Appendix — Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue

Supreme Court brief1989

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anite

October Term, 1988

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,

Petitioner,

-against-

MINDY HYMOWITZ and ROBERT ABRAMS,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Respondents.

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,

Petitioner,

-against-

ELIZABETH TIGUE, et al.,

| Respondents.

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,

Petitioner,

-against-

JANE DOLAN and ROBERT ABRAMS,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

ALLEN F MAULSBY DAVID A. BARRETT

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE Counsel of Record

One Chase Manhattan Plaza DUKER & BARRETT

New York, N.Y. 10005 90 Broad Street

Banny M. Epstein New York, N.Y. 10004

MARC S. KLEIN (212) oe eree

SILLS CUMMIS ZUCKERMAN RADIN ROBERT L. DICKSON

TISCHMAN EPSTEIN & GROSS DAVID J. FLEMING

450 Park Avenue DICKSON, CARLSON & CAMPILLO

New York, N.Y. 10022 150 Broadway, Suite 1600

New York, N.Y. 10038

August 2, 1989

|

= m\

iF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A

Opinion of New York Court of Appeals in

Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., Tigue v. E.R.

Squibb & Sons, Inc., Dolan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

and Hanfling v. Eli Lilly & Co. (April 4,

eg RENE REE IA iii 2 SRE ROE RRS «OD Pe la

Appendix B

Order of Appellate Division, First Department, in

Hymowitz(April 14, 1988)......................065. 35a

Appendix C

Order and Opinion of Appellate Division, First

Department, in Tigue (April 14, 1988) .......... 37a

Appendix D

Order of Appellate Division, First Department, in

I I faba ii sane verde en -veensscrses 42a

Appendix E

Opinion of Supreme Court, New York County, in

FE VOROWES UIGEY FO BOOED anon ve eecceccccccceceeene: 44a

Appendix F

Opinion of Supreme Court, New York County, in

ps i a eee Peer e eee 55a

Appendix G

Order of Supreme Court, New York County, in

Dotan (September 23, 1987) ..................0000. 66a

* This Appendix reproduces the original slip opinions and orders ©

as exactly as possible. Petitioner has not attempted to change

apparent errors in matters of spelling, typography, or form.

Appendix H

Order of Supreme Court, New York County, in

Dotan (Octobe: Be Bi icaks sas one nsvcdscaewcttxie-

Appendix |

Supplemental Order of Supreme Court, New York

County, in Tigue (August 17, 1988)..............

Appendix J

Judgment/Remittitur of New York Court of

Appeals in Hymowitz (April 4, 1989)............

Appendix K

Judgment/ Remittitur of New York Court of

Appeals in Tigue (April 4, 1989)..................

Appendix L

Judgment/ Remittitur of New York Court of

Appeals in Dolan (April 4, 1989) .................

Appendix M

Excerpt from “Brief of Defendant-Appellant E.R.

Squibb & Sons, Inc.,” filed in New York Court

of Appeals in Tigue (November 8, 1988)........

Appendix N

Excerpt from “Brief of Defendants-Appellants

Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company,

and Merck & Co., Inc.,” filed in New York

Court of Appeals in Tigue (November 8,

GED wv cas sno 0cnginctbense ce aeeeencoa ae

Appendix O

Excerpt from “Brief of Defendant-Appellant of E.R.

Squibb & Sons, Inc.,” filed in New York Court

of Appeals in Dolan (November 8, 1988) .......

69a

74a

75a

77a

79a

8la

82a

87a

iil

Appendix P

Excerpt from “Brief of Appellant E.R. Squibb &

Sons, Inc.,” filed in Appellate Division, First

Department in Zigue and Dolan (November

LL dic, devcecetctaccviee ese ove .. 88a

la

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the New York Court of Appeals

(April 4, 1989)

STATE OF NEW YORK

COURT OF APPEALS

l No.

Mindy Hymowitz,

Respondent,

56

v.

Eli Lilly and Company,

et al.,

Appellants,

and Merck & Co., Inc.,

et al.

Defendants,

Attorney General of the

State of New York,

Intervenor-Respondent.

OPINION

This opinion is uncorrected

and subject to revision

before publication in the

New York Reports.

l No.

Jane Dolan, et al.,

Respondents,

58

v.

Eli Lilly & Company, et al.,

Appellants.

(and other actions.)

#151 actions

l No.

Elizabeth Tigue, et al.,

Respondents,

57

v.

E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,

et al.

Appellants,

et al.,

Defendants.

l No.

Barbara Hanfling, et al.

Respondents,

59

v.

Eli Lilly and Company,

et al.

Appellants,

et al.,

Defendants.

(56) Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Sanford N. Berland, Susan

A. Winston, NYC, for appellant Lilly.

Robin J. Stout, Jay P.

Mayesh, William A. Rome,

NYC, for appellant Upjohn.

2a

Robert M. Dato, David J. Fleming, Santa Monica,

Barry M. Epstein, Lindsay H. Lew, NYC, for

appellant Squibb.

Karl E. Seib, Jr., Robert D. Wilson, Jr., NYC, for

appellant Abbott.

Paul D. Rheingold, NYC, for respondent

Hymowitz.

Kobert Abrams, Attorney General (Andrea Green,

O. Peter Sherwood of counsel) for intervenor-

respondent.

Herbert Semel, NYC, NY Public Interest Research

Group, et al., amici curiae.

(57) Jay P. Mayesh, Burton N. Lipshie, Robin J. Stout,

William A. Rome, NYC, for appellant Upjohn.

A. Edward Grashof, Thomas F. Clauss, Jr., Sheila

M. Fessler, Paul A. Scrudato, NYC, for appellant

Rexall.

Alexander C. Cordes, Paul K. Stecker, Buffalo;

Marc S. Klein, Lindsay H. Lew, NYC; David

J. Fleming, Robert M. Dato, Santa Monica, for

appellant Squibb.

Charles M. McCaghey, William K. Dodds, NYC,

for appellant Boyle.

John L. McGoldrick, Karl E. Seib, Jr., Theodore

V.H. Mayer, John F. Brenner, NYC, for

appellants Abbott et al.

Paul D. Rheingold, NYC, for respondents.

(58) Sharon E. Jaffe, Joseph A. DiBenedetto, Lisa A.

Schoolman, NYC, for appellant Rorer.

Jay P. Mayesh, Burton N. Lipshie, Robin J. Stout,

Carole W. Nimaroff, NYC, for appellant Upjohn.

Alexander C. Cordes, Paul K. Stecker, Buffalo;

Marc S. Klein, Lindsay H. Lew, NYC, David

J. Fleming, Robert M. Dato, Santa Monica, for

appellant Squibb.

3a

Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Sanford N. Berland, Susan

A. Winston, NYC, for appellant Lilly.

William D. Fireman, NYC, for respondents Dolan

et al.

Perry S. Reich, Sybil Shainwald, Steven M.

Schapiro, NYC, for respondents Murphy.

(59) Karl E. Seib, Jr., Robert D. Wilson, Jr., NYC, for

appellant Abbott.

Robin J. Stout, James T. Conlon, David M. Covey,

Ann L, Wilson, NYC for appellant Upjohn.

W. Burlette Carter, Theodore V.H. Mayer, Charles

Lozow, NYC, for appellant Merck.

Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Kenneth J. King, Charna L.

Gerstenhaber, NYC, for respondent Lilly.

Arthur N. Luxenberg, Morris J. Eisen, Perry Weitz,

NYC, for respondents.

WACHTER, Ch. J.:

Plaintiffs in these appeals allege that they were injured

by the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) ingested by their

mothers during pregnancy. They seek relief against

defendant DES manufacturers. While not class actions,

these cases are representative of nearly 500 similar

actions pending in the courts in this state; the rules

articulated by the Court here, therefore, must do justice

and be administratively feasible in the context of this

mass litigation. With this in mind, we now resolve the

issue twice expressly left open by this Court, and adopt

a market share theory, using a national market, for

determining liability and apportioning damages in DES

cases in which identification of the manufacturer of the

drug that injured the plaintiff is impossible (see,

Kaufman vy Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 456; Bichler v

Lilly & Co., 5S NY2d 571, 580). We also hold that the

Legislature’s revival for one year of actions for injuries

4a

caused by DES that were previously barred by the statute

of limitations (see, L 1986, ch 682, § 4) is constitutional

under the State and Federal Constitutions.

The history of the development of DES and its

marketing in this country has been repeatedly chronicled

(see, e.g., Bichler v Lilly & Co., supra; Martin v Abbott

Labs, 102 Wash2d 581; Sindell v Abbott Labs, 26 Cal3d

588 cert denied 449 US 912; Sheiner, DES and a

Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 Ford L Rev

963). Briefly, DES is a synthetic substance that mimics

the effect of estrogen, the naturally formed female

hormone. It was invented in 1937 by British researchers,

but never patented.

In 1941, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

approved the New Drug Applications (NDA) of 12

manufacturers to market DES for the treatment of

various maladies, not directly involving pregnancy. In

1947, the FDA began approving the NDAs of manu-

facturers to market DES for the purpose of preventing

human miscarriages; by 1951, the FDA had concluded

that DES was generally safe for pregnatcy use, and

stopped requiring the filing of NDAs when new

manufacturers sought to produce the drug for this

purpose. In 1971, however, the FDA banned the use

of DES as a miscarriage preventative, when studies

established the harmful latent effects of DES upon the

offspring of mothers who took the drug. Specifically,

tests indicated that DES caused vaginal adenocarci-

noma, a form of cancer, and adenosis, a pre- cancerous

vaginal or cervical growth.

Although strong evidence links prenatal DES

exposure to later development of serious medical

problems, plaintiffs seeking relief-in court for their

Sa

injuries faced two formidable and fundamental barriers

to recovery in this State; not only is identification of

the manufacturer of the DES ingested in a particular

case generally impossible, but, due to the latent nature

of DES injuries, many claims were barred by the statute

of limitations before the injury was discovered.

The identification problem has many causes. All DES

was of identical chemical composition. Druggists usually

filled prescriptions from whatever was on hand.

Approximately 300 manufacturers produced the drug,

with companies entering and leaving the market

continuously during the 24 years that DES was sold

for pregnancy use. The long latency period of a DES

injury compounds the identification problem; memories

fade, records are lost or destroyed, and witnesses die.

Thus the pregnant women who took DES generally never

knew who produced the drug they took, and there was

no reason to attempt to discover this fact until many

years after ingestion, at which time the information is

not available.

We recognized this predicament in Bichler v Lilly &

Co. (supra at 579), where the Court stated that in DES

cases it is a “practical impossibility for most victims

[to] pinpoint * * * the manufacturer directly responsible

for their particular injury.” We allowed plaintiff's

recovery in that case, however, notwithstanding the

failure of the plaintiff to identify the manufacturer of

the injurious DES, on the limited basis that “the evidence

was legally sufficient to support the jury verdict for the

plaintiff’ on the law as charged to the jury, and

unobjected to by the defendant (see, Kaufman v_Lilly

& Co., 65 NY2d 449, 456). The question, therefore, of

whether non-identification of the manufacturer pre-

cludes plaintiffs from recovering for DES caused injuries,

remained unresolved after Bichler v Lilly & Co. (supra).

6a

The second barrier to recovery, involving the statutue

of limitations, arose from the longstanding rule in this

State that the limitations period accrued upon exposure

im actions alleging personal injury caused by toxic

substances (Fleishman v Lilly & Co., 62 NY2d 888, cert

denied 469 US 1192). In Fleishman v Lilly & Co. (supra)

it became clear that this exposure rule led to many DES

cases being barred by the statute of limitations before

the discovery of injury; we held, however, that any

change in the accrual date from exposure to discovery

was more properly the prerogative of the Legislature

(id. at 890; see, id. at 891 [Cooke, Ch. J., dissenting]).

Four years after Fleishman v Lilly & Co. the Legislature

addressed the statute of limitations problem, and

instituted a discovery rule for “the latent effects of

exposure to any substance” (L 1986, ch 682, §2). The

Legislature also, for one year, revived causes of action

for exposure to DES that had been time barred (L 1986,

ch 682, § 4).

It is estimated that eventually 800 DES cases will be

brought under the revival portion of this recent statute.

Moreover, as indicated in Bichler v Lilly & Co. (supra),

and as apparent from the record now before the Court,

in the vast majority of these cases identification of the

manufacturer of the DES that injured the plaintiff will

be impossible. The Legislature, however, while reviving

these time-barred actions, did not resolve the identifi-

cation problem.

The present appeals are before the Court in the context

of summary judgment motions. In all of the appeals

defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the

complaints because plaintiffs could not identify the

manufacturer of the drug that allegedly injured them.

In three of the appeals defendants also moved on statute

of limitations grounds, arguing that the revival of the

7a

actions was unconstitutional under the State and Federal

Constitutions, and that the complaints, therefore, are

time barred and should be dismissed. The trial court

denied all of these motions. On the statute of limitations

issue, the trial court also granted plaintiffs’ cross

motions, [sic] dismissing defendants’ affirmative defenses

that the actions were time barred. The Appellate Division

affirmed in all respects and certified to this Court the

questions of whether the orders of the trial court were

properly made. We answer these questions in the

affirmative.

Il.

In a products liability action, identification of the exact

defendant whose product injured the plaintiff is, of

course, generally required (see, e.g., Morrissey v

Conservative Gas Corp., 285 AD 825, affd 1 NY2d 741;

Prosser & Keeton, Torts §103, at 713 [Sth ed]). In DES

cases in which such identification is possible, actions

may proceed under established principles of products

liability (Bichler v Lilly Co. supra at 579). The record

now before us, however, presents the question of whether

a DES plaintiff may recover against a DES manufacturer

when identification of the producer of the specific drug

that caused the injury is impossible.

A. ;

As we noted in Bichler v Lilly Co. (supra at 580,

n5), the accepted tort doctrines of alternative liability

and concerted action are available in some personal

injury cases to permit recovery where the precise

identification of a wrongdoer is impossible. However,

we agree with the near unanimous vies of the high state

courts that have considered the matter that these

doctrines in their unaltered commonlaw forms do rot

permit recovery in DES cases (see, e.g., Sindell v Abbott

8a

Labs, supra; Collins v Lilly & Co., 116 Wis2d 166; Martin

v Abbott Labs, supra; but see, Abel v Lilly & Co., 418

Mich 311 [held that there was a question of fact presented

as to alternative liability and concerted action]).

The paradigm of alternative liability is found in the

case of Summers v Tice (33 Cal2d 80). In Summers

(supra), plaintiff and the two defendants were hunting,

and defendants carried identical shotguns and ammu-

nition. During the hunt, defendants shot simultaneously

at the same bird,and plaintiff was struck by birdshot

from one of the defendants’ guns. The court held that

where two defendants breach a duty to the plaintiff,

but there is uncertainty regarding which one caused the

injury, “the burden is upon such actor to prove that.

he has not caused the harm” (Restatement [Second] of

Torts §433B[3]; Bichler v Lily & Co., supra at 580, n

5; cf, Ravo v Rogatnick, 70 NY2d 305 [successive

tortfeasors may be held jointly and severally liable for

an indivisible injury to the plaintiff]). The central

rationale for shifting the burden of proof in such a

situation is that without this device both defendants will

be silent, and plaintiff will not recover; with alternative

liability, however, defendants will be forced to speak,

and reveal the culpable party, or else be held jointly

and severally liable themselves. Consequently, use of the

alternative liability doctrine generally requires that the

defendants have better access to information than does

the plaintiff, and that all possible tortfeasors be before

the court (see, Summers v Tice, supra at 86; Restatement

[Second] of Torts §433B, comment h). It is also

recognized that alternative liability rests on the notion

that where there: is a smail number of possible

wrongdoers, all of whom breached a duty to the plaintiff,

the likelihood that any of them injured the plaintiff is

9a

relatively high, so that forcing them to exonerate

themselves, or be held liable, is not unfair (Sindell v

Abbott Labs, supra at 139).

in DES cases, however, there is a great number of

possible wrongdoers, who entered and left the market

at different times, and some of whom no longer exist.

Additionally, in DES cases many years elapse between

the ingestion of the drug and injury. Consequently, DES

defendants are not in any better position than are

plaintiffs to identify the manufacturer of the DES

ingested in any given case, nor is there any real prospect

of having all the possible producers before the court.

Finally, while it may be fair to employ alternative liability

in cases involving only a small number of potential

wrongdoers, that fairness disappears with the decreasing

probability that any one of the defendants actually

caused the injury. This is particularly true when applied

to DES where the chance that a particular producer

caused the injury is often very remote (Sindell v Abbot

Labs, supra at 603; Collins v Lilly & Co., supra at 184).

Alternative liability, therefore, provides DES plaintiffs

no relief.

Nor does the theory of concerted action, in its pure

form, supply a basis for recovery. This doctrine, seen

in dragT part of all defendants having an understanding,

express or tacit, to participate in “a common plan or

design to commit a tortious act” (Prosser & Keeton,

Torts §46, at 323 [Sth ed]; see Bichler v Lilly & Co.,

supra at 580-581; De Carvalho v Brunner, 223 NY 284).

As we noted in Bichler v Lilly & Co., and as the present

record reflects, drug companies were engaged in

extensive parallel conduct in developing and marketing

DES (see, id. at 585). There is nothing in the record,

however, beyond this similar conduct to show any

agreement, tacit or otherwise, to market DES for

10a

pregnancy use without taking proper steps to ensure

the drug’s safety. Parallel activity, without more, is

insufficient to establish the agreement element necessary

to maintain a concerted action claim (Sindell v Abbot

Labs, supra at 605; Collins v Lilly & Co., supra at 85;

Martin v Abbott Labs, supra at 599.) Thus this theory

also fails in supporting an action by DES plaintiffs.

In short, extant common law doctrines, unmodified,

provide no relief for the DES plaintiff unable to identify

the manufacturer of the drug that injured her. This is

not a novel conclusion; in the last decade a number

of courts in other jurisdictions also have concluded that

present theories do not support a cause of action in

DES cases. Some courts, upon reaching this conclusion,

have declined to find any judicial remedy for the DES

plaintiffs who cannot identify the particular manufac-

turer of the DES ingested by their mothers (see, Zafft

v Lilly & Co., 67 SW2d 241 [Mo] [en banc]; Mulcahy

v Lilly & Co., 386 NW2d 67 [lowa] [stating that any

change in the law to allow for recovery in non-

identification DES cases should come from the

legislature]). Other courts, however, have found that

some modification of existing doctrine is appropriate

to allow for relief for those injured by DES of unknown

manufacture (e.g., Sindell v Abbot [sic] Labs, supra;

Collins v Lilly & Co., supra; Martin v Abbott Labs,

supra).

We conclude that the present circumstances call for

recognition of a realistic avenue of relief for plaintiffs

injured by DES. These appeals present many of the same

considerations that have prompted this Court in the past

to modify the rules of personal injury liability, in order

“to achieve the ends of justice in a more modern context”

(see, People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 489; Codling V

Paglia, 32 NY2d 330, 341), and we perceive that here

lla

judicial action is again required “to oyercome the

inordinately difficult problems of proof” caused by

contemporary products and marketing techniques (see,

Bichler v Lilly & Co., supra at 579-580 [quoting Caprara

v Chrysler Corp., 52 NY2d 114, 123)).

Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the reasonable

expectations of a modern society to say to these plaintiffs

that because of the insidious nature of an injury that

long remains dormant, and because so many manufac-

turers, each behind a curtain, contributed to the

devastation, the cost of injury should be borne by the

innocent and not the wrongdoers. This is particularly

so where the legislature consciously created these

expectations by reviving hundreds of DES cases.

Consequently, the ever-evolving dictates of justice and

fairness, which are the heart of our common-law system,

require formation of a remedy for injuries caused by

DES (see, Woods v Lancet, 303 NY 349, 355; see, also,

Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate Judging: A

Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern, 73 Cornell L.

Rev. 1004).

We stress, however, that the DES situation is a singular

case, with manufacturers acting in a parallel manner

to produce an identical, generically marketed product,

which causes injury many years later, and which has

evoked a legislative response reviving previously barred

actions. Given this unusual scenario, it is more

appropriate that the loss be borne by those that produced

the drug for use during pregnancy, rather than by those

who were injured by the use, even where the precise

manufacturer of the drug cannot be identified in a

particular action. We turn then to the question of how

to fairly and equitably apportion the loss occasioned

by DES, in a case where the exact manufacturer of the

drug that caused the injury is unknown.

12a

The past decade of DES litigation has produced a

number of alternative approaches to resolve this

question. Thus, in a sense, we are now in an enviable

position; the efforts of other courts provided examples

for contending with this difficult issue, and enough time

has passed so that the actual administration and real

effects of these solutions now can be observed. With

these useful guides in hand, a path may be struck for

our own conclusion.

First, this Court’s opinion in Bichler v Lilly & Co.

(supra) must be considered. There the jury was instructed

on a modified version of concerted action, which, in

effect, substituted the fact of conscious parallel activity

by manufacturers for the usual common law requirement

that there be proof of an actual agreement between actors

to jointly act tortiously (id. at 584). The defendant in

Bichler did not object’ to this instruction, and the

modified concerted action theory became the law

applicable to that particular case (id. at 583- 584).

Now given the opportunity to assess the merits of

this theory, we decline to adopt it as the law of this

State. Parallel behavior, the major justification for

visiting liability caused by the product of one manu-

facturer upon the head of another under this analysis,

is a common occurrence in industry generally. We

believe, therefore, that inferring agreement from the fact

of parallel activity alone improperly expands the concept

of concerted action beyond a rational or fair limit; among

other things, it potentially renders small manufacturers,

in the case of DES and in countless other industries,

jointly liable for all ddmages stemming from the defective

products of an entire industry (accord, Sindell v Abbot

Labs, supra at 605).

13a

A narrower basis for liability, tailored more closely

to the varying culpableness of individual DES producers,

is the market share concept. First judicially articulated

by the California Supreme Court in Sindell v Abbott

Labs (supra), variations upon this theme have been

adopted by other courts (see, Collins v Lilly & Co.,

supra; Martin v Abbott Labs, supra). \n Sindell v Abbott

Labs (supra), the Court synthesized the market share

concept by modifying the Summers v Tice (supra)

aiternative liability rationale in two ways. It first

loosened the requirement that all possible wrongdoers

be before the court, and instead made a “substantial

share” sufficient. The court then held that each defendant

who could not prove that it did not actually injure

plaintiff would be liable according to that manufacturer’s

market share: The court’s central justification for

adopting this approach was its belief that limiting a

defendant’s liability to its market share will result, over

the run of cases, in liability on the part of a defendant

roughly equal to the injuries the defendant actually

caused (id. at 612).

In the recent case of Brown v Superior Court (44

Cal3d 1049), the California Supreme Court resolved

some apparent ambiguity in Sindell v Abbott Labs, and

held that a manufacturer’s liability is several only, and,

in cases in which all manufacturers in the market are

not joined for any reason, liability will still be limited

to market share, resulting in a less than 100% recovery

for a plaintiff. Finally, it is noteworthy that determining

market shares under Sindell v Abbott Labs proved

difficult and engendered years of litigation. After

attempts at using smaller geographical units, it was

eventually determined that the national market provided

the most feasible and fair solution,.and this national

market information was compiled (see, In re Complex

DES Litigation, No. 830/109 Cal Super Ct).

l4a

Four years after Sindell v Abbott Labs, the Wisconsin

Supreme Court followed with Collins v Lilly & Co. (116

Wis2d 166). Deciding the identification issue without

the benefit of the extensive California litigation over

market shares, the Wisconsin court held that it was

prevented from following Sindell due to “the practical

difficulty of defining and proving market share” (id. at

189). Instead of focusing on tying liability closely to

the odds of actual causation, as the Sindell court

attempted, the Collins court took a broader perspective,

and held that each defendant is liable in proportion to

the amount of risk it created that the plaintiff would

be injured by DES. Under the Collins structure, the

“risk” each defendant is liable for is a question of fact

in each case, with market shares being relevant to this

determination (id. at 191, 200). Defendants are allowed,

however, to exculpate themselves by showing that their

product could not have caused the injury to the particular

plaintiff (id. at 198).

The Washington Supreme Court, writing soon after

Collins v Lilly & Co., took yet another approach (see,

Martin v Abbott Labs, 102 Wash2d 581). The Martin

court first rejected the Sindell market share theory due

to the belief (which later proved to be erroneous in Brown

v Superior Court {supra]) that California’s approach

distorted liability by inflating market shares to ensure

plaintiffs of full recovery (id. at 601). The Martin court

instead adopted what it termed “market share alternative

liability,” justified, it concluded, because “[eJach

defendant contributed to the risk of injury to the public,

and consequently, the risk to individual plaintiffs” (id.

at 604).

Under the Washington scheme, defendants are first

allowed to exculpate themselves by proving by the

preponderance of the evidence that they were not the

1Sa

manutacturer of the DES that injured plaintiff.

Unexculpated defendants are presumed to have equal

market shares, totalling 100%. Each defendant then has

the opportunity to rebut this presumption by showing

that its actual market share was less than presumed.

If any defendants succeed in rebutting this presumption,

the liability shares of the remaining defendants who

could not prove their actual market share are inflated,

so that the plaintiff received a 100% recovery (id. at

605-606).' The market shares of defendants is a question

of fact in each case, and the relevant market can be

a particular pharmacy, or county, or state, or even the

country, depending upon the circumstances the case

presents (George v Parke- Davis, supra).

Turning to the structure to be adopted in New York,

we heed both the lessons learned through experience

in other jurisdictions and the realities of the mass

litigation of DES claims in this State. Balancing these

considerations, we are led to the conclusion that a market

share theory, based upon a national market, provides

the best solution. As California discovered, the reliable

'The actual operation of this theory proved more mathematically

compiex when the court was presented with the question of what

to do about unavailable defendants. Recognizing that the possibility

of abuse existed when defendants implead unavailable defendants,

who would then be assumed to have had an equal share of the

market, the court placed the burden upon appearing defendants

to prove the market share of the absent ones (George v Parke-

Davis, 107 Wash2d 584). If this can be proved, the plaintiff simply

cannot recover the amount attributable to the absent defendant,

and thus recovery in the case is less than 100%. If the market

Share of the absent defendant cannot be shown, the remaining

defendants who cannot proved their market shares have their shares

inflated to provide plaintiff with full recovery. Finally, if all

appearing defendants can prove their market shares, their shares

are never inflated, regardless of whether the market share of a

non-appearing defendant can be proved or not: thus, in this

situation, the plaintiff again will not recover her full damages (id.).

l6a

determination of any market smaller-than the national

one likely is not practicable. Moreover, even if it were

possible, of the hundreds of cases in the New York courts,

without a doubt there are many in which the DES that

allegedly caused injury was ingested in another State.

Among the thorny issues this could present, perhaps

the most daunting is the specter that the particular case

could require the establishment of a separate market

share matrix. We feel that this is an unfair, and perhaps

impossible burden to routinely place upon the litigants

in individual cases.

Nor do we believe that the Wisconsin approach of

assessing the “risk” each defendant caused a particular

plaintiff, to be litigated anew as a question of fact in

each case, is the best solution for this State. Applied

on a limited scale this theory may be feasible, and

certainly is the most refined approach by allowing a

more thorough consideration of how each defendant's

actions threatened the plaintiff. We are wary, however,

of setting loose, for application in the hundreds of cases

pending in this State, a theory which requires the

factfinder’s individualized and open-ended assessment

of the relative liabilities of scores of defendants in every

case. Instead, it is our perception that the injustices

arising from delayed recoveries and inconsistent results

which this theory may produce in this State outweigh

arguments calling for its adoption.

Consequently, for essentially practical reasons, we

adopt a market share theory using a national market.

We are aware that that [sic] the adoption of a national

market will likely result in a disproportion between the

liability of individual manufacturers and the actual

injuries each manufacturer caused in this State. Thus

our market share theory cannot be founded upon the

belief that, over the run of cases, liability will

17a

approximate causation in this State (see, Sindell y

Abbott Labs, supra at 612). Nor does the use of a national

market provide a reasonable link between liability and

the risk created by a defendant to a particular plaintiff

(see, Collins v Lilly & Co. supra; Martin v Abbot Labs,

supra). Instead, we choose to apportion liability so as

to correspond to the overall culpability of each

defendant, measured by the amount of risk of injury

each defendant created to the public at large. Use of

a national market is a fair method, we believe, of

apportioning defendants’ liabilities according to their

total culpability in marketing DES for use during

pregnancy. Under the circumstances, this is an equitable

way to provide plaintiffs with the relief they deserve,

while also rationally distributing the responsibility for

piaintiffs’ injuries among defendants.

To be sure, a defendant cannot participate in the

marketing of DES for pregnancy use; if a DES producer

satisfies its burden of proof of showing that it was not

a member of the market of DES sold for pregnancy

use, disallowing exculpation would be unfair and unjust.

Nevertheless, because liability here is based on the overall

risk produced, and not causation in a single case, there

should be no exculpation of a defendant who, although

a member of the market producing DES for pregnancy

use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff's

injury. It is merely a windfall for a producer to escape

liability solely because it manufactured a more

identifiable pill, or sold only to certain drugstores. These

fortuities in no way diminish the culpability of a

defendant for marketing the product, which is the basis

of liability here.?

?Various defendants argue here that although they produced DES,

it was not sold for pregnancy use. If a defendant was not a member

of the national market of DES marketed for pregnancy, it is not

18a

Finally, we hold that the liability of DES producers

is several only, and should not be inflated when all

participants in the market are not before the court in

a particular case. We understand that, as a practical

matter, this will prevent some plaintiffs from recovering

100% of their damages. However, we eschewed

exculpation to prevent the fortuitous avoidance of

liability, and thus, equitably, we decline to unleash the

same forces to increase a defendant’s liability beyond

its fair share of responsibility.3

culpable, and should not be liable. Consequently, if a particular

defendant sold DES in a form unsuitable for use during pregnancy,

or if a defendant establishes that its product was not marketed

for pregnancy use, there should be no liability. From the record

before the Court here, however, the facts are not developed weli

enough to establish that any defendants were not in the national

market of DES sold for pregnancy use. Thus summary judgment

cannot at this time be granted on this issue as to any defendants.

3The dissenter misapprehends the basis for liability here. We have

not by the backdoor adopted a theory of concerted action. We

avoided extending this theory, because its concomitant requirement

of joint and several liability expands the burden on small

manufactuers beyond a rational or fair limit. This result is reached

by the dissent, not by the majority, so that criticism on this front

is misplaced.

We are confronted here with an unprecedented identification

problem, and have provided a solution that rationally apportions

liability. We have heeded the practical lessons learned by other

jurisdictions, resulting in our adoption of a national market theory

with full knowledge that it concedes the lack of a logical link between

liability and causation in a single case. The dissent ignores these

lessons, and, endeavoring to articulate a theory it perceives to be

closer to traditional law, sets out a construct in which liability

is based upon chance, not upon the fair assessment of the acts

of defendants. Under the dissent’s theory, a manufacturer with a

large market share may avoid liability in many cases just because

it manufactured a memorably shaped pill. Conversely, a small

manufacturer can be held jointly liable for the full amount of every

DES injury in this State simply because the shape of its product

19a

The constitutionality of the revival statute remains

to be considered (see, L 1986, ch 682, §4). This section

revives, for the period of one year, actions for damages

caused by the latent effects of DES, tungsten carbide,

asbestos, chlordane, and polyvinylchloride. Defendants

argue that the revival of barred DES claims was

unconstitutional as a denial of both due process and

equa! protection, under the State and Federal Consti-

tutions (see NY Const art 1, §§6, Il; US Const, 14th

Amend, §1). We are concerned here only with the

constitutionality of the statute as it pertains to DES;

there are no producers of the other substances, or

plaintiffs alleging injury therefrom, before the Court on

these appeals. -

The federal due process clause provides very little

barrier to a state legislature’s revival of time-barred

actions (see, Chase Securities Corp v Donaldson, 325

US 304). In Chase, the United States Supreme Court

upheld the revival of a time barred action, stating that

statutes of limitation “represent a public policy about

the privilege to litigate * * * the history of pleas shows

them to be good only by legislative grace and to be

subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control”

(id. at 314). Under state law, the level of review seems

was not remarkable, even though the odds, realistically, are

exceedingly long that the small manufacturer caused the injury

in any one particular case. .

Therefore, although the dissent’s theory based upon a “shifting

the burden of proof” and joint and several liability is facially

reminiscent of prior law, in the case of DES it is nothing more

than advocating that bare fortuity be the test for liability. When

faced with the novel identification problem posed by DES cases,

it is preferable to adopt a new theory that apportions fault rationally,

rather than to contort extant doctrines beyond the point at which

they provide a sound premise for determining liability.

20a

somewhat more stringent. In Gallewski v Hentz (301

NY 164, 174) the Court stated that “the Legislature may

constitutionally revive a personal cause of action where

the circumstances are exceptional and are such as to

satisfy the Court that serious injustice would result to

plaintiffs not guilty of any fault if the intentions of the

Legislature were not effected.” It appears, however, that

we have applied a less strict test in other cases, and

have been satisfied if there was an apparent injustice

which “calls for a remedy,” and which is “reasonable”

and not “arbitrary.” (Robinson v Robbins Dry Dock

& Repair Co., 238 NY 271, 279-280).

We need not light upon a precise test here, however,

because the Legislature’s revival of DES claims meets

the highest standard. For at least 25 years this Court

maintained an exposure rule for toxic substances,

because it was felt that change in this area was the

responsibility of the Legislature (see, e.g., Schwartz v

Heyden Newport, 12 NY2d 212, 220; Fleishman v Lilly

& Co., supra at 890). Indeed, in Fleishman v Lilly &

Co. (supra) the Legislature’s attention was drawn

specifically to DES by the majority, which stated that

any change in the exposure rule was the Legislature’s

role.

The Legislature has now revived DES actions that

were time barred under the exposure rule, while also

instituting a discovery rule for future application (L 1986,

ch 682, §4; CPLR 214-c). The latent nature of DES

injuries is well known, and it is clear that in the past

the exposure rule prevented the bringing of timely actions

for recovery. Thus we believe that exceptional circum-

stances are presented, that an injustice has been rectified,

and that the requirements of Gallewski v Hentz (supra)

have been met.

'

:

2la

Defendants argue further that, even if the statute is

generally valid, it may be unconstitutionally applied in

cases in which the plaintiff could have sued originally,

but did not. It does seem that some plaintiffs may have

known of their injuries a day, or a week, a month, or

perhaps longer, before the original limitations period

ran. Some may have known of their exposure, but did

not develop injuries during the limitations period. Others

may have known of some effect upon them of DES

exposure, which became cancerous only after any action

would have been time barred. Under these circumstances,

the Legislature properly determined that it would be

more fair for all plaintiffs to uniformly now have one

year to bring their actions, rather than for the courts

to begin drawing arbitrary lines transecting this area’s

shades of gray.

Defendants also argue that the revival statute violates

equal protection, because the Legislature designated only

five substances for revival, including DES, while

instituting a prospective only discovery rule for other

substances. Defendants claim that this categorization is

without sufficient basis, and that it is the result of a

“political compromise.” But most, if not all legislation

is the product of some compromise, so that this objection

surely is no basis for finding the revival statute

unconstitutional. Instead, here we must proceed on the

presumption that the law is constitutional, and will hold

otherwise only if it is established that the distinction

drawn has no reasonable basis (Trump v Chu, 62 NY2d

20; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 61). Moreover,

because defendants allege no impairment of a funda-

mental right, the Legislature has substantial leeway in

making classifications in this area of “economics and

social welfare” (see, Montgomery v Daniels, supra,

[quoting Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485}).

22a

As it pertains to DES, surely the revival statute has

a rational basis, and the Legislature acted within its

broad range of discretion in enacting the law. The

number of DES-caused injuries was relatively well

known by the Legislature, which allowed for the

ramifications of revival of DES claims, such as the effect

on insurance interests, and the other costs, to be

reasonably predicted (Record of Proceedings, New York

Assembly [June 24, 1986][statement of Assemblyman

M. H. Miller]). Furthermore, it was also well known,

particularly after Fleishman v Lilly (supra), that DES

victims were prejudiced under current law. This, we

believe, is enough of a basis for the Legislature to revive

DES claims now, and wait as to other substances until

it is felt that these substances present a problem suitable

for resolution. The Legislature does not violate equal

protection by providing a rational piecemeal remedy for

what may be a larger problem ( Williamson v Lee Optical,

348 US 483).

Accordingly, in each case the order of the Appellate

Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified

question answered in the affirmative.

Hymowitz v Eli Lilly - Case No. 56

Tigue v E.R. Squibb - Case No. 57

Dolan v Eli Lilly - Case No. 58

Hanfling v Eli Lilly - Case No. 59

MOLLEN, J. (concurring in Hymowitz and Hanfling;

and dissenting in part in Tigue and Dolan):

The issue presented to the Court in this appeal is to

determine whether the revival statute for DES claims

is constitutional and has properly “opened the window”

to enable injured parties to recover for their injuries

caused by DES and, if so, how to best enable such

plaintiffs to overcome the practical impossibility of

23a

bearing their normal burden of proof of demonstrating

that the defendants caused their injuries. The majority

has selected one approach to meet this issue. However,

I am compelled to concur in part and dissent in part

because I am convinced that another more appropriate

method of approaching this issue is fairer and more just

and equitable to the plaitniffs and to those defendants

who could not have caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and

which is consistent with established principles of tort

law. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the

revival statute is, in all respects, constitutional and may

be relied upon by the plaintiffs herein. I am also in

complete agreement with the majority’s view that the

market share theory of liability, based upon a national

market, is an appropriate means by which to accord

DES plaintiffs an opportunity to seek recovery for their

injuries. However, | respectfully disagree with the

majority’s conclusion that there should be no exculpation

of those defendants who produced and marketed DES

for pregnancy purposes, but who produced and marketed

DES for pregnancy purposes, but who can prove, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that they did not

produce or market the particular pill ingested by the

plaintiff's mother. Moreover, in order to ensure that

these plaintiffs receive full recovery of their damages,

as they are properly entitled to by any fair standard,

I would retain the principle of imposing joint and several

liability upon those defendants which cannot exculpate

themselves.

The emergence of the market share concept ofiability

in the field of products liability reflects a recognition

by several jurisdictions throughout the United States

that due to the incidence of mass production and

marketing of various drugs and fungible goods,

consumers are many times harmed by a product which

24a

is not easiiy traceable to a specific manufacturer,

particularly in those situations where the harm occurred

many years prior to the discovery of the injuries and

the cause thereof. Such is the situation in the DES cases

now before us. Under traditional common law tort

principles, a plaintiff is required to establish the existence

of a causal relationship between the act or omission

of the defendant or defendants and the injury sustained

(see, Morrissey v Conservative Gas Corp., | NY2d 741;

Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 41, at 262). However, given

the reality of the situation in DES cases, including the

lengthy passage of time, the generic form of most DES

pills and the unavailability of pharmaceutical and

physician records, it is, as a practical matter, impossible

’ for most DES plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof

of establishing the traditional tort element of causation.

Moreover, as noted by the majority, the tort doctrines

of alternative liability and concerted action, both of

which provide for recovery in situations where a plaintiff,

through no fault of his or her own, cannot identify the

actual wrongdoer, do not provide appropriate relief to

these DES plaintiffs. Unlike the scenario present in the

DES cases, the principle of alternative liability

presupposes that the number of possible wrongdoers are

few in number, that one of the joined defendants had

to have actually caused the plaintiff’s injury and that

the defendants are in a much better position than the

plaintiff to identify the actual wrongdoer and, therefore,

the burden is shifted to the defendants to prove who

was the actual wrongdoer and who among them are

to be exculpated (see, Summers v Tice, 33 Cal2d 80;

Restatement [Second] of Torts 433B[3]). However, in

view of the difference in the factual circumstances, the

theory of alternative liability does not provide a workable

solution for DES plaintiffs.

25a

The concept of concerted action liability requires, inter

alia, that the plaintiff prove that all of the joined

defendants had an understanding, expressed or implied,

to participate in a common plan or design to commit

a tortious act or to lend assistance to the wrongdoer

(see, Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 46, at 323). Typically,

DES plaintiffs allege that the concerted action of the

DES manufacturers consisted of using one another’s

marketing techniques, relying upon each other’s testing

and encouraging one another to market DES without

performing adequate testing or warnings. The courts,

with few exceptions (see, e.g., Abel v Lilly & Co., 418

Mich. 311), have rejected the applicability of concerted

action liability to DES cases because the plaintiffs cannot

establish the existence of an express or tacit agreement

among DES manufacturers to market or produce DES

without proper testing or warnings (see, e.g., Sindell

v Abbott Labs, 26 Cal3d 588, cert denied 499 US 912;

Mariin v Abbott Labs, 102 Wash2d 581; Collins v Lilly

& Co., 116 Wis2d 166). The parallel or imitative conduct

of DES manufacturers in producing and/or marketing

DES, as the majority expressly notes, is insufficient, in

and of itself, to establish concerted action liability (slip

opinion, p 12).

The principle of market share litigation was first

espoused bv the California Supreme Court in Sindell

v Abbott Labs (supra), as a valid theory of manufac-

turer’s liability based upon each manufacturer’s share

of the market. This approach provides DES plaintiffs

with a means by which to recover damages for their

injuries without the plaintiffs being held to the traditional

tort requirement of identifying the actual wrongdoer.

The public policy underpinnings of the Sindell rationale

is that, from a perspective of fairness and equity, the

DES manufacturers are in a better position than the

26a

innocent plaintiffs who have sustained grievous injuries

to bear the cost of such injuries. Thus, the Sinde/l court

held that once a plaintiff has joined a “substantial share”

of the DES manufacturers of the relevant market in

the action and has established that the sustained injuries

were caused by the ingestion of DES by the plaintiff’s

mother during pregnancy, the burden of proof shifts

to each defendant to demonstrate, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that it did not produce or market the

pill ingested by the plaintiffs mother. Those DES

defendants who could not exculpate themselves, would

then be liable for the proportion of the judgment which

represented its share of the market. The intended result

of the Sindell approach is that, “each manufacturer’s

liability for an [particularly DES] injury would be

approximately equivalent to the damage caused by the

DES it manufactured” (supra, p 613).

The Wisconsin and Washington Supreme Courts

subsequently adopted collective liability theories in DES

cases based upon similar policy considerations; namely,

as between the injured plaintiffs and the negligent

defendants, the latter should bear the cost of injury

(Collins v Lilly Co.[sic], 116 Wis2d 166, supra; Martin

v Abbott Labs, 102 Wash2d 581, supra). Both the Collins

and Martin courts reasoned that since all of the DES

manufacturers and distributors contributed to the risk

of injury to the public and, consequently, the risk of

injury to individual plaintiffs, each defendant shared,

in some measure, a degree of culpability in producing

or marketing DES. In Collins, the Wisconsin Supreme

adopted a “risk contribution” theory of liability, and,

in Martin, the Washington Supreme Court adopted what

it termed a “market share alternative liability” theory.

These two approaches differ from the Sindell theory

primarily in the manner in which the damages are

27a

apportioned. Significantly, both the Supreme Courts of

Wisconsin and Washington in the Collins and Martin

cases, as did the Supreme Court of California in Sindell,

provided that the joined or impleaded defendants may

exculpate themselves from liability if they can establish,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that they did not

produce or market the particular DES pill taken by the

plaintiffs mother. Notably, in Collins, the Wisconsin

Supreme Court explained that it would not adopt a risk

contribution theory which would have imposed liability

solely upon the DES defendants’ participation in the

creation of the risk of injury even though some of the

defendants could establish that they could not have

actually caused the plaintiff's injury. The Collin’s court

noted, “(w)e still require it be shown that the defendant

drug company reasonably could have centributed in

some way to the actual injury” (supra, p 191, n 10).

In fact, none of the jurisdictions which have adopted

varying theories of collective liability in DES cases, has

refused to permit exculpation of those defendants which

have been able to prove that they could not have

produced cr marketed the pill which caused the

particular plaintiffs injuries, thereby recognizing that

to preclude exculpation would directly and unnecessarily

contravene the established common law tort principles

of causation (see, Sindell v Abbott Labs, supra; Collins

v Lilly & Co., supra; Martin v Abbott Labs, supra; Abel

v Eli Lilly Co., supra; McCormack v Eli Lilly & Co.,

supra; see also, Burnside v Abbott Labs, 351 Pa S 264).

Clearly, the development and underlying purpose of

the various concepts of liability in DES cases has been

to provide a means whereby the plaintiffs, who cannot

identify the actual manufacturer of the pill ingested by

their mother, are alleviated of the traditional burden _

28a

of proof of causation and to shift that burden to the

defendants. The various theories of collective liability

which have been adopted in the several jurisdictions in

an effort to provide plaintiffs with a means to recovery

for their injuries, were not intended to, and did not,

provide DES plaintiffs with an unprecedented strict

liability cause of action. However, the majority herein,

by precluding exculpation of those defendants in DES

cases who produced DES for pregnancy purposes but

who can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that they did not and could not have produced or

marketed the pill which caused the plaintiff’s injuries,

has created such a radical concept and purports to limit

it to DES claims. In the majority’s view, the defendant’s

liability in DES cases is premised upon the overall risk

of injury which they created to the public at large in

producing and marketing DES for pregnancy purpose

and, therefore, exculpation of those defendants who can |

establish that the plaintiff's mother did not ingest their

pill, would be inconsistent with the overall risk theory

of liability. By taking this view, however, the majority

while stating that it is adopting a market share theory

of liability, is. in essence, despite its disclaimer of doing

so, adopting a concerted action theory of liability, but

has eliminated therefrom the requirement that the

plaintiffs establish that the defendants tacitly agreed to

produce and market DES for pregnancy use without

proper testing and without adequate warnings of the

potential dangers involved. Such a result, represents a

radical departure from fundamental tenets of tort law

and is unnecessarily unfair and inequitable to the

defendants who have proven, or can prove, that they

did not produce the pill which caused the injury.

Moreover, this result is directly contrary to the majority's

own statement that it is rejecting the “conscious

29a

parallelism” theory utilized in Bichler v Eli Lilly & Co.

(79 AD2d 317, affd 55 NY2d 571), because, as stated

by the majority herein, “(p)arallel behavior, the major

justification for visiting liability by the product of one

manufacturer upon the head of another under this

analysis, is a common occurrence in industry generally.

We believe, therefore, that inferring agreement from the

act of parallel activity alone improperly expands the

concept of concerted action beyond a rational or fair

limit; among other things, it potentially renders small

manufacturers in the case of DES and in countless other

industries, jointly liable for all the damages stemming

from the defective products of an entire industry” (slip

opinion, p 12).

I fully concur with the above stated position of the

majority and thus, I cannot agree that the imposition

of liability on drug companies, in this case DES

| manufacturers, solely upon their contribution, in some

measure, to the risk of injury by producing and

marketing a defective drug, without any consideration

given to whether the defendant drug companies actually

caused the plaintiff’s injuries, is appropriate or

warranted. Rather, I would adopt a market share theory

| of liability, based upon a national market, which would

provide for the shifting of the burden of proof on the

issue of causation to the defendants and would impose

liability upon all of the defendants who preduced and

marketed DES for pregnancy purposes, except those

who were able to prove that their product could not

have caused the injury. Under this approach, DES

plaintiffs, who are unable to identify the actual

manufacturer of the pill ingested by their mother, would

only be required to establish, (1) that the plaintiff's

mother ingested DES during pregnancy; (2) that the

plaintiff's injuries were caused by DES, and (3) that

30a

the defendant or defendants produced and marketed

DES for pregnancy purposes. Thereafter, the burden

of proof would shift to the defendants to exculpate

themselves by establishing, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the plaintiffs mother could not have

ingested their particular pill. Of those defendants who

are unable to exculpate themselves from liability, their

respective share of the plaintiff's damages would be

measured by their share of the national market of DES

produced and marketed for pregnancy purposes during

the period in question.

I would further note that while, on the one hand,

the majority would not permit defendants who produced

DES for pregnancy purposes to exculpate themselves,

the majority at the same time deprives the plaintiffs of

the opportunity to recover fully for their injuries by

limiting the defendants’ liability for the plaintiff's

damages to severai liability. In my view, the liability

for the plaintiff's damages of those defendants who are

unable to exculpate themselves should be joint and

several thereby ensuring that the plaintiffs will receive

full recovery of their damages. In addition to being fair

to the DES plaintiffs, the imposition of joint and several

liability is consistent with that portion of the revival

statute which specifically exempted DES claims from

those provisions which provide, with certain exceptions,

for several liability of joint tortfeasors (see, L. 1986,

ch. 682, § 12; CPLR 1600 er seq.). Moreover, in order

to ease the financial burden on the specific defendants

named in the lawsuit, the defendants would have the

option of seeking contribution from their fellow

defendants for damages in excess of each defendant’s

particular market share, and a defendant should be

permitted leave to implead those DES manufacturers

who the plaintiff has not joined, in order to ensure,

3la

where possible, full contribution (see, e.g., Dole v Dow

Chemical Co., 30 NY2d 143). Admittedly, adherence

to joint and several liability could result in disproportion

between a defendant’s potential liability for the damages

suffered by the plaintiff and defendant’s actual national

market share; however, the opportunity to present

exculpatory evidence reduces the risk of imposing

liability on innocent defendants.

The application of the aforesaid principles, although

somewhat innovative and a modification of traditional

tort law, (i.e., the burden of proof is on the plaintiff

to prove proximate causation) would, in view of the

exigent circumstances, be in furtherance of a valid public

policy of imposing the burden of bearing the cost of

severe injuries upon those who are responsible for placing

into the stream of commerce the causative instrumen-

tality of such injuries. Adherence to this principle would

not be too dissimilar from the accepted doctrine of res

ipsa loquitor which provides, in essence, that where an

instrumentality which caused the plaintiff's injuries was

in the exclusive control of the defendant and the accident

which occurred is one which would not ordinarily happen

without negligence, these facts are sufficient to justify

an inference of negligence and to shift the burden upon

the defendant of coming forward with an explanation

(see, e.g., Galbraith v Busch, 267 NY 230, 234;

Richardson, Evidence § 93, p 68 [Prince 10th ed]). Thus,

this approach, unlike that taken by the majority, does

not represent an unnecessary and radical departure from

basic principles of tort iaw. By characterizing this

approach as “nothing more than advocating that bare

fortuity be the test for liability” (slip opinion p 19, n 3)

the majority fails to perceive that this is no more and

no less than a basic principle of tort law; i.e., a plaintiff

may not recover for his injuries from a defendant who

32a

could not have caused those injuries. When the majority

eliminates this fundamental causative factor as a basis

for recovery, it effectively indulges in the act of judicial

legislating. | would further note that if the Legislature

had intended to adopt this radical approach which is

at total variance with traditional tort law, it could readily

have done so when it enacted the revival statute for,

| among others, DES plaintiffs. Its refusal to do so can

certainly not be deemed to be an invitation to this Court

to assume the legislative role.

Judged by the aforesaid standard, I conclude that the

trial courts’ orders in Tigue & Margolies v E.R. Squibb

(Case No. 57) and Dolan v Eli Lilly (Case No. 58), to

the extent that they denied the summary judgment

motions of the defendant The Upjohn Company

(“Upjohn”) in both actions and the defendant Rexall

Drug Company (“Rexall”) in the Tigue action, were

improper. In Tigue, Mrs. Tigue, the plaintiff's mother,

testified that the DES pill she ingested while she was

pregnant with the plaintiff was a white, round tablet

(R 709-710). Similarly, Myrna Margolies’ mother

testified that the DES pill she ingested was a dark red,

hard, round pill (R 224-226). Mr. Margolies, the

plaintiff's father, also recalled that the pills were a reddish

color and Mrs. Margolies’ obstetrician stated that the

DES pill he prescribed to his patients was sot an Upjohn

product. Moreover, in the Dolan, action, Mrs. Dolan,

the plaintiff's mother, stated that the DES pill she took

was a white, round, hard tablet (R 321; 303). This fact

was corroborated by Mr. Dolan’s testimony (R 414; 444).

Finally, it was established that Upjohn’s DES pill which

was produced and marketed for pregnancy purposes,

was in the form of a “perle” which is a pharmaceutical

term for a dose form consisting of a soft elastic capsule

33a

containing a liquid center (R 2182). Based on the

evidence submitted in support of Upjohn’s summary

judgment motions in these two cases, | would conclude

that the plaintiffs have failed to adduce sufficient proof

in admissible form to raise a triable issue of fact as

to whether their mothers ingested an Upjohn DES pill.

Accordingly, Upjohn’s motion for summary judgment

in those actions should have been granted.

Additionally, in Tigue & Margolies v E.R. Squibb

(Case No. 57), Rexall’s motion for summary judgment

should have been granted since the plaintiffs failed to

raise a triable issue of fact as to whether their mothers

could have ingested a Rexall DES product during the

pregnancies in question. The evidence submitted in

support of Rexall’s motion established that until 1978,

Rexall sold its products, including its DES pill,

exclusively to Rexall Drug Stores (R 1934, 22003-04:

2210). The testimony of the plaintiffs’ parents, Mrs.

Tigue and Mr. and Mrs. Margolies established that they

had purchased their DES prescriptions from non-Rexall

pharmacies during the periods of their respective

pregnancies, i.e., 1960 and 1953. Based on this

uncontroverted evidence demonstrating Rexall’s non-

involvement in these plaitniffs’ injuries, Rexall’s motion

for summary judgment should have been granted.

As to those defendants which seek to exculpate

themselves from liability in these various actions based

upon the fact that they produced and marketed DES

solely for non-pregnancy purposes, we agree with the

majority’s conclusion that the record before the Court

is factually insufficient to establish that they were not

in the national market of DES sold for pregnancy use

(see, slip opinion, p 18, n 2). Accordingly, their summary

judgment motions were properly denied.

34a

~“*eeneae exe eee eee Oe Fe

In Case Nos. 56 and 59: Order affirmed, with costs,

and certified question answered in the affirmative.

Opinion by Chief Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander,

Titone and Hancock concur. Judge Mollen concurs in

a separate opinion. Judges Simons, Kaye and Bellacosa

took no part.

In Case Nos. 57 and 58: Order affirmed, with costs,

and certified question answered in the affirmative.

Opinion by Chief Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander,

Tine and Hancock concur. Judge Mollen dissents in part

and votes to modify in an opinion. Judges Simons, Kaye

and Bellacosa took no part.

Decided April 4, 1989

35a

APPENDIX B

Appellate Division Order

(April 14, 1988)

At a term of the Appellate Division of the

Supreme Court held in and for the First Judicial

Department in the County of New York, on April

14, 1988

Present-Hon. Theordore R. Kupferman, Justice Presiding

Sidney H. Asch

Ernst H. Rosenberger

Betty Weinberg Ellerin

George Bundy Smith, Justices.

Mindy Hymowitz,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-against-

Eli Lilly and Company, Abbott

Laboratories, The Upjohn Company and

E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,

Defendants-Appellants. 31981

-and-

Merck & Co., Inc., Ayerst Laboratories, a

division of American Home Products Corp.,

and Winthrop Laboratories, a division of

Sterling Drug, Inc.,

Defendants,

Attorney General of the State of New York,

Intervenor-Respondent

—-POTTETITTEPITTITI LCT TTT eee x

An appeal having been taken to this Court by the

defendants-appellants from an order of the Supreme

Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered

on July 21, 1987,

36a

And said appeal having been argued by Roy G.

Weatherup of counsel for appellant E.R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc., by Russel H. Beatie, Jr. of counsel for appellant

Eli Lilly and Company, by Robin J. Stout of counsel

for appellant The Upjohn Company, by Karl E. Seib,

Jr. of counsel for appellant Abbott Laboratories, by

Paul D. Rheingold of counsel for respondent, by Andrea

Green of counsel for intervenor-respondent, and a brief

as amicus curiae having been submitted by Joseph M.

Costello on behalf of All Putter Company, Inc.; and

due deliberation-having been had thereon,

It is unanimously ordered that the order so appealed

from be and the same hereby is affirmed for the reasons

stated by Ira Gammerman, J., without costs and without

disbursements.

ENTER:

HAROLD J. REYNOLDS

Cierk.

Sere gt ae 6 nm ee

epee ere

Re ee pe ee

37a

APPENDIX C

Appellate Division Order and Opinion

(April 14, 1988)

At a term of the Appellate Division of the ~

Supreme Court held in and for the First Judicial

Department in the County of New York, on April

14, 1988

Fresent-Hon. TheordoreR. Kupferman, Justice Presiding

Sidney H. Asch

Ernst H. Rosenberger

Betty Weinberg Ellerin

George Bundy Smith, Justices.

Elizabeth Tigue, Barbara Tigue, Sayre

Margolies, as Administratrix of the Estate

of Myrna Margolies,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

-against-

E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., Abbott Labor-

atories, Boyle & Company Pharmaceut-

icals, Merck Sharp & Dohme, a Division

of Merck & Co., Inc., Rexall Drug 31980

Company, William H. Rorer, Inc. and The

Upjohn Company,

Defendants-Appellants,

Amfre-Grant Inc., a Subsidiary of Ormont

Drug & Chemical Co., Inc., Carnrick

Laboratories, a Division of G.W.Carnrick

Co., Cole Pharmacal Company, Inc.,

Kremers-Urban Company, and Jerome

Schneider, M.D.

Defendants.

An appeal having been taken to this Court by the

defendants-appellants from an order of the Supreme

Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered

a

38a

on July 23, 1987, which denied appellants’ motions,

pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment

dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.

And said appeal having been argued by John L.

McGoldrick of counsel for appellant Abbott Labora-

tories, by A.Edward Grashof of counsel for appellant

Rexall Drug Company, by Jay P. Mayesh of counsel

for appellant The Upjohn Company, by William

K.Dodds of counsel for appellant Boyle & Company

Pharmaceuticals, by Joseph DiBenedetto of counsel for

appellant Rorer Pharmaceutical Corp., f/k/a William

H. Rorer, Inc., by Roy G. Weatherup of counsel for

appellant E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., by Theodore V.H.

Mayer of counsel for appellant Merck Sharp & Dohme,

a Division of Merck & Co., Inc., and by Paul D.

Rheingold of counsel for respondents; and due

deliberation having been had thereon, and upon the

memorandum decision of this Court filed herein.

It is unanimously ordered that the order so appealed

from be and the same hereby is affirmed, without costs

and without disbursements.

ENTER:

HAROLD J. REYNOLDS

Clerk.

~

Kupferman, J.P., Asch, Rosengerger, Ellerin, Smith,

JJ.

31980 Elizabeth Tigue, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Respondents, P.D. Rheingold

-against-

E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., et al.,

39a

Defendants-Appellants, J.L.McGoldrick

A.E.Grashof

J.P.Mayesh

W.K.Dodds

J.DiBenedetto

R.G.Weatherup

T.V.H.Mayer

Amfre-Grant Inc., etc., et al.,

Defendants.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira

Gammerman, J.), entered July 23, 1987, denying the

motions of defendants Rexall, Upjohn and Abbott,

pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment

dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaints, unanimously

affirmed, without costs.

Seven drug manufacturers appeal from a well-

seasoned determination which denied exculpation based

on their claim that they were not the manufacturer of

the drug known as diethlystilbestrol (DES), allegedly

ingested by the mothers of the plaintiffs. The history

of DES is well documented in a previous opinion of

this court, Bichler v Eli Lilly and Co., 79 AD2d 317.

The underlying problem presented is which of the

many manufacturers of this unpatented drug should be

held culpable, where it cannot be definitively determined

which company manufactured the pills ingested by the

plaintiffs’ mothers.

In the 1987 cumulative supplement to his treatise, |

NY Products Liability Sec. § 107, Michael Weinberger

succinctly analyzes the present state of the law under

the heading “Enterprise Liability”:

40a

In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,* the Court of

Appeals affirmed a plaintiff's verdict, which

was based on a concerted action theory.

However, the Court did not decide the validity

of a cause of action based on concerted action

in DES cases. The court stated that because

defendant did not object to the trial court’s

instructions on concerted action, this theory

became the law of the case, and was not

preserved for appellate review. Hence, the court

took no position on the question of whether

New York recognizes a cause of action based

on concerted action.

In a later related DES case, the Court of

Appeals again tock no position on whether the

theory of concerted action (or other related

theories) should be adopted in DES cases. The

court held only that the Bichler jury finding

of concerted action was not entitled to

collateral estoppel effect, because the issue of

concerted action was not actually contested in

the trial judge’s jury charge in the earlier case.**

Therefore, New York still has no position on

whether a cause of action in DES cases can

be based on concerted action.

* 9.50 Bichler v. Eh Lilly & Co., 55 NY2d

571, 450 NYS2d 776, 436 NE2d 182 (1982)

** 9 60 Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co.,65 NY2d

449, 492 N¥S2d 584, 482 NE2d 63 (1985).

4la

As noted by Justice Gammerman, the law in this

Department clearly recognizes the concerted action

theory. Bichler Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 79 AD2d at

328-29. There is, however, still a question of whether

exculpation is available to those drug manufacturers who

can clearly establish that they could not have been the

purveyor of the drug to a particular plaintiff, which

question is also significant in the many other DES cases

presently pending in the courts. For example, it was

testified that hard, small, white tablets were ingested

by Mrs. Tigue. It is contended that because a different

colored pill was marketed, there is no liability. Another

defendant contends that it sold only to its licensed

franchisees and, therefore, inasmuch as the pills in question

were purchased at a specific pharmacy which was not

the one of its franchisees, there should be no liability.

Another defendant postulates that it did not sell in the

East and so could not have been the purveyor to these

plaintiffs. Still another defendant contends that it did not

market DES for pregnancy-related purposes.

Basic to any determination is the question of whether

exculpation should be permitted at a!l. However, in view

of the fact that the Court of Appeals has, in two instances,

left the question of concerted action open, we should

now permit a complete trial record to be developed,

so that when the matter is finally determined, there will

be no question as to the factual details.

Order filed.

42a

APPENDIX D

Appellate Division Order

(April 14, 1988)

At 2 term of the Appellate Division of the

Supreme Court held in and for the First

Judicial Department in the County of New

York, on April 14, 1988

Present—Hon. Theordore R. Kupferman, Justice Presiding

Sidney H. Asch

Ernst H. Rosenberger

Betty Weinberg Ellerin

George Bundy Smith, Justices.

Jane Dolan, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

-against-

Eli Lilly & Company, E.R.Squibb & Sons,

Inc., The Upjohn Company and Winthrop-

Breon Laboratories, 31982

Defendants-Appellants. -83-84

(and other actions)

Appeals having been taken to this Court by the above-

named appellants from an order of the Supreme Court,

New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered on

or about October 14, 1987, an order of said court entered

on or about October 16, 1987, and an order of said

court, entered on September 29, 1987,

And said appeals having been argued by Russel H.

Beatie, Jr. of counsel for appellant Eli Lilly & Company,

43a

by Roy G. Weatherup of counsel for appellant

E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., by Jay P. Mayesh of counsel

for appellant The Upjohn Company, and by Alfred S.

Julien and Herman Schmertz of counsel for respondents;

and due deliberation having been thereon,

It is unanimously ordered that the three orders so

appealed from be and the same hereby are affirmed,

without costs and disbursements

ENTER:

HAROLD J. REYNOLDS

Clerk.

44a

APPENDIX E

Opinion of Supreme Court, New York County

(July 16, 1987)

SUPREME COURT : NEW YORK COUNTY

IAS : PART 27

MINDY HYMOWITZ.

Plaintiffs,

-against-

ELI LILLY and

COMPANY, WINTHROP INDEX NO.

LABORATORIES, a division of 24767-86

STERLING DRUG, INC.,

THE UPJOHN COMPANY,

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, and AYERST

LABORATORIES, a division of

AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS,

CORP., Defendants.

GAMMERMAN, J.:

In this pharmaceutical product liability action,

plaintiff Mindy Hymowitz alleges that she developed

cancer as a result of prenatal exposure to diethylstil-

bestrol (“DES”), a synthetic estrogen taken by her

mother in 1954 during pregnancy to prevent possible

miscarriage.

Plaintiff was born on December I1, 1954. The

cancerous condition for which plaintiff seeks damages

allegedly appeared in 1979. Under the statute of

limitations then applicable (CPLR 208, 214) plaintiff

was barred from commencing suit in December, 1975

(three years after reaching the age of majority). Plaintiff

brings this action, however, under the provisions of 1986

revival statute (L. 1986 ch. 682 §4).

——————EEeEeE—E———

45a

Plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 to strike

affirmative defenses raised by some defendants

challenging the constitutionality of the revival statute

and alleging that the action is time barred under the

statute of limitations otherwise applicable.

; Defendants Eli Lilly and Co. (“Lilly”) [sic] Abbott

Laboratories (“Abbott”) and The Upjohn Company

(“Upjohn”) seek summary judgment and dismissal of

the complaint as barred by the statute of hmitations

absent the availability of the allegedly unconstitutional

revival statute.

Defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons (“Squibb) opposes

the relief sought by plaintiff and contends that before

the issue of the constitutionality of the revival statute

is determined further discovery is required on the issue

of whether such extraordinary circumstances exist in

this case to justify invocation of the statute which Squibb

also contends is unconstitutional. (Squibb further urges

that discovery is needed to determine whether plaintiff

can identify the manufacturer of the DES actually taken

by her mother).

The revival portion of the 1986 tort reform legislation

provides that actions seeking damages for personal

injury, property damage or death caused by the latent

effects of exposure to five substances (DES, asbestos,

tungsten-carbide, chlordane and polyvinyl-chloride) that

were time barred or dismissed, as of the effective date

of the statute, may be instituted “. .within one year

from the effective date of this act.” The statute was passed

on July 1, 1986 and was signed by the Governor on

July 30, 1986.

In addition to the revival provision for the five

specified substances (§4), the new.tort reform legislation

adopted a general discovery based statute of limitations

46a

for injuries caused by latent effects of exposure to any

substance (CPLR 214. c(2)). Under subsection 2, a victim

may assert a cause of action within three years from

the date the injury was or should have been discovered.

The provision for revival of claims (§4) and the

discovery based statute of limitations (2) were intended

by the Legislature to remedy the perceived injustice

caused by the application of CPLR §§214, 208, (the

exposure based statute of limitations) and to provide

legal recourse for injuries caused by latent effects of

toxic substances. Both provisions were enacted to

remedy the failure of the old statute to recognize that

such injuries may not appear until years after exposure,

long after the expiration of the period within which

actions may be instituted.

Legislative history indicates that the five named

substances were distinguished from other toxic

substances (2) as a result of compromise between the

Assembly (which had voted to permit revival for all toxic

substances) and the Senate which wanted to limit revival.

The Legislature ultimately limited revival based upon

the existence of an identifiable group affected and the

resulting ability to predict the future costs of such revival.

The Legislature was apparently concerned that under

a broader revival statute, the large number of unknown

victims would create unpredictabie risks and costs.

Defendants challenge the revival statute on equal

protection and due process grounds, arguing that the

Statute is the result of an arbitrary and irrat’ -nal political

arrangement arrived at without rational guidelines of

scientific certainity or public necessity. Defendants

further argue that the legislative concern for limiting

the number of potential claimants and costs is not related

to the ostensible objective of the legislation, i.e. to allow

47a

victims of latent injuries to maintain actions. Defendants

\ contend that the revival provision must be stricken on

equal protection grounds, as an underinclusive random

penalty without scientific basis, on five arbitrarily chosen

substances and their manufacturers. It is contended that

the prior exposure statute of limitations or the new three

year discovery based provision would be more than

adequate for victims of the five specified substances.

Defendant Lilly urges that generally, chemical injury

claims accrue at the time of exposure (here, in utero).

Under the three year exposure based statute of

limitations (tolled to the age of majority) claimants could

bring suit until age 21. Lilly contends that most DES

patients develop cancer by age 19; and therefore, their

claims would not be time barred before becoming aware

of their injuries.

Defendants also claim a violation of the due process

clause, in that the statute constitutes an arbitrary

deprivation of the substantive property right to rely upon

the absence of claims. Defendants assert that dismissal

(or the passage of the applicable time bar) gives rise

to substantive property rights which as a general rule,

may not be abrogated and that the exceptional

circumstances to permit revival are not present (see

Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164).

Based upon the impact upon what-they allege are

substantive or property rights, defendants urge the

applicability of strict scrutiny or an intermediate

standard of review rather than a rational basis

examination.

As a general rule, state statutes of limitation reviving

time barred actions are not violative of due process.

Statutes of limitation represent a public policy statement

with respect to the privilege to litigate. “[T]he history

48a

of pleas of limitations shows them to be good only by

legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large

degree of legislative control” (Chase Securities Corp.

v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314). The expiration of

the applicable time period does not eliminate a cause

of action but rather, suspends the court’s power to grant

a remedy (Hulbert v. Clark, 125 N.Y. 295). In other

words, statutes of limitation relate to the availability

of a remedy and not to the destruction of any

fundamental right.

In the past, New York courts have upheld the power

of the state legislature to extend or revive time barred

claims. In Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co. (301 N.Y. 164,

174), the court found that a revival statute is not

necessarily void as a taking of property without due

process. The court stated that “[T]he legislature may

constitutionally revive a personal cause of action where

the circumstances are exceptional and are such as to

satisfy the court that serious injustice would result to

plaintiffs not guilty. of ahy fault if the intention of the

legislature were not effected.”

In McCann v. Walsh Construction Co., (282 A.D.

444, affd, 306 N.Y. 906) the court found that the

legislature acted within the limits of the Constitution

in extending the time period within which victims of

caissons disease could seek redress. The legislature

sought to remedy the injustice caused to victims of a

disease which in many cases did not produce symptoms

until after the period for filing Workmen’s Compensation

claims has passed. The court found that under the

circumstances, the legislature, by extending the time

within which to institute a claim, was merely complying

with the simple demands of justice.

49a

A similar due process challenge was raised by

manufacturers of Agent Orange regarding the consti-

tutionality of the recent statute extending the time within

which victims of dioxin could sue in New York (CPLR

214-b). There, as here, defendants challenged the law

on the round that it permitted commencement of actions

already time barred under the New York statute of

limitations otherwise applicable for injuries caused by

toxic chemicals. In approving the proposed settlement

of the Agent Orange litigation, the Court (Weinstein,

J.) rejected defendants’ federal and state constitutional

challenges to revival of otherwise time barred claims

by the New York legislature (Jn Re Agent Orange

Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 [E.D.N.Y.

1984]). ;

Here, as in Gallewski, McCann and the Agent Orange

case, the legislature, in reviving time barred causes of

action, expressed the public policy of giving preference

to plaintiff's privilege to litigate over defendants’

protection from stale or time barred claims. The issue

raised is whether there is a reasonable connection

between the revival statute and the promotion of a

legitimate state interest, here, health, safety and welfare

(Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 193). In

examining the constitutionality of statutes generally, the

court must bear in mind the strong presumption that

the legislature investigated the problem it addressed and

discovered the need for the legislation passed (Matter

of Taylor v. Sise, 33 N.Y.2d 357). The court must

determine: (1) whether the legislature was acting in

pursuit of permissible state objectives and, if so; (2) were

the means adopted reasonably related to the accomp-

lishment of those objectives (Montgomery v. Daniels,

38 N.Y.2d 41, 54).

50a

Here, the legislature acted within permissible

objectives relating to health, safety and welfare by

reviving causes of action based upon latent effects of

exposure to toxic substances.

Where a question of what the facts establish is raised,

the court should accept the opinion of the legisature

- Lincoln Bldg. Assoc. v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 415, app

dism 355 U.S. 12, citing Old Dearborne Co. v. Seagram

Corp., 299 U.S. 183, i196). In enacting the challenged

statute, the legislature expressed the view that victims

of the latent effects of certain toxic substances were being

denied legal recourse by the automatic application of

the exposure based statute of limitations often enough

to justify an exception to its general application. A

reasonable relationship exists between the reform and

the objective of remedying the defects or inequities under

the prior statute of limitations. There is considerable

support for the position upon which the legislature acted:

the need fo provide a forum for innocent victims who

might otherwise be time barred before becoming aware

of their injuries. Indeed, this case is illustrative of that

need. That studies or data may refute the legislative

conclusions is not dispositive. As the Court of Appeals

stated:

[t]he judiciary, however is not called on to

weigh the relative worth of data or arguments

which may be marshaled on either side as to

the wisdom of determinations made by the

Legislature in the realm of policy. ‘Whether

the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is

based on sound economic theory, whether it

is the best means to achieve the desired result,

whether, in short, the legislative discretion

within its prescribed limits should be exercised

‘in a particular manner, are matters for the

S5la

judgment of the legislature, and the earnest

conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to

bring them within the range of judicial

cognizance’.

(Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 53, quoting

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR Co. v. McGuire, 219

U.S. 549, 569.)

Given the substantial degree of legislative consider-

ation to the need for the challenged tort reform, it would

be inappropriate to express an opinion regarding the

factual predicate for the statute, its philosophical

justification or the wisdom of its enactment (see

Montgomery v. Daniels, id. at 53). In addition, staleness

of claims based on the loss of evidence over time is

not of significance. Defendants have been litigating

similar non-time barred DES cases for years.

Many of the same concepts relevant to the due process

analysis are applicable to defendants’ equal protection

challenge. Defendants argue that the revival statute is

underinclusive; it arbitrarily, without scientific basis

singies out five substances for the additional burden of

revival while excluding other toxic chemicals which cause

latent injuries; it discriminates against out-of-state

manufacturers; and it denies to defendant the protection

of new Article 16 and the 2 discovery based statute of

limitations.

Equal protection essentially requires that all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike ( Plyler v. Doe,

457 U.S. 202). As with the due process argument, the

court must determine the appropriate standard of review.

When social legislation relating to the public health is

challenged, as here, the standard of review is rather

narrow. The revival statute, contrary to defendants’

contentions, does not classify on the basis of a suspect

52a

(or quasi-suspect) class or impair a fundamental right

and therefore a strict scrutiny standard is not applicable.

The legislation must be upheld if the challenged

classification (targeting the five substances to the

exclusion of other toxic chemicals causing latent injuries)

is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose

(Western & S. Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451

U.S. 648, 657; Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20, 25).

Under the rational basis analysis, if any conceivable

facts support the classification, there is no violation of

the equal protection clause. A law may not be arbitrary

or irrational and must be reasonably related to some

“manifest evil” which need only be “reasonably

apprehended.” It is only as a last resort that courts will

invalidate legisiation as unconstitutional (Maresca v.._

Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 250). Further, the stated purpose

justifying the statute need not be its primary purpose

(McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276) and the court

may even hypothesize the motives of the legislature to

discern any conceivable legitimate goal furthered by the

provision being attacked {Maresca v. Cuomo, supra, at

251, quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 780).

Defendants’ objection to the distinctions drawn by

the legislature between the five materials and other toxic

substances is based partly upon the different treatment

accorded the two groups under the 1986 tort reform

bill. Defendants point to the traditional burden of revival

and the apparent inapplicability of Article 16 to the

revival section. Examination of the provision (as it relates

to DES cases) and the legislative history, reveals

significant reasons to justify those distinctions, based

upon the perceived realities of the latent effects of

exposure to the five substances, the ability to ascertain

a finite group of potential claimants and consequently

to predict with some accuracy the economic costs of

ee

53a

revival. Given the reasonable basis for the distinctions

drawn by the legislature, the alleged lack of scientific

precision involved in drawing the line for revival may

be disregarded. Here, the statutory classification does

not result in such disparate treatment as to be arbitrary,

irrational or invidiously discriminatory (see Dandridge

v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471; see also Parker 86th Associates

v. City of New York, 93 A.D.2d, 388, 394, aff'd 59 N.Y.2d

986).

The legislation and the challenged classification passes

constitutional muster under a rational basis test or even

under the more demanding intermediate standard

(“somewhere along the sliding scale between strict

scrutiny. . . and rational basis” (Montgomery v. Daniels,

38 N.Y.2d 41, 61)). It cannot be said that the legislature

acted unreasonably in selecting the five substances for

special treatment. The constitution is not offended

merely because the classification is not made with

mathematical or scientific exactitude or because in

practice it results in some inequity (Dandridge v.

Williams, supra at 485; Montgomery v. Daniels, supra,

at 63). In enacting reform legislation, the legislature is

permitted to proceed one step at a time and to address

the part of the problem that appears most serious

(Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489;

Montgomery v. Daniels, supra, at 62).

Seen in its most fundamental light, defendants object

to the fact that the line drawn by the legislature in

enacting tort reform includes them. Whenever the

legislature draws such a line some must be included,

some excluded. As long as the line drawn is reasonable,

the decision as to where to draw it is left to the legislature

and not the judiciary (Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,

416 U.S. 1, 8; Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41).

OT

54a

Squibb maintains that a theory of liability under which

a claimant may maintain an action without identifying

the particular manufacturer of the DES taken by her

mother is unconstitutional. Squibb contends that under

the separation of powers doctrine such a radical

restructuring of traditional tort law must be left to the

legislature. Based upon a mistaken belief that causation

need noi be shown under the challenged theories, it

argues that absent causation plaintiff lacks standing and

this court is powerless to provide a remedy.

Defendant’s contentions lack merit and wholly fail

to meet the stringent burden to. establish

unconstitutionality.

Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to strike the affirma-

tive defenses challenging the revival statute as uncon-

stitutional and alleging that this action is time barred,

is granted.

Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment

dismissing the complaint as barred by the statute of

limitations are denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: July 16, 1987

/S/ IRA GAMMERMAN

J.S.C.

FILED

JUL 21 1987

COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE

NEW YORK

eee eeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeE————e—EeEE

nines i te

55a

APPENDIX F

Opinion of Supreme Court, New York County

(July 16, 1987)

SUPREME COURT : NEW YORK COUNTY

IAS : PART 27

ELIZABETH TIGUE, BARBARA TIGUE,

SAYRE MARGOLIES, as Administratrix

of the Estate of MYRNA MARGOLIES,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., ABBOTT

LABORATORIES; AMFRE-GRANT, INC., a

Subsidiary of ORMONT DRUG & CHEMICAL

CO., INC.; BOYLE & COMPANY

PHARMACEUTICALS; CARNRICK

LABORATORIES,

Division of G. W. CARNRICK CO.:

COLE PHARMACAL COMPANY,

INC.; KREMERS-URBAN COMPANY,

ELI LILLY and COMPANY;

MERCK SHARP & DOHME,

Division of MERCK & CO., INC.;

REXALL DRUG COMPANY; WILLIAM H.

RORER, INC.; THE UPJOHN COMPANY,

and JEROME SCHNEIDER, M.D.

INDEX NO.

3838-76

Defendants.

GAMMERMAN, J::

Defendants Rexall Drug Company (“Rexall”), The

Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”) and Abbott Laboratories,

(“Abbott”) move pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary

judgment dismissing the complaint based upon the

56a

conceded inability of plaintiffs to identify the particular

manufacturer of the drug, diethylstilbestrol, (*DES”) to

which they were allegedly exposed. Defendants contend

that the right to recover on collective, non-identification

or concerted action theories of liability has not been

established in New York and urge the court to reject

adoption of such theories. Defendants further contend

that if concerted action is a viable basis of liability, it

should not be applicable in a DES case. The motions

are consolidated for disposition.

Plaintiffs seek to recover for injuries allegedly

sustained by Elizabeth Tigue and Myrna Margolies (now

deceased) as a resuit of the ingestion of DES by their

mothers. Sayre Margolies proceeds on behalf of her

daughter Myrna who died in 1977 at age 23, from clear

cell adenocarcinoma of the cervix and vagina, a rare

form of cancer in young women, associated with prenatal

exposure to DES. Plaintiff. Elizabeth Tigue was

diagnosed as having vaginal adenosis, a pre-cancerous

condition associated with DES exposure, in which

glandular tissue normally found in the cervix is found

in the vagina. Plaintiffs’ complaints allege breach of

warranty, negligence, strict liability, res ipsa loquitur,

concerted action and aiding and abetting-strict liability.

Historical Background:

DES is a synthetic hormone that duplicates the

function of estrogen, a female sex hormone naturally

present in women and, in lesser amounts, in men.

Estrogen is essential for female sexual development and

reproduction. DES was first synthesized in 1937 by

British medical researchers. The drug was never

patented, and thus, could be produced and marketed

in the United States by any company obtaining Food

S7a

and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval of a New

Drug Application (“NDA”).

By 1940 ten drug companies had filed NDAs

requesting approval to produce and market DES for

treatment of menopause, senile vaginitis, gonorrheal

vaginitis and suppression of lactation. None of the

conditions for which this initial approval was sought

related to pregnancy. These filings were rejected by the

FDA, it determining that the review process would be

facilitated by the pooling of clinical data produced by

the drug companies into a master file which would form

the data base for the FDA decision. In 1941, twelve

pharmaceutcial companies formed the “Small Commit-

tee”! to pool this clinical data for submission to the

FDA. The joint clinical data was incorporated in each

company’s resubmitted NDA and in September, 1941,

FDA approval was obtained for the use of DES. The

Small Committee was thereafter disbanded.

In 1947 and 1948 a number of drug manufacturers

filed supplemental NDAs for authorization to market

DES, now for the treatment of certain pregnancy

disorders relating to spontaneous abortion or fetal death.

The dosage proposed for this treatment was many times

stronger than the dosage previously approved in 1941.

The supplemental applications were primarily based

upon studies by two independent researches on the role

of hormones in pregnancy. The researchers reported that

the administration of additional estrogen in certain high

'The twelve companies were: Abbott; Armour Laboratories; Ayerst,

McKenna & Harrison, Ltd.; Geo. A. Breon & Co., Inc.; Charles

E. Frost & Co.; Eli Lilly & Co.; Merck & Co., Inc.; Sharp &

Dohme, Inc.; E.R. Squibb & Sons; Upjohn Winthrop Chemical

Company; and John Wyeth & Brothers, Inc. (Affidavit of Don

Charles Hines, M.D. at p. 8).

tie

58a

risk pregnancies appeared to reduce the risk of

miscarriage. FDA approval for use of the drug in

pregnancy was then given.

Lack of Product Identification:

The fundamental issue raised here (and the major

problem facing these and many other plaintiffs in these

DES cases) is their inability to identify the manufacturer

of the DES taken by the mothers of the injured women

and, thus, to directly connect the injury to a particular

defendant.

The DES taken by pregnant women was produced

under a chemically identical formula and usually

manufactured and prescribed genericaliy. Apparently,

many drug companies cannot locate or have failed to

keep records of their DES market activity. Although

that market was dominated by a small number of

companies, entry and exit from the market was fluid

and it is estimated that between 94 and 300 pharma-

ceutical companies manufactured or marketed DES

from 1947 to 1971.

Injuries caused by prenatal exposure to DES appear

many years later. Over time, the ability of a plaintiff

to identify the manufacturer is, obviously, greatly

reduced. The memories or records of those who couid

assist in identifying the manufacturer (parents,

physicians, pharmacists and drug companies) fade or

disappear.

Prior Holdings:

In this state, the general rule is that a plaintiff has

the burden of proof on product identification ( Morrissey

v. Conservative Gas Corp., 285 A.D. 825 [1955], aff'd

1 N.Y.2d 741 [1956]). However, several non-

— <a Fr eT —

59a

identification or collective liability theories have been

proposed and in some cases adopted, to deal with cases

in which the manufacturer of a product cannot be

identified.

In Bichler v. Lilly & Co., (79 A.D.2d 317 [Ist Dept.

1981], aff'd, SS N.Y.2d 571 [1982]), a theory of concerted

action liability was the basis of recovery even though

the defendant was not identified as the manufacturer

of the particular DES taken by the plaintiff's mother.

Indeed in Bichler, the jury found that the plaintiff had

not established that Lilly manufactured the DES taken

by her mother.

Two theories of concerted action were submitted to

the jury: concerted action by implied agreement and

concerted action by substantial assistance. The jury was

instructed that concerted action by agreement could be

inferred from evidence of consciously parallel actions,

that such consciously parallel action could be the basis

of a finding that the drug companies had impliedly agreed

to market DES for pregnancy use without first testing

the drug on pregnant mice. The trial court’s charge with

respect to concerted action by substantial assistance

permitted the jury to find that the failure to test DES

on pregnant mice by defendant Lilly substantially aided

or encouraged other companies (including, presumably,

the company that marketed the DES taken by plaintiff's

mother) to market without appropriate testing.

The jury found that Lilly had acted in concert, that

the failure to test was wrongful and that the injurious

effects of DES were foreseeable. On appeal to the

Appellate Division, defendant argued that the trial

court’s concerted action charge was erroneous, an

argument that the court addressed on its merits.

60a

The Appellate Division found sufficient evidence to

support the jury's findings and, in effect, adopted the

concerted action theory of liability charged by the trial

court. When Bichler reached the Court of Appeals, a

determination was made that Lilly had failed to properly

except to the trial court’s charge on concerted action

and concerted action liability was applicable only as the

law of the case. The Court concluded that there was

adequate evidence to support concerted action liability

by conscious parallelism or substantial assistance. The

Court of Appeals (unlike the trial court and the Appellate

Division) based its finding solely on events beginning

in 1947 (formation of identical chemical standards,

marketing DES without testing on pregnant mice,

reliance upon the same studies to support supplemental

NDAs) and indicated that the 1941 collaboration to

secure approval for non-pregnancy use, had no bearing

upon concerted action relating to the 1947 supplemental

NDA for pregnancy use (Bichler v. Lilly & Co., 55

N.Y.2d 571, 585, n.7). :

In Kaufman v. Lilly & Co., {65 N.Y.2d 449, 456, [sic]

the court stated: “. .we expressed no view in Bichler

and, express none now, on which the proposed theories-

concerted action, alternative liability, enterprise liability

or market share liability - if any, should be adopted in

this or similar DES cases (see, Bichier v. Lilly & Co.,

supra, at p. 580, n.5). The question is still an open one

in New York.”

Discussion:

Defendants correctly contend that the applicability

of the various “collective liability” theories (including

concerted action) to DES fact patterns has not been

finally ruled upon by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless,

the First Department clearly recognized and expressly

eC SS

6la

adopted the concerted action theory for DES cases

(Bichler v. Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317; Kaufman v.

Lilly & Co., 99 A.D.2d 695; see, Carrao v. Heitler, 117

A.D.2d 308, 313).

Since plaintiffs, at least in this Department, may

proceed on a collective or concerted action liability

theory, the inability to identify the actual manufacturer

of the DES taken by Mrs. Tigue and Mrs. Margolies

is not fatal. Plaintiffs’ factual allegations to support a

finding of concerted action are substantially the same

as those pleaded in Bichler and clearly state a viable

cause of action for concert by agreement or substantial

assistance. |

As in Bichler, plaintiffs contend that a finding of

concert by conscious parallelism or substantial assistance

may be supported based upon the formation of identical

chemcial standards for DES in pregnancy, the marketing

of the drug without prior testing on pregnant mice and

the drug companies’ reliance upon the same studies in

supplemental NDAs. Plaintiffs also rely on defendants’

activities leading to the FDA approval for non-

pregnancy use based upon the contention that their

supplemental NDAs relied upon the earlier filing.

Whether the requests for approval of DES for use in

pregnancy relied upon the earlier filings presents an issue

of fact which cannot be determined on a motion for

summary judgment. Similarly, defendant’s claims that

the actions by the drug companies in gaining FDA

approval of DES (whether for non-pregnancy or

pregnancy use) and their actions with regard to the

manufacture, marketing and distribution of DES for

use in pregnancy constitute concerted action sufficient

to impose liability are questions for the trier of fact.

| ccc aia iii

62a

In addition, plaintiffs apparently seek to impose

industry wide liability based upon wrongful failure to

test and subsequent generic marketing and dispensing

of DES. Plaintiffs’ basic theory is that “but for the

development, manufacture, distribution and sale of DES

by the defendants, plaintiffs would not have suffered

the injuries which they have suffered.”

Plaintiffs contend that under their “but for” analysis,

in addition to concert, they would be permitted to recover

under various non-identification theories: enterprise

liability (Hall v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345

F.Supp. 353 [EDN Y] 1972); alternative liability; market

share liability (Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163 Cal.

Rptr. 132, 607 P. 2d 924) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912;

risk contribution (Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis.

166, 342 N.W.2d 37 cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826).

This Court declines to rule at this time on the

applicability to DES cases of each of the various theories

of liability (in addition to concerted action), which are

not specifically pleaded but are raised in response to

defendants’ motions. The only question raised on the

motions before this court is whether defendants may

be held liable absent product iientification and the

answer is yes.

Claims of Exculpation:

Defendants Rexall and Upjohn contend that under

any collective liability theory, a defendant who can

establish that its product could not have caused plaintiff's

injury may exculpate itself from liability. While

exculpation may be thecretically possible (certainly

under market share liability), even if the product of a

particular manufacturer could be excluded a defendant

may bear legal responsibility based on joint activity,

Sti Mig Pie Ath VB 0d Mia

encouragement or assistance in bringing a harmful

product into the stream of commerce.

Constitutional Attack:

Rexall further contends that any theory of liability

(including judicially established tort doctrines) under

which liability may be imposed without “causation-in-

fact”, presumably product identification, is unconstitu-

tional as an excessive burden on interstate commerce

and violative the due process and equal protection

clauses. Further, it argues, that imposing market share

and enterprise liability frustrate expressed federal

policies regarding the marketing of prescription drugs

and thus violate the supremacy clause.

Defendant - Rexall’s due process challenges are

unpersuasive. Under the various theories discussed

above, the requirement of traditional product identifi-

cation is merely relaxed based on a finding that each

defendant by its tortious behavior caused or contributed

to plaintiff’s injuries. Under these theories, liability may

be premised upon the tortious behavior of each

defendant, whose adherence to a course of conduct

resulting in an unsafe standard, perpetuates the standard.

Fundamentally, imposition of liability absent product

identification is based on policy grounds. As a matter

of equity, the tortfeasor (who is in the best position

to absorb the cost and to take the precautions) rather

than the innocent victim, should bear the cost of injury.

Defendants can be held responsible for wrongful conduct

or omissions that result in placing a generic/fungible

harmful product on the market.

Rexall’s equal protection challenge amounts to no

more than a fairness argument which does not rise to

constitutional proportions. Equal’ protection is not

64a

synonymous with absolute equality (see Dandridge v.

Williams, 397 U.S. 471; People v. Parker, 41 N.Y.2d

21; Parker 86th Associates v. City of New York, 93

A.D.2d 388, aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 986).

Rexall’s federal preemption claim also lacks merit.

“The criteria for determining whether there has been

federal preemption are (1) the pervasiveness of the federal

regulation, (2) the dominance of the federal interest, (3)

the federal and state objectives to be obtained, and (4)

the existence of actual conflict between the state and

federal statutes, including whether the state law is an

obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress”

(Pharmaceutical Soc. of State of New York v. Lefkowitz,

586 F.2d 953, 958 [2d Cir., 1978]). Application of these

criteria precludes a finding of federal preemption. the

primary objective of the federal law is controlling

product safety and efficacy (id., p. 958). The objective

of the proposed theories of recovery is basic fairness,

to provide a remedy to the innocent victims of

wrongdoers.

Rexall contends that the imposition of liability without

product identification burdens interstate commerce, by

increasing the cost of products, reducing availability and

limiting sales by discouraging development of new drugs,

and by generally increasing the cost of doing business

thereby precluding entry into the pharmaceutical

business.

In determining whether there is an undue burden on

interstate commerce, the test is whether “. . .the burden

on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation

to the putative local benefits “ (id at 957, quoting Pike

v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142). Here, the

local benefit is providing a forum to innocent victims

of alleged wrongdoing by relaxing the traditional

65a

product identification requirement in tort law. Clearly,

a legitimate state interest is furthered. While adoption

of a non-identification theory of liability could

conceivably burden interstate commerce to the extent

that the cost of such increased liability would be passed

on to consumers through higher prices, “. . .[[nJot every

exercise of local power is invalid merely because it affects

in some way the flow the commerce between the States”

(Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Gottreli, 424 U.S.

366, 371). Rexall has failed to demonstrate that the

burden here would be clearly excessive compared to the

benefit. Therefore, the commerce clause challenge also

must fail.

Accordingly, defendants’ motions for summary

judgment dismissing the complaint are denied, and the

matter is set down for trial on September 30, 1987.

Dated: July 16, 1987 /S/

J.S.C.

IRA GAMMERMAN

66a

‘ APPENDIX G

Order of Supreme Court, New York County

(September 23, 1987)

At an individual Assignment

Part 26 of the Supreme Court of

the State of New Ycrk, held in

and for the County of New York,

at 60 Centre Street, New York,

New York on September 23,

1987.

Present

HONORABLE IRA -GAMMERMAN, Justice.

re

JANE DOLAN, Index No.

as gama (Assigned

ELI LILLY & COMPANY, E.R. SQUIBB :

to Justice

& SONS, INC., THE UPJOHN COMPANY,

Gammerman)

and WINTHROP-BREON LABORATORIES,

Defendants. ORDER

Defendant The Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”), having

moved this Court for an Order pursuant to Rule 3212

of the Civil Practice Law and Rules granting Upjohn

summary judgment; and defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc. (“Squibb”) having cross-moved pursuant to Rule

3212%e) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules for an Order

granting partial summary judgment in favor of Squibb;

and the plaintiff, by letter dated April 8, 1987, having

requested leave to amend the complaint to add additional

allegations to the complaint; and plaintiff’s request for

leave to amend the complaint having come before the

67a

Court on June 25, 1986, and the Court having granted

said request at that time,

NOW, upon reading and filing the Notice of Motion

of Upjohn, dated March 2, 1987; the Affidavit of Jay

P. Mayesh, Esq., sworn to March 2, 1987, and the

exhibits thereto, submitted in support of Upjohn’s

motion; the Affirmation of William D. Fireman, Esq.,

dated March 25, 1987, and the Sur-Reply Affirmation

of William D. Fireman, Esq., dated April 1, 1987, both

submitted in opposition to Upjohn’s motion; the Notice

of Cross-Motion of Squibb dated March 23, 1987; the

Affirmation of William D. Fireman, Esq., dated March

31, 1987, submitted in opposition to Squibb’s cross-

motion; the Affidavit of Sanford N. Berland, sworn to

March 16, 1987, and the exhibit thereto, submitted on

behalf of defendant Eli Lilly and Company; the

Affirmation of William D. Fireman, Esq., dated July

6, 1987, and the exhibit thereto, submitted in opposition

to Upjohn’s motion and Squibb’s cross-motion; and the

motion and the cross-motion having duly come before

the Court on July 6, 1987, and plaintiff having appeared

by William D. Fireman, Esq., defendant Squibb by

Charles M. McCaghey, Esq. and Debra E. Pole, Esq.,

defendant Upjohn by Jay P. Mayesh, Esq., and

defendant Eli Lilly by Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Esq.; and

due deliberation having been had thereon, and the Court

having rendered a written decision dated July 16, 1987,

NOW, on motion of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan,

attorneys for defendant The Upjohn Company, and on

cross-motion of Olwine, Connelly, Chase, O’Donnell &

Weyher, former attorneys for defendant E.R. Squibb

& Sons, Inc., it is

ORDERED that Upjohn’s motion for summary

judgment and Squibb’s cross-motion for partial

68a

summary judgment are denied for the reasons set forth

in the Court’s decision in Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc., et al., Index No. 03838/76 (Gammerman, J.), and

Aymowiz+£li Lilh&Company—etal_tndex Neos.

24767 86-and 4848/87 (Gammerman, J.), both dated

July 16, 1987.

ENTER,

: /S/

£a.6.

IRA GAMMERMAN

FILED

SEP 29 1987

COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE

NEW YORK

[*Interlineation by the Court. ]

69a

APPENDIX H

Order of Supreme Court, New York County

(Qctober 16, 1987)

At an individual Assignment

Part 27 of the Supreme Court of

the State of New York, held in

and for the County of New York,

at 60 Centre Street, New York,

New York on September 23,

1987.

Present:

HONORABLE IRA GAMMERMAN, Justice.

SPERSSES SOSES EHS SSEHASE SESE OEUVRES SOK CORE OES OD bEEBDDdE x

JANE DOLAN, .

rane, < “ee

: to Justice

be aaenal Gammerman

ELI LILLY & COMPANY, E.R. SQUIBB Index No.

& SONS, INC., THE UPJOHN COMPANY, 23999 / 86

and WINTHROP-BREON LABORATORIES,

Defendants. ORDER

Plaintiff having appeared before this Court on

September 18, 1987, and having appeared at that time

by Alfred S. Julien, Esq.; and defendant ELI LILLY

AND COMPANY having appeared at the aforesaid time

by its attorney, Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Esq.; and defendant

E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. having appeared at the

aforesaid time by its attorney, Barry Epstein, Esq.; and

defendant THE UPJOHN COMPANY having appeared

at the aforesaid time by its attorney, Jay P. Mayesh,

Esq.; and

70a

ee ee

Plaintiff having moved by oral application for an order

granting her partial summary judgment against ELI —

LILLY AND COMPANY, and severing her claims against

it from her claims against THE UPJOHN COMPANY

and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., and having moved

for an order severing her claims against ELI LILLY AND

COMPANY for trial; and

Defendant ELI LILLY AND COMPANY having moved

by oral application on the record staying any trial of

the claims against it; and

Defendants ELI LILLY AND COMPANY and E.R.

SQUIBB & SONS, INC. having moved by oral application

for an order pursuant to Rule 3212 of the Civil Practice

Law and Rules granting summary judgment in their

favor and dismissing the Complaint against them by

the plaintiff on the ground that plaintiff is barred by

the applicable Statute of Limitations; and

Defendants ELI LILLY AND COMPANY and E.R.

SQUIBB & SONS, INC. having moved by oral application

for an order holding L.1986 c.682 §§ 4 and 12

unconstitutional; and

Defendants ELI LILLY AND COMPANY and E.R.

SQUIBB & SONS, INC. having moved by oral application

for summary judgment dismissing said Complaint

against them for plaintiff's failure to allege that ELI

LILLY AND COMPANY or E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.

was the actual manufacturer of the diethylstilbestrol

allegedly ingested; and

Defendant ELI LILLY AND COMPANY having moved

for an order precluding the application of collateral

estoppel against ELI LILLY AND COMPANY; and

The Court having heard Alfred S. Julien, Esq., of

Julier & Schlesinger, P.C., in support of the motion

ee ee

Tla

for partial summary judgment and a severance, and

having heard Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Esq., attorney for

defendant ELI LILLY AND COMPANY in opposition

to said motions and in support of each of the additional

motions enumerated above, and having heard Barry

Epstein, Esq., attorney for defendant E.R. SQUIBB &

SONS, INC. in support of its motion, and the opposition

of Alfred S. Julien, Esq.;

NOW, upon motion of Julien & Schlesinger, P.C.,

it is hereby

ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion for severing the

action against ELI LILLY AND COMPANY so that said

action can proceed against defendant ELI LILLY AND

COMPANY alone is granted; and it is further

ORDERED, that defendant ELI LILLY AND COM-

PANY, as in Kaufman v. Eli Lilly and Co., 65 N.Y.2d

449, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 482 N.E.2d 63 (1985), is precluded

from litigating the following:

“1. Was DES reasonably safe in the treatment

of accidents of pregnancy when it was

allegedly ingested by plaintiff's mother in

1957?

(No)

2. In 1957 when plaintiff's mother allegedly

ingested DES, should the defendant, as

a reasonably prudent drug manufacturer,

have foreseen that DES might cause cancer

in the offspring of pregnant woman who

took it?

(Yes)

3. Foreseeing that DES might cause cancer

in the offspring of pregnant woman who

72a

took it, would a reasonably prudent drug

manufacturer test it on pregnant mice

before marketing it?

(Yes)

4. If DES had been tested on pregnant mice,

would the tests have shown that DES

causes cancer in their offspring?

(Yes)

5. Would a reasonably prudent drug manu-

facturer have marketed DES for use in

treating accidents of pregnancy at the time

it was allegedly ingested by the plaintiff's

mother if it had known that DES causes

cancer in the offspring of pregnant mice?

(No);”

and it is further

ORDERED, that the motions of defendants ELI LILY

AND COMPANY and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. for

summary judgment in their favor dismissing the

Complaint and each cause of action on the ground that

the action is barred by the applicable Statute of

Limitations are denied; and it is further

ORDERED, that the motions of defendants ELI LILLY

AND COMPANY and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. for

summary judgment in their favor dismissing the

Complaint and all claims asserted and for an order

declaring L.1986 c.682 §§ 4 and 12 unconstitutional are

denied; and it is further

ORDERED, that the motions of defendants ELI LILLY

AND COMPANY and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. for

summary judgment in their favor in this action dismissing

the Complaint against them for plaintiff's failure to allege

73a

that ELI LILLY AND COMPANY or E.R. SQUIBB &

SONS, INC. was the actual manufacturer of the

diethylstilbestrol are denied; and it is further

ORDERED, that the motion of defendant ELI LILLY

AND COMPANY for a stay of trial of this action is

denied; and it is further

ORDERED, that defendants ELI LILLY AND COM-

PANY and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. shall have until

October 14, 1987, and plaintiff until October 21, 1987,

to submit such affidavits and other papers as each shall

deem appropriate with respect to their relative positions;

and it is further

ORDERED, that the trial of the action of Dolan v.

Eli Lilly and Company is hereby set down for the Court

for November 2, 1987.

ENTER,

/S/ IRA GAMMERMAN

J.3.C.

FILED

OCT 1987

COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE

NEW YORK

74a

APPENDIX I

Supplemental Order of Supreme Court

New York County

(August 17, 1988)

SUPREME COURT : NEW YORK COUNTY

IAS : Part 27

ELIZABETH TIGUE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, INDEX NO.

-against- 03838 /76

p) SUPPLEMENTAL

E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., et al., ORDER

Defendants.

GAMMERMAN, J.:

In its order and memorandum decision entered July

23, 1987, the Court denied the motions and cross-

motions for summary judgment of defendants Rexall

Drug Company, The Upjohn Company and Abbott

Laboratories. Defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.

(“Squibb”) appeared and argued in support of these

motions, but was not formally included in this Court’s

decision. And it appearing that the plaintiff has

consented to this application, it is ordered that defendant

Squibb shall be deemed to have filed a formal cross-

motion for summary judgment on the same grounds

as the other defendants, and the order and memorandum

decision denying defendants’ motions shall be deemed

to deny the motion of Squibb nunc pro tunc.

DATED: August 17, 1988

IRA GAMMERMAN

J.S.C.

75a

APPENDIX J

Judgment/ Remittitur of New York Court of Appeals

(April 4, 1989)

Remittitur

COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF NEW YORK

The Hon. Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge, Presiding

l No. 56

_Mindy Hymowitz,

Respondent,

Eli Lilly and Company, et al.,

Appellants,

and Merck & Co., Inc., et al.,

Defendants,

Attorney General of the

State of New York,

Intervenor-Respondent.

The appellants in the above entitled appeal appeared

by the Law Offices of Russel H. Beatie, Jr., Stroock

& Stroock & Lavan, Esqs., Sills Cummis Zuckerman

Radin Tischman Epstein & Gross, P.A., Patterson

Belknap Webb & Tyler, Esqs., Dickson, Carlson &

Campillo, Esqs.; ‘he respendent(s) appeared by

Rheingold & McGowan, P.C.; the Office of the Attorney

General appeared by Andrea Green, Esq.; and the amicus

curiae appeared by New York Lawyers for the Public

Interest, Inc.

The Court, after due deliberation, orders and adjudges

that the order is affirmed, with costs, and certified

question answered in the affirmative. Opinion by Chief

Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander, Titone and Hancock

concur. Judge Mollen concurs in a separate opinion.

Judges Simons, Kaye and Bellacosa took no part.

76a

The Court further orders that the papers required to

be filed and this record of the proceedings in this Court

be remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County,

I certify that the preceding contains a correct record

of the proceedings in this appeal in the Court of Appeals

and that the papers required to be filed are attached.

/S/ DONALD M. SHERAW

es

Donald M. Sheraw, Clerk of the Court

Court of Appeals, Clerk's Office, Albany,. . .April 4, 1989. . .

77a

APPENDIX K

Judgment/ Remittitur of New York Court of Appeals

(April 4, 1989)

Remittitur

COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF NEW YORK

The Hon. Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge, Presiding

l No. 57

Elizabeth Tigue, et al.,

Respondents,

v.

E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., et

al.,

Appellants,

et al.,

Defendants.

The appellants in the above entitled appeal appeared

by the Silis Cummis Zuckerman Radin Tischman

Epstein & Gross, P.A., Hughes Hubbard & Reed, Esgqs.,

Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, Esqs., McCarter & English,

Esqs., Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler, Esqs., Dickson,

Carlson & Campillo, Esqs.; Phillips Lytle Hitchcock

Blaine & Huber, Esqs., Winthrop Stimson Putnam &

Roberts, Cole & Deitz, Esqs. and Olwine Connelly Chase

O’Donnell & Weyher, Esqs.; the respondent(s) appeared

by Aaron J. Broder, P.C. and Rheingold & McGowan,

P<.

The Court, after due deliberation, orders and adjudges

that the order is affirmed, with costs, and certified

question answered in the affirmative. Opinion by Chief

Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander, Titone and Hancock

concur. Judge Mollen dissents in part and votes to

modify in an opinion. Judges Simons, Kaye and

Bellacosa took no part.

78a

The Court further orders that the papers required to

be filed and this record of the proceedings in this Court

be remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County,

there to be proceeded upon according to law.

I certify that the preceding contains a correct record

of the proceedings in this appeal in the Court of Appeals

and that the papers required to be filed are attached.

/S/ DONALD M. SHERAW

eeocseereeeceeseeereeeseee

—werererurn rie CRUMe RAE OP BEARS YE ae

Donald M. Sheraw, Clerk of the Court

Court of Appeals, Clerk's Office, Albany,. . . April 4, 1989...

79a

APPENDIX L

Judgment/Remittitur of New York Court of

Appeals

(April 4, 1989)

Remittitur

COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF NEW YORK

The Hon. Sol Wachiler, Chief Judge, Presiding

l No. 57

Jane Dolan, et al.,

Respondents,

v.

Eli Lilly & Company, et al.,

Appellants,

(and other actions.) #151 actions.

The appellants in the above entitled appeal appeared

by the Law Offices of Russel H. Beatie, Stroock &

Stroock & Lavan, Esqs., Sills Cummis Zuckerman Radin

Tischman Epstein & Gross, P.A., Cole & Deitz, Esqs.,

Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, Esqs.;

the respondent(s) appeared by Julien & Schlesinger, P.C.

and Sybil Shainwald, Esq.

The Court, after due deliberation, orders and adjudges

that the order is affirmed, with costs, and certified

question answered in the affirmative. Opinion by Chief

Judge Wachtler. Judges Alexander, Titone and Hancock

concur. Judge Mollen dissents in part and votes to

modify in an opinion. Judges Simons, Kaye and

Bellacosa took no part.

The Court further orders that the papers required to

be filed and this record of the proceedings in this Court

be remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County,

there to be proceeded upon according to law.

80a

I certify that the preceding contains a correct record

of the proceedings in this appeal in the Court of Appeals

and that the papers required to be filed are attached.

/S/ DONALD M. SHERAW

Donald M. Sheraw, Clerk of the Court

Court of Appeals, Clerk's Office, Albany, . . April 4, 1989. . .

8la

APPENDIX M

Excerpt from “Brief of Defendant-Appellant E.R.

Squibb & Sons, Inc.,” filed November 8, 1988, in New

York Court of Appeals in Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc. (fn. 4, pp. 12-13):

4. The legislature is best able to resolve the issues

of public policy involved in this case. In the joint brief

submitted by defendants Merck, Abbott, and Lilly, it

is forcefully argued that the adoption of any form of

non-identification liability will severely restrict the

availability of pharmaceutical products in the future.

Squibb concurs with the public policy discussion

contained in that brief. Squibb also concurs with, and

hereby adopts, that section of the joint brief which

contends that any form of non-identification liability

is unconstitutional. Defendants’ due process rights are

violated because they will be held liable for injuries

sustained by plaintiffs who were not exposed to their

product. Further, such liability also imposes an

irrebuttable presumption of causation upon defendants.

82a

APPENDIX N

Excerpt from “Brief on Behalf of Defendants- Appellants

Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company and Merck

& Co., Inc.” filed November 8, 1988, in the Ne. ork

Court of Appeals in Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.

(pp. 31-34):

D. Any Theory of Non-Identification Liability Would

Violate Defendants’ Due Process Rights.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Section 6 of Article

I of the New York State Constitution prohibit any

deprivation of property without due process of law. The

due process clause affords protection against “arbitrary

action government,” Wolff v. McDonell, 418 U.S. 539

(1974), and its protection extends to arbitrary actions

of judicial as well as legislative bodies. For an action

of a court or a legislature to pass muster under the due

process clause, there must be a rational relation between

a legitimate state interest, and the judicial or legislative

means chosen to further that interest.

By eliminating proof of identification from plaintiff's

case, this Court wouid effectively create a mandatory

presu:mption of causation. That is, a manufacturer would

be presumed to be the cause of plaintiff’s injury even

though it has nothing to do with plaintiff. Indeed, as

a practical matter, this presumption would be irrebut-

table since defendants in many cases will be unable to

prove they did not make the medicine that plaintiffs

claim caused injury. Such a presumption is a violation

of defendants’ due process rights. Viandis v. Kline, 412

U.S. 441, 446 (1976);?' Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F.Supp.

2!1A mandatory presumption tells the trier of fact “that he or they

must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least

until the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut

the presumed connec*ion between the two facts.” County Court

of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1978) (emphasis

supplied).

V4 mes Sheed

83a

167, 175 (S. and E.D.N.Y. 1974) (three judge district

court), vacated as moot, 421 U.S. 338 (1975).

In order for such a preseumption to withstand due

process scrutiny, it must be neither unreasonable nor

irrational. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry,

413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973). Such a presumptionTvalid

under the due process clause. Viandis, 412 U.S. at 441.

As a number of courts have recognized in the DES

context, any theory which shifts the burden to defendants

to disprove causation creates an irrational and

unreasonable presumption of liability because there is

no certainty that any one or more of the defendants

joined in an action produced the drug in question. Ryan

v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F.Supp. at 1018; Mizell v. Eli

Lilly & Co., 526 F.Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981); Tidler

v. Eli Lilly & Co., 95 F.R.D. 332, 333 (D.D.C. 1982).

There must be a “rational connection between the fact

proved and the fact presumed.” Leary v. United States,

395 U.S. 6; 32-37 (1969) (presumption irrational unless

it can be said with substantial assurance that the

presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the

proved fact on which it is made to depend. [sic]”

(emphasis added)); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463

(1943). These rules governing presumptions apply not

only to the statutory presumptions at issue in Tot and

Leary, but to judicially created presumptions as well.

Wray v. Folsom, 166 F.Supp. 390, 395 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

Here, the proved fact is that a defendant made

stilbestrol. In most DES cases, there is no proof that

any defendant made the stilbestrol ingested by a

particular plaintiff. Indeed, in some cases, there is

affirmative proof that the defendants did not. With

literally hundreds of possible manufacturers, most of

them not before the Court, the probability that any one

84a

defendant supplied the product which caused the injury

is at best pure conjecture. Any theory which permits

plaintiffs to prevail, then, must depend on a conclusive

presumption that because a defendant sold a product

similar to the one that caused the injury, the defendant’s

conduct caused the injury. Such a theory rests on an

illogical presumption, and fails to satisfy the require-

ments of due process.

E. The First Department’s Rule of Conscious

Parallelism Is A Particularly Egregious Violation

of Defendants’ Due Process Rights.

The First Department’s conscious parallelism theory

is particularly egregious in its disregard for defendants’

constitutional rights. By equating legitimate parallel

business behavior with “concerted action,” conscious

parallelism creates an arbitrary and irrebuttable

presumption which violates the due process clauses of

the fourteenth Amendment and article 1, § 6 of the

Constitution of the State of New York.

~

The constitutional prohibition against such types of

presumptions was best stated by the Supreme Court of

the United States in Western & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson,

279 U.S. 639 (1928), when it struck down a statute

establishing a conclusive presumption against a railroad

company for damages to any person or property injured

at a crossing—a presumption rebuttable only if the

company made it clear that it exercised all due care.

The Court said, “[a] statute creating a presumption that

is arbitrary or that operates to deny a fair opportunity

to repel it violates the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” 279 U.S. at 642. The Court

has been consistent in striking down such presumptions.

See, e.g., Viandis, (invalidating Connecticut statute

establishing a presumption of nonresidency against

85a

certain students and requiring them to pay higher tu'tion

rates); Cieveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.

632 (1973) (striking down mandatory maternity leave

statute on the ground that it established a conclusive

presumption that every teacher who is four or five

months pregnant is physically incapable of continuing

her duties).

Application of conscious parallelism here would also

have the retroactive effect of holding defendants liable

for behavior which was not actionable at the time the

behavior was undertaken some thirty or forty years ago.

Regardless of the fact that the First Department has

now declared consciously parallel behavior actionable

and punishable with joint and several liability,

defendants could riot be fairly said to have had warning

that any nontortious parallel conduct in which they

independently engaged in 1941 or 1947 would someday

be the basis for the imposition of joint and several

liability. This retroactive application of the rule violates

due process. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S.

304 (1945); Valladares v. Valladares, 80 A.D.2d 224,

438 N.Y.S.2d 810 (2d Dept.), modified sub nom., Tucker

v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 378, 434 N.E.2d 1050, 449 N.Y.S.2d

863 (1981) (retroactive application of new legislation may

offend due process clause); cf. Marks v. United States,

430 U.S. 188, 191-192 (1977); see also Casillas v. Scully,

769 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that “unfore-

seeable” judicial enlargement of a criminal statute is

violative of the due process clause).? It is the very reason

22The offense to state protected due process is equally clear. The

reach of the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights in the New

York State Constitution is equal to and in some cases even exceeds

that of the comparable clauses of the United States Constitution.

People v. Adams, 53 N.Y .2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d

902, 906 (1981).

86a

why courts presume that unless clearly stated legislation

creating new rights is prospective only, Jacobus v.

Colgate, 217 N.Y. 235 (1916); In re Ayman, 9 N.Y.2d

119, 125, 172 N.E.2d 571, 573, 211 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200-

201 (1961); and where retroactivity expressly intended

by the legislature would offend due process, the statute

is not upheld. Chrysler Properties, Inc. v. Morris, 23

N.Y.2d 515, 297 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1966); Phillips v. Agway,

Inc., 88 Misc. 2d 1087, 389 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct.

1976).23

°

23 Bichler may also violate the first amendment if the “evidence’

relied upon to prove “consciously parallel behavior” is the

petitioning of the government for the approval of the drug in 1941

or 1947. In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor

Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), the Court held that railroads

that petitioned the legislature in order to achieve laws harmful

to competitors could not be held to have violated the Sherman

Act because such activities were protected by the first amendment.

Although originally developed in antitrust cases, the Noerr doctrine

has been extended to petitioning other branches of government,

e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657

(1965), and to other areas of the law including allegedly tortious

behavior, State of Missouri v. Natl Org. for Women, Inc., 620

F.2d 1301, 1317-1319 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842

(1980); Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d.

530, 542 (Sth cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979): Senari

v. Moday Chem. Corp., 597 F.Supp. 502, 506 (D. Minn. 1984).

87a

APPENDIX O

Excerpt from “Brief of Defendant-Appellant E.R.

Squibb & Sons, Inc. Relying Upon Its Brief In Hymowitz

v. Eli Lilly and Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc.,”

filed November 8, 1988 in Dolan v. Eli Lilly & Co.

(p.1):

This appeal presents two issues which have been fully

briefed by defendant-appellant E. R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc. (Squibb) in two other appeals which are currently

before this court. The first issue presented in this appeal

is the constitutionality of the revival statute (L.1986,

ch. 682 §4), and Squib» hereby adopts its principal brief

and reply brief filed in Wymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

App. Div. Case No. 31981. The second issue presented

by this appeal is the viability of any “non-identification”

form of liability, and Squibb hereby adopts its principal

brief (and reply brief, if one is filed) in Tigue v. E. R.

Squibb & Sons, Inc., App. Div. Case No. 31980.

88a

APPENDIX P

Excerpt from “Brief of Appellant E.R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc.” filed November 16, 1987 in New York Supreme

Court, Appellate Division, First Department, in Dolan

v. Eli Lilly & Co. (pp. 63-69), and Tigue v. E.R. Squibb

& Sons Inc., (pp. 63-68):

X.

Any Form of Liability Without Proof of Causation

Would Be Unconstitutional, Because There Would

Be a Presumption of Causation Without Any

Rational Basis.

Due process is denied where a defendant is subject

to liability for an injury having no causal connection

to that particular defendant’s conduct. The essence of

any modified theory of liability is that it dispenses with

the requirement of a plaintiff proving cause in fact, a

connection between a particular defendant’s conduct and

the plaintiff's claimed injury. In such acontext, a plaintiff

is allowed to sue one or all of the members of an industry,

all of whom may be held liable to the plaintiff, even

though only one out of several hundred members of

the industry may have actually harmed the plaintiff. It

is submitted that the abandonment of causation as an

element of a cause of action, through the fiction of

shifting the burden of proof, constitutes a violation of

each defendant’s separate right to due process of law.

The “touchstone” of due process is protection of a

party against “arbitrary action of government.” Wolff

v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). A rule of law

permitting one individual to sue selectively an entire

industry with hundreds of members, for the conduct

of only one member, or the conduct of no member,

constitutes such arbitrary action.

89a

In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Supreme

Court invalidated a state law that established a

presumption that an unwed father is an unsuitable

parent. It was held that such a presumption violates

due process, and that every unwed father is entitled a

particularized determination of parental fitness on the

basis of individualized proof. Similarly, in Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), it was held that the

due process clause requires that each defendant have

a separate and meaningful opportunity to be heard. A

rule may “offend due process because it operates to

foreclose a particular party’s opportunity to be heard.”

401 U.S. at 380. A state “owes to each individual that

process which, in light of the values of a free society,

can be characterized as due.” 401 U.S. at 380. Any

modified theory of liability violates the principles of

Stanley and Boddie because it lumps the defendants

together as an entity, failing to recognize that each

defendant has separate and independent constitutional

protections. Since the constitution requires an individ-

ualized determination of each defendant’s liability, the

fundamental burden of proving causation cannot be

satisfied by considering the defendant as a group. There

must be evidence of the conduct of each defendant

individually and as to each element of liability.

In Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, reh. den.,

415 U.S. 952 (1974), the United States Supreme Court

struck down a conviction based on a record lacking any

relevant evidence as to a crucial element of a particular

offense. It was held that such a conviction violated due

process. The state was not allowed to simply dispense

with an element of an offense. It is constitutionally

required that the prosecution must convince the trier

of fact of all essential elements of guilt. Jn Re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).

90a

On occasion, states have attempted to dispense with

the requirement of proving an element of a criminal

offense by shifting the burden of proof on the issue to

the defendant. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684

(1975), theSupreme Court rejected such an attempt. The

doctrine of the Winship case was applied so as to preclude

shifting the burden of proof on the defendant’s state

of mind. Similarly, the Mullaney court noted that the

Winship doctrine could not be avoided simply by

redefining the elements which constitute various crimes.

421 U.S. at 698.

The above cases demonstrate that, although states

have considerable latitude in establishing procedures,

they may not arbitrarily tamper with the elements of

an offense or a cause of action, which are established

by the traditions and conscience of our people. States

may not achieve this end by purporting to shift the

burden of proof to a defendant.

The requirement of establishing a causal connection

between a defendant’s conduct and his civil or criminal

liability is, it is submitted, rooted in the most

fundamental beliefs of our people. It is a violation of

due process to convict and punish a man without

evidence of his guilt. Thompson v. City of Louisville,

362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). Similarly, it is a violation of

due process to impose civil liability on the defendant

who, demonstrably, never harmed the plaintiff.

The principles of the above cases are applicable to

both civil and criminal proceedings. The United Supreme

Court has consistently rejected efforts to eliminate

required elements of a cause of action or an offense,

or arbitrarily shift the burden of proof in violation of

due process.

9la

Furthermore, due process is unavailable where a State

creates a presumption of causation having no rational

basis in fact or in legal precedent. To shift the burden

of proof on causation to each of the defendants is, in

effect, to create a mandatory presumption of causation.

A mandatory presumption is a “troublesome evidentiary

device.” County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442

U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224 (1979). Such a presumption

is one that tells the judge or jury that “he or they must

find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact,

at least unless the defendant has come forward with

some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between

the two facts.” 99 S.Ct. at 2224-2225.

A theory of group liability without identification

undoubtedly can be classified as a “mandatory

presumption.” Plaintiff need merely demonstrate

prenatal exposure to DES and that a particular

defendant was a manufacturer or supplier of the type

of product involved. It is then presumed that the plaintiff

was exposed to the particular defendant’s product, unless

the defendant can demonstrate that its product could

not have reached the plaintiff. Such an unusual case

might occur where, for example, a particular defendant

entered the national market after the time that the

plaintiff was exposed to DES. However, in the absence

of such evidence, the presumption of causation operates

against all of the defendants in the market place.

It should be noted that judicially created presumptions

are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as those

established by legislation. Wray v. Folsom, 166 F .Supp.

390, 395 (W.D. Ark. 1958). In order for a presumption

to pass constitutional muster, there must be “some

rational connection between the fact proved and the

ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one

fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable

92a

as to be purely arbitrary mandate.” Mobile, Jackson

& Kansas City Railroad Company v. Turnipseed, 219

U.S. 35, 43 (1910). This rule is applicable “in either

criminal or civil cases” and a presumption must not “shut

out from the party affected a reasonable opportunity

to submit to the jury in his defense all of the facts bearing

upon the issue.” 219 U.S. at 43.

In Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929), for example,

the United States Supreme Court reviewed the

constitutionality of a Georgia banking law which

established a presumption of fraud upon proof of a

bank’s insolvency. From the mere failure of the bank

financially, criminal guilt and apparently civil liability

were created, subject only to the right of the defendant

to rebut the presumption. This liability extended to the

president of the bank and all of its directors.

Unsurprisingly, the conviction of Mr. Manley was

overturned by the Supreme Court, which found that

the statutory presumption was unreasonable and

arbitrary. It was noted that insolvency could be

established without regard to the particular facts causing

it, and without regard to specific facts of any particular

transaction. Furthermore, the court noted that the

presumption was “sweeping,” extending to all directors

without proof of any individual responsibility. 279 U.S.

at 6. Under the statute, a defendant “is to be convicted

unless he negatives every fact, whether act or omission

in the management of the bank, from which fraudulent

insolvency might result, or shows that he is in no way

responsible for the condition of the bank.” 279 U.S.

at 7. Such a burden of proving a negative was held

so severe as to be unconstitutional.

More recent cases have condemned the use of

presumptions as substitutes for individual fact finding.

93a

See, for example, Cleveland Board of Education v. La

Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 649 (1974). Presumptions which

are neither necessarily nor universally true are disfavored

under the Constitution “because they preclude individ-

ualized determination of the facts upon which substantial

rights or obligations may depend.” Coleman v. Darden,

595 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. Colo. 1979), cert. den.,

444 U.S. 927 (1979).

Also, due process is violated when a defendant is

subject to civil liability merely because of its status as

a manufacturer, and not because of any particular

conduct. The foundation of both criminal and civil

liability is conduct on the part of the defendant. In either

case, there must be an act or omission in violation of

society’s rules of conduct and, in the civil case, the

conduct must have injured the plaintiff. A defendant

cannot be held liable simply for his status, however

disagreeable that may be.

The distinction between a defendant’s “status” and

his “conduct” was drawn in the leading case of Robinson

v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, reh. den., 371 U.S.

905 (1962). In Robinson, a conviction was reversed which

may have been based on the defendant’s “status” as a

narcotics addict, as distinguished from any use,

possession, or sale of a narcotic substance.

It might be possible to infer that any narcotics addict

must have, at some time, illegally possessed or used a

prescribed substance. However, the Supreme Court held

that the constitution requires proof of the actual illegal

conduct, as distinguished form [sic] the status ultimately

resulting from that conduct.

A modified theory of liability relieving plaintiff of

her burden of product identification permits civil liability

on the part of a defendant solely because of its status

94a

as a manufacturer or supplier of DES. This is true, even

though each defendant separately appeared in the market

place, complied with the requirements of federal law

regulating drugs, and separately distributed its product.

It is submitted that no state may constitutionally create

liability in favor of a single person against all parties

enjoying the “status” of manufacturer or supplier of a

- particular product.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Appendix — Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue · 493 U.S. 944 | Frix