Opposition Brief — United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States
Supreme Court brief1988
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Suprema Court, USL
EILVED
JUN 9 1988
No. 87-1803 sens oun se
So nod :
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY
COMPANY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE -
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
JOHN R. BOLTON
Assistant Attorney General
JOHN F. CORDES
PHYLLIS JACKSON PYLES
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20520
(202) 633-221 7
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the discretionary function exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2680(a),
bars petitioner’s claim that an on-scene coordinator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
who was in charge of the clean-up of a hazardous
waste site designated for an “immediate removal ac-
tion’ under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, acted neg-
ligently in directing a private contractor to proceed,
notwithstanding adverse wind conditions, with the
clean-up of a substance posing a major threat of
fire, explosion, and release of pollutants into the air.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
}?s Fi
Opinions below
Jurisdiction |
Statement 2
Argument 6
Conclusion |
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
( ases
{/ahama Flee Onan h ‘ ] s.7 7
] | 1522 (11+} ( ' Nar) 117
| lal, 0) y bey Vt ty TOY |: { Th }
1986) il
Be rhowit- \ TTnited State cert orn) ted, No of
198 (argued Apr. 19, 1988) 14
Bowman Vv. United Stat 290 8a 13! (Ath Cir
1987) 1]
Browy V. linited Chats - TOO Ie 7a. ty (] ; Cir
1986). cert ar y ied. 179 Ty . a aya? / 1987 ) }*?
C.P. Chemical Co. vy. United States. 810 F.?d 31
(2d Cir. 1987) 11
Dalehiti \ i tog] State AE | n (19° ) 5, ¢ 7.
3. 9. 10
Dra! Towing Co. \ V Yi Vi ( f (
765 J ] 1060 (11th Ciy 1QR5) 11
(5th ( r. 1985) 1?
Heller yv. 1 ited St <() | | 55R ¢ h (‘it
1986) 1?
Hend United States, T31 F2d 912 (9th
cor 1OX6) ie 1]
Lindsey v. United States, 7% F.2d 1143. (th Ci
L985) ww
Cases—Continued:
Mitchell v. United States, 787 F.2d 4166 hopes Cir.
Page
1986). cert. denied, No. 87-301 (Oct. 5, 1987)-.. 12
Myslakowski v. United States, 806 F.2d ‘91 (6th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, No. 86-1289 (Mar. 50,
OT. oo fo nor ee cedar areeaenlenaabemenicaineetas 12
Pierce v. United States, 804 F.2d 191 (Sth Cir.
I on reas iad a arses ierdesne een eneae aia 12
SCNO Barge Lines, Inc. V. Sun Transp. Co., T75
Ws SEE COE Cie RO acess 11
Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 301 (3d
eS RN rec aa esse sernant ene res 12
Spencer V. New Orleans Levee Bd., 757 F.2d 155
(5th Cir. 1984) RUSE SRS ay ee een ee 12
U.S. Fire Ins. Co. Vv. United States, 806 F.2d 1529
CR RGR Ce, BED aa aie ss Sires escenrnssannkpnnceeenaeesnonns 11
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea
Grandense (Variq Airlines), 467 U.S. 797
1984) ............. EL ORT TEN LO Sar PVE De 5, 8, 9, 10, 18, 14
Statutes and regulations:
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp.
ey re Oe eon ccece teeter a coe 2
12 U.S.C. 9601 (a) (1) tee eee arene 7
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S. C. 2680(a)_..... 4
Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1981 Comp.).. 7
Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2925 (1987) .. 7
Be Oe ee a a ores cease secede 8
Iu thy Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
No. 87-1805
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY
COMPANY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-
16a) is reported at 837 F.2d 116. The opinion of the
district court (Pet. App. 18a-48a) is reported at
638 F. Supp. 1068.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on January 15, 1988. The petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari was filed on April 14, 1988. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
at
STATEMENT
1. Petitioner is an insurer seeking indemnity or
contribution from EPA based on the alleged negli-
gence of EPA’s on-scene coordinator in allowing %
clean-up operation to proc rotwithstanding un-
favorable wind conditions (Pet. App. 3a, 5a). The
clean-up took place at a site designated for an “im-
mediate removal action” under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. HT) 9601 ef seq.
(CERCLA) (Pet. Amn. 3a). FPA tynicee! livects
‘such immediate action onlv if it determines t!
response is necessary within hours or days In ord
to prevent significant harm to the public health or to
the environment. In this case, EPA determine? that
the site posed an imminent threat of fire and explo-
. 1] ‘ *? +1 + ‘
sion, as well as hreat of public contact with |
ardous c}
coordinator. who directed the clean-up, hired peti-
tioner’s insuree. OH Materials. an expert in tonic
chs «i
. &
emicals (id. at 3a). The EPA’s on-scen
waste ahatement a containment, to perform the
various tasks required for t
4a).
One of the most serious hazards at the site was an
old railroad tank car restine on reised concrete ned-
estals. The tank contained oleum. a solution of sulfur
trioxide in concentrated sulfuric acid, which is ex-
? c , mm <« +; sate ,
treme! reactive with a W de ranee oT camyn nas nc
sensitive to moisture. At the commencement of the
removal action, the oleum tank was venting directl
into the atmosphere and posed a major threat of fire
explosion and release of pollutants. Pet. App. 4a
OH Materials suggested that the tank be removed
from its nedestals and transferred to a remote loca-
tion or. alternatively. placed on the ground at the
4
while the chemical release would have oceurred re-
gardless of the wind conditions, “much less” property
damage would have resulted if the wind had been
blowing away from Lock Haven (id. at 39a). The
court held the United States liable for 60° of the
damages caused by the chemical release based on
EPA’s failure to order the contractor to cease oper-
ations when wind conditions were not favorable (id.
at 4la-42a, 48a). The court held that the contractor
was also liable since, as “‘an expert in cleaning up
hazardous wastes, [it] knew or should have known
of the importance of paying attention to wind condi-
tions and should at least have raised this point with
the EPA” (id. at 44a). The district court found,
however, that the United States had the greater
share of the liability because “EPA retained the ul-
timate power to make decisions regarding the cleanup
operations” (ibid.).
The district court rejected the government’s con-
tention that the discretionary function exception
(28 U.S.C. 2680(a)) barred petitioner’s claim. The
court held (Pet. App. 33a-34a) that, while the United
States had discretion to ignore the dangerous site al-
together, “once it chose to clean up the hazardous
wastes there, its decisions regarding the procedures
to be followed were not of the nature and quality
that Congress intended to shield from tort liability.”
“The United States,” the court stated (id. at 34a),
“must be held accountable for the acts of its workers
who carry cut tasks on an operational level.” The
district court concluded (jhid.) that in this instance
“[t]he On Scene Coordinator’s role in the cleanup
operation was such that his conduct is not excluded
from a claim brought pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act.”
3. The court of appeals reversed, holding that pe-
titioner’s claim was barred by the discretionary func-
5
tion exception. Relying on this Court’s decisions in
United States vy. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984),
and Dalehite vy. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953
the court noted (Pet. App. 10a) that ‘tthe dichotomy
between planning level and operation level’ relied
upon by the district court “does not resolve the ques-
tion of whether a governmental act is discretionary
within the meaning of the exception.” The proper
focus is on “ ‘the nature of the conduct, rather than
the status of the actor’” (id. at lla (quoting Varig
Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813)). “Acts at the operational
level,” the court explained (ibid.), “may be discre-
tionary if planning level crders anticipate decisions
at lower levels that leave room for policy judgement
and decision.”
“Execution of [the hazardous waste clean-up] pro-
gram and accomplishment of its objective,” the court
noted (Pet. App. 12a), “necessarily require the set-
ting of priorities in light of the risks presented at
various sites and the finite resources available to ad-
dress the problem.” EPA classified the site in ques-
ticn here for “immediate remova! action,” thus in-
dicating that “significant risks would attend a delay
in cleanup” (ibid.). The on-scene coordinator,
charged with the responsibility of directing the proj-
ect, ‘faced the problem of when to schedule the neu-
tralization of an oleum tank that was venting di-
rectly into the atmosphere and posed a major threat
of fire, explosion, and release of pollutants into the
air’ (id. at 13a). The court of appeals recognized
that the coordinator’s decision had to reflect “‘not only
the available resources and the other hazards to be
neutralized on the site, but most importantly, a bal-
ancing of the risks of proceeding with the neutraliza-
6
tion on the day chosen against the risks of further
delay” (ibid.).
The court of appeals stressed (Pet. App. 14a) that
“Tt]here was no applicable constitutional provision,
statute, or regulation requiring the On Scene Coor-
dinator to undertake removal actions only on days
with favorable wind conditions.” The authority dele-
gated to the on-scene coordinator, the court stated
(id. at 13a), “left room for, and indeed required,
the exercise of policy judgment based upon the re-
sources available and the relative risks to the public
health and safety from alternative actions.” The
court of appeals accordingly concluded (id. at 14a)
that the district court erred when it sought “to sec-
ond-guess the On Scene Coordinator’s decision.”
ARGUMENT
1. The court of appeals’ conclusion follows neces-
sarily from this Court’s decision in Dalehite v. United
States, supra. In Dalehite, the Court applied the
discretionary function exception to a fertilizer pro-
curement and shipping program undertaken by the
government in an effort to increase food production
in occupied territories following the Second World
War. The plaintiffs in Dalehite argued that the im-
plementation cf the program was negligent in a num-
ber of respects, thereby causing the explosion of a
shipment of fertilizer. This Court concluded (346
U.S. at 35-36), however, that the discretionary func-
tion exception “includes more than the initiation of
programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in estab-
lishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-
tions. Where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion.” Thus, the Court held
7
that the exception not only barred claims that the
government was negligent in adopting the program
as a whole but also claims that the government was
negligent in various phases of manufacturing, pack-
aging, labeling and shipping the product and in fail-
ing to warn those handling the fertilizer of its dan-
gerous nature.
In this case, the government was engaged not, as
in Dalehite, in an activity creating its own hazards,
but rather, pursuant to a statutory duty, in the in-
herently dangerous task of cleaning up environmental
hazards created by others. Under CERCLA, EPA
has been given broad authority to contain and elimi-
nate hazardous wastes.* This authority is not cir-
cumscribed in any significant way, and EPA clearly
has broad discretion to structure individual clean-up
projects, consistently with budgetary constraints, in
*The Act provides, in pertinent part (42 U.S.C. 9604
(a) (1)):
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or
there is a substantial threat of such a release into the
environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial
threat of release into the environment of any pollutant
or contaminant which may present an imminent and sub-
stantial danger to the public health or welfare, the Presi-
dent is authorized to act, consistent with the national
contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal
of, and provide for remedial action relating to such haz-
ardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time
* * * or take any other response measure consistent with
the national contingency plan which the President deems
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the
environment * * *, —
The authority to act under this provision has been expressly
delegated to EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg.
2923 (1987); Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1981
Comp.).
8
accordance with its own views of sound policy. For
each removal action, EPA appoints an on-scene Cco-
ordinator, with full responsibility to coordinate and
direct the federal removal efforts (Pet. App. 20a).
There are no established guidelines or manuals that
control the exercise of his discretion; instead, regula-
tions require him to consider and balance a number
of factors in making clean-up decisions.°
In the present case, the on-scene coordinator de-
cided to proceed immediately with “the neutraliza-
tion of an oleum tank that was venting directly into
the atmosphere and posed a major threat of fire, ex-
plosion, and release of pollutants into the air” ( Pet.
App. 13a) rather than waiting for more favorable
wind conditions. That decision involved a balancing
of the risks of proceeding and the risks of waiting
as well as practical considerations concerning the
feasibility of the project as a whole. The on-scene
coordinator was required to act, based on considera-
tions of “social, economic, and political policy” (Varig
Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814), in accordance with his
“judgment of the best course” (Dalehite, 346 U.S.
at 34). It follows that his decision was protected by
the discretionary function exception, and it is not
‘In fashioning an appropriate clean-up plan, the on-scene
coordinator must document and evaluate pertinent facts con-
cerning the discharge or release, such as its source and cause;
the existence of potentially responsible parties; the nature,
amount, and location of discharged or released materials; the
probable direction and time of travel of discharged or released
materials; the pathways to human exposure; the potential
impact on human health, welfare and safety; the potential
impact on natural resources and property which may be af-
fected; priorities for protecting human health, welfare and
the environment; and the cost of the operation. See 40 C.F.R.
300.33 (b) (2). |
9
within the province of the courts to second-guess
that decision (467 U.S. at 814; 346 U.S. at 41).
2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 7-8) that there was
no evidence that the on-scene coordinator actually
made a policy determination to proceed with the
neutralization of this particular hazard on the day
in question. There is no requirement, however, that
the policy considerations underlying the “determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in eStab-
lishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-
tions” (346 U.S. at 35-36) be articulated in advance
by the policy maker. As the court of appeals prop-
erly concluded, the factors and options here were
clear and the on-scene courdinator made a conscious
decision to proceed in face of the risks. In that deci-
sion there was ample “room for policy judgment and
decision” (id. at 36).* Indeed, it is unimaginable
that the decision could have been reached without
such an exercise of decision-making judgment.
The district court found that this chemical plant
“was one of the most hazardous sites the EPA has
undertaken to clean up to this date under the Act’s
program” (Pet. App. 21a). The site contained more
than “3,000 drums, and various reactors and tanks,
* Alabama Elec. Coop., Ine. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523
(11th Cir. 1985), upon which petitioner relies (Pet. 8-9), is
not to the contrary. In that case the court held that alleged
negligence by the Army Corps of Engineers in the design of
a dike was not shielded by the discretionary function excep-
tion absent some indication that the design defect was the
result of a policy decision. Here, the court of appeals properly
concluded that the on-scene coordinator’s decision to proceed
in the face of the known risks “required[] the exercise of
policy judgment based upon the resources available and the
relative risks to the public health and safety from alternative
actions” (Pet. App. 13a (emphasis added) ).
10
containing hazardous chemicals” and many of these
vessels were in “deteriorating condition” (id. at 20a).
There also was ground water contamination, filled-in
lagoons of chemicals, and poor air quality in the area
(id. at 20a, 27a). The oleum tank was “Jone]
the most serious hazards” (id. at 23a). In addition,
the on-scene coordinator had a budgetary cap and a
time limitation in which to complete the work (id.
at 20a).
\s the court of appeals recognized, in deciding how
to schedule the clean-up operations, the on-scene co-
ordinator was inevitably faced with “balancing the
risk of proceeding with the neutralization on the day
chosen against the risks of further delay” (Pet. App.
13a). He ‘necessarily took certain calculated risks,
but pis risks were encountered for the advancement
of a governm purpose and pursuant to fal spe-
cific : erant of authority” (Vaeriq Airlines, 467 U.S
at 820).
9
3. Petitioner contends (Pet. 12) that the discre-
tionary function exception can apply only to the gov-
ernment’s initial decision to embark on a project, not
to dec’sions made in implementing the project. But
that is plainly incorrect. Sige this Court clearly stated
in Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 35-36, the discretionary func-
tion exception ‘nda more than the initiation of
programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in estab-
lishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-
tions.” See also Variq Airlines, 467 U.S. at 811-
813.
There is admittedly some disharmony among the
courts of dorinie in this general area. Some decisions
see a material distinction between “policy” and “plan-
ning” activities, on the one hand, and “operational”
11
activities, on the other. These decisions stress that
negligent implementation of discretionary policies
and plans is not itself discretionary and therefore
not within the scope of the exception, even where the
alleged negligence stems from a decision concerning
the proper allocation of scarce resources. See, @.9.,
U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 806 F.2d 1529
(11th Cir. 1986) (negligent placement and mainte-
nanee of buoys by Coast Guard): Aslakson v. United
States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1986) (failure of
power administration to elevate power lines over
lake): Henderson vy. United States, 784 F.2d 942
(9th Cir. 1986) (negligently exposed high voltage
wires): Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. United States,
769 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1985) (negligent design of
dike by Army Corps of Engineers); Drake Towina
Co. v. Meisner Marine Constr. Co., 765 F.2d 1060
(11th Cir. 1985) (misplacement of buoys by Coast
Guard): Eklof Marine Corp. v. United States, 762
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985) (mismarking of channel by
Coast Guard): SCNO Barge Lines, Inc. v. Sun
Transp. Co., 775 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1985) (mislead-
ing information in Coast Guard navigation reports).
Other court of appeals decisions, by contrast, em-
phasize that operational decisions may nonetheless be
discretionary, and where they are—particularly
Where an agency concerned with resource allocation
decides to do so much, and not more, in addressing
a general problem or providing a product or serv-
ice—such decisions should not be second-guessed in
a tort suit. See, e.g.. Bowman v. United States, 820
F.2d 1393 (4th Cir. 1987) (failure to erect cuard-
rail, place warning signs or close Blue Ridge Park-
way during inclement weather): C.P. Chemical Co. v.
Jnited States, 810 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1987) (decision
12
of Consumer Product Safety Commission to ban in-
sulation manufactured by — under Consumer
Product Safety Act rather than using procedures of
Federal Hazardous Substances Act): Myslahowski v.
United States, 806 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1986) (sale of
used jeeps without warning of propensity to over-
turn in certain situations). cert. denied, No. 86-1389
(Mar. 30, 1987); Pierce v. United States, 804 F.2d
101 (S8th Cir. 1986) (challenge to review process
that led to allegedly wrongful termination of disa-
bility benefits): Heller v. United States, 803 F.2d
1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (FAA’s allegedly wrongful
denial of medical certificate to pilot): Smith v. Johns-
Manville Corp., T95 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1986) (sale
of surplus asbestos “as is’ without warnings or war-
ranties): Brown v. United States, 799 F.2d 199 (1st
Cir. 1986) (issuance of weather forecast based on
incomplete information due to failure to repair or re-
nlace sporadically malfunctioning weather-reporting
buoy}, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1058 (1987); Mitchell
v. United States, 787 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986) (de-
cision not to mark power lines below 500 feet), cert.
denied, No. 87-301 (Oct. 5, 1987); Lindsey v. United
States, 778 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1985) (consideration
given to patent application): Ford v. American Mo-
tors Corp., 770 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1985) (sale of
used jeeps without ais of propensity to over-
turn in certain situations); Spencer v. New Orleans
Levee Bd., 737 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1984) (inaccurate
weather forecast ).
There is no clear conflict among the circuits posed
by the cases in these two categories. Indeed, all cir-
cuits with decisions in the first category also have
cases in the second category. While we would be
prepared to argue that some of the above-cited cases
13
were wrongly decided,* we do not believe that they
pose the sort of stark contrast of legal principle that
weighs in favor of granting certiorari. As this Court
has stressed (Variq Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813), “‘it
is unnecessary—and indeed impossible—to define
with precision every contour of the discretionary
function exception.” The cases in this area are
highly fact-specific, and the differences appear to be
more of emphasis than of principle.
More immediately, this case does not present an
occasion to clarify the tension »mong these court of
appeals decisions. The court of appeals here made
it very clear that the on-scene coordinator’s decision
to proceed with the clean-up depended not merely on
a consideration of ‘tthe resources available’ but also
upon a balancing of “the relative risks to the public
health and safety from alternative actions’ (Pet.
App. 13a). The on-scene coordinator was delegated
considerable diseretion to make this choice hased on
his overall assessment of the situation. Whatever
merit the distinction between policy determinations
end onerational decisions may have when only the
proper allocation of resources to aceomnlish a defined
objective is in question, that simplistic distinction is
incapable of capturing the “nature and quality”
(Variq Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813) of the on-scene
coordinator’s actions in this case.
Petitioner is also mistaken in attempting (Pet. 13)
to draw a related distinction between reculatory
functions—which are within the exception-—and non-
reculatory or proprietary functions—which are not.
That distinction was expressly rejected in Variq Air-
lines. The Court in Variq reaffirmed Dalehite, which
>In particular, Eklof, SCNO Barge, Drake Towing, and
U.S. Fire Ins. all seem to turn the Coast Guard into an in-
surer of safe navigation.
14
a applied the exception outside a regulatory context,
and quoted legislative history clearly stating that
‘“ ‘administrative action not of a regulatory nature,
such as the expenditure of Federal funds, the execu-
tion of a Federal project, and the like’ ” fall within
a the exception. 467 U.S. at 809-810, 811-813 (cita-
tions omitted). ‘‘{T]he basic inquiry concerning the
application of the discretionary functiom exception,”
the Court stressed, is simply whether the challenged
3 acts involve “legislative and administrative decisions
q grounded in social, economic, and political policy”
4 (Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813-814). The decision
3 how urgently to pursue and what risks to take in
abating a severe and immediate hazard to health and
| safety implicates numerous concerns of ‘
‘a nomic, and political policy.” °
‘social, eco-
CONCLUSION
: The petition for a writ of certiorari should be de-
nied.
Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor te re ral
JOHN R. BOLTON
A ssistant Attorne y ise ne ral
JOHN F. CORDES
PHYLLIS JACKSON PYLES
JUNE 1988 Attorneys
* As the court of appeals expressly noted (Pet. App. 14a),
there was no allegation in this case that the on-scene coordi-
nator violated any EPA regulation governing removal actions.
Thus, this case does not present any issue found in Berkovitz
V. United States, cert. granted, No. 87-198 (argued Apr. 19,
1988), and there is no reason to hold this case for disposition
in light of Berkovitz.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.