Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Komjathy v. Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

Supreme Court brief1988

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term,

1987

DAVID S. KOMJATHY, Petitioner,

Vv.

ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION,

and NATIONAL TRANS-

PORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Lawrence B.

3938 E. Grant Rd., #191

Tucson, Arizona 85712

(602) 326-0283

Counsel for Petitioner

Smith

April, 1988

|

a

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. When the Federal Aviation Administra-

ticn (FAA) initiates a safety-rule viola-

tion case against a pilot it chooses be-

tween two disparate tracks of justice: an

administrative system, and a judicial sys-

tem.1 with the first, it orders the suspen-

Sion or revocation of his license as pun-

ishment for the violation. He or she may

then ask the National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) for a hearing, which is con-

ducted by an administrative law judge, and

his decision may be reviewed by the Board.

On the second track, if unable to effect

compromise, it initiates a civil suit in

district court, where either party has the

right to "demand" a jury trial, and the

penalty is a money fine.

1 As FAA enforcement is rather ar-

cane, it is our opinion that brief back-

ground explanations are required for the

questions presented. For a detailed expla-

nation and legal history, see the law re-

view article cited at p. 4 n. 4, infra.

|

Authority for certificate penalties is

held to derive from § 609 of the Federal

Aviation Act, as amended (FA Act), 49

U.S.C. § 1429(a), which is said to author-

ize FAA to suspend or revoke whenever it

"determines that safety in air commerce. .

- and the public interest requires..."

It says nothing, however, of violations,

offenses, rules, sanctions or penalties.

Authority for civil penalties derives

from § 901, id. § 1471(a) (1), which pro-

vides that "Any person who violates...

any rule, regulation, or order .. . shall

be subject to a civil penalty pe a ee

trial, from § 903, id. § 1473(b) (1).

Use of these two tracks means that the

officials who initiate the case necessarily

determine at the start: (1) the kind of

trial the accused gets; (2) how he will be

punished; (3) whether he can demand jury.

The questions presented are:

A. May Congress, having mandated right

ii

to jury trial and money fines for safety

violations, thereafter constitutionally

authorize an FAA official to deny the ac-

cused those rights, and choose an adminis-

trative forum in lieu, which also brings

with it a different, and generally conceded

harsher form of punishment? Put another

way, has Congress in fact ever authorized

Suspension or revocation as a penalty?

B. Assuming, arguendo, Congress so

intended, is general language about air

safety and public interest sufficiently

specific constitutionally, and under the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5

U.S.C. § 558, to support a delegation of

authority to impose certificate sanctions?

Alternate. The Circuit Court did not

address the issue of whether language about

air safety and public interest meets the

APA's standards of clarity expressed in 5

U.S.C. § 558 which mandates that an agency

may use a penalty only if explicitly auth-

iii

orized by Congress. Thus the alternate

question is whether the Court, should it

not take jurisdiction, should remand with

instructions to do so?

2. FAA has a single certificate action

rule, Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) §

13.19, 14 C.F.R. § 13.19. Like § 609, on

which it is based, it speaks only of rein-

spection of aircraft and reexamination of

airmen, qualifications matters, and says

nothing of violations or sanctions, which

are disciplinary matters. This rule has

never been adopted through the APA public

notice and comment procedures required by 5

U.S.C. § 553, which would require dismis-

sal. The District of Columbia Circuit, even

though it apparently holds it has been,

goes on to hold it need not be, as-it only

paraphrases § 609.

The questions presented are:

A. Has FAR § 13.19 been lawfully adopted

in accordance with § 553 public notice and

iv

comment procedures? Or is it exempt?

B. Does an accused have a constitutional

right to be told how he will be punished?

3. When prosecuting any safety violation

case for which a penalty is sought, FAA

officials utilize, or may resort to, three

basic policies: (1) to initiate it, they

must choose between certificate action or

civil penalty; (2) they may use suspension

or revocation as punishment in lieu of

civil penalty;2 (3) having started on one

track, they may shift to the other--almost

always certificate to money fine.

None of these has ever been published in

the Federal Register, or promulgated as a

rule through public notice and comment.

The questions presented are:

A. Does the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1),

require that these policies, as "rules of

2 These are dealt with in Question 4.

Which means they also cannot be

found in the Code of Federal Regulations.

procedure," “statements of general policy,"

or “interpretations of general applicabil-

ity formulated and adopted by the agency,"

be published in the Federal Register; and

for failure so to do require this case to

be dismissed because that section provides

that “a person may not in any manner be

required to resort to, or be adversely

affected by, a matter required to be

published in the Federal Register and not

so published. .. ."?

B. Are these policies "substantive"

within the meaning of the APA, § 553, and

thus required to be promulgated by notice

and comment, failure of which requires

dismissal?

Alternate. Although raised, the Circuit

Court did not address these issues, which

assume, arguendo, authority to make the

policies. The only issue is compliance with

the APA. We submit this was a denial of

justice. If favorable, either would have

vi

been dispositive. Thus the alternate ques-

tion is whether the Court, should it not

take jurisdiction, should remand with

instructions to do so?

4. FAR § 13.15, 14 C.F.R. § 13.15, is

the civil penalty rule. It misrepresents

the law, § 901, which reads: Any person who

violates any rule "shall be" subject to a

Civil penalty. The rule reads: A person

"is" subject to a civil penalty. Instead of

901's preemptory command, it reads as if

FAA officials have the option not to use

Civil penalty. This is contrary to that

section's plain meaning. It fails to tell

the public that officials may shift from

license penalty to money fine.

The rule has never been lawfully promul-

gated through APA notice and comment proce-

dures; and was amended without their use.

The Circuit Court ruled that petitioner

lacked standing to challenge this rule.

The questions presented are:

vil

A. Does the rule violate due process and

the APA by misrepresenting the law upon

which it is based and failing to mention

shifts in sanctions?

B. Was the rule and its amendment

lawfully adopted pursuant to the APA, 5

U.S.C. §§ 552(a) (1), or § 553?

Alternate. Does petitioner lack stand-

ing? Should the Court decide that question,

and if favorable, remand these issues to

the Circuit Court? *

* In preparing this petition we were

mindful of Mr. Stern's admonition to keep

it short. It is, however, near the maximum.

In our view, any one of these questions, if

decided favorably, would warrant reversal.

The difficulty with reducing their number,

however, is that on a practical level they

are inextricably intertwined, and paint a

total picture which we think the Court

should see.

_ viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ete eee Ae em EPS |

OPINIONS BELOW ee re er ee ee ear

JURISDICTION rey eer re ee yr rr er ere a ae ee ee

STATUTES INVOLVED a ha il eal ak ie ara a eal a a

STATEMENT OF THE CASE cccccccccccesesecsed

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......2.2.2.6

Exceptional IMPOrtanCe acccccccceseses®

I. Congress has never authorized both a

judicial and an administrative sys-

tem of justice for the same safety

violations rere rer re re eye Pe eT Tee er ee

A. Denial of right to jury trial .....10

B. Even assuming legitimacy, “public

interest" is an unconstitutional

grant of power ol Se deh ae ea ea a ee ee

Il. FAR § 13.19, the certificate rule

never lawfully adopted; is unconsti-

tutionally vague: does not advise

citizen of how he will be punished ...26

A. Not lawfully adopted ..sccccccscsseeetl

Exempt from rulemaking? ....-.eeeeee32

B. Right to know Penalty cccsescoeseesal

III. FAA's three basic enforcement poli-

cies have never been lawfully pub-

lished or promulgated .cccccccccceseec4O

ix

A. FALIGER CO PUI OR oc cgcrsscvcesses 40

B. PAaLiure tO PEOMUIGEAEE .ccsscessecces 45

Alternate question: Should the

Court Remand ..... Cees eae seseresesees 48

IV. FAR § 13.15, FAA's civil penalty

rule misrepresents the law, fails to

advise that it is an alternative to

certificate action; was never law-

promulgated or amended; petitioner

has standing to challenge it .ssccescea 49

A. MiSFOEPEOSENtS Che LAW -.icccececccves 49

B. Not lawfully promulgated or

BINOTIGOE oo 00-8056 6 064 00008 HORRORS 34

C.. EOCE OF StANGLNG 2.640 6a ween end en cue 54

CONCLUSION ..... anceeea Terre r eT eC eee 58

APPENDIX (Separately bound) (Opinion

and Judgment of Court of Appeals;

Opinion and Order of the National

Transp. Safety Bd.), etC. ......a-l to a-78

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F.Supp. 628

[sls COLES AST 7) ace ceva ewes 6a aes 26,47

Am. Standard, inc... Vs U.S... 662 F.2¢

ZOU: LUseeces GE CLES Sete) ab eteeees 47

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566

Fad S351 (40 Cif. LETT) secevcecccese 45

Connally v. General Construction Co.,

269 U.S. 385 (1926) waccvecesesccecese 24

x

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281

(1979) eoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeteeee@ 37

Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 1421

[Far Ghee AFOR) Kasecsaseenaense tteeue 37

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.

Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir

LVGal éktdehwesdnasee ers ee ee ee ee a ee 48

Global Van Lines v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1290

[Sun Gare APGS) eaxnades wTererrTy Te TT ere. |

Go Leasing, Inc. v. National Transp.

Safety Bd., et al., 800 F.2d 1514

(StH Cif. 1966) sccsccasesveesessi0,15,25

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.

BUG ULF7Z) caoccevaecesencsescncessvettyeae

Gulf Oil Corporation v. Hickel, 435 F.2d

S40 (1970) ceccccccnesecesessesevieea, Si

Hard v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 248

F.2d 761 (7th Cir.), cert. denied

2535 O15. 360 tiSal) we teanedarecasdebhorvae

Komjathy, NTSB Order No. EA-2343,

SE-6249, July 14, 1986 wccccccccoves oe26

Komjathy v. National Transp. Safety

Bd., 832 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir.

1987) ceccceces peenceeehl p21 720932739990

Mallen v. Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation, 667 F.Supp. 652 (D.

Iowa 1987); Sup. Ct. No. 87-82,

July 9, 1987 wccccescvessces sb peenecaes 36

Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air

Force, 591 F.2nd 852 (1978) ..... ‘ween Se

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) cecos 44

xi

National Retired Teacher's Ass'n v.

United States Postal Service, 430

F.Supp. 141 (D.D.C.), affirmed 593

Tea Lave 40eCs CAs EBS) 66 eeseneee es 47

NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759

(1969) acccccvcccevsscscsscccccess -37,48

Northern California Power Agency v.

Morton, 396 F.Supp. 1187 (D.D.C.

1975), affirmed 539 F.2d 243 (D.C.

CiSs. LF7G) cecvcctscsivsscsicaseseeneuus 44

Pangburn v. Civil Aeronautics Board,

SLi Fes S49 (iOC CAts E904) #5 zo 600 15,19

Pastrana v. United States, 746 F.2d

kGG? CLEGM GELs BEES! 604 400ebsseneann eee

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass'n v.

Finch, 307 F.Supp. 858 (D.C. Del.

oy | Pr rrr re re ee rer odtee?

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of

Energy, 449 F.Supp. 760 (D.Del.),

affirmed 596 F.2d 1029 (Emer.Ct.App.

BPIO) coseeceaceses cocccccccccccccccscehs

Pike v. C.A.B., 303 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.

1962) wees co ccccccccccces occeceel22,38,51

Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n,

Sha Pea 180 (SEG Cifs SPOPl these eear 48

United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677

_ (1892) caenes (36600800680 0060 04 baEE 21,25

United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506

FRO EU) 26400088 Mebbeue ebb neeee eeu ene aisae

United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669

#) 520 Perera TrrrrTrecr. sesae

Xil

Valley Forge Christian College v. Amer-

icans United for Separation of Church

and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464

SOP MEME EMSC E ESCH ES SG esc cccccccer 54,55

W.G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corpor-

ation v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498

TE OR CA ebb eaccceccsccccce 57

Wilson v. Civil Aeronautics Board,

244 F.2d 773, cert. denied, 355 U.S.

re ws 6 0 eee ekee ad, 24,25

Constitution and Statutes:

U.S. Const. Amend V (Due Process

DTT Shee hawk eh ee 6066 00 0c a7 eae, 486,51

Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44

ne i Lis 6 666s 6 0s 000000 0c 19

Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub.

alenewee ga eceac. 973 (1938) ..... Pe §.

P.L. 110-223, Sec. 204, 101 Stat.

BSED CA9GT) accscccsvcces ee ccccccccccs 49

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§§ 551-559, 702-706 (1982):

DUPE REM EE RES SSS se ssceescccccsccecs 45

§ S52(a) (1) ~c ccc ccccuee 42,45,48,54,57

DS DES ASO b se sessenccnes 26,27,28,46,47,54

DUM CPC ME CSM E WSS SSS sec ecco cesccccccs 21

WM MOM MO SS ee wees c ccc ccc cscs cccces 54

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended,

49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982):

X1i1li

© 1341 (a) cecccccccccccccccccccsccccees 33

GS LS43(E) cectanscsccssssns (este henews 33

S$ 1429 (a) (§ GOS) ssasnsvenes 13,25,32,34

§ 1471(a) (1) & (2) (§ 901) .....-4.. 12,50

§ 1473 (b) (1) (§ 903) ceccccccceccccce 012

Regulations:

Department of Commerce, Air Commerce

Regulations, § 74(A), (F) (1926) ..... 18

Civil Aeronautics Regulations:

14 C.F.R. § 2O.37110 (1958) cesvcseas send

14 C.P.R. § 406.25 (1952) wececs rrr 36

Federal Aviation Regulations, 14

C.F.R. Parts 1-199 (1986):

eery) Serrrrirr cre eT TeeveTUTE tee 50

S Leeks ccconevaes weer ree yt 26,38,52

§ 408.23 (1960) wccccccrccccccccces 32429

§ 408.25 (1960) wcccccceccccccccccves 29

National Transportation Safety Board:

49 C.P.R. 8 821.54 (B) sccscccsctsccvss 36

Miscellaneous:

Civil Aeronautics, Legislative History of

the Air Commerce Act of 1926 ...... vee

Federal Aviation Administration Materials:

Xiv

Compliance and Enforcement Program,

FAA Order 2150.3 (1980) ..... 11,12,38,41

N. KOMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS, FEDERAL

CIVIL AVIATION POLICY UNDER THE AIR

COMMERCE ACT 1926-1938 (1978) ........ i?

Federal Register:

24 Fed. Reg. 10 (1959) wecseccer av; oagoes

26 Fed. Reg. 10698 (1961) ..cccceeeeee 31

27 Fed. Reg. 5686, 5694-95

(A962) secseece TeET PCR ee ee 28,30,53

27 Fed. Reg. 9585-92 (1962) ..cccee 32,33

Go Leasing, Inc. v. NTSB, United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-

cuit, No. 85-7401, Petitioner's

ROOLY BELGE scccsceevtresoncveneene oveetl

Komjathy v. National Transp. Safety Bd.,

United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit, No.

86-1444, Petitioner's Reply Brief ....32

S. Rep. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1946) [Legislative History of the

Administrative Procedure Act] ..... 21,42

Smith, FAA Blackjack, Professional Pilot

MPeGSEING At Fi, FORD. LFGL soscedcasssees 4

Smith, FAA: Illegal disciplinarian?,

Aviation Digest at 26, Sep. 1987 ..... 4

Smith, FAA PUNITIVE CERTIFICATE

SANCTIONS: THE EMPEROR WEARS NO

CLOTHES; OR, HOW DO YOU PUNISH A

PROPELLER?, 14 Transp. L.J. 59-100

CLOSES) ceteeraaas e709 9i2716,17,18,29,56

XV

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1987

DAVID S. KOMJATHY, Petitioner,

V «

ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION, and NATIONAL TRANS-

PORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Petitioner David S. Komjathy respect-

fully prays that a writ of certiorari issue

to review the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit, entered in

this proceeding November 13, 1987, order

denying rehearing entered February 1, 1988.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit is repor-

ted at 832 F.2d 1294, and is reprinted in

the accompanying separate appendix. (a-32)

The opinion and order of the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has not

been reported. It is reprinted in the

appendix (a-19), as is the administrative

law judge's oral initial decision, which it

affirmed. (a-6)

JURISDICTION

The Federal Aviation Administration, on

April 4, 1984, after having earlier served

a Notice of Proposed Certificate Action on

1

May 23, 1983, initiated an enforcement act-

ion against petitioner, under 49 U.S.C.

app. § 1429(a), by ordering a 180-day sus-

pension of his private pilot license as

punishment for certain alleged safety

violations. (a-1) He appealed to the NTSB,

under § 1429(a), and hearing was held by an

administrative law judge on September 20,

i985, who upheld the suspension, with the

final Board order, also affirming, entered

July 14, 1986. Mr. Komjathy petitioned the

Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit for review, under 49

U.S.C. § 1486. That court entered a

judgment and opinion affirming the NTSB

order on November 13, 1987; an order

denying a petition for rehearing was

entered February 1, 1988.

The jurisdiction of this Court to review

the judgment of the District of Columbia

Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutes and regulations directly

relevant to the issues are here listed,

with the pertinent portions of their text

set forth in the appendix:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§§ 551-559, 702-706 (1982): §§ 551(4),

552(a) (1), 553, 558, 706;

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as

amended, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552

(1982): §§ 1429(a), 1471(a) (1) & (2),

1473(a) & (b) (1);

Federal Aviation Regulations, 14

C.F.R. Parts 1-199 (1986): §§ 13.15, 13.193

§§ 408.23 and 408.25 (1960).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The issues petitioner raises go to the

Federal Aviation Administration's lack of

authority to bring a safety violation case

as a certificate action, its failure to

comply with the Administrative Procedure

Act, remedy for any failure of which is

3

dismissal, and related due process issues.4

No issue turns on any fact involved in the

incident. We briefly describe it, however,

as a frame of reference. A number of sali-

ent facts of general public notice support

the legal issues, which we present in the

reasons section.

Mr. Komjathy, a maintenance supervisor

for the New York State Thruway, and private

pilot, on November 26, 1982, took off

lawfully under visual flight rules (VFR)

conditions from the Schenectady, New York,

Airport. While still in its control zone

(within five miles of the airport) a snow

squall hit. Snow, unlike rain, cuts visibi-

lity to almost nil. He immediately radioed

4 For an indepth explanation and

history of FAA safety enforcement, see

Smith, FAA PUNITIVE CERTIFICATE SANCTIONS:

THE EMPEROR WEARS NO CLOTHES; OR, HOW DO

YOU PUNISH A PROPELLER?, 14 Transp. L.J.

59-100 (1985) [hereinafter “Emperor"];

Smith, PAA: Illegal disciplinarian?,

Aviation Digest at 26, Sep. 1987, and

Smith, PAA Blackjack, Professional Pilot

Magazine at 91, Feb. 1981.

4

tower for permission to return. Because the

field was now under instrument flight rules

(IFR), the tower told him to contact Albany

approach control. They gave him certain

directions which he either didn't hear or

was unable to follow. A non-instrument

rated pilot, he did the only sensible thing

he could, dropped down low to keep contact

with the ground, and flew back and forth

across the airport until the controllers

figured out they should let him land.

As a resuit, FAA charged him with flying

in less than weather conditions required

for VFR flight and contrary to air traf-

fic control (ATC) instructions. Following

appropriate notice, FAA, on April 4, 1984,

ordered his license suspended for 180 days,

strictly as punishment for violation of

related air-traffic rules.

He asked the NTSB for a hearing. Counsel

moved to dismiss, raising the same issues

as here. The Board denied the motion, and

5

petitioner filed an interlocutory appeal

with the District of Columbia Circuit, also

denied, but on grounds no final order had

been issued. Hearing was held September 20,

1985. On the advice of counsel, with peti-

tioner's full knowledge and consent, he did

not contest the charges. The administrative

law judge (ALJ) upheld the suspension.

Appeal was taken to the full Board, which

affirmed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Exceptional Importance

One million American citizens, pilots,

mechanics, flight engineers, air-taxi

operators, repair stations and air carriers

hold certificates issued by the Federal

Aviation Administration. We estimate that

at least 250,000 of them rely on their

license for their livelihood. Tens of thou-

sands of other jobs are dependent on com-

panies with FAA operating certificates. In

1979, the last public statistics we are

6

aware of, 4,000 safety enforcement cases

were closed by FAA. About 2,400, or 60%,

the vast majority of them pilots, had their

licenses suspended or revoked for periods

of up to one year, strictly as punishment

for the violation of safety regulations.

Perhaps 700 relied on their licensees for

their livelihood, not including businessmen

who needed to fly for business travel. The

other 40% were settled by civil penalty.

Emperor at 60.

For private and student pilots, punitive

certificate actions comprised 87% of the

total. Ninety-nine percent of these were

first offenses and generally involved

inadvertent violations of traffic and other

technical safety rules. Id. One can imagine

what would happen if 87% of auto cases re-

sulted in license suspension. Recently FAA

officials have increased emphasis on certi-

ficate actions, even for professionals,

rather than settle with a compromise money

5

fine, so today the figures could be con-

siderably higher.

It is plain fact that no statute, no

regulation exists which so much as hints

that FAA may suspend or revoke a pilot's

license as penalty for a safety violation.

Put another way, this means that a lawyer

unfamiliar with aviation, if asked to find

out how pilots are punished for air-traffic

violations, cannot find the answer in the

United States Code or the Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR). This is remarkable, to

say the least.

What is also remarkable, and discernable

through review of the Federal Register, is

that FAA officials, in the agency's three

decades of existence, have never, through

APA notice and comment procedures, involved

the public in the making of the few proce-

Gure rules they do have.°

5 Emperor at 82-98, traces this

regulatory history.

In 1926, seminal year of federal regu-

lation of aviation, Congress, for enforce-

ment, considered both a criminal system and

a Civil penalty system with right to jury

trial. It chose the latter. Neither then,

nor at any time since has any agency ever

asked for authority to set up a parallel

certificate-sanction system of justice, no

legislator has ever introduced a bill pro-

posing such, no committee of Congress has

ever held hearings on the subject.

The reported cases which provide the

only foundation for the agency's claim of

authority are all based on a gross error of

fact: belief the certificate system was

authorized by Congress in 1938, when in

fact officials started it in 1926, right in

the face of Congress' single choice, civil

money penalties with jury trial.®

6 A detailed exposition of this, and

how enforcement works, may be found in

Emperor at 59-82.

I. FAA's claim that Congress authorized

both a judicial and an administrative

system of justice for the same violations,

which allows it to deny right to jury

trial, is without foundation.

A. Denial of right to jury trial. To

raise as an issue whether Congress, having

mandated right to jury trial and a money

fine for air-safety violations, may there-

after constitutionally authorize a federal

agency to deny those rights, at worst, must

appear frivolous, at best, profoundly con-

fused.’ Such a situation would obviously

violate the most fundamental precepts of

Our democracy and system of jurisprudence.

Yet this is precisely what FAA's contention

amounts to. It is spelled out by plain lan-

7 Although argued (Petitioner's Reply

Brief at 18, Komjathy v. NTSB, United

States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit, No. 86-1444), perhaps

this is why the circuit court failed to

address this conundrum. Nor did the Ninth

Circuit in Go Leasing, Inc. v. NTSB, 800

F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1986) (Petitioner's

Reply Brief at 17, Go Leasing, Inc. v.

NTSB, United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit, No. 85-7401).

10

guage in the agency's enforcement manual:

"When violations occur, firm action must be

taken. . . . Impose punitive sanctions,

after the fact, to deter violations (e.g.,

certificate actions, civil penalties); . .

-" Or this: “If monetary sanction against

any certificate holder is insufficient to

get and keep their attention, do not hesi-

tate to use certificate action." Compliance

and Enforcement Program, FAA Order 2150.3,

q 203.c.(1)(b) and 7 203.c.(2) at pages 13-

14 [hereafter 1980 Handbook]. (See Exhibit

A, a-72, which contains more examples.)

It is important to note that the manual

carefully distinguishes qualifications mat-

ters from punitive purposes: "[Another

purpose is to] [a]chieve remedial purposes

(e.g., certificate suspension pending :

demonstration of qualifications; revocation

for lack of certificate qualifications) ."

11

Id. 4 203.c.(1) (c). (a-73) .8

Authority for civil penalties and that

Claimed for certificate penalties provide a

marked contrast:

(a) (1) Amy person who violates (A)

any provision of subchapter III, IV, V,

VI, or XII of this chapter ... or any

rule, regulation, or order issued

thereunder .. . shall be subject to a

Civil penalty of not to exceed $1,000

for each such violation...

(2) Any civil penalty may be com-

promised... :

(b) (1) Any civil penalty imposed or

assessed under this chapter may be col-

lected by proceedings in personam again-

st the person subject to the penalty. .

- Such proceedings shall conform as

nearly as may be to civil suits in

admiralty .. . either party may demand

trial by jury of any issue of fact, if

the value in controversy exceeds $20,

and the facts so tried shali not be

reexamined other than in accordance with

the rules of the common law... .

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended

(FA Act), §§ 901 and 903, 49 U.S.C. app. §§

1471(a)(1) and 1473(b) (1) [emphasis added].

What could be plainer? Certificate action:

8 See Emperor at 61-63.

12

The [Administrator] may, from time to

time, reinspect any civil aircraft, air-

craft engine, propeller, appliance, air

navigation facility, or air agency, or

may reexamine any civil airman. If, as a

result of any such reinspection or reex-

amination, or if, as a result of any

other investigation made by the [Admin-

istrator], he determines that safety in

air commerce or air transportation and

the public interest requires, the [Adm-

inistrator] may issue an order amending,

modifying, suspending, or revoking, in

whole or in part, any type certificate,

production certificate, airworthiness

certificate, airman certificate, air

Carrier operating certificate, air navi-

gation facility certificate (including

airport operating certificate), or air

agency certificate. . . . Any person

whose certificate is affected by such an

order .. . may appeal [for hearing] ..

- to the National Transportation Safety

Boara « « »

FA Act § 609, id., § 1429(a) [emphasis

added]. FAA contends, and several courts of

appeal have so held (cases discussed,

infra), that § 609 constitutes a broad

grant of power to the Administrator to

amend, modify, suspend or revoke a certifi-

cate whenever he "determines that safety in

air commerce or air transportation and the

public interest requires" it.

33

Several arguments undercut this claim:

(1) If one parses § 609 it is to be seen

that the air-safety-public-interest lang-

uage is lifted out of context. It is not a

broad grant to use power but a condition

subsequent to first reinspecting, reexami-

ning or investigating ("if as a result

of").9 In actuality it offers the Adminis-

trator a way to justify a decision not to

Suspend or revoke.

(2) As we have seen, FAA carefully dis-

tinguishes between suspensions used for

qualifications purposes and those used for

punishment. If Congress intended to use §

609 as a parallel system of justice for

violations, why would it use language

relevant to qualifications, reinspection

and reexamination, but fail to include such

9 oy general congressional exhorta-

tion to go forth and do good, without more,

is not a proper foundation for the sound

development of administrative law." Global

Van Lines v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1290, 1295-96

(Sth Cir. 1983); see also Emperor at 73.

14

obvious terms as violations, offenses, reg-

ulations, sanctions or penalties? The pre-

mier maxim of statutory interpretation,

expressio unius est exclusio alterius,

applies.

(3) Prior to Go Leasing, supra, and the

instant case, in only three reported cases

were certificate sanctions challenged:

aioe wv. ee. 264 F.24 773 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 355 U.S. 870 (1957); Hard v.

C.A.B., 248 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 355 U.S. 960 (1957)? Pangburn v.

C.A.B., 311 F.2d 349 (ist Cir. 1962)

{hereafter referred to individually or as

the Triad]. All were airline captains. As

they readily reflect, Wilson was the

touchstone.!9 The challenge there was to

the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,

10 Which makes it indeed puzzling as

to why the District of Columbia Circuit in

the instant case cited only Pangburn, 832

F.2d at 1296;. Pangburn clearly relies on

Wilson. 311 F.2d at 354.

15

§ 609, 52 Stat. 973, 1011 (1938 Act). (That

§ 609 was pretty much the same as the pre-

sent, except for the transfer of power from

the Civil Aeronautics Board to the new Fed-

eral Aviation Agency in 1958.) The District

of Columbia Circuit held, that "(bly rest-

ing suspension on a Board determination

that the ‘interest of the public so re-

quires,' Congress conferred broad discre-

tionary authority upon the Board." 244 F.2d

at 774; see also Emperor at 72. Ina

decision barely one-page, the court did not

explain why § 901 was not exclusive. 244

F.2d at 774.

Lacking plain statutory language to sup-

port suspension penalties with administra-

tive trial in lieu of right to jury, the

Triad, especially Wilson, has always been

the only such source for FAA's claim. The

District of Columbia Circuit, however, adds

a new one. It contends that NTSB is plainly

authorized to review FAA suspensions--

16

citing statutes. 832 F.2d at 1297. That is

undoubted, but it begs the salient ques-

tion: For what purpose or purposes has

Congress authorized FAA to suspend or

revoke certificates? And would Congress

knowingly authorize executive branch

officials to deny right to jury trial?

The root problem with the Triad is that

those cases are all based on a gross error

of fact: this so-called "deterrent" sanc-

tion system of justice did not start in

1938, authorized by the 1938 Act, as the

decisions show those courts believed,

certificate penalties were instituted in

1926. See Emperor at 74-77 (which explains

in detail how this happened) .11 Moreover,

11 “"[I]n October 1929, the [Aeronaut-

ics] Branch gradually began to deal more

severely with violators. .. . [It] turned

to suspensions as a primary enforcement

tool. At the same time revocations were

being handed out with greater frequency. .

- -" N. KOMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS, FEDER-

AL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY UNDER THE AIR

COMMERCE ACT 1926-1938, at 107-08 (1978)

(official history).

17

the government never argued that they

started in 1938, but in their brief pointed

out it was indeed 1926. See Emperor at 70

n. 75. But opposing counsel and the Wilson

court failed to pick up on this and con-

tinued to focus on 1938.

The issue before these courts was con-

gressional intent. How can the Triad cases

have any validity when based on such a fun-

damental mistake? Any argument about that

intent must be conducted in the time-frame

of 1926. In fact, the government itself

argued that it was the Air Commerce Act of

1926, § 3(f), 44 Stat. 568, 570 (1926),

from whence came their authority. See

The then extant certificate penalty rule

read: “Pilots' and mechanics' licenses will

be suspended or revoked for -- (A) Violat-

ing any provision of the air commerce act

of 1926 or these regulations. ... (F)

Violating air traffic rules." Department of

Commerce, Air Commerce Regulations, § 74

(A) and (F) (1926); see also 14 C.F.R. §

20.37110 (1938) (seminal edition of the

C.F.R. in which this rule was codified for

the first--and last--time).

18

Emperor at 75-76, and 74 n.91. But if

conducted in that time-frame the govern-

ment's position must fail. It is crystal

clear that the only enforcement system

chosen in 1926 was civil money penalties

with right to jury trial.12 CIVIL AERO-

NAUTICS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR

COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, at 59 (1928) (hereaf-

ter 1926 History); see Emperor at 67-68.13

Thus the real question is: On what basis

would Congress, in 1926, for violations of

air-safety rules, carefully choose a civil-

money~penalty system of justice over a

criminal system, mandate right to jury

trial in district court, then at some point

thereafter, authorize a parallel system of

administrative justice with a certificate

12 See Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch.

344, 11(b), 44 Stat. 568, 574.

Is justice served when FAA, and

appeals courts, continue to cite Wilson,

Hard and Pangburn, without confronting the

fact they are based on such obvious and

fundamental error?

19

penalty, using only vague language about

air safety and public interest, with no

bill introduced or hearings held to support

it? FAA never answers this question.

The irony of its position may be seen in

this conundrum: Assume a gross safety vio-

lation by a pilot who either never had a

license or had it revoked; without a certi-

ficate to act against, the only way FAA can

prosecute him is by means of the civil pen-

alty system. Thus the truly bad actor is

assured of his right to jury and, at worst,

a money fine collectible only by levy.

B. Even assuming, arguendo, that Con-

gress intended to grant broad authority to

use suspension and revocation for whatever

is in the “public interest," it is an

unconstitutional delegation of power.

Even if the above problems with § 609

could be overcome, its language about air

safety and public interest is constitution-

ally inadequate as a touchstone of power.

It is fundamental that Congress may not

delegate its authority to create benefits

20

or sanctions. United States v. Eaton, 144

U.S. 677 (1892), United States v. Grimaud,

220 U.S. 506 (1910). This principle finds

expression in the APA:

(a) This section applies, according

to the provisions thereof, to the exer-

cise of a power or authority.

(b) A sanction may not be imposed or

a substantive rule or order issued

except within jurisdiction delegated to

the agency and as authorized by law.

5 U.S.C. § 558(a) & (b). Its history:

This provision, limiting administra-

tively imposed requirements to the auth-

ority granted and delegated, is designed

to afford statutory recognition for the

basic rule of law, embodied in judicial

decisions. The creation of penalties or

benefits is exclusively the province of

Congress.

[It] means that agencies may not

undertake anything which statutes or

other adequate sources of authority

(such as treaties) do not authorize them

to do. Where these sources are specific

in the authority granted no additional

authority may be assumed. .. . Sanc-

tions in the way of penalties or relief

must be identified and authorized by

law, and where authorized they must in

any case apply in the factual situation

presented.

S. Rep. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 34

and 274 (1946) [emphasis added]. "No addi-

21

tional authority may be assumed" is another

way of stating the maxim: Expressio unius

est exclusio alterius. Congress chose civil

money penalties with right to jury trial.

Where does the FA Act say anything else?

"Factual situation presented." The only

factual situation § 609 talks about is

"reinspection" and "reexamination,"

qualifications matters.

Assuming, arguendo, FAA has jurisdiction

to impose punitive suspensions, specific

authority presents a separate hurdle. At

the least, this mandate imposes a standard

of clarity for what sanctions Congress has

os

authorized, and what it has not. What else

could “must be identified" mean?

Congress wrote §§ 901 and 903 with a

high degree of clarity. Where in the FA Act

is there a hint that suspension or revoca-

tion may be imposed as a penalty?

The landmark FAA case of Pike v. C.A.B.,

303 F.2d 353, (8th Cir. 1962), is instruc-

22

tive. A commercial pilot, Pike was charged

with giving flight instruction when he did

not possess an instructor's certificate.

The court reversed revocation of his

license because nothing in the statutes or

FAA regulations specifically forbade him

from giving instruction. Blackmun, J.:

This lack of specificity and com-

pleteness of the Regulations disturbs us

for this case. Because of this we are

disinclined to reach a result, drastic

in its application to the individual

concerned (whether it be Pike or any

other), which deprives an airman of

admitted experience and ability his

primary means of livelihood. [Citing

cases] We prefer to have, where a result

of that magnitude is to be forthcoming,

a statute or regulation which is more

positive and definite than those here

involved.

Id. at 357. We doubt if the court meant

that magnitude of the penalty would deter-

mine the legal principles, but a 180-day

suspension of a private pilot who owns his

own plane is hardly insubstantial.

It is axiomatic that a statute is uncon-

stitutionally vague if persons of "common

as

intelligence must necessarily guess at its

meaning and differ as to its application."

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269

U.S. 385, 391 (1926). How can layman or

lawyer read § 609 and obtain from it a

legislative mandate for license penalties?

"Vague laws offend several important

values." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408

U.S. 104, 108 (1972). “There are, of

course, instances where the plain language

of a regulation [or statute] simply does

not ‘bear the construction' furnished by

the officer or agency involved. Such a case

was Pike v. CAB .. ." Gulf Oil Corporation

v. Hickel, 435 F.2d 440, 445 (D.C. Cir.

1970).

Wilson held that "[b]y resting suspen-

Sion on a Board determination that the

"interest of the public so requires,'

Congress conferred broad discretionary

authority on the Board." 244 F.2d at 744.

By its own terms, even assuming, arguendo,

24

this were true, on its face it violates the

standard of clarity required by § 558 and

the principles laid down in Grimaud and

Eaton, supra. It says, not that Congress

delegated authority to impose suspension

and revocation as punitive sanctions, but

that the Board (then the C.A.B.) could

suspend for whatever it deemed to be in the

public interest. In other words, the choice

was the agency's and, ergo, it, not Con-

gress, created the sanction, which would

make it an unconstitutional delegation.14

Even NTSB recognizes the obvious, but not

its legal relevancy:

"This statute [§ 1429(a)] does not

explicitly state that the Administrator

may suspend a certificate for violations

of the FAR;; however, a prior version of

this section which contained similar

14 wilson, of course, addressed none

of this. Again, it is puzzling why the

court below failed to do so; these issues

were prominently raised. Petitioner's Brief

at 36-40, Komjathy v. NTSB, supra, n. 7. Go

Leasing, supra, held that § 558 had been

complied with, but offered no analysis. 800

F.2d at 1526.

25

langauge [sic] has been construed to

authorize the suspension of an airman

license for violations of safety

regulations. 4/ In Wilson, the court

rejected the argument that the then §609

which provided for the suspension of an

airman certificate "if the interest of

the public so requires" did not author-

ize a suspension for the violation of

regulations.

Komjathy, NTSB Order No. EA-2343, SE-6249,

July 14, 1986. (a-24-25)

II. FPAA's certificate rule, FAR § 13.19 has

never been lawfully adopted through APA

public notice and comment procedures; it is

unconstitutionally vague--does a citizen

have a constitutional r. “ht to be told how

he is to be punished?

A. Not lawfully adopted. FAR § 13.19, 14

C.F.R. § 13.19, is FAA's certificate susp-

ension and revocation rule. The APA, 5

U.S.C. § 553, requires that "substantive"

rules be adopted through formal public

notice and comment procedures (Notice of

Proposed Rule Making--NPRM). The rule is

substantive and has not been so adopted.

This requires dismissal. Id. § 706; Aiken

v. Obledo, 442 F.Supp. 628, 650 (D.C.

Calif. 1977) ("The reviewing court shall--

26

- - « hold unlawful and set aside agency

action . . « found to be .. . not in

accordance with law... .").

The Circuit Court holds that the rule

does not require formal adoption because it

is not substantive as it merely paraphrases

§ 609 on which it is based. 832 F.2d at

1296-97. Evidently straddling both sides of

the issue, the Court also appears to hold

that, even so, rulemaking formalities were

in fact complied with--and that petitioner

agrees. Id. at 1297 n. 1. This is mistaken:

petitioner does not in any manner agree.

Whether § 553 has been complied with is

purely a factual question. Rulemaking re-

quirements are well understood. First an

NPRM in the Federal Register is required

which includes: (1) time, place, and nature

of the proceedings; (2) reference to the

legal authority under which the rule is

proposed; (3) its terms and substance. 5

U.S.C. § 553(b). In other words, the agency

27

explains that it is proposing a rule that

will govern certificate actions and expl-

ains how it will work. After this notice,

it collects comments sent in by interested

persons to the docket number and address

specified in the NPRM, considers and sum-

marizes them, adopts a concise general

statement of the rule and its purpose and,

along with the rule as finally adopted,

publishes this material in the Federal

Register. Id. § 553(c)&(d).

The Circuit Court cites 27 Fed. Reg.

5694 (1962) as the required NPRM. 832 F.2d

at 1297 n. 1. This notice cannot under any

circumstances so qualify. It was part of a

major rules recodification project carried

out in 1961-62. Nothing in it refers to any

proposal to create a certificate rule, much

less explain its purpose, legal basis, or

invites the public to comment on how it

should work, etc. And in order to further

comply one would have to cite to an addi-

28

tional Federal Register notice which con-

tained a summary of the public comments,

the rule as finally adopted, and so forth.

Id. § 553(c)&(d). This was not done: no

such notice was ever published.

The certificate rule at the time of this

notice, 1962, was codified as 14 C.F.R. §

408.25, see 24 Fed. Reg. 10 (1959). Neither

did this 1959 notice make any pretense of

being an NPRM proposing a certificate rule

(or any other--if it had, then the focus

would be on 1959, not 1962); it simply an-

nounced that the new Federal Aviation Agen-

cy was adopting the entire set of enforce-

ment rules it set forth. Nothing was said

as to why § 553 requirements were not fol-

lowed. See, Emperor at 87-90. The purpose

of the recodification project was to change

the old Part 408 numbers, and others, which

were a carryover from the Civil Aeronautics

Administration (CAA--metamorphosed into

FAA).

29

The notice relied upon by the court

below plainly states in its preamble:

"Interested persons are invited to

participate in the proposed recodifica-

tion « « «

The proposal is part of the program

of the Federal Aviation Agency to recod-

ify its regulatory material . . . The

object of the new chapter is to restate

existing regulations, not to make new

ones. The pertinent provisions have been

freely reworded and rearranged, subject

to every precaution against disturbing

existing rights, privileges, duties or

functions. ...

No substantive change has been made

in the regulations, the purpose of the

recodification project being simply to

streamline and clarify present regulat-

ory language and to delete obsolete or

redundant provisions. ...

27 Fed. Reg. 5686 (1962) [emphasis added].

. This notice referred to an earlier one, 26

Fed. Reg. 10698 (1961), which first announ-

ced the project. Id. It said:

This notice proposes no substantive

changes in the regulations and is not a

notice of proposed rule making subject

to the Administrative Procedure Act. ..

- The program will not result in any new

regulatory requirements.

Most of the current rules and

regulations have been inherited from

predecessor organizations and were

promulgated by them over a period of

30

more than twenty years. ...

The recodified system will serve to

assure consistency in style, format and

approach in any substantive revision of

the actual requirements of the regula-

tions that may be undertaken after the

recodification program is completed...

With minor exceptions, the regulat-

ions included in the outline are those

that were in effect January 1, 1961...

- In addition, rewritten regulations

will be published under notices of

proposed rule making in the FEDERAL

REGISTER and all interested persons will

be invited to submit comments and

recommendations on the form and manner

of their inclusion in the recodified

structure.

Id. 10698-99 [emphasis added]. It should be

noted that this notice proposed to cody

enforcement rules as Part 15. Yet another

notice, apparently the last, changed Part

15 to the present Part 13. It stated:

A part of the comments received rec-

commended specific substantive changes

to the regulations. Although some of

these recommendations might, upon fur-

ther study, appear to be meritorious,

they cannot be adopted as a part of the

recodification program. The purpose of

the program is simply to streamline and

Clarify present regulatory language and

to delete obsolete or redundant provis-

ions. To attempt substantive changes in

31

the recodification of these regulations

(other than minor, relaxatory ones that

are completely noncontroversial) would

delay the project and would be contrary

to the ground rules specified for it in

the FEDERAL REGISTER on November 15,

1961 (26 F.R. 10698), and Draft Release

62-27. However, all comments of this

nature will be preserved and considered

in any later substantive revision of the

affected parts.

27 Fed. Reg. 9585 (1962) [emphasis added].

Under no circumstances has FAR 13.19

ever been promulgated through public notice

and comment procedures. How the District of

Columbia Circuit concluded otherwise is

difficult to understand. All of these

Federal Register notices, along with

appropriate quotations, were cited to it

for reference. (Petitioner's Reply Brief at

10-11, Komjathy v. NTSB, supra.)

Is 13.19 is exempt from rulemaking? The

Circuit Court asserts that the rule "does

no more than repeat, virtually verbatim,

the statutory grant of authority in 49 App.

U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) [§ 609] for the

ordering of such suspensions." 832 F.2d at

32

1296. This manifestly is not correct. It

delegates to specific agency officials the

Administrator's authority to issue suspen-

sion and revocation orders. These officials

are not designated by § 609. The need to

formally delegate is required by FA Act, §

301, 49 U.S.C. 1341(a) ("The Administrator

shall be responsible for the exercise of

all powers and the discharge of all duties

of the Administration, and shall have

authority and control over all personnel

and activities thereof."), and § 302, id. §

1343(f) ("The [Administrator] is authorized

- « « to define their authority and duties

es eee

Since Congress has delegated to the Adm-

inistrator enormous responsibility to make

rules (laws) on its behalf and issue orders

that often determine the right to hold a

job, or continue in business, surely it is

a matter of substantive public concern to

whom he delegates this authority. A clerk?

33

Implementing § 609, the rule lays out a

scheme of procedural due process. The stat-

ute instructs the Administrator "except in

cases of emergency, [to] provide the holder

of such certificate an opportunity to ans-

wer any charges and be heard as to why such

certificate should not be amended, modifi-

ed, suspended or revoked." 49 U.S.C. app. §

1429(a). It does not specify Row the

charges are to be presented, how process is

to be served, how the accused shall answer.

The rule offers a number of options for

the accused. By what means does the agency

serve the notice of proposed certificate

action? It doesn't say. Service of process

is one of the most fundamental of procedu-

ral due process concerns. Is it to be

personal service? Certified mail? What

happens if the accused is out of the coun-

try and someone else signs for it? The

holder only has 15 days to respond. Do not

"interested persons" of the aviation public

34

have the right to comment on whether it

should be 10 days, 20 days, 30 days? The

informal conference, or option to write a

letter, is FAA's interpretation of 609's

command to provide an opportunity to

answer. This is the agency performing a

legislative function, filling in details.

What the rule does not say is as signi-

ficant as what it does. The accused has an

automatic stay of any order, unless "the

[Administrator] advises the . . . Board

that an emergency exists and safety in air

commerce or air transportation requires the

immediate effectiveness of his order..."

When an FAA official declares an emergency

pilots are instantly put out of their job,

businesses closed down with dozens or

hundreds of employees out of work. Yet

13.19 does not specify how that advice is

to be given, or in what period of time.15

15 This lack of detail allows an FAA

official to extend the 60-day limit in

35

Where are criteria establishing what con-

stitutes a threat to air safety?1l® Should

the official have to file an affidavit, or

otherwise explain his drastic action? Now,

all he does is recite the litany that the

order is in the interest of air safety and

the public, without having to say why.

The Circuit Court's holding that 13.19

does no more than paraphrase § 609 does not

which the Board must decide the case, by

first serving the order on the holder to

shut him down, which he always obeys on the

spot, then delaying his letter of advice,

which is a separate document. Under NTSB

rules the 60 days only start running "as of

the date when the Administrator's written

advice of the emergency character of his

order has been received ..." 49 C.F.R. §

821.54(b). This same issue is raised in

Mallen v. Federal Deposit Insurancé Corpor-

ation, 667 F.Supp. 652 (D.Ia. 1987), Sup.

Ct. No. 87-82, July 9, 1987.

Although FAA has no emergency rule

as such, CAA, its predecessor, did: "(An

emergency will be deemed to exist [i]n the

event the condition or conduct of a certif-

icate holder is such as to indicate immed-

iate danger of injury to a person or damage

to property, and the immediate suspension

of the certificate might reasonably be ex-

pected to avert such injury or damage .

o” 14 C.F.R. § 468.25 (1952).

36

comport with the facts. The rule, indeed,

does do that, but it also affects indivi-

dual rights and obligations by legislating

a substantive scheme of procedural due

process, the test set out in Chrysler Corp.

v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979).

"Once an agency rule or regulation has been

determined to be substantive, it neverthe-

less will not have ‘the force and effect

of law' unless its promulgation conforms

‘with any procedural requirements imposed

by Congress.' [Citing Chrysler Corp., id.

at 303.]" Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F.2d

1421, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1986). The rule has

never been lawfully promulgated. The

requirements of the APA were designed to

assure fairness and mature consideration of

rules of general application. NLRB v.

Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); see

also Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Assoc. v. Finch,

307 F.Supp. 858 D. Del. 1970).

B. Right to know the penalty. FAR §

37

13.19 violates due process. Petitioner (and

the public) has a right to be told how FAA

will punish him for a safety violation. FAA

interprets § 609 to authorize suspension

and revocation for two entirely separate

purposes: (1) suspension until the holder

demonstrates he is qualified, revocation if

it turns out he is not; (2) purely as pun-

ishment for the violation of a safety rule.

1980 Handbook, 4 203.c.(1) (b)&(c) and

205.b.(3)&(4) at pages 13 and 15. (a-72-

73) Yet the rule warns only of its use for

qualifications matters (reinspection and

reexamination). Failure to tell the public

about punitive suspensions violates the APA

and the most basic concepts of substantive

due process. Pike v. C.A.B., supra.

Whether § 609, through vague language

about public interest, authorizes suspen-

Sion penalties is an entirely separate

issue from whether the agency (which, after

all, has complete control over what it

38

publishes as regulations) has lived up to

its responsibilities in telling the public

what its enforcement policies are. "Vague

laws offend several important values."

Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, 408

U.S. at 108. Why would this important

regulatory agency not tell the persons it

regulates their licenses are at risk for

safety violations?

The Circuit Court appears to say that

the rule is adequate as long as it repeats

§ 609's public interest language, and that

the public ought to be able to figure out

that this includes suspension and revoca-

tion as penalties. 832 F.2d at 1296. This

is a remarkable position. The reasoning

behind it is rather unclear. What is clear,

is that nothing can change the fact that

there is neither statute nor regulation

which so much as hints that in addition to

the civil-money fine suspension and

revocation are also used as penalties.

39

III. Three basic policies apply to any FAA

safety enforcement case: (1) right to

choose the track of justice, administrative

or judicial; (2) right to impose a certif-

icate penalty; (3) right to shift from one

track to the other. Not one has ever been

published in the Federal Register or,

although substantive, promulgated through

public notice and comment procedures.

A. Failure to publish. FAA policies: (1)

direct agency officials, when initiating

any safety violation case, to choose

between the § 609 administrative track of

justice and the § 901 civil-penalty-jury-

trial track; (2) explain that certificate

suspension or revocation, may be used as

punishment in lieu of civil penalties; (3)

authorize officials, in their discretion,

having initiated one track, to shift over

to the other (almost always certificate to

Civil money fine).

All three may be found in the agency's

enforcement manual. (1) "Formal legal

actions are undertaken to: .. . Impose

punitive sanctions, after the act, to deter

violations (e.g., certificate action, civil

40

penalties) . . ." 1980 Handbook, supra,

203.¢C.(1) (b) (a-73)3 (2) “IE monetary

sanction against any certificate holder is

insufficient to get and keep their atten-

tion, do not hesitate to use certificate."

Id. FJ 203.c.(2) (a-74); see also 9 205.a. &

b. (a-75-78) Policy No. 3 reads:

Shift in sanctions Ordinarily it will

not be FAA policy to withdraw one rem-

edy, after it has been commenced, to

pursue another, although circumstances

may arise in which such action is appro-

priate. An example where such action

would be appropriate is when counsel has

commenced certificate action against a

pilot and thereafter learns that the

pilot uses an aircraft in business or a

profession and that the proposed suspen-

sion would constitute a sanction much

more severe than is warranted by the

violation. Contrary situations will also

occur.

Id. 4 1202.a.(4) at page 163.17

17 The manual does not explain what

happens to the pilot's right to jury trial.

Had agency officials initiated the case as

a civil penalty instead, the accused would

have been in a position to say, "I didn't

do it, I won't pay, sue me," and then would

have been able to "demand" a jury trial.

Nor does it, of course, explain how, once

having started the case as a civil penalty,

with its absolute right to jury trial, the

41

Congress has mandated in the APA that

virtually every agency policy which might

somehow impinge on the public be published

in the Federal Register or promulgated

through formal procedures. Senator Pat

McCarran, its sponsor, called that act

a bill of rights for the hundreds of

thousands of Americans whose affairs are

controlled or regulated in one way or

another by agencies of the federal

government. It is designed to provide

guaranties of due process in administra-

tive procedures.

S. Rep. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 298

(1946). The act provieé>s that each agency

shall "publish in the Federal Register for

the guidance of the public-- ... [inter

alia] rules of procedure, statements of

general policy, or interpretations of

general applicability formulated and adop-

ted by the agency .. ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)-

(1). Unless the person has actual and time-

FAA can deny that right and switch to a

certificate action -- “contrary situation".

Is it not incumbent upon FAA to explain

this conundrum?

42

ly notice, "a person may not in any manner

be required to resort to, or be adversely

affected by, a matter required to be pub-

lished in the Federal Register and not so

published. . . ." Id. This is a legislative

exclusionary rule, the only remedy should

an agency violate the act.

The three policies fit one or more of

the named categories, arguably all three.

FAA has never contended otherwise. Since no

reference to any one of them is to be found

in the FA Act, they are clearly interpreta-

tions of §§ 609 and 901, formulated and

adopted by the agency and, obviously, of

general applicability. FAA has never claim-

ed that any one of them has ever been pub-

lished in the Federal Register. Never

claimed they do not apply, or would not be

available to resort to, in petitioner's

case.18 since they do apply, fall within

18 PAA's defense seems to be that

Since they are contained in the enforcement

43

one or more of the named categories, and

have never been published, the federal

courts must follow Congress' mandate and

dismiss.

The only place official reference to

these FAA policies may be found is in agen-

cy manuals. The Court has specifically held

this not to be sufficient: APA publication

requirements must be followed. Morton v.

Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). “The statute [5

U.S.C. § 552(a) (1)] clearly provides that

no administrative action taken pursuant to

unpublished procedures can be allowed to

stand against a person adversely affected

thereby." Northern California Power Agency

Vv. Morton, 396 F.Supp. 1187, 1191 (D.D.C.

1975), affirmed 539 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir.

1976). “Any agency regulation that so dir-

ectly affects preexisting legal rights or

manual and it is available to the public

they need not be published. This argument

is wholly without merit.

44

Obligations .. . indeed, that is ‘of such

a nature that knowledge of it is needed to

keep the outside interests informed of the

agency's requirements in respect of any

subject within its competence,' is within

the publication requirement [of the APA]."

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d

4Si, 455 (4th Cir. 1977).

B. Failure to promulgate. Each of the

three policies constitutes a “rule” as

defined by the APA: "rule" means the whole

or a part of an agency statement of general

Or particular applicability and future

effect designed to implement, interpret, or

prescribe law or policy or describing the

organization, procedure, or practice requi-

rements of an agency ...5 U.S.C. §

551(4). The basic question, however, is

whether or not these "rules" are “substan-

tive" within the meaning of id. § 553(d)

("The required publication of a substantive

rule shall be made .. .") and § 552(a)-

45

(1) (D) (“substantive rules of general

applicability adopted as authorized by

law"). If so classified, the APA mandates

that they be adopted pursuant to formal

procedures which require, inter alia,

notice of proposed rulemaking published in

the Federal Register with a statement of

basis and purpose, opportunity for public

comment, and publication of the rule as

finally adopted. Id. § 553(b).

The policies are clearly substantive,

they affect a property right. See Pastrana

v. United States, 746 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir.

1984). Careful search of the Code of Feder-

al Regulations and Federal Register since

1958 reveals no NPRMs or rules as finally

adopted for any of the three. That failure

is an absolute bar to this case: "[A] per-

son may not in any manner be required to

resort to, or be adversely affected by, a

matter required to be published in the

Federal Register and not so published." 5

46

U.S.C. § 552(a) (1). “The reviewing court

shall--hold unlawful and set aside agency

action . . . found to be-- .. . not in

accordance with law." Id. § 706(2) (A);

Aiken v. Obledo, supra, 442 F.Supp. at 650.

"The purpose of requiring a statement of

the basis and purpose is to enable courts,

which have the duty to exercise review, to

be aware of the legal and factual framework

underlying the agency's action." Am. Stan-

dard, Inc. v. U.S., 602 F.2d 256, 269

(U.S.Ct. of Claims 1979).

Section 553(b), was meant to provide an

opportunity for public participation in the

rule making process when that process re-

sults in the promulgation of rules or regu-

lations of substantial impact. Pharmaceu-

tical Mfrs. Assoc. v. Finch, 307 F.Supp.

858 (D. Del. 1970); Phillips Petroleum Co.

v. Dep't of Energy, 449 F.Supp. 760 (D.

Del.), affirmed 596 F.2d 1029 ({Emer.Ct.App.

1978); National Retired Teachers Ass'n v.

47

United States Postal Service, 430 F.Supp.

141 (D.D.C.), affirmed 593 F.2d 1360 (D.C.

Cir. 1979); see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon

Co., supra, and Texaco, Inc. v. Federal

Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740 (3rd Cir. 1969).

"Any claim of exemption from APA rulemaking

requirements ‘will be narrowly construed

and only reluctantly countenanced.' [Citing

cases]" Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.

Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816 (D.C. Cir.

1983).

Alternate question. These issues of

publication and promulgation were prominen-

tly raised in petitioner's brief below. FAA

has never contested the existence of these

policies, that they fit the § 552(a) (1)

categories, or claimed they do not apply to

petititioner's case. They have not, because

it is impossible to suggest otherwise. Yet

the District of Columbia Circuit failed

to address both issues, which would have

been dispositive of the case--and which,

48

assume, arguendo, full authority to make

the policies.

We submit that this failure was a denial

of justice, and ask the Court, should it

not take jurisdiction of this case, to

remand it to the Circuit Court with

instructions to decide the two issues.

IV. PAR § 13.15, the civil penalty rule,

violates due process: it was purposefully

amended to misrepresent the law; it fails

to advise the citizen that it may be re-

sorted to as an alternative to certificate

action; neither original rule nor amend-

ment were promulgated in accordance with

APA procedures. The APA's "resort to” lan-

guage provides petitioner with standing.

A. FAR § 13.15 misrepresents the law.

The statutory basis for FAA's civil penalty

rule, FAR § 13.15, is § 901, which reads:

Any person who violates... any

provision... [of this Act], or any

rule, regulation or order issued there-

under .. . shall be subject to a civil

penalty of not to exceed $1,000 for each

such violation. .. .19

19 The statute was recently amended

to raise the civil penalty -for air carriers

to $10,000; but the $1,000 limit was left

untouched for individuals. P.L. 100-223,

Sec. 204, 101 Stat. 1519 (1987).

49

49 U.S.C. app. § 1471(a) (1) [emphasis

added]. The rule reads:

(a) Under sec. 901 of the Federal

Aviation Act of 1958 . . . a person who

violates any provision... . of that

Act, or any regulation or order issued

[thereunder] .. . is subject to a civil

penalty...

14 C.F.R. § 13.15(a) [emphasis added].

The plain command of section 901, “Any

person shall be subject to meee pen-

alty," cannot be reconciled with "a person

is subject to a civil penalty." The rule

misrepresents the law in a fundamental way.

It changes a peremptory command that FAA

officials use civil penalty for all viola-

tions, to "use it if you feel like it."

The rule uses the phrase "if a civil

penalty is contemplated." Id. § 13.15(b).

Thus it is deficient because it does not

explain, if not a civil. penalty, just what

it is that is contemplated for the viola-

tion. We know, of course, it is certifi-

cate action. Nor does it mention that the

50

penalty can be shifted from suspension or

revocation to a money fine.

In light of the lengths to which the

agency goes in its enforcement manual to

guide its officials on how to choose

between the two forms of action, is it not

remarkable that neither 13.19 nor 13.15

mentions the other?

By writing a regulation that misrepre-

sents the law, fails to advise that the

agency claims it can choose between civil

and certificate penalties (as well as two

disparate forms of justice) and that its

officials may shift back and forth between

them, PAA viclaned the APA and petitioner's

right to due process under the Fifth

Amendment. Pike v. C.A.B., supra, Gulf Oil

Corporation v. Hickel, supra; see also

Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force,

S91 F.26 852. (D.C. Cir... 2978}.

B. Both original and amended rule

promulgated in violation of APA. FAR 1

51

13.15 started life as 14 C.F.R. § 408.23

(1960), first published in 24 Fed. Reg. 10

(1959). It has never been promulgated

through the APA public notice and comment

procedures required by 5 U.S.C. § 553. It

tracks FAR § 13.19 in this regard (since it

was always the entire set of rules publish-

ed, not single ones). FAA does not dispute

this. Like 13.19, this rule is substantive

because it delegates authority and legis-

lates procedures for FAA handling of civil

penalty cases, that is, creates a system

not spelled out in the statute. We adopt by

reference 13.19's arguments, supra.

FAR § 13.15, however, has an added di-

mension, however. It was once amended--on

the sly, it’s fair to say--completely

changing its meaning, without following

either the publication or notice and

comment procedures of the APA. As § 408.23,

and when first announced, the rule faith-

fully followed § 901: "Under section 901 of

52

the Act, any person who violates any provi-

sion ... Of the Act, or any rule, regu-

lation, or order issued thereunder, shall

"

be subject to a civil penalty .. ." 24

Fed. Reg. 10 (1959), 14 C.F.R. § 408.23

(1960) (a-66). The recodification project

tirst proposed that enforcement rules be

codified as Part 15. See 27 Fed. Reg. 5694

(Thursday, June 14, 1962). It was in this

particular notice where the language was

changed to read “a person is subject to a

civil penalty.” Then in yet another publi-

cation of the rules, as finally recodified,

Part 15 was changed to Part 13, where it

still remains. 27 Fed. Reg. 9586, 9590

(1962) (Friday, September 28, 1962). (It

seems strange FAA officials had such a hard

time settling on the new number.)

Nothing in the notice of June 14, 1962,

explained it was changing the language of

the civil penalty rule, publishing a new or

amended rule of procedure, statement of

a3

general policy, or interpretation of gener-

al applicability formulated and adopted by

the agency. This violated the publication

requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1). AS

the change was obviously substantive, from

peremptory command, to at your discretion,

the failure to use notice and comment pro-

cedures violated id. § 553. Both failures

require dismissal. Id. § 706.

C. Lack of standing. The Circuit Court

holds that petitioner lacks standing to

challenge the civil penalty rule. This pos-

ition reflects a serious lack of understan-

ding of FAA enforcement. It cites Valley

Forge Christian College v. Americans United

for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,

454 0.S.. 464 (1982). It is ditfticuit to

understand the relevance of a case where

those who lacked standing were an indepen-

dent group dedicated to challenging govern-

ment action they believed violative of sep-

aration of church and state. More relevant

54

is United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669

(1973). If a group of law students con-

cerned about forests being trashed because

of a freight-rate increase have standing,

where does that leave petitioner whose

license is subject to an integrated FAA

enforcement program that includes both

civil and license penalties?

The Valley Forge test cited is that pet-

itioner may invoke the court's authority

only if he "has suffered injury, whether

past or future, that the injury is trace-

able to the action of the defending party,

and that a favorable ruling by the court is

likely to remedy the harm." 832 F.2d at

1295-96. Petitioner fully meets this test.

As the manual makes clear, before initiat-

ing the case against him, FAA officials

were required to choose between certificate

action and civil penalty. The injury is

obvious: by choosing to suspend his lic-

ense, petitioner was denied the right to

55

have his trial in district court where,

should he have so desired, he could have

"demanded" a jury; he was denied the oppor-

tunity to negotiate a compromise and, fail-

ing that, if convicted, a money fine was

the worst he'd have suffered.

The District of Columbia Circuit also

overlooked the shift in sanctions policy,

which puts the issue squarely within the

APA.~ As we have shown, this is an integral

part of enforcement policy; 99.99 % of

shifts are from certificate action to money

fine. The only survey to our knowledge ever

done showed that 35% of all civil penalties

started as certificate actions. See Emper-

or at 79 n. 115. The Circuit Court is

clearly saying, if the agency chooses not

to use civil penalty in your case, you

can't complain. The irony of this is that

it leaves one's standing completely in

control of the agency itself.

How could petitioner "be required to re-

56

Sort to," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1), the shift

in sanctions policy when it had never been

- published in the Federal Register?29 See

W.G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corporation

v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498, 503 (4th Cir.

1973) ("Before debarring a contractor from

future government contracts, a federal ag-

ency must comply with § 3(a) of the [APA]

by stating and publishing its rules of

procedure. [Citing cases]"). Petitioner has

standing.

Should the Court decline to take juris-

diction of this case, we respectfully ask

it to at the least consider this standing

issue, and if favorable to petitioner,

remand to the District of Columbia Circuit

with instructions to decide the civil

penalty issues.

20 and how would he know? This writer

has interviewed dozens of airmen; it is

certain the vast majority, and most of

their lawyers, do not know of this shift

policy. How would they, with no rule?

57

CONCLUSION

For these various reasons, this petition

for certiorari should be granted. Should

the Court not take jurisdiction, petitioner .

asks it to take cognizance of the standing

issue and the fact the District of Columbia

Circuit failed to address the several legi-

timate issues noted, any one of which would

have been dispositive of the case, and in

exercise of its supervisory powers to

remand to that court for their disposition.

Respectfully submitted,

LAWRENCE B. SMITH

3938 E. Grant Rd., #191

Tucson AZ 85712

602/326-0283

Counsel for Petitioner

April 1988

58

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.