Petition for Writ of Certiorari — City of New Haven v. Marsh

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FILED

JUL 5S 1988

YOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

CLERK

8-18

No. 88-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

City OF NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF

THE ARMY, et al.

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

NEIL T. PROTO

Counsel of Record

KELLEY DRYE & WARREN

Suite 600

1330 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-8333

Special Counsel

City of New Haven, CT

BRIAN MURPHY

Corporation Counsel

City of New Haven

770 Chapel Street

New Haven, CT 06510

(203) 787-8232

Toes eeteaeencaee aeeneememnenehedemeaneenteempemnttantaiaine emameemieammen aemneneataeme ene

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This suit for declaratory and

injunctive relief was brought by respon-

Gent, Mall Properties, Inc., against re-

spondents, Secretary of the Army and of-

ficials of the United States Army Corps

of Engineers, to challenge the denial of

a permit to fill waters of the United

States, in order to construct a regional

shopping mall, under section 404 of the

Clean Water Act, section 10 of the Rivers

and Harbors Act and section 102(2)(C) of

the National Environmental Policy Act.

Following two years of review, the Dis-

trict Court granted summary judgment for

respondent, Mall Properties, Inc., on the

merits, vacated the Corps’ denial deci-

sion as being contrary to law, enjoined

the Corps on remand from engaging in

=e oe

previously accepted, long-standing regu-

latory practice (the consideration of

social and economic, as well as environ-

mental effects of the project) and did

not retain jurisdiction. Petitioner,

City of New Haven, which had successfully

sought permit denial before the Corps and

was granted intervention under Rule 24(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

by the District Court, appealed. The

First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed

the appeal because the District Court

remand order was not a final judgment.

The Court of Appeals further held that

New Haven could not appeal because the

respondent, Secretary of the neue. chose

not to appeal.

The questions presented are:

i. Whether, under the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act and 28 U.S.C.

» Sw

§ 1291, a District Court decision grant-

ing summary judgment on the merits, va-

cating an agency decision based on a new

legal standard and enjoining previously

accepted, long-standing federal agency

practice on remand is not a “final deci-

sion” because the District Court did not

yet grant the respondent, Mall Proper-

ties, Inc., ultimately what it wanted

(i.e., a fill permit to construct a re-

gional shopping mall).

Y + Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1291

forbids a successful party before a fed-

eral agency and one granted intervention

under Rule 24(a) of the Federai a of

Civil Procedure, from appealing an ad-

verse District Court decision because the

federal agency chooses not to appeal.

- iii -

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The petitioner is the City of

New Haven, Connecticut. The respondents

are John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the

Army, Lt. General E. R. Heiberg, Chief of

the United States Army Corps of Engi-

neers, Col. Thomas A. Rhen, Division En-

gineer, New England Division and the

United States Army Corps of Engineers,

Department of the Army. The respondents

also include Mall Properties, Inc., a

corporation organized under the laws of

the State of New York that maintains its

principal office in the City and County

of New York.

- iv -

OPINIONS BELOW * . . - . . . . . . . 2

JURISDICTION 7 . . . . . 7 . . . . . 2

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED . 3

S TATEMENT . . . . . . . o . . * . 7. . 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION. . 23

CONCLUSION ...«+«-e-seee2e 06 «© « 98

ADDENDUM . . . . . o . . . . . . * . 1 a

(Separate Volume)

AeeemGsSe Aes st tc tb se ersten es

Repeeeee Bs «st se te te 8k Ce el HO

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Cc

D

AppemGsasa Bcc ec sc eee ew ow 6 OSS

F

Appendix G

H

Appendi7

» 765 F.2d 937

(9th Cir. 1985). . . « « « « 45, 47

, 545 F.2d

363 (3d Cir. 1976) .... +. 22

, 744 F.2d 1424

(10th Cir. 1984) ..... + passim

674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y.

1987), aff'd, Nos. 87-6275,

87-6295, slip op.

(2d Cir. June 8, 1988) ... 42

Bersani v. EPA, Nos. 87-6275,

87-6295, slip op.

(2d Cir. June 8, 1988) ... 46

States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 47

447 U.S. 352 (1980). ... . 48, 49

324 U.S. 229 (1945). . ... 28

467 U.S. 837 (1984). ... . 26, 40,

41, 43

Cohen v. Beneficial

Industrial Loan Corp.,

337 U.S. 541 (1949). ... . 29, 33

- wi -

CASES - Continued PAGE

» 521 F.2d

661 (9th Cir. 1975). ... . 46

Dickinson v. Petroleum

Conversion Corp.,

Bae ee ee eens « « co co 84, 36

Jacquelin, 417 U.S.

BSG €2974) «ec ec ec eo eo oc eo PRRSIS

Faulkner Hospital Corp.

vy. Schweicker, 537

F. Supp. 1058 (D. Mass.

1982), aff'd, 702

F.2d 22 (lst Cir. 1983)... 17

vy. Schweicker, 702

Gillespie v. United

States Stee] Corp.,

379 U.S. 148 (1964). as.

vy. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 1035 (1984) .... 45, 47

Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561

(D. Mass. 1987), aff'd,

841 F.2d 440 (lst Cir.

1988), petition for re-

hearing denied, No.

87-1827, slip op.

(lst Cir. April 7, 1988) . . passim

- vii -

CASES - Continued PAGE

Ry., 146 U.S. 536 (1892) . . 23, 34

Metropolitan Edison Co.

vy. People Against

Nuclear Energy (PANE),

460 U.S. 766 (1983). ... . passim

Morton v. Ruiz,

ae Bele Gee CRORE). « 2 « 6 43

NL Industries, Inc. v.

Secretary of Interior, 777

F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1985) .. 49

Olmsted Citizens For a

Better Community v.

United States, 793

F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1986) .. 44

, 592 F. Supp.

698 (D. Haw. 1983) ....., 45

Pacific Northwest Bell]

633 F. Supp. 725

(W.D. Wash. 1986). ..... 45

5973 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1978). 47

Air Force, 457 F.2d

ae Gee Gee Beeans «© « « « BA, 39

Rochester v. United States

Postal Service, 541 F.2d

es t >. eee ”

- viii -

CASES - Continued PAGE

vy. Watt, 713 F.2d 525

(9th Cir. 1983). ...... 49

Transportation-Communication

Division v. St. Louis-San

, 419 F.2d 933

Francisco Rw,

(8th Cir. 1969), cert.

denied, 400 U.S. 818 (1970). 30

380 U.S. 1 (1965). ..... 42

Laboratories, 636 F.2d 876

(lst Cir.), cert. denied,

663, Gy BOR Geeeae 2 6 et le 22

j , 642

F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980) . 49, 51

289 U.S. 352 (1933). .... 41

Zabel _v, Tabb, 430 F.2d 199

(5th Cir. 1970), cert.

denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). 41

STATUTES

Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). . 3, 18,

23, 24

ee eee eS eee

28 U.S.C. § 1291. ....... passim

- iz -

STATUTES -- Conti i

Clean Water Act,

$3 0.8.C. § i944 .

Rivers and Harbors Appropria-

tion Act of 1899,

33 U.S.C. § 403.

National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969,

42 U.S.C. § 4321 .

42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). .

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)

REGULATIONS

Public Interest Review Regula-

tion of the United States

Army Corps of Engineers,

33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)

33 C.F.R. § 320.4(q)

Regulations of the Council

Environmental Quality,

on

40 C.F.R. §

40 C.F.R. §

40 C.F.R. §

40 C.F.R. §

40 C.F.R. §

MISCELLANEOUS

1502.16.

1508.7

1508.8(a).

1508.8(b).

1508.14.

Connecticut Bluebook (1987 ed).

Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a).

12,

14,

14

26

48,

MISCELLANEOUS - Continued

Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54 ...-+.« -

Final Environmental Impact

Statement, § § IV-10, IV-2l,

IV-22, IV-29, IV-31-34

- Zi -

PAGE

32

6-7

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

NO.

CITY OF NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT,

PETITIONER,

Vv.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF

THE ARMY, ET AL.

RESPONDENTS.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

The City of New Haven, Connecti-

cut respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit in, this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Ap-

peals (App. p)+/

is reported at 84l

F.2d 440 (lst Cir. 1988). The denial of

the petition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing en banc (App. A) is unre-

ported at this time. No. 87-1827, slip

op. (lst Cir. April 7, 1988). The memo-

randum and order of the District Court

(App. D) is reported at 672 F. Supp. 561

(D. Mass. 1987).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of

Appeals (App. B) iis eaasell on March ll,

1988. The petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing en banc (App. A)

1/ The opinions below and other rele-

vant materials are bound in a sepa-

rate Appendix, hereinafter referred

te as “app: .....<

was denied on April 7, 1988. The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves issues under

28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Add. at 5a)*’; rele-

vant provisions of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Add. at 4a-5a); the

Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403

(Add. at 3a-4a); the National Environmen-

tel Peitey. Act, 42 U.8.6. § § 4321,

4331(b) & 4332(2)(C)(Add. at la-3a); the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A) (Add. at 5a); regulations of

the United States Army Corps of Engi-

neers, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) 5 (q) (Add.

at 6a-8a); regulations of the Council on

2/ The texts of all cited statutes and

regulations are set forth in the

Addendum to this Petition, herein-

after referred to as "Add. at .

2

Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § §

1502.16, 1508.7, 1508.8(a), (b), &

15C .14 (Add. at 8a-lla).

STATEMENT

As This suit for declaratory

and injunctive relief was filed by re-

spondent, Mall Properties, Inc., in the

United States District Court for the Dis-

trict of Massachusetts on October 29,

1985 against the respondent, Secretary of

the Army and various officials of the

United States Army Corps of Engineers

("U.S.. ACOE” or “Corps"), under section

404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33

U.S.C. § 1344, section 10 of the Rivers

and Harbors Act ("RHA"), 33 U.S.C. § 403

and section 102(2)(C) of the National

Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42

U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Mall Properties,

Inc. challenged the final decision of the

eT Re ee ee eT eee eee

New England Division of the U.S. ACOE

denying its application for a permit to

deposit one million cubic yards of fill

onto the floodplains and wetlands of the

Quinnipiac River in North Haven, Connect-

icut in order to construct a 1.2 million

square foot regional shopping mall. The

primary basis for its challenge was that

the U.S. ACOE was without’ statutory

authority to consider, as part of its

permit denial decision, the adverse so-

cial, economic and racial effects of the

proposed mall on the region, particularly

the City of New Haven.

2.a. The City of New Haven is

one of the nation's oldest (founded in

1638) and poorest municipalities (7th in

the United States according to the 1980

census; 23% of its residents are below

the poverty level). It is immediately

adjacent to North Haven and is the larg-

est municipality within the 10-town re-

gion that would be served by the proposed

mall. Moreover, the proposed mall is

less than 8 miles from New Haven's cen-

tral business district, easily accessible

by numerous roadways from various loca-

tions throughout the region (including

New Haven) and situated on the Quinnipiac

River, which flows downstream through New

Haven and into its Harbor. The Quin-

nmipiac River has historically been a

source of serious flooding problems.

b. The proposed North Haven

Mall would generate 55,000 motor vehicle

trips per day, 500 to 3,077 tons of solid

waste per year, and require the filling

of more than 30 acres of wetlands and

open water. Final Environmental Impact

Statement ("EIS") at Iv-10, IV-22,

Pe VR a ee

ee

IV-21. With specific reference to the

City of New Haven, the proposed mall

would result in the estimated loss of 600

jobs, more than one million dollars a

year in tax revenues (1982 dollars), ap-

proximately 20 percent of its’ retail

sales, one or more major department

stores and other ancillary, adverse so-

cial, economic and racial effects. Final

EIS, IV-31-34, IV-29.

3. The City of New Haven

actively opposed the respondents’ appli-

cation before the U.S. ACOE on environ-

mental (ij.e., flooding, wetlands loss),

social and economic grounds, including

the adverse aesthetic and racial strati-

fication impact it will have on_ the

region. New Haven was granted interven-

tion as of right under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 24(a) in the District

Court. App. E. The District Court

The court finds that

the City of New Haven has

met the requirements for

intervention of right. The

City of New Haven seeks to

intervene under Rule 24

primarily to protect the

economic interests the

Corps allegedly relied upon

in denying the permit.

Therefore, unlike the envi-

ronmental groups, the City

of New Haven is directly

interested in the “econom-

ics” question which plain-

tiff has raised by this

action. An adverse ruling

by the court on this issue

would limit the City’s

ability to protect its in-

terests on remand.

Plaintiff [Mall Prop-

erties, Inc.) argues that

the Corps adequately repre-

sents the City's interests

in this action. The City

replies that the government

may not represent its in-

terests adequately, arguing

that the government has a

Guty to protect the public

interest, while the City

seeks to protect its unique

interests. The City has

also outlined the history

of disagreements between

ee

the Corps and the City

which have arisen during

the permit litigation be-

fore the Corps. The court

also notes that the Corps

does not object to the

City's intervention in this

case.

App. E at 90a-92a. The District Court

denied the motion of national and local

(Connecticut and North Haven-based) envi-

ronmental and citizens groups to inter-

vene (id. at 92a), despite the participa-

tion of most such groups in the admin-

istrative proceeding below. No appeal

was taken from the District Court's

ruling.

4. The U.S. ACOE, following

six years of review and the preparation

of an Environmental Impact Statement

("EIS") under the National Environmental

Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)),

denied respondent Mall Properties‘

application in a “proposed Final Order”

of November 15, 1984 (App. F) and a

“Final Order" of August 20, 1985 (App.

H) .=/ The August 1985 denial was based

3/7

In November 1984, the New England

Division Engineer affixed his sig-

nature to a 45-page “Record of

Decision" ("ROD")(App. F) denying

respondents’ application for a fill

permit because of: (i) the “cumula-

tive impact from other past, present

and reasonably foreseeable future

actions affecting wetlands, flood

plains and flooding"; (ii) the “ir-

retrievable loss of 25 acres of wet-

lands"; (iii) “negative impacts on

the quality of life in North Haven";

and (iv) adverse “socio-economic

impacts, in particular, those af-

fecting the City of New Haven." Id.

at 98a. The factual basis for this

last reason for permit denial was,

inter alia, that:

New Haven provides services and

an environment for a community

with a sizeable low to moderate

income population. This popula-

tion is less able to travel to

reach services at other loca-

tions. It is more dependent

upon a vibrant, viable city to

provide services and a healthy,

safe and desirable environment.

FOOTNOTE CONTINUED

a 26-<

|

.

on three grounds: (i) “a net loss in

wetland resources” (App. H at 270a); (ii)

“flooding impacts" (id. at 270a); and

(iii) tDe “socio-economic impacts this

project would have on the City of New

Haven" (id. at 270a).

Before the Corps, and during the

District Court proceeding, the Department

FOOTNOTE 3/7 CONTINUED:

Id. at 98a. This November 1984 ROD

was not made public. A copy was

made available only to the respon-

dent, Mall Properties, Inc. The

fact of its existence was not made

known to New Haven until June 1985.

Neither the November 1984 ROD nor

the August 1985 ROD are designated

as “proposed” or “final” -- termi-

nology used only by the District

Court.

It is New Haven's position, sup-

ported explicitly by the New England

Division Engineer, that the August

1985 ROD is premised expressly on

and can only be understood in refer-

ence to the November 1984 ROD. §¢ee

App. H at 155a.

- ll -«-

of Interior supported the Corps’ concerns

about wetlands. App. H at 132a. Fur-

thermore, the Department of Housing and

Urban Development and the Governor's Of-

fice of Policy and Management supported

the Corps' concerns about adverse social,

economic and racial impacts (id. at 139a)

and the Federal Emergency Management

Agency supported the Corps’ concerns

about flooding (id. at 142a). All such

supporting comments were submitted to the

Corps as part of the EIS process, consid-

ered by it pursuant to NEPA and in accor-

dance with its “Public Interest Review”

regulation (33 C.F.R. § 320.4)(which re-

quires consideration of “economics” and

“the needs and welfare of the people,”

promulgated pursuant to, jnter alia,

NEPA, CWA and the RHA (Add. 6a-8a)), and

- 12 -

identified in its August 1985 ROD. App.

H at 2664.

5.a. The District Court, on

cross-motions for summary judgment filed

by all the parties, vacated the U.S. ACOE

Gecision on September 8, 1987. Mall

Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp.

561 (D. Mass. 1987). App. D. It deter-

mined that the permit denial decision,

based on the Corps’ Public Interest Re-

view regulations (33 C.F.R. § 320.4),

NEPA, the CWA and the RHA, “was not made

in accordance with law" because, inter

alia, “the Corps exceeded its authority

. by basing its denial of the permit on

socio-economic harms [to the region and

the City of New Haven] that are not prox-

imately related to changes in the physi-

cal environment,” caused by the fill.

App. D at 26a (emphasis added)(relying on

se

the “standard” set forth in Metropolitan

Edi C P i Against Nuc]

Energy (PANE), 460 U.S. 766 (1983)).

Contrary to the position of the Petition-

er and the U.S. ACOE that, under the

Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ)

and U.S. ACOE's regulations, such econom-

ic and social impacts must be considered

because they are “reasonably foresee-

able," (40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8(b), 1508.7)

indirect effects of a regional mall on

the region, the District Court stated:

"The record reveals that these impacts

would not result from any effect the mall

would have on the physical environment

generally or wetlands particularly.

Rather, it is the economic competition

for New Haven which would result from the

mere existence of a mall anywhere in

North Haven .. . [even though the] Corps

sa &

—

did find that there was no alternative

Site for the mall in North Haven." App.

D at 36a.2/

Moreover, although Metropolitan

Edison involved only the threshold ques-

tion of whether an EIS was required in

light of alleged psychological harm from

the restart of an already existing facil-

ity (see 460 U.S. at 768), the District

Court here (i) concluded the “proximately

related" standard applied to all NEPA

questions (including, for the first time,

which impacts should be addressed follow-

ing a determination to prepare an EIS for

a new project); and (ii) determined that

the reasoning of “pre-Metropolitan Edison

4/ The District Court incorrectly

stated that “North Haven is a suburb

about 10 miles from New Haven, Con-

necticut.” App. D at 26a-27a. As

stated at the outset, New Haven and

North Haven are adjacent to each

other.

~ 2

NEPA cases," including those from the

5th, 6th, 7th and 2nd Circuits concerning

whether reasonably foreseeable social and

economic impacts had to be considered in

an EIS that was premised on recognized

environmental harm, have been “eliminated

by Metropolitan Edison.” App. D at 70a.

b. The District Court also

stated that it “is elementary .. . that

in our system of government, decisions

concerning which competing constituency's

economic interests ought to be preferred

are traditionally made by democratically

accountable officials,” (App. D at 75a),

such as the Governor of Connecticut but

not the U.S. ACOE; and that, in the

legislative history of the statutes in-

volved here, there “is no suggestion that

~ 2

[the Corps] was perceived by those enact-

ing the relevant statutes to have exper-

tise concerning whether the economic in-

terests of aging cities or their newer

suburbs should as a matter of public pol-

icy be preferred.“ App. D at 75a.2/

Finally, the District Court,

relying on the First Circuit's decision

in Faulkner Hospital Corp, v. Schweicker,

537 F. Supp. at 1071 (D. Mass. 1982),

aff‘d, 702 F.2€ 22 (ist Cir. 1983), va-

cated the U.S. ACOE decision, enjoined it

from any further consideration of the

mall's social, economic or racial impacts

on the region, including New Haven, and

2/ It should be noted that New Haven

and North Haven were founded in the

17th and 18th Centuries, respective-

ly. Connecticut Blue Book (1987

ed.).

i

remanded “for further proceedings consis-

tent with this decision.” App. D at

g4a.9/

The District Court did not

retain jurisdiction. Additionally,

throughout the District Court proceeding,

the Justice Department -- on behalf of

the Corps -- supported the August 1985

permit denial decision. Moreover, no

questions were raised about the adequacy

of the evidence before the District Court

or the need for the Court to postpone its

§8/ In its Complaint, respondent Mall

Properties, Inc., sought a judgment

“directing ACOE to issue Mall Prop-

erties the subject permits...

(Complaint & 3b). At the suggestion

of the District Court, respondent

recognized that such relief was not

available to it, and that, under the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and other juris-

prudential considerations, the ap-

propriate judicial remedy was a re-

mand to the U.S. ACOE for further

proceedings.

“a

decision on the merits of the issues,

pending some further factual development

or the resolution of a legal issue by the

U.S. ACOE.

6.a. The City of New Haven ap-

pealed on September 14, 1987. On Novem-

ber 19, 1987 -- after the expiration of

the appeal period -- the Justice Depart-

ment informed the Court of Appeals, with-

out explanation, that it had determined

not to appeal and that New Haven's appeal

should be dismissed. No reasoning, case

citations, subsequent brief, memoranda or

affidavit was ever filed by the Justice

Department to support its motion, nor did

the Court order it to do so, - despite

Petitioner's formal request. On December

y F 1987, respondent Mall Properties

stated that it was joining the Govern-

ment's motion to dismiss.

b. On March il, 1988, a panel

» 29 <

of the Court of Appeals granted, without

Oral argument, the U.S. ACOE’s motion to

Gismiss, concluding the “remand order” of

the District Court is “not a final judg-

ment" and, therefore, not appealable un-

der 28 U.S.C. § 1291. App. B at 5a.

Focusing on Mall Properties’

ultimate objective, (i.e,., to have the

Corps grant the permit to build a region-

al mall) as being the controlling crite-

rion determining “finality,” the Court of

Appeals concluded that because “the Dis-

trict Court's remand order does not grant

Mall ultimately what Mall wants,” the

“court's order is but one interim step in

the process toward Mall's obtaining its

ultimate goal.” "The litigation,” the

Court stated, “has not ended.” App. B at

8a.

Moreover, although the Court of

Appeals stated that “generally orders

- 20 -

remanding to an administrative agency are

not final, immediately appealable or-

ders,” (id. at 10a)(citing Pauls v. Sec-

retary of Air Force, 457 F.2d 294 (lst

Cir. 1972)), it also characterized other

cases where appeals were allowed as “ex-

ceptions,” to this general rule, such as

United States v. Alcon Laboratories, 636

F.2d 876 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 451

U.S. 1017 (1981). The Court, recognizing

that in one such “exception” -- Bender v.,

Clark, 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1984) --

the government was allowed to appeal from

a substantive decision on the merits that

required a remand, nonetheless concluded

that because the U.S. ACOE did not appeal

here, Bender had no application to New

Haven. App. B at 16a-18a.

The Court of Appeals also con-

cluded that New Haven “has not been fore-

closed from participating in the proceed-

ings on remand" because “[p]resumably, it

a 2

can urge environmental reasons why the

permits should be denied” (id. at 18a),

and, after review by the Corps and a sub-

sequent District Court decision, New

Haven can “appeal to this Court and...

argue that the original permit denial

o WAS proper . -. « «* Id. at 18a.

Thus, “review of the socio-economic issue

the City now wants to present, is not

Genied; it is simply delayed.“ Jd. at

18a-19a.

Finally, the Court concluded

that allowing the appeal “would violate

» efficiency ... .°* Id.- at 20a.

Although stating’ that, “were review

granted now and were we to conclude the

District Court erred, an unnecessary ad-

ministrative proceeding could be averted

(fn. omitted)" (id. at 20a-21a), the

Court found, relying on Bachowski vy.

Usery, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976), that

e 23 «

“wisdom” required that “we focus on sys-

temic, as well as particularistic, im-

pacts.” Id. at 2la-22a.

7. On March 24, 1988, New

Haven filed its Petition for Rehearing

and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,

which was denied by the First Circuit's

Order dated April 7, 1988. App. A.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision of the Court of

Appeals establishes a pernicious, new

rule for determining “finality” in judi-

cial review under the Administrative

Procedure Act ("APA") that renders mean-

ingless the efforts of this Court, since

at least McGourkey vy. Toledo & O.C, Ry.,

146 U.S. 536, 544-545 (1892), to provide

a modicum of protection to the debilitat-

ing effect of delaying justice to an ad-

versely affected party. As a practical

matter, the Court of Appeals’ opinion

= 96 «

restricts the criteria for determining

“finality” to one factor and to the ef-

fect on one party: whether the applicant

received ultimately what it wanted from a

federal agency (in this case, an econom-

ically valuable fill permit to construct

@ mall), regardless of the fact such

relief is not judicially available. Un-

der such a standard, the Judicial Branch

becomes an advocate for the applicant;

assuring, in the end, that the substan-

tive content or the practical effect of a

District Court decision will not be mean-

ingfully reviewed until the applicant

extracts his alleged economic benefit

from the Executive Branch. This Court,

as argued below, has never articulated

such a fundamentally unfair and constitu-

tionally inappropriate rule. For this

reason alone, review by this Court is

warranted.

« 26 «

Here, however, much more is at

stake. A new, substantive legal standard

concerning NEPA, the CWA and the RHA has

been articulated by the District Court.

It is not trivial. Based on the misap-

plication of this Court's decision in

Metropolitan Edison v, PANE, the District

Court “eliminated” more than a decade of

judicial precedents from the 2nd, 5th,

7th and 6th Circuits (App. D at 70a);

and, it enjoined the U.S. ACOE's long-

standing interpretation of its statutory

obligations to consider the reasonably

foreseeable effects of a project and the

"Public Interest,” including economic

effects and the welfare of the people, in

rendering a permit decision. Jd. at 26a,

77a, 79a, 83a, 84a. It also has raised

troublesome questions about the continued

viability of the Council on Environmental

» 26 «

Quality’s NEPA regulations defining the

“human environment” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.14)

and “indirect” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.7) and

“cumulative” impacts (40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.7). See Add. at lla, 9a. In the

end, the District Court impermissibly

exceeded its role by failing to accord

any deference to the U.S. ACOE's inter-

pretation of the CWA, NEPA and the RHA

and the specific effects of this pro-

ject. Chevron U.S.A... Inc. v. NRDC, 467

U.S. 837 (1984).

The District Court's decision

remains unreviewed by the Court of Ap-

peals, unreviewable by the U.S. ACOE on

remand, and unreviewable by the District

Court under the law of the case doc-

trine. The incongruous effect on New

Haven is deadening. We are estopped from

challenging it below and precluded from

appealing it now. Moreover, as a practi-

cal matter, the decision's reasoning is

—

stifling to any litigant who is dependent

on the federal government -- in civil

rights, equal employment opportunity or a

broad range of environmental cases -- to

vindicate an important public and judi-

Cially cognizable issue directly affect-

ing such a litigant. Based on an inar-

ticulated philosophy of government or the

political discomfort of being on the

“wrong side,“ an agency -- by not appeal-

ing -- can thwart the appeal of a party

that was a successful proponent before

the agency and, in the process, thwart

the agency's statutory mission and, in

this case, the meritorious reasoning of

that agency after six years of study.

The Court of Appeals’ decision

warrants the timely exercise of this

Court's .supervision on the question of

“finality” and the appeal rights of an

intervenor, the petitioner, City of New

Haven.

a: on

l.a. The Court of Appeals‘ anal-

ysis is flawed in its premise. "We do

not view the [District Court] remand or-

der,” the Court of Appeals stated, "as

meeting the traditional definition of a

final judgment, that is, one which ‘ends

the litigation on the merits and leaves

nothing for the court to do but execute

the judgment,’ Catlin _v. United States,

324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).° App. B at

8a. This Court has eschewed such a “tra-

ditional definition” as being either the

beginning or the end of a proper analysis

of whether a decision is “final” under 28

¥.8.C. 9 2293. The correct analytical

premise is that “a decision ‘final’ with-

in the meaning of § 1291 does not neces-

sarily mean the last order possible to be

made in a case.” Gillespie v. United

States Stee] Corp.,, 379 U.S. 148, 152

=

(1964)(emphasis added). And, more re-

cently: "We know, of course, that § 1291

does not limit appellate review to ‘those

final judgments which terminate an action

- « « ,* but rather that the requirement

of finality is to be given a ‘practical

rather than a technical construction.'”"

Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S.

156, 170-71 (1974)(emphasis added) (quot-

ing Cohen v., Beneficial Industrial Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949)).

Having started on a faulty prem-

ise and inappropriate definition, the

Court of Appeals strayed further. Seem-—

ingly seeking a simple factual predicate

to meet the “traditional definition,” it

further defied this Court's teachings and

elevated a “verbal formula” (Eisen v.

Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 170),

from Pauls v. Secretary of Air Force, 457

= 29 «

F.2d at 297-98)("“generally orders remand-

ing to an administrative agency are not

final, immediately appealable orders"),

into a general rule; concluding that the

word “remand” in the formulation of the

District Court's relief is a talisman for

lack of finality. It is not, as _ the

Court of Appeals own case law (Faulkner

Hospital Corp, v. Schweicker, 702 F.2d 22

(lst Cir. 1983), cited by the District

Court, should have informed it.2/ The

1/ The Court of Appeals’ other cita-

tions undermined its own formulation

of an alleged “rule” correlating a

“remand” to a lack of finality. In

each of the cases it cites, a sub-

stantive decision on the merits was

expressly eschewed as premature

(App. B at 8a-lla)(see, e.g., Trans-

tation-c icati Divisi

St. Louis-San Francisco Rw., 419

F.2d 933, 934 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.

denied, 400 U.S. 818 (1970)), where-

in the remands involved were in-

tended to resolve a procedural or

evidentiary deficiency, certainly

FOOTNOTE CONTINUED

». 30 «

result: the Court of Appeals focused not

on the “practical” (Eisen, 417 U.S. at

170), but rather the “technical construc-

tion" of the District Court decision

(i.e., whether it was a “remand") and its

Singular effect on the attainment of the

respondent, Mall Properties, Inc.'s ulti-

mate goal (a regional shopping mall).

The effect is a radical, perni-

cious departure from the practical, cau-

tious approach this Court has admonished

lower courts to undertake in determining

FOOTNOTE 7/ CONTINUED:

not the case here. Moreover, the

Court -of Appeals strained its new

“rule” beyond credulity by claiming

that Bender v, Clark, 744 F.2d 1424

(10th Cir. 1984) -- where the Court

of Appeals concluded an appeal under

28 U.S.C. § 1291 from a decision on

the merits was permissible where the

District Court had ordered a remand

-- is distinguishable from this case

only because it was the government,

not another defendant, that sought

appellate review.

ny

“finality.” In the end, the Court of

Appeals has taken a rule of limited ap-

plication (see n. 7, supra), elevated it

beyond its purpose and established a

general rule of broad application to

every case involving a “verbal formula,”

(Eisen, 417 U.S. at 170), “remand to the

agency,” contrary to its own customary

practice, the rule of the 10th Circuit in

Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d at 1426, and

based, inappropriately, on the economic

agenda of the respondent, Mall Proper-

ties, Inc., vis-a-vis. the Executive

Branch.

b. The Court of Appeals failed

to recognize that the District Court

granted summary judgment, under Rule 54

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

on the substantive merits of the single

issue all the parties agreed was the fun-

damental legal linchpin to the U.S. ACOE

= 39 «

AP ttre. 5 Neate ee et lt Mi Sn

permit denial: whether, under the CWA,

the RHA, NEPA and the U.S. ACOE “Public

Interest Review" regulation, the ACOE had

the authority to consider, jinter alia,

the social and economic effects of the

proposed regional mall on the region,

particularly New Haven. The District

Court by resolving the issue as a matter

of law, vacating the agency's decision

and enjoining the Corps from any further

consideration of such effects, clearly

acted in a manner that “was not ‘tenta-

tive, informal or incomplete’ .. . but

settled conclusively [respondent Mall

pedderkéen: Inc.'s] GROG k=. «a

Eisen, 417 U.S. at 171 (quoting Cohen,

337 U.S. at 546). It was, in the words

of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, a “final decision.”

C. This Court has not explic-

itly articulated a practical construction

(see Eisen, 417 U.S. at 170), concerning

« $3 «

“finality” directly applicable to the

broad range of APA cases wherein an agen-

cy decision is “remanded” for further

consideration. The absence of such es-

sential guidance is, once again, a grow-

ing lack of harmony (see McGourkey v.

Toledo & O.C,. Ry., 146 U.S. 536 (1892)),

among the Circuits and the formation of a

wholly inappropriate and harmful rule

within the First Circuit.

2.a. “(T]he danger of denying

justice [to New Haven] by delay,” (Dick-

inson _v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338

U.S. 507, 511 (1950)), permeates’ the

Court of Appeals decision. More is at

stake, however, than the indefensible

consequence of delaying resolution of the

issue concerning the U.S. ACOE's author-

ity to consider social and economic ef-

fects. New Haven has been denied the

most elementary notions of justice. By

“—

ae Stoel sal

“delaying” New Haven's ability to have

the issue even considered until it

reaches the Court of Appeals again, the

decision places petitioner in a very pre-

dictable “catch-22"; constantly forced to

argue that it has a right to be heard on

a legal issue that neither the U.S. ACOE

nor the District Court have any duty to

consider. Under such circumstances, New

Haven's “standing” under Article III to

even argue economic or social reasons for

permit denial would certainly be chal-

lenged. So too would New Haven's stand-

ing to argue some “physical environmen-

tal” issues as that term is defined by

the District Court. Moreover, it could

be two more rounds of procedural and

jurisdictional (j.e., standing) litiga-

tion before the Court of Appeals reaches

the merits of the social-economic issue,

if ever. The U.S. ACOE could deny the

- 35 -

permit again, on other grounds, and the

District Court could affirm the denial.

This, of course, is not the end

of the serious impediments the Court of

Appeals has created. Its analysis of res

judicata and law of the case provides

doubtful comfort. Dickinson, 338 U.S. at

511. In order to diminish the risk that

the Court of Appeals is incorrect on the

issues of “finality,” res judicata and

law of the case, New Haven is, as a prac-

tical matter, precluded from seeking ju-

Gicial review in any other jurisdiction

except Massachusetts even though the Dis-

trict Court below did not retain juris-

diction and petitioner is entitled to

file any subsequent challenge to the

Corps in Connecticut or the District of

Columbia. “This scenario of ‘possibil-

ities’ is too conjectural to avoid reach-

ing a more just result" (Bender v. Clark,

- 36 -

744 F.2d at 1428), particularly where, as

here, the Court of Appeals acknowledged

that “were review granted now and were we

to conclude the District Court erred, an

unnecessary administrative proceeding

could be averted." App. B at 2la.

b. By making the attainment of

the respondent, Mall Properties, Inc.'s,

economic goal the essential focus of its

analysis, the Court of Appeals made no

meaningful effort to undertake an evalua-

tion of the effect of its decision on the

parties. There is no “inconvenience and

cost{ ]," (Eisen, 417 U.S. at 171), to

Mall Properties, Inc. in the immediate

resolution of the legal issue jt has

wanted resolved since filing its Com-

plaint in October 1985. There is no dis-

cernable harm to the U.S. ACOE; no gov-

ernment project is at stake nor is the

filling of wetlands or the construction

«a 239 «

of suburban shopping malls a statutory or

policy objective. The adverse harm to

New Haven and the the administration of

the CWA, NEPA and the RHA is clear and

immediate.

The City of New Haven has ac-

tively opposed the construction of the

North Haven Mall since 1980. It took the

U.S. ACOE almost six years to render its

ROD, 45 pages in length, denying the per-

mit. The litigation has now consumed

almost three additional years. For a

municipality like New Haven -- the 7th

poorest in the United States, according

to the 1980 census, for cities over

100,000 -- such an effort has placed a

substantial burden on New Haven's tax-

payers. Moreover, the resolution of the

legal issues in this case are of funda-

mental importance to the entire metro-

politan region.

- 38 -

c. The fundamental flaw in the

District Court's reasoning stemmed from

its wholly unwarranted intrusion into

interpreting the statutory obligations of

the U.S. ACOE. Relying on the respon-

dent, Mall Properties, Inc.'s, character-

ization of the permit denial as being

based on economic competition®” rather

than social and economic jimpacts, the

District Court decided that: (i) the

U.S. ACOE is not “democratically account-

able“ (App. D at 75a) and cannot make

such a “competition” judgment ; and,

therefore, (ii) the Court “is called upon

to discern the scope of the authority to

consider economic factors which has been

8/ App. D at 36a. The notion of “eco-

nomic competition” was nowhere ad-

dressed by the U.S. ACOE in its ROD

and clearly not reflected in the

"Conclusions" reached in its Novem-

ber 1984 or August 1985 ROD's.

FOOTNOTE CONTINUED

« 20 «

Gelegated to, and exercised by, the

Corps.” Id. at 42a. Unable to find any

direct legislative history under the RHA,

CWA or NEPA, that “unambiguously ex-

pressed [the] intent of Congress" (Chev-

ron _U.S.A., Inc, v,. NRDC, 467 U.S. at

843), that the U.S. ACOE was precluded

from considering social and economic fac-

tors, the District Court grafted onto

that history this Court's “proximately

related” standard from Metropolitan ‘Edi-

son (id. at 59a-60a), although such a

standard is nowhere referred to or cited

FOOTNOTE 8/ CONTINUED:

Moreover, no federal or state agency

raised any question about "“competi-

tion“; all participants before the

U.S. ACOE -- HUD, the Department of

the Interior/U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service and the Connecticut Office

of Policy and Management -- stated

that adverse environmental, social,

economic or racial impacts warranted

permit denial.

w 46 @

in the legislative history in this con-

text. Moreover, the District Court made

no meaningful effort to assess whether

“the agency's [interpretation] is based

on a permissible construction of the

statute” (Chevron U.S.A... Inc, v. NRDC,

467 U.S. at 843), despite the fact such

social or economic effects have been:

(i) considered by the Corps since 1933

(see United States v, Dern, 289 U.S. 352

(1933); Zabel_v,. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 207

(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.

910 (1971)(The RHA “itself does not put

any restrictions on denial of a permit or

the reasons why the Secretary may refuse

to grant a permit ... .")); (ii) inte-

grated into the Corps‘ Public Interest

Review regulation since 1974 (App. D at

S5la); (iii) required, under the rea-

sonably foreseeable standard, to be

at 43-0

considered by the CEQ regulations~’

and (iv) formally considered, based on

Six years of legal and factual analysis

in this case and, with even greater

breath and detail, in Bersani v. EPA, 674

F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, Nos.

87-6275, 87-6295, slip op. (2d Cir. June

8, 1988)(economic viability and market-

place impacts of proposed mall on the

region considered by the U.S. ACOE and

EPA in CWA permit decision). The Dis-

trict Court, in the end, emerged as the

“democratically accountable” (App. D at

75a) Branch of government, failed to show

any deference to the U.S. ACOE's inter-

pretation of its obligations (Udal]_ v,.

Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Morton v.

Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)), and

2/ In fact, the District Court does not

even cite the CEQ regulations.

i oe io

“substitute[d] its own construction of a

statutory provision for a reasonable in-

terpretation made by the .. . agency.”

Chevron U.S.A.. Inc, v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at

844.

The U.S. ACOE, for an indetermi-

nate period of time, is now free to im-

pose within the First Circuit -- if not

elsewhere -- a new legal standard con-

cerning indirect, induced or cumulative

social and economic impacts that departs

from its previously accepted practice, as

acknowledged by the U.S. ACOE in the Dis-

trict Court. See Federal Defendant's

Reply Memorandum, on Cross-Motions for

Summary Judgment at 9. At stake is the

daily administration of three major

statutes: NEPA, CWA and RHA.

Moreover, no court -- including

the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-

cuit relied upon by the District Court

here (App. D at 68a) -- has applied the

7: oe

“proximately related” standard beyond the

limited, threshold question of whether an

EIS should be prepared. In Qlmsted Cit-

, F Bett C x United

States, 793 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1986), the

Eighth Circuit was confronted with the

threshold question of whether an EIS was

required based not on any allegations of

environmental harm but on the possible

“introduction of weapons and drugs into

the area ... [and] .. . an increase in

esime.«.. . .*: 9@. et 265... 40 concluded

an EIS was not necessary, relying on the

“proximately related" standard of Metro-

politan Edison, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), the

fact that “we are not convinced that Olm-

sted Citizens has identified any signif-

icant impacts on the physical environment

o « «” €Olmated, 792 F.26- et 266) and

that “[e]ven before Metropolitan Edison”

(id.), a similar result would have lied.

Moreover, subsequent court decisions have

a— oe

interpreted Metropolitan Edison to be

limited to the threshold question of

whether NEPA applies in the absence of

recognized environmental impacts. See

Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co, v.

Dole, 633 F. Supp. 725, 727 (W.D. Wash.

1986); Ono v. Harper, 592 F. Supp. 698,

701 (D. Haw. 1983); Animal Lovers Volun-

teer Assoc, v, Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937,

938 (9th Cir. 1985); Glass Packaging In-

Stitute v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091-93

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035

(1984). Here,- it is beyond peradventure

that: (i) Significant physical, environ-

mental impacts were present (i.e., depos-

iting one million cubic yards of fill;

harm to 30 acres of wetlands; flooding

problems, etc.); (ii) the U.S. ACOE pre-

pared a multi-volume EIS -- a legal and

factual determination not challenged be-

low; (iii) mumerous federal and state

agencies substantiated the environmental,

“ae

social and economic impacts of the pro-

ject; and (iv) the demonstrable, physi-

cal, economic and social impacts on the

region, including New Haven, was thor-

oughly documented and found by the U.S.

ACOE in its EIS and ROD‘'s. Under such

circumstances, the District Court deci-

sion -- by extending the “proximately

related" standard of Metropolitan Edison

and precluding consideration of the re-

gional mall's social and economic effects

on the region -- is directly in conflict

with those of at least the 2nd and 9th

Circuits (Rochester v. United States Pos-

tal Service, 541 F.2d 967, 973 (2d Cir.

1976); Bersani v. EPA, Nos. 87-6275,

87-6295, slip op. (2d Cir. June 8, 1988);

Davis _v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676-77

(9th Cir. 1975)); the CEQ regulations

requiring consideration of “reasonably

foreseeable" effects (including social

and economic effects that are “later in

~

time or farther removed in distance,” 40

C.F.R. 1508.8(b)); and the Corps’ own

Public Interest Review regulation; and,

without reason and contrary to sound ju-

Gicial administration, the limited hold-

ings of the 9th (Animal Lovers Volunteer

Assoc. v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d at 938-39)

and D.C. Circuits (Glass Packaging Insti-

tute v. Regan, 737 F.2d at 1091).

Certainly, the “issue is a seri-

ous and unsettled one ....” Bender v.

Clark, 744 F.2d at 1428. At stake is the

uncertainty in outcome of such an impor-

tant matter and the rights of numerous

permit applicants, the U.S. ACOE and the

public (Paluso v. Mathews, 573 F.2d 4, 8

(10th Cir. 1978)), as well as the fate of

thousands of acres of wetlands within New

England, if not elsewhere; all placed at

risk without appellate review. “The pub-

lic interest .. . would lose by such a

procedure.” Brown Shoe Co, v. United

—

States, 370 U.S. 294, 309 (1962).

3. The Court of Appeals deter-

mination that the Government enjoys some

special status vis-a-vis intervenors with

respect to appellate rights (App. B at

14a-15a) conflicts directly with Bryant

vy. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-68 (1980),

the protection afforded by Rule 24(a) of

the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and

the precedents of at least the 9th and

D.C. Circuits. If not corrected, its

consequences will be insidious; lurking,

perhaps inconspicuously for now, with

grave effect on those who, in the context

of litigation, are dependent on the gov-

ernment to vindicate individual rights or

seek judicial redress on matters of pub-

asic importance.

The City of New Haven was

granted the right to intervene under Fed-

eral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). App.

E at 86a. As an intervenor, New

=e

Haven has the right to appeal an adverse

ruling regardless of whether the govern-

ment seeks such an appeal. Bryant v.,

Yellen, 447 U.S. at 366-68; NL Indus-

tries, Inc, v. Secretary of Interior, 777

F.2d 433, 436 (9th Cir. 1985); United

States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1293-94

(3.6. Gaets«s. . 29863 It would defeat the

entire purpose of Rule 24(a) if the find-

ing of “inadequate representation” had

application only in the District Court.

The Government could, with impunity and

without explanation, simply defeat the

interests of the intervenor by acquiesc-

ing in the views of its adversary through

“settlement,” whether expressed in formal

terms or undertaken with the quiet pas-

sage of the time beyond which it must

appeal. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc, v.

Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983).

The insidious nature of the

Court of Appeals determination also is

— =

founded in the absence of an explanation

for the Government's conduct. As this

Court is aware, the Record of Decision

was issued by the New England Division of

the U.S. ACOE; defending that decision in

litigation is not its responsibility.

The Justice Department's determination

not to appeal may have been premised on a

philosophical discomfort with the New

England Division's denial of a permit or

the political discomfort of being on the

“wrong side” in the Court of Appeals. It

also may have simply missed the jurisdic-

tion deadline for filing a notice of ap-

peal. Its motion to dismiss New Haven's

appeal in this case was made without ci-

tations or legal argument. In fact, in

the 5 months the U.S. ACOE's motion was

pending, it was never requested by the

Court of Appeals -- despite our insis-

tence -- to explain either why it was

made or what the effect would be if this

o $0 «

appeal proceeded. Nonetheless, the Court

cf Appeals fashioned a rule denying an

intervenor from appealing based, in part,

on its own assumptions, or those ex-

tracted from other cases, as to the Gov-

ernment‘’s motivation or the effect on New

Haven. In the end, it protected the U.S.

ACOE decision not to appeal, imposed

enormous litigation burdens on New Haven

(let alone on others who actively opposed

the issuance of the permit before the

U.S. ACOE) and radically altered the fac-

tual and legal posture of the case, with-

out any reasoning articulated by the

rule's primary beneficiary, the U.S. ACOE.

In any event, New Haven is en-

titled to “all the prerogatives of a par-

ty litigant" (United States v. AT&T, 642

F.2d at 1294), including the right to

appeal since, as is abundantly obvious

here, New Haven's interests were “not

s =

adequately represented in the decision

[by the U.S. ACOE] not to appeal.” Id.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ade f VA

Neil T. Proto

Kelley Drye & Warren

Suite 600

1330 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-8333

Brian Murphy

Corporation Counsel

City of New Haven

770 Chapel Street

New Haven, CT 06510

(203) 787-8232

July 5, 1988

“—

* oe

2 “eee. .

a

ad

A Na Be

mes

ADDENDUM

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

AND _ REGULATIONS INVOLVED

1. Section 101(b)(5) of the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42

U.S.C. § 4331(b) provides in perti-

nent part:

(b) In order to carry out the

policy set forth in this chapter

(42 U.S.C.S. §§ 4321 et seg.],

it is the continuing responsi-

bility of the Federal Government

to use all practicable means,

consistent with other essential

considerations of national pol-

icy, to improve and coordinate

Federal plans, functions, pro-

grams, and resources to the end

that the Nation may--

* x x

(5) achieve a balance between

population and resource use

which will permit high standards

of living an a wide sharing of

life's amenities;

2. Section 102 of the National Environ-

mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332, provides in pertinent part:

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[Section 102(2)(C)]

The Congress authorizes and di-

rects that, to the fullest ex-

tent possible: (1) the poli-

cies, regulations, and public

laws of the United States shall

be interpreted and administered

in accordance with the policies

set forth in this chapter [42

U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seg.], and (2)

all agencies of the Federal Gov-

ernment shall--

(C) include in every recommen-

dation or report on proposals

for legislation and other major

Federal actions significantly

affecting the quality of the

human environment, a detailed

statement by the responsible

official on--

(i) the environmental impact

of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental

effects which cannot be

avoided should the propos-

al be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to th» pro-

posed action,

(iv) the relationship between

local short-term uses of

man's environment and the

maintenance and enhance-

ment of long-term produc-

tivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irre-

trievable commitments of

resources which would be

involved in the proposed

action should it be imple-

mented.

- 2a -

Prior to making any detailed

statement, the responsible Fed-

eral official shall consult with

and obtain the comments of any

Federal agency which has juris-

diction by law or special exper-

tise with respect to any envi-

ronmental impact involved. Cop-

ies of such statement and the

comments and views of the appro-

priate Federal, State, and local

agencies, which are authorized

to develop and enforce environ-

mental standards, shall be made

available to the President, the

Council on Environmental Quality

and to the public as provided by

section 552 of title 5, United

States Code [5 U.S.C.S. § 552],

and shall accompany the proposal

through the existing agency re-

view processes;

3. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors

Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.

§ 403, provides in pertinent part:

The creation of any obstruction

not affirmatively authorized by

Congress, to the navigable

Capacity of any of the waters of

the United States is hereby pro-

hibited; and it shall not be

lawful to build or commence the

building of any .. . structures

in any .. . navigable river, or

other water of the United

States, outside established har-

bor lines, or where no harbor

- 3a -

lines have been’ established,

except on plans recommended by

the Chief of Engineers and

authorized by the Secretary of

the ALM? «ss

4. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1344, provides in perti-

nent part:

(a) , 3 al

he Discharge _into navigable

Sites. The Secretary may issue

permits, after notice and oppor-

tunity for public hearings for

the discharge of dredged or fill

material into the navigable

waters at specified disposal

Sites. Not later than the fif-

teenth day after the date an

applicant submits all the infor-

maticn required to complete an

application for a permit under

this subsection, the Secretary

shall publish the notice re-

quired by this subsection.

(b) Specification for disposal

Sites. Subject to subsection

(c) of this section, each such

disposal site shall be specified

for each such permit by the Sec-

retary (1) through the applica-

tion of guidelines developed by

the Administrator, in conjunc-

tion with the Secretary, which

guidelines shall be based upon

Criteria comparable to the cri-

teria applicable to the terri-

torial seas, the contiguous

- 4a-

zone, and the ocean under sec-

tion 1343(c) of this title, and

(2) in any case where such

guidelines under clause (1)

alone would prohibit the speci-

fication of a site, through the

application additionally of the

economic impact of the site on

navigation and anchorage.

x x ca

(d) The term “Secretary” as

used in this section means the

Secretary of the Army, acting

through the Chief of Engineers.

5. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) provides in perti-

nent part:

The reviewing court shall --

x w x

(2) hold unlawful and set aside

agency .- action, findings, and

conclusions found to be -

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or other-

wise not in accordance with law;

x x x

(D) without observance of proce-

dure required by law;

6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides:

The courts of appeals

shall have jurisdiction of ap-

peals from all final decisions

of the Gistrict courts ..« .

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The “Public Interest Review" regula-

tion of the Army Corps of Engineers,

33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (a) and (q), pro-

vides:

(a) Public Interest Review.

(1) The decision whether to issue a

permit will be based on an evaluation

of the probable impacts, including

cumulative impacts, of the proposed

activity and its intended use on the

public interest. Evaluation of the

probable impact which the proposed

activity: may have on the public in-

terest requires a careful weighing of

all those factors which become rele-

vant in each particular case. The

benefits which reasonably may be ex-

pected to accrue from the proposal

must be balanced against its reason-

ably foreseeable detriments. The

decision whether to authorize a pro-

posal, and if so, the conditions

under which it will be allowed to

occur, are therefore determined by

the outcome of this general balancing

process. That decision should re-

flect the national concern for both

protection and utilization of impor-

tant resources. All factors which

may be relevant to the proposal must

be considered including the cumula-

tive effects thereof: among those

are conservation, economics, aesthe-

tics, general environmental concerns,

wetlands, historic properties, fish

and wildlife values, flood hazards,

- 6a -

floodplain values, land use, naviga-

tion, shore erosion and accretion,

recreation, water supply and conser-

vation, water quality, energy needs,

safety, food and fiber production,

mineral needs, considerations of

property ownership and, in general,

the needs and welfare of the people.

For activities involving 404 dis-

charges, a permit will be denied if

the discharge that would be author-

ized by such permit would not comply

with the Environmental Protection

Agency's 404(b)(1) guidelines. Sub-

ject to the preceding sentence and

any other applicable guidelines and

criteria (See §§ 320.2 and 320.3), a

permit will be granted unless’ the

district engineer determines that it

would be contrary to the public in-

terest.

(q) Economics. When private

enterprise makes application for

a permit, it will generally be

assumed that appropriate econom-

ic evaluations have been com-

pleted, the proposal is econom-

ically viable, and is needed in

the marketplace. However, the

district engineer in appropriate

cases, may make an independent

review of the need for the pro-

ject from the perspective of the

overall public interest. The

economic benefits of many pro-

jects are important to the local

community and contribute to

needed improvements in the local

economic base, affecting such

factors as employment, tax

- Ja -

revenues, community cohesion,

community services, and property

values. Many projects also con-

tribute to the National Economic

Development (NED) (i.e., the

increase in the net value of the

national output of goods and

services).

The regulations of the Council on

Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R.

§ 1502.16, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7, 40

C.F.R. § 1508.8{(a)(b), and 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.14 provide:

§ 1502.16 Environmental conse-

quences.

This section forms’ the

scientific and analytic basis

for the comparisons under

§ 1502.14.- It shall consolidate

the discussions of those ele-

ments required by sections

102(2)(C)(i), (ii), (iv), and

(v) of NEPA which are within the

scope of the statement and as

much of section 102(2)(C) (iii)

as is necessary to support the

comparisons. The discussion

will include the environmental

impacts of the alternatives in-

cluding the proposed action, any

adverse environmental effects

which cannot be avoided should

the proposal be implemented .

* x x

(1502.16 (cont.))

It shall include discus-

sions of:

(a) Direct effects and

their significance (§ 1508.8).

(b) Indirect effects and

their significance (§ 1508.8).

(c) Possible conflicts

between the proposed action and

the objectives of Federal,

regional, State, and local

land use plans, policies and

controls for the area

concerned. (See § 1506.2(d).)

(d) The environmental ef-

fects of alternatives including

the proposed action. ...

~ 2 *

(g) Urban ES 2

and the design of the built en-

vironment, including the reuse

and conservation potential of

various alternatives and mitiga-

tion measures.

§ 1508.7 Cumulative impact.

“Cumulative impact” is the

impact on the environment which

results from the incremental

impact of the action when added

to other past, present, and rea-

sonably foreseeable future ac-

tions regardless of what agency

(Federal or non-Federal) or per-

son undertakes such other ac-

tions. Cumulative impacts can

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result from individually minor

but collectively Significant

actions taking place over a

period of time.

§ 1508.8 Effects.

“Effects” include:

(a) Direct effects, which

are caused by the action and

occur at the same time and place.

(b) Indirect effects,

which are caused by the action

and are later in time or farther

removed in distance, but are

still reasonably foreseeable.

Indirect effects may include

growth inducing effects and

other effects related to induced

changes in the pattern of land

use, population density or

growth rate, and related effects

on air -.and water and other

natural systems, including eco-

systems.

Effects and impacts as used in

these regulations are synony-

mous. Effects include ecologi-

cal (such as the effects on

natural resources and on the

components, structures, and

functioning of affected ecosys-

tems), aesthetic, historic, cul-

tural, economic, social, or

health, whether direct, indi-

rect, or cumulative. Effects

may also include those resulting

from actions which may have both

- 10a -

beneficial and detrimental ef-

fects, even if on balance the

agency believes that the effect

will be beneficial.

§ 1508.14 Human environment.

“Human environment” shall

be interpreted comprehensively

to include the natural and phys-

ical environment and the rela-

tionship of people with that

environment. (See the defini-

tion of “effects" (§ 1508.8).)

This means that economic or so-

cial effects are not intended by

themselves to require prepara-

tion of an environmental impact

statement. When an environmen-

tal impact statement is prepared

and economic or social and nat-

ural or physical environmental

effects are interrelated, then

the environmental impact state-

ment will discuss all of these

effects on the human environment.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)

provides:

(a) Intervention of Right.

Upon timely application anyone

shall be permitted to intervene

in an action: (1) when a stat-

ute of the United States confers

an unconditional right to inter-

vene; or (2) when the applicant

claims an interest relating to

the property or transaction

- lla -

which is the subject of the ac-

tion and he is so situated that

the disposition of the action

may as a practical matter impair

Or impede his ability to protect

that interest, unless the appli-

cant's interest is adequately

represented by existing parties.

- 12a -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 5,

1988 I caused copies of the attached

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit and the Appendix thereto to

be served via first class mail, postage

prepaid, or by hand delivery (“*"), upon:

*Honorable Charles Fried

Solicitor General of the United States

United States Department of Justice

Room 5143

10th and Constitution Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

Daniel Riesel, Esq.

Sive, Paget and Riesel, P.C.

10th Floor

460 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10022

Alice Richmond, Esq.

Hemenway and Barnes

60 State Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02109

Peter Shelly, Esq.

Conservation Law Foundation

of New England, Inc.

4 Joy Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02116

*Honorable Edwin Meese

Attorney General of the United States

United States Department of Justice

10th and Constitution Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

James Tripp, Esq.

Environmental Defense Fund

257 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10010

Katherine H. Robinson, Esq.

Connecticut Fund for the Environment

32 Grand Street

Hartford, Connecticut 06106

Peter Steenland, Esq.

Appellate Section

Land and Natural Resources Division

Department of Justice

P. O. Box 23795 (L'Enfant Station)

Washington, D.C. 20026

Edward S. Lawson

Westin, Patrick, Willard and Redding

84 State Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02109

Roberta Friedman, Esq.

383 Orange Street

New Haven, Connecticut 06511

«im

Frank Cochran, Esq.

Cochran, Cooper, et al.

P. O. Box 1898

New Haven, Connecticut 06508

July 5, 1988 hy Fi PAG

Neil T. Proto

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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