Reply Brief — Alabama Power Co. v. Thomas

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Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

No. 88-61 SEP 30 1988

WV

7

FP, SPANIOL, JR

CLERK

IN THE

Suprenw Court of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION AND

EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,

Petitioners,

We

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION

AND EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE

Davip C. BRANAND HENRY V. NICKEL

1130 17th Street, N.W. (Counsel of Record)

Washington, D.C. 20036 F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

(202) 463-2643 MEL 8S. SCHULZE

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Suite 9000

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Petitioner

September 30, 1988 Edison Electric Institute

Counsel for Petitioner

National Coal Association

ee ed

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO

ADDRESS THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S FAILURE

TO APPLY THIS COURT’S CHEVRON DOC-

TRINE AND TO AFFORD DEFERENCE TO

EPA’S REASONABLE INTERPRETATION

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. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO

ENSURE THAT THE DOCTRINES OF LAW

OF THE CASE AND RES JUDICATA ARE

APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

AGENCY REMAND PROCEEDINGS .............

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ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837

Ci } Ppeeeenemmnrnretmtrr: Le a 1

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987)... 4

NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1988).. 5

Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1983),

cert. denied sub nom. Alabama Power Co. »v.

Sierra Club, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984) ..................... 2,4, 8,9

STATUTES:

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq. (1982)

6 125, 48 UBS. S Fae Cisee) ete passim

FEDERAL REGISTER:

46 Fraud. Ter, GE € R ascinespsaivacstcccenccicenses 8

GO Fad. Heel. RIGO CD aseessivciccsuenenneans 4

MISCELLANEOUS:

H.R. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) .... 6

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-61

NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION AND

EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,

. Petitioners,

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION

AND EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE

ARGUMENT

As Petitioners explained in their Petition for Certio-

rari, the D.C. Circuit in this case essentially required

that sources conduct case-by-case demonstrations of stack

height credit, when the plain language of § 123 of the

Clean Air Act and the Agency’s interpretation of that

provision contemplate a general “good engineering prac-

tice’ (GEP) rule.’ As Petitioners explained, the lower

court’s decision in this regard ignored basic principles of

law restricting judicial intervention in agency action, as

embodied in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC2 and the doc-

trines of law of the case and res judicata.

1 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18-20 (hereinafter “Pet.

—’’) ,

2 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (“Chevron”).

amet aati anne

2

In response to the Petition, Federal Respondents agree

that “EPA’s decision to grandfather within-formula stack

height increases [from demonstration requirements] was

a reasonable one . . . under Section 123 . .. and should

have been sustained by the court of appeals.”* Federal

Respondents also agree that an agency “should not be

required to relitigate the merits of previously adopted

regulatory choices every time it engages in supplemental

rulemaking after a remand,” and state that the Agency

did in fact “originally interpret[] Sierra Club’s affirm-

ance of the [earlier] grandfathering provision as effec-

tively encompassing” the rule set aside by the more re-

cent D.C. Circuit decision.*

Nevertheless, Federal Respondents and Respondents

Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. (hereinafter

“NRDC”)*® oppose certiorari. Contrary to representa-

tions made before the D.C. Circuit,* Federal Respondents

now contend that this case involves only a “fact-specific

ruling [that] is not of general importance.”* Further-

more, contrary to its earlier view of Sierra Club,® the

Agency now believes that that decision is “somewhat

ambiguous” on the issue of grandfathering previous

stack height increases.° For the reasons discussed below,

3 Brief for Federal Respondents in Opposition at 25-26 (Sep-

tember 12, 1988) (hereinafter “Fed. Resp. Brief ——’”).

4 Fed. Resp. Brief 26; Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436 (D.C.

Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. Sierra

Club, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984).

5 Brief For Respondents in Opposition (February 12, 1988)

(hereinafter “NRDC Brief at P

6 See generally Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing (March 7,

1988) (hereinafter “EPA Rehearing Petition ——”’). The Rehear-

ing Petition is printed in the Appendix to this Brief.

7 Fed. Resp. Brief 26.

8 See generally EPA Rehearing Petition.

® Fed. Resp. Brief 26.

3

Respondents’ arguments in opposition to certiorari are

without merit.

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO AD-

DRESS THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S FAILURE TO APPLY

THIS COURT’S CHEVRON DOCTRINE AND TO

AFFORD DEFERENCE TO EPA’S REASONABLE

INTERPRETATION OF § 123.

As explained in the Petition for Certiorari, the D.C.

Circuit has twice addressed the Agency’s rules imple-

menting § 123 of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments—

a seemingly simple and straightforward statutory provi-

sion requiring EPA to establish rules within six months

providing for “good engineering practice” stack height

credit. In successive opinions, the D.C. Circuit, while

recognizing that neither § 123 nor its legislative history

is a model ef clarity, has interpreted this provision to

restrict the scope of the Agency’s authority to proceed by

general rule. In Sierra Club, the court required more

extensive use of case-by-case demonstrations for future

stack height increases. In its most recent decision, the

court extended this holding to stack height increases that

took place before its Sierra Club decision.

In response to the D.C. Circuit’s ever-expanding in-

structions on what EPA’s stack height credit regulations

must provide, Federal Respondents insist that EPA’s im-

plementation of § 123 with respect to “within-formula

stack height increases” was “reasonable” and “should

have been sustained by the court of appeals.” Peti-

tioners agree with Federal Respondents in this respect.

Petitioners disagree, however, with Federal Respondents’

view that the D.C. Circuit’s instructions on how to imple-

ment this technical statutory provision reflect due regard

for basic standards governing judicial review."

10 Jd. 25-26.

1 See id.; Pet. 18-22.

4

In Chevron, this Court announced that a reviewing

court must give deference to an agency’s reasonable

interpretation of its enabling statute, even if the review-

ing court itself would have adopted another interpreta-

tion of that statute. Under Chevron, therefore, the lower

court was required to defer to EPA’s reasonable inter-

pretation of the Act to allow use of a generally appli-

cable GEP formula for all sources with pre-October 1983

stacks."

Review by this Court is necessary to address the

D.C. Circuit’s failure to abide by or even acknowl-

edge the Chevron deference principle. Moreover, since

there has been confusion in the circuit courts as to the

scope and applicability of Chevron in the aftermath of

this Court’s decision in JNS v. Cardoza-Fonseca," grant-

ing certiorari in this case would give the Court an op-

portunity to clarify the scope of the Chevron doctrine.”

2 This interpretation of $123 was in fact adopted by EPA

from the pre-Chevron Sierra Club decision, which did not question

the use of the formula for pre-October 1983 stacks. See infra

pp. 6-9.

13 See Pet. 21 n.58: INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207

(1987).

14 In contrast to Federal Respondents’ recognition that its imple-

mentation of § 123 was reasonable and should have been upheld by

the lower court, NRDC, in opposing certiorari, argues that the lower

court’s decision “is not based on its adoption of a statutory inter-

pretation conflicting with the agency’s interpretation,” but rather

upon EPA’s failure to justify the grandfathering provision provid-

ing that sources with pre-October 1983 stacks may use the GEP

formula. NRDC Brief 8. NRDC ignores that the “crucial considera-

tion” in an agency's decision to adopt a grandfathering rule is the

“statutory interest” factor. Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 468. Accord-

ingly, in allowing sources with pre-October 1983 replaceraent stacks

to use the GEP formula, EPA of necessity had to find that rule to be

consistent with § 123 as well as with the lower court’s remand

order. EPA did just that. 50 Fed. Reg. 27900 (1985), Appendix

to Petition for Certiorari at 103a (hereinafter “App. ——”").

EPA therefore adopted as its own the Sierra Club court's inter-

—— OQ

5

While agreeing that the Agency’s implementation of

§ 123 was reasonable and should have been upheld by the

D.C. Circuit, Federal Respondents argue that this case

represents only “a fact-specific ruling [that] is not of

general importance,” and therefore not worthy of review

by this Court.” This assertion is surprising in light of

Federal Respondents’ representation to the D.C. Circuit

in EPA’s Petition for Rehearing that that court’s further

instructions on how to define GEP stack height credits

has “serious consequences for the Agency.” ** As Federal

Respondents then explained, the lower court’s ruling

would “deprive[] a significant number of sources of the

grandfathering protection conferred in Sierra Club,” and

would require the Agency “to devote substantial time and

resources” to yet another judicially-inspired approach to

§ 123 implementation." Federal Respondents offer no ex-

planation as to why these views have changed; nor do

they offer any response to Petitioners’ extensive discus-

sion of the importance of this case.”

pretation of § 123 to allow the use of the GEP formula by sources

with pre-October 1983 stacks. See infra pp. 6-9.

The D.C. Circuit in this case rejected EPA's interpretation

of §123. Stating an inaccurate view of the Sierra Club court's

interpretation of § 123, reached as a result of NRDC’s mischarac-

terization of that decision, see infra note 24, the court held

that sources with pre-October 1983 replacement stacks could not

use the GEP formula. NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1244-46

(D.C. Cir. 1988), App. 36a-40a. It is this continued reinterpreta-

tion of § 123 by the lower court, in a manner contrary to the

Agency’s interpretation of that provision, that has created the

need for certiorari.

1 Fed. Resp. Brief 26.

1% EPA Rehearing Petition 13, Appendix to this Brief at 12a

7 Jd.

1% See Pet. 24-26. NRDC, on the other hand, does attempt to

respond to Petitioners’ assertions regarding the importance of

this case. NRDC Brief 12-13. NRDC first argues that the court

6

In sum, the D.C. Circuit failed to show proper defer-

ence to EPA’s interpretation of § 123, under which the

GEP formula retained its vitality. Instead, it rejected

EPA’s rule without considering the Chevron doctrine,

rendering the GEP formula explicitly endorsed by- Con-

gress in § 123 and its legislative history unavailable for

most sources.” As a result, after a decade of § 123 rule-

making proceedings, EPA must again reallocate its

searce resources to development of rules implementing a

straightforward statutory provision for which Congress

expected final rules to be in place in 1978. This Court

should grant certiorari to end the confusion over § 123

and to clarify the proper roles of federal courts and

agencies in interpreting a statutory provision granting

the agency broad rulemaking powers.

II. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO ENSURE

THAT THE DOCTRINES OF LAW OF THE CASE

AND RES JUDICATA ARE APPLIED IN JUDICIAL

REVIEW OF AGENCY REMAND PROCEEDINGS.

During the remand rulemaking following Sierra Club

and in the subsequent litigation in the court below, EPA

consistently held the view that the court in Sierra Club

did not require case-by-case demonstrations or a multi-layered

grandfathering scheme in lieu of a generally applicable GEP

formula, so long as EPA justifies the formula. As explained in the

Petition, however, Pet. 15 n.26, the burden that the lower court has

created for justification of a generally applicable formula will make

it difficult, as a practical matter, for EPA to justify the current

GEP formula.

Second, NRDC argues that even if case-by-case demonstrations

were required, they would not be burdensome because mathe-

matical models could be used instead of wind tunnels or field

studies. This claim makes no sense—the models that NRDC wants

EPA to use require that stack height be an input to the model;

the models cannot be used to assess what GEP stack height is.

19 See Pet. 19-20; H.R. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 143

(1977).

————eeeeeeaLgL.LLLLS=SaE_~S”——C

7

had affirmed the use of the GEP formula for all stacks

except future replacement stacks that increase stack

height.” EPA’s 1985 rules refiected this view of the

lower court’s opinion by (1) allowing use of the tradi-

tional 2.5H GEP formula for any pre-1979 stack upon a

showing of reliance; (2) allowing, subject to a discre-

tionary demonstration requirement, use of the refined

H + 1.5L GEP formula for any pre-October 1983 stack

not able to use the 2.5H formula, and for any post-

October 1983 original stack; and (3) requiring demon-

strations for post-October 1983 replacement stacks with

increased height.

Ignoring the Agency’s view of Sierra Club and § 123,

however, the D.C. Circuit set aside EPA’s rules allowing

GEP formula credit for past stack height increases.

Petitioners and Federal Respondents strongly objected to

the D.C. Circuit’s reversal of its prior position, explain-

ing more fully in petitions for rehearing how the deci-

sion below conflicted with the Sierra Club decision that

had guided the remand rulemaking.

Federal Respondents now suggest that Sierra Club “is

in fact somewhat ambiguous” on whether use of the GEP

formula for pre-October 1983 stacks is consistent with

§ 123," and on this basis suggest that the doctrines of

law of the case and res judicata are not important to

this case. In light of the history of this proceeding, Fed-

eral Respondents’ eleventh-hour reversal of position

should, if anything, lead this Court to examine this case

all the more closely.

Petitioners and others participated in the remand rule-

making based on the premise that the Sierra Club opin-

ion upheld the Agency’s rule allowing use of the 2.5H

GEP formula for all sources with pre-1979 stacks, as

20 See EPA Rehearing Petition 6-13, Appendix to this Brief at

5a-lla; Fed. Resp. Brief 26 (the Agency “originally interpreted”

Sierra Club in this manner).

21 Fed. Resp. Brief 26.

8

long as the Agency limited use of that rule to sources

that had relied on that formula.“ The D.C. Circuit, how-

ever, gave no weight to the view of Sierra Club that

guided the remand rulemaking* nor to the history of

that rulemaking in remanding for yet additional rule

making in accordance with its contrary view of that

case.* If rulemaking participants are subject to ever-

22 See Pet. 10-11, 23.

23See EPA Rehearing Petition 6-13, Appendix to this Brief

at 5a-1la.

24In contrast to Petitioners and Federal Respondents, NRDC

disagrees that the Sierra Club court authorized use of the 2.5H

formula for all pre-1979 stacks. NRDC reads the portion of

Sierra Club addressing stack height increases as applying to all

post-1970 stacks, and argues that this reflects its arguments in

Sierra Club. Id. 8-9 and note 16.

NRDC’s arguments are belied by its 1982 brief and the Sierra

Club decision. In the 1981 rulemaking and in its 1982 brief,

NRDC argued that EPA in its 1982 rules should have adopted the

Agency’s “well-reasoned 1980 policy,” NRDC Brief in Sierra Club

at 30 (October 25, 1982); see Comments of NRDC on the 1981

Proposed Rules at 13 (November 3, 1981), which would have re-

quired demonstrations, in lieu of automatic use of the GEP

formula, for increases in stack height in the future. Pet. 7-8;

45 Fed. Reg. 42282 (1980) (“EPA has concluded that an existing

source increasing its stack height should not automatically receive

credit for the increase on the basis of the GEP formula. In the

future, any source seeking to raise its stack . . . will be required

to conduct a fluid modeling study or field study to demonstrate

the GEP height ....” (emphasis added)). NRDC’s 1982 brief

therefore presented its argument in the future tense. See, e.g.,

NRDC Brief in Sierra Club at 27 (“EPA may not apply its rule

of thumb formula to sources wishing te raise existing stacks”

(emphasis added).).

The Sierra Club decision reflects NRDC’s arguments. Thus,

the court, agreeing with NRDC’s argument on stack height in-

creases, remanded for EPA to consider whether demonstrations

should be required “before stack heights may be raised... .”

Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 460. Use of the future tense here con-

9

changing interpretations of earlier court decisions in

litigation following remand rulemaking, the administra-

tive rulemaking process will have no certainty and no

end. In this sense, EPA’s willingness to change its posi-

tion so easily in light of a decision from the D.C. Circuit

that the Agency only six months ago vigorously con-

tended was inconsistent with Sierra Club** shows that

certiorari is important to provide guidance on the scope

of judicial review of agency decisions during remand

rulemaking.

In sum, Federal Respondents were required in the

court below to do something that they clearly find dis-

turbing: “relitigate the merits of previously adopted

regulatory choices” following a remand rulemaking.

Against this background, this Court should settle that the

doctrines of law of the case and res judicata apply in

litigation over rules promulgated on remand from an

earlier court decision.

firms that neither NRDC nor the court was questioning use of

the GEP formula for past stack height increases.

Moreover, in upholding use of the traditional 2.5H formula for

pre-1979 stacks where reliance could be shown, the court in Sierra

Club did not attempt to distinguish between pre-1979 replacement

stacks (with increased stack height) and pre-1979 original stacks.

Rather, the court’s decision applied to all pre-1979 stacks. 719

F.2d at 467 (“We hold that the statute does not prevent EPA

from allowing its past rule [the 2.5H formula] to be applied to

stacks built before” 1979). Reading the Sierra Club decision as

a whole therefore shows that NRDC’s argument is without merit.

25 See generally EPA Rehearing Petition.

26 Fed. Resp. Brief 26.

10

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and those discussed in the

Petition for Certiorari, this Court should grant certio-

rari.

Respectfully submitted,

Davip C. BRANAND HENRY V. NICKEL

1130 17th Street, N.W. (Counsel of Record)

Washington, D.C. 20036 F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

(202) 463-2643 MEL S. SCHULZE

Counsel for Petitioner HUNTON & WILLIAMS

National Coal Association 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Suite 9000

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Petitioner

September 30, 1988 Edison Electric Institute

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 85-1488 and consolidated cases

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al.

Petitioners,

v.

LEE M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AND THE

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR REHEARING

On Petition for Review of Regulations of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency

The United States Environmental Protection Agency

and Lee M. Thomas, Administrator (hereinafter “EPA”

or “the Agency”), hereby petition this Court for rehear-

ing pursuant to the provisions of Fed. R. App. P. 40 and

Local Court Rule 15. EPA files this petition to bring to

the attention of this Court a conflict between its Janu-

ary 22, 1988, decision and its previous decision in Sierra

Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. de-

nied, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984), relating to the permissibility

of grandfathering pre-1979 within-formula stack height

increases.

2a

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

This Court’s January 22, 1988,. decision remanded to

the Agency three provisions of its July 8, 1985, stack

height regulations including that governing the “grand-

fathering of pre-October 1, 1983, stack increases from

demonstration requirements” (Slip op. at 63). In Sierra

Club this Court affirmed EPA’s decision to grandfather

stacks in existence on January 12, 1979. In the 1985

rulemaking and consistent with its interpretation of the

Sierra Club decision, EPA required stacks constructed

prior to January 12, 1979, to demonstrate reliance on the

2.5H formula’ in order to receive full credit under that

formula, and authorized credit to the H + 1.5L? for-

mula for all other pre-October 1, 1983,? stacks along with

discretionary authority for the permitting authority to

require additional studies. In establishing these require-

ments, the Agency did not distinguish between “original

design” stacks and stack “increases.” This Court’s opin-

ion, however, concludes that such a distinction is ap-

propriate, in conflict with its prior decision in Sierra

Club. EPA estimates that more than 150 sources will

be affected by this portion of the Court’s decision.

1 Section 123 of the Clean Air Act limits credit for stack height

to that dictated by “good engineering practice,’ which is limited to

two and a half times the height of [the] source [2.5H]

unless the owner or operator of the source demonstrates...

that a greater height is necessary as provided under the

preceding sentence.

42 U.S.C. § 7423(c).

2The “H + 1.5L” formula gives credit for the height of the

nearby structure plus one-and-one-half times the lesser of the

height or width of the structure.

3The Court’s opinion refers to October 1, 1983, in apparent

reliance on a typographical error in the Agency’s original Federal

Register notice. That error has been corrected to October 11,

1983, the date of the Sierra Club decision, and so appears in the

re-codified regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 51.100(kk) (2).

3a

BACKGROUND

The Court’s January 22, 1988, decision is its second

addressing EPA’s efforts to implement section 123 of

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7423, which governs the

award of credit for stack height in setting emission limi-

tations under the Act. Upon investigation, the Agency

discovered that the statutory 2.5H formula overestimated

“good engineering practice” stack height for some

sources. Accordingly, it promulgated a refined formula

of H + 1.5L as part of its June 9, 1982, stack height

regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(ii) (2) (i), 47 Fed. Reg.

5,868 (J.A. 71). The June 9, 1982, regulations were

challenged by Sierra Club, the Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., and the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-

vania on numerous grounds and in October 1983, the

Court issued its decision affirming portions of the regu-

lations, reversing two provisions, and remanding others

to EPA for reconsideration. Sierra Club v. EPA, 719

F.2d 4386 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204

(1984).

Two aspects of the decision in Sierra Club v. EPA are

here relevant. First, the Court affirmed EPA’s decision

to give stack height credit up “2.5H” for stacks in exist-

ence on January 12, 1979, when EPA’s refined formula

was proposed, providing the source could show it actually

relied on the 2.5H formula in constructing its stack.

See id. at 468. In addition, the Court directed the EPA

to reconsider the issue of “whether . . . demonstrations

are necessary before stack heights may be raised, even

if the final height will not exceed formula height.” Jd.

at 459-60.

In response to the Court’s remand, the Agency promul-

gated revised stack height regulations on July 8, 1985.

See 50 Fed. Reg. 27,892 (1985). In those revised regu-

lations EPA reformulated its grandfathering provision

for pre-January 12, 1979, stacks to take actual reliance

into account:

4a

“Good engineering practices” (GEP) stack height

means...

For stacks in existence on January 12, 1979, and

for which the owner or operator had obtained all

applicable permits or approvals required under 40

C.F.R. Parts 51 and 52,

Hg=2.5H,

provided the owner or operator produces evidence

that this equation was actually relied on in establish-

ing an emission limitation ....

40 C.F.R. § 51.1(ii) (2) (i), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,906 (J.A.

26). With respect to a source which seeks to increase an

existing stack up to the levels established by the “good

engineering practice’ formula after October 1, 1983,

EPA requires that the source perform a fluid modeling

demonstration to justify this credit. 40 C.F.R. § 51.1

(kk) (2), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,907 (J.A. 27). Within-

formula stack height increases accomplished prior to Oc-

tober 1, 1983, are subject to the provisions of 40 C.F.R.

§ 51.1(ii) (2) (1), which imposes a ceiling of 2.5H on

stack height credit for pre-January 12, 1979 stack height

increases where the source can demonstrate reliance on

the 2.5H formula. Pre-January 12, 1979, sources which

can not meet the reliance requirement, and post-January

12, 1979, increases are limited to stack height credit of

H + 1.5L. 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(ii) (2) (ii), 50 Fed. Reg.

27,906 (J.A. 26).

Following promulgation of the July 8, 1985, regula-

tions, eleven petitions for review were filed by environ-

mental, state and industry petitioners. The Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., Sierra Club, the Envi-

ronmental Defense Fund, and several states (hereinafter

collectively referred to as “NRDC”) challenged the two

provisions discussed above. First, and notwithstanding

this Court’s decision in Sierra Club v. EPA, NRDC chal-

lenged EPA’s decision to retain a grandfathering provi-

5a

sion for stacks in existence on January 12, 1979, based

on its argument that all sources must “control first’? be-

fore receiving any credit for stack height. See NRDC br.

at 51-54. In the alternative, NRDC challenged EPA’s

decision to retain a grandfathering provision for sources

which increased their stacks prior to January 12, 1979,

up to 2.5H, and to permit grandfathering of all other

stacks constructed before October 1, 1983, up to H +

1.5L. Id. at 31-35.

In its January 22, 1988, decision, the Court reaffirmed

its earlier decision in Sierra Club v. EPA, that sources

may continue to utilize the 2.5H formula in calculating

their emission limitations for stacks in existence on Jan-

uary 12, 1979, providing they demonstrate reliance on

that formula. See Slip op. at 42. The Court went on,

however, to impose the new requirement that before a

source could take advantage of this grandfathering pro-

vision it must have been originally designed to 2.5H.

Id. at 40. Accordingly, EPA must now reconsider its

decision to grandfather pre-January 12, 1979, sources

which increased their stacks up to formula height, re-

gardless of whether the sources relied on the 2.5H for-

mula in increasing stacks.

ARGUMENT

I. SIERRA V. EPA DOES NOT PROVIDE A

BASIS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN

ORIGINALLY-DESIGNED AND INCREASED

STACKS.

In Sierra Club v. EPA, this Court upheld EPA’s ‘deci-

sion to grandfather all stacks in existence on January

12, 1979, up to 2.5H provided the affected sources dem-

onstrated reliance on the statutory formula in construct-

ing their stacks. See 719 F.2d at 468. “Stacks in ex-

istence” necessarily include stacks originally constructed

to 2.5H and stacks subsequently raised to 2.5H. In af-

firming this grandfathering provision, the Sierra Club

6a

court did not distinguish between original and increased

stacks, and certainly never suggested that pre-January

12, 1979, original and increased stacks should be sub-

jected to different grandfathering provisions.* Nor did

NRDC advance such an argument in the earlier case.

See NRDC br. at 27-31, filed in Sierra Club v. EPA.

NRDC did challenge EPA’s decision in the 1982 regu-

lations not to impose a fluid modeling demonstration re-

quirement for stack height increases. See 719 F.2d at

456-59. NRDC’s challenge, however, appeared to be

limited to the Agency’s failure to impose a demonstra-

tion requirement for prospective stack height increases.

See NRDC br. at 30, filed in Sierra Club v. EPA (“EPA

has not met its burden of showing why its well-reasoned

1980 policy . . . may now be discarded.”). The 1980 pol-

icy referenced by NRDC was purely prospective in ap-

plication. Under this 1980 policy, pre-January 12, 1979,

stack height increases would certainly have been grand-

fathered. See 45 Fed. Reg. 42,279 (June 24, 1980). See

also EPA br. at 34 n.22.

The Sierra Club Court remanded to the Agency the

question of whether “demonstrations are necessary be-

fore stack heights may be raised, even if the final height

will not exceed formula height.” 719 F.2d at 459-60.

4In fact, when the Sierra Club court remanded the 2.5H grand-

fathering provision based on the need to demonstrate reliance,

it stated that there are 171 stacks over 500 feet which were

built between 1970 and 1979, citing a report based on FAA data

listing all stacks over 61 meters built between 1970 and 1979.

Id. at 468. It seems clear that the FAA listed all stacks regardless

NRDC br. at 9 (168 sources increased their stack height after

of whether they were original or increased stacks. Compare

1970). The Court did not state that the reliance requirement

only related to the subset of these stacks which were originally

designed to 2.5H. Thus, the figure the Sierra Club court cites

as sources needing to show reliance in order to be grandfathered

was not limited to original stacks, but included all stacks con-

structed before 1979.

7a

Because NRDC did not challenge EPA’s decision not to

require demonstrations for any pre-January 12, 1979,

stack height increases, and the Court did not distinguish

among “stacks in existence’, EPA was not required to

reevaluate a grandfathering provision for pre-January

12, 1979, stack height increases. Nothing in this Court’s

Sierra Club opinion suggests a different interpretation.

Moreover, a review of the rulemaking record makes

clear that the Agency did not consider this an open

issue. In its November 9, 1984, proposal, the Agency

stated that it did not intend to require demonstrations

for prospective stack height increases. See 49 Fed. Reg.

44,883 (J.A. 6). In its final rule, the Agency altered

its position and imposed a demonstration requirement for

all stacks seeking to raise existing stack height after

October 11, 1983. NRDC submitted comments (J.A. 851)

arguing that the regulations should not permit the grand-

fathering of pre-1979 stack height increases. As the

Sierra Club opinion on the issue of grandfathering

sources to 2.5H was considered to have related to all

sources built before 1979, the Agency did not distinguish

between original and increased stacks in its treatment of

the reliance question in the preamble to the fina! rule:

The EPA intends to “grandfather” any source that

relied on the formula in building its stack before the

date of EPA’s 1979 proposal from the effect of this

discretionary re-examination requirement.

Only in that proposal did EPA, first suggest that

such a discretionary reexamination provision might

be included in the final rule. The retroactivity anal-

ysis set out earlier therefore supports exempting

stacks built in reliance on EPA guidance before that

date from discretionary reexamination. Indeed, a

failure to “grandfather” these sources would lead

to the paradoxical result that a source that had built

a GEP stack under the traditional EPA formula

8a

would have its direct reliance interests protected by

the “grandfather” provision previously upheld by

the court, but could then lose that “grandfathered”

credit through a case-specific demonstration require-

ment showing that the traditional formula was some-

what inaccurate—the very reason behind the change

in the formula properly found non-retroactive by

EPA earlier.

50 Fed. Reg. 27,900 (J.A. 20). This discussion plainly

shows that EPA did not view the grandfathering of all

pre-1979 sources showing reliance to be an open issue.

It was resolved by Sierra Club, and the Agency declined

to go beyond the Court’s instructions.

II. NRDC CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO CHAL-

LENGE PRE-JANUARY 12, 1979, STACK

HEIGHT INCREASES IN THIS CASE.

In Sierra Club v. EPA, this Court upheld EPA’s de-

cision to grandfather pre-January 12, 1979, stacks up to

2.5H. Thus, litigation of this issue, including the per-

missibility of grandfathering stack height increases, was

foreclosed in this case.

In full compliance with the Court’s remand in Sierra

Club v. EPA, EPA formulated a demonstration require-

ment for sources seeking credit for within-formula stack

height increases after October 11, 1983. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 51.1(kk) (2), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,907 (J.A. 27). EPA

aiso reformulated its grandfathering provision for pre-

January 12, 1979, stacks to take actual reliance into

account. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(ii) (2) (i), 50 Fed. Reg.

27,906 (J.A. 26). In all other respects, this regulation

remains unchanged. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 51.1 (ii) (2) (i),

50 Fed. Reg. 27,906 (J.A. 26) with 40 C.F.R. § 51.1

(ii) (2) (i), 47 Fed. Reg. 5868 (J.A. 71).

Nonetheless, in this case, NRDC again challenged

EPA’s decision to grandfather all sources with pre

9a

January 12, 1979, stacks constructed up to 2.5H. See

NRDC br. at 19-35. The Court rejected NRDC’s attempt

to relitigate this issue with respect to pre-January 12,

1979, stacks originally designed to 2.5H:

the environmental petitioners in Sierra Club did not

attack the formula at all and attacked the want of

demonstrations only for stack height increases and

instances where local authorities were concerned

that the formula might overpredict GEP.

Slip op. at 42. Without explanation, however, the Court

did address NRDC’s arguments that the Agency did not

have the authority to grandfather pre-January 12, 1979,

stack height increases from the demonstration require-

ments imposed for prospective stack height increases.

NRDC could and should have made this argument in

Sierra Club v. EPA. Thus, the Court should not have

reached this issue in this case. Nor did the Agency’s

publication of revised stack height regulations reopen

this issue.

NRDC’s challenge to EPA’s decision to grandfather

pre-January 12, 1979, stack height increases up to 2.5H

is in actuality a substantive attack on a decision made

by EPA in the 1982 regulations to grandfather all stacks

in existence as of the date of the 1979 proposal. That

regulatory decision was upheld in the Sierra Club deci-

sion. Thus, any substantive challenge to the 1982 regu-

lation is barred under section 307(b)(1) of the Act,

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1). Section 307(b) (1) of the Clean

Air Act requires that petitions for review of Agency

regulations be filed within sixty days of promulgation.

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1). The failure of an affected en-

tity to file a petition within this time limitation fore-

5In the Sierra Club case NRDC challenged the grandfathering

of all pre-January 12, 1979, sources up to 2.5H. It did not sep-

arately challenge the grandfathering of pre-January 12, 1979,

stack height increases.

10a

closes any subsequent challenge. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1150 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (en banc); Hawaiian Electric Co. v. EPA,

723 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984) ; City of Seabrook

v. United States E.P.A., 659 F.2d 1349, 1870 (5th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 822 (1982). See also Eagle-

Picher Ind., Inc. V. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir.

1985) (interpreting a similar provision of the Compre-

hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-

bility Act of 1980): Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc. Vv. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 666 F.2d 595, 602

(D.C. Cir. 1981) (interpreting a similar provision of

the Hobbs Act).

EPA’s promulgation of revisions to the stack height

regulations in 1985 does not reopen this issue for fur-

ther litigation. See, e.g., State of Ohio v. EPA, No. 86-

1096, Slip op. at 7 (D.C. Cir. February 12, 1988) ; Mon-

tana Vv. Clark, 749 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-

nied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985). In this case, EPA was re-

sponding to a narrow remand from the Court to re-

consider only certain discrete provisions of the 1982 reg-

ulations. While EPA did publish the unchanged portion

of the regulation at issue, 40 C.F.R. 51.1(ii) (2) (i), it

did so only to place in context the new reliance require-

ment added in response to the Court’s remand in the

Sierra Club decision. See J.A. 6, 9. The Agency did

not explain the unchanged language and did not solicit

comment on the issue of whether pre-January 12, 1979,

sources, including sources which increased their stacks,

should be subject to new demonstration requirements.

See State of Ohio v. EPA, Slip op. at 7. Accordingly,

NRDC’s challenge to EPA’s grandfathering provision

for pre-January 12, 1979, stacks is untimely.

To allow NRDC to raise in this case arguments which

should have been made in the Sierra Club litigation flies

in the face of the principle of finality section 307 was

designed to protect. As articulated by this Court in a

similar context,

lla

[t]he 60 day period for seeking judicial review set

forth in the Hobbs Act is jurisdictional in nature,

and may not be enlarged or altered by the courts.

This time limit, like other similar limitations, serves

the important purpose of imparting finality into the

administrative process, thereby conserving adminis-

trative resources and protecting the reliance inter-

ests of regulatees who conform their conduct to the

regulations.

NRDC v. Nuclear Reg. Com’n, 666 F.2d at 602 (foot-

notes omitted).

EPA informed the Court in this litigation that the

grandfathering of pre-January 12, 1979, stack height

increases had been affirmed in Sierra Club v. EPA, and

that subjecting affected sources to the threat of demon-

strations conflicted with the Court’s opinion in that case.

See EPA br. at 34. Moreover, industry intervenors ar-

gued that NRDC’s challenge to grandfathering of pre-

January 12, 1979, stacks was barred by the doctrine of

res judicata. See Intervenors’ Alabama Power Co. et al.

br. at 60.6 In remanding this issue to EPA, however,

the Court addressed neither argument.

NRDC’s failure to challenge EPA’s decision to grand-

father pre-January 12, 1979, stack height increases in

Sierra Club v. EPA forecloses it from challenging that

provision in this case. Accordingly, this Court should

have declined to entertain NRDC’s arguments on the

same grounds as it declined to revisit the issue of grand-

fathering of pre-January 12, 1979, stacks originally de-

signed to 2.5H. See Slip op. at 42.

6 NRDC made no real effort to respond to these arguments in

its Reply Brief. Certainly, it proffered no explanation of why

it could not have raised the issue of pre-January 12, 1979, stack

height increases in the Sierra Club v. EPA litigation. See NRDC

Reply br. at 16,

12a

III. THE COURT’S REMAND OF PRE-JANUARY

12, 1979, WITHIN-FORMULA STACK HEIGHT

INCREASES HAS SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS

FOR THE AGENCY.

Pursuant to this Court’s decision on January 22, 1988,

EPA must reconsider its decision to grandfather all pre-

October 1, 1983, stack height increases, including all pre-

January 12, 1979, stack height increases which would

otherwise be subject to the grandfathering provision up-

held by this Court in Sierra Club v. EPA. Under the

Court’s decision, EPA must select one of three options:

(1) design a detailed grandfathering scheme which takes

into account the “variations in regulatory history and

degrees of reliance” (Slip op. at 40), (2) validate the

accuracy of the “good engineering practice’ formulae,

or (3) require demonstrations for all stack height in-

creases.

The Court’s decision has serious consequences for the

Agency. First and foremost, it deprives a significant

number of sources of the grandfathering protection con-

ferred in Sierra Club v. EPA. EPA estimates that more

than 150 sources are adversely affected by this provi-

sion. ICF, Inc., Final Analysis of the Proposed Stack

Height Regulations, June 1985, Appendix D, Certified

Index No. IV-A-3. The Agency will be required to de-

vote substantial time and resources to addressing these

sources. At a minimum the Agency will be required to

conduct a comprehensive review of the circumstances sur-

rounding all pre-January 12, 1979, stack height increases,

in order to formulate a detailed grandfathering provi-

sion complying with the Court’s directive. Even more

onerous is a requirement that all affected sources conduct

fluid modeling demonstrations in order to retain the bene-

fit of stack height credit previously awarded. As ex-

plained by the Agency in its initial brief, EPA is aware

of fewer than ten fluid modeling demonstration centers

13a

throughout the country. See EPA br. at 21-22. See also

49 Fed. Reg. 44,883 (J.A. 6). Not only would a blanket

demonstration requirement be cumbersome administra-

tively but it would be expensive and burdensome for the

affected sources.

EPA’s final option would be to validate the accuracy

of the “good engineering practice” formulae. This is not

a meaningful alternative as it relates to sources which

increased stack height up to 2.5H. EPA concedes that

its refined formula of H + 1.5L is the more accurate

predictor of “good engineering practice” stack height

and it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible for most

pre-January 12, 1979, sources to demonstrate that 2.5H

is the appropriate measure. This difficulty is precisely

why EPA adopted, and the Court affirmed, a grand-

fathering provision protecting sources which constructed

stacks up to 2.5H prior to January 12, 1979, from ap-

plication of the refined formula.

l4a

CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, EPA requests this Court to grant

its petition for rehearing on the issue cf whether pre-

January 12, 1979, stack height increases may be shel-

tered from the demonstration requirements.

Respectfully submitted,

ROGER J. MARZULLA

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Land and Natural Resources Division

/s/ Lisa F. Ryan

LIsA F. RYAN, Attorney

U.S. Depatrment of Justice

P.O. Box 23986

Washington, D.C. 20026-3986

Of Counsel: PATRICIA EMBREY, Attorney

GERALD H. YAMADA U.S. Environmental Protection

Deputy General Counsel Agency

401 M Street, S.W.

ALAN W. ECKERT Washington, D.C. 20460

Associate General Counsel

CHARLES S. CARTER

Assistant General Counsel

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

401 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

Attorneys for Respondents

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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