Opposition Brief — City of Philadelphia v. Concerned Citizens
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nm Supreme Court, Date
a FILED
No. 88-143 AUG 12 1986
INTHE ee ae 7
Supreme Court of the United-States
October Term, 1987
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, and
JAMES STANLEY WHITE, in his capacity as
MANAGING DIRECTOR, and
WILLIAM J. MARRAZZO, in his capacity as
WATER COMMISSIONER,
Petitioners,
ct.
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF BRIDESBURG, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF BRIDESBURG, et al.
Michael Churchill*
Jerome Balter
Public Interest Law Center of
Philadelphia
125 South 9th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 627-7100
Counsel for Concerned Citizens
of Bridesburg, et al.
*Counsel of Record
PACKARD PRESS / LEGAL DIVISION. 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA., PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000
Oe AT i, Te ee REESE acer | TA retiree
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF
PETITIONERS QUESTIONS
1. Whether petitioners’ challenge to subject matter juris-
diction was made moot when plaintiffs’ federal claim was
judicially determined to have been in effect continuously
throughout the litigation.
2. Whether the City of Philadelphia is immunized from
monetary civil contempt sanctions imposed by a federal court.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Counter-Statement of Petitioners Questions ............ i
Tele of Coetemts. ... 2. cai aia eee ii
Tale of Authorities. ......6640000041 0 eee iii
Brief in Opposition of Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg,
OU Me eee ee ee
Counter-Statement of the Case ..................00005 ]
Reasons For Denying the Writ ....................24. 4
NON oo ia ccs he a ee 4
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Has Existed Throughout
Tits LA 8 ie eee 6
A. Odor Regulations In the Pennsylvania SIP Fur-
nish Subject Matter Jurisdiction .............. 6
B. Odor Regulations In the Pennsylvania SIP Have
Continued To Exist Throughout the Litigation.. 7
C. Petitioners Are Precluded From Collateral At-
tack on the Contempt Judgment.............. 8
D. There Is no Conflict Between the Third Circuit
and the Seventh Circelt. ..... 2.666 cen snes 10
II. The District Court Is Not Barred From Imposing
Monetary Civil Contempt Sanctions Against the City
at PRR so. ce hE ee ees
Complesion .. och oss io os Ye sn eeee 12
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
In Re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litigation, 689 F.2d
EE ee 1]
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308
a 9
Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F.
Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1974)... 2.000 ceccececeeee. 6
City of Philadelphia v. United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, No. 85-3285 (3rd Cir. 8/22/85)... ... 7
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water
Department, C.A. No. 85-14 (E.D. Pa. 4/23/85)..... 2,6
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water
Department, 643 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 7/28/86)... 2
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water
Department, C.A. No. 85-14 (E.D. Pa. 1/28/87)..... 3
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water
Department, 843 F.2d 679 (3rd Cir. 3/31/88) ....... 1,4
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 836 F.2d 777 (3rd Cir.
SR IRE a te ara a a 3, 8
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.
Pa. 1982); aff'd., 678 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir. 1982); cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1962)...................... 1]
Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 419 F.
Supp. 528, 533-34 (D.D.C. 1976)................. 6
Gould v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 790 F.2d
ic Maik dbk AA pA ada Ca wes ab
Hodge v. Hodge, 621 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1980) ..........
Illinois v. Celotex Corporation, 516 F. Supp. 716 (C.D. Il.
re es ge Ss Vy wee ae.a'a vn 00.80 6
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— Continued)
Cases: Page
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxite
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)................0.. )
Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297
a. SE ak cach 6 Mande emda keene aakahtes 8
Quinter v. Volkswagon of America, 676 F.2d 969 (3rd Cir.
rr ees Fe Pers EPR re prea 11, 12
Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F.2d
CRN BI eee ye ole eek ¥sva ee 10
train ©. NADC, 421 U.S. GD (1G7S) .. wn ec cee 6
United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977)......... 8
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258
SSS os Cn ee ake ORES Soo Se ea Te ck 11, 12
Statutes:
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United States Constitution Article VI §2............ Me ll
No. 88-143
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, and
JAMES STANLEY WHITE, in his capacity as
MANAGING DIRECTOR, and
WILLIAM J. MARRAZZO, in his capacity as
WATER COMMISSIONER,
Petitioners,
wis
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF BRIDESBURG, et al.,
Respondents.
_ On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF BRIDESBURG, et al.
Respondents, Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg, et al.,
respectfully request the Court deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari seeking review of the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reported at
843 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1988) which is reproduced in petitioner's
appendix at A-1 to A-9.
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg et al. on January 3, 1985
filed a citizen lawsuit pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
l
2 Counter-Statement of the Case
§ 7604, to enjoin the Water Department of the City of Phila-
delphia (“City”) from operating its Northeast Water Pollution
Control Plant (“N/E WPCP’) in violation of the odor regulations
in the Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan (“SIP”), 40
C.F.R. 52.2020 et seq.
The City moved to dismiss contending the odor regulations
in the Pennsylvania SIP were invalid and unenforceable. After
extensive briefing the district court issued a comprehensive
opinion denying the City’s motion. Concerned Citizens of
Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water Department, C.A. No. 85-14
(E.D. Pa. 4/23/85).!
The City then filed a Petition for Review against the EPA,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b), seeking to invalidate the EPA
action that had incorporated the odor regulations into the
Pennsylvania SIP. 38 Fed Reg 32893 (11/28/73). The Court of
Appeals dismissed the City’s Petition for Review because it had
been filed after the time period allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).
City of Philadelphia v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, No. 85-3285 (3rd Cir. 8/22/85).2 The City did not seek
a writ of certiorari to challenge the Court of Appeals decision.
Trial on the merits of the Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg
lawsuit was held from May 5 to May 8, 1986. After trial, while
the district court decision was pending, the EPA published a
rule deleting the odor regulations from the Pennsylvania SIP, 51
Fed Reg. 18438 (5/20/86).
The District Court judgment was filed July 28, 1986.
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water De-
partment, 643 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa 1986) (A-24).° The court
noted that EPA's deletion of the odor regulation removed
plaintiff's federal claim but that it did not remove the court's
jurisdiction to decide the pendent state common law claim of
maintaining a public nuisance. (A-48, A-50-51).
1. Petitioner neglected to include the district court opinion of April 23,
1985 in the Appendix
2. Petitioner also neglected to include the Third Circuit Dismissal of the
City Petition in the Appendix
3. References are to Appendix prepared by Petitioner
Counter-Statement of the Case 3
The district court held that the City was maintaining a
public nuisance as evidenced by the numerous malodorous
emissions from the N/E WPCP that were causing substantial
harm, injury, annoyance and discomfort to the residents in the
area of the N/E WPCP in violations of the odor regulations
under Pennsylvania law. (A-54, A-55). By way of remedy the
court, inter alia, enjoined defendants from operating the N/E
WPCP in violation of the state odor regulations (A-56).
The district court order of July 28, 1986 was a final
judgment from which the City could have appealed. On appeal
the City could have challenged the jurisdictional issues consid-
ered and decided by the final judgment including the district
court's April 23, 1985 opinion declaring the odor regulations in
the Pennsylvania SIP to be enforceable regulations. The City,
however, did not appeal from the July 28, 1986 final judgment.
Several months after the July 28, 1986 court injunction,
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg moved to declare defendants
in civil contempt because of the repeated violations of the
injunction. Following a 3 day hearing, the district court, on
January 28, 1987, filed an opinion and order declaring the City
to be in civil contempt and imposing civil contempt sanctions to
coerce defendants into compliance. Concerned Citizens of Bri-
desburg v. Philadelphia Water Department, C.A. 85-14 (E.D.
Pa. 1/28/87) (A-12). The sanctions, inter alia, required defen-
dants to pay monetary penalties into the Registry of the Court
for future violations of the injunctions, these funds to be
available to compensate plaintiffs for actual losses due to the
city's violations. (A-19, A-20).
Defendants appealed the contempt judgment of January 25,
1987. The appeal, essentially, challenged the jurisdiction of the
district court, though defendants had failed to appeal the
underlying judgment of July 28, 1986 which had considered and
ruled on all of the jurisdictional issues.
Defendants also appealed the contempt judgment in re-
spect to the monetary contempt sanctions imposed by the
district court.
While the City’s appeal of the contempt order was pending,
the ‘Court of Appeals invalidated EPA's rule deleting the odor
4 Reasons for Denying the Writ
regulations. Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 836 F2d 777 (3rd Cir.
12/18/87). (A-96) The EPA did not seek a writ of certiorari to
challenge the decision.
Thereafter, the district court's contempt order of January
28, 1987 was affirmed. Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v.
Philadelphia Water Department, 843 F2d 679 (3rd Cir. 3/31/88)
(A-1). The Court of Appeals held that the City’s challenges to
jurisdiction had been made moot by the court decision invali-
dating the EPA rule, (A-6, A-7).
The Court of Appeals also rejected the City’s arguments in
respect to the monetary sanctions imposed by the district court
to coerce compliance with the July 28, 1986 injunction (A-8,
A-9).
Reasons for Denying the Writ
SUMMARY
The petition for a writ of certiorari presents no questions of
significance or importance. The decision of the Court of Appeals
was unanimous and clearly correct. The petition for a writ
should be denied.
The principal issue raised by the petition for a writ concerns
jurisdiction. The district court judgment of July 28, 1986 (A-24)
considered and decided all the jurisdictional issues. The district
court had ruled that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed at
the outset of the case by reason of the substantial allegations that
defendants were violating the odor regulations in the Pennsyl-
vania State Implementation Plan (SIP) under the Clean Air Act;
that the federal claim had been renioved after trial on the merits
but prior to the July 28, 1986 judgment, by reason of the EPA
rule of May 20, 1986 deleting the odor regulations from the
Pennsylvania SIP, but the district court had maintained juris-
diction to decide the pendant state common law claim of
maintaining a public nuisance.
Had the defendants appealed from the july 28, 1986
judgment they could have had a judicial review of all the
jurisdictional matters concerned with pendent jurisdiction and
SS
Reasons for Denying the Writ 5
with the enforceability of the odor regulations in the Pennsyl-
vania SIP. The defendants, however, chose not to file an appeal.
These jurisdictional issues, however, were raised by defen-
dants on their appeal of the civil contempt order issued six
months later, on January 28, 1987. When the Court of Appeals
came to decide the appeal the material facts had changed. By
then, the EPA's rule deleting the odor regulations had been
invalidated and nullified by the Court of Appeals (A-96). Thus
the federal claim providing jurisdiction had been restored as
though it had existed continuously throughout the litigation.
The odor regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP have never
been invalidated by a state court or a federal court; nor has any
state court or federal court ever found that the odor regulations
had been invalidly incorporated into the Pennsylvania SIP.
These odor regulations in the SIP, therefore, are regulations
that may be enforced by citizen lawsuits under the Clean Air
Act.
The Third Circuit decision affirming the contempt order of
January 28, 1987 stands for the proposition that SIP provisions
may be enforced by citizen lawsuits under the Clean Air Act. it
is not in conflict with the Seventh Circuit which held that a SIP
provision is not enforceable if it has been ruled to be invalid by
a state court.
The defendant's contention that the federal district court is
barred from imposing monetary civil contempt sanctions on the
City of Philadelphia by reason of a State tort liability act
misconstrues the nature of a contempt sanction and suggests that
federal courts are without power to enforce their own decrees
against a Pennsylvania municipality. Defendant's contention is
incorrect,
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Has Existed Throughout This
Litigation.
A. Odor Regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP Furnish Sub-
ject Matter Jurisdiction
The citizen lawsuit brought by Concerned Citizens of
Bridesburg derives jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because
6 Reasons for Denying the Writ
the case arises from the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.
and from the citizen lawsuit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7604, of the
Clean Air Act.
The complaint alleged that the City was operating its N/E
WPCP in violation of the odor regulations in the Pennsylvania
SIP, 40 CFR 52.2020 et seq., which had been incorporated into
the Pennsylvania SIP in 1973 by the EPA pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
7410. 38 Fed. Reg. 32893 (11/28/73)
Provisions of a SIP are emission standards or limitations, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(f), which are enforceable under the federal-state-
private enforcement scheme of the Clean Air Act, Illinois v
Celotex Corporation, 516 F. Supp. 716, 717 (C.D. Ill. 1976);
Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F.Supp.
136, 139 (D.D.C. 1974). See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 92
(1975). Jurisdiction was established here by substantial allega-
tions that defendants were violating the odor regulations in the
Pennsylvania SIP promulgated by the EPA. Since the action
arises out of alleged violations of federal law, jurisdiction is
provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Since plaintiffs provided 60 day
notices of intent to sue jurisdiction is also provided by 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604.
Defendants contend, however, that the odor regulations in
the Pennsylvania SIP are not enforceable under the Clean Air
Act. This contention was rejected by the district court, in a
comprehensive opinion, because defendants could not demon-
strate that the odor regulations were wholly unrelated to EPA’s
ambient air quality standards. Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg
v. Philadelphia Water Dept., C.A. No. 85-14 (E.D. Pa. 4/23/85).
See Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 419
F.Supp 528, 533-34 (D.D.C. 1976).
The City then challenged the validity of the EPA action, 38
Fed. Reg. 32893 (11/28/73), that had incorporated the odor
regulations into the Pennsylvania SIP. The City filed a Petition
for Review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7607(b), against the EPA but
the Court of Appeals dismissed, on the motion of the EPA,
because the City’s Petition for Review had been filed beyond the
Reasons for Denying the Writ 7
time provided by the Clean Air Act. City of Philadelphia v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency No. 85-3285 (3d
Cir. 8/22/85).
In sum, the odor regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP
existed when the complaint was filed. The viclations of these
regulations provided jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and 42 U.S.C. § 7604. These odor regulations are valid and
enforceable under federal law; ne court has ever ruled other-
wise.
B. The Odor Regulations In the Pennsylvania SIP Have
Continued To Exist Throughout the Litigation
Trial on the merits of plaintiffs complaint was held May 3
through May 8, 1986. After trial but prior to the issuance of the
court judgment, the EPA published a rule that deleted the odor
regulations from the Pennsylvania SIP. 51 Fed. Reg. 18438
(5/20/86).
Thereafter, on July 28, 1986, the district court issued its
judgment (A-24). Noting EPA’s rule the district court recog-
nized that the federal claim no longer existed but the court
exercised its discretion to maintain jurisdiction in respect to the
pendent state common law claim of maintaining a public nui-
sance (A-48-51). The court found that the malodorous emissions
from the N/E WPCP were in violation of state odor regulations
and that such violations constituted a public nuisance. The
district court, therefore, issued an order (A-56) enjoining the
defendants from any further violation of the state odor
regulations. 4
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg, challenged EPA’s rule
deleting the odor regulations. This challenge, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b) of the Clean Air Act, was upheld in Concerned
Citizens of Bridesburg v. United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 836 F2d 777 (3d Cir. 12/18/87) (A-96, A-118). The
effect of this decision was to nullify the EPA rule thereby
restoring the validity of the odor regulations in the Pennsylvania
4. The state odor regulations found to have been violated by the district
court are the exact same odor regulations that are in the Pennsylvania SIP.
8 Reasons for Denying the Writ
SIP as though EPA had never issued the rule. See United States
v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873, n.12 (1977), Manhattan Gen-
eral Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
The decision invalidating the EPA rule was issued while
defendants’ appeal of the contempt order was under consider-
ation by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals took note of
that decision; correctly recognized that it made the defendant's
arguments regarding jurisdiction moot and affirmed the district
court’s contempt order. (A-6, A-7).
The odor regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP which existed
at the initiation of the complaint continued to exist throughout
the litigation and continued to provide federal jurisdiction.
C. Petitioners Are Precluded From Collateral Attack on the
Contempt Judgment
The district court judgment of July 28, 1986 enjoined
defendants from operating the N/E WPCP in violation of the
odor regulations under Pennsylvania's Air Pollution Control Act,
35 P.S. § 4001 et seq, and under the Philadelphia Air Manage-
ment Code (A-56). It was a final order that could have been
appealed. Since the judgment of July 28, 1986 and the prior
interlocutory opinion of April 23, 1985 considered and ruled on
the City’s jurisdictional objections, the City had the opportunity
to have appellate review of these issues by an appeal of the July
28, 1986 judgment. The City chose not to appeal.
However, when the district court declared the defendants
to be in civil contempt, on January 28, 1987 (A-21) and imposed
a civil contempt sanction (A-22, A-23) the City did appeal and
the principal issue raised by the City concerned the matter of
jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals recognized that the City’s challenge
to jurisdiction in the appeal of the contempt order was a
collateral attack on the contempt order (A-6, A-7) but the Court
had no reason to consider the propriety of the City’s argument
because the invalidation of the EPA rule had restored the
federal claim on which original jurisdiction was based. (A-7)
Reasons for Denying the Writ 9
Whether subject matter jurisdiction can be used to collat-
erally attack a subsequent contempt order by a party that had
failed to bring a direct appeal poses the problem of balancing
judicial concern for finality of judgments against judicial concern
for the validity of judgments. The modern trend gives substan-
tially greater weight to the concern for finality. Hodge v. Hodge,
621 F2d 590, 592 (3d Cir. 1980). Restatement (Second) Judg-
ments, § 12, Comment C.
Greater concern for finality is also evidenced in Chicot
County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 37]
(1940) where Chief Justice Hughes declared:
“The [district] court has the authority to pass upon its own
jurisdiction and its decree sustaining jurisdiction against
attack, while open to direct review, is res judicata in a
collateral action.”
308 U.S. at 377. See Gould v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New
York, 790 F2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986).
In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des
Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) the Supreme Court
declared:
“A party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question
of subject matter jurisdiction may not, however, reopen
that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judg-
ment. It has long been the rule that the principles of res
judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations — both sub-
ject matter and personal.” (citation omitted)
Id., 456 U.S. at 702 n.9.
The City’s failure to take a direct appeal of the July 28, 1986
judgment precludes the city from collaterally attacking the
contempt judgment of January 28, 1987. The sustained existence
of the odor regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP makes the City’s
jurisdictional arguments moot, whether or not they could assert
a collateral attack.
10 Reasons for Denying the Writ
D. There is no Conflict Between the Third Circuit and the
Seventh Circuit
The City has attempted to create a conflict between the
Third and Seventh Circuits in respect to the enforceability of
SIP provisions. No such conflict exists.
Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F2d
1145 (7th Cir. 1983), affirmed a district court order dismissing a
Clean Air Act citizen lawsuit because the SIP provision at issue
had been invalidated by an Indiana State court. The Seventh
Circuit correctly reasoned that if the provision had been inval-
idly adopted by the State it was a nullity ab initio and therefore,
could not be enforced though it had been incorporated by the
EPA into the Indiana SIP.
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit case, the Third Circuit
affirmance of the January 28, 1987 contempt order concerned
provisions of the Pennsylvania SIP which had been validated by
the courts on numerous occasions. No state court or federal
court had ever declared the odor regulations to be invalid, nor
had any court invalidated the procedure by which the regula-
tions had been incorporated into the Pennsylvania SIP.
The Third Circuit held that a SIP provision that had not
been invalidated by any court is a provision that is enforceable
through a Clean Air Act citizen lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit
held that a SIP provision judicially declared to be invalid by a
State Court is a SIP provision that could not be enforced by a
Clean Air Act citizen lawsuit. There is no conflict between these
decisions.5
5. It should be noted that the district court judgment of July 28, 1986,
which was issued when the EPA rule deleting the odor regulations from the
SIP was apparently in effect, did not enjoin defendants from violating the odor
regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP. Instead, the injunction prohibited
defendants from violating the odor regulations under the Pennsylvania Air
Pollution Act and the Philadelphia Air Management Code (A-56).
Reasons for Denying the Writ 11
II. The District Court Is Not Barred From Imposing Monetary
Civil Contempt Sanctions Against the City of Philadelphia
The district court contempt order of January 28, 1987
requires the City, inter alia, to pay monetary penalties into the
Registry of the Court for repeated violations of the court
injunctions. (A-21, A-22) These monetary penalties are to be
paid into a special fund which may be used to compensate
named plaintiffs who can demonstrate, by clear and convincing
evidence, actual losses due to the City’s violations of the
injunction. (A-19, A-20)
The City contends these sanctions violate the provisions of
Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Torts Claims Act, 42 Pa.
C.S.A. § 8541 et seq. (A-88) and therefore, the City argues that
the contempt sanctions are invalid. The City is incorrect, they
have misconstrued the nature of the civil contempt sanctions.
The district court has wide discretion to fashion a civil
contempt sanction to compel defendants to undertake the
necessary actions required by a court's injunction. A contempt
sanction seeks to correct a defendants’ conduct to prevent future
violations of a court order. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for
Clean Air v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 533 F.Supp. 869
882 (E.D. Pa 1982); aff'd, 678 F2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982); cert den.
459 U.S. 969 (1982): In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchise Litiga-
tion, 689 F2d 1150, 1158 (3d Cir. 1982).
The contempt sanction is prospective in nature. It is not
imposed in response to a tort claim. See United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1946); Quinter v. Volks-
wagon of America, 676 F2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982). Therefore,
the Tort Claims Act is not relevant or applicable to a federal
court contempt sanction.
If the Tort Claims Act immunized the City from the
contempt sanction it would frustrate the court's ability to enforce
federal court orders against contumacious municipalities. This
would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution Article VI § 2.
It is well recognized that a court may award damages to
persons incurring losses that result from acts in violation of court
12 Conclusion
injunctions. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 303-04 (1946), Quinter v. Volkswagon of America, 676 F2d
969 (3rd Cir. 1982).
These damage awards are not awards for losses due to
tortious actions, they are awards for losses due to actions in
violation of court orders. Therefore, the Tort Liability Act is not
relevant or applicable to such damage awards.
The civil contempt sanctions imposed by the district court
here do not conflict or violate the Pennsylvania Political Subdi-
vision Tort Liability Act. The Court of Appeals was correct in
affirming the district court order (A-8, A-9).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth supra, Concerned Citizens of
Bridesburg et al. respectfully request the Supreme Court of the
United States deny the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review
the opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER
OF PHILADELPHIA
Michael Churchill*
Jerome Balter
125 S. 9th Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19107 .
(215) 627-7100
Counsel for Respondents,
Concerned Citizens of
Bridesburg, et al.
*Counsel of Record
—
ee
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