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Supreme Court, USL

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4 MAR 17 186

No. 87-1200 JOSEP E. SPANRGL,

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

AUBURN UNIVERSITY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS

Assistant Attorney General

JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER

MARK L. GROSS

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-221

cel

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the disqualification of a judge under 28

U.S.C. 455(b)(1) may be based on evidence that was not

presented to the district court assigned initial responsibili-

ty for resolving the disqualification issue.

2. Whether a state university has standing under the

Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq., to challenge for its own

benefit the racially discriminatory actions of the state-

created system of higher education of which it is a part.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d

1285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) ...... 13

Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) ........... 12-13

Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd,

462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 412 U.S. 92

i St A nr 13

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) ................ 10

Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116 (Sth Cir.), cert.

ER 0, ee 8

Health Services Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d

796 (Sth Cir. 1986), cert. granted, No. 86-957 (Mar. 9,

ee ae ads vk deb d se ee esses 9, 10

- Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) ............. 1]

International Business Machines Corp., In re, 618 F.2d

i or ca oy a ws Wis Vd okt x a wd 2 aw 8

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 317 F. Supp. 103

(M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd in part and modified in part,

ge | a a

Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444

(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981) ..... 9

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438

ise ds ha Gi esos ws <a wis v2 eos 11

Risty v. Chicago, R.1. & Pac. Ry., 270 U.S. 378 (1926) ... 11

School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987) ...... 13

Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) ............ 1]

(III)

lV

Cases — Continued: Page

United States v. Conforte:

624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

ee ee re I e's hae tk aca) ss dee a cues 9

457 F. Supp. 641 (D. Nev. 1978) .................. 9

United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985),

cert. dented, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986) .................. 9

Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S.

eT CNN Gees es eo cee OM LES A ates Ga eels 12

Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933) ..... 10-11

Constitution and statutes:

U.S. Const.:

Art. VI, Cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause) ................ 12

Amend. XiV (Equal Protection Clause) ........... 2, 11

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d ef

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SAP se Es > cae cen ees on een ke ae a kirs 10

rR FR rn Dene rerenbe yp Gr hee 8, 9, 10

Pe es EE 86a ss oa er he ee ee Ka eka 7

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No. 87-1200

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

V.

AUBURN UNIVERSITY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-40a)

is reported at 828 F.2d 1532. An earlier opinion of the

court of appeals (Pet. App. 139a-154a) is reported at 791

F.2d 1450. The opinion of the district court with respect to

the motion to recuse (Pet. App. 41a-61a) is reported at 582

F. Supp. 1197. The opinion of the district court with

respect to the merits of the controversy (Pet. App.

62a-138a) is reported at 628 F. Supp. 1137.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

October 6, 1987. On December 29, 1987, Justice Stevens

extended the time for filing a petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari to and including January 19, 1988, and the petition

was filed on that date. The jurisdiction of this Court ts in-

voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

STATEMENT

1. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

2000d ef seqg., prohibits recipients of federal financial

assistance from discriminating on the basis of race in

federally assisted programs or activities. In July 1983, the

United States filed suit in the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging that the

State of Alabama, the Alabama State Board of Education,

and all state-supported four-year institutions of higher

education in the State of Alabama, including Alabama

State University (ASU) and Alabama A & M (A & M), two

historically and predominantly black colleges, had been

maintaining a racially segregated system of higher educa-

tion in violation of Title VI and the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Pet. App. 3a).

Both ASU and A & M, however, moved for realignment as

parties-plaintiff on the ground that their interests were an-

tagonistic to those of the other defendants (id. at Sa n.1).

In addition, John F. Knight moved to intervene as

representative of a plaintiff-class of ASU graduates, black

adults and minor children in Alabama presently attending

or eligible to attend an Alabama higher education institu-

tion in the relevant geographic area, and black citizens

who are or may be employed by these higher education in-

stitutions (jd. at 4a-Sa). The district court, with the

Honorable U.W. Clemon presiding, granted these mo-

tions (id. at 4a-Sa, 12a).

In September 1983, however, Auburn University and

the State Superintendent of Education moved, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 144 and 455, to disqualify Judge Clemon (Pet.

App. 12a).' They argued that Judge Clemon’s children

were potential members of the plaintiff-class; that Judge

' 28 U.S.C. 144 and 455 are reprinted in full at Pet. App. 13a-1Sa

n.21.

OEE

3

Clemon had represented the plaintiffs in Lee v. Macon

County Bd. of Educ., 317 F. Supp. 103 (M.D. Ala. 1970),

aff'd in part and modified in part, 453 F.2d 524 (Sth Cir.

1971), a case which allegedly involved some of the same

parties and presented some of the same issues; and that

Judge Clemon knew and was sponsored for the bench by a

member of the law firm that now represented Alabama

A & M (Pet. App. 12a-13a, 18a-23a). Judge Clemon sum-

marily rejected these arguments, finding that the affidavits

accompanying the motions had not been signed by “par-

ties,” as required by 28 U.S.C. 144, and that a reasonable

person viewing the true facts would not harbor doubts

concerning his impartiality, as required by 28 U.S.C. 455

(Pet. App. 12a).

Auburn University filed a petition for a writ of man-

damus to the court of appeals with respect to the dis-

qualification issue (Pet. App. 12a). The court of appeals

granted the petition and remanded the case “with direc-

tions that another judge be assigned to hear the recusal

proceedings” (No. 83-7557 (11th Cir. Nov. 10, 1983), slip

op. 1). Judge Hobart Grooms was then assigned to the

case (Pet. App. 12a). He held an evidentiary hearing with

respect to this matter and, on December 19, 1983, ruled

that Judge Clemon should be disqualified (/d. at 12a-13a).

On January 19, 1984, however, Judge Grooms vacated his

order and recused himself from deciding the disqualifica-

tion issue (/d. at 13a).

Accordingly, Senior Judge David W. Dyer of the court

of appeals was assigned to the case (Pet. App. 13a). He

determined that Judge Clemon need not disqualify himself

from the underlying matter (/d. at 4la-61la). Judge Dyer

found that the affidavits filed by Auburn University and

the Superintendent of Education “fail[ed] to state material

facts with sufficient particularity to convince a reasonable

man that a personal bias exists” (/d. at 45a).

4

2. The case then proceeded to trial, with Judge

Clemon presiding (Pet. App. 5a). While the case was

pending, however, the Alabama State Board of Education

determined that it would not recertify certain

undergraduate and graduate teacher education programs

of ASU (id. at 140a-14la). ASU and the Knight inter-

venors promptly moved the district court preliminarily to

enjoin the Alabama State Board of Education from doing

so (id. at 141a). On August 21, 1985, the district court

issued the requested preliminary relief, finding that the

decision not to recertifiy the teacher education programs

was racially motivated and that the status quo should be

maintained until the underlying action brought by the

United States could be resolved (id. at 14la, 15la). On

December 7, 1985, the district court found that, until

1965, each public college in Alabama was segregated by

law and by custom, that between 1965 and 1975 the de-

fendants had engaged in a series of actions which con-

tinued the racially dual system, and that the vestiges of the

pre-1965 and 1965-1975 actions continued to exist in the

Alabama higher education system (id. at Sa-6a, 62a-138a).

Accordingly, it ordered the State, the Governor, the

Alabama State Board of Education, and the Alabama

Public School and College Authority to submit a remedial

plan consistent with its findings to “ ‘eliminate all vestiges

of the dual system’ ” (id. at 7a). All further proceedings

were stayed, however, pending disposition of the defend-

ants’ appeals (/bid.).

3. In an opinion and order rendered on June 6, 1986 in

review Of the district court’s August 21, 1985 order (Pet.

App. 139a-154a), the court of appeals upheld the pre-

liminary relief issued by the district court against denial of

recertification of ASU teacher education programs. It first

ruled that ASU did not have standing under either the

Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI to challenge for its

own benefit the racially discriminatory actions of the

state-created system of higher education of which it is a

part (id. at 14la-142a). The court found that “ASU, as a

creature of the state, may not raise a Fourteenth Amend-

ment claim under Section 1983” (id. at 144a) and that

“{njothing in Title VI or its legislative history suggests that

Congress conceived of a state instrumentality as a ‘person’

with rights under this statute” (/d. at 146a).? Concomitant-

ly, however, the court found that “the trial court’s entry of

the preliminary injunction sought by the Knight inter-

venors against the Board was entirely appropriate” (id. at

1Sla), reasoning that “[t]he standing of the * * * in-

tervenors remains unchallenged” (id. at 147a), that “even

the partial demise of ASU would impede the ability of the

trial court—and this [c]ourt on review—to remedy any

violation of law proved in the state-wide action originally

brought by the United States and joined by the Knight in-

tervenors” (id. at 152a), and that “the intervenors had a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits” (/bid.).

Thus, the court affirmed “entry of this injunction, on

behalf of the intervenors, against the members of the

[S]tate Board in their official capacities,” and reversed

“the district court’s entry of any injunction on behalf of

ASU * * *” (id. at 153a).3

4. On October 6, 1987, the court of appeals reviewed

the district court’s December 7, 1985 order, determined

that Judge Clemon should have been disqualified from

hearing the case and, accordingly, reversed and remanded

? The court, however, rejected the “broad contention that [ASU], as

a creature of state government, has no federally protected rights what-

soever under the Constitution or laws of the United States” (Pet. App.

142a).

> The Board of Trustees of Alabama State University petitioned for

certiorari on the court of appeals’ ruling as to standing. The Court

denied the petition (No. 86-749 (Feb. 23, 1987))

6

without reaching the merits (Pet. App. la-40a).* It agreed

with the district court that neither the presence of Judge

Clemon’s two minor children in the plaintiff class nor the

judge’s background as a civil rights lawyer and political

figure in Alabama required disqualification (id. at

18a-23a). But the court held that Judge Clemon’s involve-

ment as a legislator with the matters at issue in the litiga-

tion did require the trial judge’s disqualification (id. at

23a-29a).

The court rested its holding on the fact that, “[d]Juring

his tenure in the state legislature, the trial judge actively

participated in the very events and shaped the very facts

that are at issue in this suit” (Pet. App. 23a (footnote

omitted)). Specifically, it found that, “[a]s chairman of the

Senate Rules Committee, Judge Clemon played a critical

role in the confirmation of those individuals nominated

for positions on the board of trustees of the defendant in-

stitutions” (/d. at 23a-24a), and “[y]Jet Judge Clemon ex-

plicitly found at trial that the composition of defendants’

governing boards was a relevant and important factor in

this finding of liability” (id. at 25a). It further found that,

“[w]jhile in the statehouse, Judge Clemon also helped

spearhead a bill to appropriate $10,000,000 to Alabama A

& M” (ibid.), yet “[a]t trial, A & M cited the defeat of this

bill as evidence of racial animus” and thus “Judge Clemon

was again forced to make factual findings about events in

which he was an active participant” (/bid.). Finally, it

found that Judge Clemon’s involvement as a lawyer in the

+ The court also held (Pet. App. 29a-39a) that the United States had

improperly alleged that the entire system of public higher education

was covered by Title VI and had failed to identify the particular pro-

grams Or activities at individual colleges receiving federal funds. The

court instructed (/d. at 39a) that, on remand, the United States should

prepare and file a new complaint.

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., supra, litigation pro-

vided him with information relating to the discrimination

suffered by black high school principals, a subject on

which evidence was also presented in this case (Pet. App.

26a-27a). The court concluded that, as a result of his in-

volvement in these matters, 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(1) required

his disqualification, since Judge Clemon had “personal

knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding” (Pet. App. 27a).

In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the claim

that it should “not consider Judge Clemon’s activities as a

state Senator since these facts were not presented to Judge

Dyer” (Pet. App. 23a n.49). It acknowledged that “[t}he

question of whether considerations of timeliness apply

under [28 U.S.C.] 455 is a difficult one,” noting that

“Congress did not incorporate a time limitation into the

amended statute, and courts have differed as to whether

the timeliness requirement of the prior [Section] 455 sur-

vived” (ibid.). But the court ruled that, “[e]ven if the prin-

ciple of timeliness has some application to motions

brought under [Section] 455(b), it would be inappropriate

to apply this principle under the circumstances of this

case” (id. at 24a n.49). It reasoned that “[t]hose courts that

have adopted a timeliness requirement have done so ‘to

prevent litigants from abusing motions to disqualify as

dilatory tactics Or as a means to “sample the temper of the

court” before deciding whether to raise an issue of dis-

qualification’”’ (ibid. (citations omitted)), that

“{a]ppellants here were not acting to delay or to speculate

on a favorable substantive judgment in the interim”

(ibid.), that “[m]otions to disqualify Judge Clemon were

filed at the earliest stages of the litigation and aggressively

prosecuted throughout” (/bid.), that “[a]ppellants did not

discover relevant information about Judge Clemon’s ac-

tivities as a State legislator until late in the litigation, and

8

raised this ground for disqualification at the first available

moment” (ibid.); and, finally, that “[g]iven the critical im-

portance of the appearance of impartiality guaranteed by

[Section] 455,” it would not “adopt the cramped inter-

pretation of this statute asserted by appellees” (/bid.).

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals does not merit

review by this Court. Although the United States adheres

to its position that disqualification was improper since the

claims were either untimely or lacking in merit, it is clear

that the disqualification issue is essentially a factual one

and that the resolution of this issue by the court below

does not conflict with any decision of this Court or of any

other court of appeals. Moreover, this Court has already

declined to review the question whether ASU has standing

to challenge for its own benefit the racially discriminatory

actions of the state-created system of which it is a part

(No. 86-749), and the question is no more deserving of

review at this time.’ Accordingly, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be denied.

1. Petitioners initially err in suggesting (Pet. 14-15)

that the decision below conflicts with the holdings of other

courts that a litigant must raise in a timely fashion the

grounds on which it seeks to disqualify a judge under 28

U.S.C. 455(b). To be sure, there is a conflict among the

circuits on this question (compare /n re International

Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1980)

(party may not await outcome of trial before seeking to

disqualify trial judge on basis of information known to

party before trial); Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116

(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982) (same); and

our brief in opposition in No, 86-749,

y

United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980) (same), with United States v.

Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475

U.S. 1012 (1986)). This conflict may be short-lived,

however, because, as petitioners concede (Pet. 15 n.8), the

Seventh Circuit “appears to be ready to reconsider.”

Moreover, the court of appeals in this case did not decide

whether a time limitation applies to disqualification mo-

tions under 28 U.S.C. 455(b). Rather, it held that, even

assuming that such a limitation applies, the motion for

disqualification in this case was timely filed (Pet. App.

23a-24a n.49). The court found that “[mJotions to dis-

qualify Judge Clemon were filed at the earliest stages of

the litigation and aggressively prosecuted throughout,”

and that “{respondents] did not discover relevant informa-

tion about Judge Clemon’s activities as a state legislator

until late in the litigation, and raised this ground for dis-

qualification at the first available moment” (ibid.). Ac-

cordingly, the decision below does not add to the circuit

conflict or provide a vehicle for resolving it.

2. Petitioners similarly err in suggesting (Pet. 15-18)

that the decision below conflicts with decisions of other

courts in which remands were ordered to permit the

development of a factual record on the disqualification

issue. In the cases that petitioners cite, the remands were

ordered because the facts material to the disqualification

issue were in dispute. See Health Services Acquisition

Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.

granted, No. 86-957 (Mar. 9, 1987); Price Bros. v.

Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981); United States v.

Conforte, 457 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D. Nev. 1978). Here, by

contrast, the court of appeals apparently concluded that

the facts material to the disqualification issue were not in

dispute and that the issue could be resolved without further

i0

factfinding by a district court; the court of appeals be-

lieved that the undisputed facts established that Judge

Clemon was intimately involved as a state legislator with

matters at issue in this case. See Pet. App. 23a-29a. Ac-

cordingly, its decision not to remand the case for further

proceedings is not in conflict with the decisions that peti-

tioners cite.®

~ 3. Petitioners next argue (Pet. 18-22) that the facts

upon which the court of appeals relied do not require

Judge Clemon’s disqualification. But the question is in-

herently fact-bound and non-recurring. Accordingly, in

Our view, it is not sufficiently important to justify review

by this Court.’

4. Finally, petitioners err in suggesting (Pet. 22-27)

that the court of appeals erred in holding that ASU and A

& M were without standing under either the Equal Protec-

tion Clause or Title VI to challenge for their own benefit

the racially discriminatory actions of the state education

system of which they are a part. This Court has long held

that, “[b]eing but creatures of the State, municipal corpora-

tions have no standing to invoke the * * * provisions of the

Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in opposition

to the will of their creator.” Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.

433, 441 (1939) (footnote omitted). See generally Williams

© Petitioners note (Pet. 13-14) that this Court has granted certiorari

and heard argument in Liljeberg, which involves a question concern-

ing the timeliness of a disqualification motion under 28 U.S.C. 455(a).

But petitioners properly do not ask that their petition be held pending

the disposition of Liljeberg. That case involves allegations concerning

the “appearance of impropriety” of a judge, not personal knowledge

of important facts. Accordingly, the decision there should not bear on

the proper resolution of the timeliness question that sometimes arises

under 28 U.S.C. 455(b).

’? There is no basis for petitioners’ suggestion (Pet. 14) that the dis-

qualification decision in this case was based upon Judge Clemon’s

race.

11

v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); Risty v.

Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 270 U.S. 378, 389-390 (1926);

Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923); Hunter

vV. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). Title VI likewise is

designed to protect individual rights and, in enacting that

statute, Congress made no suggestion that it was granting

State-created entities any rights that heretofore were

unavailable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf.

Regents of the University of Californiayv. Bakke, 438 U.S.

265, 287 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (Title VI proscribes

“only those racial classifications that would violate the

Equal Protection Clause”); id. at 328 (opinion of Brennan,

White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ.) (same). Accordingly, the

decision of the court below — that state-created entities like

ASU and A & M may not rely on either the Equal Protec-

tion Clause or Title VI to challenge for their own benefit

the discriminatory actions of the state that created

them —is correct.

Petitioners acknowledge (Pet. 23) that “a line of cases

[from this Court exists] holding that disputes between

arms or creatures of a State do not normally implicate

federal rights.” But petitioners repeat the argument that

was advanced, and that this Court declined to review, in

No. 86-749, to wit, that the court of appeals failed to con-

sider cases “which have allowed claims such as those

asserted here when they were brought by state-created en-

tities or their board members, in pursuit of their obligation

under the Supremacy Clause to conform their conduct to

the federal Constitution or a federal statute” (Pet. 23). As

we noted in our brief in opposition in No. 86-749 (at 6),

however, the court of appeals could not consider an argu-

ment that was not presented to it. ASU did not argue to

the court of appeals that it was representing the interests

of its students, faculty, or administrators, or that it was

12

pursuing an obligation under the Supremacy Clause to

conform its conduct to the federal Constitution or a

federal statute.

Rather, ASU argued only that it had standing as an in-

stitution to seek the preliminary injunction. Thus, in

answering respondents’ argument to the court of appeals

that petitioner ASU was without standing, ASU con-

tended only that “Alabama State University as a creature

of the State has federally protected rights under the Con-

stitution and the Laws of the United States” (ASU C.A.

Br. 21). Accordingly, the court below had only to decide

“whether any given constitutional provision or law pro-

tects the interests of the body in question,” to wit, ASU.

See Pet. App. 143a-144a (emphasis added). Petitioners’ re-

characterization of the cause in this petition for a writ of

certiorari cannot change the question presented to and de-

cided by the court below.’ ;

Petitioners therefore err (Pet. 22-26) in suggesting that

the decision below conflicts with decisions of this Court

and other courts which have held that state-created entities

may challenge on behalf of their students, faculties, and

board members the discriminatory actions of their state-

creators. The school boards in the cited cases either alleged

that a state statute Or some other state action required a

constitutional or statutory duty to be violated by board

members (see, e.g., Washington v. Seattle School District

No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392

’ As we noted in our brief in opposition in No. 86-749 (at 6n.1), it

may be that ASU intended to argue to the court of appeals that it was

representing the interests of its students, faculty, and administrators,

as well as the interests of the institution as a whole. But, as we also

noted there (/bid.), ASU did not make these intentions clear to the

court of appeals and, accordingly, the fault in the decision below, if

any, lies with ASU, not with the court of appeals.

13

U.S. 236 (1968)), or that they were representing the con-

Stitutional rights of their students or faculty (see, e.g.,

Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Bradley v.

School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev’d on other

grounds, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally

divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973); School Bd. v. Baliles,

829 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4th Cir. 1987)). Here, by contrast,

ASU alleged only that its own rights as an institution were

in issue. Thus, it is clear that petitioners ask this Court to

resolve a conflict that does not exist.

The suggestion (Pet. 26-27) that the decision below

“leaves a significant gap in the means of protecting the

constitutional rights of [their] students” is equally

meritless. The United States and the intervenors in this

litigation have adequately represented and will continue

adequately to represent the students and faculty of the

Alabama schools—the persons who would truly benefit

from the desegregation of the Alabama system of higher

education.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

Wt. BRADFORD REYNOLDS

Assistant Attorney General

JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER

MARK L. GROSS

Attorneys

MARCH 1988

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1988 — 20203760338

218a

Association (CCTA) request reconsideration of the interim

must carry rules on the grounds they unconstitutionally

intrude on the First Amendment rights of cable operators,

programmers and subscribers.

20. TBS argues that the interim must carry rules are

a prior restraint on constitutionally protected speech in

that they preclude cable operators’ programming selec-

tions, compel certain substitutions, and impose severe sanc-

tions for refusals to comply. Thus, it states that there is

a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity

and that a standard of review more stringent than the

O'Brien standard should apply. TBS further argues that

the new rules are unconstitutional even under the more

lenient O’Brien standard. It states that the Commission

failed to demonstrate that maximizing viewer choices is a

substantial governmental interest that would be harmed in

the absence of must carry rules. In this regard, TBS crit-

icizes the Commission for adopting interim must carry rules

despite its findings that cable systems have continued to

carry local stations since the former must carry rules were

invalidated and that viewer choice is increased where cable

systems do not carry local stations. In addition, it states

that the Commission failed to adequately investigate the

market situation with respect to the use and availability

of built-in and outdoor antennas and takes the position

that the Commissicn is obligated to show that a six month

consumer education program is insufficient to rectify any

existing problem of subscriber awareness of the need for

alternative reception capabilities.

21. TBS further states that the interim must carry rules

are not narrowly tailored to meet the purported need. In

this regard, it specifically criticizes the exemption of

smaller cable systems from must carry obligations, the 25

percent channel capacity cap, the five year term of the

interim must carry rules, the requirement that cable sys-

tems carry duplicating noncommercial stations, the viewing

standard and the requirement that must carry signals be

219a

carried on the lowest-priced separately available tier of

service. TBS thus requests that we eliminate the interim

must carry rules.

22. Century argues that the interim must carry rules

are content-based and, thus, O’Brien is not the appropriate

standard for review. In this regard, Century states that

in making their programming judgments, cable operators

exercise their editorial discretion relative to speech con-

tent. Thus, Century argues, the rules directly interfere

with communicative activity by designating certain sources

that must be included by cable editors and by according

preferences to certain favored classes of speakers, such as

those who are local and popular. Century also claims that

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (Renton)® is in-

appropriately applied by the Commission in its constitu-

tional analysis of the new regulations, as the rationale for

time, place and manner restrictions cannot be used to con-

done intrusions into program content and distribution. It

further argues that Without Renton, the Commission’s ra-

tionale cannot be sustained. Century concludes that the

Commission’s constitutional analysis of the must carry rules

improperly blends content regulation with market entry

and other non-communicative aspects of cable television.

Therefore, Century seeks elimination of the interim must

carry rules.

23. CCTA takes the position that the five year sunset

provision does not justify unconstitutionally intruding on

First Amendment rights. It cities Century Federal, Inc. v.

City of Palo Alto (Century Federal),’® for the proposition

that intrusions on cable operators’ speech rights are not

acceptable merely because they are limited in duration.

CCTA thus argues that the infirmity of the interim must

carry rules is not cured by the five year sunset provision.

°106 S.Ct. 925, 54 U.S.L.W. 4160 (1986).

' 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 1986).

220a

CCTA proposes that if the Commission decides to retain

the interim must carry rules, then it should select a shorter

interim period that is more in keeping with the regulatory

program goal of educating consumers. In this regard, it

argues that there is nothing in the record of this pro-

ceeding to suggest that a five year period is needed to

- accomplish the educational task.

24. CCTA also submits that input selector switches

should not be mandatory; rather, they should be available

for sale or lease to subscribers who request them pursuant

to a strong information requirement, somewhat like the

cable “parental control’? device. As CCTA sees it. this

modification offers two advantages: 1) it would not impose

unnecessary costs on customers who do not need or desire

an input selector switch; and, 2) it would allow a market

for built-in input selector switches to develop. CCTA con-

tends that the Commission's approach, if implemented,

would impede the development of That market because

subscribers would have no reason to buy receivers with

built-in switches if cable systems provide switches for free.

25. The Texas Cable TV Association, filing jointly with

four other cable interests. (Texas Cable) contends that the

consumer education information requirement is unconsti-

tutional since the Supreme Court has outlawed mandatory

“consumer interest’? messages of the kind adopted by the

Commission to effect its decision. In support, it cites Pa-

cific Gas and Electric v. P.U.C. of California (Pacific Gas),!!

which, it states, held that mandated access to “extra

space’ in billing envelopes for consumer advocacy group

messages violated the First Amendment rights of a reg-

ulated utility. Moreover, Texas Cable maintains that the

education program is inconsistent with the Commission’s

underbrush decisions to leave the regulation of broad-

casters’ trade practices to the FTC and the Better Busi-

106 S.Ct. 903, 54 U.S.L.W. 4149 (1986),

221a

ness Bureau, and with the 1985 Fairness Report, in which

the Commission determined that the public interest is not

served by forcing broadcasters to telecast messages on

controversial issues of public importance.

26. The Association of Independent Television Stations,

Inc. (INTV) requests reconsideration of the sunset provi-

sion of the interim must carry rules. INTV contends that

it is unlikely that the ‘fair and open competitive market

environment” for programming sought by the Commis-

sion can be achieved within five years through the input

selector switch and consumer education requirements. It

argues that various cable and broadcast industry studies

and reports, including that submitted by the Joint

Petitioners as discussed above, demonstrate that input se-

lector switches are flawed, ineffective mechanisms for re-

capturing the access to off-the-air broadcast signals that

is lost when cable service is installed.

27. INTV cites the NCTA and NAB studies, which, it

states. show the technical problems with the input selector

switch plan. Additionally, INTV states that it pointed out

in its original comment in this proceeding the difficulties

in using input selector switches with cable-ready sets and/

or videocassette recorders (VCRs). It also submits that

input selector switches are totally unusable for many TV

viewers who are prohibited from erecting outdoor TV an-

tennas, live in apartment buildings, or otherwise “cannot

or will not’ use input selector switches due to local zoning

regulation or complexity of operation.

98. INTV further argues that even if the input selector

switch rules did provide adequate subscriber access to off-

the-air broadcast signals, the market environment envi-

sioned by the Commission will never be achieved unless

and until Congress and the Commission eliminate a pan-

oply of regulatory and statutory policies that insulate cable

2 See Report and Order, supra at para. 133.

222a

systems from the market in which broadcasters compete.

According to INTV, these policies include: 1) the cable

compulsory copyright license; 2) entry barriers to cable

competition from telephone companies, broadcast stations,

and television networks; and, 3) Commission-approved ab-

rogation of local television stations’ exclusive local pro-

gram exhibition licenses. It states that sunset of the must

carry rules will, absent concurrent actions on the part of

the Commission and Congress, leave undisturbed this re-

gime of ‘‘cable friendly’ regulation that insulates cable

from the forces of marketplace competition. Thus, INTV

argues that the government interest in maximizing diver-

sity in program choices and fostering competition among

program sources will be ill-served in the absence of on-

going, limited signal carriage rules.

29. INTV is also concerned that the Commission ap-

parently “‘dismissed’’ Section 307(b) of the Communications

Act, which requires that radio frequency services be dis-

tributed ‘‘among the several states and communities” in

a fair and equitable manner, as a component of the federal

interest supporting the interim must carry rules. It sub-

mits that localism and free, local broadcast service remain

preeminent communications policy objectives and impor-

tant federal interests. INTV states that there is no sta-

tutory interest comparable to that expressed in Section

307(b) for non-local program services available only to per-

sons who are willing to pay for them. It submits that the

Commission’s seeming equation of free local broadcast ser-

vice with non-local, subscription? narrowcast services such

as cable networks is, therefore, unwarranted! It argues

that the Commission’s disregard for Section 307(b) is un-

warranted, unsupportable, and inconsistent with its sta-

tutory mandate and must be corrected on reconsideration.

30. INTV requests that the interim must carry rules be

retained until the fair and competitive market environment

we seek has actually been achieved. It suggests that we

adopt a system-by-system sunset of our must carry rules

223a

to be effective upon: 1) elimination of all the above-men-

tioned governmentally mandated protections of cable sys-

tems from the free market in which local broadcasters and

all other video program distributors must operate; and, 2)

introduction of intra-modal competition, that is, a second

cable system into the community. In the alternative, INTV

requests adoption of the “permissible signal carriage”’ rule

which it initially proposed in this proceeding. Under that

proposal, the cable operator would choose either to invoke

the compulsory copyright license by carrying all “local”

signals or to negotiate separately with copyright holders

for use of their work. INTV further submits that if we

decide to retain The five-year sunset provision, we should

indicate willingness to consider, as an aspect of our con-

sideration of continuing relief in particular situations where

continuing signal carriage rules might be necessary, the

possibility of extending the rules beyond their scheduled

expiration date.

31. To support ongoing signal carriage rules, INTV ar-

gues that the Commission’s constitutional analysis should

rely more confidently on the standard established in

O'Brien and other applicable Supreme Court decisions. In

this respect, INTV states that the Commission's analysis

is basically correct but is not complete. It submits that

the Court’s holding in Renton makes clear that regulations

which are not aimed at suppression of speech, that is,

those that are ‘‘justified’”’ without reference to the content

of the regulated speech, are constitutional if they are de-

signed to serve a “‘substantial government interest” and

“allow for reasonable alternative avenues of communica-

tions.’ INTV asserts that the interim must carry rules,

without the input selector switch rules, satisfy this test,

including the second part of it, by leaving at least 75

percent of cable system’ channel capacity free from any

signal carriage obligation. If further argues that the in-

's Renton, supra at 928-930.

224a

terim must carry rules clearly satisfy the O’Brien standard

even in the absence of the Court’s decision in Renton. In

this respect, INTV observes that the Court recently af-

firmed in United States v. Albertini (Albertini)'* that ‘‘an

incidental burden on speech is no greater than essential,

and therefore permissible under O’Brien, so long as the

content-neutral regulation promotes a substantial govern-

ment interest that would be achieved less effectively ab-

sent the regulation.”’ .

32. Richard Leghorn seeks revision of our basic ap-

proach for resolving the must carry matter. He submits

that we took the good idea of relying on input selector

switch requirements as a long term means to achieve our

goals, but then misapplied it in a manner that satisfies no

one and fails to accomplish those goals. Specifically, Legh-

orn objects to what he terms are: 1) our unnecessary and

excessive reliance on external switches; 2) the massive

information campaign required of cable operators to cure

a market dysfunction caused by the former rules; and, 3)

the five additional years of unnecessarily intrusive must

carry rules. He contends that we did not develop a com-

plete record on input selector devices and, thus, we failed

to satisfy the requirements of administrative rule making

and we further failed to identify the least intrusive means

of achieving our policy objectives. Leghorn argues that the

two-part regulatory program is technically impractical and

infringes the First Amendment rights of cable operators.

33. Leghorn argues that the Report and Order fails to

recognize that, in the long term, input selector switches

built in during the manufacture of television receivers are

significantly superior to external switches. He states that

there are a number of advantages to use of electronic,

internal switches, including: 1) purchase and maintenance

costs would be lower; 2) technical performance would be

#472 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2907 (1985).

substantially better; 3) the dangers of signal leakage to

air navigation and increased risks of lightning harm re-

sulting from poor grounding would be practically elimi-

nated; and 4) the home television environment would be

‘friendlier’ for consumers. Leghorn asserts that our input

selector switch rules will suppress demand for receivers

with internal switches because cable subscribers will not

purchase receivers with built-in switching capability when

they are provided mechanical, external switches free of

charge.

34. Leghorn characterizes the consumer education pro-

gram as, in effect, compelling cable operators to advertise

the availability of their off-the-air competition, an approach

which he says will greatly waste time and money and

engender consumer confusion and resentment. Leghorn

contends that the education requirement cannot be justi-

fied as a mere consumer protection mechanism, since it

directly forces an industry to advertise the whereabouts

of its competitors without requiring any effort by the com-

petitors themselves. Consequently, Leghorn submits that

the consumer education program is unconstitutional, as

cable operators may not wish to use their facilities to

advertise their competition, and these rules wiil in many

instances compel operators to speak. In support, Leghorn

principally cites Pacific Gas, in which he states the

Supreme Court agreed with the contention of a regulated

utility that it had a First Amendment right not to be

required to use its own property to help spread a message

with which it disagrees. Texas Cable essentially agrees

with this analysis. Leghorn proposes that responsibility for

carrying the burden of consumer education be shifted to

broadcasters and/or the Commission.

35. Finally, Leghorn asserts that the interim must carry

rules are unconstitutional. He argues that more exacting

scrutiny than the O’Brien standard is required to evaluate

these rules. In this respect, Leghorn contends that the

Commission’s interpretation of Renton in its rationale for

226a

applying O’Brien was incorrect. He argues that Renton

only applies when the regulation at issue is not directed

at the content of the communications involved, and that

it does not stand for the proposition that any regulation

is content-neutral simply because it is viewpoint-neutral.

He futher states that by contrast with the situation in

Renton, the interim must carry rules are directly concerned

with the content of speech because they rank categories

of speech and speakers. Leghorn also contends that the

Commission incorrectly applied the O’Brien test by ignor-

ing the impact the must carry rules will have on the con-

tent of a cable operator’s speech. In addition, he asserts

that the rules coerce speech by forcing cable operators to

retransmit television programming which they might net

otherwise carry.

36. In view of the above, Leghorn requests that we

conduct a supplemental inquiry to develop a public record

on the relative costs, technical performance, safety, and

consumer convenience aspects of external switches versus

switches that are built-in to television receivers, including

current designs and feasible improvements in such devices.

He proposes that, after conducting this injury, we adopt

rules generally in accordance with his earlier proposal to

require manufacturers to build switches into television re-

ceivers and related control equipment, and require cable

systems for an interim period to provide external switches

only when they choose not to carry all local VHF signals.

He maintains that the Commission has authority to man-

date these built-in switches under the All-Channel Receiver

Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §303(s). Leghorn also suggests that

his proposal be modified to require that cable operators

who do not carry all local VHF signals provide external

switches, but be permitted to charge for their installation.

He states that this will alleviate our concern that his pro-

posal would operate as an incentive for cable systems to

carry a fixed set of signals as a way to avoid expenses.

Leghorn further requests that we adopt performance spec-

to

i)

ifications as a means to ensure that manufacturers develop

switches that consumers can safely install themselves.

37. Taft Broadcasting Company (Taft) urges the Com-

mission to issue a Notice of Inquiry to investigate the

technical adequacy of input selector switches, the extent

to which viewers are in fact able to erect antennas, the

comparative quality of off-the-air signals and the cable sig-

nals of the same station, and the extent to which viewers

will choose to watch a superior quality television signal

over a signal of inferior quality even when the viewer

might prefer programming content of the inferior signal.

Taft suggests that the Commission continue to suspend

the input selector switch requirements and the five year

sunset period pending the outcome of the inquiry, but that

it implement the new must carry rules to ensure that cable

subscribers will continue to have access to off-the-air tel-

evision stations.

38. Range Television Cable Co., Inc. (Range) urges the

Commission to reconsider its input selector switch rules

to create an exemption for cable systems that provide all

available off-the-air broadcast signals to their subscribers

as part of their basic tier of cable service. Range submits

that the effect of the rules adopted is to cause cable sys-

tems carrying all local signals to incur the additional ex-

pense of installing input selector switches for no good

reason and, at the same time, cause increased costs for

subscribers.

39. Continental Cablevision, Inc. (Continental) states

that it generally supports the NCTA, CATA and NAB

petition and strongly opposes the blanket requirement to

install input selector switches without regard to whether

a cable system is inhibiting the reception of local television

signals. In this regard, Continental states that it would

not oppose a rule requiring installation of an input selector

switch at any future date (even after the sunset of the

interim must-carry rules) for subscribers of systems that

228a

cease to carry signals defined by the Commission's rules

as local. Such an exemption also is supported by the Na-

tional Independent Television Committee (NITC), which re-

quests in the alternative that the input selector switch rule

not be applied Where cabie systems are subject to full

competition, i.e., where telephone companies can offer ca-

ble television services and cable systems are not protected

by the compulsory copyright license.

40. The Office of Communication of the United Church

of Christ, Henry Geller, and Donna Lampert (UCC) submit

a joint petition criticizing the new rules as an imposed

government solution that looks good on paper but does

not realistically address the important public policy inter-

ests at issue. UCC argues that input selector switches will

never be an effective means for providing access to off-

the-air signals that are not carried by a cable system. They

point to the various technical problems with the switches

indicated in the NCTA report, although they also suggest

these problems are being exaggerated for tactical pur-

poses. UCC believes that because of the inconvenience of

switching to antenna reception and then tuning to a sta-

tion, it is unlikely that consumers will actually use switches

to gain access to a relatively few stations not carried by

their cable system. They submit that the input selector

switch requirement will impose costs on the industry and

the public and will not further our policy objectives.

41. UCC also argues that we have not properly defined

the public interest. They argue that we were incorrect in

determining that the federal interest was concerned not

with the service of particular local broadcasters, but rather

with preserving during the interim period the program

source diversity provided by the system of broadcasting.

In this respect, UCC states that the preservation of local

service is mandated by Section 307(b) of the Communi-

cations Act.

990-

22a

42. UCC argues that the proper analysis of the must

carry situation is that cable has inserted itself into the

broadcast signal distribution scheme and is, therefore, sub-

ject to reasonable Commission regulation to ensure that

its actions are consistent with the foundations of that

scheme. They assert that these foundations require the

maintenance of healthy local broadcast outlets. They ac-

knowledge that there is a changed circumstance—the de-

velopment of many cable program services and the

difficulty in carrying all broadcast and cable services on

systems with limited channel capacity—that militates

against mandatory carriage of all available broadcast sig-

nals.

43. Because of these changed circumstances, UCC sub-

mits that the Commission, if it is to act reasonably, must

restrict mandatory carriage rights to those stations truly

in need of cable carriage. They maintain that the cate-

gories of stations in need are those set forth in their

comments and replies in this proceeding. Thus, they re-

quest must carry protection be established as follows: 1)

carriage of all local stations in sparsely populated areas

(e.g. blow the top 100 markets), regardless of channel ca-

pacity; 2) carriage priority for public broadcasting stations,

community stations, and UHF independents (initial license

period) in situations involving cable systems with limited

capacity in the top 100 markets. Under the UCC proposal,

there would be no mandatory carriage for VHF stations

in the top 100 markets, regardless of cable system channel

capacity, and no mandatory carriage would be afforded

unless the station is serving as a significant local outlet,

i.e. broadcasts more than 40 percent local programming

directed to serving the needs and interests of the com-

munity.

44. They also argue that regulation that is reasonably

related to the public interest in the signal carriage matter

would not violate the First Amendment. UCC submits that

cable interests cannot insist upon the right to import dis-

230a

tant signals, to the detriment of local signals in rural areas,

of new UHF independents, or of local public broadcasting

service. Moreover, they contend that even if the O'Brien

test were used, the approac') in their proposal would easily

pass constitutional muster in that it would provide pro-

tection for an important and substantial federal interest

and its incidental impact on the alleged First Amendment

freedoms would be the minimum necessary to the fur-

therance of that interest.

45. In its reply comments, Pico Macom, Inc., which

states that it is the leading supplier of input selector

switches for the cable industry, refutes petitioners’ claims

that there are technical problems with the available input

selector switches that render them unsuitable for use with

cable service. Pico Macom submits that its current switch,

the ‘“‘“Macom AB-2” meets or exceeds all of the technical

specifications required by the cable industry, including iso-

lation, insertion loss, and return loss. It also states that

its factory testing process proves that This switch will

withstand at least 10 years of very hard use. Pico Macom

also contends that Gill Industries, as discussed below, dra-

matically overstates the extent to which the use of a prop-

erly installed input selector switch will cause objectionable

interference to television viewing.

46. Pico Macom also submits that petitioners, particu-

larly Joint Petitioners, have greatly overstated the cost of

compliance with the switch rules. It states that based on

a poll of three major distributors, cable operators can pur-

chase its switch for as little as $2.25 per switch. Pico

Macom argues that Joint Petitioners also have inflated the

long term cost of the switch by underestimating its useful

life. It states that the actual switch life of 10 years will

significantly reduce the costs of labor and hardware for

switch replacement/repair claimed by Joint Petitioners. Pico

Macom aiso submits that Joint Petitioners have overstated

the costs of providing transformers for use with switches

23la

because not every subscriber will need such a device."

Finally, it claims that petitioners have failed to recognize

that the price of switches, transformers, and jumper cables

is likely to fall by as much as 10 percent if the rule goes

into effect, as production efficiencies will be realized with

the increased demand.

Evaluation of Basic Policy Issues

47. We are not persuaded that we should alter the basic

approach of our two-part program for resolving the must

carry matter. In this respect, we find unpersuasive

petitioners’ arguments that we incorrectly assessed the

federal interest and that the two-part program is an un-

workable solution to the must carry matter. Rather, we

continue to believe that the undesired effects of our former

must carry rules will be best resolved by a regulatory

program that includes both input selector switch and in-

terim must carry requirements. This approach is both the

most effective and the least intrusive means to achieve

our objectives to alter consumers’ existing practices and

knowledge concerning the need for off-the-air reception

capability and to provide an orderly transition to a new

environment in which cable mandatory signal carriage reg-

ulation will no longer be necessary. We are confident that

the fundamental approach of the program adopted in the

Report and Order is the appropriate course of action in

this matter. However, we recognize petitioners’ argument

that the program, is adopted, imposes significant costs and

implementation burdens on the cable industry. Therefore,

we are modifying certain provisions of the program. We

believe that these modifications are responsive to

Pico Macom states that a transformer is necessary only if the

subscriber's antenna is connected with 300 ohm flat wiring. It argues

that in many instances antennas are connected to receivers with 75

ohm coaxial cable and, for support, points to the statement in Gill

Industries’ petition that 51 percent of its customers in the San Jose,

California have only coaxial leads for antenna input.

232a

petitioners’ concerns and will enhance the long-term ef-

fectiveness of the basic two-part program to achieve our

objective of ensuring viewers’ access to the maximum num-

ber of program choices available through cable and off-

the-air broadcast television facilities.

48. The Federal Interest. We find no merit in INTV’s

and UCC’s position that we incorrectly or otherwise im-

properly treated Section 307(b) of the Communications Act

as a component of the federal interest in the must carry

matter. In the Report and Order, we observed that our

assessment of the federal interest is premised on concerns

different from the Section 307(b) concerns relied upon by

the Commission in initially adopting the former must carry

rules. We found that the structure of the overall video

market has changed and that this change is primarily due

to the emergence of the cable industry as a means for

distributing new program services. These findings led us

to conclude that it is no longer appropriate nor desirable

to treat cable purely as a supplementary or auxiliary video

distribution service and to protect local television service

in competition with cable service. Therefore, consistent

with the statutory goals contained in Sections 151 and

303(g) of the Communications Act, and Section 601 of the

Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act),’®

we determined that the public interest would be better

served by a policy that maximizes program choices rather

than one that protects one segment of the television in-

dustry by substantially limiting the ability of others to

offer service to consumers. While we did not, therefore,

rely specifically on Section 307(b), we did find that the

plan we adopted also contributes towards the Section 307(b)

statutory goals.

49. We continue to believe that it is desirable to proceed

toward an environment where we no longer wili protect

'° 47 U.S.C. §§151 and 303(g); Cable Communications Policy Act of

1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§1 et seq., 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).

233a

the broadcast industry from competition with the cable

industry.'’ In maintaining this position, we are cognizant

of our mandate to distribute radio frequency services

“among the several states and communities” in a fair and

equitable manner. We believe our two-part program con-

tributes to Section 307(b) objectives by fostering inde-

pendent access to local off-the-air television services so

that such stations may operate in a fair and open com-

petitive environment with other providers of video ser-

vices. To protect the broadcast industry per se in

furtherance of Section 307(b), wouid have the effect of

limiting access to program choices. Such a policy might

diminish the overall public interest with respect to our

mandate to ‘“‘make available to all the people of The United

States a rapid, efficient communications service’’ and to

‘“‘sxenerally encourage the larger, more effective use of ra-

dio’ under Sections 151 and 303(g) of the Communications

Act. It might also impede the intent of the Cable Act, as

expressed in Section 601 thereof, to establish a national

policy that encourages the growth and development of ca-

ble services and assures that cable systems are responsible

to the needs and interests of the local communities They

serve.

50. Feasibility of Input Selector Switches. We believe

that the technical problems described by those seeking

elimination of the input selector switch requirements are

much overstated. First, improper installation of switches

by subscribers is not likely to be a cause of harmful signal

leakage. Cable subscribers generally will be able to install

these devices properly themselves if they are provided with

uppropriate instructions, including directions to immedi-

‘* Nothing in this Memorandum Opinion and Order is intended to

prejudice our decision on any of the issues raised by Satcom, Inc. in

its petition for rule making proposing rules relating to multiple own-

ership of cable systems. The Commission requested comments on that

petition in a Public Notice issued June 19, 1986, RM-5475.

234a

ately check for proper switch operation. The primary po-

tential for interference is that switches could be installed

such that the cable output would be connected directly to

the antenna, and thus would radiate th2 full bandwidth of

the input cable signal. Such connections will not be a major

problem because when they do occur, the switch will be

unable to alternate between the input sources and the

installer/subscriber will realize immediately that something

is wrong and take corrective action. Another factor that

must be considered in assessing the interference potential

of input selector switches is whether a separate terminal

device is used to receive cable service and, if so, whether

the switch is installed on the cable or receiver side of the

terminal device. Where a terminal device is used, and the

switch is between it and the television receiver, the risk

of interference resulting from improper installation is par-

ticularly low. In such cases, the direct connection of the

terminal device output to the antenna through improper

switch installation would result in radiation of only the

device output. Because the output of the device is on a

channel unused for broadcasting (generally either channel

3 or 4), the potential for interference created by acciden-

tally coupling the terminal device to the antenna is very

low. In cases where switches are built-in to television re-

ceivers and TV interface devices, the potential for inter-

ference is even less.

51. Evidence that subscribers can make complex cable

connections correctly is provided by the fact that there

have been no widespread problems or difficulties encoun-

tered by consumers-in installation of cable-ready VCRs and

receivers. We also observe that, as addressed in Gen.

Docket No. 85-301, many cable subscribers now are ac-

quiring and successfully installing their own cable terminal/

converter equipment.'* We are aware of no widespread or

'* See Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Gen. Docket No. 85-301,

50 FR 42729 (1985); and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in

Gen. Docket No. 85-301, 51 FR 31147 (1986).

235a

general problem with consumers’ installation of this equip-

ment and believe that consumers also can correctly install

input selector switches. In any event, those who contend

consumers cannot properly install switches present no

credible evidence to support their claim.

52. Second, we do not believe that input selector

switches will degrade reception of cable service or permit

signal leakage that will cause interference to off-the-air

reception. Section 15.606(a) of our rules specifies a 60 dB

isolation standard under which millions of transfer switches

have been authorized (as components of video games, com-

puters and other devices).'’* We are unaware of any in-

terference to off-the-air reception attributable to any of

these switches (mechanical or electronic), failing to isolate

the antenna port sufficiently. Therefore, we believe that

the 90 dB of isolation that Joint Petitioners claim is nec-

essary to avoid these problems far exceeds that which is

actually required in most instances. With regard to inter-

ference to cable reception, we observe that the signal

strength received by the antenna and delivered to the

receiver input terminals in most locations is substantially

less than the 40 dBmV signal claimed by petitioners. Thus,

for most installations, switch isolation of 60 dB appears

sufficient to prevent interference to cable reception. In

those areas close to broadcast transmitters, direct pick-up

interference at the receiver tuner would frequently offset

any additional protection provided by higher switch iso-

lation. In those rare instances where greater switch iso-

lation would be worthwhile, this fact could be brought to

subscribers’ attention so that they may act accordingly.

We also find no evideace in the record to indicate that

'* Section 15.606(a) specifies a maximum voltage which may be gen-

erated at the antenna terminals of an antenna Transfer switch. For a

typical cable system using 75 ohm coaxial cable and signal amplitudes

of 3.16 millivolts (+10 dBmV), the switches must exhibit an isolation

of at least 60 dB.

236a

use of properly designed input selector switches would

result in unacceptable insertion or return loss. In fact, as

discussed by ATC and Pico Macom, switches that appear

to provide acceptable technical performance are available

now. Moreover, we are aware that similar switches are

available from many other manufacturers and have been

in use by cable subscribers for some time. We are aware

of no reports of general leakage or other performance

problems with any of the switches currently available.

However, while we are confident that input selector

switches can be used without leading to harmful interfer-

ence, we recognize the importance of the switch technical

performance issue and the need for appropriate standards

to ensure that their use does not lead to harmful inter-

ference. Accordingly, we plan to initiate a separate pro-

ceeding, as discussed below, to consider technical standards

for such switches.

53. Third, we find no merit in petitioners’ arguments

that input selector switches will fail or “wear out” even

before the interim must carry rules expire. As Pico Macom

indicates, reasonably priced switches that are capable of

providing many years of service under heavy use are avail-

able now. Finally, we previously have addressed petitioners’

claims that use of input selector switches would render

unuseable certain features of cable subscribers’ television

receivers, VCRs and cable converters. As we stated in the

Report and Order, any such problems can be overcome

through relatively minor modifications to switching de-

vices. Cable operators and other equipment suppliers can

provide the information and/or assistance consumers may

need to install switches in a manner that will enable op-

eration of all the various features of video equipment.

54. Finally, we find no need to conduct further inquiry

into the feasibility of input selector switch requirements

as an effective element of our policy for resolving the must

carry matter as argued by Taft and Leghorn. We disagree

with petitioners who contend that the record in this pro-

237a

ceeding did not provide sufficient information to support

the input selector switch requirements. The record adduced

at the Report and Order stage of this proceeding addressed

issues and included evidence and information concerning

the benefits and potential problems associated with use of

input selector switches in connection with cable service.

In any event, the abundant additional information sub-

mitted on reconsideration corrects any deficiencies that

might have existed in the record. Thus, the information

currently before us with respect to switch costs, technical

performance, consumer convenience, switch compatibility

with other equipment, and use of antennas for off-the-air

reception is more than sufficient to support our decision

in this proceeding. We note, moreover, that input selector

switches have been at issue since Turner’s initial petition

for rule making to eliminate the former must carry rules

and that it was part of the Quincy court’s findings.

55. Other Input Selector Switch Issues. We also are not

persuaded by petitioners’ arguments that other policy con-

siderations render the input selector switch requirements

unworkable as part of the solution to the must carry mat-

ter. We continue to disagree with petitioners that con-

sumers will find input selector switches impractical to use.

As we indicated in the Report and Order, consumers are

becoming increasingly accustomed to switching between

alternate program input sources, particularly in conjunc-

tion with use of VCRs.

56. We also continue to reject Leghorn’s proposal to

require manufacturers to build input selector switches into

new television receivers. In the Report and Order, we fully

considered this proposal. There we indicated that it is not

desirable to require all receivers to be built with a feature

intended for use only by cable households. We further

recognized that cable subscribers purchasing cable-ready

receivers may prefer a more sophisticated external switch-

ing device and, thus, may not need built-in switching ca-

pability. We concluded that market forces are the most

238a

appropriate means to determine both the number of re-

ceivers to be produced with built-in switches and the spe-

cific design of those features. We also observe that the

desirable features of integ~al switches described by Legh-

orn also can be incorporated into switches built-in to video

peripheral equipment such as VCRs and cable converter/

controllers. Most of these features also can be made part

of stand-alone switching devices.

o7. We do not find that the input selector switch rules

should be modified to permit the exemptions requested by

Joint Petitioners, Range, NITC, and Leghorn. Those

petitioners generally seek exemptions from the switch re-

quirements in cases where cable systems either choose to

carry all available off-the-air signals or are subject to direct

competition from one or more other cable systems. Legh-

orn’s proposal to require cable systems to provide external

input selector switch requirements for an interim period

only where they do not carry all local VHF signals would

be particularly undesirable. This proposal would encourage

cable systems to carry a fixed complement of broadcast

signals (namely the VHF signals) and, thus, would be con-

trary to our intention that cable operators have the great-

est flexibility possible to tailor their program services to

meet viewer preferences. As proposed, this solution to the

must carry matter would not address in any way The issue

of access to the signals of stations other than those VHF

Stations that would qualify as “local signals.”” We also

reject Adelphia’s request that input selector switches not

be required for new cable subscribers. We believe that new

subscribers are just as likely to have the same mispercep-

tions as existing subscribers. Many ‘“‘new subscribers” in

fact have subscribed previously to cable service while the

former must carry rules were in effect.2° In addition, many

In this respect, we note that annually, approximately one-third of

new cable customers nationwide formerly subscribed to cable service.

Remarks of James P. Mooney, President and CEO, NCTA, before the

National Press Club, Washington, D.C., January 12, 1987.

239a

first-time subscribers also are likely to have formed the

misperception as a result of contacts with existing cable

subscribers and from information provided in media sources

and cable sales literature. Moreover, we believe it is im-

portant during the transition period to make affirmative

efforts to encourage the installation and use of input se-

lector switches.

58. Must Carry Policy. In the Report and Order, we

concluded that short-term must carry rules are necessary

to ensure that broadcasting remains a competitive alter-

native source of programming during the transition period.

We also recognized that such rules are a stringent form

of regulation that intrudes on cable operators’ free speech

rights. Thus, we found that must carry rules are neither

desirable nor sustainable as long-term solutions to the

problem of cable subscribers’ access to broadcast signals

and, in fact, would impede our objective of maximizing

program choices to viewers.

59. We are not persuaded by petitioners’ arguments that

we should alter our decision to adopt interim must carry

rules on policy grounds. First, we reject TBS’ argument

that we did not demonstrate that interim must carry rules

are warranted. In the Report and Order, we found that

there is evidence that some cable systems have ceased to

carry individual broadcast stations, refused to carry new

stations, and/or requested payment for carriage of stations.

In weighing the evidence of cable industry behavior in the

absence of must carry rules, we also considered that many

cable operators thus far may have been hesitant to act as

if there were no such rules pending the outcome of this

rule making proceeding. In particular, we observed that

NCTA leaders apparently have suggested to members that

they continue to carry local signal until this matter is

settled? We further determined that cable subscribers

21 See also Report and Order, supra at n. 109.

240a

generally have not maintained independent off-the-air re-

ception capability and that there is ample evidence that

cable penetration nationwide has reached a level such that

there is potential for this problem to affect a substantial

portion of the population. While it is difficult to provide

an accurate forecast of the effects of cable systems’ signal

carriage practices in the absence of must carry rules on

viewer access to program choices, the evidence is sufficient

to demonstrate that many cable subscribers may not have

access to local broadcast signals during the transition pe-

riod. Because a significant portion of the viewing public

might not have access to broadcast signals, the competitive

structure of the video programming industry could be ma-

terially harmed in the transition period. Thus, mandatory

signal carriage rules are needed to ensure the competitive

viability of broadcast television service during the transi-

tion to the new competitive environment.

60. Second, we disagree with the position of Joint

Petitioners and INTV that continuing must carry require-

ments are necessary on the ground that the input selector

switch and consumer education rules will not achieve their

intended objectives. As indicated above, we remain con-

fident that the input selector switch and consumer edu-

cation aspects of our program are a workable means to

ensure that cable subscribers will gain and maintain the

awareness of the need for, and have the opportunity to

acquire, capability to receive broadcast signals off-the-air.

We also remain confident that requiring must carry rules

on an interim basis will prevent disruption of the flow of

television services to the public and will facilitate an or-

derly transition to a new market environment in which

must carry regulation is no longer necessary because con-

sumers will have both the awareness and capability to use

switching devices to alternate between cable and broadcast

program services.

61. Third, we also reject INTV’s and NITC’s argument

that continuing must carry rules are needed to prevent

24la

disequilibria in the marketplace resulting from other reg-

ulatory and statutory factors. In the Report and Order,

we recognized that these other factors also may tend to

distort competition in the video market in a manner that

may adversely affect viewers’ access to program choices.

While we indicated our intention to separately examine

these other regulatory and statutory factors,” we deter-

mined that our action in the signal carriage matter is

supportable in its own right based on the evidence in the

record of this proceeding. In this regard, the D.C. Circuit

in Committee to Save WEAM v. FCC found that the Com-

mission may rely on competitive market forces to achieve

its public interest objectives even where market imperfec-

tions exist.22 While the compulsory license and the like

may prevent ideal market conditions, they do not preclude

basic competition in the market; and the latter is all that

is needed to justify reliance on market forces.** Accord-

ingly, we find no new information or evidence in these

petitioners’ submissions to alter our conclusion that these

factors are separable issues and resolution of the signal

carriage matter is not affected thereby. Therefore, we con-

tinue to maintain that there is no justification for the long-

term intrusion on cable operators’ First Amendment rights

that would be imposed by continuing signal carriage rules.

62. On the other side of this issue, it would not be

desirable to shorten the transition period as argued by

On February 12, 1987, We initiated two proceedings to address

these issues. We adopted a Notice of Proposed Rule Making Gen. Docket

No. 87-24. FCC 87-65, released April 23, 1987, which proposed to

repromulgate some form of syndicated exclusivity rules, to strengthen

the network non-duplication rules, and to delete the current non-net-

work program territorial exclusivity rules. We also adopted a Notice

of Inquiry, Gen. Docket No. 87-25, FCC 87-66, released April 23, 1987,

to examine the effects of cable’s compulsory copyright license on com-

petition between the cable and broadcast television industries.

23 808 F.2d 113, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

- 5.

242a

CCTA. We believe that our decision to allow for a five

year transition period reflects a sound predictive judgment

and rational exercise of our broad discretion to engage in

regulatory ‘“‘line drawing’’ in furtherance of our public in-

terest responsibilities.* As indicated in the Report and

Order, we determined that a five year transition period

is necessary not simply to provide consumers with suffi-

cient time to become aware of the need for independent

access to off-the-air broadcast signals, but also to acquire

or reacquire such capability if they so desire by installing

indoor or outdoor antennas. Further, this period is nec-

essary not only to educate consumers about the need for

input selector devices, but also to provide sufficient time

for the design, development, and marketing of equipment

that will provide consumers with a continuing and effective

off-the-air access capability.

63. Finally, for the reasons we indicated in the Report

and Order, we continue to reject UCC’s proposal for new

must carry rules that restrict carriage rights to only those

“significant local stations’ that are “in need” of carriage.”*

There, we found that UCC’s proposal was not only un-

suited to the current need for must carry rules during the

transition, but also that 1c would, in fact, hinder rather

than promote viewer access to program choices in the

interim period! We observe that UCC’s resubmission of its

earlier proposal in this proceeding is predicated on its

assertion that we improperly defined the federal interest

in this matter. As we indicated in the Report and Order,

and reiterate here, “[oJur objective in adopting these rules

is neither to penalize nor to benefit any particular station,”

but rather ‘to temper, during an interim period, potential

threats to the program source diversity provided by the

* See generally FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,

436 U.S. 775, 814 (1977).

** See Report and Order, supra at paragraph 177

243a

system of broadcasting.’’”’ Inasmuch as we find that ar-

gument incorrect, as discussed above, we need not further

address UCC’s request.

64. Constitutional and Statutory Issues. After reviewing

the relevant Federal case law, we determined in the Report

and Order that intrusions on the First Amendment rights

of cable operators are subject to a more stringent standard

of review than that currently applied to broadcasters, that

the interim must carry rules could properly be classified

as content-neutral and that, using the standard for ana-

lyzing the propriety of content-neutral regulations, the

rules furthered the substantial federal interest of maxi-

mizing the viewing choices available to consumers and were

narrowly tailored to meet that objective. A number of

petitioners now maintain that our determination of the

must carry regulations’ content-neutrality was incorrect,

and make various arguments against our use or application

of the O'Brien standard’ to evaluate the constitutionality

of the overall must carry program. Petitioners further

claim that the input selector switch requirement is fatally

overbroad, that the five-year sunset provision does not

Sufficiently limit the rules’ intrusions on cable operators’

First Amendment rights, and that the consumer education

component of our overall plan unconstitutionally compels

cable operators to speak and to advertise their broadcast

competitors. We will address these arguments in turn.

65. Several petitioners address our application of

O'Brien in the Report and Order and the content-neutrality

of the interim must carry rules. TBS claims that the in-

terim must carry rules constitute a prior restraint on pro-

tected speech under the First Amendment because the

“ Report and Order, supra at paragraph 198.

* Generally, under O'Brien and subsequent cases, a government reg-

ulation that imposes an incidental burden on speech will be upheld if

it advances a substantial governmental interest and is narrowly tailored

to further that interest. Report and Order, supra, at 894.

244a

rules act to preclude cable operators’ programming selec-

tions, compel cable operators to make particular signal

substitutions, and impose sanctions for refusals to comply.

Consequently, TBS states, the O’Brien test is inappro-

priate to judge the constitutionality of the rules, and

stricter constitutional analysis should be applied. Century

and Leghorn maintain essentially that the interim rules

are not content-neutral because they improperly interfere

with the protected editorial discretion of cable operators

by designating classes and preferences of speakers and by

forcing operators to carry signals which they otherwise

may not choose to program.

66. We reject the suggestion that these rules should not

be considered as content-neutral for purposes of consti-

tutional analysis. The interim must carry rules require only

that for a limited time, cable systems must devote a limited

portion of their channel capacity to carriage of broadcast

signals available off-the-air in their community. As we

stated in the Report and Order, the interim rules make

that determination based not on the content of those sig-

nals, but on criteria wholly unrelated to their content—

namely, their proximity to the cable headend and the ex-

tent to which they are viewed. Moreover, they do not

forbid dissemination of any particular signal or signals.

Where, as here, The primary purpose of a regulation is

not the promotion or suppression of particular viewpoints,

the regulation in question is considered to be content-neu-

tral.’ The interim rules are intended to further the max-

imization of viewer choice, “‘not ... to prefer broadcast

viewpoints over those of cable operators or program-

*In contrast, the use of prior restraint analysis to determine the

constitutionally of a government regulation is appropriate only when

the restriction imposed by the regulation in question is content-based.

Prior restraint of a speaker seeks to prevent the dissemination of some

particular viewpoint. See e.g. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931):

Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).

245a

mers.””* Consequently, the rules are content-neutral for pur-

poses of constitutional evaluation; the use of the O'Bren

standard for evaluating content-neutral regulations is there-

fore fitting in this context.

67. The arguments of all three petitioners implicitly as-

sert that the content-neutral test itself is flawed because

the indirect effects of those rules upon programming judg-

ments should not be considered an incidental burden on

speech. This is a conclusion we are not empowered to reach;

this Commission will not second-guess the Supreme Court

on the formulation of constitutional tests and standards.

TBS Century and Leghorn all intimate that any attenuation

of cable operators’ programming discretion, no matter how

indirect, is presumptively invalid—a thesis which our review

of the pertinent case law belies.** The interim must carry

rules are “consistent with [the] definition of ‘content-neu-

tral’ speech regulations as those that ‘are justified without

reference to the content of the regulated speech.’ ’* There-

fore, petitioners’ arguments must fail.

68. Adelphia and TBS argue that we have failed to dem-

onstrate a substantial federal interest to justify the new

rules. In this regard, they claim that we have failed to

Report and Order, supra at R43.

Carriage of noncommercial educational television stations during

the transitional period is required to further the uniquely important

Federal interest in ensuring continued access to programming “that is

not subject to the same market forces as commercial broadcast and

cable television.” Report and Order, supra at 879.

“ We note that even in assessing the constitutional implications of

regulations affecting newspapers, the First Amendment does not ‘‘nec-

essarily bar{ ] every regulation which in any way affects what the

newspapers publish.” Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir.

1968). cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842

(1969). See also Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1 (1945).

® Renton, supra n. 7, at 929 (quoting Virginia Board of Pharmacy

vr. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (Virginia Board of Phar-

macy), 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added)).

246a

, amass a sufficient evidentiary basis to substantiate the

existence of the problems which justify further must carry

regulation and our conclusion that input selector switches

will assist in maximizing consumer viewing choices. How-

ever, our decision in those respects has been reached after

weighing the voluminous comments and studies submitted

in this proceeding, our own studies on the changing system

for providing television service in this country and The

evolving role of cable television in that system, and various

congressional determinations and amendments to the Com-

munications Act encouraging diversity of programming and

competition in the cable television industry. We further

observed that, due to ‘‘the rapidly evolving nature of the

cable industry and changing competitive incentives result-

ing from the continuing development of satellite program-

ming services carried by cable systems and other factors

’ it is not clear that timely studies could be performed

to obtain an accurate forecast of the actual effect of aban-

doning must carry rules.*4

69. Therefore, our decision to implement the input se-

lector switch requirements and interim must carry rules

was based on the consideration of all available evidence

combined with our special expertise in this field of regu-

lation, a combination that we found was ample to dem-

onstrate the substantial Federal interest at stake and how

our solution to the must carry matter best furthers that

interest. We concluded, and still believe, that our long-

term goal of maximizing viewer chcice can be achieved

only after correcting consumers’ misperceptions that cable

systems will carry all available off-the-air signals and that

the only available means to view broadcasting signals is

through their cable systems, and after providing subscri-

bers with the opportunity to obtain the hardware to switch

4 Report and Order, supra at 894, n. 159.

247a

between off-the-air and cable program sources.**° We also

concluded that it is necessary to provide interim must

carry relief to the broadcast television industry for a time

to ensure that it remains a competitive alternative source

of programming as we move to an environment without

must carry rules. Consequently, a must carry program

limited in duration and less intrusive on cable operators

than the former rules remains necessary to ensure that

cable subscribers retain access to off-air signals during the

transitional period after the input selector switch rules

take effect.

70. Adelphia and TBS also claim that we failed to dem-

onstrate that the new rules are the least burdensome al-

ternative on cable operators to achieve any substantial

federal interest. We do not disagree with the proposition,

both as a matter of sound economic regulatory policy and

of constitutional doctrine, That we should seek the least

burdensome alternative, and we have attempted to fashion

rules adequate to the task at hand with that objective in

mind. However, in our judgment, petitioners’ argument

reveals a misunderstanding of the applicable test for es-

tablishing the constitutionality of the interim rules. The

proper standard for review was recently expressed thus

by the Supreme Court:

[R]egulations [are not] invalid simply because there is

some imaginable alternative that might be less bur-

densome on speech. Instead, an incidental burden on

speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore

is permissible under O’Brien, so long as the neutral

regulation promotes a substantial governmental inter-

* TBS’ argument that switches are not necessary because most cable

operators have not dropped local broadcast signals is not persuasive.

Moreover, because our interest is in ensuring maximum program

choices, even the dropping of one two signals frustrates that objective

if the owner does not have the knowledge or equipment to ubtain these

signals directly off-the-air.

248a

est that would be achieved less effectively absent the

regulation.*

Moreover, we are afforded a broad degree of discretion

in crafting rules to accomplish our public interest

objectives*’

71. We concluded in the Report and Order that the

interim must carry rules are narrowly tailored to meet our

objectives, and that the burden on cable operators’ speech

imposed thereby is no greater than necessary to ensure

that program source diversity in broadcasting is not threat-

ened during the transition to a video marketplace without

must carry rules. We noted that the interim rules avoid

overbreadth and undue burdens on cable operators by ex-

empting cable systems with capacities of 20 channels or

less, by providing for absolute limitations on the number

of stations a non-exempt system is required to carry, by

narrowing the criteria for a broadcasting signal to be qual-

ified for must carry status, and by restricting the duration

of the rules to a five-year period. The rules further ensure

that local broadcast signals will be available to all sub-

scribers by requiring their availability on the lowest priced

tier. We believe that the refinements we are making to

both the interim. must carry rules and the input selector

switch and consumer education requirements, as described

below, further ensure that our two-part program is prop-

erly tailored and thus constitutionally permissible.*

* Albertini, supra n. 12, at 2907 (citations omitted). See also Arcara

v. Cloud Books, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W. 5060, 106 S.Ct. 3172, 3175 (1986).

3° See Quincy, supra at 1459; see also White House Vigil for the ERA

Committee v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

*s Adeiphia argues that the input selector switch requirements are

overboard for three reasons: 1) they fail to provide an exemption in

cases where an input selector switch would serve no purpose (for ex-

ample, in situations where all local VHF broadcast stations are carried

on a local cable system or where no local VHF signals are receivable

off-air in the cable system area); 2) they should not be applied to new

249a

72. While Adelphia and TBS urge us to adopt a solution

which is less intrusive on cable operators’ First Amend-

ment rights, specifically, the immediate elimination of all

must carry requirements, we are no* persuaded that there

is an alternative that would meet the need to preserve

cable subscribers’ access to off-the-air broadcast program-

ming during the transition period. That is, because of the

perception caused by our former rules’ requirement that

all local broadcast signals be carried on cable, subscribers

will lack both the awareness and capability in the short

run to access broadcast signals that are not carried by

cable. Although the awareness should be gained once the

consumer education programs begin, as described below,

it is our best judgment that a five year period is needed

to permit subscribers to regain the capability—by installing

both switches and antennae. Therefore, we continue to

believe that our solution to the must carry matter is the

most appropriate and effective means of ensuring that the

public interest is served.

73. CCTA claims that the five-year sunset provision for

the interim must carry rules does not cure their consti-

tutional infirmity. It cites Century Federal to support its

proposition that abridgement of cable operators’ First

Amendment rights is not permissible merely because it is

of limited duration. CCTA urges us to select a shorter

sunset period of no longer than one year for the interim

rules, and declares that the record in this proceeding does

not indicate that a five year period is the most appropriate

to accomplish the Commission’s goals.

74. Initially, we note that Century Federai is readily

distinguishable from the instant situation. That case in-

subscribers, since only previously existing subscribers would suffer from

the misperception that local broadcast signals cannot still be received

through external antennas; and, 3) they should not be mandatory, but

rather optional. See para. 16, supra. We believe these arguments are

resolved by our modifications te the input selector switch requirements,

detailed below at paras. 78-83.

250a

volved a potential cable operator’s First Amendment chal-

lenge to Palo Alto, California’s use of an exclusive

franchising arrangement to limit to one the number of

cable operators granted access to the facilities necessary

to install cables within the city. In granting a motion for

partial summary judgment, the district court held that the

insignificant (if any) disruption to the public domain caused

by the installation of more than one cable system does not

constitute a substantial or important governmental interest

so as to warrant suppression of all cable speakers save

one, and that even if the cable television market in a

particular area is a natural monopoly, no justification ex-

ists for greater governmental regulation of cable operators

than is otherwise permitted under the First Amendment.**

In contrast, the must carry matter involves not the total

suppression of a speaker to promote a governmental in-

terest of uncertain value, but an incidental burden on a

speaker’s First Amendment rights for a limited period of

time to further the substantial governmental interest in

maximizing viewer choice.

75. The propriety of a given time period to accomplish

our objectives in making the transition to a regulatory

environment free of mandatory signal carriage restrictions

is, of course, something that cannot be quantified through

empirical analysis.*° The five-year sunset period was se-

lected because, in our judgment, it is-the most reasonable

time period in which to impose limited mandatory carriage

while ensuring that the consumer education program is

completed and cable subscribers have an opportunity to

reestablish independent access to off-the-air broadcast tel-

evision service. We believe that, after that time, the mar-

ketplace can be relied upon to maximize program choices

for the nation. The five-year period also will allow us an

3° Century Federal, supra n. 8.

*” Significantly, we observe that CCTA does not suggest any method

by which this might be accomplished.

25la

ample opportunity to observe the transitional cable and

broadcast marketplace for purposes of our prospective rule

making to determine whether mandatory carriage should

continue to be required in particular instances beyond the

sunset of the interim rules. Consequently, for all these

reasons, we continue to believe that the five-year sunset

period is necessary and appropriate.

76. Texas Cable and Leghorn criticize the consumer ed-

ucation requirement of our two-part regulatory program

as adopted in the Report and Order, claiming that it is

unconstitutional because it compels cable operators to ad-

vertise the existence of their competitors and coerces cable

operators to spread a message with which the operators

may disagree. Texas Cable likens the consumer education

requirement to the kind of required ‘‘consumer interest”

message recently struck down by the Supreme Court in

Pacific Gas. Leghorn contends that case supports his po-

sition because the Court there agreed with the utility's

contention that it had a First Amendment right not to be

required to use its own property to help spread a message

with which it disagrees.

77. Petitioners’ arguments misconstrue the purpose and

function of the consumer education requirements. The re-

quirements as modified below direct only that cable op-

erators list Television stations that may be available off-

the-air in the community that are not carried on their cable

systems at the time the listing is provided, and give gen-

eral guidelines as to the information to be provided to

subscribers about the input selector switch requirements

and the carriage of local television stations. A regulated

entity may be required to provide certain information to

protect substantial or important interests of its customers.

For example, Section 631 of the Cable Act* requires cable

operators to inform subscribers in writing of the nature,

“47 U.S.C. §551.

252a

etc., of personally identifiable information collected or to

be collected about them and the possible uses of that in-

formation. The consumer education information require-

ments at issue here, including the identification of

uncarried signals, similarly further the public interest by

educating consumers about changes in the video market-

place that affect their ability to receive programming. We

believe that this requirement can be imposed under Sec-

tions 2(a), 4(i), and 303(r) of the Act to advance the im-

portant federal interest in maximizing program choices.”

We also note that the consumer education requirement

fosters Section 307(b) objectives by facilitating access to

off-the-air television. However, the guidelines do not re-

quire operators to provide any further information or in-

ducement that solicits subscribers to actually view the video

‘“‘competition”’, e.g., a description of the general format or

programming of the uncarried television station or stations

to interest subscribers in switching to their off-the-air ca-

pability to watch programs carried on that signal. Without

such an inducement, we do not believe that the mere iden-

tification of uncarried television stations as part and parcel

of our overall program of educating video consumers about

the changes in the signal carriage rules and their possible

need for input selector switches constitutes ‘‘advertising”’

of those stations.** While the Supreme Court, in Central

See U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); see also

Report and Order in CC Docket No. 81-893, 95 FCC 2d 1276, 1293-

94 (1983).

** For example, Leghorn, in characterizing the consumer education

program as ‘‘advertising,”” states that “‘Broadcasting already devote

considerable promotional effort to identifying their video fare.”” How-

ever, our program requires only the identification of a signal, not in-

formation about any programming carried on that signal. Video

consumers are induced to view a station because of desirable program-

ming, not because they are informed that a station operates on a

particular channel. These petitioners also neglect to note a crucial dif-

ference between the consumer education program and ‘‘advertising’’—

namely, that we are requiring dissemination of this information only

253a

Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission

of New York (Central Hudson),** recognized the need to

protect commercial speech due to the importance of the

information function of advertising, it does not follow that

any or all information required to be provided by a reg-

ulated entity regarding changes in rules and obligations

which affect service to its customers constitutes advertis-

ing per se.** In any event, “‘[b]ecause the extension of First

Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified

principally by the value to consumers of the information

such speech provides ... [the] constitutionally protected

interest in not providing any particular factual information

in [a business’’] advertising is minimal.’’*

78. Insofar as a purely informational requirement like

the one adopted in this proceeding is entitled to First

Amendment protection,” it is well settled that restrictions

that incidentally burden speech are justified if the regu-

lation is content-neutral, serves a substantial governmental

interest and is not more extensive than necessary to fur-

ther that interest.** Equally permissible are restrictions on

to their business customers, not to the public at large. In addition, we

note that the Commission has imposed similar disclosure requirements

in the common carrier area. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Fur-

nishing of Customer Premises Equipment, 95 FCC 2d 1117, 1143 (1983).

“447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).

* Pacific Gas, supra at 908, n. 9, is inapposite in this regard, since

the “speech” involved there was a utility's newsletter that ‘‘extend[ed]

well beyond speech that proposes a commercial transaction.”” The Court

clearly distinguished applicable law relating to disclosure requirements

by businesses. Ja. at n. 12.

* Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct.

2265, 2285 (1985).

* Even commercial speech consisting of purely factual matter without

an advertising component is entitled to a measure of First Amendment

protection. Virginia Board of Pharmacy, supra n. 24, at 762.

* See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).

254a

false, misleading or deceptive commercial speech.** More-

over, we note that ‘disclosure’ requirements for com-

mercial speech are not subject to ‘‘a strict ‘least restrictive

means’ analvsis. ...’°° We believe that the guidelines as

to the information which must be provided to consumers

are a permissible, minimally intrusive form of directing

the manner in which that information is presented and of

assuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about

the function of the input selector switch requirement and

the meaning of and impact which the interim must carry

rules and their expiration may have on their viewing

choices and habits. In reaching this conclusion, it is im-

portant to point out what the consumer education require-

ments do not mandate. We are not attempting to confine

or limit the commercial expression of cable operators on

particular issues.*! or to particular language in describing

features and effects-of the new rules, but, rather, we seek

to provide only a measure of accuracy with regard to

commercial information disseminated in one area—that of

the general requirements and possible effects of our two-

part regulatory program. Similarly, we do not attempt to

circumscribe what may be said about the two-part pro-

gram, but only require, in the interest of educating video

consumers who are cable subscribers, a minimum of in-

formation about how our new regulations may affect their

ability to receive local television signals. Consequently,

these information requirements are narrowly tailored to

serve the important commercial speech objective of ‘‘as-

sist{ing] consumers and further[ing] The societal interest

in the fullest possible dissemination of information,’ dur-

* See Virginia Board of Pharmacy, supra n. 24, at 771-772.

* Zauderer, supra at 2282, n. 14.

= Cf. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 485 U.S. 765 (1978).

* Central Hudson, supra n. 32, at 561-562.

255a

ing the transitional period to a video marketplace free of

mandatory carriage requirements.*

79. Finally, we believe that the substantial modifications

to the input selector switch requirements we are making

herein will resolve Adelphia’s concerns that the input se-

lector switch requirements adopted in the Report and Or-

der contravene Sections 622 and 623 of the Cable Act.

The revised switch requirements will not restrict the

amount cable systems may charge for services and/or

equipment. Further, neither the input selector switch re-

quirements nor the interim must carry rules impose any

new requirement regarding the content of cable services

as addressed by Section 624 of the Cable Act. As we noted

in the Report and Order, we believe that the specific ref-

erence to the former must carry rules by the House Report

‘® Texas Cable claims that the consumer education program also is

inconsistent with our decisions to eliminate various policies regarding

trade practices of broadcasters under our “‘underbrush’’ proceedings

and with our 1985 finding that the fairness doctrine is contrary to the

public interest. We observe that the underbrush decisions eliminated

policies that often were not under this Commission’s areas of expertise

and/or were duplicative of other policies. Where alternative remedies

or market forces would serve to deter an undesired practice, we elim-

inated the policy in question. See e.g., Elimination of Unnecessary

Broadcast Regulation, 57 RR 2d 913 (1985), recon. denied, 58 RR 2d

864 (1985), affd sub nom. Telecommunications Research and Action

Center v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In contrast, as we have

determined in this proceeding, the must carry matter requires our

intervention to assure that the information disseminated to subscribers

is consistent with implementation of the rules and policies adopted

herein. Moreover, we find no correlation between the informational

requirement here and rules that we have raised questions about relating

to regulatory oversight of the correct balance of coverage of particular

kinds of issues by broadcasters. The latter concerns not factual ‘‘dis-

closure requirements for business corporations,” Pacific Gas and Elec-

tric, 106 S.Ct. at 911, n.12, but speech regarding matters of public

concern, which is entitled to the highest degree of encouragement and

protection. See 1985 Fairness Report, 102 FCC 2d 143, 149-50 (1985).

256a

on the Cable Act expresses Congress’ intention that we

had, and continue to have, the authority to promulgate

regulations to further the substantial Federal interests at

issue in this proceeding, including the authority to use

must carry rules and to amend them if necessary.®* Con-

sequently, the adoption of interim rules is well within our

discretion under the Cable Act and, moreover, does not

constitute a ‘‘new’’ addition to the content of cable services

within the meaning of Section 624 of the Act. On the

contrary, the new rules require considerably less to be

carried than the former rules.

Basic Policy Rule Modifications

80. While we remain confident that the basic elements

of our regulatory program are practically, technically and

legally feasible means for achieving our policy objectives,

we find that certain features of that program should be

modified to accomplish better those objectives. In partic-

ular, the input selector switch rules, as adopted, may im-

pose burdens on cable operators that are greater than

necessary to correct the viewer misperception problem and

also may tend to limit cable operators’ and consumers’

flexibility to choose switching equipment appropriate to

their specific circumstances. Also, the consumer education

requirements may not provide cable operators sufficient

* “Regulations which relate to the content of cable service and which

remain in effect include the FCC’s must-carry requirements." H.R.Rep.

No. 934, 98th Congress, 2d Sess. at 70 (1984).

> Report and Order at 896. In this connection, we observe again that

the Quincy court ruled only that The must carry requirements at issue

there were unconstitutional, and expressly reserved judgment on the

question of whether any must carry requirements could pass consti-

tutional muster.

%* The fact that the Quincy court vacated the rules does not alter

this conclusion. Section 624(f{2MA) of the Cable Act proliibits only the

adoption of new content regulations not in effect on September 21,

1983. The must carry rules were undisputably in effect on that date.

257a

flexibility to tailor their information programs to their sys-

tems’ circumstances. Finally, some aspects of our program

require clarification.

81. In considering petitioners’ statements with respect

to input selector switch costs, we recognize that the rules

as adopted may impose substantial financial burdens on

cable operators. These rules not only would require cable

systems to bear all of the costs associated with equipment

and installation for new subscribers, but also would require

them to provide switches in cases where subscribers might

not want them. We also note petitioners’ point that the

rules would require switches to be provided in areas where

there are no broadcast signals available off-the-air, such

that the switches would serve no useful purpose.

82. In addition, upon further reflection on this issue, we

find that the rules tend to limit incentives and flexibility

for cable operators to provide a range of switching equip-

ment to meet varying subscriber preferences and to ensure

better switch compatibility with video peripheral equip-

ment, such as VCRs, and specific video equipment fea-

tures. By requiring that switches be provided at no charge

or at cost, the rules reduce cable operators’ economic in-

centives to offer switch options with premium features,

such as electronic operation or remote control capability,

or to offer upgraded terminal/converter devices that in-

clude built-in switches. Subscribers will be more likely to

maintain and use independent off-the-air reception capa-

bility if the associated input selector devices are compatible

with their needs and otherwise convenient to use. More-

over, the record demonstrates that there are other ad-

vantages to the more expensive electronic switches,

including longer lifespan and better isolation. Obviously,

cable operators may not desire to provide these switches

free of charge.

83. In view of these considerations, we are adopting

substantial revisions to the input selector switch require-

258a

ments that are generally consistent with the approach sug-

gested by CCTA. Under the revised rules, cable systems

will be required to offer switches to new and existing

subscribers, but will be permitted in all cases to charge

for the purchase or lease of switches and associated hard-

ware. In addition, cable systems will be permitted to charge

for installation of switches for existing subscribers. There

will be no “at cost’’ restriction on pricing of either the

equipment or its installation for existing subscribers. How-

ever, cable systems will not be permitted to charge an

additional fee strictly for installation of switches for new

subscribers. We believe the incremental labor necessary to

include a switch along with installation of other equipment

for new subscribers is minimal and that to provide in-

stallation at no additional charge will assist in encouraging

new subscribers to acquire a switch. Cable systems will

be required to make an affirmative switch offer to their

subscribers in accordance with our original plan; however,

the rules also will include language to clarify that sub-

scribers may decline the switch offer and are not otherwise

obligated to install or maintain off-the-air reception ca-

pability. Also, we wish to clarify that consumers may use

switches and associated hardware obtained from sources

other than their cable system. We believe this will provide

a proper competitive balance in the marketing of input

selector equipment to limit the price of switches. We are

making these changes in order to encourage flexibility in

the range of switch options available to subscribers, so

that we do not inadvertently encourage use only of the

non-state-of-the-art mechanical ‘‘A/B” switch, and in order

to greatly reduce the financial burden imposed on cable

operators. By this change, not only will cable operators

not be responsible for bearing the costs of switches and

their installation, but they will not be required to provide

switches To subscribers who do not need them, for ex-

ample, because their reception of off-the-air signals is weak

or non-existent.

259a

84. We agree with petitioners who argue that there is

no need to require inpvt selector switches or consumer

education in areas where there are no broadcast signals

available off-the-air. Accordingly, we will exempt cable sys

tems that are located in such areas from any requirements

under the rules adopted in this proceeding. The most re-

liable general indicators of whether a broadcast station’s

signal is generally available off-the-air in a particular area

are its Grade B predicted contour and whether it is ‘‘sig-

nificantly viewed”’ in the cable community.” These are the

indicators of available off-the-air signals we adopted for

use in determining whether cable systems are subject to

effective competition for basic service as part of our im-

plementation of the Cable Communications Policy Act of

1984 in MM Docket No. 84-1296. These two indicators

are also appropriate for use in determining signal avail-

ability for purposes of the exemption from the switch and

consumer education rules. The Grade B contour of a sta-

tion is the standard relied on to determine expected service

areas. Also, we recognize that in many cases, a television

station’s signal may be viewable off-the-air at distances

beyond its Grade B contour. In the latter case, reception

of the station’s signals is generally less reliable with or-

dinary roof-top antennas and may require special equip-

ment. Areas beyond a station’s Grade B contour where

its signa! is available with ordinary equipment or where

the population has tended to install Special antennas and

other equipment necessary to ensure reliable reception can

* As defined in Section 76.5(k) of our ruies, a station is significantly

viewed if its audience in noncable households meets or exceeds the

following levels: 1) for full or Partial network affiliated station—a share

of viewing hours of at least 3 percent (total week hours), and a net

weekly circulation of at least 25 percent; and, 2) for an independent

station—a share of viewing hours of at least 2 percent (total week

hours), and a net weekly circulation of at least 5 percent. See 47 CFR

§§76.5(k) and 76.54.

“ See Report and Order in MM Docket No. 84-1296, 58 RR 2d 1

(1985).

260a

be identified by whether the station is significantly viewed

in the area. Thus, the rules will exempt any cable system

serving a community where no portion of that community

is within the predicted Grade B contour of at least one

full service broadcast television station or a noncommercial

educational translator station eligible for must carry status

and no such stations are significantly viewed in the county

in which the cable community is located.

85. There also may be situations where the Grade B

contour of one or more broadcast stations overlaps all or

a portion or the cable community, yet the signals will not

be viewable in that area due to terrain shielding or other

factors. In such instances, the cable system operator may

submit showings and engineering studies that the signals

are not available anywhere within the cable community.

Such submissions shall include studies made in accordance

with Section 73.686 of our rules.**86. We also recognize

that there may be instances where a new broadcast sta-

tion, existing broadcast station with newly upgraded fa-

cilities, or existing station that becomes significantly viewed

will provide service to a community served by a cable

system previously exempt from the rules. Where such a

situation occurs prior to the expiration of the five-year

transition period, the cable system at that time will be

required to comply with all aspects of the rules as adopted

in this proceeding. Where such a situation occurs subse-

quent to the expiration of the transition period, the cable

system will be required to comply only with the consumer

education rules that continue beyond the five year period.

87. We also acknowledge the concern express. d by some

petitioners that the available supply of input selector

switches may not be adequate to enable cable operators

to begin providing switches to new subscribers within 30

days of the release of the instant decision, when the rules

*See 47 CFR §73.686.

26la

would become effective, as stated in the Order staying

their effective date.* We recognize that the production

and distribution systems for supplying input selector

switches and associated equipment may need some time

to catch up to the increased demand for this equipment

and to meet the switch technical standards to be adopted

pursuant to the proceeding will initiate shortly as discussed

below. Additional time also would enable cable operators

to more fully plan their activities for complying with the

new rules. Accordingly, the requirement for offering

switches to new subscribers will be delayed for six months

after the effective date of these rules in the same manner

as the requirement for offering switches to existing sub-

scribers. However, cable operators will be required to in-

form new subscribes at the time of installation of service

of the need to maintain off-the-air reception capability and

to provide the other information required by the consumer

education requirements immediately upon the effective date

of the rules.

88. In considering the signal leakage issue discussed

above, we recognize that there may be some cases where

consumers install switches improperly or switches fail and

signal leakage results. Cable systems will be responsible

for detecting and eliminating signal leakage in excess of

the standards set forth in Sections 76.605 and, after its

July 1, 1990 effective date, 76.611 of our rules resulting

from input selector switches regardless of whether the

switches are owned or installed by subscribes. Cable sys-

tems already are required to conduct systematic perform-

ance checks of their facilities under Section 76.601 and,

thus, this requirement will not substantially alter the reg-

ulatory burden on able operators. Moreover, the typical

cable subscriber does not have the technical expertise or

equipment to detect signal leakage. We also recognize the

importance to life and safety of preventing signal leakage

* See Order supra at n. 38.

262a

on the aeronautical frequencies and that in general cable

systems will be the only entities qualified and equipped to

detect Such signal leakage. Cable operators’ responsibility

in this regard will be limited to the minimum necessary

to detect and eliminate signal leakage in excess of that

permitted under the rules. In cases where such leakage

occurs, cable operators will be required only to disconnect

or, if ultimately necessary, discontinue service to the sub-

scriber until the leakage problem is corrected. Cable op-

erators will not be restricted from charging for services

and hardware associated with correction of switch leakage,

including the replacement, repair, or proper installation of

the switching equipment.

89. As indicated above, we do not want the revised

switch requirements to provide cable systems with eco-

nomic advantages that might permit them to charge ex-

cessive prices for switches and installation or otherwise to

be less attentive to consumer needs in this area. As an

additional measure to limit this advantage, it is necessary

to include provisions in the consumer education rules to

require cable systems to include as part of their program

a statement that switches may be obtained from other

suppliers. Cable systems also will be required to indicate

that there are a range of possible switch options, including,

for example, simple cable/broadcast manual, multiple source

input switches, electronic switches, remote control

switches, and receivers with built-in switching functions.

They will further be required to state that the list of switch

options indicted is only representative of those that may

be offered and that other options also may be available.

90. In view of the importance of consumer education to

the achievement of our goal of correcting viewers’ mis-

perceptions about the need for independent access to off-

the-air broadcast signals, we plan to maintain the con-

sumer education program as a continuing requirement be-

yond the five-year transition period. However, we recognize

that this requirement imposes some burden on cable op-

263a

erators. Therefore, we would expect to revisit the need

for continuing the consumer education requirement as part

of the proceeding announced in the Report and Order and

which we plan to complete prior to the expiration of the

transition period, to determine whether there are partic-

ular situations where must carry rules might continue to

be necessary.

91. We believe this revised approach effectively will

eliminate the major portion of the financial burden imposed

on cable operators by our original decision. It also will

eliminate the requirement for switches to be provided in

situations where they would not be used. In addition, the

revised switch requirements will provide cable operators

with the incentives and flexibility to offer a wider range

of switch options to meet varying consumer needs. These

rule modifications will not compromise our objectives To

change consumers’ misperception of the need for main-

taining access to off-the-air broadcast signals and to assist

consumers in obtaining or reestablishing that access. Our

objective of correcting this misperception will be achieved

so long as consumers are made aware of the need for

independent access to broadcast signals through the con-

sumer education program, are provided an affirmative op-

portunity to obtain a switch, and are provided sufficient

time to reinstall an antenna if they so wish. Our revised

approach in fact will enhance the effectiveness of our over-

all program by aligning it more closely with the reality of

market forces. In this respect, the revised rules will rely

on market forces, as represented by consumer decisions

on whether to obtain a switch and the type of switching

equipment they need or prefer, to determine both the pat-

tern of switch penetration and the type of equipment that

is used.

264a

TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR INPUT SELECTOR

SWITCHES

92. Gill Industries, Inc. (Gill), operator of a cable system

with dual cables utilizing A/B switches for cable selection

argues that we should adopt specific technical standards

for input selector switches. Gill submitted the results of

a study completed on December 30, 1986, wherein the

interference effects of A/B switches were examined. Gill

examined switches in both subscribers’ homes and in the

lab. It states that using switches to connect antennas to

its system in many cases caused notic. ‘ie, objectionable

interference to the reception of cable signals by subscribers

and to the reception of off-the-air TV signals by non-sub-

scribers. Gill further states that use of antenna/cable input

selector switches will probably cause signal leaks which

will raise its cumulative leakage index above the limits

established by Section 76.611 of the Commission’s Rules.

Finally, Gill submits that in homes equipped with outdoor

antennas, the antenna/switch isolation must be at least 80

dB to avoid individual leaks that will exceed the 20 uV/

m standard for cable systems imposed under Section

76.605(aX12) of the Rules. It states that by its tests, it

found that in approximately 50 percent of its installations

the addition of a switch and antenna will result in only

45-50 dB of isolation. Gill claims that its tests demonstrate

that the input selector switch rules as now structured will

result in significant signal reradiation, which is incompat-

ible with the maintenance of a clean Rf environment for

off-the-air TV reception, and with the Commission’s policy

of protecting aeronautical navigation and communications

frequencies.

93. Gill therefore requests that the commission modify

its input selector switch rules to: 1) require all equipment

connected to a cable system to meet the signal leakage

limits now in the Commission’s Rules; 2) require, in the

case of new subscribers, that cable operators connect an

ee

265a

input selector switch to the cable system and to an off-

the-air antenna, with the subscriber’s consent, at cost, us-

ing equipment that meets Part 76 standards; 3) require

all input selector switches and their connections to meet

an 80 dB isolation standard; 4) permit only coaxial antenna

cable to be used in the case of rooftop antennas; 5) permit

use of only ‘“‘rabbit-ear’’ antennas with coaxial cable

downleds, given their relative radiating inefficiencies and

the short length of the connecting wire; and, 6) permit

cable operators to install input selector switches in the

homes of existing subscribers who request a switch, at

reasonable cost, using equipment that meets Part 76 stand-

ards.

94. We continue to believe that the technical standards

applied to TV interface device transfer switches as set

forth in Section 15,606 of the Rules are sufficient to ensure

that properly connected input selector switches do not

cause interference to cable or off-the-air reception or oth-

erwise permit harmful signal leakage.*! These standards

were established in earlier Commission proceedings® and,

in view of the fact that no interference complaints have

been filed with this Commission that have been lined to

switching devices, the existing standards appear to be suf-

ficient to provide the level of isolation necessary to protect

against interference. However, we recognize the concerns

expressed by Gill and others in this proceeding for possible

interference, particularly on the aeronautical communica-

tions and navigation frequencies, that might result from

use of switches that are inadequate to prevent significant

signal reradiation. We find that the important nature of

this issue warrants the provision of additional opportunity

for interested parties to comment and to submit evidence.

Accordingly, we will issue a separate Notice of Proposed

Rule Making to consider standards for input selector

°° 47 CFR §15.606.

* See Report and Order in Docket No. 19281, 38 FCC 2d 430 (1972).

266a

switches used to alternate between cable and broadcast

television service. This new proceeding will be limited to

issues associated with technical standards for broadcast/

cable input selector switches. We intend to complete this

proceeding in an expeditious manner in order that man-

ufacturers will be able to supply switches in accordance

with the scheduled implementation of the new rules as set

forth herein. Consistent with this action, we vacate the

new Section 76.66(b) adopted in the Report and Order

which would have required that all switches used to select

between broadcast and cable service comply with the tech-

nical standards of Section 15.606(a) of the rules.

REVISIONS TO THE CONSUMER EDUCATION

REQUIREMENTS

95. In their joint supplementa! petition, NCTA and

CATA request that the Commission revise the information

statement requirement now set forth in Section 76.66(c)

of the Rules. This rule section prescribes the consumer

education information that cable operators are required to

provide to new subscribers at the time of installation, and

to all subscribers on an annual basis. Under the new rules,

as adopted in the Report and Order, this information state-

ment must consist of a brief, general description of the

Commission’s signal carriage rules and the purpose of in-

put selector switching devices, followed by a list of the

local broadcast stations not carried by the system and the

name and telephone number of a contact person repre-

senting the system. NCTA and CATA specifically object

to the requirement that all local broadcast stations not

carried by the system be contained in the information

statement. NCTA and CATA state that the term “local

broadcast station’’ is nowhere defined and will cause un-

certainty among system operators about which stations are

to be included. Additionally, any such list, NCTA and

CATA maintain, will inevitably be overinclusive, underin-

clusive, or both, due to the locations of particular sub-

267a

scribers and changes in the list during the year due to

stations signing on-the-air or going dark. NCTA and CATA

also object to the inclusion of specific suggested wording

for the consumer education program as “regulatory mi-

cromanagement”’ virtually certain to cause confusion

among operator and their subscribers. In place of the cur-

rent requirement, these petitioners suggest that systems

merely be required to supply their subscribers with general

information about the Commission’s rules and the availa-

bility of broadcast signals over the air. Specifically, sys-

tems would be required to notify their subscribers that:

1) under Federal regulations, the system must carry a

certain number of local broadcast signals; 2) systems may

choose to carry additional broadcast signals; 3) there maybe

other local broadcast stations not carried by the system

that could be received off-the-air with appropriate equip-

ment; 4) ‘appropriate equipment’ may include an off-the-

air antenna and/or an input selector switch; 5) in the event

of an equipment outage, antennas and switches also can

be used to receive some or all of the broadcast stations

carried on the system; and, 6) more information on the

availability of off-the-air reception to a particular location

can be obtained from a television station, an antenna sup-

plier, or an electronics store.

96. Spanish International Communications Corp. and

Spanish International Network (SICC) generally applaud

the Commission’s consumer education program. SICC be-

lieves that this approach satisfies the interests of con-

sumers, safeguards the First Amendment rights of cable

operators, and ultimately will work to maximize viewer

choice through the workings of the marketplace. However,

SICC observes that consumer education is only as suc-

cessful as the ability of consumers to understand the in-

formation being disseminated. Therefore, SICC urges the

Commission to require cable systems to provide consumer

education notices in English and in a foreign language in

communities with sizeable foreign-language speaking pop-

268a

ulations. As a means of determining whether such a pop-

ulation exists, the Commission should look to the existence

of a full-time foreign language television station. To ease

the administrative burden, cable systems could rely on th2

local foreign language station to provide accurate trans-

lations of the consumer education notice, and SICC thinks

the Commission should encourage dialogue between cable

operators and television station managers to facilitate this

effort.

97. In view of the changes we are making with respect

to the basic provisions of our policy as discussed above,

it is necessary to make a number of changes in the con-

sumer education requirements. We agree, moreover, with

NCTA and CATA that the current specification of the

consumer information requirements in the form of specific

suggested language in the rules may inhibit a cable sys-

tem’s understanding as to the flexibility in presenting the

required information in the manner that best suits its par-

ticular situation. Accordingly, we are revising the rules to

state the consumer education requirements in general

terms.

98. However, we are not persuaded that we should elim-

inate the requirement for cable systems to identify avail-

able off-the-air full service station signals that they do not

carry. Such identification is necessary for consumers to

know which signals they will need to access off-the-air. In

examining this requirement, we find that certain clarifi-

cations are necessary. We recognize that the rules, as

adopted, did not define ‘‘local broadcast’’ for this purpose.

It is our intention that subscribers be made aware of all

signals that may be available to them off-the-air but are

not carried on their cable service. This is consistent with

our stated goal of maximizing viewer access to program

services. We believe that criteria to be used in determining

off-the-air signal availability for exemption from the two-

part program requirements, i.e., predicted Grade B con-

tour and significantly viewed, also are appropriate for de-

269a

termining signals that may be available for purposes of

the consumer education program. Accordingly, cable sys-

tems will be required to list those broadcast stations they

do not carry whose predicted Grade B contours overlap

any portion of the cable community or are significantly

viewed in the county. Cable systems will not be required

to notify subscribers of changes that occur throughout the

year in the stations that maybe available off-the-air and

not carried. Rather, the identification of such stations will

be part of the annual consumer education requirement and

will be required to be current to within one month of the

date the annual distribution of that information. The rules

also are modified to provide that such stations be identified

by both call sign and channel number. This will ensure

that subscribers are able to recognize the listed stations.

99. Under the consumer education requirements we are

adopting, cable systems will have flexibility to provide the

required information in foreign languages and, where it is

warranted, should have the incentive to do so in order to

be responsive to subscribers’ needs. We do not find it is

necessary to require cable systems to provide consumer

education in both English and a foreign language in com-

munities with sizeable foreign language speaking popula-

tions.

100. The following is a summary description of the re-

vised consumer education requirements. Cable systems will

be required to inform their subscribers, on an annual basis,

that: 1) for the next few years, they may not be required

to carry all broadcast signals available off-the-air in the

community; 2) after FILL IN EXPIRATION DATE They

will no longer be required to carry any broadcast signals;

and, 3) it may be necessary to use an antenna in con-

junction with an input selector switch up access broadcast

signals available off-the-air and not carried by the cable

system. In addition, cable systems will be required to de-

scribe the function of an input selector switch, explaining

the differences between mechanical and electronic switches,

270a

and the fact that use of either type of switch will aid the

viewer in obtaining independent access to off-the-air tel-

evision service. Further, cable operators will be required

to inform subscribers that a range of input selector

switches may be obtained from sources other than the

cable system. Finally, cable operators will be required to

identify by call sign and channel number any broadcast

television signals that may be available off-the-air in their

community that they do not carry.

101. This consumer education information must be pro-

vided to all nw subscribers at the time of installation of

the cable service and to existing subscribers that do not

have input selector switches within six months after the

effective date of the new rules and thereafter on an annual

basis. This will be a continuing requirement that will not

expire at the end of the five year transition period. This

annual consumer education requirement and the annual

input selector switch offering may both be satisfied by

including the information in monthly subscriber billings or

other mailings.

REVISIONS TO THE INTERIM MUST CARRY RULES

102. Numerous petitioners seek clarification of, and sug-

gest modifications to, specific provisions of the interim

must carry rules, including the standards for qualified sta-

tus, the definitions of tier of cable service and useable

activated channels, the nonduplication, sunset and dispute

resolution provisions, the provisions respecting carriage

rights of noncommercial educational stations, commercial

and noncommercial translators and satellite stations, and

the exceptions for carriage and copyright payments.

Qualified Stations

103. Viewing Standard. Several petitioners address the

requirement that in order to qualify for must carry status,

commercial broadcast stations (other than ‘‘new stations’’)

must attain at least an average share of total viewing

27la

hours of two percent and a net weekly circulation of five

percent in noncable households in the county where the

cable system is located.

104. INTV seeks clarification of the viewing standard

to recognize the carriage rights of stations for which “‘tel-

evision survey season’’ ratings as defined in Section 76.55

of the rules are unavailable because adequate numbers of

complete diaries are not returned by noncable television

households. It proposes that Section 76.55 provide that

once a station achieves qualified status for mandatory cable

carriage eligibility, the station then maintains that status

until a county coverage report containing adequate audi-

ence measurement data for a survey season shows that it

no longer meets the viewing standard. INTV also proposes

that in cases where adequate ratings data has never been

available for a station, the station be permitted to utilize

a special survey conducted by an independent audience

survey organization that follows a methodology comparable

to that used by recognized ratings services such as Ar-

bitron and Nielsen.

105. While published audience data is available or nearly

all broadeast stations, we recognize INTV’s point that

broadcast stations in the few areas where published au-

dience survey data are not available would face a consid-

erable burden in demonstrating that they meet the viewing

standard on an annual basis. We find it desirable to permit

broadcast stations to qualify for carriage rights for the

remainder of the transition period once they initially dem-

onstrate that they meet the viewing standard. However,

we believe it is necessary balance this presumption of qual-

ification with a means to permit cable systems to cease

carriage of a station that no longer meets the viewing

standard. On this basis, we are amending the qualifying

station provisions to specify that stations are not required

to reconfirm that they meet the viewing standard on a

regular, recurring basis. However, at any time after one

year from the time a station demonstrates that it meets

cm ii

272a

the viewing standard, a cable system may nullify the sta-

tion’s must carry eligibility if it demonstrates, using the

methodology specified in Section 76.55 of the rules, that

the station no longer meets the viewing standard. In r2-

sponse to INTV’s request concerning special audience sur-

veys, we observe that the rules, as adopted, plainly indicate

that stations may utilize such special audience surveys to

demonstrate that they meet the viewing standard.

106. Adelphia seeks modification of the viewing stand-

ard to allow for the use of community-specific audience

measurement data in establishing or rebutting a station's

status as ‘qualified’. Adelphia claims that the use of such

data would further the interests of the viewing public by

qualifying stations in communities Where they actually

have substantial viewership but might be unable to meet

the two percent/five percent standard on a county-wide

basis due to geographical factors such as size and terrain

conditions. In addition, it asserts that use of a community-

specific survey would relieve cable operators of the obli-

gation to carry stations that do not have significant view-

ership and whose carriage would thwart viewer preference.

We do not believe it is desirable to allow the use of com-

munity-specific data to measure audience data for viewing

standard purposes. As indicated above, the regularly pub-

lished reports of the major audience ratings services gen-

erally provide a convenient means for nearly all stations

nationwide to demonstrate whether they meet the viewing

standards. We believe that to permit use of community-

based audience studies would not further the purposes of

the interim must carry rules. Rather, to allow use of such

surveys likely would result in widespread increased survey

efforts on the part of both broadcasters and cable oper-

ators that would be costly and, thereby, would have the

effect or subjecting the affected parties to unnecessary

additional burden. Moreover, we believe that the require-

ment that qualifying stations deliver a good quality signal

273a

to the principal cable headend will suffice to limit carriage

to those actually receivable off-the-air.

107. Lincoln Broadcasting Company (Lincoln), the licen-

see of stacion KSTF-TV, requests that the viewing stand-

ard be modified to exempt any commercial station that

certifies it broadcasts foreign language programming dur-

ing at least one-third of the hours of an average broadcast

week and one-third of weekly prime time hours. It states

that the survey Services and methods prescribed by the

new rules do not accurately measure foreign-language

speaking viewership and, thus, without this exemption, for-

eign language programming stations will not be able to

estabiish qualified status. Lincoln asserts that the use of

special surveys to measure these audiences is prohibitively

costly and subject to challenge based on methodology. It

states that even if these hurdles could be overcome, sta-

tions would be unable to meet the viewing standard re-

quirements until they have completed a full year’s cycle

of special surveys. Thus it requests that if its proposed

exemption is not adopted, foreign language stations should

be exempt from the viewing standard for at least one year

from the effective date of the rules. Lincoln also requests

that in the event the Commission elects not to change its

rules in either of the above manners, that its petition be

construed as a request for speciai relief regarding the

viewing standard aspect of the interim must carry rules.

108. In developing the criteria for qualifying stations,

we carefully crafted the new rules to avoid special carriage

rights for stations based on their programming. Such pre-

ferred treatment tends to conflict with the strict content-

neutral requirements of the First Amendment with respect

to regulation that furthers a substantial governmental in-

terest. We believe that to provide an exemption for foreign

language stations from the viewing standard as requested

by Lincoln would create a content-based provision of the

type it is necessary to avoid. Moreover, we do not believe

that such a general exception is essential to our objective

274a

of preserving the commercial broadcast system as a com-

petitive alternative source of programming during the

transition to an environment without must carry rules. We

also believe that the modifications to the viewing standard

procedures we are making herein, as discussed above, will

reduce the burden on stations that can only demonstrate

that they meet this standard through special surveys. Lin-

coln’s alternative proposed basis for special carriage

rights— its difficulty obtaining the necessary viewer show-

ing— thus also does not persuade us that different carriage

rights are warranted. Accordingly, we are denying Lin-

coln’s request.”

109. Adelphia believes that the definition of qualified

station unconstitutionally limits the editorial discretion of

cable operators located near foreign borders by making

stations licensed by foreign governments ineligible for

qualified must carry status. It also ciaims that to deny

qualified status to foreign stations frustrates the viewing

preferences of cable subscribers. Adelphia illustrates the

problem as one facing cable systems located near foreign

borders where their channels are occupied such that not

all qualified stations are being carried. It states that in

order to meet their must carry obligations, such cable sys-

tems may be forced to drop stations now carried that meet

the mileage and viewing standards, but do not qualify for

mandatory carriage because they are licensed by a foreign

government. Adelphia requests that carriage of foreign-

licensed stations which in all other respects satisfy the

*® Lincoln also requests that in the event the Commission elects not

to change its rules in either of the above manners, that its petition be

construed as a request for special relief regarding the viewing standard

aspect of the interim must carry rules. We have decided not to rule

on Lincoln’s request for special relief as part of the instant Memoran-

dum Opinion and Order, but will instead consider this request in a

separate action. Our action herein is not intended to prejudge our

separate action on Lincoln’s request for special relief.

275a

qualified station standard count toward fulfilling a cable

system’s required must carry complement.

110. At the outset, we observe that we crafted the in-

terim must carry rules so as to require that only a limited

portion of a cable system’s channel capacity be devoted

to mandatory signal carriage obligations. We believe, as

discussed in the Report and Order and above, that these

provisions are consistent with the O’Brien standard. Thus,

the interim rules do not preempt cable operators’ discre-

tion to carry other video program services such as station

licensed by foreign governments. Moreover, we believe that

cable operators’ editorial discretion is sufficient to ensure

that they are able to tailor their mix of program services

to meet subscriber preferences. In addition, the federal

interest in ensuring that the broadcast television industry

remains a competitive source of alternative programming

during the transition period does not extend to service

provided by stations licensed by foreign governments. The

Communications Act nowhere contemplates access to for-

eign stations as an element of the national communications

policy.

111. NITC believes that the viewing standard should be

deleted on the grounds that it establishes unconstitutional

classification preferences. It states that the viewing stand-

ard is a “popularity test,’’ which, on the basis of ratings,

subordinates the rights of one group, the less highly rated,

to those of another group, the more highly rated, in vi-

olation of the First Amendment. NTIC claims that the

viewing standard will cause particularly great harm to in-

dependent local stations that have to compete for audience

with the often duplicative programming of distant broad-

cast stations or non-broadcast cable networks. NITC also

states that similar harm would befall minority broadcasters

who serve smaller audiences that are not measurable by

the prescribed methodology but are significant nonetheless.

It also asserts that the viewing standard fails to specify

certain methodology requirements and, thus, it is imper-

276a

missibly vague. SICC also believes that the viewing stand-

ard should be deleted from the interim must carry rules.

It claims That the viewing standard, as measured by com-

mercial ratings services, does not accurately reflect foreign

language television viewing. Thus, SICC states that elim-

ination of the viewing standard would avoid its discrimi-

natory impact on eligibility for mandatory carriage in a

manner more consistent with the First Amendment con-

cerns of the Quincy court.

112. We reject petitioners’ arguments that the viewing

standard is unconstitutional and should be deleted from

the interim must carry rules. The viewing standard does

not establish classification preferences, but instead ensures

that viewer program choice is reflected in the transitional

period. As we stated in the Report and Order:

[T]he economic effect of the rules on any individual

station is not our primary concern. On the contrary,

requirement that failing stations be carried might be

inimical to the public interest, in that we might well

be requiring cable systems to carry stations the public

did not want to watch, thereby preventing the cable

system from offering a program service the viewers

preferred. This would run directly counter to the

Quincy court’s concern that our former must carry

rules were unresponsive to consumer preference.™

—Further, we continue to believe that the viewing standard

is an accurate and appropriate means for identifying those

stations that consumers prefer to watch. NITC, Lincoln,

and SICC have not provided any evidence to persuade us

that minority or foreign language audiences are unmesur-

able. Accordingly, the-viewing standard, as adopted in the

Report and Order, will be retained as part of the interim

must carry rules.

** Report and Order, supra at 895, n. 170.

277a

113. In their supplemental petition, NCTA and CATA

request that Sections 76.5(d) and 76.55 of the new rules

be clarified to reflect the language in the Report and Order

providing that commercial broadcast stations must meet

the viewing standard for the previous television survey

season. Reference to the ‘“‘previous’”’ television survey sea-

son was inadvertently omitted from the rules. Accordingly,

the rules will be revised to correct this omission. :

114. NCTA and CATA also object to the exemption of

new stations from the viewing standard for 12 months

following the date on which they begin operations pursuant

to program test authority, and the ‘“‘grandfather’’ provision

for stations which commenced operations after July 19,

1985. They claim that these provisions do not pass con-

stitutional scrutiny on the grounds that by creating long

exemption periods, the rules are not sensitive to viewer

preferences and unduly burden nonbroadcast cable services

which must compete for cable carriage. NCTA and CATA

seek modification of these provisions in accordance with

the joint industry agreement proposal that new stations

be permitted to satisfy the viewing standard by means of

a special survey taken at anytime prior to completion of

the first full television survey season following commence-

ment of operations. They also request clarification that a

station can be considered ‘‘new”’ only once and, thus, op-

erational modifications such as increases in power and

changes in antenna design and transmitter location, do not

transform existing stations into new station for purposes

of the interim must carry rules.

115. In the Report and Order, we indicated that we

found it necessary to exempt new stations from the view-

ing standard in order to afford them an opportunity to

gain a foothold in the market, thereby furthering our in-

terest in maximizing program choices. We disagree with

NCTA and CATA that the one year exemption for new

stations and the extension of this exemption to stations

commencing operation after July 19, 1985, are unconsti-

278a

tutional. These provisions are not content-based and are

narrowly tailored to further our interest in maximizing

consumers’ program choices. The one year period will af-

ford new stations a reasonable period of time in which to

stabilize its operations and to establish an audience for its

programming. We do recognize petitioners’ concern that

operational changes by stations might appear to requalify

them for ‘“‘new” station status. Accordingly, we wish to

clarify that stations will be eligible for ‘“‘new’’ status only

once, upon commencement of their initial program test

authority. A major change in facilities will, therefore, not

qualify a station for ‘‘new’’ station carriage rights.

116. WLIG requests that the exemption of new stations

from the viewing standard be expanded. It argues that

such stations do not have the viewership or financial ability

to secure carriage on cable systems that may choose from

among more than seven qualified signals to meet their

must carry requirements. WLIG also contends that new

stations need the fair opportunity that cable carriage can

provide to help them survive in the currently unbalanced

television market environment. Thus, it requests that the

rules be modified to define as ‘‘new”’ those stations that

began operations for the first time after January 1, 1983,

and to require cable carriage of such stations for the full

interim period of five years. WLI states that this definition

of ‘“‘new’’ would include approximately 96 commercial sta-

tions and that the five year period coincides with The

interim period needed to achieve maximum diversity by

reliance on market forces.

117. As indicated above, we believe that the exemption

of new stations from the viewing standard is a necessary

means to further our interest in maximizing viewers’ pro-

gram choices. However, we disagree with WLIG’s argu-

ment that this exemption should be expanded. As indicated

above, the one year period provides a reasonable amount

of time for new stations to gain a foothold in the market.

After this time a station and its programming can be

279a

expected to overcome the initial hurdle of becoming fa-

miliar to potential viewers such that the size of its audi-

ence will be a reflection of the appeal of its programming

rather than its new entry to the market. A one year limit

on the exemption from the viewing standard also is con-

sistent with our concern for minimizing the intrusiveness

of the interim must carry rules on cable operators’ First

Amendment rights. Moreover, it is appropriate to extend

this exemption to stations new as of July 19, 1985, the

date of the Quincy decision, to provide cable subscribers

an opportunity to become familiar with stations that may

not have been carried after the former must carry rules

were ruled unconstitutional. To grant this exemption to

stations new prior to July 19, 1985, is unwarranted as

such stations would have been entitled to carriage under

the former must carry rules.

118. Definitions. WLIG also requests that use of the

principal headend of the cable system as the reference

point for calculation of the required 50-mile zone be re-

placed with a “home county carriage” provision, under

which cable systems first would be required to carry sta-

tions licensed within the county to which the cable system

is franchised as part of their 25 percent must carry com-

plement. WLIG states this definition would prevent cable

systems from circumventing Commission intent and frus-

trating the statutory purposes of local franchising by des-

ignating a particular headend as ‘“‘principal’’ in order to

reduce the number or makeup of broadcast stations within

the 50-mile zone.

119. We are not persuaded that we should adopt WLIG’s

‘home county carriage’ approach as an alternative to use

of the cable system’s principal headend as the geographical

reference point for signal carriage requirements. In this

respect, we continue to believe that use of the principal

cable headend as the designated reference point is the

most appropriate means for determining signal carriage

obligations. We are aware that many cable systems operate

280a

multiple headend facilities and that it may be possible in

some cases to choose a particular headend as ‘“‘principal”’

in order to limit the number of broadcast stations eligible

for must carry status. However, we believe it is important

to provide cable operators with flexibility in this area an

entrust to them responsibility for choosing their principal

headend in a manner consistent with the spirit of the

interim rules. Thus, we will continue to permit cable op-

erators to use their discretion in designating their system’s

principal headend. While we expect cable operators will

exercise this discretion in good faith, we will investigate

and consider appropriate action on a case-by-case basis

Where cable operators appear to be abusing this discretion

by designating their principal headend so as to avoid signal

carriage obligations.

120. Several petitioners request modifications to the rule

providing that cable systems are required to carry qualified

signals on their “‘lowest-priced Separately available tier of

service.’’ The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB),

the National Association of Public Television Stations

(NAPTS) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), filing

jointly [CPB], and INTV request that the Commission clar-

ify that when must carry signals are carried on a tier

requiring use of a converter to receive qualified broadcast

signals, the converter must be available at no cost addi-

tional to that charged for the lowest-priced tier which does

not require use of a converter. CPB also requests clari-

fication that where program services are available on sep-

arate tiers at a cost lower than the basic programming

tier that includes broadcast stations, such ‘‘add-on”’ tiers

do not qualify as a permissible must carry tier.

121. In a similar vein, Adelphia objects to the lowest-

priced separately available tier definition on the grounds

it does not take into consideration cable operators’ need

for flexibility to offer separately available multi-pay pack-

age of the add-on type described by CPB. It requests the

rule be modified to define “‘tier’’ as ‘‘two or more video

28la

program services which are not otherwise available indi-

vidually.’’ Adelphia states that this definition would ensure

that qualified stations are carried on a tier of service most

likely to have the widest distribution to cable subscribers

and that cable operators would have maximum flexibility

to package and market non-basic services in a manner

most responsive to marketplace demands. WLIG also op-

poses the “‘‘lowest-priced’”’ definition on the grounds it is

subject to potential abuse. It states that cable operators

could create a separate tier that included only must carry

broadcast signals and price it slightly below the cost of

the ‘‘true’”’ basic tier which would include broadcast sig-

nals, satellite networks, and other services. Must carry

signals that the cable o

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Opposition Brief — Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Commission · 486 U.S. 1032 | Frix