Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue

Supreme Court brief1989

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IN THE :

Supreme Court of the Anited States

October Term, 1988

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,

Petitioner,

-against-

MINDY HYMOWITZ and ROBERT ABRAMS,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Respondents.

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,

Petitioner,

-against-

ELIZABETH TIGUE, et al.,

Respondents.

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,

Petitioner,

-against-

JANE DOLAN and ROBERT ABRAMS,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

ALLEN FE. MAULSBY DAVID A. BARRETT

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE Counsel of Record

One Chase Manhattan Plaza DUKER & BARRETT

New York, N.Y. 10005 90 Broad Street

BARRY M. EPSTEIN New York, N.Y. 10004

MARC S. KLEIN (sap eres

SILLS CUMMIS ZUCKERMAN RADIN ROBERT L. DICKSON

TISCHMAN EPSTEIN & GROSS DAVID J. FLEMING

450 Park Avenue DICKSON, CARLSON & CAMPILLO

New York, N.Y. 10022 150 Broadway, Suite 1600

New York, N.Y. 10038

August 2, 1989

q

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a state court violates due process by allow-

ing the award of tort damages against a defendant that con-

cededly could not have caused injury to the plaintiff or where

there is concededly no “reasonable link between liability and

the risk created by [the| defendant to a particular plaintiff.”

2. Whether a state statutc .eviving previously time-

barred tort claims—arising from use of only five arbitrarily

selected products—deprives defendants of property without

~ due process of law or violates the Equal Protection Clause.

LIST OF PARTIES

The decision below involved four separate appeals which

were consolidated for argument and decision by the New York

Court of Appeals. Three of those four appeals are the subject

of this petition. The parties involved in the three cases before

this Court are as follows:

Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.

Plaintiff Mindy Hymowitz

Intervenor Attorney General of the State of

New York

Defendants-appellants Eli Lilly & Co.; Abbott

in court of appeals Laboratories; The Upjohn Co.;

Merck & Co.; E.R. Squibb &

Sons, Inc.*

Defendants Ayerst Laboratories (a division of

American Home Products

Corp.); Winthrop Laboratories

(a division of Sterling Drug, Inc.)

* Petitioner E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary

of Squibb Corporation. The affiliates and subsidiaries (other than wholly-

owned subsidiaries) of Squibb Corporation are Squibb-Marsam, Inc.;

Squibb-Novo, Inc.; Chesapeake Biological Laboratories, Inc.; Medaphis Cor-

poration; Squibb of Bangladesh, Ltd.; Squibb Industria Quimica, S.A.; P.T.

Squibd Indonesia; Squibb Korea Limited; Squibb Pakistan Ltd; Von Heyden

Gesellschaft Mit Beschrankter Haftung; Manufactureros Quimicos Far-

maceuticos S.A.; Synbiotics Limitec; R.C.S. Realty Corporation; Sino-

American Shanghai Squibb Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; and Squibb (Nigeria)

Limited.

On July 26, 1989, Squibb Corporation, Bristol-Myers Company and

Screen Co., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bristol-Meyers, executed an agree-

ment and plan of merger which provides, among other things, that upon

consummation of the merger, Squibb Corporation will become a wholly-

owned subsidiary of Bristol-Myers.

Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.

Plaintiffs

Defendants-appellants

in court of appeals

Defendants

Elizabeth Tigue; Barbara Tigue;

and Sayre Margolies (as Ad-

ministratrix of the Estate of

Myrna Margolies)

E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.; Abbott

Laboratories; Merck, Sharpe &

Dohme (a division of Merck &

Co.); Rexall Drug Co.; The Up-

john Co.; William H. Rorer, Inc.;

Boyle & Co. Pharmaceuticals

Amfre-Grant, Inc. (a subsidiary

of Ormont Drug & Chemical

Co.); Carnrick Laboratories (a

division of G.W. Carnrick Co.);

Cole Pharmaceutical Co.;

Kremers-Urban Co.; Jerome

Schneider, M.D.

Dolan v. Eli Lilly & Co.

Plaintiff

Intervenor

Defendants-appellants

in court of appeals

Defendant

Jane Dolan

Attorney General of the State of

New York

Eli Lilly & Co.; E.R. Squibb &

Sons, Inc.; The Upjohn Co.

Winthrop-Breon Laboratories

a

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .......cccccscccsccsees i

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ee TE bios cece cnccbudsactecters IV

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SE Ui wa cddncacestceusveécves 1 i

PE 0a oaks hn pb hah ch wecebeces secu 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

PE REE ins wwe che dbeneeeesesneséues és 2

ES SS OT eT See ere 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............-0..000- 3

‘A. DESand the Litigationof DES Claims 3

B. The New York “Revival” Statute ...... 7

C. The Proceedings Below and Presentation of

PE Ra wv nccescceccecass 8

ee) | | ee 8

2. The Hymowitz Action ............ 9 |

3. The Dolan Action ............... 9 |

D. The Decision of the New York Court of

PE thien Péb dds owrsinteeséentas<s 10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

IT.

The Decision Below Violates the Most

Fundamental Principies of Adjudicatory

Due Process by Allowing Damage Awards

Where There Is No “Reasonable Link

Between Liability” and the Plaintiff’s

Alleged Injury, As Well As Where a

Defendant Concededly Could Not Have

Caused the Plaintiff’s Injury ........

A. Viciation of Constitutional Burden of

Proof Requirements .............

B. Non-Identification Liability Creates an

Irrebuttable Presumption .........

C. ‘The Decision Below Amounts to

Impermissible Judicial Legislation .

The New York “Revival” Statute

Irrationally Singles Out Ciaims Against

DES Manufacturers and Arbitrarily Divests

Their Right of Repose Under the Statute of

RED had eeecncscncenadcosnve se

4 AS EER a ES A om SORE oe

11

15

17

19

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343

N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984) ..

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) .........

Bateman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d

TISZ (Sti Cir. TSE) nw cs ccccvcnncivcccccccess

Bixler v. J.C. Penney Co., 376 N.W.2d 209 (Minn.

BOE sacar svc ccecccercacecweauseevescccce

Biackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764

F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985) ................085.

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) ....

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281

RAs CTO CED cone scvnnnsd cecnesececoescece

Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245 Cal.

Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988) ...............

Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super.

264, 505 A.2d 973 (1985) .........e eee eee eee

Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) ...........

Celotex Corp. v. St. Joseph Hospital, 259 Ga. 108,

SPP ee SOU CASES) a scnweenccccccccccccces

Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S.

ER See becnccnecccewacececeseneseccess

Clift v. Nelson, 25 Wash. App. 607, 608 P.2d 647

— PRERENMPCTTTTCTTTT TTT TTT e Tee

Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342

N.W.2d 37, cert. denied 469 U.S. 833 (1984) ....

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469

(1975)

11, 12

vii

PAGE

Dawson v. Bristol Laboratories, 658 F.Supp. 1036

CUR EOED -chUvadoketseseadatonhcccneres 6

Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d

ee i AE nn nang eeeciedscusracese ces 5

Flax v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 4174 (Pa.

Ct. of Common Pleas (Philadelphia) Sept. 30,

BUD 040.066 necnSenpaeesenscopsticesecces Rese 7

Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 478

N.Y.S.2d 853, 467 N.E.2d 517 (1984), cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985) ................. 7,8

Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.

SPUD: . -aeudwacdbtdedadddawds Viwascsecceces. 6

Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33 Ohio

St. 3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691 (1987) .............. 6

Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.

Se EE OBA Ciba cb dhcceculln SWasdecvedesee 6, 13

Griffin v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 FSupp. 964

Cee EN IES os ch accccdbcsdvncseccesiess 6

Hall v. EJ. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F.

A Se CEC INEED SRScccweesccceeee. 18

Heiner ». Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) .......... 19

Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375

EET Sha NaehSe he eaeebeenans 004.0005 cece 15, 16

In re ‘Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation,

597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ............ 13-15, 18

In re Asbestos Litigation, 509 A.2d 1116 (Del.

Super. 1986), aff'd, 525 A.2d 146

SCE WubNbabeKbceSedkseescicccccccsess 6

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ...........05. 15

Vili

Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ........

Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) ..........

Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170

N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (1979) ..........

Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash.2d 581,

PU IIID cackacincesaseccs..e.....

Miller v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CV-80-0047107S

(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 1985) .............

Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C.

a an

Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593

I wean

Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (lowa

a ines

Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J.

Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981) .............

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

ELE

Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway

Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944) .........

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y- 339,

iti i

Parker v. Port Authority, 113 A.D.2d 763, 493

N.Y.S.2d 355 (2d Dep’t 1985) .............00-

Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540,

Lt are

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New

BRN ae Whe, BOO COPED ceccccncccccccccccss

Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987) ..........

PAGE

Ryan: v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004

Gas MED 6606554 666 Sak aaesdnnccscccce. 4, 6,14

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) ......... 12, 13,15, 16

Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or.

yr Whe bs) errr errr 6, 13, 17

Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, A.2d ,

No. A/16/17/18 (N.J. July 31, 1989) ........... 6

Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588,

163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 4,6,11

SO Ths PU CNOED Svc ccececccccccnweccucce 14, 18

Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 527

8 & bf | RPPPOTTTTTI TIT TCT T TTT ie 6

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337

PRED . wise veqnncnawteveansecececcosccccacs 12

Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) .. 17

Thompson v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp.,714

F.2d 581 (Sth Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S.

REID. Soko ceacasesndmes cevesesceacccss 6

Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.

GHD. BE bac pemanadésendtecescocevencensss 4, 6, 14

Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 95 FR.D. 332 (D.D.C.

1982), aff'd, 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ..... 13, 15

Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So.2d

TIT TTT TT TTT TTT Tee 22, 23

United States Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413

TTT TTT TTT TTT ee 20, 23

Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,

SE EEE ScASinenaceecnesecsdevesss 13, 19, 20

a | |

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans

United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) .............2245- -

Viandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) ............

Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo.

EEL

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1) Cae PE EEG kv ccc cccccackcet> ee: :

RS sae is vo hi cseeess Eiieai

Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. $§ 901, et '

I STD Ave sdaniccsstcdacwpabine

ee, i en

N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 214(5) (McKinney

TD ais Kk 6 ida ehh Ee Chaba eirs ovens

N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R.214-c (McKinney Supp.

GORD :o.06 cr bh ise danvvns Weis Sioa eee anaes.

RR AR PIES te ie

Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682 $ 4, 1986 N.Y.

BBS NE ss RE OF ae) IE gs ca Oh

OTHER-AUTHORITIES

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B (1965) ...

Herbst, et al., Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina —

Association of Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy

with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284

New Eng, J. Med. B78 (IS71) 2. wweccsciccsecess

PAGE

13

18, 19

4, 6, 13, 14

24

2, 7, 21-24

17

bite

xi

McFarlane, et al., Diethylstilbestrol and Clear

Cell Vaginal Carcinoma, 81 Am. J. Med. 855

RR ern soe np er ea eee 5

Mantel, “Some Problems With Investigations

and Epidemiologic Studies Relating to

Pregnancy,” in Prevention of Physical and

Mental Congenital Defects, pp. 45-48 (Marois

oe RE a ee 5

1986 N.Y. Legislative Annual 288 .............. a4

1986 Record of Proceedings, N.Y. Senate at

5147, 5152-53 (statements of Senators Connor

Per rr ereye Terry CET E TTT 20, 21

E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., respectfully prays that a writ

of certiorari issue to review the judgments and opinion of the

New York Court of Appeals entered on April 4, 1989.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in four

cases (of which three are appealed here), consolidated for

argument and decision as Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., is

reported at 73 N. Y.2d 487, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 539 N.E.2d 1069

(1989), and is reprinted in the Appendix at 1a-34a.! The

opinions of the lower courts in two of the cases are reported

as Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 136 Misc.2d 482, 518 N.Y.S.2d

996 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1987) (App. 44a-54a), aff'd, 139

A.D.2d 437, 526 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1st Dep’t 1988) (App. 35a-

36a); and Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 136 Misc.2d 467,

518 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1987) (App. 55a-65a),

aff'd, 139 A.D.2d 431, 526 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep’t 1988)

(App. 37a-41a). The unreported decision of the Supreme

Court, New York County, in Dolan v. Eli Lilly & Co. is

reproduced at App. 66a-73a; its affirmance is reported at 139

A.D.2d 978, 527 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1st Dep’t 1988) (App. 42a-

43a).

JURISDICTION

The judgments of thc New York Court of Appeals effec-

tively rejecting petitioner’s federal constitutional claims were

entered on April 4, 1989. No rehearing was sought. By order

dated June 23, 1989, Justice Marshall extended Squibb’s time

to petition for certioragi to and including August 2, 1989. This

Court has certiorari jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

\

1 In this petition, all parenthetical references to a number followed by

the letter “a” (e.g., “3a,” “27a”) refer to pages of the separately bound

Appendix to the petition.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-

stitution provides in pertinent part:

“No State . .. shall . . . deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws.”

Section 4 of chapter 682, Act of July 30, 1986, 1986

New York Laws 1567, provides in pertinent part:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, . . .

every action for personal injury . . . or death caused by

the latent effects of exposure to diethylstilbestrol,

tungsten-carbide, asbestos, chlordane or polyvinyl-

chloride upon or within the body . . . which is barred as

of the effective date of this act or which was dismissed

prior to the effective date of this act solely because the

applicabie period of limitations has or had expired is

hereby revived and an action thereon may be com-

menced provided such action is commenced within one

year from the effective date of this act... .”

INTRODUCTION

At issue in this case is whether a state court can radically

and retroactively expand common law tort liability by eliminat-

ing the fundamental requirement of individualized assessment

of a defendant’s liability. Under the rule adopted by the court

below, a plaintiff can now take petitioner Squibb’s property

through judicial process even though the likelihood is con-

cededly “very remote” that Squibb actually injured the plain-

tiff (App. 9a).

Squibb’s responsibility is presumed upon mere proof that

it belongs to an industry of some 200-300 members, of which

one member allegedly may have injured the plaintiff. As the

court below acknowledged, this rule of “non-identification”

liability permits damage awards absent any “reasonable link

between liability and the risk created by a defendant to a

particular plaintiff” (App. 17a; emphasis added).

Ee Shi

3

Indeed, by making liability turn on the creation of risk

“to the public at large” (id.), the court below has allowed a

plaintiff to exact damages even from a defendant that con-

clusively proves its product was not the source of plaintiff’s

alleged injuries (id.). This “non-exculpation” rule allows a

finding of liability even when the evidence conclusively

demonstrates innocence.

The attraction of taxing a deep-pocket defendant to pay

for an allegedly serious injury is clear. But judicial imposition

of collective guilt, with no opportunity for individual excul-

pation, raises profound constitutional questions.

The impact of New York’s judge-made rule of non-iden-

tification, non-exculpation liability is compounded here by a

discriminatory new statute of limitations. Substantial due

process and equal protection questions are raised by the so-

called “revival” statute, which singled out petitioner’s product

as one of five substances as to which stale claims—including

claims known to the plaintiffs during the old limitations

period—were revived.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. DES and the Litigation of DES Claims.

Over the past two decades, lawsuits alleging injury from

the drug diethylstilbestrol, or DES, have been brought

throughout the country. Plaintiffs claim that they were ex-

posed to DES when their mothers allegedly took the drug to

prevent miscarriage of the pregnancies that culminated in

plaintiffs’ births. Plaintiffs’ injuries allegedly do not appear

until many years later. As a result, most plaintiffs cannot

prove which of several hundred potential defendants

produced the DES their mothers allegedly took. ;

DES duplicates the physiological effects of estrogens,

the natural female sex hormones, which are essential to fer-

tility and successful pregnancy. DES was first synthesized by

British researchers in the late 1930’s. Compared to natural

estrogens, DES is inexpensive and easy to produce. Instead

4

of requiring often painful injections, it is effective wken taken

orally. DES “was accordingly regarded as a revolutionary

breakthrough in biomedical science.” Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

851 F.2d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1988). It made “estrogen therapy

available for the first time to all women.” Ryan v. Eli Lilly &

Co., 514 F Supp. 1004, 1009 (D.S.C. 1982).

The U. S. Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) first

approved DES as safe for use in treating certain non-pregnan-

cy related conditions in 1941. See Tidler, 851 F2d at 420;

Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1009-10; Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,

102 Wash.2d 581, 689 P.2d 368, 374 (1984). It is still “in use

~ today with full approval of the FDA and the Surgeon General”

for treatment of those conditions, Lyons v. Premo Phar-

maceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185,

189-90 (1979), and others including some breast and prostate

cancers. See 36 Fed. Reg. 21538 (1971).

In 1947, the FDA approved use of DES in treating cer-

tain endocrine-produced disturbances of pregnancy, including

spontaneous abortions or miscarriages. By the early 1950’s,

the FDA had concluded that DES was “generally recognized

... as safe” for pregnancy use, Ryan, 514 F Supp. at 1011 &

n.3, as had been confirmed by independent researchers in ite

field.

DES was widely recommended by medical experts and

prescribed by doctors for preventing miscarriages. Some 200-

300 suppliers ultimately distributed products that contained

generic DES as the active ingredient. See Zafft v. Eli Lilly &

Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Mo. 1984). It was taken by an

estimated 1.5-3 million pregnant women during the period

‘1947-1971. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cai.3d 588,

163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, 927, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912

(1980).

In none of the extensive clinical studies leading to the

approval of DES (nor in any studies during over 20 years of

use thereafter) was there evidence of danger to the mother or

fetus. Indeed, during normal pregnancy the fetus is exposed

to estrogen levels hundreds of times greater than those in

Ris. sa di : bay ee ee ee eee SP ae

5

non-pregnant women. In 1971, however, Dr. Arthur Herbst

published an article which purported to show a statistical

association between a form of vaginal cancer in young women

and prenatal exposure to DES.” Shortly thereafter, the FDA

barred use of DES during pregnancy. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly

& Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, 169, cert. denied, 469

U.S. 833 (1984); Lyons, 406 A.2d at 189. Herbst’s article has

been cited literaily hundreds of times since 1971. Yet not a

single subsequent controlled epidemiologic study has verified

Herbst’s‘elaims nor causally linked DES to vaginal cancer or

other serious abnormalities.

Although the Herbst article is the essential basis for

claims that prenatal DES exposure causes cancer, Herbst’s

raw Statistical data have never been made available for scien-

tific peer review and criticism or subjected to cross-examina-

tion in court. See Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740

F.2d 556, 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1984). More recent studies ques-

tion the validity of Herbst’s purported statistical associations

and suggest that prenatal DES exposure does not cause ihe

alarming increases in cancer claimed by plaintiffs.? Most sig-

nificantly, all the reproductive ailments claimed by plaintiffs

to be caused by DES can and do occur in women who were

never exposed to the drug. See, e.g., n. 3 above; Burnside v.

Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa.Super. 264, 505 A.2d 973, 988

(1985).

In response to the inability of DES plaintiffs t to identify

the supplier of the drug that allegedly injured them, the lower

courts have reached widely divergent and often conflicting

results. The fundamental importance of individualized

2 Herbst, et al., Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina—Association of Mater-

nal Stilbestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 New

Eng. J. Med. 878 (1971).

3 See, e.g., McFarlane, et al, Di¢iayistilbestrol and Clear Cell Vaginal

Carcinome, 81 Am. J. Med. 855 (1986); Mantel, “Some Problems With

Investigations and Epidemiologic Studies Relating to Pregnancy,” in Preven-

tion of Physical and Mental Congenital Defects, pp. 45-48 (Marois ed. 1985).

6

factfinding has led most courts to dismiss cases where plaintiffs

cannot identify the proper defendant.* Several states have

adopted non-identification liability, but in forms that differ

substantially from each other.> Still others have left the ques-

tion open.® All states but New York, however, permit defen-

4 See, e.g., Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988);

Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984); Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super.

264, 50S A.2d 973 (1985); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super.

19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593

(M.D. Fla. 1982); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981);

Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Gray v. United States,

445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).

In addition, a number of courts have rejected non-identification

liability in cases involving other products. See, e.g., Shackil v. Lederle

Laboratories, A2d_ , No. A/16/17/18 (NJ. July 31, 1989); Goldman v.

Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33 Ohio St.3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691 (1987); In re

Asbestos Litigation, 509 A.2d 1116 (Del. Super. 1986), aff'd, 525 A.2d 146

(Del. 1987); Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480

(11th Cir. 1985) (Georgia taw); Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. , 714

F.2d 581 (Sth Cir. 1983) (Louisiana law), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984);

Dawson v. Bristol Laboratories, 658 F. Supp. 1936 (W.D.Ky. 1987); Griffin v.

Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 964 (W.D.N.C. 1986). Cf. Senn v. Merrell-

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988) (rejecting

“market share alternative liability”).

5 Under the teading Sindell decision in California, Sindell! v. Abbott

Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied,

449 U.S. 912 (1980), a plaintiff must sue a “substantial percentage” of DES

producers, based on nationa! market share figures, and each defendant’s

share of liability is limited to its market share. Id. at 937. See Brown v.

Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988).

Michigan requires a plaintiff to bring “all possible defendants into court”,

thereafter subjecting them to joint and several liability. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, 173-74, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984)

(emphasis added). In other states, non-identification actions may proceed

against Oniy a single DES producer, and defendants’ liability can be “inflated”

above market share according to differing rules. See Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); Martin v.

Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash.2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Smith v. Eli

Lilly & Co., 173 Ill. App.3d 1, 527 N.E.2d 333 (1988). .

6 See, e.g., Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989); Bixler

v. J.C. Penney Co., 376 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 1985); Payton v. Abbott

Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).

7

dants in non-identification actions to introduce evidence to

exculpate themselves. Individual DES defendants, including

Squibb, have in fact proven repeatedly that they could not

have been responsible for particular plaintiffs’ injuries.’

In DES cases that have gone to trial, plaintiffs’ specula-

tive causation claims have generally failed to impress juries

that have seen their lack of persuasive scientific evidence.

One Connecticut jury, for example, that heard four months of

testimony—including numerous medical experts presented by

skilled plaintiffs’ counsel—took just two hours to return a

special verdict finding that DES did not cause plaintiff’s in-

juries. Though individual verdicts do not preclude claims by

other plaintiffs, the fact that all plaintiffs’ scientific evidence

of causation is largely identical, combined with juries’ rejec-

tion of that evidence, indicates that defendants are not the

“wrongdoers” assumed by the court below.

B. The New York “Revival” Statute.

Two of the cases on appeal here would have been barred

by the New York statute of limitations were it not for the

passage of a special “revival” statute by the legislature. See

Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682 § 4, 1986 N.Y. Laws 1567 (p. 2

above). That statute singled out DES, along with four other

substances,’ from a multitude of products believed to cause

latent injury. The statute revived claims based on “the latent

effects of exposure” that were otherwise barred by, or had

been dismissed because of, the statute of limitations. !°

7 See, e.g., Martin, 689 P.2d at 372 (summary judgment exculpating

Squibb); Burnside, 505 A.2d at 986.

8 Miller v. Eli Lilly & Co., et al., No. CV-80-0047107S (Conn. Super.

Ct. Feb. 13, 1985). See also, e.g., Flax v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 4174

(Pa.Ct. ef Common Pleas (Philadelphia) Sept. 30, 1988) (special verdict that

DES did not cause plaintiff’s injuries after one-month trial).

9 The other substances were asbestos, polyvinyichloride (PVC),

tungsten carbide and chlordane.

10 The same legislation also changed the New York rule that the

three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, see N.Y. Civ. Prac.

ee - —

8

C. The Proceedings Below and Presentation of Federal

Questions.

The three cases that are the subject of this petition were

separately briefed in the court of appeals and then con-

solidated with a fourth action (not appealed from here) for

argument and decision. The cases had been certified for

appeal by the appellate division. The three cases here at issue

are as follows:

1. The Tigue Action.

Plaintiffs Elizabeth Tigue, Barbara Tigue and Sayre Mar-

golies filed suit in 1976, individually and as representatives of

a class that was never certified. Elizabeth Tigue alleged that

as a result of her mother’s ingestion of DES, she suffered from

adenosis, a benign tissue condition also found in non-DES

exposed women. Sayre Margolies, as administratrix of the

estate of her daughter Myrna, asserted a claim for wrongful

death, alleging that DES she took caused her daughter to

develop cancer. Plaintiffs alleged that they could not identify

the actual manufacturer of the DES allegedly ingested, and

that they therefore would rely upon some theory of “non-

identification” liability.!!

A number of defendants, including Squibb (App. 74a),

moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs

had failed to identify them as the manufacturer of the DES in

question, and that any form of non-identification liability was

unconstitutional. Certain defendants further affirmatively

demonstrated that they did not supply the DES actually

taken. !2

L. & R. § 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1989), began to run when a plaintiff was

last exposed to an allegedly harmful substance. See Fleishman v. Eli Lilly &

Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853, 467 N.E.2d 517 (1984), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 1192 (1985). Under the new law, the limitations period is measured

from the date of discovery of the injury. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214-c,

(McKinney Supp. 1989), codifying 1986 N.Y. Laws, ch. 682 § 2.

11 The revival statute is not implicated in the Tigue action.

12 Defendant Upjohn showed that the form of DES that it manufac-

tured (a soft gelatinous capsule) was completely inconsistent with the physical

9

The trial court denied the motions for summary judg-

ment in a published opinion rejecting defendants’ constitu-

tional challenges (App. 55a-65a). Although the Appellate

Division and the Court of Appeals did not address the con-

stitutional claims, they were presented in defendants’ briefs to

each court (App. 81a-94a).

2. The Hymowitz Action.

Plaintiff Mindy Hymowitz alleged that her action was

authorized by the 1986 revival statute. Squibb raised a statute

of limitations defense, asserting that the revival provision

violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The

trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to strike the limitations

defense (App. 44a-54a). The constitutional claims challeng-

ing the revival statute were raised in both appellate courts and

rejected by them (App. 19a-22a, 35a-36a, 44a-54a).

3, The Dolan Action.

Plaintiff Jane Dolan alleged that she was unable to iden-

tify the manufacturer of the DES ingested by her mother and

that her action was timely by virtue of the revival statute.

Squibb and other defendants moved for summary judgment,

on the grounds that the revival statute was unconstitutional

and that plaintiff had failed to identify the manufacturer of the

DES ingested by her mother.

The trial judge denied defendants’ motions in an un-

published memorandum decision, relying on his earlier

opinions in Hymowitz and Tigue (App. 66a-73a). Constitu-

tional claims identical to those raised in the Tigue and

Hymowitz actions were raised in the appellate courts

(App. 87a-94a). The constitutional challenges to non-iden-

tification liability were not discussed by those courts; the

characteristics of the hard tablets described by Mrs. Margolies and

Mrs. Tigue. Defendant Rexall showed that it sold DES only through its own

franchised drugstores and that none of the pharmacies patronized by Mrs.

Margolies ard Mrs. Tigue was a Rexall franchisee. See App. 32a-33a.

10

challenges to the revival statute were rejected (App. 19a-22a,

42a-432a).

D. The Decision of the New York Court of Appeals.

As befits an appeal from denial of summary judgment,

the opinion of the court of appeals opens by mentioning that

plaintiffs “allege that they were injured” by DES (App. 3a).

The opinion goes on, however, to state as established fact that

“strong evidence links prenatal DES exposure to later

development of serious medical problems” (App. 4a), with no

mention of the countervailing evidence or the numerous

defendants’ verdicts in DES cases. Apparently based on these

and other allegations, the opinion describes “the insidious

nature” of plaintiffs’ injuries and asserts that “many manufac-

turers, each behind a curtain, contributed to the devastation”

(App. 11a), finally describing plaintiffs as “the innocent” and

the manufacturers as “the wrongdoers” (id.).

Faced with plaintiffs’ inability to identify the suppliers

allegedly responsible for their injuries, the court of appeals

imposed a form of non-identification liability that goes well

beyond anything adopted by other courts. The court below

simply eliminated the ancient requirement of “causation in a

single case” (App. 17a). It imposed this “non-identification”

liability on DES producers even though it admitted that there

is no “reasonable link between liability and the individual risk

created by a defendant to a particular plaintiff” (id.). Indeed,

the court below recognized that “the chance that a particular

producer caused the injury is often very remote” (App. 9a).

Instead, the court based liability upon a presumed “risk of

injury each defendant created to the public at large”

throughout the country by producing DES, with that “risk” to

be measured by each defendant’s “market share” of DES sold

for pregnancy use on an otherwise unspecified “national

market” basis (App. 16a-17a).

The court conceded that liability is not “based on...

causation in a single case” (App. 17a) and that its rule “will

likely result in a disproportion between the liability of in-

dividual manufacturers and the actual injury each manufac-

ee

11

turer caused” in New York (App. 16a). Indeed, the court

admitted that its rule “cannot be founded upon the belief that,

over the run of cases, liability will approximate causation” in

New York (App. 16a-17a).

Most strikingly, ‘he court of appeals’ logic led it to hold

that a defendant is liable for DES injuries notwithstanding

that uncontroverted evidence establishes it had no connection

with the plaintiff whatsoever (“non-exculpation” liability). In

the words of the court below, “there should be no exculpation

of a defendant who. . . appears not to have caused a particular

plaintiff’s injury” (App. 17a). The proven fact that a defen-

dant could not have manufactured the DES actually taken by

plaintiff’s mother “is merely a windfall . . . to escape liability”

(id.).

Finaily, the court held that the revival statute does not

violate due process or equal protection (App. 19a-22a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Decision Below Violates the Most Fundamental

Principles of Adjudicatory Due Process by Allowing

Damage Awards Where There Is No “Reasonable Link

Between Liability” and the Plaintiff's Alleged Injury, As

Well As Where A Defendant Concededly Could Not Have

Caused the Plaintiff's Injury.'>

By denying certiorari in Sindell and its progeny, this

Court has allowed the lower courts to experiment with various

13 Although the judgments below remand these cases for further

proceedings in the state trial courts, they are “final” for purposes of this

Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Cox Broadcasting

Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-87 (1975). The judgments below finally and

conclusively resolve ail federal questions presented here. Remand procecd-

ings cannot shed material new light upon, or otherwise alter the posture of,

the federal questions. A remand would address state issues only, such as

whether DES caused plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and whether Squibb was

negligent. Further, whatever the disposition might be on remand, there is no

doubt that identical federal issues will repeatedly arise in the 800 cases now

pending or likely to be filed in New York alone (App. 3a, 6a), in most of which

the plaintiffs concede—as they do here—that they cannot identify the

12

forms of non-identification liability. The result has been a

decade of confusion and uncertainty, with no consensus

developing.!4 Non-identification liability remains an aberra-

tion that, as shown below, raises substantial constitutional

questions. The court of appeals’ decision, in linking non-iden-

tification liability with a rule denying defendants the right to

exculpate themselves, raises even more fundamental due

process concerns. In light of New York’s quantum expansion

of non-identification liability, this Court should now set con-

stitutional limits on liability without causation.

Individualized determination of guilt is a uniquely judi-

cial duty that stands at the core of “the Anglo-American legal

heritage.” Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343

(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). In making individualized

responsibility for a plaintiff’s injuries irrelevant and expressly

barring individual exculpation, the decision below raises sub-

stantial constitutional questions as to whether a court—in the

guise of common law decisionmaking—has the power to

engage in “social engineering” of a distinctly legislative char-

acter. See Mulcahy 376 N.W.2d at 76.

A state court’s development of its common law is, of

course, limited by constitutional constraints. See, e.g., New

York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1963); Brinker-

hoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930).

This “Court must examine [the] State’s chosen standard to

determine whether it satisfies ‘the constitutional minimum of

manufacturer whose product allegedly injured them. Many more cases are

pending in other states.

Finally, the decision below renouncing bedrock concepts of causation

and personal responsibility—while imposing damage awards even on defen-

dants who concededly did not cause plaintiff any harm—threatens core

federal constitutional policies governing irrebuttable and irrational presump-

tions, adjudicative due process and arbitrary action by the states. See Cox

Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 483.

14 See pp. 5-7 & nn. 4-6 above. One result is a crazy-quilt of potential

liability that makes it impossible to insure rationally against the almost in-

evitable dangers of pharmaceutical innovation. It also unfairly penalizes

13

“fundamental fairness”.’”” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,

756 n.8 (1982) (citations omitted).

é The requirement that a plaintiff prove that the named

defendant was the person who seonges the plaintiff is a

fundamental tenet of our legal system.!° See, e.g., In re “Agent

Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 822

(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“fundamental principle[ ] . . . that a defen-

dant should not be held responsible for harm he did not

cause”); Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at 76; (“fundamental

negligence requirement of proving causation”); Zafft, 676

S.W.2d at 247 (“so fundamental a concept of tort law”); Mor-

ton, 538 F. Supp. at 599-600 (“fundamental requirement of

causation”); Namm, 427 A.2d at 1125 (“fundamental princi-

ple”); Gray, 445 F. Supp. at 338 (same); Tidler v. Eli Lilly &

Co., 95 ER.D. 332, 334 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 851 F2d 418

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (“market share theory of liability . . . repre-

sents a radical departure”); Mizell, 526 F. Supp. at 596 (same);

Bateman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1132, 1133

(Sth Cir. 1986) (characterizing market share liability as “radi-

cal expansion”); Senn, 751 P.2d at 223 (market share “alterna-

tive liability requires a profound change in fundamental tort

principles of causation”).

Under our civil justice system, a plaintiff cannot recover

for “negligence in the air”, Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,

248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); see Mulcahy, 386

N.W.2d at 76, and thus it is necessary to prove both that the

defendant did something wrong and that it was done to the

national firms with long histories in the industry, since they are the obvious

targets of litigation, while defunct competitors will never have to pay the

alleged costs of their negligence.

15 Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464,

472 (1982) (citations omitted):

“Art. III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to ‘show

that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as

a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,’ and that

the injury ‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action.”

14

—

plaintiff before the court. Proof of either element alone is not

sufficient. Cf. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,

13, 35 (1976) (district court invalidated Black Lung Benefits

Act provision on ground that it precluded defense that plain-

tiff’s injury “did not arise out of employment in the particular

mines for which [a defendant] was responsible”). The “law

does not guarantee relief to every deserving plaintiff.” See

Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 246; Bateman, 781 F.2d at 1133-34 (refus-

ing to adopt market share liability although plaintiff had no

other remedy); Clift v. Nelson, 25 Wash. App. 607, 608 P.2d 647

(1980) (assault action by police officer struck from behind in

mob confrontation dismissed for failure to prove which defen-

dant hit plaintiff).

The rule adopted by the court below amounts in practical

-ffect to a selective tax or social insurance scheme. See Black-

ston, 764 F.2d at 1483 (“elimination of a causation require-

ment would render every manufacturer an insurer not only of

its own products, but also of all generically similar products

manufactured by its competitors”). It “is not merely an exten-

sion of established legal principles, but an action of wholesale

judicial legislation.” See Tidler, 851 F.2d at 422 (citation

omitted); see also Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1018 (describing Sin-

deil as “unprecedented legislation”). By the very nature of the

judical process, a court’s ability to make legislative type

decisions is sharply limited by its narrow focus on the parties

before it and the arguments and facts they choose to present,

the restrictions on its ability to gather information, and judges’

lack of power to levy taxes. In light of these inherent limita-

tions, this Court should consider whether due process permits

a state court to perform core legislative functions.

At bottom, this Court must consider whether the

decision below ignores the profound distinction between the

quantum of proof necessary to meet due process requirements

in the fundamentally different contexts of legislative regula-

tion and judicial factfinding. When government seeks to

protect its citizens through a prospective administrative or

legislative ban on possibly toxic substances, the action may be

upheld “even though the probability of harm to any individual

15 -

is small . . . the studies necessary to assess risk are incomplete”

and there is “a very low probability of any causal relationship.”

Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 781, 785. Where, however,

individuals invoke tort law to seek retrospective “compensa-

tion for injuries after the fact,” id. at 781, evidence that might -

_ be adequate to justify a prospective regulatory ban “would not

be sufficient to find an individual defendant liable to an

individual plaintiff.” Jd. at 782. This is because “the law

believes it unfair to require an individual to pay for another’s

tragedy unless it is shown that it is more likely than not that

he caused it.” Jd. at 781.

A. Violation of Constitutional Burden of Proof Require-

ments.

The decision below presents the important question

whether due process allows a state court to take a defendant’s

property where the plaintiff cannot prove by a fair prepon-

derance of the evidence that the defendant caused her alleged

injury. See Tidler, 95 FR.D. at 334 n.5 (noting due process

issue). ‘

This Court has repeatedly recognized that “[t]he func-

tion of a standard of proof” under the Due Process Clause “is

to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence

our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual

conclusions.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979);.

quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J.,

concurring). The standard of proof “serves to allocate the risk

of error between the litigants” and reflects a societal judgment

as to “the relative importance attached to the ultimate

decision.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.

Of particular relevance here, the Court has recognized

that “while private parties may be interested intensely in a civii

dispute over money damages, application of a ‘fair

preponderance of the evidence’ standard indicates both

society’s ‘minimal concern with the outcome,’ and a con-

clusion that the litigants should ‘share the risk of error in

roughly equal fashion.’ [Addington,] 441 U.S., at 423.” San-

tosky, 455 U.S. at 755. “Any other standard expresses a

16

preference for one side’s interests.” Herman & MacLean v.

Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983). This Court has never

even suggested that private property may be taken in a damage

award upon proof of anything less than a “fair preponderance

of the evidence.” When the standard of proof is changed, it

is invariably done to protect defendants, see, e.g. Addington;

Santosky (“clear and convincing evidence” required to deprive

individuals of certain personal liberties), so as not to disad-

vantage them by “express[ing] a preference for [plaintiff’s]

interests.” See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390.

Where private parties have a “relatively equal . . . inter-

est in the outcome... it is appropriate that each share roughly

equally in the risk of an inaccurate factual determination.”

Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 581 n.8 (1987). The decision

below, however, would judicially deprive Squibb of property

where there is no “reasonable link between liability and the

risk created” (App. 17a), and where the likelihood is admit-

tedly “very remote” that Squibb injured the plaintiff

(App. 9a).

The case thus presents the question whether, under the

Due Process Clause, a state court may decide that a particular

group of plaintiffs—“the innocent,” according to the court of

appeals (App. 11a)—is so much more deserving than a par-

ticular group of defendants—arbitrarily characterized as

“wrongdoers” (id.)—that even substantial doubt as to a re-

quired element of the tort must be resolved in plaintiffs’ favor.

This Court has suggested that “in a civil dispute over money

damages,” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755, such a judicial thumb on

the scales of justice is inappropriate because “the State’s

legitimate interest is in the fair and impartial adjudication of

all civil disputes.” Rivera, 483 U.S. at 581 n.8. Even where

“the interests of plaintiffs in such suits are significant”—as

where, for example, plaintiffs are “among the very individuals

Congress sought to protect”—they “should recover” only “[i]f

they prove that it is more likely than not” that the defendant

injured them. Herman-& MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390.

The reason is clear: “the Constitution expressly protects

against confiscation of private property.” Lindsey v. Normet,

17

405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). If that Fourteenth Amendment right

is to have any substance, it must mean that a person challeng-

ing an owner’s right to his property must show some greater

: entitlement to the property than the owner. In other words,

property cannot be taken where, as here, the challenger’s

claim to it is “very remote” (App. 9a) and the court “concedes

the lack of a logical link” (App. 18a n.3) between the owner

and the challenger.

The New York rule is not justified by the court of

appeals’ claim that it “apportion[s] liability so as to correspond

to the overall culpability of each defendant,” measured by

each DES producer’s “market share” of an undefined “nation-

al market” (App. 16a-17a). Our legal system simply does not

function that way. As an illustration, consider a pedestrian

killed by a speeding hit-and-run driver. Assume that a police

video camera a few hundred yards away records 100 cars

speeding on the stretch of a highway during the hour in which

the victim was struck. No one would seriously contend that

the victim’s estate could sue all 100 drivers and recover 1% of

its damages from each one of them. Having failed to identify

the specific wrongdoer, the estate could recover nothing in

court. !6

B. Non-Identification Liability Creates an Irrebuttable

Presumption.

The decision below also raises the important question

whether an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption is

created by allowing non-identification liability with no oppor-

<6 orden

16 The only widely-accepted circumstance in which courts in this

country have allowed recovery against all members of a group in which only

one member could have injured the plaintiff is under the so-called “alterna-

tive liability” theory of § 433B(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts

(1965). Under that theory, where two or more defendants act tortiously but

there is uncertainty as to which of them caused plaintiff’s injury, the burden

is shifted to each defendant to prove that he did not cause the harm. See, e.g.,

Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (two defendant hunters fired

negligently in direction of plaintiff, who was injured by a single bullet). Bui

see Senn (rejecting alternative liability). Assuming that alternative liability

| | |

18

tunity for exculpation. Under the New York rule, it is con-

clusively presumed that because Squibb produced any DES, it

is responsible for producing the DES that was taken by every

plaintiff’s mother. The court of appeals effectively conceded

the irrationality of this presumption when it acknowledged the

“lack of a logical link between liability and causation in a single

case” (App. 18a n.3). Although all non-identification liability

imposes an irrebuttable presumption, the problem is most

starkly posed by the “non-exculpation” rule, which conclusive-

ly presumes that the plaintiff was injured by a manufacturer

that proves it did not produce the allegedly offending DES.

“[P]ermanent irrebutable presumptions have long been

disfavored under the Due Process Clause.” Viandis v. Kline,

412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973). A “presumption must be regarded

as ‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary’, and hence unconstitutional, unless

it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the

comports with due process, it still does not answer the serious constitutional

questions raised by New York’s DES liability scheme.

Under the alternative liability theory, the plaintiff must still meet the

due process requirement of proving causation. “it must be more probable

than not that an injury was caused . . . by some one of the named defendant

manufacturers.” Hall v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353,

379 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). An alternative liability claim will faii where the plaintiff

does not sue enough defendants to meet that standard of causation—that is,

where the injury may well have been caused by an actor not named as a

defendant. See id. at 359, 379 (defendants included ail U.S. manufacturers of

allegedly dangerous product and their trade association); Agent Orange, 597

FE Supp. at 827 (all producers of alleged toxic chemical were defendants). As

the court below recognized in rejecting the alternative liability approach here,

its “fairness disappears with the decreasing probability that any one of the

defendants actually caused the injury” (App. 9a). Presumably out of similar

concerns, other courts in DES cases have required plaintiffs to join as defen-

dants all DES producers, Abel, 343 N.W.2d at 174; or at least the producers

of a “substantial share” of DES. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.

New York, however, has imposed no such requirement. It allows cases

t> proceed even against a single manufacturer. Notably in the instant cases,

the total of all Gefendants’ market shares is less than 50% (as would be

expected in a market of some 200-300 firms). In such factual circumstances,

a finding that the “injury was caused . . . by some one of the named defendant

manufacturers,” Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 379, would be pure speculation.

a

19

presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved

fact on which it is made to depend.” Leary v. United States,

395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969). See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining

Co., 428 U.S. at 28 (presumption standards in civil law con-

text).

In the instant cases, no such “substantial assurance” is

possible. Indeed, the opposite is true. No DES producer had

a majority share of DES sales in the 1950’s and 60’s, while

Squibb’s share was about 5-10%. Thus, “a significant percent-

age,” Leary, 395 at 46, or a “not inconsiderable proportion,”

id. at 52, of DES—indeed about 90% of DES—was not sup-

plied by Squibb. Accordingly, as a matter of simple mathe-

matics, the only statement that can be made with “substantial

assurance” here is that “the presumed fact” that a plaintiff was

exposed to DES made by Squibb is not “likely . . . to flow from

the proved fact” that Squibb manufactured DES. See Leary,

395 US. at 36. .

An important constitutional question is thus posed by

whether New York’s DES rule violates the Due Process

- Clause because it “‘operates to deny a fair opportunity to

rebut it.”” Viandis, 412 U.S. at 446, quoting Heiner v. Donnan,

285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932). It “constitutes an attempt, by [judi-

cial] fiat, to enact into existence a fact which here does not,

and cannot be made to exist in actuality,” see Heiner, 285 U.S.

at 329—namely, that Squibb’s product injured every plaintiff

in some proportion related to its market share. Moreover,

because New York lacks the constitutional power to “deny{ ]

a litigant the right to prove the facts of its case,” it cannot

“escape from constitutional restrictions” by doing the same

thing “in the guise of a rule of substantative law.” Jd.

C. The Decision Below Amounts to Impermissible Judi-

cial Legislation.

Under New York’s DES rule, all producers are liable for

their “market share” of all tort damages allegedly caused by

DES, without regard to their connection to a particular

plaintiff’s injuries. This taking of defendants’ property—

without proof of individual responsibility for the plaintiff’s

ia

20

injuries—is functionally identical to the imposition of a

retroactive tax or social insurance compensation scheme upon

all DES producers. See p. 14 above. Such retroactive

comensation regimes raise serious due process questions,

evea when imposed by Congressional enactment. See, e.g.,

Turner, 428 U.S. at 16-20.

Yet here, the court of appeals has adopted a system of

virtually unlimited victim compensation, based only upon the

narrow factual record of asummary judgment motion. In light

of the inherent limitations of judicial proceedings (see p. 14

above) and the fact that all the conditions allegedly caused by

DES also occur absent DES exposure (see p. 5 above), the

rational basis for the court of appeals’ DES rule is open to

serious question. See, e.g., Turner, 428 U.S. at 17-18 (“we

would . .. hesitate to approve the retrospective imposition of

liability on any theory of deterrence or blameworthiness”)

(citations omitted), 25 (“[t]he damage resulting from a miner’s

death that is due to causes other than the operator’s conduct

can hardly be termed a ‘cost’ of the operator’s business” which

it is rational to charge to the employer); United States Dep’t of

Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).

The court of appeals’ claim that it was merely fulfilling

“expectations” that “the legislature consciously created . . . by

reviving hundreds of DES cases” (App. 11a) is demonstrably

inaccurate. The revival statute was part of a tort reform act

passed only after extensive debate over the course of severa!

legislative sessions. As one of its Senate sponsors said just

before final passage: “[W]e are changing a statute of limita-

tions here. We are changing a procedural measure. We are

not changing substantive right[s], certainly not retrospective-

ly.”17 Thus, the court below simply ignored the express limita-

tions imposed by the democratic branch of government and

17 Statement of Sen. Connor, 1986 Record of Proceedings, N.Y.

Senate at 5152-53; emphasis added). The revival bill’s lead Senate sponsor

explained:

“I would emphasize . . . as I have said over and over again, this

legislation . .. does not automatically have someone be paid a claim.

21

enacted its own political predilections into law. A serious

question is raised by whether appointed judges, whose func-

tion is to adjudicate individual cases, may impose such a

scheme.

II. The New York “Revival” Statute Irrationally Singles

Out Claims Against DES Manufacturers and Arbitrari-

ly Divests Their Right of Repose Under the Statute of

Limitations.

New York’s 1986 revival statute (see p. 2 above) allowed

plaintiffs to file claims—otherwise long barred by the statute

of limitations—involving five enumerated substances during

the one-year period ending July 30, 1987. The revival statute

was justified as an adjunct to a general change in the time from

which the limitations period for alleged latent toxic tort in-

juries runs in New York. Under the new law, the date of

discovery of the injury controls, rather than the date of ex-

posure (see p. 7n. 10 above). The claims that were “revived,”

however, were not limited to those that plaintiffs could not

have discovered during the old limitations period. Rather, the

statute also allowed suits by plaintiffs who knew of their claims

years before the statute had run, but had voluntarily elected

not to sue, as well as claims that were otherwise barred by

actual judgments on statute of limitations grounds.

In rejecting Squibb’s due process challenge to the revival

statute, the court of appeals relied primarily upon this Court’s

decision in Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304

(1945), which held that statutes of limitations are “proce-

dural” and that rights under them exist “only by legislative

grace.” Jd. at 314. An important constitutional question is

presented by whether the analysis and result of Chase—which

was based on the outmoded right-privilege distinction—sur-

vives this Court’s modern redefinition of constitutionally-

They . . . have to have their day in court and they have to prove their

case. By no means are people automatically going to be paid.”

Statement of Sen. Stafford, id. at 5147.

a

22

protected property rights.'8 The need for review is high-

lighted by the fact that two state supreme courts have in-

validated revival statutes similar to New York’s, see Celotex

Corp. v. St. Joseph Hospital, 259 Ga. 108, 376 S.E.2d 880

(1989); Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So.2d 263

(Ala. 1981), albeit on state constitutional grounds. Those

courts’ use of state constitutional provisions is further indica-

tion that the continuing usefulness of the Chase approach is

questionable.

Modern due process analysis defines constitutionally-

protected property interests “by existing rules or under-

standings that stem from an independent source such as state

law.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The

purpose of the analysis is “to protect those claims upon which

people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be

arbitrarily undermined.” Jd. Similarly, modern just compen-

sation analysis identifies protected property by looking to

whether state regulation “has interfered with distinct

investment-backed expectations.” Penn Central Transporta-

tion Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

Statutes of limitations give rise to precisely the sort of

reliance interests and “investment-backed expectations” that

due process protects. As Justices Bradley and Harlan recog-

nized over a century ago:

“The immunity from suit which arises by operation of the

Statute of Limitations is as valuable a right as the right

to bring the suit itself. ... Statutes of limitation are not

only calculated for the repose and peace of society, but

to provide against the evils that arise from loss of

evidence and the failing memory of witnesses. . . . [I]t is

18 In addition, even under the outmoded Chase analysis, it is not clear

that the revival statute is merely “procedural.” A truly procedural statute of

limitations applies on a general basis to all cases in broad categories. Here,

however, by singling out DES and four other substances, while ignoring the

many other substances legislatively recognized to produce possible latent

injuries (see pp. 23-24 below), the revival statute in fact makes substantive

distinctions that cannot be rationally justified.

EP a gta LLG woe eee A cen aa

do Pacha

23

... aright, ... when vested, ... as much to be protected

as any other right that a man has.”

Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631 (1885) (Bradley, J., dis-

senting). See also Tyson, 399 So.2d at 269 (“the great

preponderance of authority favors the view that... after a

cause of action has become barred by the statute of limita-

tions, the defendant has a vesied right . . . or property which

cannot be taken away by legislation”). New York recognizes

that statutes of limitations confer on defendants the right of

repose and the legitimate expectation to be free from stale

claims. See, e.g., Parker v. Port Authority, 113 A.D.2d 763, 493

N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (2d Dep’t 1985) (“primary purpose of

Statutes of Limitation is to relieve defendants of the necessity

of investigating and preparing a defense,” citing Order of

Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express. gency, 321 U.S. 342,

348-49 (1944)).

In the instant case, the revival statute directly impinges

upon investment-backed expectations that arose by virtue of

the former statute of limitations. Freed from potential

liability by the expiration of the limitations period, a manufac-

turer tailors its business decisions accordingly. In DES cases,

revival prejudices defendants by the very mischief that rights

of repose are intended to prevent: “evidence has been lost,

memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” See

Railroad Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 349. The deprivation is

particularly acute where defendants relied on actual judg-

ments of dismissal, which are effectively vacated by the revival

Statute.

A substantial question is also raised as to whether

New York’s revival of stale DES claims is irrational and ar-

bitrary, thereby denying petitioner both due process and equal

protection. The rationale for revival is to give a day in court

to plaintiffs who could not reasonably have discovered their

claims earlier. But revival of claims of which the plaintiffs

were aware during the former limitations period is inconsis-

tent with that rationale. Such inconsistency between a

statutory provision and the general justification for the law

24

raises serious constitutional questions. See, e.g., Moreno, 413

USS. at 533-34.

Moreover, although it was asserted in enacting the

revival statute that it covered “all of the currently known

categories of victims of exposure to toxic or harmful substan-

ces,” see 1986 N.Y. Legis. Ann. at 288, that claim is

demonstrably inaccurate. For example, the New York

Workers Compensation Law specifically lists at least a dozen

additional substances that may cause latent injury. See N.Y.

Work. Comp. L. § 28 (M<Kinney Supp. 1989). Similarly, New

York’s prospective change in 1986 to a discovery-based limita-

tions period applied to all substances that may cause latent

injury. See p. 7 n. 10 above.

In these circumstances, a substantial question is

presented by whether it is irrational to single out DES for

revival of claims when other substances that the legislature

believed to be potentially as or more likely to cause alleged

latent injuries are not subject to the same treatment. The

legislative history contains no rational justification for the

distinction; it appears simply to have been a matter of political

expediency. Although, as the court of appeals noted

(App. 22a), the legislature may address a problem one step at

a time, any line that is drawn must be constitutionally accept-

able. An important constitutional question exists as to

whether the revival statute meets the applicable due process

and equal protection standards.

=

musa

25

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York

should be granted.

August 2, 1989

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN F MAULSBY DAVID A. BARRETT

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE Counsel of Record

One Chase Manhattan Plaza DUKER & BARRETT

New York, N.Y. 10005 90 Broad Street

(212) 428-1000 New York, N.Y. 10004

(212) 809-7700

BARRY M. EPSTEIN ROBERT L. DICKSON

MARC S. KLEIN. DAVID J. FLEMING

SILL CUMMIS ZUCKERMAN DICKSON, CARLSON &

RADIN TISCHMAN CAMPILLO

EPSTEIN & GROSS 150 Broadway, Suite 1600

450 Park Avenue New York, N.Y. 10038

New York, N.Y. 10022 (212) 791-9640

(212) 349-7600

Aitorneys for Petitioner

E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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