Opposition Brief — United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States

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Suprema Court, USL

EILVED

JUN 9 1988

No. 87-1803 sens oun se

So nod :

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY

COMPANY, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

JOHN R. BOLTON

Assistant Attorney General

JOHN F. CORDES

PHYLLIS JACKSON PYLES

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20520

(202) 633-221 7

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the discretionary function exception to

the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2680(a),

bars petitioner’s claim that an on-scene coordinator

of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

who was in charge of the clean-up of a hazardous

waste site designated for an “immediate removal ac-

tion’ under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-

sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, acted neg-

ligently in directing a private contractor to proceed,

notwithstanding adverse wind conditions, with the

clean-up of a substance posing a major threat of

fire, explosion, and release of pollutants into the air.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

}?s Fi

Opinions below

Jurisdiction |

Statement 2

Argument 6

Conclusion |

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

( ases

{/ahama Flee Onan h ‘ ] s.7 7

] | 1522 (11+} ( ' Nar) 117

| lal, 0) y bey Vt ty TOY |: { Th }

1986) il

Be rhowit- \ TTnited State cert orn) ted, No of

198 (argued Apr. 19, 1988) 14

Bowman Vv. United Stat 290 8a 13! (Ath Cir

1987) 1]

Browy V. linited Chats - TOO Ie 7a. ty (] ; Cir

1986). cert ar y ied. 179 Ty . a aya? / 1987 ) }*?

C.P. Chemical Co. vy. United States. 810 F.?d 31

(2d Cir. 1987) 11

Dalehiti \ i tog] State AE | n (19° ) 5, ¢ 7.

3. 9. 10

Dra! Towing Co. \ V Yi Vi ( f (

765 J ] 1060 (11th Ciy 1QR5) 11

(5th ( r. 1985) 1?

Heller yv. 1 ited St <() | | 55R ¢ h (‘it

1986) 1?

Hend United States, T31 F2d 912 (9th

cor 1OX6) ie 1]

Lindsey v. United States, 7% F.2d 1143. (th Ci

L985) ww

Cases—Continued:

Mitchell v. United States, 787 F.2d 4166 hopes Cir.

Page

1986). cert. denied, No. 87-301 (Oct. 5, 1987)-.. 12

Myslakowski v. United States, 806 F.2d ‘91 (6th

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, No. 86-1289 (Mar. 50,

OT. oo fo nor ee cedar areeaenlenaabemenicaineetas 12

Pierce v. United States, 804 F.2d 191 (Sth Cir.

I on reas iad a arses ierdesne een eneae aia 12

SCNO Barge Lines, Inc. V. Sun Transp. Co., T75

Ws SEE COE Cie RO acess 11

Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 301 (3d

eS RN rec aa esse sernant ene res 12

Spencer V. New Orleans Levee Bd., 757 F.2d 155

(5th Cir. 1984) RUSE SRS ay ee een ee 12

U.S. Fire Ins. Co. Vv. United States, 806 F.2d 1529

CR RGR Ce, BED aa aie ss Sires escenrnssannkpnnceeenaeesnonns 11

United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea

Grandense (Variq Airlines), 467 U.S. 797

1984) ............. EL ORT TEN LO Sar PVE De 5, 8, 9, 10, 18, 14

Statutes and regulations:

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp.

ey re Oe eon ccece teeter a coe 2

12 U.S.C. 9601 (a) (1) tee eee arene 7

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S. C. 2680(a)_..... 4

Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1981 Comp.).. 7

Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2925 (1987) .. 7

Be Oe ee a a ores cease secede 8

Iu thy Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No. 87-1805

UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY

COMPANY, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-

16a) is reported at 837 F.2d 116. The opinion of the

district court (Pet. App. 18a-48a) is reported at

638 F. Supp. 1068.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on January 15, 1988. The petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari was filed on April 14, 1988. The jurisdiction

of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

at

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner is an insurer seeking indemnity or

contribution from EPA based on the alleged negli-

gence of EPA’s on-scene coordinator in allowing %

clean-up operation to proc rotwithstanding un-

favorable wind conditions (Pet. App. 3a, 5a). The

clean-up took place at a site designated for an “im-

mediate removal action” under the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-

bility Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. HT) 9601 ef seq.

(CERCLA) (Pet. Amn. 3a). FPA tynicee! livects

‘such immediate action onlv if it determines t!

response is necessary within hours or days In ord

to prevent significant harm to the public health or to

the environment. In this case, EPA determine? that

the site posed an imminent threat of fire and explo-

. 1] ‘ *? +1 + ‘

sion, as well as hreat of public contact with |

ardous c}

coordinator. who directed the clean-up, hired peti-

tioner’s insuree. OH Materials. an expert in tonic

chs «i

. &

emicals (id. at 3a). The EPA’s on-scen

waste ahatement a containment, to perform the

various tasks required for t

4a).

One of the most serious hazards at the site was an

old railroad tank car restine on reised concrete ned-

estals. The tank contained oleum. a solution of sulfur

trioxide in concentrated sulfuric acid, which is ex-

? c , mm <« +; sate ,

treme! reactive with a W de ranee oT camyn nas nc

sensitive to moisture. At the commencement of the

removal action, the oleum tank was venting directl

into the atmosphere and posed a major threat of fire

explosion and release of pollutants. Pet. App. 4a

OH Materials suggested that the tank be removed

from its nedestals and transferred to a remote loca-

tion or. alternatively. placed on the ground at the

4

while the chemical release would have oceurred re-

gardless of the wind conditions, “much less” property

damage would have resulted if the wind had been

blowing away from Lock Haven (id. at 39a). The

court held the United States liable for 60° of the

damages caused by the chemical release based on

EPA’s failure to order the contractor to cease oper-

ations when wind conditions were not favorable (id.

at 4la-42a, 48a). The court held that the contractor

was also liable since, as “‘an expert in cleaning up

hazardous wastes, [it] knew or should have known

of the importance of paying attention to wind condi-

tions and should at least have raised this point with

the EPA” (id. at 44a). The district court found,

however, that the United States had the greater

share of the liability because “EPA retained the ul-

timate power to make decisions regarding the cleanup

operations” (ibid.).

The district court rejected the government’s con-

tention that the discretionary function exception

(28 U.S.C. 2680(a)) barred petitioner’s claim. The

court held (Pet. App. 33a-34a) that, while the United

States had discretion to ignore the dangerous site al-

together, “once it chose to clean up the hazardous

wastes there, its decisions regarding the procedures

to be followed were not of the nature and quality

that Congress intended to shield from tort liability.”

“The United States,” the court stated (id. at 34a),

“must be held accountable for the acts of its workers

who carry cut tasks on an operational level.” The

district court concluded (jhid.) that in this instance

“[t]he On Scene Coordinator’s role in the cleanup

operation was such that his conduct is not excluded

from a claim brought pursuant to the Federal Tort

Claims Act.”

3. The court of appeals reversed, holding that pe-

titioner’s claim was barred by the discretionary func-

5

tion exception. Relying on this Court’s decisions in

United States vy. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio

Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984),

and Dalehite vy. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953

the court noted (Pet. App. 10a) that ‘tthe dichotomy

between planning level and operation level’ relied

upon by the district court “does not resolve the ques-

tion of whether a governmental act is discretionary

within the meaning of the exception.” The proper

focus is on “ ‘the nature of the conduct, rather than

the status of the actor’” (id. at lla (quoting Varig

Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813)). “Acts at the operational

level,” the court explained (ibid.), “may be discre-

tionary if planning level crders anticipate decisions

at lower levels that leave room for policy judgement

and decision.”

“Execution of [the hazardous waste clean-up] pro-

gram and accomplishment of its objective,” the court

noted (Pet. App. 12a), “necessarily require the set-

ting of priorities in light of the risks presented at

various sites and the finite resources available to ad-

dress the problem.” EPA classified the site in ques-

ticn here for “immediate remova! action,” thus in-

dicating that “significant risks would attend a delay

in cleanup” (ibid.). The on-scene coordinator,

charged with the responsibility of directing the proj-

ect, ‘faced the problem of when to schedule the neu-

tralization of an oleum tank that was venting di-

rectly into the atmosphere and posed a major threat

of fire, explosion, and release of pollutants into the

air’ (id. at 13a). The court of appeals recognized

that the coordinator’s decision had to reflect “‘not only

the available resources and the other hazards to be

neutralized on the site, but most importantly, a bal-

ancing of the risks of proceeding with the neutraliza-

6

tion on the day chosen against the risks of further

delay” (ibid.).

The court of appeals stressed (Pet. App. 14a) that

“Tt]here was no applicable constitutional provision,

statute, or regulation requiring the On Scene Coor-

dinator to undertake removal actions only on days

with favorable wind conditions.” The authority dele-

gated to the on-scene coordinator, the court stated

(id. at 13a), “left room for, and indeed required,

the exercise of policy judgment based upon the re-

sources available and the relative risks to the public

health and safety from alternative actions.” The

court of appeals accordingly concluded (id. at 14a)

that the district court erred when it sought “to sec-

ond-guess the On Scene Coordinator’s decision.”

ARGUMENT

1. The court of appeals’ conclusion follows neces-

sarily from this Court’s decision in Dalehite v. United

States, supra. In Dalehite, the Court applied the

discretionary function exception to a fertilizer pro-

curement and shipping program undertaken by the

government in an effort to increase food production

in occupied territories following the Second World

War. The plaintiffs in Dalehite argued that the im-

plementation cf the program was negligent in a num-

ber of respects, thereby causing the explosion of a

shipment of fertilizer. This Court concluded (346

U.S. at 35-36), however, that the discretionary func-

tion exception “includes more than the initiation of

programs and activities. It also includes determina-

tions made by executives or administrators in estab-

lishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-

tions. Where there is room for policy judgment and

decision there is discretion.” Thus, the Court held

7

that the exception not only barred claims that the

government was negligent in adopting the program

as a whole but also claims that the government was

negligent in various phases of manufacturing, pack-

aging, labeling and shipping the product and in fail-

ing to warn those handling the fertilizer of its dan-

gerous nature.

In this case, the government was engaged not, as

in Dalehite, in an activity creating its own hazards,

but rather, pursuant to a statutory duty, in the in-

herently dangerous task of cleaning up environmental

hazards created by others. Under CERCLA, EPA

has been given broad authority to contain and elimi-

nate hazardous wastes.* This authority is not cir-

cumscribed in any significant way, and EPA clearly

has broad discretion to structure individual clean-up

projects, consistently with budgetary constraints, in

*The Act provides, in pertinent part (42 U.S.C. 9604

(a) (1)):

Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or

there is a substantial threat of such a release into the

environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial

threat of release into the environment of any pollutant

or contaminant which may present an imminent and sub-

stantial danger to the public health or welfare, the Presi-

dent is authorized to act, consistent with the national

contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal

of, and provide for remedial action relating to such haz-

ardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time

* * * or take any other response measure consistent with

the national contingency plan which the President deems

necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the

environment * * *, —

The authority to act under this provision has been expressly

delegated to EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg.

2923 (1987); Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1981

Comp.).

8

accordance with its own views of sound policy. For

each removal action, EPA appoints an on-scene Cco-

ordinator, with full responsibility to coordinate and

direct the federal removal efforts (Pet. App. 20a).

There are no established guidelines or manuals that

control the exercise of his discretion; instead, regula-

tions require him to consider and balance a number

of factors in making clean-up decisions.°

In the present case, the on-scene coordinator de-

cided to proceed immediately with “the neutraliza-

tion of an oleum tank that was venting directly into

the atmosphere and posed a major threat of fire, ex-

plosion, and release of pollutants into the air” ( Pet.

App. 13a) rather than waiting for more favorable

wind conditions. That decision involved a balancing

of the risks of proceeding and the risks of waiting

as well as practical considerations concerning the

feasibility of the project as a whole. The on-scene

coordinator was required to act, based on considera-

tions of “social, economic, and political policy” (Varig

Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814), in accordance with his

“judgment of the best course” (Dalehite, 346 U.S.

at 34). It follows that his decision was protected by

the discretionary function exception, and it is not

‘In fashioning an appropriate clean-up plan, the on-scene

coordinator must document and evaluate pertinent facts con-

cerning the discharge or release, such as its source and cause;

the existence of potentially responsible parties; the nature,

amount, and location of discharged or released materials; the

probable direction and time of travel of discharged or released

materials; the pathways to human exposure; the potential

impact on human health, welfare and safety; the potential

impact on natural resources and property which may be af-

fected; priorities for protecting human health, welfare and

the environment; and the cost of the operation. See 40 C.F.R.

300.33 (b) (2). |

9

within the province of the courts to second-guess

that decision (467 U.S. at 814; 346 U.S. at 41).

2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 7-8) that there was

no evidence that the on-scene coordinator actually

made a policy determination to proceed with the

neutralization of this particular hazard on the day

in question. There is no requirement, however, that

the policy considerations underlying the “determina-

tions made by executives or administrators in eStab-

lishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-

tions” (346 U.S. at 35-36) be articulated in advance

by the policy maker. As the court of appeals prop-

erly concluded, the factors and options here were

clear and the on-scene courdinator made a conscious

decision to proceed in face of the risks. In that deci-

sion there was ample “room for policy judgment and

decision” (id. at 36).* Indeed, it is unimaginable

that the decision could have been reached without

such an exercise of decision-making judgment.

The district court found that this chemical plant

“was one of the most hazardous sites the EPA has

undertaken to clean up to this date under the Act’s

program” (Pet. App. 21a). The site contained more

than “3,000 drums, and various reactors and tanks,

* Alabama Elec. Coop., Ine. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523

(11th Cir. 1985), upon which petitioner relies (Pet. 8-9), is

not to the contrary. In that case the court held that alleged

negligence by the Army Corps of Engineers in the design of

a dike was not shielded by the discretionary function excep-

tion absent some indication that the design defect was the

result of a policy decision. Here, the court of appeals properly

concluded that the on-scene coordinator’s decision to proceed

in the face of the known risks “required[] the exercise of

policy judgment based upon the resources available and the

relative risks to the public health and safety from alternative

actions” (Pet. App. 13a (emphasis added) ).

10

containing hazardous chemicals” and many of these

vessels were in “deteriorating condition” (id. at 20a).

There also was ground water contamination, filled-in

lagoons of chemicals, and poor air quality in the area

(id. at 20a, 27a). The oleum tank was “Jone]

the most serious hazards” (id. at 23a). In addition,

the on-scene coordinator had a budgetary cap and a

time limitation in which to complete the work (id.

at 20a).

\s the court of appeals recognized, in deciding how

to schedule the clean-up operations, the on-scene co-

ordinator was inevitably faced with “balancing the

risk of proceeding with the neutralization on the day

chosen against the risks of further delay” (Pet. App.

13a). He ‘necessarily took certain calculated risks,

but pis risks were encountered for the advancement

of a governm purpose and pursuant to fal spe-

cific : erant of authority” (Vaeriq Airlines, 467 U.S

at 820).

9

3. Petitioner contends (Pet. 12) that the discre-

tionary function exception can apply only to the gov-

ernment’s initial decision to embark on a project, not

to dec’sions made in implementing the project. But

that is plainly incorrect. Sige this Court clearly stated

in Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 35-36, the discretionary func-

tion exception ‘nda more than the initiation of

programs and activities. It also includes determina-

tions made by executives or administrators in estab-

lishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-

tions.” See also Variq Airlines, 467 U.S. at 811-

813.

There is admittedly some disharmony among the

courts of dorinie in this general area. Some decisions

see a material distinction between “policy” and “plan-

ning” activities, on the one hand, and “operational”

11

activities, on the other. These decisions stress that

negligent implementation of discretionary policies

and plans is not itself discretionary and therefore

not within the scope of the exception, even where the

alleged negligence stems from a decision concerning

the proper allocation of scarce resources. See, @.9.,

U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 806 F.2d 1529

(11th Cir. 1986) (negligent placement and mainte-

nanee of buoys by Coast Guard): Aslakson v. United

States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1986) (failure of

power administration to elevate power lines over

lake): Henderson vy. United States, 784 F.2d 942

(9th Cir. 1986) (negligently exposed high voltage

wires): Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. United States,

769 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1985) (negligent design of

dike by Army Corps of Engineers); Drake Towina

Co. v. Meisner Marine Constr. Co., 765 F.2d 1060

(11th Cir. 1985) (misplacement of buoys by Coast

Guard): Eklof Marine Corp. v. United States, 762

F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985) (mismarking of channel by

Coast Guard): SCNO Barge Lines, Inc. v. Sun

Transp. Co., 775 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1985) (mislead-

ing information in Coast Guard navigation reports).

Other court of appeals decisions, by contrast, em-

phasize that operational decisions may nonetheless be

discretionary, and where they are—particularly

Where an agency concerned with resource allocation

decides to do so much, and not more, in addressing

a general problem or providing a product or serv-

ice—such decisions should not be second-guessed in

a tort suit. See, e.g.. Bowman v. United States, 820

F.2d 1393 (4th Cir. 1987) (failure to erect cuard-

rail, place warning signs or close Blue Ridge Park-

way during inclement weather): C.P. Chemical Co. v.

Jnited States, 810 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1987) (decision

12

of Consumer Product Safety Commission to ban in-

sulation manufactured by — under Consumer

Product Safety Act rather than using procedures of

Federal Hazardous Substances Act): Myslahowski v.

United States, 806 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1986) (sale of

used jeeps without warning of propensity to over-

turn in certain situations). cert. denied, No. 86-1389

(Mar. 30, 1987); Pierce v. United States, 804 F.2d

101 (S8th Cir. 1986) (challenge to review process

that led to allegedly wrongful termination of disa-

bility benefits): Heller v. United States, 803 F.2d

1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (FAA’s allegedly wrongful

denial of medical certificate to pilot): Smith v. Johns-

Manville Corp., T95 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1986) (sale

of surplus asbestos “as is’ without warnings or war-

ranties): Brown v. United States, 799 F.2d 199 (1st

Cir. 1986) (issuance of weather forecast based on

incomplete information due to failure to repair or re-

nlace sporadically malfunctioning weather-reporting

buoy}, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1058 (1987); Mitchell

v. United States, 787 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986) (de-

cision not to mark power lines below 500 feet), cert.

denied, No. 87-301 (Oct. 5, 1987); Lindsey v. United

States, 778 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1985) (consideration

given to patent application): Ford v. American Mo-

tors Corp., 770 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1985) (sale of

used jeeps without ais of propensity to over-

turn in certain situations); Spencer v. New Orleans

Levee Bd., 737 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1984) (inaccurate

weather forecast ).

There is no clear conflict among the circuits posed

by the cases in these two categories. Indeed, all cir-

cuits with decisions in the first category also have

cases in the second category. While we would be

prepared to argue that some of the above-cited cases

13

were wrongly decided,* we do not believe that they

pose the sort of stark contrast of legal principle that

weighs in favor of granting certiorari. As this Court

has stressed (Variq Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813), “‘it

is unnecessary—and indeed impossible—to define

with precision every contour of the discretionary

function exception.” The cases in this area are

highly fact-specific, and the differences appear to be

more of emphasis than of principle.

More immediately, this case does not present an

occasion to clarify the tension »mong these court of

appeals decisions. The court of appeals here made

it very clear that the on-scene coordinator’s decision

to proceed with the clean-up depended not merely on

a consideration of ‘tthe resources available’ but also

upon a balancing of “the relative risks to the public

health and safety from alternative actions’ (Pet.

App. 13a). The on-scene coordinator was delegated

considerable diseretion to make this choice hased on

his overall assessment of the situation. Whatever

merit the distinction between policy determinations

end onerational decisions may have when only the

proper allocation of resources to aceomnlish a defined

objective is in question, that simplistic distinction is

incapable of capturing the “nature and quality”

(Variq Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813) of the on-scene

coordinator’s actions in this case.

Petitioner is also mistaken in attempting (Pet. 13)

to draw a related distinction between reculatory

functions—which are within the exception-—and non-

reculatory or proprietary functions—which are not.

That distinction was expressly rejected in Variq Air-

lines. The Court in Variq reaffirmed Dalehite, which

>In particular, Eklof, SCNO Barge, Drake Towing, and

U.S. Fire Ins. all seem to turn the Coast Guard into an in-

surer of safe navigation.

14

a applied the exception outside a regulatory context,

and quoted legislative history clearly stating that

‘“ ‘administrative action not of a regulatory nature,

such as the expenditure of Federal funds, the execu-

tion of a Federal project, and the like’ ” fall within

a the exception. 467 U.S. at 809-810, 811-813 (cita-

tions omitted). ‘‘{T]he basic inquiry concerning the

application of the discretionary functiom exception,”

the Court stressed, is simply whether the challenged

3 acts involve “legislative and administrative decisions

q grounded in social, economic, and political policy”

4 (Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813-814). The decision

3 how urgently to pursue and what risks to take in

abating a severe and immediate hazard to health and

| safety implicates numerous concerns of ‘

‘a nomic, and political policy.” °

‘social, eco-

CONCLUSION

: The petition for a writ of certiorari should be de-

nied.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor te re ral

JOHN R. BOLTON

A ssistant Attorne y ise ne ral

JOHN F. CORDES

PHYLLIS JACKSON PYLES

JUNE 1988 Attorneys

* As the court of appeals expressly noted (Pet. App. 14a),

there was no allegation in this case that the on-scene coordi-

nator violated any EPA regulation governing removal actions.

Thus, this case does not present any issue found in Berkovitz

V. United States, cert. granted, No. 87-198 (argued Apr. 19,

1988), and there is no reason to hold this case for disposition

in light of Berkovitz.

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