Reply Brief — Alabama Power Co. v. Thomas

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Supreme Court, US,

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No. 87-2068 ep 27 1988

eH SPANIOL, JR.

CLERK

IN THE maa

Suprene Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

ALABAMA POWER Co., et al., UNITED MINE WORKERS

OF AMERICA, AND ORMET CORPORATION,

Pe titione rs,

V.

LEE M. THOMAS, et al

Respond nts.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeais

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

ALABAMA POWER (CO., EZ AL.,

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,

AND ORMET CORPORATION

DONALD C. WINSON GEORGE C. FREEMAN, JR.

RICHARD S. WIEDMAN HENRY V. NICKEL

ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN (Counsel of Record

& MELLOTT F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

42nd Floor, 600 Grant Street MEL S. SCHULZE

Pittsburgh, PA 15219 HUNTON & WILLIAMS

(412) 566-6000 2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Suite 9000

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Petitioners

Alabama Power Co., et al.

Counsel for Petitioner

Ormet Corporation

MICHAEL H. HOLLAND

900 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 842-7330

Counsel for Petitioner United

September 27, 1988 Mine Workers of America

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-O096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO

RESOLVE A CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS

AND TO SETTLE THE PROPER SCOPE OF

THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT IN §4 OF

i adbitiiisiirctia dah tnceaedbintbseltnckennns

II. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO

SETTLE THAT THE TECHNICAL BASIS

FOR A RULE CONTAINING AN EXCEP-

TIONS PROCEDURE MUST BE SUPPORTED

BY AN ADEQUATE RECORD ..........00002.02........

RA eae IIEITIE isig sensei heb dcinensncavapienterdphskesemumbeterensseeiotaiens

10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.

Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 CUBBE) ai niicsnsccncasaceincionssansdes 9

Chocolate Manifacturers Association of United

States v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985)... 5, 6

Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d

525 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835

CL.) ) nero ee hesro fo es 3

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d

1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,

480 U.S. 112 (A080) an..cccssdieeeeeeeeeee 7

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980)... 6

Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum

Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) .....................0---0+. i)

National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C.

Cir, ROBO) no cncicciccconcassuccnpanccteubencaeecneusel een 9

NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224 (D. C. Cir.

1OBSB) ........ .-.-.csnsss-scdeecsseeneneneeesentniea a aaERED 2, 4, 6

STATUTES:

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq. (1982)

$ 110, 42 U.S.C. § TRO GAD ns casio ticccterees 3

$ 111, 42 UBC. § FORE Sie cictieceieeee 3

§ 128, 42 U.S.C. § TAGS CEGBE) an cinccecssccccsssccceces 4,9

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§§ 551, et seq., 701, et seq. (1982)

$ 4,5 U.S.C. § GOS (Ra nk ce 1,2

$ 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § TOG (A962) unwise 9

FEDERAL REGISTER:

49 Fed. Reg. 44883 (1984) ........................... scnfaadeceliedes 9

MISCELLANEOUS:

Transcript of Public Hearing on EPA’s Proposed

Stack Height Regulations (January 8, 1985)... 4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 87-2068

ALABAMA POWER Co., et al., UNITED MINE WORKERS

OF AMERICA, AND ORMET CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

Vv.

LEE M. THOMAS, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

ALABAMA POWER CO., ET AL.,

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,

AND ORMET CORPORATION

ARGUMENT

In this case, Petitioners seek review of the lower

court’s pronouncements on two fundamental principles of

administrative law. The first concerns whether the notice

requirement under $4 of the Administrative Procedure

Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982), is satisfied, as to

any potentially affected member of the public, when a

final rule is an outgrowth of rulemaking comments urg-

ing an approach which was not even suggested in the

rulemaking proposal. The second addresses the need

under the APA for an administrative record in support

of a regulation containing an “exceptions” procedure.

As to the first issue, the Federal Respondents argue

that certiorari should not be granted because, in their

2

view, “Petitioners received the notice to which APA Sec-

tion 4 entitled them.”' As to the second issue, Federal

Respondents argue that promulgation of a rule that con-

tains an exceptions procedure allows reallocation of the

burden of proof from the agency (to support its rule)

to regulated parties (to show that a rule is not sup-

ported), and therefore that no technical record is needed

to support such a regulation.* For the reasons discussed

below, Federal Respondents’ arguments in opposition to

certiorari are without merit.

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO RE-

SOLVE A CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS AND TO

SETTLE THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE NOTICE

REQUIREMENT IN §4 OF THE APA.

Federal Respondents argue in opposition to certiorari

that the Agency’s rulemaking proposal “identified the

NSPS limit as one of three emission rates that . . . would

be applied to various affected sources,” and that the

Agency “eliminat[ed] the two alternatives to the NSPS

limit” in response to rulemaking comments.* Federal Re-

spondents contend on this basis that the final rule was a

“logical outgrowth” of the rulemaking proposal.

That Federal Respondents persist in arguing that the

proposal itself gave notice of three alternative rates is

surprising since, in response to the identical assertion

below, the D.C. Circuit found that “{nJothing in the

[proposal] . . . suggested that EPA intended to adopt

one of the three rates for universal use.”* Rather, the

1 Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 16 (here-

inafter “Fed. Resp. Brief -——”’).

2 Id. at 19-20.

3 Id. at 17-18.

4NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (em-

phasis added), Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 3la (here-

inafter “App. ——~’’).

3

court found that EPA’s suggestion that it had proposed

three alternative emission rates, any one of which could

have been adopted separately and imposed on all sources

(including sources to which that rate would otherwise be

inapplicable) , was “quite disingenuous.” °

The preamble to the proposed rules merely identified

the regulatory programs under which emission rates were

established for existing and new sources,® and simply

stated that EPA guidance would provide that the “ap-

plicable” emission rate would be used in fluid modeling—

guidance thac was consistent with past practice and that

reflected pre-existing legal requirements.’ By imposing

NSPS on existing sources to which that rate is inap-

plicable, therefore, the final rule contains a requirement

that is exactly opposite to the “‘applicable’”’ emission rate

approach described in the preamble to the proposal.’ In

5 838 F.2d at 1242, App. 31a.

6 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8 (hereinafter “Pet. ——’”’).

New sources are subject to NSPS under § 111 of the Act, and

existing sources are subject to state implementation plan (SIP)

limits established under § 110 of the Act.

7 See Pet. 7-8. There was no need to propose a rule requiring that

a source use its “applicable” emission rate, because that “applicable”

rate already applied without a new rule stating that fact. Thus,

new sources would use an NSPS limit and existing sources would

use a SIP limit in fluid modeling.

8 Federal Respondents’ attempt to imply that this case is anal-

ogous to Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525,

533 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982), is without

merit. Fed. Resp. Brief 16. In that case, unlike here, the agency

(the NRC) did propose distinct, mutually exclusive rules, only one

of which was promulgated. The court therefore held that the NRC’s

proposal had provided adequate notice of the final rule under the

APA.

More importantly, Connecticut Light and Power did not address

the central issue presented here—whether rulemaking comments

can provide the notice required under the APA. Significantly, EPA

highlighted that case before the D.C. Circuit in this case, see Brief

for Respondents at 39 n.25 (February 17, 1987), but the court did

not rely upon or even cite that case. In short, that case has no

bearing on this case.

4

these circumstances, Federal Respondents’ attempt to

characterize the final rule as a “logical outgrowth” of the

proposal is simply without merit.’

Indeed, the first time that imposition of an inappli-

cable NSPS rate was even suggested to the Agency oc-

curred over seven years after passage of § 123 at a pub-

lic hearing held after the 1984 proposal was published.”

In other words, the imposition of an inapplicable NSPS

on existing sources was not an issue that was even pre-

sented to the Agency until after development of its pro-

posed rules. Understandably then, this issue was not

raised in the notice of proposed rulemaking.

Federal Respondents also suggest, as the lower court

held, that the filing of two (out of over four hundred)

rulemaking comments gave potentially regulated parties

an opportunity to oppose the NSPS presumption rule."

* For these reasons, while the D.C. Circuit continues to pay lip

service to the phrase “logical outgrowth of the proposal” in its

opinions and, in fact, used that phrase in its opinion in this case,

838 F.2d at 1242, App. 32a, even a cursory analysis of the opinion

reveals that the court’s holding that notice was adequate was based

not on such a finding (which would have been inconsistent with the

finding that EPA’s argument was “quite disingenuous”), but rather

on the fact that rulemaking comments had urged a rule similar to

the one promulgated.

See Transcript of Public Hearing on EPA’s Proposed Stack

Height Regulations at 171, 191 (January 8, 1985) (statement of

NRDC).

1! The more detailed of these comments in fact suggested a much

broader interpretation of the Act that could have required applica-

tion of NSPS by all sources subject to § 123, even those that did

not seek above-GEP formula credit. EPA does not dispute that this

much broader approach was never proposed. The court found, how-

ever, that “[t]hough the target raised by this contention was

broader than NSPS, it ... gave industry critics an opportunity . . .

to attack any form of control-first .... [T]jhere was a clearly

foreseeable risk that EPA would reject the environmentalists’ read-

ing of the law but proceed to adopt control-first as a matter of

choice.” 838 F.2d at 1243, App. 33a (emphasis in original). For

5

The D.C. Circuit’s use of isolated rulemaking comments

as the basis for application of the “logical outgrowth”

doctrine in this and other cases™ represents a radical

extension of that doctrine—an extension that is incon-

sistent with the law in other circuits.

Federal Respondents are simply wrong to suggest that

the Fourth Cireuit’s decision in Chocolate Manufacturers

Association of United States v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098

(4th Cir. 1985), does not conflict with the D.C. Circuit’s

decision in this case. In Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n, the pro-

posal included a pre-existing rule allowing use of flavored

milk as part of school lunches, and the Department of

Agriculture did not indicate that any consideration was

being given to changing the rule. Nonetheless, in re-

sponse to comments, the Department eliminated the rule

allowing flavored milk. The Fourth Circuit held that

rulemaking comments could not cure the notice defect in

the proposal.

In this case, the court recognized that the proposal did

not even suggest the “universal use” of NSPS, whereas

the final rule required it. Nevertheless, the court, relying

on the fact that two rulemaking comments suggested a

rule different from the approach described in the pro-

posal, held that, in light of these comments, all potential

rulemaking participants (even those that, like Petitioners

United Mine Workers of America (UMW) and Ormet,

had not participated in the rulemaking) were not entitled

to additional notice under the APA."

other members of the public that were not participating in the

rulemaking because the proposal did not give notice of an NSPS

requirement for fluid modeling ( as in the case of Petitioners United

Mine Workers of America and Ormet), however, these rulemaking

comments did not even form a basis for predicting what EPA might

do in a final rule.

12 See Pet. 18-20.

™ See id. 11-12.

6

The instant case is therefore in direct conflict with

Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n—in both cases, neither “the his-

tory of the issue in the agency nor the preamble discus-

sion furnished fair warning that the position eventually

adopted in the final rule would even be considered, .. .

and, indeed the final rule was exactly opposite of the

original proposal . . . .”"* Federal Respondents com-

pletely ignore the holding in Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n that

is significant in this case—that notice must come from a

rulemaking proposal published by the agency, not from

comments filed by rulemaking participants.

Finally, Federally Respondents ignore the broad policy

implications of the D.C. Circuit’s decision.” As de-

scribed in the Petition, it is inconsistent with basic no-

tions of due process to allow a federal agency to lull

potentially interested parties into not filing comments

and then later, without further public notice and com-

ment, adopt a final rule reversing the course described in

its proposal."*

As Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed, the issue of

what notice is adequate when a final rule differs from

a proposal is “a recurring one that will ultimately re-

quire interpretation of ... [the APA] by this Court.” "’

Fed. Resp. Brief 18-19.

15 See Pet. 20-23.

16 Federal Respondents suggest half-heartedly that they did give

certain rulemaking participants notice of the final rule two weeks

before it was promulgated. Fed. Resp. Brief 18 n.11; see NRDC

v. Thomas, 838 F.2d at 1244, App. 33a. Such belated notice is

clearly inadequate. See Pet. 10 n.24. Moreover, that notice was

not extended to all rulemaking participants or to other persons, such

as Petitioner UMW, who had not participated in the rulemaking

given the wording of the proposal.

iT Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096, 1098 (1980) (dissent-

ing from decision not to grant certiorari).

7

Given the confusion in the circuits as to the proper scope

of the APA notice requirement and the broad policy im-

plications of this issue for the proper functioning of the

administrative process, the time for review by this Court

has come.

Il. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO SETTLE

THAT THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR A RULE

CONTAINING AN EXCEPTIONS PROCEDURE

MUST BE SUPPORTED BY AN ADEQUATE REC-

ORD.

In opposing certiorari, Federal Respondents assert that

Petitioners are wrong in suggesting “that the EPA made

a factual finding that most sources can meet the

NSPS.” ** Rather, according to Federal Respondents,

“EPA merely ‘ma[de] the presumption that this limit

can be met by all sources.’”" Since the Agency pre-

sumed that the key fact underlying the final rule was

true (i.e, that sources subject to the rule could meet

NSPS levels of control), Federal Respondents contend

that “there was no factual finding that required record

support.” *° Thus, Federal Respondents’ contention is

that a rule containing an “exceptions” procedure can be

based on “presumed” facts that have no demonstrated

relationship to reality.

In establishing a legislative rule, an agency is not per-

mitted under the APA to “presume” the crucial fact un-

derlying that rule. Rather, an agency is required to find

that fact (in this case, that sources subject to the rule

could typically meet NSPS) and support it in the record.”

8 Fed. Resp. Brief 19.

19 Jd.

20 Id.

21 See Pet. 24-25 and note 64.

8

Addition of an “exceptions” procedure to a rule is no

basis for ignoring this principle.

Federal Respondents are wrong to argue that the D.C.

Circuit’s decision is not in conflict with the Fourth Cir-

cuit’s decision in E.J. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.

Train.** In that case, the Fourth Circuit clearly applied

the long-standing administrative law principle that

“t]he grounds upon which the agency acted must be

clearly disclosed in, and sustained by, the record.” ** The

significance of the Fourth Circuit’s decision is that this

principle was applied even though the regulations (estab-

lishing effluent limitations) contained an “exceptions”

procedure.** By contrast, in this case, the D.C. Circuit

found no need for a record in support of an analogous

rule establishing an applicable emission rate that is sub-

ject to an “exceptions” procedure.

Federal Respondents are also wrong to suggest that

the need for record support for a rule may be disregarded

where there is a general congressional policy suggesting

caution in case-by-case implementation of the rule.” It

is true under administrative law principles that a regu-

lated party seeking an administrative order has the bur-

den of proof in demonstrating that the regulatory re-

quirements necessary to obtain that order are met. Under

the APA, however, the proponent of a rule (the agency)

22541 F.2d 1018, 1028 (4th Cir. 1976), aff’d in part, rev'd in part,

430 U.S. 112 (1977).

23 Jd. (emphasis added).

24 Without knowing the facts underlying a rule containing an ex-

ceptions procedures, there is no basis for knowing which facts would

justify an exception to the rule. In du Pont, an exception to the

effluent limits in the rules could be granted on a showing of the

presence of “fundamentally different” factors. The “exception”

provision in the rules referenced a detailed technical support docu-

ment that would disclose whether the facts in an individual case

were different from those considered by the agency in developing

the generic effluent limit.

25 See Fed. Resp. Brief 19.

9

has burden of proof in rulemaking proceedings.*° This

burden does not shift simply because the regulation con-

tains an “exceptions” procedure.”

Finally, Federal Respondents’ view of the law would

result in a fundamental reallocation of regulatory bur-

dens among agencies and private parties, inconsistent

with the APA. Under this view, an agency could promul-

gate regulations based upon wholly unsupported “pre-

sumptions” of facts so long as an “exceptions” procedure

or “safety valve” was included in the rule.

Under this principle, EPA could adopt control tech-

nology rules under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,

and similar statutes by presuming, without any technical

support, that certain control technologies are economically

and technologically feasible.** The Secretary of Labor,

under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, could

adopt workplace standards by presuming, without record

support, that the standards are economically and techno-

logically feasible.*’ In other words, under this principle,

26 See Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum Institute,

448 U.S. 607, 653 (1980); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (providing for

review of agency decisions based on the agency’s record).

27 In adopting another rule that also applies to parties seeking

above-formula stack height credit, therefore, EPA did assemble a

technical record to support the rule, rather than adopt a stringent

rule, without technical support, that a regulated party could attempt

to rebut. See 49 Fed. Reg. 44883 (1984), App. 157a (the “nearby

terrain” rule). Thus, EPA did not allege that § 123 congressional

policy allowed the Agency to dispense with normal administrative

law record requirements, except with respect to a rule that it

developed at the very end of a lengthy rulemaking process without

notice and comment.

28Cf. National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir.

1980).

229 Cf. American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452

U.S. 490 (1981).

10

as long as a rule contains an “exceptions” procedure, fed-

eral rulemakers are free to bypass the facts by presuming

them. The opportunities for such “streamlined” rulemak-

ing decisions are limitless and would lead to a total loss

of agency accountability in federal rulemakings.

This is not the law. Certiorari should be granted in

this case to make clear that including an “exceptions”

procedure in a regulation does not eliminate an agency’s

duty under the APA to support the factual basis for the

rule in the record.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those discussed in the

Petition for Certiorari, this Court should grant certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

DONALD C. WINSON

RICHARD S. WIEDMAN

ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN

& MELLOTT

42nd Floor, 600 Grant Street

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

(412) 566-6000

Counsel for Petitioner

Ormet Corporation

September 27, 1988

30 See Pet. 25-27.

GEORGE C. FREEMAN, JR.

HENRY V. NICKEL

(Counsel of Record)

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

MEL S. SCHULZE

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Suite 9000

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Petitioners

Alabama Power Co., et al.

MICHAEL H. HOLLAND

900 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 842-7330

Counsel for Petitioner United

Mine Workers of America

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Reply Brief — Alabama Power Co. v. Thomas · 488 U.S. 888 | Frix