Reply Brief — Alabama Power Co. v. Thomas
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Supreme Court, US,
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No. 87-2068 ep 27 1988
eH SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK
IN THE maa
Suprene Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
ALABAMA POWER Co., et al., UNITED MINE WORKERS
OF AMERICA, AND ORMET CORPORATION,
Pe titione rs,
V.
LEE M. THOMAS, et al
Respond nts.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeais
for the District of Columbia Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
ALABAMA POWER (CO., EZ AL.,
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
AND ORMET CORPORATION
DONALD C. WINSON GEORGE C. FREEMAN, JR.
RICHARD S. WIEDMAN HENRY V. NICKEL
ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN (Counsel of Record
& MELLOTT F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
42nd Floor, 600 Grant Street MEL S. SCHULZE
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 HUNTON & WILLIAMS
(412) 566-6000 2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Suite 9000
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 955-1500
Counsel for Petitioners
Alabama Power Co., et al.
Counsel for Petitioner
Ormet Corporation
MICHAEL H. HOLLAND
900 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 842-7330
Counsel for Petitioner United
September 27, 1988 Mine Workers of America
WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-O096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO
RESOLVE A CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS
AND TO SETTLE THE PROPER SCOPE OF
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT IN §4 OF
i adbitiiisiirctia dah tnceaedbintbseltnckennns
II. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO
SETTLE THAT THE TECHNICAL BASIS
FOR A RULE CONTAINING AN EXCEP-
TIONS PROCEDURE MUST BE SUPPORTED
BY AN ADEQUATE RECORD ..........00002.02........
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10
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 CUBBE) ai niicsnsccncasaceincionssansdes 9
Chocolate Manifacturers Association of United
States v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985)... 5, 6
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d
525 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835
CL.) ) nero ee hesro fo es 3
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d
1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
480 U.S. 112 (A080) an..cccssdieeeeeeeeeee 7
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980)... 6
Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) .....................0---0+. i)
National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C.
Cir, ROBO) no cncicciccconcassuccnpanccteubencaeecneusel een 9
NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224 (D. C. Cir.
1OBSB) ........ .-.-.csnsss-scdeecsseeneneneeesentniea a aaERED 2, 4, 6
STATUTES:
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq. (1982)
$ 110, 42 U.S.C. § TRO GAD ns casio ticccterees 3
$ 111, 42 UBC. § FORE Sie cictieceieeee 3
§ 128, 42 U.S.C. § TAGS CEGBE) an cinccecssccccsssccceces 4,9
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551, et seq., 701, et seq. (1982)
$ 4,5 U.S.C. § GOS (Ra nk ce 1,2
$ 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § TOG (A962) unwise 9
FEDERAL REGISTER:
49 Fed. Reg. 44883 (1984) ........................... scnfaadeceliedes 9
MISCELLANEOUS:
Transcript of Public Hearing on EPA’s Proposed
Stack Height Regulations (January 8, 1985)... 4
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
No. 87-2068
ALABAMA POWER Co., et al., UNITED MINE WORKERS
OF AMERICA, AND ORMET CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
Vv.
LEE M. THOMAS, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
ALABAMA POWER CO., ET AL.,
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
AND ORMET CORPORATION
ARGUMENT
In this case, Petitioners seek review of the lower
court’s pronouncements on two fundamental principles of
administrative law. The first concerns whether the notice
requirement under $4 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982), is satisfied, as to
any potentially affected member of the public, when a
final rule is an outgrowth of rulemaking comments urg-
ing an approach which was not even suggested in the
rulemaking proposal. The second addresses the need
under the APA for an administrative record in support
of a regulation containing an “exceptions” procedure.
As to the first issue, the Federal Respondents argue
that certiorari should not be granted because, in their
2
view, “Petitioners received the notice to which APA Sec-
tion 4 entitled them.”' As to the second issue, Federal
Respondents argue that promulgation of a rule that con-
tains an exceptions procedure allows reallocation of the
burden of proof from the agency (to support its rule)
to regulated parties (to show that a rule is not sup-
ported), and therefore that no technical record is needed
to support such a regulation.* For the reasons discussed
below, Federal Respondents’ arguments in opposition to
certiorari are without merit.
I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO RE-
SOLVE A CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS AND TO
SETTLE THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENT IN §4 OF THE APA.
Federal Respondents argue in opposition to certiorari
that the Agency’s rulemaking proposal “identified the
NSPS limit as one of three emission rates that . . . would
be applied to various affected sources,” and that the
Agency “eliminat[ed] the two alternatives to the NSPS
limit” in response to rulemaking comments.* Federal Re-
spondents contend on this basis that the final rule was a
“logical outgrowth” of the rulemaking proposal.
That Federal Respondents persist in arguing that the
proposal itself gave notice of three alternative rates is
surprising since, in response to the identical assertion
below, the D.C. Circuit found that “{nJothing in the
[proposal] . . . suggested that EPA intended to adopt
one of the three rates for universal use.”* Rather, the
1 Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 16 (here-
inafter “Fed. Resp. Brief -——”’).
2 Id. at 19-20.
3 Id. at 17-18.
4NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (em-
phasis added), Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 3la (here-
inafter “App. ——~’’).
3
court found that EPA’s suggestion that it had proposed
three alternative emission rates, any one of which could
have been adopted separately and imposed on all sources
(including sources to which that rate would otherwise be
inapplicable) , was “quite disingenuous.” °
The preamble to the proposed rules merely identified
the regulatory programs under which emission rates were
established for existing and new sources,® and simply
stated that EPA guidance would provide that the “ap-
plicable” emission rate would be used in fluid modeling—
guidance thac was consistent with past practice and that
reflected pre-existing legal requirements.’ By imposing
NSPS on existing sources to which that rate is inap-
plicable, therefore, the final rule contains a requirement
that is exactly opposite to the “‘applicable’”’ emission rate
approach described in the preamble to the proposal.’ In
5 838 F.2d at 1242, App. 31a.
6 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8 (hereinafter “Pet. ——’”’).
New sources are subject to NSPS under § 111 of the Act, and
existing sources are subject to state implementation plan (SIP)
limits established under § 110 of the Act.
7 See Pet. 7-8. There was no need to propose a rule requiring that
a source use its “applicable” emission rate, because that “applicable”
rate already applied without a new rule stating that fact. Thus,
new sources would use an NSPS limit and existing sources would
use a SIP limit in fluid modeling.
8 Federal Respondents’ attempt to imply that this case is anal-
ogous to Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525,
533 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982), is without
merit. Fed. Resp. Brief 16. In that case, unlike here, the agency
(the NRC) did propose distinct, mutually exclusive rules, only one
of which was promulgated. The court therefore held that the NRC’s
proposal had provided adequate notice of the final rule under the
APA.
More importantly, Connecticut Light and Power did not address
the central issue presented here—whether rulemaking comments
can provide the notice required under the APA. Significantly, EPA
highlighted that case before the D.C. Circuit in this case, see Brief
for Respondents at 39 n.25 (February 17, 1987), but the court did
not rely upon or even cite that case. In short, that case has no
bearing on this case.
4
these circumstances, Federal Respondents’ attempt to
characterize the final rule as a “logical outgrowth” of the
proposal is simply without merit.’
Indeed, the first time that imposition of an inappli-
cable NSPS rate was even suggested to the Agency oc-
curred over seven years after passage of § 123 at a pub-
lic hearing held after the 1984 proposal was published.”
In other words, the imposition of an inapplicable NSPS
on existing sources was not an issue that was even pre-
sented to the Agency until after development of its pro-
posed rules. Understandably then, this issue was not
raised in the notice of proposed rulemaking.
Federal Respondents also suggest, as the lower court
held, that the filing of two (out of over four hundred)
rulemaking comments gave potentially regulated parties
an opportunity to oppose the NSPS presumption rule."
* For these reasons, while the D.C. Circuit continues to pay lip
service to the phrase “logical outgrowth of the proposal” in its
opinions and, in fact, used that phrase in its opinion in this case,
838 F.2d at 1242, App. 32a, even a cursory analysis of the opinion
reveals that the court’s holding that notice was adequate was based
not on such a finding (which would have been inconsistent with the
finding that EPA’s argument was “quite disingenuous”), but rather
on the fact that rulemaking comments had urged a rule similar to
the one promulgated.
See Transcript of Public Hearing on EPA’s Proposed Stack
Height Regulations at 171, 191 (January 8, 1985) (statement of
NRDC).
1! The more detailed of these comments in fact suggested a much
broader interpretation of the Act that could have required applica-
tion of NSPS by all sources subject to § 123, even those that did
not seek above-GEP formula credit. EPA does not dispute that this
much broader approach was never proposed. The court found, how-
ever, that “[t]hough the target raised by this contention was
broader than NSPS, it ... gave industry critics an opportunity . . .
to attack any form of control-first .... [T]jhere was a clearly
foreseeable risk that EPA would reject the environmentalists’ read-
ing of the law but proceed to adopt control-first as a matter of
choice.” 838 F.2d at 1243, App. 33a (emphasis in original). For
5
The D.C. Circuit’s use of isolated rulemaking comments
as the basis for application of the “logical outgrowth”
doctrine in this and other cases™ represents a radical
extension of that doctrine—an extension that is incon-
sistent with the law in other circuits.
Federal Respondents are simply wrong to suggest that
the Fourth Cireuit’s decision in Chocolate Manufacturers
Association of United States v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098
(4th Cir. 1985), does not conflict with the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in this case. In Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n, the pro-
posal included a pre-existing rule allowing use of flavored
milk as part of school lunches, and the Department of
Agriculture did not indicate that any consideration was
being given to changing the rule. Nonetheless, in re-
sponse to comments, the Department eliminated the rule
allowing flavored milk. The Fourth Circuit held that
rulemaking comments could not cure the notice defect in
the proposal.
In this case, the court recognized that the proposal did
not even suggest the “universal use” of NSPS, whereas
the final rule required it. Nevertheless, the court, relying
on the fact that two rulemaking comments suggested a
rule different from the approach described in the pro-
posal, held that, in light of these comments, all potential
rulemaking participants (even those that, like Petitioners
United Mine Workers of America (UMW) and Ormet,
had not participated in the rulemaking) were not entitled
to additional notice under the APA."
other members of the public that were not participating in the
rulemaking because the proposal did not give notice of an NSPS
requirement for fluid modeling ( as in the case of Petitioners United
Mine Workers of America and Ormet), however, these rulemaking
comments did not even form a basis for predicting what EPA might
do in a final rule.
12 See Pet. 18-20.
™ See id. 11-12.
6
The instant case is therefore in direct conflict with
Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n—in both cases, neither “the his-
tory of the issue in the agency nor the preamble discus-
sion furnished fair warning that the position eventually
adopted in the final rule would even be considered, .. .
and, indeed the final rule was exactly opposite of the
original proposal . . . .”"* Federal Respondents com-
pletely ignore the holding in Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n that
is significant in this case—that notice must come from a
rulemaking proposal published by the agency, not from
comments filed by rulemaking participants.
Finally, Federally Respondents ignore the broad policy
implications of the D.C. Circuit’s decision.” As de-
scribed in the Petition, it is inconsistent with basic no-
tions of due process to allow a federal agency to lull
potentially interested parties into not filing comments
and then later, without further public notice and com-
ment, adopt a final rule reversing the course described in
its proposal."*
As Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed, the issue of
what notice is adequate when a final rule differs from
a proposal is “a recurring one that will ultimately re-
quire interpretation of ... [the APA] by this Court.” "’
Fed. Resp. Brief 18-19.
15 See Pet. 20-23.
16 Federal Respondents suggest half-heartedly that they did give
certain rulemaking participants notice of the final rule two weeks
before it was promulgated. Fed. Resp. Brief 18 n.11; see NRDC
v. Thomas, 838 F.2d at 1244, App. 33a. Such belated notice is
clearly inadequate. See Pet. 10 n.24. Moreover, that notice was
not extended to all rulemaking participants or to other persons, such
as Petitioner UMW, who had not participated in the rulemaking
given the wording of the proposal.
iT Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096, 1098 (1980) (dissent-
ing from decision not to grant certiorari).
7
Given the confusion in the circuits as to the proper scope
of the APA notice requirement and the broad policy im-
plications of this issue for the proper functioning of the
administrative process, the time for review by this Court
has come.
Il. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO SETTLE
THAT THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR A RULE
CONTAINING AN EXCEPTIONS PROCEDURE
MUST BE SUPPORTED BY AN ADEQUATE REC-
ORD.
In opposing certiorari, Federal Respondents assert that
Petitioners are wrong in suggesting “that the EPA made
a factual finding that most sources can meet the
NSPS.” ** Rather, according to Federal Respondents,
“EPA merely ‘ma[de] the presumption that this limit
can be met by all sources.’”" Since the Agency pre-
sumed that the key fact underlying the final rule was
true (i.e, that sources subject to the rule could meet
NSPS levels of control), Federal Respondents contend
that “there was no factual finding that required record
support.” *° Thus, Federal Respondents’ contention is
that a rule containing an “exceptions” procedure can be
based on “presumed” facts that have no demonstrated
relationship to reality.
In establishing a legislative rule, an agency is not per-
mitted under the APA to “presume” the crucial fact un-
derlying that rule. Rather, an agency is required to find
that fact (in this case, that sources subject to the rule
could typically meet NSPS) and support it in the record.”
8 Fed. Resp. Brief 19.
19 Jd.
20 Id.
21 See Pet. 24-25 and note 64.
8
Addition of an “exceptions” procedure to a rule is no
basis for ignoring this principle.
Federal Respondents are wrong to argue that the D.C.
Circuit’s decision is not in conflict with the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision in E.J. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train.** In that case, the Fourth Circuit clearly applied
the long-standing administrative law principle that
“t]he grounds upon which the agency acted must be
clearly disclosed in, and sustained by, the record.” ** The
significance of the Fourth Circuit’s decision is that this
principle was applied even though the regulations (estab-
lishing effluent limitations) contained an “exceptions”
procedure.** By contrast, in this case, the D.C. Circuit
found no need for a record in support of an analogous
rule establishing an applicable emission rate that is sub-
ject to an “exceptions” procedure.
Federal Respondents are also wrong to suggest that
the need for record support for a rule may be disregarded
where there is a general congressional policy suggesting
caution in case-by-case implementation of the rule.” It
is true under administrative law principles that a regu-
lated party seeking an administrative order has the bur-
den of proof in demonstrating that the regulatory re-
quirements necessary to obtain that order are met. Under
the APA, however, the proponent of a rule (the agency)
22541 F.2d 1018, 1028 (4th Cir. 1976), aff’d in part, rev'd in part,
430 U.S. 112 (1977).
23 Jd. (emphasis added).
24 Without knowing the facts underlying a rule containing an ex-
ceptions procedures, there is no basis for knowing which facts would
justify an exception to the rule. In du Pont, an exception to the
effluent limits in the rules could be granted on a showing of the
presence of “fundamentally different” factors. The “exception”
provision in the rules referenced a detailed technical support docu-
ment that would disclose whether the facts in an individual case
were different from those considered by the agency in developing
the generic effluent limit.
25 See Fed. Resp. Brief 19.
9
has burden of proof in rulemaking proceedings.*° This
burden does not shift simply because the regulation con-
tains an “exceptions” procedure.”
Finally, Federal Respondents’ view of the law would
result in a fundamental reallocation of regulatory bur-
dens among agencies and private parties, inconsistent
with the APA. Under this view, an agency could promul-
gate regulations based upon wholly unsupported “pre-
sumptions” of facts so long as an “exceptions” procedure
or “safety valve” was included in the rule.
Under this principle, EPA could adopt control tech-
nology rules under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
and similar statutes by presuming, without any technical
support, that certain control technologies are economically
and technologically feasible.** The Secretary of Labor,
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, could
adopt workplace standards by presuming, without record
support, that the standards are economically and techno-
logically feasible.*’ In other words, under this principle,
26 See Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum Institute,
448 U.S. 607, 653 (1980); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (providing for
review of agency decisions based on the agency’s record).
27 In adopting another rule that also applies to parties seeking
above-formula stack height credit, therefore, EPA did assemble a
technical record to support the rule, rather than adopt a stringent
rule, without technical support, that a regulated party could attempt
to rebut. See 49 Fed. Reg. 44883 (1984), App. 157a (the “nearby
terrain” rule). Thus, EPA did not allege that § 123 congressional
policy allowed the Agency to dispense with normal administrative
law record requirements, except with respect to a rule that it
developed at the very end of a lengthy rulemaking process without
notice and comment.
28Cf. National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
229 Cf. American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490 (1981).
10
as long as a rule contains an “exceptions” procedure, fed-
eral rulemakers are free to bypass the facts by presuming
them. The opportunities for such “streamlined” rulemak-
ing decisions are limitless and would lead to a total loss
of agency accountability in federal rulemakings.
This is not the law. Certiorari should be granted in
this case to make clear that including an “exceptions”
procedure in a regulation does not eliminate an agency’s
duty under the APA to support the factual basis for the
rule in the record.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those discussed in the
Petition for Certiorari, this Court should grant certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
DONALD C. WINSON
RICHARD S. WIEDMAN
ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN
& MELLOTT
42nd Floor, 600 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
(412) 566-6000
Counsel for Petitioner
Ormet Corporation
September 27, 1988
30 See Pet. 25-27.
GEORGE C. FREEMAN, JR.
HENRY V. NICKEL
(Counsel of Record)
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
MEL S. SCHULZE
HUNTON & WILLIAMS
2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Suite 9000
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 955-1500
Counsel for Petitioners
Alabama Power Co., et al.
MICHAEL H. HOLLAND
900 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 842-7330
Counsel for Petitioner United
Mine Workers of America
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