Opposition Brief — City of Philadelphia v. Concerned Citizens

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nm Supreme Court, Date

a FILED

No. 88-143 AUG 12 1986

INTHE ee ae 7

Supreme Court of the United-States

October Term, 1987

THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, and

JAMES STANLEY WHITE, in his capacity as

MANAGING DIRECTOR, and

WILLIAM J. MARRAZZO, in his capacity as

WATER COMMISSIONER,

Petitioners,

ct.

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF BRIDESBURG, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF BRIDESBURG, et al.

Michael Churchill*

Jerome Balter

Public Interest Law Center of

Philadelphia

125 South 9th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

(215) 627-7100

Counsel for Concerned Citizens

of Bridesburg, et al.

*Counsel of Record

PACKARD PRESS / LEGAL DIVISION. 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA., PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000

Oe AT i, Te ee REESE acer | TA retiree

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF

PETITIONERS QUESTIONS

1. Whether petitioners’ challenge to subject matter juris-

diction was made moot when plaintiffs’ federal claim was

judicially determined to have been in effect continuously

throughout the litigation.

2. Whether the City of Philadelphia is immunized from

monetary civil contempt sanctions imposed by a federal court.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Counter-Statement of Petitioners Questions ............ i

Tele of Coetemts. ... 2. cai aia eee ii

Tale of Authorities. ......6640000041 0 eee iii

Brief in Opposition of Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg,

OU Me eee ee ee

Counter-Statement of the Case ..................00005 ]

Reasons For Denying the Writ ....................24. 4

NON oo ia ccs he a ee 4

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Has Existed Throughout

Tits LA 8 ie eee 6

A. Odor Regulations In the Pennsylvania SIP Fur-

nish Subject Matter Jurisdiction .............. 6

B. Odor Regulations In the Pennsylvania SIP Have

Continued To Exist Throughout the Litigation.. 7

C. Petitioners Are Precluded From Collateral At-

tack on the Contempt Judgment.............. 8

D. There Is no Conflict Between the Third Circuit

and the Seventh Circelt. ..... 2.666 cen snes 10

II. The District Court Is Not Barred From Imposing

Monetary Civil Contempt Sanctions Against the City

at PRR so. ce hE ee ees

Complesion .. och oss io os Ye sn eeee 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

In Re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litigation, 689 F.2d

EE ee 1]

Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308

a 9

Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F.

Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1974)... 2.000 ceccececeeee. 6

City of Philadelphia v. United States Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, No. 85-3285 (3rd Cir. 8/22/85)... ... 7

Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water

Department, C.A. No. 85-14 (E.D. Pa. 4/23/85)..... 2,6

Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water

Department, 643 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 7/28/86)... 2

Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water

Department, C.A. No. 85-14 (E.D. Pa. 1/28/87)..... 3

Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water

Department, 843 F.2d 679 (3rd Cir. 3/31/88) ....... 1,4

Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. United States Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency, 836 F.2d 777 (3rd Cir.

SR IRE a te ara a a 3, 8

Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.

Pa. 1982); aff'd., 678 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir. 1982); cert.

denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1962)...................... 1]

Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 419 F.

Supp. 528, 533-34 (D.D.C. 1976)................. 6

Gould v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 790 F.2d

ic Maik dbk AA pA ada Ca wes ab

Hodge v. Hodge, 621 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1980) ..........

Illinois v. Celotex Corporation, 516 F. Supp. 716 (C.D. Il.

re es ge Ss Vy wee ae.a'a vn 00.80 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— Continued)

Cases: Page

Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxite

de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)................0.. )

Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297

a. SE ak cach 6 Mande emda keene aakahtes 8

Quinter v. Volkswagon of America, 676 F.2d 969 (3rd Cir.

rr ees Fe Pers EPR re prea 11, 12

Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F.2d

CRN BI eee ye ole eek ¥sva ee 10

train ©. NADC, 421 U.S. GD (1G7S) .. wn ec cee 6

United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977)......... 8

United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258

SSS os Cn ee ake ORES Soo Se ea Te ck 11, 12

Statutes:

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United States Constitution Article VI §2............ Me ll

No. 88-143

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, and

JAMES STANLEY WHITE, in his capacity as

MANAGING DIRECTOR, and

WILLIAM J. MARRAZZO, in his capacity as

WATER COMMISSIONER,

Petitioners,

wis

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF BRIDESBURG, et al.,

Respondents.

_ On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF BRIDESBURG, et al.

Respondents, Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg, et al.,

respectfully request the Court deny the petition for a writ of

certiorari seeking review of the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reported at

843 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1988) which is reproduced in petitioner's

appendix at A-1 to A-9.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg et al. on January 3, 1985

filed a citizen lawsuit pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

l

2 Counter-Statement of the Case

§ 7604, to enjoin the Water Department of the City of Phila-

delphia (“City”) from operating its Northeast Water Pollution

Control Plant (“N/E WPCP’) in violation of the odor regulations

in the Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan (“SIP”), 40

C.F.R. 52.2020 et seq.

The City moved to dismiss contending the odor regulations

in the Pennsylvania SIP were invalid and unenforceable. After

extensive briefing the district court issued a comprehensive

opinion denying the City’s motion. Concerned Citizens of

Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water Department, C.A. No. 85-14

(E.D. Pa. 4/23/85).!

The City then filed a Petition for Review against the EPA,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b), seeking to invalidate the EPA

action that had incorporated the odor regulations into the

Pennsylvania SIP. 38 Fed Reg 32893 (11/28/73). The Court of

Appeals dismissed the City’s Petition for Review because it had

been filed after the time period allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).

City of Philadelphia v. United States Environmental Protection

Agency, No. 85-3285 (3rd Cir. 8/22/85).2 The City did not seek

a writ of certiorari to challenge the Court of Appeals decision.

Trial on the merits of the Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg

lawsuit was held from May 5 to May 8, 1986. After trial, while

the district court decision was pending, the EPA published a

rule deleting the odor regulations from the Pennsylvania SIP, 51

Fed Reg. 18438 (5/20/86).

The District Court judgment was filed July 28, 1986.

Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water De-

partment, 643 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa 1986) (A-24).° The court

noted that EPA's deletion of the odor regulation removed

plaintiff's federal claim but that it did not remove the court's

jurisdiction to decide the pendent state common law claim of

maintaining a public nuisance. (A-48, A-50-51).

1. Petitioner neglected to include the district court opinion of April 23,

1985 in the Appendix

2. Petitioner also neglected to include the Third Circuit Dismissal of the

City Petition in the Appendix

3. References are to Appendix prepared by Petitioner

Counter-Statement of the Case 3

The district court held that the City was maintaining a

public nuisance as evidenced by the numerous malodorous

emissions from the N/E WPCP that were causing substantial

harm, injury, annoyance and discomfort to the residents in the

area of the N/E WPCP in violations of the odor regulations

under Pennsylvania law. (A-54, A-55). By way of remedy the

court, inter alia, enjoined defendants from operating the N/E

WPCP in violation of the state odor regulations (A-56).

The district court order of July 28, 1986 was a final

judgment from which the City could have appealed. On appeal

the City could have challenged the jurisdictional issues consid-

ered and decided by the final judgment including the district

court's April 23, 1985 opinion declaring the odor regulations in

the Pennsylvania SIP to be enforceable regulations. The City,

however, did not appeal from the July 28, 1986 final judgment.

Several months after the July 28, 1986 court injunction,

Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg moved to declare defendants

in civil contempt because of the repeated violations of the

injunction. Following a 3 day hearing, the district court, on

January 28, 1987, filed an opinion and order declaring the City

to be in civil contempt and imposing civil contempt sanctions to

coerce defendants into compliance. Concerned Citizens of Bri-

desburg v. Philadelphia Water Department, C.A. 85-14 (E.D.

Pa. 1/28/87) (A-12). The sanctions, inter alia, required defen-

dants to pay monetary penalties into the Registry of the Court

for future violations of the injunctions, these funds to be

available to compensate plaintiffs for actual losses due to the

city's violations. (A-19, A-20).

Defendants appealed the contempt judgment of January 25,

1987. The appeal, essentially, challenged the jurisdiction of the

district court, though defendants had failed to appeal the

underlying judgment of July 28, 1986 which had considered and

ruled on all of the jurisdictional issues.

Defendants also appealed the contempt judgment in re-

spect to the monetary contempt sanctions imposed by the

district court.

While the City’s appeal of the contempt order was pending,

the ‘Court of Appeals invalidated EPA's rule deleting the odor

4 Reasons for Denying the Writ

regulations. Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. United States

Environmental Protection Agency, 836 F2d 777 (3rd Cir.

12/18/87). (A-96) The EPA did not seek a writ of certiorari to

challenge the decision.

Thereafter, the district court's contempt order of January

28, 1987 was affirmed. Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v.

Philadelphia Water Department, 843 F2d 679 (3rd Cir. 3/31/88)

(A-1). The Court of Appeals held that the City’s challenges to

jurisdiction had been made moot by the court decision invali-

dating the EPA rule, (A-6, A-7).

The Court of Appeals also rejected the City’s arguments in

respect to the monetary sanctions imposed by the district court

to coerce compliance with the July 28, 1986 injunction (A-8,

A-9).

Reasons for Denying the Writ

SUMMARY

The petition for a writ of certiorari presents no questions of

significance or importance. The decision of the Court of Appeals

was unanimous and clearly correct. The petition for a writ

should be denied.

The principal issue raised by the petition for a writ concerns

jurisdiction. The district court judgment of July 28, 1986 (A-24)

considered and decided all the jurisdictional issues. The district

court had ruled that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed at

the outset of the case by reason of the substantial allegations that

defendants were violating the odor regulations in the Pennsyl-

vania State Implementation Plan (SIP) under the Clean Air Act;

that the federal claim had been renioved after trial on the merits

but prior to the July 28, 1986 judgment, by reason of the EPA

rule of May 20, 1986 deleting the odor regulations from the

Pennsylvania SIP, but the district court had maintained juris-

diction to decide the pendant state common law claim of

maintaining a public nuisance.

Had the defendants appealed from the july 28, 1986

judgment they could have had a judicial review of all the

jurisdictional matters concerned with pendent jurisdiction and

SS

Reasons for Denying the Writ 5

with the enforceability of the odor regulations in the Pennsyl-

vania SIP. The defendants, however, chose not to file an appeal.

These jurisdictional issues, however, were raised by defen-

dants on their appeal of the civil contempt order issued six

months later, on January 28, 1987. When the Court of Appeals

came to decide the appeal the material facts had changed. By

then, the EPA's rule deleting the odor regulations had been

invalidated and nullified by the Court of Appeals (A-96). Thus

the federal claim providing jurisdiction had been restored as

though it had existed continuously throughout the litigation.

The odor regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP have never

been invalidated by a state court or a federal court; nor has any

state court or federal court ever found that the odor regulations

had been invalidly incorporated into the Pennsylvania SIP.

These odor regulations in the SIP, therefore, are regulations

that may be enforced by citizen lawsuits under the Clean Air

Act.

The Third Circuit decision affirming the contempt order of

January 28, 1987 stands for the proposition that SIP provisions

may be enforced by citizen lawsuits under the Clean Air Act. it

is not in conflict with the Seventh Circuit which held that a SIP

provision is not enforceable if it has been ruled to be invalid by

a state court.

The defendant's contention that the federal district court is

barred from imposing monetary civil contempt sanctions on the

City of Philadelphia by reason of a State tort liability act

misconstrues the nature of a contempt sanction and suggests that

federal courts are without power to enforce their own decrees

against a Pennsylvania municipality. Defendant's contention is

incorrect,

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Has Existed Throughout This

Litigation.

A. Odor Regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP Furnish Sub-

ject Matter Jurisdiction

The citizen lawsuit brought by Concerned Citizens of

Bridesburg derives jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because

6 Reasons for Denying the Writ

the case arises from the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.

and from the citizen lawsuit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7604, of the

Clean Air Act.

The complaint alleged that the City was operating its N/E

WPCP in violation of the odor regulations in the Pennsylvania

SIP, 40 CFR 52.2020 et seq., which had been incorporated into

the Pennsylvania SIP in 1973 by the EPA pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

7410. 38 Fed. Reg. 32893 (11/28/73)

Provisions of a SIP are emission standards or limitations, 42

U.S.C. § 7604(f), which are enforceable under the federal-state-

private enforcement scheme of the Clean Air Act, Illinois v

Celotex Corporation, 516 F. Supp. 716, 717 (C.D. Ill. 1976);

Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F.Supp.

136, 139 (D.D.C. 1974). See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 92

(1975). Jurisdiction was established here by substantial allega-

tions that defendants were violating the odor regulations in the

Pennsylvania SIP promulgated by the EPA. Since the action

arises out of alleged violations of federal law, jurisdiction is

provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Since plaintiffs provided 60 day

notices of intent to sue jurisdiction is also provided by 42 U.S.C.

§ 7604.

Defendants contend, however, that the odor regulations in

the Pennsylvania SIP are not enforceable under the Clean Air

Act. This contention was rejected by the district court, in a

comprehensive opinion, because defendants could not demon-

strate that the odor regulations were wholly unrelated to EPA’s

ambient air quality standards. Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg

v. Philadelphia Water Dept., C.A. No. 85-14 (E.D. Pa. 4/23/85).

See Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 419

F.Supp 528, 533-34 (D.D.C. 1976).

The City then challenged the validity of the EPA action, 38

Fed. Reg. 32893 (11/28/73), that had incorporated the odor

regulations into the Pennsylvania SIP. The City filed a Petition

for Review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7607(b), against the EPA but

the Court of Appeals dismissed, on the motion of the EPA,

because the City’s Petition for Review had been filed beyond the

Reasons for Denying the Writ 7

time provided by the Clean Air Act. City of Philadelphia v.

United States Environmental Protection Agency No. 85-3285 (3d

Cir. 8/22/85).

In sum, the odor regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP

existed when the complaint was filed. The viclations of these

regulations provided jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

and 42 U.S.C. § 7604. These odor regulations are valid and

enforceable under federal law; ne court has ever ruled other-

wise.

B. The Odor Regulations In the Pennsylvania SIP Have

Continued To Exist Throughout the Litigation

Trial on the merits of plaintiffs complaint was held May 3

through May 8, 1986. After trial but prior to the issuance of the

court judgment, the EPA published a rule that deleted the odor

regulations from the Pennsylvania SIP. 51 Fed. Reg. 18438

(5/20/86).

Thereafter, on July 28, 1986, the district court issued its

judgment (A-24). Noting EPA’s rule the district court recog-

nized that the federal claim no longer existed but the court

exercised its discretion to maintain jurisdiction in respect to the

pendent state common law claim of maintaining a public nui-

sance (A-48-51). The court found that the malodorous emissions

from the N/E WPCP were in violation of state odor regulations

and that such violations constituted a public nuisance. The

district court, therefore, issued an order (A-56) enjoining the

defendants from any further violation of the state odor

regulations. 4

Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg, challenged EPA’s rule

deleting the odor regulations. This challenge, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 7607(b) of the Clean Air Act, was upheld in Concerned

Citizens of Bridesburg v. United States Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, 836 F2d 777 (3d Cir. 12/18/87) (A-96, A-118). The

effect of this decision was to nullify the EPA rule thereby

restoring the validity of the odor regulations in the Pennsylvania

4. The state odor regulations found to have been violated by the district

court are the exact same odor regulations that are in the Pennsylvania SIP.

8 Reasons for Denying the Writ

SIP as though EPA had never issued the rule. See United States

v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873, n.12 (1977), Manhattan Gen-

eral Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).

The decision invalidating the EPA rule was issued while

defendants’ appeal of the contempt order was under consider-

ation by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals took note of

that decision; correctly recognized that it made the defendant's

arguments regarding jurisdiction moot and affirmed the district

court’s contempt order. (A-6, A-7).

The odor regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP which existed

at the initiation of the complaint continued to exist throughout

the litigation and continued to provide federal jurisdiction.

C. Petitioners Are Precluded From Collateral Attack on the

Contempt Judgment

The district court judgment of July 28, 1986 enjoined

defendants from operating the N/E WPCP in violation of the

odor regulations under Pennsylvania's Air Pollution Control Act,

35 P.S. § 4001 et seq, and under the Philadelphia Air Manage-

ment Code (A-56). It was a final order that could have been

appealed. Since the judgment of July 28, 1986 and the prior

interlocutory opinion of April 23, 1985 considered and ruled on

the City’s jurisdictional objections, the City had the opportunity

to have appellate review of these issues by an appeal of the July

28, 1986 judgment. The City chose not to appeal.

However, when the district court declared the defendants

to be in civil contempt, on January 28, 1987 (A-21) and imposed

a civil contempt sanction (A-22, A-23) the City did appeal and

the principal issue raised by the City concerned the matter of

jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals recognized that the City’s challenge

to jurisdiction in the appeal of the contempt order was a

collateral attack on the contempt order (A-6, A-7) but the Court

had no reason to consider the propriety of the City’s argument

because the invalidation of the EPA rule had restored the

federal claim on which original jurisdiction was based. (A-7)

Reasons for Denying the Writ 9

Whether subject matter jurisdiction can be used to collat-

erally attack a subsequent contempt order by a party that had

failed to bring a direct appeal poses the problem of balancing

judicial concern for finality of judgments against judicial concern

for the validity of judgments. The modern trend gives substan-

tially greater weight to the concern for finality. Hodge v. Hodge,

621 F2d 590, 592 (3d Cir. 1980). Restatement (Second) Judg-

ments, § 12, Comment C.

Greater concern for finality is also evidenced in Chicot

County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 37]

(1940) where Chief Justice Hughes declared:

“The [district] court has the authority to pass upon its own

jurisdiction and its decree sustaining jurisdiction against

attack, while open to direct review, is res judicata in a

collateral action.”

308 U.S. at 377. See Gould v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New

York, 790 F2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986).

In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des

Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) the Supreme Court

declared:

“A party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question

of subject matter jurisdiction may not, however, reopen

that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judg-

ment. It has long been the rule that the principles of res

judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations — both sub-

ject matter and personal.” (citation omitted)

Id., 456 U.S. at 702 n.9.

The City’s failure to take a direct appeal of the July 28, 1986

judgment precludes the city from collaterally attacking the

contempt judgment of January 28, 1987. The sustained existence

of the odor regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP makes the City’s

jurisdictional arguments moot, whether or not they could assert

a collateral attack.

10 Reasons for Denying the Writ

D. There is no Conflict Between the Third Circuit and the

Seventh Circuit

The City has attempted to create a conflict between the

Third and Seventh Circuits in respect to the enforceability of

SIP provisions. No such conflict exists.

Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F2d

1145 (7th Cir. 1983), affirmed a district court order dismissing a

Clean Air Act citizen lawsuit because the SIP provision at issue

had been invalidated by an Indiana State court. The Seventh

Circuit correctly reasoned that if the provision had been inval-

idly adopted by the State it was a nullity ab initio and therefore,

could not be enforced though it had been incorporated by the

EPA into the Indiana SIP.

In contrast to the Seventh Circuit case, the Third Circuit

affirmance of the January 28, 1987 contempt order concerned

provisions of the Pennsylvania SIP which had been validated by

the courts on numerous occasions. No state court or federal

court had ever declared the odor regulations to be invalid, nor

had any court invalidated the procedure by which the regula-

tions had been incorporated into the Pennsylvania SIP.

The Third Circuit held that a SIP provision that had not

been invalidated by any court is a provision that is enforceable

through a Clean Air Act citizen lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit

held that a SIP provision judicially declared to be invalid by a

State Court is a SIP provision that could not be enforced by a

Clean Air Act citizen lawsuit. There is no conflict between these

decisions.5

5. It should be noted that the district court judgment of July 28, 1986,

which was issued when the EPA rule deleting the odor regulations from the

SIP was apparently in effect, did not enjoin defendants from violating the odor

regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP. Instead, the injunction prohibited

defendants from violating the odor regulations under the Pennsylvania Air

Pollution Act and the Philadelphia Air Management Code (A-56).

Reasons for Denying the Writ 11

II. The District Court Is Not Barred From Imposing Monetary

Civil Contempt Sanctions Against the City of Philadelphia

The district court contempt order of January 28, 1987

requires the City, inter alia, to pay monetary penalties into the

Registry of the Court for repeated violations of the court

injunctions. (A-21, A-22) These monetary penalties are to be

paid into a special fund which may be used to compensate

named plaintiffs who can demonstrate, by clear and convincing

evidence, actual losses due to the City’s violations of the

injunction. (A-19, A-20)

The City contends these sanctions violate the provisions of

Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Torts Claims Act, 42 Pa.

C.S.A. § 8541 et seq. (A-88) and therefore, the City argues that

the contempt sanctions are invalid. The City is incorrect, they

have misconstrued the nature of the civil contempt sanctions.

The district court has wide discretion to fashion a civil

contempt sanction to compel defendants to undertake the

necessary actions required by a court's injunction. A contempt

sanction seeks to correct a defendants’ conduct to prevent future

violations of a court order. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for

Clean Air v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 533 F.Supp. 869

882 (E.D. Pa 1982); aff'd, 678 F2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982); cert den.

459 U.S. 969 (1982): In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchise Litiga-

tion, 689 F2d 1150, 1158 (3d Cir. 1982).

The contempt sanction is prospective in nature. It is not

imposed in response to a tort claim. See United States v. United

Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1946); Quinter v. Volks-

wagon of America, 676 F2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982). Therefore,

the Tort Claims Act is not relevant or applicable to a federal

court contempt sanction.

If the Tort Claims Act immunized the City from the

contempt sanction it would frustrate the court's ability to enforce

federal court orders against contumacious municipalities. This

would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States

Constitution Article VI § 2.

It is well recognized that a court may award damages to

persons incurring losses that result from acts in violation of court

12 Conclusion

injunctions. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.

258, 303-04 (1946), Quinter v. Volkswagon of America, 676 F2d

969 (3rd Cir. 1982).

These damage awards are not awards for losses due to

tortious actions, they are awards for losses due to actions in

violation of court orders. Therefore, the Tort Liability Act is not

relevant or applicable to such damage awards.

The civil contempt sanctions imposed by the district court

here do not conflict or violate the Pennsylvania Political Subdi-

vision Tort Liability Act. The Court of Appeals was correct in

affirming the district court order (A-8, A-9).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth supra, Concerned Citizens of

Bridesburg et al. respectfully request the Supreme Court of the

United States deny the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review

the opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER

OF PHILADELPHIA

Michael Churchill*

Jerome Balter

125 S. 9th Street, Suite 700

Philadelphia, PA 19107 .

(215) 627-7100

Counsel for Respondents,

Concerned Citizens of

Bridesburg, et al.

*Counsel of Record

—

ee

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