Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Komjathy v. Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Supreme Court brief1988
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Text
No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term,
1987
DAVID S. KOMJATHY, Petitioner,
Vv.
ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION,
and NATIONAL TRANS-
PORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Lawrence B.
3938 E. Grant Rd., #191
Tucson, Arizona 85712
(602) 326-0283
Counsel for Petitioner
Smith
April, 1988
|
a
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. When the Federal Aviation Administra-
ticn (FAA) initiates a safety-rule viola-
tion case against a pilot it chooses be-
tween two disparate tracks of justice: an
administrative system, and a judicial sys-
tem.1 with the first, it orders the suspen-
Sion or revocation of his license as pun-
ishment for the violation. He or she may
then ask the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) for a hearing, which is con-
ducted by an administrative law judge, and
his decision may be reviewed by the Board.
On the second track, if unable to effect
compromise, it initiates a civil suit in
district court, where either party has the
right to "demand" a jury trial, and the
penalty is a money fine.
1 As FAA enforcement is rather ar-
cane, it is our opinion that brief back-
ground explanations are required for the
questions presented. For a detailed expla-
nation and legal history, see the law re-
view article cited at p. 4 n. 4, infra.
|
Authority for certificate penalties is
held to derive from § 609 of the Federal
Aviation Act, as amended (FA Act), 49
U.S.C. § 1429(a), which is said to author-
ize FAA to suspend or revoke whenever it
"determines that safety in air commerce. .
- and the public interest requires..."
It says nothing, however, of violations,
offenses, rules, sanctions or penalties.
Authority for civil penalties derives
from § 901, id. § 1471(a) (1), which pro-
vides that "Any person who violates...
any rule, regulation, or order .. . shall
be subject to a civil penalty pe a ee
trial, from § 903, id. § 1473(b) (1).
Use of these two tracks means that the
officials who initiate the case necessarily
determine at the start: (1) the kind of
trial the accused gets; (2) how he will be
punished; (3) whether he can demand jury.
The questions presented are:
A. May Congress, having mandated right
ii
to jury trial and money fines for safety
violations, thereafter constitutionally
authorize an FAA official to deny the ac-
cused those rights, and choose an adminis-
trative forum in lieu, which also brings
with it a different, and generally conceded
harsher form of punishment? Put another
way, has Congress in fact ever authorized
Suspension or revocation as a penalty?
B. Assuming, arguendo, Congress so
intended, is general language about air
safety and public interest sufficiently
specific constitutionally, and under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 558, to support a delegation of
authority to impose certificate sanctions?
Alternate. The Circuit Court did not
address the issue of whether language about
air safety and public interest meets the
APA's standards of clarity expressed in 5
U.S.C. § 558 which mandates that an agency
may use a penalty only if explicitly auth-
iii
orized by Congress. Thus the alternate
question is whether the Court, should it
not take jurisdiction, should remand with
instructions to do so?
2. FAA has a single certificate action
rule, Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) §
13.19, 14 C.F.R. § 13.19. Like § 609, on
which it is based, it speaks only of rein-
spection of aircraft and reexamination of
airmen, qualifications matters, and says
nothing of violations or sanctions, which
are disciplinary matters. This rule has
never been adopted through the APA public
notice and comment procedures required by 5
U.S.C. § 553, which would require dismis-
sal. The District of Columbia Circuit, even
though it apparently holds it has been,
goes on to hold it need not be, as-it only
paraphrases § 609.
The questions presented are:
A. Has FAR § 13.19 been lawfully adopted
in accordance with § 553 public notice and
iv
comment procedures? Or is it exempt?
B. Does an accused have a constitutional
right to be told how he will be punished?
3. When prosecuting any safety violation
case for which a penalty is sought, FAA
officials utilize, or may resort to, three
basic policies: (1) to initiate it, they
must choose between certificate action or
civil penalty; (2) they may use suspension
or revocation as punishment in lieu of
civil penalty;2 (3) having started on one
track, they may shift to the other--almost
always certificate to money fine.
None of these has ever been published in
the Federal Register, or promulgated as a
rule through public notice and comment.
The questions presented are:
A. Does the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1),
require that these policies, as "rules of
2 These are dealt with in Question 4.
Which means they also cannot be
found in the Code of Federal Regulations.
procedure," “statements of general policy,"
or “interpretations of general applicabil-
ity formulated and adopted by the agency,"
be published in the Federal Register; and
for failure so to do require this case to
be dismissed because that section provides
that “a person may not in any manner be
required to resort to, or be adversely
affected by, a matter required to be
published in the Federal Register and not
so published. .. ."?
B. Are these policies "substantive"
within the meaning of the APA, § 553, and
thus required to be promulgated by notice
and comment, failure of which requires
dismissal?
Alternate. Although raised, the Circuit
Court did not address these issues, which
assume, arguendo, authority to make the
policies. The only issue is compliance with
the APA. We submit this was a denial of
justice. If favorable, either would have
vi
been dispositive. Thus the alternate ques-
tion is whether the Court, should it not
take jurisdiction, should remand with
instructions to do so?
4. FAR § 13.15, 14 C.F.R. § 13.15, is
the civil penalty rule. It misrepresents
the law, § 901, which reads: Any person who
violates any rule "shall be" subject to a
Civil penalty. The rule reads: A person
"is" subject to a civil penalty. Instead of
901's preemptory command, it reads as if
FAA officials have the option not to use
Civil penalty. This is contrary to that
section's plain meaning. It fails to tell
the public that officials may shift from
license penalty to money fine.
The rule has never been lawfully promul-
gated through APA notice and comment proce-
dures; and was amended without their use.
The Circuit Court ruled that petitioner
lacked standing to challenge this rule.
The questions presented are:
vil
A. Does the rule violate due process and
the APA by misrepresenting the law upon
which it is based and failing to mention
shifts in sanctions?
B. Was the rule and its amendment
lawfully adopted pursuant to the APA, 5
U.S.C. §§ 552(a) (1), or § 553?
Alternate. Does petitioner lack stand-
ing? Should the Court decide that question,
and if favorable, remand these issues to
the Circuit Court? *
* In preparing this petition we were
mindful of Mr. Stern's admonition to keep
it short. It is, however, near the maximum.
In our view, any one of these questions, if
decided favorably, would warrant reversal.
The difficulty with reducing their number,
however, is that on a practical level they
are inextricably intertwined, and paint a
total picture which we think the Court
should see.
_ viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ete eee Ae em EPS |
OPINIONS BELOW ee re er ee ee ear
JURISDICTION rey eer re ee yr rr er ere a ae ee ee
STATUTES INVOLVED a ha il eal ak ie ara a eal a a
STATEMENT OF THE CASE cccccccccccesesecsed
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......2.2.2.6
Exceptional IMPOrtanCe acccccccceseses®
I. Congress has never authorized both a
judicial and an administrative sys-
tem of justice for the same safety
violations rere rer re re eye Pe eT Tee er ee
A. Denial of right to jury trial .....10
B. Even assuming legitimacy, “public
interest" is an unconstitutional
grant of power ol Se deh ae ea ea a ee ee
Il. FAR § 13.19, the certificate rule
never lawfully adopted; is unconsti-
tutionally vague: does not advise
citizen of how he will be punished ...26
A. Not lawfully adopted ..sccccccscsseeetl
Exempt from rulemaking? ....-.eeeeee32
B. Right to know Penalty cccsescoeseesal
III. FAA's three basic enforcement poli-
cies have never been lawfully pub-
lished or promulgated .cccccccccceseec4O
ix
A. FALIGER CO PUI OR oc cgcrsscvcesses 40
B. PAaLiure tO PEOMUIGEAEE .ccsscessecces 45
Alternate question: Should the
Court Remand ..... Cees eae seseresesees 48
IV. FAR § 13.15, FAA's civil penalty
rule misrepresents the law, fails to
advise that it is an alternative to
certificate action; was never law-
promulgated or amended; petitioner
has standing to challenge it .ssccescea 49
A. MiSFOEPEOSENtS Che LAW -.icccececccves 49
B. Not lawfully promulgated or
BINOTIGOE oo 00-8056 6 064 00008 HORRORS 34
C.. EOCE OF StANGLNG 2.640 6a ween end en cue 54
CONCLUSION ..... anceeea Terre r eT eC eee 58
APPENDIX (Separately bound) (Opinion
and Judgment of Court of Appeals;
Opinion and Order of the National
Transp. Safety Bd.), etC. ......a-l to a-78
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F.Supp. 628
[sls COLES AST 7) ace ceva ewes 6a aes 26,47
Am. Standard, inc... Vs U.S... 662 F.2¢
ZOU: LUseeces GE CLES Sete) ab eteeees 47
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566
Fad S351 (40 Cif. LETT) secevcecccese 45
Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385 (1926) waccvecesesccecese 24
x
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979) eoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeteeee@ 37
Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 1421
[Far Ghee AFOR) Kasecsaseenaense tteeue 37
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir
LVGal éktdehwesdnasee ers ee ee ee ee a ee 48
Global Van Lines v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1290
[Sun Gare APGS) eaxnades wTererrTy Te TT ere. |
Go Leasing, Inc. v. National Transp.
Safety Bd., et al., 800 F.2d 1514
(StH Cif. 1966) sccsccasesveesessi0,15,25
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
BUG ULF7Z) caoccevaecesencsescncessvettyeae
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Hickel, 435 F.2d
S40 (1970) ceccccccnesecesessesevieea, Si
Hard v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 248
F.2d 761 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
2535 O15. 360 tiSal) we teanedarecasdebhorvae
Komjathy, NTSB Order No. EA-2343,
SE-6249, July 14, 1986 wccccccccoves oe26
Komjathy v. National Transp. Safety
Bd., 832 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ceccceces peenceeehl p21 720932739990
Mallen v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 667 F.Supp. 652 (D.
Iowa 1987); Sup. Ct. No. 87-82,
July 9, 1987 wccccescvessces sb peenecaes 36
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air
Force, 591 F.2nd 852 (1978) ..... ‘ween Se
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) cecos 44
xi
National Retired Teacher's Ass'n v.
United States Postal Service, 430
F.Supp. 141 (D.D.C.), affirmed 593
Tea Lave 40eCs CAs EBS) 66 eeseneee es 47
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759
(1969) acccccvcccevsscscsscccccess -37,48
Northern California Power Agency v.
Morton, 396 F.Supp. 1187 (D.D.C.
1975), affirmed 539 F.2d 243 (D.C.
CiSs. LF7G) cecvcctscsivsscsicaseseeneuus 44
Pangburn v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
SLi Fes S49 (iOC CAts E904) #5 zo 600 15,19
Pastrana v. United States, 746 F.2d
kGG? CLEGM GELs BEES! 604 400ebsseneann eee
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass'n v.
Finch, 307 F.Supp. 858 (D.C. Del.
oy | Pr rrr re re ee rer odtee?
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of
Energy, 449 F.Supp. 760 (D.Del.),
affirmed 596 F.2d 1029 (Emer.Ct.App.
BPIO) coseeceaceses cocccccccccccccccscehs
Pike v. C.A.B., 303 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.
1962) wees co ccccccccccces occeceel22,38,51
Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
Sha Pea 180 (SEG Cifs SPOPl these eear 48
United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677
_ (1892) caenes (36600800680 0060 04 baEE 21,25
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
FRO EU) 26400088 Mebbeue ebb neeee eeu ene aisae
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
#) 520 Perera TrrrrTrecr. sesae
Xil
Valley Forge Christian College v. Amer-
icans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
SOP MEME EMSC E ESCH ES SG esc cccccccer 54,55
W.G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corpor-
ation v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498
TE OR CA ebb eaccceccsccccce 57
Wilson v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
244 F.2d 773, cert. denied, 355 U.S.
re ws 6 0 eee ekee ad, 24,25
Constitution and Statutes:
U.S. Const. Amend V (Due Process
DTT Shee hawk eh ee 6066 00 0c a7 eae, 486,51
Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44
ne i Lis 6 666s 6 0s 000000 0c 19
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub.
alenewee ga eceac. 973 (1938) ..... Pe §.
P.L. 110-223, Sec. 204, 101 Stat.
BSED CA9GT) accscccsvcces ee ccccccccccs 49
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 702-706 (1982):
DUPE REM EE RES SSS se ssceescccccsccecs 45
§ S52(a) (1) ~c ccc ccccuee 42,45,48,54,57
DS DES ASO b se sessenccnes 26,27,28,46,47,54
DUM CPC ME CSM E WSS SSS sec ecco cesccccccs 21
WM MOM MO SS ee wees c ccc ccc cscs cccces 54
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended,
49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982):
X1i1li
© 1341 (a) cecccccccccccccccccccsccccees 33
GS LS43(E) cectanscsccssssns (este henews 33
S$ 1429 (a) (§ GOS) ssasnsvenes 13,25,32,34
§ 1471(a) (1) & (2) (§ 901) .....-4.. 12,50
§ 1473 (b) (1) (§ 903) ceccccccceccccce 012
Regulations:
Department of Commerce, Air Commerce
Regulations, § 74(A), (F) (1926) ..... 18
Civil Aeronautics Regulations:
14 C.F.R. § 2O.37110 (1958) cesvcseas send
14 C.P.R. § 406.25 (1952) wececs rrr 36
Federal Aviation Regulations, 14
C.F.R. Parts 1-199 (1986):
eery) Serrrrirr cre eT TeeveTUTE tee 50
S Leeks ccconevaes weer ree yt 26,38,52
§ 408.23 (1960) wccccccrccccccccces 32429
§ 408.25 (1960) wcccccceccccccccccves 29
National Transportation Safety Board:
49 C.P.R. 8 821.54 (B) sccscccsctsccvss 36
Miscellaneous:
Civil Aeronautics, Legislative History of
the Air Commerce Act of 1926 ...... vee
Federal Aviation Administration Materials:
Xiv
Compliance and Enforcement Program,
FAA Order 2150.3 (1980) ..... 11,12,38,41
N. KOMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS, FEDERAL
CIVIL AVIATION POLICY UNDER THE AIR
COMMERCE ACT 1926-1938 (1978) ........ i?
Federal Register:
24 Fed. Reg. 10 (1959) wecseccer av; oagoes
26 Fed. Reg. 10698 (1961) ..cccceeeeee 31
27 Fed. Reg. 5686, 5694-95
(A962) secseece TeET PCR ee ee 28,30,53
27 Fed. Reg. 9585-92 (1962) ..cccee 32,33
Go Leasing, Inc. v. NTSB, United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, No. 85-7401, Petitioner's
ROOLY BELGE scccsceevtresoncveneene oveetl
Komjathy v. National Transp. Safety Bd.,
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, No.
86-1444, Petitioner's Reply Brief ....32
S. Rep. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946) [Legislative History of the
Administrative Procedure Act] ..... 21,42
Smith, FAA Blackjack, Professional Pilot
MPeGSEING At Fi, FORD. LFGL soscedcasssees 4
Smith, FAA: Illegal disciplinarian?,
Aviation Digest at 26, Sep. 1987 ..... 4
Smith, FAA PUNITIVE CERTIFICATE
SANCTIONS: THE EMPEROR WEARS NO
CLOTHES; OR, HOW DO YOU PUNISH A
PROPELLER?, 14 Transp. L.J. 59-100
CLOSES) ceteeraaas e709 9i2716,17,18,29,56
XV
No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1987
DAVID S. KOMJATHY, Petitioner,
V «
ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, and NATIONAL TRANS-
PORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Petitioner David S. Komjathy respect-
fully prays that a writ of certiorari issue
to review the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, entered in
this proceeding November 13, 1987, order
denying rehearing entered February 1, 1988.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit is repor-
ted at 832 F.2d 1294, and is reprinted in
the accompanying separate appendix. (a-32)
The opinion and order of the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has not
been reported. It is reprinted in the
appendix (a-19), as is the administrative
law judge's oral initial decision, which it
affirmed. (a-6)
JURISDICTION
The Federal Aviation Administration, on
April 4, 1984, after having earlier served
a Notice of Proposed Certificate Action on
1
May 23, 1983, initiated an enforcement act-
ion against petitioner, under 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1429(a), by ordering a 180-day sus-
pension of his private pilot license as
punishment for certain alleged safety
violations. (a-1) He appealed to the NTSB,
under § 1429(a), and hearing was held by an
administrative law judge on September 20,
i985, who upheld the suspension, with the
final Board order, also affirming, entered
July 14, 1986. Mr. Komjathy petitioned the
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit for review, under 49
U.S.C. § 1486. That court entered a
judgment and opinion affirming the NTSB
order on November 13, 1987; an order
denying a petition for rehearing was
entered February 1, 1988.
The jurisdiction of this Court to review
the judgment of the District of Columbia
Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §
1254(1).
STATUTES INVOLVED
The statutes and regulations directly
relevant to the issues are here listed,
with the pertinent portions of their text
set forth in the appendix:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 702-706 (1982): §§ 551(4),
552(a) (1), 553, 558, 706;
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552
(1982): §§ 1429(a), 1471(a) (1) & (2),
1473(a) & (b) (1);
Federal Aviation Regulations, 14
C.F.R. Parts 1-199 (1986): §§ 13.15, 13.193
§§ 408.23 and 408.25 (1960).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The issues petitioner raises go to the
Federal Aviation Administration's lack of
authority to bring a safety violation case
as a certificate action, its failure to
comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act, remedy for any failure of which is
3
dismissal, and related due process issues.4
No issue turns on any fact involved in the
incident. We briefly describe it, however,
as a frame of reference. A number of sali-
ent facts of general public notice support
the legal issues, which we present in the
reasons section.
Mr. Komjathy, a maintenance supervisor
for the New York State Thruway, and private
pilot, on November 26, 1982, took off
lawfully under visual flight rules (VFR)
conditions from the Schenectady, New York,
Airport. While still in its control zone
(within five miles of the airport) a snow
squall hit. Snow, unlike rain, cuts visibi-
lity to almost nil. He immediately radioed
4 For an indepth explanation and
history of FAA safety enforcement, see
Smith, FAA PUNITIVE CERTIFICATE SANCTIONS:
THE EMPEROR WEARS NO CLOTHES; OR, HOW DO
YOU PUNISH A PROPELLER?, 14 Transp. L.J.
59-100 (1985) [hereinafter “Emperor"];
Smith, PAA: Illegal disciplinarian?,
Aviation Digest at 26, Sep. 1987, and
Smith, PAA Blackjack, Professional Pilot
Magazine at 91, Feb. 1981.
4
tower for permission to return. Because the
field was now under instrument flight rules
(IFR), the tower told him to contact Albany
approach control. They gave him certain
directions which he either didn't hear or
was unable to follow. A non-instrument
rated pilot, he did the only sensible thing
he could, dropped down low to keep contact
with the ground, and flew back and forth
across the airport until the controllers
figured out they should let him land.
As a resuit, FAA charged him with flying
in less than weather conditions required
for VFR flight and contrary to air traf-
fic control (ATC) instructions. Following
appropriate notice, FAA, on April 4, 1984,
ordered his license suspended for 180 days,
strictly as punishment for violation of
related air-traffic rules.
He asked the NTSB for a hearing. Counsel
moved to dismiss, raising the same issues
as here. The Board denied the motion, and
5
petitioner filed an interlocutory appeal
with the District of Columbia Circuit, also
denied, but on grounds no final order had
been issued. Hearing was held September 20,
1985. On the advice of counsel, with peti-
tioner's full knowledge and consent, he did
not contest the charges. The administrative
law judge (ALJ) upheld the suspension.
Appeal was taken to the full Board, which
affirmed.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Exceptional Importance
One million American citizens, pilots,
mechanics, flight engineers, air-taxi
operators, repair stations and air carriers
hold certificates issued by the Federal
Aviation Administration. We estimate that
at least 250,000 of them rely on their
license for their livelihood. Tens of thou-
sands of other jobs are dependent on com-
panies with FAA operating certificates. In
1979, the last public statistics we are
6
aware of, 4,000 safety enforcement cases
were closed by FAA. About 2,400, or 60%,
the vast majority of them pilots, had their
licenses suspended or revoked for periods
of up to one year, strictly as punishment
for the violation of safety regulations.
Perhaps 700 relied on their licensees for
their livelihood, not including businessmen
who needed to fly for business travel. The
other 40% were settled by civil penalty.
Emperor at 60.
For private and student pilots, punitive
certificate actions comprised 87% of the
total. Ninety-nine percent of these were
first offenses and generally involved
inadvertent violations of traffic and other
technical safety rules. Id. One can imagine
what would happen if 87% of auto cases re-
sulted in license suspension. Recently FAA
officials have increased emphasis on certi-
ficate actions, even for professionals,
rather than settle with a compromise money
5
fine, so today the figures could be con-
siderably higher.
It is plain fact that no statute, no
regulation exists which so much as hints
that FAA may suspend or revoke a pilot's
license as penalty for a safety violation.
Put another way, this means that a lawyer
unfamiliar with aviation, if asked to find
out how pilots are punished for air-traffic
violations, cannot find the answer in the
United States Code or the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR). This is remarkable, to
say the least.
What is also remarkable, and discernable
through review of the Federal Register, is
that FAA officials, in the agency's three
decades of existence, have never, through
APA notice and comment procedures, involved
the public in the making of the few proce-
Gure rules they do have.°
5 Emperor at 82-98, traces this
regulatory history.
In 1926, seminal year of federal regu-
lation of aviation, Congress, for enforce-
ment, considered both a criminal system and
a Civil penalty system with right to jury
trial. It chose the latter. Neither then,
nor at any time since has any agency ever
asked for authority to set up a parallel
certificate-sanction system of justice, no
legislator has ever introduced a bill pro-
posing such, no committee of Congress has
ever held hearings on the subject.
The reported cases which provide the
only foundation for the agency's claim of
authority are all based on a gross error of
fact: belief the certificate system was
authorized by Congress in 1938, when in
fact officials started it in 1926, right in
the face of Congress' single choice, civil
money penalties with jury trial.®
6 A detailed exposition of this, and
how enforcement works, may be found in
Emperor at 59-82.
I. FAA's claim that Congress authorized
both a judicial and an administrative
system of justice for the same violations,
which allows it to deny right to jury
trial, is without foundation.
A. Denial of right to jury trial. To
raise as an issue whether Congress, having
mandated right to jury trial and a money
fine for air-safety violations, may there-
after constitutionally authorize a federal
agency to deny those rights, at worst, must
appear frivolous, at best, profoundly con-
fused.’ Such a situation would obviously
violate the most fundamental precepts of
Our democracy and system of jurisprudence.
Yet this is precisely what FAA's contention
amounts to. It is spelled out by plain lan-
7 Although argued (Petitioner's Reply
Brief at 18, Komjathy v. NTSB, United
States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, No. 86-1444), perhaps
this is why the circuit court failed to
address this conundrum. Nor did the Ninth
Circuit in Go Leasing, Inc. v. NTSB, 800
F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1986) (Petitioner's
Reply Brief at 17, Go Leasing, Inc. v.
NTSB, United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, No. 85-7401).
10
guage in the agency's enforcement manual:
"When violations occur, firm action must be
taken. . . . Impose punitive sanctions,
after the fact, to deter violations (e.g.,
certificate actions, civil penalties); . .
-" Or this: “If monetary sanction against
any certificate holder is insufficient to
get and keep their attention, do not hesi-
tate to use certificate action." Compliance
and Enforcement Program, FAA Order 2150.3,
q 203.c.(1)(b) and 7 203.c.(2) at pages 13-
14 [hereafter 1980 Handbook]. (See Exhibit
A, a-72, which contains more examples.)
It is important to note that the manual
carefully distinguishes qualifications mat-
ters from punitive purposes: "[Another
purpose is to] [a]chieve remedial purposes
(e.g., certificate suspension pending :
demonstration of qualifications; revocation
for lack of certificate qualifications) ."
11
Id. 4 203.c.(1) (c). (a-73) .8
Authority for civil penalties and that
Claimed for certificate penalties provide a
marked contrast:
(a) (1) Amy person who violates (A)
any provision of subchapter III, IV, V,
VI, or XII of this chapter ... or any
rule, regulation, or order issued
thereunder .. . shall be subject to a
Civil penalty of not to exceed $1,000
for each such violation...
(2) Any civil penalty may be com-
promised... :
(b) (1) Any civil penalty imposed or
assessed under this chapter may be col-
lected by proceedings in personam again-
st the person subject to the penalty. .
- Such proceedings shall conform as
nearly as may be to civil suits in
admiralty .. . either party may demand
trial by jury of any issue of fact, if
the value in controversy exceeds $20,
and the facts so tried shali not be
reexamined other than in accordance with
the rules of the common law... .
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended
(FA Act), §§ 901 and 903, 49 U.S.C. app. §§
1471(a)(1) and 1473(b) (1) [emphasis added].
What could be plainer? Certificate action:
8 See Emperor at 61-63.
12
The [Administrator] may, from time to
time, reinspect any civil aircraft, air-
craft engine, propeller, appliance, air
navigation facility, or air agency, or
may reexamine any civil airman. If, as a
result of any such reinspection or reex-
amination, or if, as a result of any
other investigation made by the [Admin-
istrator], he determines that safety in
air commerce or air transportation and
the public interest requires, the [Adm-
inistrator] may issue an order amending,
modifying, suspending, or revoking, in
whole or in part, any type certificate,
production certificate, airworthiness
certificate, airman certificate, air
Carrier operating certificate, air navi-
gation facility certificate (including
airport operating certificate), or air
agency certificate. . . . Any person
whose certificate is affected by such an
order .. . may appeal [for hearing] ..
- to the National Transportation Safety
Boara « « »
FA Act § 609, id., § 1429(a) [emphasis
added]. FAA contends, and several courts of
appeal have so held (cases discussed,
infra), that § 609 constitutes a broad
grant of power to the Administrator to
amend, modify, suspend or revoke a certifi-
cate whenever he "determines that safety in
air commerce or air transportation and the
public interest requires" it.
33
Several arguments undercut this claim:
(1) If one parses § 609 it is to be seen
that the air-safety-public-interest lang-
uage is lifted out of context. It is not a
broad grant to use power but a condition
subsequent to first reinspecting, reexami-
ning or investigating ("if as a result
of").9 In actuality it offers the Adminis-
trator a way to justify a decision not to
Suspend or revoke.
(2) As we have seen, FAA carefully dis-
tinguishes between suspensions used for
qualifications purposes and those used for
punishment. If Congress intended to use §
609 as a parallel system of justice for
violations, why would it use language
relevant to qualifications, reinspection
and reexamination, but fail to include such
9 oy general congressional exhorta-
tion to go forth and do good, without more,
is not a proper foundation for the sound
development of administrative law." Global
Van Lines v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1290, 1295-96
(Sth Cir. 1983); see also Emperor at 73.
14
obvious terms as violations, offenses, reg-
ulations, sanctions or penalties? The pre-
mier maxim of statutory interpretation,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
applies.
(3) Prior to Go Leasing, supra, and the
instant case, in only three reported cases
were certificate sanctions challenged:
aioe wv. ee. 264 F.24 773 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 870 (1957); Hard v.
C.A.B., 248 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 960 (1957)? Pangburn v.
C.A.B., 311 F.2d 349 (ist Cir. 1962)
{hereafter referred to individually or as
the Triad]. All were airline captains. As
they readily reflect, Wilson was the
touchstone.!9 The challenge there was to
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
10 Which makes it indeed puzzling as
to why the District of Columbia Circuit in
the instant case cited only Pangburn, 832
F.2d at 1296;. Pangburn clearly relies on
Wilson. 311 F.2d at 354.
15
§ 609, 52 Stat. 973, 1011 (1938 Act). (That
§ 609 was pretty much the same as the pre-
sent, except for the transfer of power from
the Civil Aeronautics Board to the new Fed-
eral Aviation Agency in 1958.) The District
of Columbia Circuit held, that "(bly rest-
ing suspension on a Board determination
that the ‘interest of the public so re-
quires,' Congress conferred broad discre-
tionary authority upon the Board." 244 F.2d
at 774; see also Emperor at 72. Ina
decision barely one-page, the court did not
explain why § 901 was not exclusive. 244
F.2d at 774.
Lacking plain statutory language to sup-
port suspension penalties with administra-
tive trial in lieu of right to jury, the
Triad, especially Wilson, has always been
the only such source for FAA's claim. The
District of Columbia Circuit, however, adds
a new one. It contends that NTSB is plainly
authorized to review FAA suspensions--
16
citing statutes. 832 F.2d at 1297. That is
undoubted, but it begs the salient ques-
tion: For what purpose or purposes has
Congress authorized FAA to suspend or
revoke certificates? And would Congress
knowingly authorize executive branch
officials to deny right to jury trial?
The root problem with the Triad is that
those cases are all based on a gross error
of fact: this so-called "deterrent" sanc-
tion system of justice did not start in
1938, authorized by the 1938 Act, as the
decisions show those courts believed,
certificate penalties were instituted in
1926. See Emperor at 74-77 (which explains
in detail how this happened) .11 Moreover,
11 “"[I]n October 1929, the [Aeronaut-
ics] Branch gradually began to deal more
severely with violators. .. . [It] turned
to suspensions as a primary enforcement
tool. At the same time revocations were
being handed out with greater frequency. .
- -" N. KOMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS, FEDER-
AL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY UNDER THE AIR
COMMERCE ACT 1926-1938, at 107-08 (1978)
(official history).
17
the government never argued that they
started in 1938, but in their brief pointed
out it was indeed 1926. See Emperor at 70
n. 75. But opposing counsel and the Wilson
court failed to pick up on this and con-
tinued to focus on 1938.
The issue before these courts was con-
gressional intent. How can the Triad cases
have any validity when based on such a fun-
damental mistake? Any argument about that
intent must be conducted in the time-frame
of 1926. In fact, the government itself
argued that it was the Air Commerce Act of
1926, § 3(f), 44 Stat. 568, 570 (1926),
from whence came their authority. See
The then extant certificate penalty rule
read: “Pilots' and mechanics' licenses will
be suspended or revoked for -- (A) Violat-
ing any provision of the air commerce act
of 1926 or these regulations. ... (F)
Violating air traffic rules." Department of
Commerce, Air Commerce Regulations, § 74
(A) and (F) (1926); see also 14 C.F.R. §
20.37110 (1938) (seminal edition of the
C.F.R. in which this rule was codified for
the first--and last--time).
18
Emperor at 75-76, and 74 n.91. But if
conducted in that time-frame the govern-
ment's position must fail. It is crystal
clear that the only enforcement system
chosen in 1926 was civil money penalties
with right to jury trial.12 CIVIL AERO-
NAUTICS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR
COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, at 59 (1928) (hereaf-
ter 1926 History); see Emperor at 67-68.13
Thus the real question is: On what basis
would Congress, in 1926, for violations of
air-safety rules, carefully choose a civil-
money~penalty system of justice over a
criminal system, mandate right to jury
trial in district court, then at some point
thereafter, authorize a parallel system of
administrative justice with a certificate
12 See Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch.
344, 11(b), 44 Stat. 568, 574.
Is justice served when FAA, and
appeals courts, continue to cite Wilson,
Hard and Pangburn, without confronting the
fact they are based on such obvious and
fundamental error?
19
penalty, using only vague language about
air safety and public interest, with no
bill introduced or hearings held to support
it? FAA never answers this question.
The irony of its position may be seen in
this conundrum: Assume a gross safety vio-
lation by a pilot who either never had a
license or had it revoked; without a certi-
ficate to act against, the only way FAA can
prosecute him is by means of the civil pen-
alty system. Thus the truly bad actor is
assured of his right to jury and, at worst,
a money fine collectible only by levy.
B. Even assuming, arguendo, that Con-
gress intended to grant broad authority to
use suspension and revocation for whatever
is in the “public interest," it is an
unconstitutional delegation of power.
Even if the above problems with § 609
could be overcome, its language about air
safety and public interest is constitution-
ally inadequate as a touchstone of power.
It is fundamental that Congress may not
delegate its authority to create benefits
20
or sanctions. United States v. Eaton, 144
U.S. 677 (1892), United States v. Grimaud,
220 U.S. 506 (1910). This principle finds
expression in the APA:
(a) This section applies, according
to the provisions thereof, to the exer-
cise of a power or authority.
(b) A sanction may not be imposed or
a substantive rule or order issued
except within jurisdiction delegated to
the agency and as authorized by law.
5 U.S.C. § 558(a) & (b). Its history:
This provision, limiting administra-
tively imposed requirements to the auth-
ority granted and delegated, is designed
to afford statutory recognition for the
basic rule of law, embodied in judicial
decisions. The creation of penalties or
benefits is exclusively the province of
Congress.
[It] means that agencies may not
undertake anything which statutes or
other adequate sources of authority
(such as treaties) do not authorize them
to do. Where these sources are specific
in the authority granted no additional
authority may be assumed. .. . Sanc-
tions in the way of penalties or relief
must be identified and authorized by
law, and where authorized they must in
any case apply in the factual situation
presented.
S. Rep. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 34
and 274 (1946) [emphasis added]. "No addi-
21
tional authority may be assumed" is another
way of stating the maxim: Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. Congress chose civil
money penalties with right to jury trial.
Where does the FA Act say anything else?
"Factual situation presented." The only
factual situation § 609 talks about is
"reinspection" and "reexamination,"
qualifications matters.
Assuming, arguendo, FAA has jurisdiction
to impose punitive suspensions, specific
authority presents a separate hurdle. At
the least, this mandate imposes a standard
of clarity for what sanctions Congress has
os
authorized, and what it has not. What else
could “must be identified" mean?
Congress wrote §§ 901 and 903 with a
high degree of clarity. Where in the FA Act
is there a hint that suspension or revoca-
tion may be imposed as a penalty?
The landmark FAA case of Pike v. C.A.B.,
303 F.2d 353, (8th Cir. 1962), is instruc-
22
tive. A commercial pilot, Pike was charged
with giving flight instruction when he did
not possess an instructor's certificate.
The court reversed revocation of his
license because nothing in the statutes or
FAA regulations specifically forbade him
from giving instruction. Blackmun, J.:
This lack of specificity and com-
pleteness of the Regulations disturbs us
for this case. Because of this we are
disinclined to reach a result, drastic
in its application to the individual
concerned (whether it be Pike or any
other), which deprives an airman of
admitted experience and ability his
primary means of livelihood. [Citing
cases] We prefer to have, where a result
of that magnitude is to be forthcoming,
a statute or regulation which is more
positive and definite than those here
involved.
Id. at 357. We doubt if the court meant
that magnitude of the penalty would deter-
mine the legal principles, but a 180-day
suspension of a private pilot who owns his
own plane is hardly insubstantial.
It is axiomatic that a statute is uncon-
stitutionally vague if persons of "common
as
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application."
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926). How can layman or
lawyer read § 609 and obtain from it a
legislative mandate for license penalties?
"Vague laws offend several important
values." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972). “There are, of
course, instances where the plain language
of a regulation [or statute] simply does
not ‘bear the construction' furnished by
the officer or agency involved. Such a case
was Pike v. CAB .. ." Gulf Oil Corporation
v. Hickel, 435 F.2d 440, 445 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
Wilson held that "[b]y resting suspen-
Sion on a Board determination that the
"interest of the public so requires,'
Congress conferred broad discretionary
authority on the Board." 244 F.2d at 744.
By its own terms, even assuming, arguendo,
24
this were true, on its face it violates the
standard of clarity required by § 558 and
the principles laid down in Grimaud and
Eaton, supra. It says, not that Congress
delegated authority to impose suspension
and revocation as punitive sanctions, but
that the Board (then the C.A.B.) could
suspend for whatever it deemed to be in the
public interest. In other words, the choice
was the agency's and, ergo, it, not Con-
gress, created the sanction, which would
make it an unconstitutional delegation.14
Even NTSB recognizes the obvious, but not
its legal relevancy:
"This statute [§ 1429(a)] does not
explicitly state that the Administrator
may suspend a certificate for violations
of the FAR;; however, a prior version of
this section which contained similar
14 wilson, of course, addressed none
of this. Again, it is puzzling why the
court below failed to do so; these issues
were prominently raised. Petitioner's Brief
at 36-40, Komjathy v. NTSB, supra, n. 7. Go
Leasing, supra, held that § 558 had been
complied with, but offered no analysis. 800
F.2d at 1526.
25
langauge [sic] has been construed to
authorize the suspension of an airman
license for violations of safety
regulations. 4/ In Wilson, the court
rejected the argument that the then §609
which provided for the suspension of an
airman certificate "if the interest of
the public so requires" did not author-
ize a suspension for the violation of
regulations.
Komjathy, NTSB Order No. EA-2343, SE-6249,
July 14, 1986. (a-24-25)
II. FPAA's certificate rule, FAR § 13.19 has
never been lawfully adopted through APA
public notice and comment procedures; it is
unconstitutionally vague--does a citizen
have a constitutional r. “ht to be told how
he is to be punished?
A. Not lawfully adopted. FAR § 13.19, 14
C.F.R. § 13.19, is FAA's certificate susp-
ension and revocation rule. The APA, 5
U.S.C. § 553, requires that "substantive"
rules be adopted through formal public
notice and comment procedures (Notice of
Proposed Rule Making--NPRM). The rule is
substantive and has not been so adopted.
This requires dismissal. Id. § 706; Aiken
v. Obledo, 442 F.Supp. 628, 650 (D.C.
Calif. 1977) ("The reviewing court shall--
26
- - « hold unlawful and set aside agency
action . . « found to be .. . not in
accordance with law... .").
The Circuit Court holds that the rule
does not require formal adoption because it
is not substantive as it merely paraphrases
§ 609 on which it is based. 832 F.2d at
1296-97. Evidently straddling both sides of
the issue, the Court also appears to hold
that, even so, rulemaking formalities were
in fact complied with--and that petitioner
agrees. Id. at 1297 n. 1. This is mistaken:
petitioner does not in any manner agree.
Whether § 553 has been complied with is
purely a factual question. Rulemaking re-
quirements are well understood. First an
NPRM in the Federal Register is required
which includes: (1) time, place, and nature
of the proceedings; (2) reference to the
legal authority under which the rule is
proposed; (3) its terms and substance. 5
U.S.C. § 553(b). In other words, the agency
27
explains that it is proposing a rule that
will govern certificate actions and expl-
ains how it will work. After this notice,
it collects comments sent in by interested
persons to the docket number and address
specified in the NPRM, considers and sum-
marizes them, adopts a concise general
statement of the rule and its purpose and,
along with the rule as finally adopted,
publishes this material in the Federal
Register. Id. § 553(c)&(d).
The Circuit Court cites 27 Fed. Reg.
5694 (1962) as the required NPRM. 832 F.2d
at 1297 n. 1. This notice cannot under any
circumstances so qualify. It was part of a
major rules recodification project carried
out in 1961-62. Nothing in it refers to any
proposal to create a certificate rule, much
less explain its purpose, legal basis, or
invites the public to comment on how it
should work, etc. And in order to further
comply one would have to cite to an addi-
28
tional Federal Register notice which con-
tained a summary of the public comments,
the rule as finally adopted, and so forth.
Id. § 553(c)&(d). This was not done: no
such notice was ever published.
The certificate rule at the time of this
notice, 1962, was codified as 14 C.F.R. §
408.25, see 24 Fed. Reg. 10 (1959). Neither
did this 1959 notice make any pretense of
being an NPRM proposing a certificate rule
(or any other--if it had, then the focus
would be on 1959, not 1962); it simply an-
nounced that the new Federal Aviation Agen-
cy was adopting the entire set of enforce-
ment rules it set forth. Nothing was said
as to why § 553 requirements were not fol-
lowed. See, Emperor at 87-90. The purpose
of the recodification project was to change
the old Part 408 numbers, and others, which
were a carryover from the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA--metamorphosed into
FAA).
29
The notice relied upon by the court
below plainly states in its preamble:
"Interested persons are invited to
participate in the proposed recodifica-
tion « « «
The proposal is part of the program
of the Federal Aviation Agency to recod-
ify its regulatory material . . . The
object of the new chapter is to restate
existing regulations, not to make new
ones. The pertinent provisions have been
freely reworded and rearranged, subject
to every precaution against disturbing
existing rights, privileges, duties or
functions. ...
No substantive change has been made
in the regulations, the purpose of the
recodification project being simply to
streamline and clarify present regulat-
ory language and to delete obsolete or
redundant provisions. ...
27 Fed. Reg. 5686 (1962) [emphasis added].
. This notice referred to an earlier one, 26
Fed. Reg. 10698 (1961), which first announ-
ced the project. Id. It said:
This notice proposes no substantive
changes in the regulations and is not a
notice of proposed rule making subject
to the Administrative Procedure Act. ..
- The program will not result in any new
regulatory requirements.
Most of the current rules and
regulations have been inherited from
predecessor organizations and were
promulgated by them over a period of
30
more than twenty years. ...
The recodified system will serve to
assure consistency in style, format and
approach in any substantive revision of
the actual requirements of the regula-
tions that may be undertaken after the
recodification program is completed...
With minor exceptions, the regulat-
ions included in the outline are those
that were in effect January 1, 1961...
- In addition, rewritten regulations
will be published under notices of
proposed rule making in the FEDERAL
REGISTER and all interested persons will
be invited to submit comments and
recommendations on the form and manner
of their inclusion in the recodified
structure.
Id. 10698-99 [emphasis added]. It should be
noted that this notice proposed to cody
enforcement rules as Part 15. Yet another
notice, apparently the last, changed Part
15 to the present Part 13. It stated:
A part of the comments received rec-
commended specific substantive changes
to the regulations. Although some of
these recommendations might, upon fur-
ther study, appear to be meritorious,
they cannot be adopted as a part of the
recodification program. The purpose of
the program is simply to streamline and
Clarify present regulatory language and
to delete obsolete or redundant provis-
ions. To attempt substantive changes in
31
the recodification of these regulations
(other than minor, relaxatory ones that
are completely noncontroversial) would
delay the project and would be contrary
to the ground rules specified for it in
the FEDERAL REGISTER on November 15,
1961 (26 F.R. 10698), and Draft Release
62-27. However, all comments of this
nature will be preserved and considered
in any later substantive revision of the
affected parts.
27 Fed. Reg. 9585 (1962) [emphasis added].
Under no circumstances has FAR 13.19
ever been promulgated through public notice
and comment procedures. How the District of
Columbia Circuit concluded otherwise is
difficult to understand. All of these
Federal Register notices, along with
appropriate quotations, were cited to it
for reference. (Petitioner's Reply Brief at
10-11, Komjathy v. NTSB, supra.)
Is 13.19 is exempt from rulemaking? The
Circuit Court asserts that the rule "does
no more than repeat, virtually verbatim,
the statutory grant of authority in 49 App.
U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) [§ 609] for the
ordering of such suspensions." 832 F.2d at
32
1296. This manifestly is not correct. It
delegates to specific agency officials the
Administrator's authority to issue suspen-
sion and revocation orders. These officials
are not designated by § 609. The need to
formally delegate is required by FA Act, §
301, 49 U.S.C. 1341(a) ("The Administrator
shall be responsible for the exercise of
all powers and the discharge of all duties
of the Administration, and shall have
authority and control over all personnel
and activities thereof."), and § 302, id. §
1343(f) ("The [Administrator] is authorized
- « « to define their authority and duties
es eee
Since Congress has delegated to the Adm-
inistrator enormous responsibility to make
rules (laws) on its behalf and issue orders
that often determine the right to hold a
job, or continue in business, surely it is
a matter of substantive public concern to
whom he delegates this authority. A clerk?
33
Implementing § 609, the rule lays out a
scheme of procedural due process. The stat-
ute instructs the Administrator "except in
cases of emergency, [to] provide the holder
of such certificate an opportunity to ans-
wer any charges and be heard as to why such
certificate should not be amended, modifi-
ed, suspended or revoked." 49 U.S.C. app. §
1429(a). It does not specify Row the
charges are to be presented, how process is
to be served, how the accused shall answer.
The rule offers a number of options for
the accused. By what means does the agency
serve the notice of proposed certificate
action? It doesn't say. Service of process
is one of the most fundamental of procedu-
ral due process concerns. Is it to be
personal service? Certified mail? What
happens if the accused is out of the coun-
try and someone else signs for it? The
holder only has 15 days to respond. Do not
"interested persons" of the aviation public
34
have the right to comment on whether it
should be 10 days, 20 days, 30 days? The
informal conference, or option to write a
letter, is FAA's interpretation of 609's
command to provide an opportunity to
answer. This is the agency performing a
legislative function, filling in details.
What the rule does not say is as signi-
ficant as what it does. The accused has an
automatic stay of any order, unless "the
[Administrator] advises the . . . Board
that an emergency exists and safety in air
commerce or air transportation requires the
immediate effectiveness of his order..."
When an FAA official declares an emergency
pilots are instantly put out of their job,
businesses closed down with dozens or
hundreds of employees out of work. Yet
13.19 does not specify how that advice is
to be given, or in what period of time.15
15 This lack of detail allows an FAA
official to extend the 60-day limit in
35
Where are criteria establishing what con-
stitutes a threat to air safety?1l® Should
the official have to file an affidavit, or
otherwise explain his drastic action? Now,
all he does is recite the litany that the
order is in the interest of air safety and
the public, without having to say why.
The Circuit Court's holding that 13.19
does no more than paraphrase § 609 does not
which the Board must decide the case, by
first serving the order on the holder to
shut him down, which he always obeys on the
spot, then delaying his letter of advice,
which is a separate document. Under NTSB
rules the 60 days only start running "as of
the date when the Administrator's written
advice of the emergency character of his
order has been received ..." 49 C.F.R. §
821.54(b). This same issue is raised in
Mallen v. Federal Deposit Insurancé Corpor-
ation, 667 F.Supp. 652 (D.Ia. 1987), Sup.
Ct. No. 87-82, July 9, 1987.
Although FAA has no emergency rule
as such, CAA, its predecessor, did: "(An
emergency will be deemed to exist [i]n the
event the condition or conduct of a certif-
icate holder is such as to indicate immed-
iate danger of injury to a person or damage
to property, and the immediate suspension
of the certificate might reasonably be ex-
pected to avert such injury or damage .
o” 14 C.F.R. § 468.25 (1952).
36
comport with the facts. The rule, indeed,
does do that, but it also affects indivi-
dual rights and obligations by legislating
a substantive scheme of procedural due
process, the test set out in Chrysler Corp.
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979).
"Once an agency rule or regulation has been
determined to be substantive, it neverthe-
less will not have ‘the force and effect
of law' unless its promulgation conforms
‘with any procedural requirements imposed
by Congress.' [Citing Chrysler Corp., id.
at 303.]" Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F.2d
1421, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1986). The rule has
never been lawfully promulgated. The
requirements of the APA were designed to
assure fairness and mature consideration of
rules of general application. NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); see
also Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Assoc. v. Finch,
307 F.Supp. 858 D. Del. 1970).
B. Right to know the penalty. FAR §
37
13.19 violates due process. Petitioner (and
the public) has a right to be told how FAA
will punish him for a safety violation. FAA
interprets § 609 to authorize suspension
and revocation for two entirely separate
purposes: (1) suspension until the holder
demonstrates he is qualified, revocation if
it turns out he is not; (2) purely as pun-
ishment for the violation of a safety rule.
1980 Handbook, 4 203.c.(1) (b)&(c) and
205.b.(3)&(4) at pages 13 and 15. (a-72-
73) Yet the rule warns only of its use for
qualifications matters (reinspection and
reexamination). Failure to tell the public
about punitive suspensions violates the APA
and the most basic concepts of substantive
due process. Pike v. C.A.B., supra.
Whether § 609, through vague language
about public interest, authorizes suspen-
Sion penalties is an entirely separate
issue from whether the agency (which, after
all, has complete control over what it
38
publishes as regulations) has lived up to
its responsibilities in telling the public
what its enforcement policies are. "Vague
laws offend several important values."
Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, 408
U.S. at 108. Why would this important
regulatory agency not tell the persons it
regulates their licenses are at risk for
safety violations?
The Circuit Court appears to say that
the rule is adequate as long as it repeats
§ 609's public interest language, and that
the public ought to be able to figure out
that this includes suspension and revoca-
tion as penalties. 832 F.2d at 1296. This
is a remarkable position. The reasoning
behind it is rather unclear. What is clear,
is that nothing can change the fact that
there is neither statute nor regulation
which so much as hints that in addition to
the civil-money fine suspension and
revocation are also used as penalties.
39
III. Three basic policies apply to any FAA
safety enforcement case: (1) right to
choose the track of justice, administrative
or judicial; (2) right to impose a certif-
icate penalty; (3) right to shift from one
track to the other. Not one has ever been
published in the Federal Register or,
although substantive, promulgated through
public notice and comment procedures.
A. Failure to publish. FAA policies: (1)
direct agency officials, when initiating
any safety violation case, to choose
between the § 609 administrative track of
justice and the § 901 civil-penalty-jury-
trial track; (2) explain that certificate
suspension or revocation, may be used as
punishment in lieu of civil penalties; (3)
authorize officials, in their discretion,
having initiated one track, to shift over
to the other (almost always certificate to
Civil money fine).
All three may be found in the agency's
enforcement manual. (1) "Formal legal
actions are undertaken to: .. . Impose
punitive sanctions, after the act, to deter
violations (e.g., certificate action, civil
40
penalties) . . ." 1980 Handbook, supra,
203.¢C.(1) (b) (a-73)3 (2) “IE monetary
sanction against any certificate holder is
insufficient to get and keep their atten-
tion, do not hesitate to use certificate."
Id. FJ 203.c.(2) (a-74); see also 9 205.a. &
b. (a-75-78) Policy No. 3 reads:
Shift in sanctions Ordinarily it will
not be FAA policy to withdraw one rem-
edy, after it has been commenced, to
pursue another, although circumstances
may arise in which such action is appro-
priate. An example where such action
would be appropriate is when counsel has
commenced certificate action against a
pilot and thereafter learns that the
pilot uses an aircraft in business or a
profession and that the proposed suspen-
sion would constitute a sanction much
more severe than is warranted by the
violation. Contrary situations will also
occur.
Id. 4 1202.a.(4) at page 163.17
17 The manual does not explain what
happens to the pilot's right to jury trial.
Had agency officials initiated the case as
a civil penalty instead, the accused would
have been in a position to say, "I didn't
do it, I won't pay, sue me," and then would
have been able to "demand" a jury trial.
Nor does it, of course, explain how, once
having started the case as a civil penalty,
with its absolute right to jury trial, the
41
Congress has mandated in the APA that
virtually every agency policy which might
somehow impinge on the public be published
in the Federal Register or promulgated
through formal procedures. Senator Pat
McCarran, its sponsor, called that act
a bill of rights for the hundreds of
thousands of Americans whose affairs are
controlled or regulated in one way or
another by agencies of the federal
government. It is designed to provide
guaranties of due process in administra-
tive procedures.
S. Rep. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 298
(1946). The act provieé>s that each agency
shall "publish in the Federal Register for
the guidance of the public-- ... [inter
alia] rules of procedure, statements of
general policy, or interpretations of
general applicability formulated and adop-
ted by the agency .. ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)-
(1). Unless the person has actual and time-
FAA can deny that right and switch to a
certificate action -- “contrary situation".
Is it not incumbent upon FAA to explain
this conundrum?
42
ly notice, "a person may not in any manner
be required to resort to, or be adversely
affected by, a matter required to be pub-
lished in the Federal Register and not so
published. . . ." Id. This is a legislative
exclusionary rule, the only remedy should
an agency violate the act.
The three policies fit one or more of
the named categories, arguably all three.
FAA has never contended otherwise. Since no
reference to any one of them is to be found
in the FA Act, they are clearly interpreta-
tions of §§ 609 and 901, formulated and
adopted by the agency and, obviously, of
general applicability. FAA has never claim-
ed that any one of them has ever been pub-
lished in the Federal Register. Never
claimed they do not apply, or would not be
available to resort to, in petitioner's
case.18 since they do apply, fall within
18 PAA's defense seems to be that
Since they are contained in the enforcement
43
one or more of the named categories, and
have never been published, the federal
courts must follow Congress' mandate and
dismiss.
The only place official reference to
these FAA policies may be found is in agen-
cy manuals. The Court has specifically held
this not to be sufficient: APA publication
requirements must be followed. Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). “The statute [5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (1)] clearly provides that
no administrative action taken pursuant to
unpublished procedures can be allowed to
stand against a person adversely affected
thereby." Northern California Power Agency
Vv. Morton, 396 F.Supp. 1187, 1191 (D.D.C.
1975), affirmed 539 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir.
1976). “Any agency regulation that so dir-
ectly affects preexisting legal rights or
manual and it is available to the public
they need not be published. This argument
is wholly without merit.
44
Obligations .. . indeed, that is ‘of such
a nature that knowledge of it is needed to
keep the outside interests informed of the
agency's requirements in respect of any
subject within its competence,' is within
the publication requirement [of the APA]."
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d
4Si, 455 (4th Cir. 1977).
B. Failure to promulgate. Each of the
three policies constitutes a “rule” as
defined by the APA: "rule" means the whole
or a part of an agency statement of general
Or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requi-
rements of an agency ...5 U.S.C. §
551(4). The basic question, however, is
whether or not these "rules" are “substan-
tive" within the meaning of id. § 553(d)
("The required publication of a substantive
rule shall be made .. .") and § 552(a)-
45
(1) (D) (“substantive rules of general
applicability adopted as authorized by
law"). If so classified, the APA mandates
that they be adopted pursuant to formal
procedures which require, inter alia,
notice of proposed rulemaking published in
the Federal Register with a statement of
basis and purpose, opportunity for public
comment, and publication of the rule as
finally adopted. Id. § 553(b).
The policies are clearly substantive,
they affect a property right. See Pastrana
v. United States, 746 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir.
1984). Careful search of the Code of Feder-
al Regulations and Federal Register since
1958 reveals no NPRMs or rules as finally
adopted for any of the three. That failure
is an absolute bar to this case: "[A] per-
son may not in any manner be required to
resort to, or be adversely affected by, a
matter required to be published in the
Federal Register and not so published." 5
46
U.S.C. § 552(a) (1). “The reviewing court
shall--hold unlawful and set aside agency
action . . . found to be-- .. . not in
accordance with law." Id. § 706(2) (A);
Aiken v. Obledo, supra, 442 F.Supp. at 650.
"The purpose of requiring a statement of
the basis and purpose is to enable courts,
which have the duty to exercise review, to
be aware of the legal and factual framework
underlying the agency's action." Am. Stan-
dard, Inc. v. U.S., 602 F.2d 256, 269
(U.S.Ct. of Claims 1979).
Section 553(b), was meant to provide an
opportunity for public participation in the
rule making process when that process re-
sults in the promulgation of rules or regu-
lations of substantial impact. Pharmaceu-
tical Mfrs. Assoc. v. Finch, 307 F.Supp.
858 (D. Del. 1970); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Dep't of Energy, 449 F.Supp. 760 (D.
Del.), affirmed 596 F.2d 1029 ({Emer.Ct.App.
1978); National Retired Teachers Ass'n v.
47
United States Postal Service, 430 F.Supp.
141 (D.D.C.), affirmed 593 F.2d 1360 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., supra, and Texaco, Inc. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740 (3rd Cir. 1969).
"Any claim of exemption from APA rulemaking
requirements ‘will be narrowly construed
and only reluctantly countenanced.' [Citing
cases]" Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
Alternate question. These issues of
publication and promulgation were prominen-
tly raised in petitioner's brief below. FAA
has never contested the existence of these
policies, that they fit the § 552(a) (1)
categories, or claimed they do not apply to
petititioner's case. They have not, because
it is impossible to suggest otherwise. Yet
the District of Columbia Circuit failed
to address both issues, which would have
been dispositive of the case--and which,
48
assume, arguendo, full authority to make
the policies.
We submit that this failure was a denial
of justice, and ask the Court, should it
not take jurisdiction of this case, to
remand it to the Circuit Court with
instructions to decide the two issues.
IV. PAR § 13.15, the civil penalty rule,
violates due process: it was purposefully
amended to misrepresent the law; it fails
to advise the citizen that it may be re-
sorted to as an alternative to certificate
action; neither original rule nor amend-
ment were promulgated in accordance with
APA procedures. The APA's "resort to” lan-
guage provides petitioner with standing.
A. FAR § 13.15 misrepresents the law.
The statutory basis for FAA's civil penalty
rule, FAR § 13.15, is § 901, which reads:
Any person who violates... any
provision... [of this Act], or any
rule, regulation or order issued there-
under .. . shall be subject to a civil
penalty of not to exceed $1,000 for each
such violation. .. .19
19 The statute was recently amended
to raise the civil penalty -for air carriers
to $10,000; but the $1,000 limit was left
untouched for individuals. P.L. 100-223,
Sec. 204, 101 Stat. 1519 (1987).
49
49 U.S.C. app. § 1471(a) (1) [emphasis
added]. The rule reads:
(a) Under sec. 901 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 . . . a person who
violates any provision... . of that
Act, or any regulation or order issued
[thereunder] .. . is subject to a civil
penalty...
14 C.F.R. § 13.15(a) [emphasis added].
The plain command of section 901, “Any
person shall be subject to meee pen-
alty," cannot be reconciled with "a person
is subject to a civil penalty." The rule
misrepresents the law in a fundamental way.
It changes a peremptory command that FAA
officials use civil penalty for all viola-
tions, to "use it if you feel like it."
The rule uses the phrase "if a civil
penalty is contemplated." Id. § 13.15(b).
Thus it is deficient because it does not
explain, if not a civil. penalty, just what
it is that is contemplated for the viola-
tion. We know, of course, it is certifi-
cate action. Nor does it mention that the
50
penalty can be shifted from suspension or
revocation to a money fine.
In light of the lengths to which the
agency goes in its enforcement manual to
guide its officials on how to choose
between the two forms of action, is it not
remarkable that neither 13.19 nor 13.15
mentions the other?
By writing a regulation that misrepre-
sents the law, fails to advise that the
agency claims it can choose between civil
and certificate penalties (as well as two
disparate forms of justice) and that its
officials may shift back and forth between
them, PAA viclaned the APA and petitioner's
right to due process under the Fifth
Amendment. Pike v. C.A.B., supra, Gulf Oil
Corporation v. Hickel, supra; see also
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force,
S91 F.26 852. (D.C. Cir... 2978}.
B. Both original and amended rule
promulgated in violation of APA. FAR 1
51
13.15 started life as 14 C.F.R. § 408.23
(1960), first published in 24 Fed. Reg. 10
(1959). It has never been promulgated
through the APA public notice and comment
procedures required by 5 U.S.C. § 553. It
tracks FAR § 13.19 in this regard (since it
was always the entire set of rules publish-
ed, not single ones). FAA does not dispute
this. Like 13.19, this rule is substantive
because it delegates authority and legis-
lates procedures for FAA handling of civil
penalty cases, that is, creates a system
not spelled out in the statute. We adopt by
reference 13.19's arguments, supra.
FAR § 13.15, however, has an added di-
mension, however. It was once amended--on
the sly, it’s fair to say--completely
changing its meaning, without following
either the publication or notice and
comment procedures of the APA. As § 408.23,
and when first announced, the rule faith-
fully followed § 901: "Under section 901 of
52
the Act, any person who violates any provi-
sion ... Of the Act, or any rule, regu-
lation, or order issued thereunder, shall
"
be subject to a civil penalty .. ." 24
Fed. Reg. 10 (1959), 14 C.F.R. § 408.23
(1960) (a-66). The recodification project
tirst proposed that enforcement rules be
codified as Part 15. See 27 Fed. Reg. 5694
(Thursday, June 14, 1962). It was in this
particular notice where the language was
changed to read “a person is subject to a
civil penalty.” Then in yet another publi-
cation of the rules, as finally recodified,
Part 15 was changed to Part 13, where it
still remains. 27 Fed. Reg. 9586, 9590
(1962) (Friday, September 28, 1962). (It
seems strange FAA officials had such a hard
time settling on the new number.)
Nothing in the notice of June 14, 1962,
explained it was changing the language of
the civil penalty rule, publishing a new or
amended rule of procedure, statement of
a3
general policy, or interpretation of gener-
al applicability formulated and adopted by
the agency. This violated the publication
requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1). AS
the change was obviously substantive, from
peremptory command, to at your discretion,
the failure to use notice and comment pro-
cedures violated id. § 553. Both failures
require dismissal. Id. § 706.
C. Lack of standing. The Circuit Court
holds that petitioner lacks standing to
challenge the civil penalty rule. This pos-
ition reflects a serious lack of understan-
ding of FAA enforcement. It cites Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 0.S.. 464 (1982). It is ditfticuit to
understand the relevance of a case where
those who lacked standing were an indepen-
dent group dedicated to challenging govern-
ment action they believed violative of sep-
aration of church and state. More relevant
54
is United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(1973). If a group of law students con-
cerned about forests being trashed because
of a freight-rate increase have standing,
where does that leave petitioner whose
license is subject to an integrated FAA
enforcement program that includes both
civil and license penalties?
The Valley Forge test cited is that pet-
itioner may invoke the court's authority
only if he "has suffered injury, whether
past or future, that the injury is trace-
able to the action of the defending party,
and that a favorable ruling by the court is
likely to remedy the harm." 832 F.2d at
1295-96. Petitioner fully meets this test.
As the manual makes clear, before initiat-
ing the case against him, FAA officials
were required to choose between certificate
action and civil penalty. The injury is
obvious: by choosing to suspend his lic-
ense, petitioner was denied the right to
55
have his trial in district court where,
should he have so desired, he could have
"demanded" a jury; he was denied the oppor-
tunity to negotiate a compromise and, fail-
ing that, if convicted, a money fine was
the worst he'd have suffered.
The District of Columbia Circuit also
overlooked the shift in sanctions policy,
which puts the issue squarely within the
APA.~ As we have shown, this is an integral
part of enforcement policy; 99.99 % of
shifts are from certificate action to money
fine. The only survey to our knowledge ever
done showed that 35% of all civil penalties
started as certificate actions. See Emper-
or at 79 n. 115. The Circuit Court is
clearly saying, if the agency chooses not
to use civil penalty in your case, you
can't complain. The irony of this is that
it leaves one's standing completely in
control of the agency itself.
How could petitioner "be required to re-
56
Sort to," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1), the shift
in sanctions policy when it had never been
- published in the Federal Register?29 See
W.G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corporation
v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498, 503 (4th Cir.
1973) ("Before debarring a contractor from
future government contracts, a federal ag-
ency must comply with § 3(a) of the [APA]
by stating and publishing its rules of
procedure. [Citing cases]"). Petitioner has
standing.
Should the Court decline to take juris-
diction of this case, we respectfully ask
it to at the least consider this standing
issue, and if favorable to petitioner,
remand to the District of Columbia Circuit
with instructions to decide the civil
penalty issues.
20 and how would he know? This writer
has interviewed dozens of airmen; it is
certain the vast majority, and most of
their lawyers, do not know of this shift
policy. How would they, with no rule?
57
CONCLUSION
For these various reasons, this petition
for certiorari should be granted. Should
the Court not take jurisdiction, petitioner .
asks it to take cognizance of the standing
issue and the fact the District of Columbia
Circuit failed to address the several legi-
timate issues noted, any one of which would
have been dispositive of the case, and in
exercise of its supervisory powers to
remand to that court for their disposition.
Respectfully submitted,
LAWRENCE B. SMITH
3938 E. Grant Rd., #191
Tucson AZ 85712
602/326-0283
Counsel for Petitioner
April 1988
58
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.