable” judicial enlargement of a criminal statute is
violative of the due process clause).? It is the very reason
22The offense to state protected due process is equally clear. The
reach of the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights in the New
York State Constitution is equal to and in some cases even exceeds
that of the comparable clauses of the United States Constitution.
People v. Adams, 53 N.Y .2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d
902, 906 (1981).
86a
why courts presume that unless clearly stated legislation
creating new rights is prospective only, Jacobus v.
Colgate, 217 N.Y. 235 (1916); In re Ayman, 9 N.Y.2d
119, 125, 172 N.E.2d 571, 573, 211 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200-
201 (1961); and where retroactivity expressly intended
by the legislature would offend due process, the statute
is not upheld. Chrysler Properties, Inc. v. Morris, 23
N.Y.2d 515, 297 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1966); Phillips v. Agway,
Inc., 88 Misc. 2d 1087, 389 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct.
1976).23
°
23 Bichler may also violate the first amendment if the “evidence’
relied upon to prove “consciously parallel behavior” is the
petitioning of the government for the approval of the drug in 1941
or 1947. In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), the Court held that railroads
that petitioned the legislature in order to achieve laws harmful
to competitors could not be held to have violated the Sherman
Act because such activities were protected by the first amendment.
Although originally developed in antitrust cases, the Noerr doctrine
has been extended to petitioning other branches of government,
e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965), and to other areas of the law including allegedly tortious
behavior, State of Missouri v. Natl Org. for Women, Inc., 620
F.2d 1301, 1317-1319 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842
(1980); Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d.
530, 542 (Sth cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979): Senari
v. Moday Chem. Corp., 597 F.Supp. 502, 506 (D. Minn. 1984).
87a
APPENDIX O
Excerpt from “Brief of Defendant-Appellant E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc. Relying Upon Its Brief In Hymowitz
v. Eli Lilly and Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc.,”
filed November 8, 1988 in Dolan v. Eli Lilly & Co.
(p.1):
This appeal presents two issues which have been fully
briefed by defendant-appellant E. R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc. (Squibb) in two other appeals which are currently
before this court. The first issue presented in this appeal
is the constitutionality of the revival statute (L.1986,
ch. 682 §4), and Squib» hereby adopts its principal brief
and reply brief filed in Wymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
App. Div. Case No. 31981. The second issue presented
by this appeal is the viability of any “non-identification”
form of liability, and Squibb hereby adopts its principal
brief (and reply brief, if one is filed) in Tigue v. E. R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., App. Div. Case No. 31980.
88a
APPENDIX P
Excerpt from “Brief of Appellant E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc.” filed November 16, 1987 in New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, First Department, in Dolan
v. Eli Lilly & Co. (pp. 63-69), and Tigue v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons Inc., (pp. 63-68):
X.
Any Form of Liability Without Proof of Causation
Would Be Unconstitutional, Because There Would
Be a Presumption of Causation Without Any
Rational Basis.
Due process is denied where a defendant is subject
to liability for an injury having no causal connection
to that particular defendant’s conduct. The essence of
any modified theory of liability is that it dispenses with
the requirement of a plaintiff proving cause in fact, a
connection between a particular defendant’s conduct and
the plaintiff's claimed injury. In such acontext, a plaintiff
is allowed to sue one or all of the members of an industry,
all of whom may be held liable to the plaintiff, even
though only one out of several hundred members of
the industry may have actually harmed the plaintiff. It
is submitted that the abandonment of causation as an
element of a cause of action, through the fiction of
shifting the burden of proof, constitutes a violation of
each defendant’s separate right to due process of law.
The “touchstone” of due process is protection of a
party against “arbitrary action of government.” Wolff
v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). A rule of law
permitting one individual to sue selectively an entire
industry with hundreds of members, for the conduct
of only one member, or the conduct of no member,
constitutes such arbitrary action.
89a
In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Supreme
Court invalidated a state law that established a
presumption that an unwed father is an unsuitable
parent. It was held that such a presumption violates
due process, and that every unwed father is entitled a
particularized determination of parental fitness on the
basis of individualized proof. Similarly, in Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), it was held that the
due process clause requires that each defendant have
a separate and meaningful opportunity to be heard. A
rule may “offend due process because it operates to
foreclose a particular party’s opportunity to be heard.”
401 U.S. at 380. A state “owes to each individual that
process which, in light of the values of a free society,
can be characterized as due.” 401 U.S. at 380. Any
modified theory of liability violates the principles of
Stanley and Boddie because it lumps the defendants
together as an entity, failing to recognize that each
defendant has separate and independent constitutional
protections. Since the constitution requires an individ-
ualized determination of each defendant’s liability, the
fundamental burden of proving causation cannot be
satisfied by considering the defendant as a group. There
must be evidence of the conduct of each defendant
individually and as to each element of liability.
In Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, reh. den.,
415 U.S. 952 (1974), the United States Supreme Court
struck down a conviction based on a record lacking any
relevant evidence as to a crucial element of a particular
offense. It was held that such a conviction violated due
process. The state was not allowed to simply dispense
with an element of an offense. It is constitutionally
required that the prosecution must convince the trier
of fact of all essential elements of guilt. Jn Re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
90a
On occasion, states have attempted to dispense with
the requirement of proving an element of a criminal
offense by shifting the burden of proof on the issue to
the defendant. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975), theSupreme Court rejected such an attempt. The
doctrine of the Winship case was applied so as to preclude
shifting the burden of proof on the defendant’s state
of mind. Similarly, the Mullaney court noted that the
Winship doctrine could not be avoided simply by
redefining the elements which constitute various crimes.
421 U.S. at 698.
The above cases demonstrate that, although states
have considerable latitude in establishing procedures,
they may not arbitrarily tamper with the elements of
an offense or a cause of action, which are established
by the traditions and conscience of our people. States
may not achieve this end by purporting to shift the
burden of proof to a defendant.
The requirement of establishing a causal connection
between a defendant’s conduct and his civil or criminal
liability is, it is submitted, rooted in the most
fundamental beliefs of our people. It is a violation of
due process to convict and punish a man without
evidence of his guilt. Thompson v. City of Louisville,
362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). Similarly, it is a violation of
due process to impose civil liability on the defendant
who, demonstrably, never harmed the plaintiff.
The principles of the above cases are applicable to
both civil and criminal proceedings. The United Supreme
Court has consistently rejected efforts to eliminate
required elements of a cause of action or an offense,
or arbitrarily shift the burden of proof in violation of
due process.
9la
Furthermore, due process is unavailable where a State
creates a presumption of causation having no rational
basis in fact or in legal precedent. To shift the burden
of proof on causation to each of the defendants is, in
effect, to create a mandatory presumption of causation.
A mandatory presumption is a “troublesome evidentiary
device.” County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224 (1979). Such a presumption
is one that tells the judge or jury that “he or they must
find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact,
at least unless the defendant has come forward with
some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between
the two facts.” 99 S.Ct. at 2224-2225.
A theory of group liability without identification
undoubtedly can be classified as a “mandatory
presumption.” Plaintiff need merely demonstrate
prenatal exposure to DES and that a particular
defendant was a manufacturer or supplier of the type
of product involved. It is then presumed that the plaintiff
was exposed to the particular defendant’s product, unless
the defendant can demonstrate that its product could
not have reached the plaintiff. Such an unusual case
might occur where, for example, a particular defendant
entered the national market after the time that the
plaintiff was exposed to DES. However, in the absence
of such evidence, the presumption of causation operates
against all of the defendants in the market place.
It should be noted that judicially created presumptions
are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as those
established by legislation. Wray v. Folsom, 166 F .Supp.
390, 395 (W.D. Ark. 1958). In order for a presumption
to pass constitutional muster, there must be “some
rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one
fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable
92a
as to be purely arbitrary mandate.” Mobile, Jackson
& Kansas City Railroad Company v. Turnipseed, 219
U.S. 35, 43 (1910). This rule is applicable “in either
criminal or civil cases” and a presumption must not “shut
out from the party affected a reasonable opportunity
to submit to the jury in his defense all of the facts bearing
upon the issue.” 219 U.S. at 43.
In Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929), for example,
the United States Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a Georgia banking law which
established a presumption of fraud upon proof of a
bank’s insolvency. From the mere failure of the bank
financially, criminal guilt and apparently civil liability
were created, subject only to the right of the defendant
to rebut the presumption. This liability extended to the
president of the bank and all of its directors.
Unsurprisingly, the conviction of Mr. Manley was
overturned by the Supreme Court, which found that
the statutory presumption was unreasonable and
arbitrary. It was noted that insolvency could be
established without regard to the particular facts causing
it, and without regard to specific facts of any particular
transaction. Furthermore, the court noted that the
presumption was “sweeping,” extending to all directors
without proof of any individual responsibility. 279 U.S.
at 6. Under the statute, a defendant “is to be convicted
unless he negatives every fact, whether act or omission
in the management of the bank, from which fraudulent
insolvency might result, or shows that he is in no way
responsible for the condition of the bank.” 279 U.S.
at 7. Such a burden of proving a negative was held
so severe as to be unconstitutional.
More recent cases have condemned the use of
presumptions as substitutes for individual fact finding.
93a
See, for example, Cleveland Board of Education v. La
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 649 (1974). Presumptions which
are neither necessarily nor universally true are disfavored
under the Constitution “because they preclude individ-
ualized determination of the facts upon which substantial
rights or obligations may depend.” Coleman v. Darden,
595 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. Colo. 1979), cert. den.,
444 U.S. 927 (1979).
Also, due process is violated when a defendant is
subject to civil liability merely because of its status as
a manufacturer, and not because of any particular
conduct. The foundation of both criminal and civil
liability is conduct on the part of the defendant. In either
case, there must be an act or omission in violation of
society’s rules of conduct and, in the civil case, the
conduct must have injured the plaintiff. A defendant
cannot be held liable simply for his status, however
disagreeable that may be.
The distinction between a defendant’s “status” and
his “conduct” was drawn in the leading case of Robinson
v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, reh. den., 371 U.S.
905 (1962). In Robinson, a conviction was reversed which
may have been based on the defendant’s “status” as a
narcotics addict, as distinguished from any use,
possession, or sale of a narcotic substance.
It might be possible to infer that any narcotics addict
must have, at some time, illegally possessed or used a
prescribed substance. However, the Supreme Court held
that the constitution requires proof of the actual illegal
conduct, as distinguished form [sic] the status ultimately
resulting from that conduct.
A modified theory of liability relieving plaintiff of
her burden of product identification permits civil liability
on the part of a defendant solely because of its status
94a
as a manufacturer or supplier of DES. This is true, even
though each defendant separately appeared in the market
place, complied with the requirements of federal law
regulating drugs, and separately distributed its product.
It is submitted that no state may constitutionally create
liability in favor of a single person against all parties
enjoying the “status” of manufacturer or supplier of a
- particular product.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.